A Paper by Kusch.kirchberg.2010

8/13/2019 A Paper by Kusch.kirchberg.2010

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Martin Kusch

Disagreement and Picture in Wittgenstein's "Lectures on Religious Belief"

1. Introduction

In 1938 in Cambridge, Wittgenstein gave a lecture course on belief. One art of the

course discussed religious belief. !he lecture notes of three students "ho attended this

art#$ush $hees, %oric& 'm(thies and )ames !a(lor#"ere later *comiled* and

ublished b( C(ril +arrett '. ). under the title *ectures on $eligious +elief* - LRB/ in

the 1900 volume Wittgenstein: Lectures & Conversations.1

LRB is difficult to understand. It is hard to ma&e out a central, overall train of thought

the te2t is fragmentar( man( sentences are incomlete and ungrammatical and it is

occasionall( unclear "hether a given assage summarises Wittgenstein4s vie"s or those

of one of the students. !he fact that +arrett leaves the rinciles of his editing unstated

further comlicates the situation. It thus is eas( to agree "ith Cora 5iamond that in LRB

"e see Wittgenstein4s osition onl( *through a &ind of fog*.6

7 te2t of this &ind is bound to give rise to conflicting interretations. In this aer, I

shall ut for"ard and defend a ne" reading of m( o"n. It can be summarised in five

claims -1/ or LRB there is no incommensurabilit( bet"een religious and ordinar(

discourses. -6/ LRB allo"s that a nonbeliever can understand, "ithout converting, the

roositional attitude, and the content, of religious belief. -3/ 7ccording to LRB, a non

believer can criticise religious believers first, on the basis of the standards of the religion

in :uestion second, on the basis of shared general rinciles -e.g. that selfdecetion is to

be avoided/ and, third, on the basis of rinciles not shared "ith the believer. -;/ LRB

rules out, ho"ever, that a nonbeliever can criticise the roositional attitude of religious

belief rel(ing on standards that the nonbeliever and the believer have in common. 7nd

finall( -</, for the Wittgenstein of LRB, a =relativism of distance> is a ermissible



resonse to the lac& of common standards bet"een the believer and the nonbeliever

"hen the ver( aroriateness of having attitudes of religious belief is at issue.

2. Disagreement Lost

Consider "hat one might call *the standard model* of a straightfor"ard disagreement and

its hilosohical rendering. )ones sa(s =I believe Wiener 'chnit?el tastes good.> 7nd

'mith relies =I believe Wiener 'chnit?el tastes bad.> !he standard anal(sis tells us that

)ones and 'mith have ic&ed out the same roosition -Wiener Schnitzel tastes good

that the( both have the same roositional attitude of !elie" but that )ones affirms the

ver( roosition that 'mith denies.

Our e2amle can also serve as an instance of a disagreement that is *faultless*. It is

natural to thin& that in forming their resective beliefs about Wiener 'chnit?el, neither

)ones nor 'mith need to have made a mista&e. 7fter all, "e are, b( and large, comfortable

"ith the thought of different, e:uall( accetable, standards of taste. 7 relativism of taste

has a lot of initial lausibilit(.

@eedless to sa(, in other areas "e are less "illing to countenance relativistic

ossibilities. 7ssume that )ones asserts *I believe that 08A<B16<*, and 'mith relies *I

believe that 08A<B<*. !o most of us, this does not loo& li&e a faultless disagreement. If

b( *A* 'mith means addition, then the disagreement is not faultless. 7nd if b( *A* 'mith

refers to some other mathematical function, then he does not disagree "ith )ones.

With these reliminaries out the "a(, "e can turn to the case that matters most for

LRB. 7ssume )ones utters -a/ and 'mith -b/

-a/ I believe there "ill be a ast )udgement.

-b/ I believe there "ont be a ast )udgement.



I susect that most of us "ould be inclined to thin& that )ones and 'mith disagree and that

their disagreement is not faultness.

Dnter the Wittgenstein of LRB. Ee confesses not to have the belief e2ressed b( -a/.

Ee goes on to insist that not having the belief e2ressed b( -a/ does not commit him to

having the belief e2ressed b( -b/. 7nd he concludes that he does not disagree#at least

not in an( standard sense of disagreement#"ith the believer "ho utters -a/

'uose that someone believed in the ast )udgement, and I don4t, does this mean

that I believe the oosite to him, Fust that there "on4t be such a thingG I "ould sa(

*not at all, or not al"a(s.= ... *5o (ou contradict the manG* I4d sa( *@o.*3

Wh( does Wittgenstein thin& that not having the belief e2ressed b( -a/ does not

commit him to having the belief e2ressed b( -b/G #rima "acie Wittgenstein seems to

give t"o Fustifications. !he first turns on the idea of t"o different uses of *believe* and

thus on the idea of t"o different roositional beliefattitudes. !he second Fustification

aears to focus on Wittgenstein4s difficulties in grasing the roositional content of -a/,

and thus focus on his difficulties in understanding the meaning of the term *ast

)udgement*. I shall no" develo both otions in a little more detail.

LRB distinguishes bet"een *ordinar(* and *e2traordinar(* uses of *belief*, and thus

bet"een ordinar( and e2traordinar( beliefattitudes. Ordinar( beliefattitudes are found in

emirical and scientific beliefs e2traordinar( beliefattitudes are characteristic of

religious beliefs.; LRB allo"s that one and the same roosition#for instance, that there

$ill !e a Last %udgment #can serve as the roositional content for both an e2traordinar(

and for an ordinar( beliefattitude *... eole "ho ... ma&e forecasts for (ears and (ears

ahead and the( describe some sort of )udgement 5a(. . . . Hsuch belief ... "ouldn4t at all

be a religious belief.<

Wittgenstein dra"s his students4 attention to five central features of ordinar( beliefs.

irst, *oinion*, *vie"*, or *h(othesis* are ever(da( "ords for ordinar( beliefs. 'econd,



ordinar( beliefs can be measured as more or less reasonable, that is, as more or less "ell

suorted b( evidence. !hird, mere ordinar( beliefs comare unfavourabl( "ith

&no"ledge. !he rational erson "ill usuall( aim to obtain the evidence needed for turning

his ordinar( belief into &no"ledge. ourth, *I am not sure*, or *ossibl(* are often

aroriate resonses to someone else4s e2ression of an ordinar( belief. 7nd fifth,

ordinar( beliefs do not normall( have the o"er to ma&e us change our lives.0

D2traordinar( beliefs differ from ordinar( beliefs in all these resects. *aith* and

*dogma* rather than *oinion* and *h(othesis* are the nontechnical terms commonl(

used for e2traordinar( beliefs e2traordinar( beliefs are not on the scale of being

confirmed or falsified b( emirical evidence although e2traordinar( beliefs are the

*firmest* of all beliefs, the( are not candidates for &no"ledge the( are tied to strong

emotions and ictures the( guide eole4s life and their e2ression can be the

culmination of a form of life.B

Wittgenstein sa(s surrisingl( little regarding connections and comarisons bet"een

ordinar( and e2traordinar( beliefs. What he does mention is that the t"o &inds of beliefs

have entirel( different connections, and that in the case of other cultures "e might find it

difficult to searate ordinar( and e2traordinar( beliefs from each other. Ee also notes that

an e2traordinar( belief can bloc& or overturn even a ver( "ell suorted -=indubitable>/

ordinar( belief. +ut he sa(s nothing on the :uestion "hether there is a common core for,

or similarities or inferential lin&s bet"een, the t"o uses of =belief>.8

!o sum u, Wittgenstein4s first e2lanation for "h( he cannot contradict the religious

believer "ho utters -a/ - I believe that there "ill be a ast )udgement/ is the follo"ing.

-a/ involves the roositional attitude of e2traordinar( belief. Wittgenstein does not have

this attitude in his reertoire of roositional attitudes. Moreover, if *believe* in -b/ - I

believe that there "on4t be a ast )udgement/ is ta&en as ordinar( belief, then -b/ does not

contradict -a/. Jsing the nontechnical terms for the t"o t(es of attitudes, -a/ becomes

-a/ and -b/ -b/



-a/ I have faith that there "ill be a ast )udgement.

-b/ I have the h(othesis that there "ont be ...

Wittgenstein holds that someone could coherentl( have both the belief e2ressed b( -a/

and the belief e2ressed -b/.

I no" turn to the second e2lanation for "h( Wittgenstein feels unable to contradict

the believer in a ast )udgement. Lrevious interreters have seen this e2lanation as

central. On this account, Wittgenstein is unable to ic& out the roositional contents of

religious beliefs since he cannot translate religious language into his o"n. Lut differentl(,

the languages of the believer and the nonbeliever are, in imortant resects,

incommensurable.

!here is some suort for such a reading in the te2t. Wittgenstein sa(s that he *has no

thoughts* about &e( religious themes, or that he lac&s the believers *ictures*. !he later

oint is ertinent here since LRB also stresses that it is religious ictures that give

religious terms their meaning.9

@evertheless, in "hat follo"s I shall argue that ultimatel( LRB is not endorsing the

incommensurabilit( roosal. !he onl( reason "h( Wittgenstein is rinciall( unable to

disagree -in the standard sense of disagreement/ "ith the believer in the ast )udgement

is that Wittgenstein lac&s e2traordinar( beliefattitudes. +ut this lac& does not revent

him from learning the meaning of religious language. !he &e( tool in this underta&ing is

grammatical investigation. 7s a result Wittgenstein is able to ic& out the roositional

content to"ards "hich the believer ta&es the attitude of e2traordinar( belief.

' Con"licting Inter(retations I: )he *eaning o" Religious )erms

!he best&no"n advocate of an incommensurabilit( thesis regarding Wittgenstein4s vie"s

on religion is of course Kai @ielsen.1 I shall discuss @ielsen4s *fideist* reading later in

this aer. 7t this oint it seems more instructive to focus on C(ril +arrett4s Wittgenstein



on +thics and Religious Belie" -1991/ and Nenia 'chnbaumsfeld4s , Con"usion o"

S(heres -6B/.11 @either of them a(s attention to the distinction bet"een "hat I have

called the *first* and the *second e2lanation* above. +oth concentrate on the *second*.

+arrett and 'chnbaumsfeld hold that for Wittgenstein religious language involves a

*reorientation* of ordinar( language. Moreover, the( iml( that the nonbeliever can

come to gras the meaning of religious language onl( b( converting. 7nd the( suggest

that the nonbeliever suffers from a &ind of concetual asectblindness. +arrett "rites

that for *a believer Hreligious terms have a meaning that transcends ordinar( emlo(ment

of language ...*16 Ee goes on to as& "hether the nonbeliever *can ... be said to suffer

from asectblindnessG*, and ans"ers "ith a :ualified *(es* *In a sense, (es ... Ee fails

to see "hat the believer sees ... 4their e(es the( have closed lest at an( time the( should

see "ith their e(es ... and be converted4 -Matthe" 13, 1</ ...>13 'chnbaumsfeld notes that

*a Pconcetual reorientation ... haens in religious conte2ts ... Nod moveHs the religious

believer to use the "ords Pfather or Pfatherl( love almost as ne" "ords.*1;

+arrett accets that on his reading a religious term li&e *father* *cannot be translated

into its ordinar( use.*1< 'urrisingl( enough, given the assage Fust :uoted,

'chnbaumsfeld nevertheless does not "ish to attribute the incommensurabilit( thesis to

Wittgenstein

$eligious discourse cannot ... be Pselfcontained or Psealed off from other

linguistic Pdomains, for it is recisel( the :uotidian senses of "ords that ma&e

ossible the Prene"ed uses or alications of these "ords in religious conte2ts. In

this resect, religious discourse, li&e artistic languageuse, involves an e-tension or

trans"ormation of ever(da( discourse and conse:uentl( cant be

Pincommensurable "ith it.10

I am not convinced. irst, the fact that religious discourse *rene"s* ordinar( "ords

does not establish that this discourse is translatable into those "ords. 7rguabl( Dinsteins



concet of mass *rene"s* @e"tons concet#and (et, this is the aradigm case of

incommensurabilit( in the histor( of science. 'econd, if it needs Nod4s intervention to

give the religious believer *almost ne" "ords>, then "hat#short of a conversion#can

enable the nonbeliever to understand these "ordsG !hird, 'chnbaumsfeld4s arallel

bet"een artistic and religious languageuse does not seem at for demonstrating

commensurabilit( of religious and ever(da( language. =Nod is the father> is not

sufficientl( li&e =)uliet is the sun>. +( 'chnbaumsfeld4s o"n criteria grasing religious

discourse for the first time amounts to a fundamental change in form of life.

Jnderstanding an artistic metahor surel( does not -or onl( in e2tremel( rare

circumstances/.

M( main goal in the ne2t section is to argue that the central assages of LRB

contradict the incommensurabilit( reading. +ut it might be useful to indicate ho"ever

briefl( alread( here that there is also eriheral internal as "ell as e2ternal evidence

against the it.

!he eriheral internal evidence#internal to LRB #is the follo"ing assage

'uose someone "ere a believer and said *I believe in a ast )udgement,* and I

said *Well, I4m not so sure. Lossibl(.* ... It isn4t a :uestion of m( being an("here

near him, but on an entirel( different lane, "hich (ou could e2ress b( sa(ing

*%ou mean something altogether different, Wittgenstein.> !he difference might not

sho" u at all in an( e2lanation of the meaning.1B

!he last sentence is the &e( statement here in order to understand Wittgenstein4s resonse

to the believer in the ast )udgement "e might not have to invo&e considerations relating

to meaning. +ut if that is true then incommensurabilit( cannot be the central

e2lanation.18

!he reliminar( or eriheral e-ternal evidence against incommensurabilit( in

Wi i & f 193 1931 d 19;0 i l



7 language that I do not understand is no language.19

Whatever the language that I might construct, it has to be translatable into an

e2isting language.6

It is an imortant fact that "e assume it is al"a(s ossible to teach our language to

men "ho have a different one.61

'omeone "ho insists on translatabilit( as a criterion for something being a language is

not going to ma&e an e2cetion for religious language.

)he Disagreements !et$een Sm/thies and Wittgenstein

!he central evidence in LRB against the incommensurabilit( of religious and ordinar(

discourses is to be found in the t"o debates bet"een %oric& 'm(thies and Wittgenstein.

!he first controvers( culminates in Wittgenstein accusing 'm(thies of being *muddled*

the clima2 of the second confrontation is Wittgenstein4s calling 'm(thies4 vie" *rubbish*.

On m( reading, in the first disagreement Wittgenstein insists that religious discourse

deends on ordinar( discourse. 7nd in the second disute he sho"s ho" grammatical

investigations enable nonbelievers to come to understand religious language.

7 coule of "ords on %oric& 'm(thies -191B198/ seem aroriate at this oint.

'm(thies "as robabl( the main noteta&er for LRB -he comes first in +arrett4s list/. Ee

"as one of Wittgenstein4s favourite students and follo"ed his teacher4s advice not to

become a hilosoher. Ee became a librarian in O2ford instead. In 19;; he converted to

Catholicism, an event that Wittgenstein commented on in an imortant letter -that I shall

use later in this aer/.66 Most imortant for our concerns ho"ever is the fact that in 19;<

'm(thies returned to the Cambridge to give a tal& on *Meaning* in the Moral 'ciences

Club "ith Wittgenstein in the chair. In his aer 'm(thies defended rivate *acts of



meaning*. !he secretar( of the Club, Dli?abeth 7nscombe, roduced the follo"ing

summar(

Mr 'm(thies ut the :uestion "hat haens in m( mind "hen I sa( =draughts> and

mean =chess>. Ee thought that there must be an act of meaning *chess* "hich

could not be identified either "ith ossible mental accomaniments of sa(ing

*draughts*, or "ith surrounding circumstances, such as m( behaviour before and

after. It did not seem to him to be a nonsensical suosition that at the time of

reading his aer he meant b( its sentences the sentences of a :uite different aer,

e.g. one on Moore4s arado2, though he had no memor( of this later, and gave no

sign of it at the time.63

I submit that 'm(thies 19;<aer continued the first 1938controvers( bet"een

'm(thies and Wittgenstein. Jnfortunatel(, "e do not &no" directl( "hich vie" 'm(thies

advanced in 1938 all "e have is Wittgenstein4s resonse. +ut if "e assume that 'm(thies

defended in 1938 roughl( the same vie" that he argued for in 19;<, and if additionall(

"e ta&e it that 'm(thies in 1938 ut for"ard this vie" "ith secial reference to religious

language, then the ieces of LRB fall into lace. $econstructed and slightl( regimented,

'm(thies4 1938osition comes to this

-a/ 7n individual 0 i can rivatel( assign an( meaning to a signvehicle.

-b/ i alone then &no"s "hat i means b( that sign.

-c/ i can introsect the meaning in one moment of time -i.e. "ithout

considering a ractice or techni:ue of use/.

-d/ 7 referential term introduced in this "a( has one uni:ue determinate

interretation, indeendentl( of a ractice.



@oone "ho is familiar "ith the general outlines of Wittgensteins later hilosoh(

"ill be surrised b( his resonse to 'm(thies osition. !hus Wittgenstein reFects the idea

of signs that can be interreted in onl( one "a( as based on a muddled *idea of a suer

icture*, that is, a icture "ith one uni:ue method of roFection. Moreover, the religious

believer must ta&e his starting oint from the ractices and techni:ues of ordinar(

language. Onl( against this bac&dro can he introduce religious ictures and narratives in

terms of "hich he e2resses and formulates his religious beliefs. !he ictures, including

the techni:ues for their use, can be e2lained to others, nonbelievers and believers ali&e.

!he idea of suericture is the central muddle

!he first idea ... is that (ou are loo&ing at (our o"n thought, and are absolutel(

sure that it is a thought that so and so. ... It seems to be a suericture. ...

With a icture, it still deends on the method of roFection, "hereas here it seems

that (ou get rid of the roFecting relation ... 'm(thies4s muddle is based on the idea

of a suericture.6;

!he follo"ing three short assages oint out the imortance of ublic techni:ues of

usage. i&e an( sea&er, so also the religious believer, is unable to sideste these

techni:ues

=... I &no" "hat I mean* ... It loo&ed as though (ou could tal& of understanding a

"ord, "ithout an( reference to the techni:ue of its usage. ...

We are all here using the "ord *death*, "hich is a ublic instrument, "hich has a

"hole techni:ue Hof usage. ... If (ou treat this H(our idea as something rivate,

"ith "hat right are (ou calling it an idea of deathG ...

If "hat he calls his *idea of death* is to become relevant, it must become art

of our game.6<



7nd finall(, Wittgenstein gives an e2amle of someone "ho teaches him to understand

the meaning of a :uasireligious term, *not ceasing to e2ist after death*, b( "a( of a

icture

I haven4t an( clear idea "hat I4m sa(ing "hen I4m sa(ing *I don4t cease to e2ist,*

etc. 'iritualists ma&e one &ind of connection. 'iritualist sa(s *7arition* etc.

7lthough he gives me a icture I don4t li&e, I do get a clear idea.60

!urning from 'm(thies *muddle* to his *rubbish*, here "e are concerned in more

detail "ith the relationshi bet"een religious ictures, religious language, and grammar.

!he &e( is the follo"ing muchdebated assage that I shall :uote in an abbreviated form

HWittgenstein *Nod4s e(e sees ever(thing*#I "ant to sa( of this that it uses a

icture. ... We associate a articular use "ith a icture.

'm(thies 4!his isn4t all he does#associate a use "ith a icture.4

Wittgenstein $ubbish. I meant "hat conclusions are (ou going to dra"G etc. 7re

e(ebro"s going to be tal&ed of, in connection "ith the D(e of NodG ... If I sa( he

used a icture, I don4t "ant to sa( an(thing he himself "ouldn4t sa(. ... !he "hole

"eight ma( be in the icture. ... I4m merel( ma&ing a grammatical remar& ...6B

!he assage raises t"o maFor :uestions of interretation What "orried 'm(thies

about Wittgensteins claim =We associate a articular use "ith a icture>G 7nd "hat

anno(ed Wittgenstein about 'm(thies4 remar& =!his isnt all he does#associate a use

"ith a icture>G 7n ans"er to the second :uestion must also e2lain Wittgenstein4s oint

in invo&ing the *"eight* of ictures and in referring to grammar.

Concerning both :uestions I "ant to motivate m( o"n resonses b( sho"ing that the

todate best ans"ers are not -full(/ satisfactor(. I am thin&ing here of the discussions in



Eilar( Lutnam4s Rene$ing #hiloso(h/ -1996/, Cora 5iamond4s *!he Nulf bet"een Js*

-6</, and Nenia 'chnbaumsfeld4s , Con"usion o" S(heres -6B/.68

7ll three authors are in full agreement regarding 'm(thies4 "orr( about the *using a

icture* roosal. Lutnam ta&es 'm(thies to thin& that on Wittgenstein4s suggestion

*religious language is noncognitive*. 5iamond has 'm(thies obFect to Wittgenstein4s

alleged reduction of religion to *e2ressing a resolve to live in a certain "a(*. 7nd

'chnbaumsfeld arovingl( cites 5iamond4s rendering.69

!here is a bit more variet( "ith resect to Wittgenstein4s sentence *the "hole "eight

might be in the icture*. Lutnam suggests that it is best understood in light of a diar(

entr( of 19;9 *... "e al$a/s eventuall( have to reach some firm ground, either a icture

or something else, so that a icture "hich is at the root of all of our thin&ing is to be

resected ...*3 In other "ords, the "eight( icture is the "undamental icture. 5iamond

sides "ith Lutnam in emhasising the relevance and imortance of the 19;9 comment.

+ut she also introduces a further thought "hich she finds in theologians such as ran?

$osen?"eig, Kornelis Mis&otte and Eelmut Noll"it?er. !his is the idea that the religious

icture is "eight( insofar as it enables us sea& to Nod as erson. !he "eight( icture is

*the anthroomorhic icturelanguage, used of Nod*. Nod =ma&es Hthis icture

available for us to use in sea&ing of him>. !his icture is inescaable since it alone

enables the believer to tal& about and to Nod, and to listen to him.31 inall(,

'chnbaumsfeld catures Wittgenstein4s thought b( "riting that the *the icture is Hnot

instrumentall( intersubstitutable*, that it is *irrelaceable Q nonarahrasable*.36

I am not convinced b( the three authors4 interretation of 'm(thies4 "orr(. Wh(

should the idea that religion centrall( involves the use of ictures commit Wittgenstein to

a noncognitivist vie" of religionG Eo" can the noncognitivist understanding of religion

be 'm(thies4 central concern "hen noncognitivism had alread( been e2licitl( reFected

b( Wittgenstein earlier in LRBG33 7nd, most imortantl(, ho" can a reference to the

"eightiness of ictures alleviate 'm(thies4 discomfortG If ma&ing the use of ictures

central to religion commits one to noncognitivism, "h( does the use of $eight/ ictures



cancel out this commitmentG Jnfortunatel(, Lutnam, 5iamond and 'chnbaumsfeld do

not address these :uestions.

Eere is a different and simler reading of 'm(thies4 "orr(. 'm(thies fears that

Wittgenstein is utting for"ard a reductive account of religion that religion is nothing

!ut the maniulation of ictures. 7nd this is unaccetable to 'm(thies. 'uch reductive

account, he thin&s, ignores the essence of religion, that is, the relationshi bet"een the

believer and Nod. 7s "e shall see in a moment, on this interretation it is not difficult to

see "h( the "eightiness of religious ictures constitutes a resonse to 'm(thies4

*rubbish*.

!urning to our three interreters4 roosals on the "eightiness of the ictures, I have

alread( indirectl( indicated m( main obFection in the last aragrah. If I am right about

'm(thies4 "orr(, then it is not clear ho" an insistence on either the fundamental

character, or the anthroomorhic nature, of the "eight( icture rovides a remed(. I also

miss in all three authors a detailed attention to Wittgenstein4s reference to grammar. 7nd,

last but not least, I am uncomfortable "ith the hermeneutic strateg( of interreting a 1938

te2t via a 19;9 comment, or via the "or& of three theologians that Wittgenstein robabl(

never read.

M( o"n interretation starts from the fact that Wittgenstein resents his observations

about the role of ictures in religion as *a grammatical remar&*. !his is not of course the

first and onl( time that Wittgenstein connects religion and grammar. or instance, the

"ell&no"n R3B3 of the #hiloso(hical Investigations reads

Nrammar tells us "hat &ind of obFect an(thing is. -!heolog( as grammar./3;

7s "e &no" from 7lice 7mbrose4s and N. D. Moore4s notes on a lecture course from

193633, Wittgenstein had been interested in the lin& bet"een theolog( and grammar at

least from the earl( 193s on"ards.3< Eere I refer to focus on a later assage, both

because of its length and richness, and because of its temoral ro2imit( to the 1938



lecture course on religious belief. !he assage I am referring to is a diar( entr( from

ebruar( 193B

One &neels do"n S loo&s u S folds one4s hands S sea&s, S one sa(s one sea&s

"ith Nod, one sa(s that Nod sees ever(thing that I do one sa(s Nod sea&s to me

in m( heart one sea&s of Nod4s e(es, hand, mouth, but not of other arts of the

bod( learn from this the grammar of the "ord =Nod*T -'ome"here I have read

that uther has "ritten that theolog( is the Pgrammar of the "ord of Nod4, the hol(

scriture./30

!hese lines hel "ith understanding R3B3 of the #hiloso(hical Investigations.

!heolog( is a grammar of the "a(s in "hich the religious believer sea&s and thin&s

about Nod, of the actions he deems ossible visavis Nod, and of the roerties he

attributes to Nod.

Jnfortunatel( Wittgenstein does not tell us "here he read that uther thought of

theolog( as the *grammar of the "ord of Nod*. I venture the follo"ing suggestion the

source "as )ohann Neorg Eamann -1B31B88/, or someone "riting about him.

Eistorians of theolog( tell us that uther himself never actuall( said that theolog( is the

grammar of the "ord of Nod.3B 'omething close to this e2ression "as ho"ever used b(

Eamann "ith reference to uther. In one lace Eamann "rote that *it "as a religious

scholar of enetrating "it "ho called theolog( a grammar for the language of the hol(

scriture*, and in another lace he rofessed to *follo" uther in turning the "hole of

UU( - hilosoh(/ into a grammar*. !he second :uote ma&es it li&el( that uther is the

*religious scholar of enetrating "it* mentioned in the first.38

+e this as it ma(, for resent concerns it is most imortant to note that *theolog( as

grammar* offers a method for ho" the nonbeliever can come to understand the language

of the religious believer. !he nonbeliever needs to stud( carefull( the religious narratives

and rituals, and he needs to identif( and tabulate the various descritions, intentions and



actions involved in these narratives and rituals. In this "a( he can learn both the use of

the -literal and metahorical/ ictures and the meanings of religious terms. Moreover, the

urose of this investigation is not to reduce or critici?e religion the urose is to

understand it. @o "onder then that Wittgenstein felt seriousl( misunderstood "hen

'm(thies imlicitl( accused him of reducing religion to a mere maniulation of ictures.

7s concerns the meaning of Wittgenstein4s *the "hole "eight ma( be in the icture* it

also hels to ta&e the Eamann connection seriousl(. $ecall that, on m( reading, 'm(thies

insisted that a vie" that reduces religion to the use of ictures misses its most imortant

asect the relationshi bet"een the religious believer and Nod. Wittgenstein4s resonse

to this criticism "as to sa( that an(one "ho dra"s the contrast bet"een the t"o ideas -of

the ictures and of the relationshi/ in this "a( must assume that the ictures are of little

"eight. On Wittgenstein4s rendering of the role of ictures and narratives in religion the(

do not stand in the "a( of a relationshi "ith Nod. On the contrar(, the( are essential to

that relationshi. !his vie" is clearl( e2ressed in the follo"ing assage from Eamann

... the miracles that the "ord of Nod does in the soul of ious Christians ... are as

great as the miracles narrated in it an understanding of this boo& and faith in its

contents can onl( be reached through the ver( sirit that has moved its authors

and the ineffable sighs that this sirit causes in our hearts are of the ver( same

nature as the ine2ressible ictures heaed u ... in the hol( scriture.39

or Eamann the hol( scriture is not Fust a reort on Nod4s deeds, it is first and foremost

a divine action to"ards us. We understand the bible onl( because Nod enables us to do

so and the te2t and our reaction to it are of one iece. In other "ords, for Eamann the

bible is a "eight( icture because it is the icture through "hich Nod relates to us, and

"e to him.

Im(lications: Criticism 3aultlessness Relativism o" Distance



One central strand of the debate over Wittgenstein4s vie"s on religion has been the

:uestion "hether Wittgenstein allo"s the nonbeliever an( form of rational criticism of

religious belief and doctrine. In the remainder of this aer I "ant to e2lain "hat ans"er

emerges from m( interretation of LRB.

In addressing this :uestion it is crucial to distinguish bet"een different cases and

scenarios. 7 first t(e of situation in "hich Wittgenstein allo"s outsiders to criticise

religion are cases "here the believer has committed *blunders*, that is, "here he has

deviated from the s(stem of assumtions and rules of his religion. Wittgenstein mentions

an e2amle earl( on in the lectures

5uring the "ar, Wittgenstein sa" consecrated bread being carried in chromium

steel. !his struc& him as ludicrous.;

Whether a thing is a blunder or not#it is a blunder in a articular s(stem. )ust as

something is a blunder in a articular game and not in another.;1

7 second t(e of scenario in "hich outside criticism of religion is ossible and

unroblematic is "here the religious believer can be sho"n to be guilt( of a violation of

some general toicneutral demands, for e2amle, the demand not to deceive himself. 7

case in oint in LRB is ather O4Eara "ho sought to ma&e religion accetable to a

secularisedscientific "orld b( assimilating religious to scientific belief. Eis mista&e is

not so much a *blunder* as a case of blindness concerning the ver( nature of religious

belief.

ather O4Eara is one of those eole "ho ma&e it a :uestion of science.;6

+ut I "ould ridicule it, not b( sa(ing it is based on insufficient evidence. I "ould

sa( here is a man "ho is cheating himself.;3



!he third and erhas most note"orth( case concerns the ver( attitude of

e2traordinar( belief. Wittgenstein holds that although the nonbeliever might feel inclined

to criticise the believer for having e2traordinar( attitudes, an( such criticism must be

ineffective. It must be ineffective since eole "ho have, and eole "ho do not have,

e2traordinar( beliefattitudes do not share rinciles on the basis of "hich the ver(

adotion of such beliefattitudes could be rationall( evaluated. In the follo"ing assage

Wittgenstein refers to e2actl( such &ind of *controvers(*

!hese controversies loo& :uite different from an( normal controversies. $easons

loo& entirel( different from normal reasons. !he( are, in a "a(, :uite

inconclusive.;;

!his suggests that the attitude of e2traordinar( belief lies too dee for it to be subFect to

standards. Lresumabl( the same alies to the stance of not having e2traordinar(

attitudes. 7nd thus the t"o stances each are internall( related to different sets of reasons.

!he last :uotation sea&s of the encounter bet"een the religious erson and someone

"ho lac&s e2traordinar( beliefs as a *controvers(*. !his might seem to be in tension "ith

Wittgenstein4s un"illingness to call the difference bet"een himself and the religious

believer -over the :uestion of the ast )udgement/ a *disagreement*. On closer insection

it turns out, ho"ever, that Wittgenstein does not "ish to legislate "hether "e can use the

term *disagreement* here. Comare the follo"ing assages

*5o (ou contradict the manG* I4d sa( *@o.* ...;<

... does this mean that I believe the oosite ... G =... not at all, or not al"a(s.*;0

... (ou can call it believing the oosite, but it is entirel( different from "hat "e

normall( call believing the oosite.;B

!hese controversies loo& :uite different from an( normal controversies.;8



It seems to me that these var(ing statements are best understood in light of RB9 of the

#hiloso(hical Investigations *'a( "hat (ou choose, so long as it does not revent (ou

from seeing the facts.* @ot much hinges on "hether "e use the term *disagreement* for

Wittgenstein4s distance from the believer "ho asserts his belief in the ast )udgement.

What is imortant is to understand the eculiarit( of this &ind of distance, and ho" it

differs from more familiar or standard forms of disagreement.

I therefore roose the term *nonstandard faultless disagreement* to cature the

secial form of distance that e2ists bet"een Wittgenstein and the believer. !he terms

*nonstandard* and *faultless* should be clear from "hat has alread( been said. !he label

*disagreement* seems aroriate at least insofar as one cannot assert, "ithout

contradiction, both -a4/ and -b4/

-a4/ I have faith that there "ill be a ast )udgement, and

-b4/ I lac& the attitude of faith -in a ast )udgement/ altogether.

Of course, the realisation that in a certain domain disagreements are -often or

invariabl(/ faultless can trigger various resonses. One such resonse is sceticism, that

is, the thought that, since "e cannot rationall( agree, no &no"ledge or Fustified belief is

ossible in this domain. 7nother ossible resonse is relativism each of us is right

relative to their resective standards or stances, but there is no vie"oint from "hich

such standards or stances themselves can be evaluated. In LRB Wittgenstein does not

seem to be temted b( either of these vie"s, at least not in their canonical form.

!here is ho"ever a certain non4standard form of relativism that fits the osition of

LRB. !his osition is a variant of "hat +ernard Williams once called *relativism of

distance*.;9 !he central element of this vie" is the *notional* confrontation, that is, a

confrontation in "hich the vie" of the other side is not a real or live otion for oneself.

One cannot image going over to it. Williams also sa(s that in such confrontation one4s

ordinar( *vocabular( of araisal* seems out of lace *... for a reflective erson the



:uestion of araisal does not genuinel( arise ... in urel( notional confrontation.* < +oth

features are central in Wittgenstein4s encounter "ith the believer. !heir confrontation is

notional since onl( a conversion, and thus reordering of all real or live otions, "ould

ta&e Wittgenstein to the religious stance. 7nd the idea that one4s vocabular( of araisal

seems out of lace surfaces in Wittgenstein4s insistence that in such confrontation reasons

must aear inconclusive. !he oint is also visible in $+4s reeated insistence on not

"anting to e2ress an( vie" that might be offensive or insulting to the believer

I couldn4t aroach his belief at all b( sa(ing *!his could Fust as "ell have been

brought about b( so and so* because he could thin& this blashem( on m( side.<1

If I sa( he used a icture, I don4 t "ant to sa( an(thing he himself "ouldn4t sa(.<6

7ll I "ished to characteri?e "as the conventions HsicT he "ished to dra". If I

"ished to sa( an(thing more I "as merel( being hilosohicall( arrogant.<3

5 Con"licting Inter(retations III: Criticism o" Belie" in 6od

It remains for me to contrast m( reading of Wittgenstein on the criticism of religion "ith

the best&no"n alternative, Kai @ielsen4s *fideist* interretation. In a recent aer,

@ielsen sums u his interretation as follo"s

... "hat cannot be done, on a Wittgensteinian fideist vie", is relevantl( to criticise

belief in Nod -"here PNod is roerl( conceived/ ... H!here is ... no intelligible

"a( of sa(ing that the ver( idea of Nod is incoherent or that belief in Nod rests on

an illusion or that PNod e2ists is false.<;

!his vie" does not sit "ell "ith m( argument above. When Wittgenstein emhasises

the lac& of shared standards, he is tal&ing about the difference bet"een a erson "ho has

e2traordinar( beliefattitudes, and a erson "ho lac&s them. !hat is to sa(, at issue is the



resence or absence of such attitudes, at issue are not their secific contents. !his leaves

oen the ossibilit( of various forms of criticism#on the basis of shared standards#of

articular doctrines concerning Nod. @ote also that although criticism on the basis of

shared standards is imossible in cases of nonstandard faultless disagreement,

Wittgenstein does not rule out critical assessments on the basis of criteria that are not

shared. or instance, "hen 'm(thies informed Wittgenstein about his conversion to

Catholicism in 19;;, the latter relied that he had his o"n "a(s of assessing "hether

'm(thies4 move "ould be a success or a failure *... "hat sort of man (ou are and "ill be.

!his "ill, for me, be the eating of the udding.><< Eere Wittgenstein seems little bothered

b( the thought that his criteria for such an evaluation might be different from the criteria

emlo(ed b( the believer 'm(thies.

7 Conclusion

In this aer I have develoed a ne" interretation of LRB. Central to m( reading is the

claim that there is no incommensurabilit( bet"een religious and ordinar( discourses that

Wittgenstein offers grammar as a method for overcoming roblems of understanding

bet"een believer and nonbeliever that the nonbeliever can understand the roositional

attitude and the roositional content of religious belief -"ithout converting/, and that a

nonbeliever can criticise religious believers on various grounds. !he onl( thing that is

ruled out is a criticism, on the basis of shared standards, of the ver( adotion of

e2traordinar( standards.

@eedless to sa(, there is lent( of unfinished business. In order to ma&e Wittgenstein4s

osition convincing, "e need a better ta2onom( of different uses of *believe* a

ta2onom( of ossible different forms of e2traordinar( beliefs -religious, magical,

commitments to various forms of life/ an account of similarities as "ell as differences

bet"een ordinar( and e2traordinar( beliefs and a more detailed account of "h( reasons

give out in the defence of e2traordinar( beliefs.





1

@otes

*ectures on $eligious +elief,* in Wittgenstein: Lectures & Conversations on ,esthetics

#s/cholog/ and Religious Belie" , edited b( C(ril +arrett -+er&ele( and os 7ngeles Jniversit( of

California Lress, 1900/, <3B6.

2 Cora 5iamond, *Wittgenstein on $eligious +elief !he Nulfs +et"een Js,* in Religion and

Wittgenstein8s Legac/, edited b( 5. V. Lhillis and Mario von der $uhr -7ldershot 7shgate, 6</,

9913B, here 99.

3 Wittgenstein, *ectures,* <3.

4 *In a religious discourse "e use such e2ressions as PI believe that so and so "ill haen, and

use them differentl( to the "a( in "hich "e use them in science.* -Wittgenstein, *ectures,* <B./ #

*... there is this e2traordinar( use of the "ord 4believe4. One tal&s of believing and at the same time

one doesn4t use 4believe4 as one does ordinaril(.* -Wittgenstein, *ectures,* <9./


6 =4Well, ossibl( it ma( haen and ossibl( not4 ...> -Wittgenstein, *ectures,* <0./# *... one

"ould be reluctant to sa( 4!hese eole rigorousl( hold the oinion -vie"/ that there is a ast

)udgement4. ... It is for this reason that different "ords are used 4dogma4, 4faith4.* -Wittgenstein,

*ectures,* <B./ # %ou might sa( -in the normal use/ *%ou onl( believe#oh "ell ...> Eere it is

used entirel( differentl( ... it is not used as "e generall( use the "ord 4&no"4.* -Wittgenstein,

*ectures,* <90./

7 *We don4t tal& ... about high robabilit(. @or about &no"ing.* -Wittgenstein, *ectures,* <B./

#*@o induction. !error. !hat is, as it "ere, art of the substance of belief. ... a certain icture

might la( the role of constantl( admonishing me ...* -Wittgenstein, *ectures,* <0./#*Wh(

shouldn4t one form of life culminate in an utterance of belief in a ast )udgementG* -Wittgenstein,



*ectures,* <8/.

8 *We come to an island and "e find beliefs there, and certain beliefs "e are inclined to call

religious. ... Dntirel( different connections "ould ma&e them into religious beliefs ...*

-Wittgenstein, *ectures,* <8./#* ... and there can easil( be imagined transitions "here "e

"ouldn4t &no" for our life "hether to call them religious beliefs or scientific beliefs.* -Wittgenstein,

*ectures,* <8./# *7 religious belief might in fact fl( in the face of such a forecast, and sa( P@o.

!here it "ill brea& do"n.* -Wittgenstein, *ectures,* <0./

9 ... *Wittgenstein, (ou don4t ta&e illness as unishment, so "hat do (ou believeG*#I d sa( *I don4t have an(

thoughts of unishment.* ... I thin& differentl(, in a different "a(. I sa( different things to m(self. I have

different ictures.* -Wittgenstein, *ectures,* <<./# *!a&e PNod created man. Lictures of Michelangelo

sho"ing the creation of the "orld. In general, there is nothing "hich e2lains the meanings of "ords as "ell

as a icture ...* -Wittgenstein, *ectures,* 03./

10 'ee e.g. 9. @ielsen *Wittgensteinian ideism $evisited,* in Wittgensteinian 3ideism, edited b(

5. V. Lhillis and Kai @ielsen -ondon, 'CM, 6</, 9B131.

11 C(ril +arrett, Wittgenstein on +thics and Religious Belie" -O2ford +lac&"ell, 1991/ Nenia

'chnbaumsfeld, , Con"usion o" the S(heres: 9ieregaard and Wittgenstein on #hiloso(h/ and

Religion -O2ford O2ford Jniversit( Lress, 6B/.

12 +arrett, Wittgenstein, 168.

13 +arrett, Wittgenstein, 1;;.

14 'chnbaumsfeld, Con"usion, 18;.

15 +arrett, Wittgenstein, 168.

16 'chnbaumsfeld, Con"usion, 193.


18 Cf. Eilar( Lutnam, Rene$ing #hiloso(h/ -Cambridge, Mass. Earvard Jniversit( Lress, 1996/,

1<1.

19 ud"ig Wittgenstein, ;achlass: )he Bergen +lectronic +dition -C5$om, O2ford O2ford

Jniversit( Lress, 6/, 19 190.



20 Wittgenstein, ;achlass, 11 1;;.

21 ud"ig Wittgenstein, Remars on the #hiloso(h/ o" #s/cholog/, <olume I -O2ford +lac&"ell,

198/, R0;;.

22 Interesting biograhical information can be found in ol&er 7. Mun?, *ud"ig Wittgenstein and

%oric& 'm(thies 7 hitherto Jn&no"n $elationshi,* in Wittgenstein und die =uun"t der

#hiloso(hie: +ine ;eu!e$ertung nach > %ahren Beitr?ge der @sterreichischen Lud$ig

Wittgenstein 6esellscha"t olume IX/ -Kirchberg am Wechsel 61/, 96 A 9B.

23 N. D. M. 7nscombe, *rom the Minutes of the Moral 'ciences Club, 1<.11.19;<,* in Wittgenstein

in Cam!ridge: Letters and Documents 111411, edited b( +rian McNuinness -O2ford

+lac&"ell, 68/, 389.

24 Wittgenstein, *ectures,* 0B.

25 Wittgenstein, *ectures,* 0809.

26 Wittgenstein, *ectures,* B.

27 Wittgenstein, *ectures,* B1B6.

28 Lutnam, Rene$ing #hiloso(h/ 5iamond, *Nulf* 'chnbaumsfeld, Con"usion.

29 Lutnam, Rene$ing #hiloso(h/, 1<; 5iamond, *Nulf,* 118 'chnbaumsfeld, Con"usion, 1BB.

30 Lutnam, Rene$ing #hiloso(h/, 1<0 cf. ud"ig Wittgenstein Culture and <alue -Chicago

Jniversit( of Chicago Lress, 198/, 8;.

31 5iamond, *Nulf,* 160168.

32 'chnbaumsfeld, Con"usion, 18.

33 Wittgenstein, *ectures,* B1.

34 ud"ig Wittgenstein #hiloso(hical Investigations. third edition, edited and translated b( N. D. M.

7nscombe -O2ford +lac&"ell, 61/.

35 ud"ig Wittgenstein, Wittgensteins Lectures Cam!ridge 1'241'. 3rom the ;otes o" ,lice

,m!rose and *argaret *acdonald, edited b( 7lice 7mbrose -7mherst, @. %. Lrometheus +oo&s,

61/, 36 N. D. Moore, =Wittgensteins ectures in 1931933,* in ud"ig Wittgenstein,

#hiloso(hical ccasions: 112411, edited b( ).C. Klagge and 7. @ordman -Indianaolis



Eac&ett, 1993/ ;011;, here 13.

36 ud"ig Wittgenstein, Den!e$egungen: )age!Echer 1'>41'2 1'F41'5 , edited b( I.

'omavilla -ran&furt am Main ischer, 1999/, 9.

37 )ohannes von Y&e, *!heologie als 4Nrammati& ?ur 'rache der heiligen 'chrift4 Dine 'tudie ?u

uthers !heologieverstZndnis,* ;eue =eitschri"t "Er s/stematische )heologie und

Religions(hiloso(hie 3;, 1996 66B6<.

38 )ohann Neorg Eamann, *ermischte 7nmer&ungen Yber die WortfYgung in der fran?sischen

'rache,* in Eamann, S?mtliche Were Gistorisch4ritische ,usga!e, edited b( )osef @adler,

volume 6 -Wien Eerder, 19</, 16B130, here 169 and )ohann Neorg Eerder, Brie"$echsel,

volume B, edited b( 7rthur Een&el -ran&furt am Main Insel, 19B9/, 109.

39 )ohann Neorg Eamann, *Nedan&en Yber meinen ebenslauf,* in Eamann, S?mtliche Were,

volume 6, 9<;, here ;3.



42 Wittgenstein, *ectures,* <B.





47 Wittgenstein, *ectures,* <<.


49 +ernard Williams, *!he !ruth in $elativism,* in +ernard Williams, *oral Luc , -Cambridge Cambridge

Jniversit( Lress, 1981/, 1361;3.

50 Williams, *$elativism,* 1;1.

51 Wittgenstein, *ectures,* 01.





54 @ielsen, *ideism $evisited,* . 13.

55 ud"ig Wittgenstein, *etter to 'm(thies, 7ril Bth, 19;;,* in Wittgenstein in Cam!ridge, 303.

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Eamann, )ohann Neorg. *ermischte 7nmer&ungen Yber die WortfYgung in der fran?sischen

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