5/20/2018 Aachen 1944

1/106

R HIVES

CGSC

FT

LEAVENWO

TH

KtiK4

APR

7 953

r

MONO SSIG

MON OG

PHi~

CCESSION

NO

PO

Ri G iSTRY

THE

GERMANS

OPPOSITE

lI

CORPS

IN

SEPTEMBER

1944

Y

LUCIAN

HEICHLER

DISTRIBL

DE

THIS

MONOGRAPH

MAY

NOT

BE

REPRODUCED

EITHER

IN

WHOLE

OR IN PART

WITHOUT

THE

PERMISSION

OF

THE

CHIEF

OF

MILITARY

HISTORY

The German

opposite

VII

Corps

in Sep

44

hi

of

f s

1 1 t

ib>yB

52

CGSC Form

16

3

Mar

5

Army CGSC P3 1966 20

Mar 53 5M

UNqCL SSIFI[Q

p.

r

AXZ

This Document

IS

A

HOLDING

OF

THE

ARCHIVES

SECTION

LIBRARY SERVICES

FORT LEAVENWORTH

KANSAS

DOCUMENT

NO. R 16436.3oB

COPY

NO.

STORY

Nomp

7,

_ a l

1

a

pt

5/20/2018 Aachen 1944

2/106

5/20/2018 Aachen 1944

3/106

CHAPTER

III

Tr

GLE1ANS OPPOSITE

VII CORPS

IN SEPTEMBER

1944

Part

of

a

Study

of

the

German

Side Undertaken

in

Support

of

The Siegfried Line by Charles

B MacDonald

OCMH:

In Progress

Based Entirely

on

German Records, This Chapter is Intended

to Complement

Charter of The Siegfried

Line:

VII

Corns

Penetrates

the

Line

by

2VL ~a c~,

Lucian

Heichler

Research Section

Office

of

the Chief

of Military

History

Washington, D

C.

December 952

~~

;SSFED

5/20/2018 Aachen 1944

4/106

5/20/2018 Aachen 1944

5/106

U abe

A

Sofon

s

Table of Contents

ntroduction

Defense

of Aachen

and

the Stolberg

orridor

The DXXXI

Corps

Situation

in Mid September

1944

LXXXI

Corps: ounterattack

and

Stalemate

LXXIV Corps:

Defense

of the Lammersdorf

Corridor

and

the West

VIall

Page

1

41

S

8

APPENDIX:

Map

of

the West Wall in the LXXXI

and

LXX V

orps

s tors

5/20/2018 Aachen 1944

6/106

UNCL SSIF

I

Introduction

n the

early

years of World

War the German

Army

amply

demonstrated

its

ability

to

exploit victory to

the

fullest .

After the tide had turned against the

Germans,

it became ap-

parent

that they also possessed the more outstanding

bility

to quickly recover

from

a defeat before

their

opponents

could

thoroughly

exploit their

success.

The

German Seventh

Army exemplified

this faculty

late

in

the

summer

of 1944

Less than

month

after suffering

an

apparently

decisive

defeat

in which

it

was crushed

and battered

beyond

recognition

Seventh

Army

established

a

coherent

front

line

from

the Maas River

to the

Sohnee

Eifel Range

in September

1944.

Committed

in this

wide

are and supported

by

a

motley

conglomeration

of

last-ditch

reserves the

army s

remaining

elements successfully

defended

the approaches

to the Reich.

During

its

withdrawal

from

Falaise

to

the West

Wall,

Seventh

Army passed

through

three

distinct

phases.

n th e

first stage

the

rout

following

narowly averted

annihilation

in the

Falaise Pocket

Seventh

rmy

ceased to exist

as n

independent

organization.

Its

shattered

remnants were

attached

to Fifth Panzer

Army

until

4 September

1944.

n

that date

Seventh

Army was

apparently

reconstituted

under

the

command

of General

der Panzertruppen

Erich Brandenberger.

The army

then

passed

through the

phase

of delaying

action

while

it

~rsa~

5/20/2018 Aachen 1944

7/106

UM

lED

reorganized

its

forces

and re-established

the semblance of

a

front

line. Despite persistent

orders from

above

to defend

every

foot

of ground, General

Brandenberger

realized

that a

fairly rapid

with-

drawal

was

called

for, if his forces

were

to

reach

the West

Wall

ahead

of

American

spearheads.

MS

B-730

(Brandenberger).

The delaying

action

ended

officially on

9

September 1944 when

Seventh

Army was

charged

with the

defense

of the West

Wall in

the

Maastricht

Aachen

Bitburg

sectors. Along

with the

fortifications

the

army took

over

all headquarters

and troops stationed

in this

area.

f

Seventh

Army s three corps,

LXUXI Corps

was assigned the

northern

sector of

the West Wall

from the

Herzogenrath

Dueren

switch

position to

the

Rollesbroich

Huertgen

Forest

sector.

LXXIV Corps

was committed in

the center, from

Roetgen to Ormont,

and

I

SS

Panzer

orps

was

to defend the

West

Wall in the Schnee

Eifel sector,

from

Ormont

to

the

boundary with

First Army

at

Diekirch.

Order,

Seventh Army

to

ll corps,

9

Sep 44,

LXXI Corps

KTB

Anlagen,

Befehle:

Heeresgruppe,

Armee,

usw.

[Orders:

Army

Group,

Army,

etc.],

5.VIII.

21.X.44.

Referred

to hereafter

as LCXXI

Corps

KTB

Befehle:

Heeresgruppe,

Armee, usw.

See

also Appendix,

map

of

the

West

Wall.

With this

transition

from the

second to the

third

phase

of

operations

from

delaying

action

to firm

resistance

based

on

th e

u~~L~s~ INN

~i~e~SYI

5/20/2018 Aachen 1944

8/106

fortified cositions

of

the W est Wall

the

withdrawal

from

France

came

to

an end and

the defense

of

Germany began.

When

U.S.

VII

Corps launched its

reconnaissance

in force

on

12

September 1944 Seventh

rmy

was in

the

mi st

of this process

of

transition. While

some

of ts elements had already

occupied

their

assigned

West Wall

so~tors others were

still fighting

a de-

laying action well forward

of the bunker line.

UN L SSIFIED

h

fit i

5/20/2018 Aachen 1944

9/106

Defense of

Aachen

and

the

Stolberg

Corridor

On 12 September 1944 the forces

of

LJ I

Corps,

under the

command

of

Generalleutnant Friedrich-August

Schack, were committed

from Breust

on the Maas River eastward to Hombourg and Moresnet

thence

south along the

West

Wall

to

the boundary with LXXIV Corps

Eupen - Roetgen - Zuelpich

- Bonn).*

Noon

Sitrep,

LXXXI

Corps,

12 Sep

44, LXXX Corps KTB

Anlagen

Tagesmeldungen [Daily

Sitreps], 6.VIII. 21.X.44.

Referred to

hereafter as

LXXXI

Corps

KTB

Tagesmeldungen.

Four

badly

mauled understrength

divisions were committed in

the LXXXI Corps front line.

In the northwestern

sector, between

the

Maas

River

and

the Aachen

area 275th and 49th Infantry Divisions

held

the line against U.S.

XIX

Corps.

In the

southeastern half

For an account

of these two divisions

see

Lucian

Heichler

Chapter IV, The Germans

Facing XIX Corps, OCMH in progress).

the

LUXI Corps

zone, opposite U.S.

VII Corps,

116th

Panzer

Division

and 9th Panzer

Division faced

the

U.S. 1st

Infantry and

3d Armored

Divisions.

The

sector of 116th Panzer

Division

was

defined

in

the northwest

by

the boundary with

49th Infantry Division:

Hombourg Schneeberg

Hill along

the West Wall to Bardenberg.

In

the

southeast

the

boundary with

9th

Panzer

Division extended from Welkenrath

via

Hauset

L SSFIED

5/20/2018 Aachen 1944

10/106

5

and

Brand to Stolberg.*

The

organic strength

of

115th Panzer

Division

Order, LTJXI

Corps to all

divs, 2230 on

12

Sep

44, LXXI

Corps

KTB

Anlagen,

Befehle

an

Dive, [Orders

to Divs], 3.VIII.

21.X.44.

Referred

to

here fter

as

LCX=I

Corps

KTB

Befehle

an

Div.

und:r the command

of

Generalleutnant Graf

Gerhard von

Schwerin, was

organized

in two

armored regiments 60th and 156th

Panzer Grenadier

Regiments -- the

116th Panzer

Reconnaissance

Battalion, and the

116th

Panzer

Artillery

Regiment.

Commanded by Generalmajor

Gerhard

Mueller, 9th Panzer Division

had

only arrived

in

the

LXXXI

ors

zone

on

11 September

1944.

Its

sector extended

from

the

boundary

with 116th

Panzer Division

to th e

boundary with LXXIV Corps

see above).

According to

General

Brandenberger

its first

wave

had

consisted

of but

three

companies

of panzer grenadiers

advance detachment

of either

10th or 11th

Panzer

Grenadier Regiment), an

engineer

company, and

two batteries

of artillery General Schack amalgamated these elements with th e

remaining forces of 105th

Panzer Brigade

Major Volker).

Since

its attachment to LXXXI Corps

on

3 September 1944 this

tank

brigade

had lost most

of its armored inf ntry

b tt lion nd

all

but

ten of

its tanks. Instead of committing the weak elements of 9th Panzer

Division in

the

West Wall, L I Corps

had found

it necessary

to

send these forces

into the front line.

Badly mauled on their

first

day of action

as was to be

expected the

remaining

elements

of Kampfgruppe

9th Panzer

Division

had assembled

in Eynatten during

the

night

from 11

to

I September.

They

were

to

fight

delaying

L i IED

5/20/2018 Aachen 1944

11/106

action

back

to their

West

Wail

sector

while all

other

elements

of

thl

division

still

enroute from

their assembly

area

at Kaiserslautern

were to

be committed

immediately

in the West

all upon

arrival.*

MS

B-730

(Brandenberger).

In

addition

to

the

units

enumerated

above,

IXXDI Corps

also

commanded

353d

Infantry

Division

Generalleutnant

Paul

M-ahlmann).

This

division

was

exhausted

and

possessed

very

few

organic

con-

tingents. Far too

weak

to be committed

in

a

front

line

sector,

its headquarters

and

remaining

elements

were

moved

to the

assigned

W'est

Wall

sectors

of 116th

and

9th

Panzer

Divisions to

establish

liaison with

the

various

headquarters

and local

defense

units

in

the

rear

of

LXXXI

Corps.

On

9

September

944

Seventh

Army

had

attached

to

LXXXI Corps

the

Wfehrmachtbefehlshaber [Military Governor]

for

Belgium and

Nortnern

France

with his

staff

and

troops,

the

Kampfkommandant*

of

Aachen

A

term

whicn

is difficult

to

translate.

Literally

it

means

combat

commander

but

is

used

to

describe

a military

officer

ap-

pointed

to

organize

the

defense

of

a city

or

rear area.

See

iv

T-121

(Zimmermann

et al.),

pp.

1820ff.

(Colonel

von

Osterroth),

the

53d

Grenadier Training Regiment of

526th

Reserve

Division,*

and a

strange

assortment

of

independent

The

other two

regiments

of

526th

Reserve

Division,

4 6th

and

536th

Grenadier

Training

Regiments,

were

attached to

LXXIV Corps

while the

division

headquarters at

Euskirchen remained

directly

subordin ted

to

Seventh

Army.

UriL S

H[

5/20/2018 Aachen 1944

12/106

battalions representing

the

proverbial

bottom

of

the barrel.

Some

of

these

were

Luftwaffe

Fortress

Battalions ;*

others

were

called

Luftwaffe

ground

troops

hastily

organized

in infantry

batta-

lions

usually

without

sufficient

training

poorly

armed,

and of

little

combat

value

according to

German

postwar

accounts

such as

M S

B-730 Brandenberger).

Landesschuetzen

Battalions (the

termra

is

vaguely

equivalent

to

home

guard )

which

were quite inadequately

armed,

without

heavy

weapons,

and composed

of men

as

old as the

hills .*

Order, Seventh

Army

to all

corps,

9 Sep 44,

LXXXI Corps

KTB

Befehle:

Heeresgruppe,

Armee, usw.;

Quotation

from

ETHINT

18

(Schwerin).

Landesschuetzen Battalions

were usually composed

of

men

fifty

to

sixty

years

old.

The

situation

in

the

LXXXI

Corps area

was

canplicated further

by

tne presence

of

police and Hitler Youth detachments

who

attempted

to

make themselves

useful

by

doing such work

on the

West

Vall

fortifications

as they saw

fit, but

refused

to

co-operate

with

the

military.

The various

independent

battalions

described above

were

sub-

ordinated

to 353d

Infantry

Division

prior to

their

commitment

with

the

front line divisions.

By

order

of

Field

Marshal

Model

Commander

in

Chief,

Army Group

B)

the

newly

arrived 8th 12th,

and

19th

Luftwaff

Fortress

Battalions

were

attached

to 353d

Infantry

Division

on con-

dition

that they would

be

employed

only in

defense of

the West

Wall.

The

division

reported

that

by

1800 on

12

September

1944

the

Schill Lin

5/20/2018 Aachen 1944

13/106

eastern and more strongly fortified

bunker belt

of

the

West Wall

--

would be occupied

by

the

19th

Luftwaffe Fortress

Battalion,

com-

mitted

in

the

area

northwest of

Wuerselen (northeast

of Aachen),

3d Landesschuetzen

Battalion

in the

area

northwest

of Stolberg,

12th

Luftwaffe Fortress

Battalion in the vicinity

of Stolberg,

and

2d Landesschuetzen

Battalion south

of

Stolberg.

The

8th Luftwaffe

Fortress

Battalion

was designated 353d Infantry

Division reserve.*

Tel Conv, Seventh

Army to

LXXXI

Corps, 0110 on 12

Sep

44, and

Mng

Sitrep,

353d

Inf

Div,

12

Sep

44,

LXXXI

Corps

KTB

Anlagen,

Kampfverlauf

[Operations),

2.VIII.

21.X.44.

Referred

to hereafter

as ULXXI

Corps

KTB

Kampfverlauf;

Tabulation of

Troop

Trains Ar-

rived 9 Sep

31 Oct

44,

Seventh

Army KTB

Anlagen,

Semi-Annual

Report

of

Seventh

Army

Transport

Officer, 1.VII.

- 31.XII.44.

General

Schack

learned on

12

September

that the

first

of three

full strength divisions

12th

Infantry, 183d

and 246th

Volks

Grenadier

Divisions)

destined to reinforce

the

Aachen

area during

September

1944 would arrive

in

the LXXXI Corps

sector

in

a few days. Hitler

had

ordered

12th

Infantry

Division

Colonel

Gerhard Engel , just

rehabilitated in East Prussia after

service

on the Eastern

Front

to

begin entraining for the Aacnen

sector

at

0001 dn 14

September.*

Mng Sitrep, A

Gp B 12 Sep 44, OB VEST

KTB

Text),

1 IX. - 30.

IX.44.

Referred

to

hereafter

as

OB WEST

KTB.

For additional order

of battle data, such as strength

information

see

The LXXXI

Corps

Situation

in

Mid-September

1944,

pp.4lff.

Southwest of

Aacnen the forces of 116th

Panzer

Division enjoyed

an

uneventful night

from 11 to 12

September 1944.

This

enabled

them

UNLA

5

[SFE

5/20/2018 Aachen 1944

14/106

FI U

at

0800

on 12

September

to occupy positions along the railroad

from ombourg to Moresnet and from

Moresnet along the

Gueule

Creek

via

ergenrath to Hauset.

The object was to

establish

a coherent

ng

Sitrep, 6th Pz

Div 12 Sep

44 and Daily -Sitrep,

116th

Pz

Div

1900

o

12 Sep 44 L X Corps

KTB Kampfverlauf.

defense

line

which based

on

a railway tunnel

and a creek, would

facilitate antitank

defense. The division committed the

156th

Panzer Grenadier

Regiment o

the right,

between Hombourg and

Moresnet

and the 60th

Panzer Grenadier

Regiment

on the left

along

the

Gueule. The 116th

Panzer

Reconnaissance

Battalion was

dis-

engaged

and recommitted at daybreak north of the Gueule with th e

mission

to

establish contact

with 9th

Panzer Division at Eynatten.

Tel

Cony LXXXI Corps

to

116th

Pz Div

0810 on 12 Sep

44

LXXX

Corps

KTB

Kampfverlauf.

The forces of

116th

Panzer

Division found their mobility

greatly

restricted

by

the work of over-eager

German

demolition

engineers

who had destroyed all Gueule

Creek

crossings

from

Moresnet

to north. of Eynatten and had

blocked all roads leading to the West

Wall

with

the

exception

of the

Moresnet

Gemmenich

Aachen road.

TVlX

116th Pz Div

to L=XXI

Corps

0155 on

12

Sep 44 LIX

Corps KTB Anlagen

Meldungen

der Divisionen [Division

Sitreps],

25.VIII. 1.X.44.

Referred to

hereafter as LXXX Corps

KTB

Meldungen

der Div.; Tel Conv

LXXXI Corps to 116th Pz Div

0810 on

12

Sep

44

LXXXI Corps

KTB

Kampfverlauf.

on~ew~ifsL

5/20/2018 Aachen 1944

15/106

IE

10

These

obstacles

seriously interfered

with General

von Schwerin s

intention

to withdraw

to the

West

Wall

on

12

September.

But during

the

morning

General

Schack

ordered

von Schwerin

not

to occupy

his

West all sector

before

receiving special

orders from

IXXXI Corps,

and

to

hold out

in front

of the

West Wall

generally as long

as

possible.

Tel

Cony, LXXXI

Corps to 116th

Pz

Div, 1000

on 12

Sep 44,

LXXXI Corps KTB

Kampfverlauf.

The

lull

enjoyed

by

116th

Panzer

Division was

shattered

at

noon

on

12 September

when

American

tanks probed

German defenses

north

of

Montzen

and

Hombourg.

Shortly

thereafter

the

storm

Rad,

116th

Pz

Div to LXXXI

Corps,

1155 on

12 Sep

44,

LXXXI

Corps KTB

Meldungen

der

Div.

broke

over the

heads

of the

Germans.

he

American

reconnaissance

was followed

up by

a tank

attack

toward

Hombourg.

At

the

same

time

American armor

crossed the

railway between

Hombourg

and

Moresnet.

Sitrep,

116th

Pz Div to

LXXXI

Corps,

1200

on 12

Sep

44,

LXXXI

Corps

KTB Kampfverlauf.

American

infantry

pushed

up

the road

from

Hombourg

to

Voelkerich

and

Bleyberg.

While

the

156th

Panzer

Grenadier

Regiment

f ll

back

before

these

attacks

American

troops

crossed

the

Gueule

Creek

be-

tween

Moresnet

and Hergenrath

in

the

early

afternoon

and

infiltrated

a3~: DsE

5/20/2018 Aachen 1944

16/106

UN

A

S

IF

the

lines

of

the

60th Panzer

Grenadier

Regiment.* General

von

Sitrep, 116th

Pz

Div

to

LXXI

Corps, 133 on

12

Sep

44,

LXXX

Corps KTB Kampfverlauf.

Schwerin was

forced

to withdraw

about 1530

n

a northwesterly

direction from

Moresnet

along

the

Gueule Creek.*

The

peculiar

Daily

Sitrep, 116th Pz

Div,

1900

on

12

Sep

44, LT; I

Corps

KTB

Kampfverlauf.

direction

of this withdrawal was

probably necessitated by

the

fact

that German engineers

had

blocked

the roads

leading northeast.

While

the U.S.

1st Infantry

Division

launched

ts drive on

Aachen

and

broke

through

the

lines

of

116th

Panzer

Division,

th e

U.S. 3d

Armored

Division

jumped

off from

Eupen

toward Eynatten

and

Roetgen

n the

sector

of 9th

Panzer

Division.

West

of

the

Eupen

Aachen

road

the

Americans

took Lontzen

and Walhorn;

east of

the

road

tney

pushed

into

Raeren.*

From

Walhorn

they

launched

a

tank

attack

Sitrep,

353d

Inf

Div

to LXXXI

Corps,

1200

on

12 Sep

44,

IXXXI

Corps

KTB Kampferlauf.

toward

Eynatten,

which

fell

into

American hands

at 1345.

Elements

of Kampfgruppe

9th

Panzer

Division

tnere

withdrew

northeastward.

TWX 9th Pz

Div 105th

Pz Brig) to LXXXI

Corps,

1417 on

12 Sep

44, LXXXI

Corps

KTB Meldungen

der Div.;

Sitrep,

9th

Pz

Div to

LXXII

Corps,

1425 on

12

Sep

44, LXXXI

Corps

KTB

Kampfverlauf.

I NGLAS I ED

5/20/2018 Aachen 1944

17/106

2

These

elements

and

the

local defense

units under

the

command of

353d Infantry

Division

were

unable

to interfere seriously with

American operations. Later in the

afternoon General Schack was

disturbed

by

a civilian report

that American

forces had occupied

Rott at 1800,

conveying

the impression that they had broken througn

the Wvest Wall

outh

of

Rott.

The

rumor

that the Americans

were

KTB

Entry, 1800 on 12 Sep 44,

TLXI

Corps KTB

Kampfverlauf.

just

south

of Rott

caused

panic

among

the

men

of

a

Luftwaffe

anti-

aircraft

artillery

unit

committed

at

Rott.

The 3d Battery

9th

Regiment

of

the 7th

Flak

Division

smashed

the

optical

equipment

of their

three

20-mm.

antiaircraft

guns,

abandoned

their

positions,

guns, equipment,

and

belongings,

and fled.

The

cause

of

the

false

Tel

Cony,

Seventh

Army

to LXJCI

Corps,

0050

on

22

Sep

44,

UCOXI

Corps KTB Befehle

an Div.

alarm

seems to

have

been

an American armored

reconnaissance

patrol

on

the

Aachen

Monschau

road.*

Tel Cony, LX.KII

Corps

to

353d

Inf

Div,

2150 on 12 Sep 44, L3IXI

Corps

KTB,

Meldunge

n

der

Div.

n the

evening of

12

September

353d Infantry

Division reported

American

armor converging

on

Roetgen from

the west. Elements of

the 253d

Grenadier

Training Regiment

observed

American

tanks and

jeeps, followed

by

strong

infantry

detachments on

personnel

carriers

m

3

5/20/2018 Aachen 1944

18/106

Uu

13

moving

along

the

Raeren

Roetgen road.* Two American

tanks and

Ibid.

four

armored

cars

accompanied

by infantry

pushed into

Roetgen. One

platoon of the security company in

Roetgen

328th Replacement

Training Battalion

of 253d Grenadier

Training

Regiment)

was pushed

into the

southern

part

of the

town.

Intensive infantry

fighting

developed

as American armor advanced

to the

northern periphery

of

Roetgen. Keeping

out

of

the range of German entitank

weapons, th e

tanks fired

into

West Wall bunker embrasures, while American

in

fantry

guns laid down

a

heavy barrage

in

front of

the

obstacle wall.

Low-flying aircraft

attacked

the obstacles and

defense

positions.

By 1900 the volume

of

American

artillery

and

tank

fire began to

dwindle. The Germans

remained in

possession of ll

West Wall

fortifications. An

hour later

German reconnaissance found

that

the

Americans had left Roetgen.*

Sitrep,

328th

Repl

Trng

n to LXXXI

Corps,

12

Sep 44, L~C

Corps

KTB

Meldungen

der Div.;

Daily

Sitrep,

LXXXI Corps, 2230

on

12

Sep 44,

LX X Corps

KTB Tagesmeldungen.

At

2000 on

12

September

American

tanks

and infantry

advancing

between

the Hergenrath

Aachen

and the

Eupen

Aachen

roads

tcward

the

Scharnhorst

Line

the first

western)

band

of

West

W1all

fortifications

captured

Bunker

161

at

Brandenberg

Hill,

two

miles

north

of

Hauset.

Forces

under

the Kampfkommandant

of

Aachen

were

immediately

committed

in a

counterattack

to

wipe

out

this

UN

L

SII[

5/20/2018 Aachen 1944

19/106

American penetration

of the West

Wall. They

failed

in

this

endeavor

but

were able to

stop the American

attack.

temporarily. At the

Eng

Sitrep,

353d

Inf Div,

0445

on

13

Sep

44, and Tel Conv,

Seventn Army

to LXXXI

Corps,

1140

on 13 Sep 44,

LXCXI Corps

KTB

Kaapfverlauf; ihg

Sitrep,

LXXI Corps, 0555 on 13 Sep

44, Lm=I

Corps

KTB

Tagesmeldungen.

same time

American armored

cars

and

a few

tanks also reached

the

West Wall about half

a mile southeast

of Schmidthof and apparently

decided to

laager there

for the

night.

ng Sitrep, 353d

Inf Div, 0445 on

13

Sep

44,

LXXI Corps

KTB

ampfverlauf

Late

in

the evening of 12

September

General

Schack

issued an

order to his

divisions

which

defined their assigned West

Wall sectors

and

outlined the

further

conduct of

operations.

The 116th

Panzer Division was

charged with defending

the city

of Aachen. The

Kampfkiommandant

of Aachen

with attached

troops

was

subordinated

to

116th Panzer

Division,

as were

ll

elements

of

353d

Infantry and

526th

Reserve Divisions

in

the

sector: 8th, 12th,

19th

Luftwaffe

Battalions

and

the

453d

Grenadier Training

Battalion

253d

Grenadier

Training

Regiment).*

The

armored

elements

of

116th

TWX A

Gp

B

to

OB

WEST

2350 on

22

Sep

44,

A

Gp B

KTB

Anlagen3

Operations-Befehle

[Operational

Orders],

1.IX.

30.IX.44.

Referred

to

hereafter

as A

Gp

B KTB

Operations-Befehle;

Daily

Sitrep,

116th

Pz Div,

1925

on 21 Sep 44,

LI~XI

Corps KTB

Tagesmeldungen.

U

3

FIE

5/20/2018 Aachen 1944

20/106

lG

S[

Panzer Division were to

fall

back

to

the West Wall only

in

the face

of superior

American

pressure while the

attached

forces

would

move

into

the

fortifications ahead of

the

main body in order to complete

the improvement

of

the positions.

Order, LXX Corps to all divs, 2230 on

12 Sep

44,

LXXI

Corps

KTB

Befehle

an

Div.

The 9th Panzer

Division,

with attached

remaining

elements of

105th Panzer

Brigade,

was

assigned

to

the defense

of

the-sector

between

116th Panzer Division

and

the boundary with LXXIV

Corps

the

Stolberg

Corridor

and northern

Wenau Forest.

All

elements

of

353d Infantry

and

526th

Reserve

Divisions

in

this

sector of

the

West

Wall

were

attached to 9th

Panzer

Division.

These

were

eadquart

253d

Grenadier

Training Regiment

Colonel Feind)

ana

the

328th

and

473d Replacement

Training

Battalions.*

The

division

was authorized

Tel

Conv, LXXXI

Corps

to 9th Pz Div,

1500 on 15

Sep 44, LXXI

Corps KTB Kampfverlauf;

Sitrep, 9th Pz

Div to IXXXI

Corps, 16

Sep 44,

LXXX Corps

KTB

Meldungen

der Div.

The geographic

location

of the 9th Panzer

Division

sector

fated

this

division

to

bear

the

brunt

of the

Battle of the Stolberg

Corridor.

ever

possessed of organic elements sufficient

for an

adequate defense,

the division

also sustained very heavy

losses

in

this

action. Thus

it had to

be shored

up regularly

by all

kinds

of reinforcements,

sometimes

of a

very

dubious value.

The designation

9th

Panzer

Division

became

a

collective

term

for

a

veritable

hodgepodge

of

unrelated

armor, antitank,

infantry,

and artillery

units.

to

withdraw ts

organic

elements

to

the

West Wall

only

in the

face

of

overwhelming

American

attacks.

In

the West Wall

the

main effort

5/20/2018 Aachen 1944

21/106

CL SSIFIED

6

of resistance

would

center

around the

roads leading toward

the

fortifications

from the south

and

south est.

The divisions were ordered

to station strong outposts forward

of

the MLR

equipped

with

heavy

infantry

weapons and

antitank

guns,

who were

to

do all

in

their power to delay the American advance.

In

the

sectors of 116th

and

9th Panzer Divisions this outpost line

was

to extend from

west

of

Germenich west of Hauset east

of

Raeren

to

west

of

Roetgen.

The 353d Infantry

Division received orders to

relinquish con-

trol

of the Scharnhorst Line

and all elements

committed

tnere

to

116th

and 9th Panzer Divisions.

Three

Landesschuetzen Battalions

(1/9,

11/6,

and III/6)

remained temporarily

attached to

353d Infantry

Division for

special

assignments.*

Landesschuetzen

Battalions I/9 and III/6 were

attached to 9th

Panzer Division two

days

later.

Following

its arrival

in

the

LXXI Corps

zone the anxiously

awaited 394th Assault

Gun Brigade (six

or seven assault

guns)

was

to

ssemble

in

the

vicinity

of Brand. n

corps

reserve this assault

gun

brigade

would

be ready to

participate on snort

notice in counter-

attacks with

both 116th

and

9th

Panzer Divisions.

Artillery

Group Aachen, composed

of the artillery regiments

of

116th Panzer

and

353d Infantry Divisions

and

the Flak

Gruppe

Aachen*

Antiaircraft Artillery Group Aachen a

reserve

antiaircraft

regimental

headquarters.

5/20/2018 Aachen 1944

22/106

IN L

SSFIE

7

was

placed

under

the

command

of

Colonel

ean

Commander, 116th

Panzer Artil lery Regiment

and received

orders

to collaborate

closely

witn

49th Infantry 116th and 9th Panzer

Divisions in

co-ordinating

ts

fire with the

main effort

of

defense.*

Order, LX

Corps to all

divs

2230 on

12

Sep

44,

LX3XI Corps

KTB

Befehle

an

Div.

The

night

from

12 to 13 September

passed

quietly.

During the

small hours of the morning the 8th

12th, and 19th Luftwaffe Fortress

Battalions

were

attached

to

the Kampfkommandant

of Aachen

in order

to

be committed

at daybreak in

a counterattack

against

the

American

penetration

of the

Scharnhorst

Line

at Brandenberg

Hill south

of Aach

Mng Sitrep

353d

Inf Div,

0445 on 13 Sep

44, D~UXI Corps

KTB

Kampfverlauf.

At

0600 on 13

September 116th and 9th

Panzer

Divisions

assumed

comm nd

of

their

new

West

Wall sectors.

With

ome local

defense

units in the

front line

General von

Schwerin disengaged

the

organic

forces

of 116th Panzer Division

badly in

need

of regrouping

and

some

rest in order to assemble them in

the

Richterich

u rs l n

area northeast

of Aachen. That move

made

it impossible

to commit

these forces

against

the penetraticn at

Brandenberg Hill

before

afternoon.

In addition if

the

enemy continued to advance and

exploit his

success

which had

to

be

expected

in any

event

he could

not

be

prevented

from entering

the

town [of Aachen]

from

tne

south

U

t

iUt

5/20/2018 Aachen 1944

23/106

18

by

noon.

*

ETHINT 18

Schwerin);

Daily

Sitrep,

116th Pz Div, 13

Sep 44,

LXXXI Corps KTB

Tagesmeldungen.

During

the

night

from 12

to 13

September the city

of Aachen

had been in

the

grip

of chaos.

Since General von

Schwerin

was to

assume control

on 13 September, he

drove into

Aachen

the evening

before on

the

way to

his

command post

at Laurensberg.

He

found

the population in panic.

It was the

picture

Hitler

h d made all

too

familiar

in

Europe

but

now,

for the first

time,

the

shoe was

on

the

other

foot.

Women,

with

small children

and

babies,

had

loaded

their

last possessions

on

small

hand

carts and prams

and

w lked

into

the

night without

h ving

ahy

idea where

to

go;

they

were driven

only

by fear

and the threats

of

the Party that

every

person who

did

not leave

the

town would

be shot

as

traitor.... *

EThINT 18

Schwerin).

Stirred by

humane motivations

and worried

about

the effect

of

the

panic

and

the jammed

roads

on the

morale and

mobility of his

troops, von

Schwerin

decided to

put an

immediate

stop

to the dis-

organized

flight.

When he

sent his

officers

out

to

contact

th e

police with

orders

to halt

the

evacuation,

they returned

to him

with

the

shocking

news that

the

entire

police force

and

ll govern-

ment

and

Party

officials

had left

Aachen;

not

one police

station

SGL SS I~ED

ra~

5/20/2018 Aachen 1944

24/106

9

was occupied.* Thereupon

General von Schwerin took

matters into

Ibid.;

Report MIodel to B3 VST

2230

on

15 Sep 44

Gp

B

KTB

Operations-Befehle; Ltr,

Gen

Mattenklott

to Reichsfuehrer

SS

Heinrich

Himmler

15

Sep 44 LX II Corps

KTB

Meldungen der Div.

General der Infanterie Franz TMattenklott

commanded Wehrkreis VI

the

military

district

which included the

Aachen area.

his

own

hands. He

sent his officers out once more to persuade th e

frantic populace to return

to

their

homes.

In so

doing he exposed

himself to

the

grave charge of

having countermanded a Fuehrer order

commanding

the

evacuation

of

Aachen.

In

the morning

of

13

September

the

city was nearly calm

again; for the time being all signs

of

panic had

disappeared. All

buildings

housing the

Party and municipal

administration were

deserted.

South

of the

city Kampfkommandant

Colonel von

Osterroth launched

another

counterattack against

the

American

penetration

at

Brandenberg.

Osterroth s

attempt

of

the

night

before

to

restore

the

situation

had

failed.

The

Americans

were

now in

possession

of Bunkers

160

and

161

and were feeding additionalforces

into their

salient. All

morning attempts

by the weak

forces under the

command of

Colonel

von

Osterroth to

seal off the

penetration remained

inconclusive.*

ETHITT 18

(Schwerin);

Tel

Cony

Seventh

Army to

LJ=I

Corps

1140

on

13 Sep 44

LXX I Corps

KTB Kampfverlauf;

Daily

Sitrep,

116th

Pz Div 13

Sep 44 LEXXI

Corps

KTB

Tagesmeldungen.

As

mentione

above,

General

von

Schwerin s organic forces

were

executing

a maneuver which prevented them

from participating

~LhI

ILDa

5/20/2018 Aachen 1944

25/106

UN L SSIFIE

20

in

the

fighting

southwest

of Aachen

before

late

afternoon.

He be-

lieved

that the

American

penetration

at Brandenberg

Hill

would

develop into

a main

effort

attack

against

the

city,

and

he

knew

that

the Luftwaffe

battalions

would

be

no

match

for

their opponents.

Convinced

that the Americans

would have

Aachen

occupied

in

a

matter

of hours,

von Schwerin

privately thought

this the

best solution

for

the old

city.* After

much

searching through

empty public

buildings,

ETmTT

18

Schwerin).

In desiring

to spare

Aachen

the terrors

of becoming

a

battleground, von Schwerin

deviated

sharply

from

H itler s

avowed

determination

to

turn the

city of Charlemagne

into

a

fortified

stronghold where

each

house

would

be fanatically

de-

fended

to

give

the Allies

a

foretaste

of what to

expect

inside

Germany.

von Schwerin

finally

found

one

man

still

at his

post,

an

official

of the

telephone

service.

To

him

General Schwerin

entrusted

a letter,

written

in

Ehglish,

which the

official

promised

to take

to the

com

manding

officer

of

the

American

forces

as

soon

as

they

had

occupied

Aachen. The

letter

read as

follows:

I

stopped

the absurd

evacuation of this

town;

therefore, I

am responsible

for

the fate of its inhabitants

and I ask

you, in

the case

cf an

occupation

by

your

troops,

to take

care

of

th e

unfortunate

population

in a humane way.

I an the

last German

Commanding

Officer in

the sector

of Aachen.

Signed: SC.F7BRIN

Ibid.;

Rpt,

Model

to

03

IEST,

233

on

15

Sep 44,

A

Gp

B

KT

Operations-Befehle.

Consequences

to Count von Schwerin

arising from

his interference

with

the

evacuation

of Aachen and

the

discovery

of this

letter

by

the

Nazis will be discussed

later in this study.

rtean.vhile,

however,

the tactical

situation had changed.

Gradually

it dawned

on

the

Germans

that the

Americans

were

not

going

UtLA~ffl

5/20/2018 Aachen 1944

26/106

U CLASSFIEP

1

2

to exploit their opportunity to walk into

achen

but

that they

intended,

rather, to envelop the

city by driving

up

the

Stolberg

Corridor

in

the

direction

of

Esdaweiler.

By noon on 13

September

von Osterroth s

men had

finally

succeeded

in

sealing

off the American

salient south

of

Aachen. Colonel von

Osterroth thought he could

hold the

line

against the

American

tanks if the assault guns of

394th Assault Gun Brigade just detrained at

the

Aacnen-Nord Railway

Station could

be

committed

against

them.*

LXXXI

Corps

ordered

T17X

Col von Osterroth

to

116th

Pz Div, 1315 on 13

Sep 44,

LXXXI

Corps KTB

Meidungen

der

Div.; Daily

Sitrep 116th Pz

Div

13 Sep 44,

LIXXI

Corps

KTB,Tagesmeldungen.

116th Panzer

Division to

wipe out the American penetration

at

Brandenberg

Hill

at all

cost.* Unwillingly

von Schwerin

ordered

Rad,

LeXXI

Corps to 116th

Pz Div, 1230

on

13

Sep 44, LXXI

Corps

KTB

Kampfverlauf.

his division,

which

had just arrived

in the

Richterich Wuerseien

assembly area,

to turn around,

march

back to the

other

end

of

Aachen

and

assemble

there

for the counterattacc,.

Although

some

re-

placements had arrived

in

the

morning, and

the battalions had an

average strength

of

about three hundred men

the

fighting power of

the

division was stiil low.

Only about thirty tanks and assault

guns

were

operationally

fit and the troops were tired and battleweary

ETHINT

18 Schwerin).

UNCL SSIF

E

5/20/2018 Aachen 1944

27/106

U9t N

''

-

Von

Schwerin ordered the 156th Panzer Grenadier Regiment to march

through the city while the

60th Panzer Grenadier

Regiment

bypassed

Aachen on ts

soutnern

periphery.

At

1600 the division

jumped off

against

the American

salient at

Brandenberg

Hill. It made some

Ibid.;

Daily Sitrep,

116th

Pz

Div 13

Sep 44 LXXI

Corps KTB,

Kamnfverlauf.

headway against

American

armored

reconnaissance

which

had advanced

to

the

outskirts

of

the

city. The armor

withdrew

to

the break

in

the German MLR

and 116th Panzer

Division

was able

to

close

the

gap

without

attempting

to recapture the American-held

pillboxes

after darkness had

set

in.

Ibid.;

Rad 116th

Pz

Div

to IXXI Corps,

2235

on

13 Sep

44,

MLXX

Corps KTB Meldungen der

Div.;

Daily

Sitrep, A p B

0100

on

14

Sep 44 A Gp

KTB

Anlagen

Tagesmeldungen 1.IX.

- 15.X.44.

Referred to hereafter as A Gp KTB Tagesmeldungen.

Shortly after noon on 13

September

U.S.

3d Armored Division

resumed ts drive up the

Stolberg

Corridor. South of

Rott

the

Americans

cracked a number of bunkers

and

at

1225

achieved

a

penetration in the MLR American

armor advanced up the road toward

Rott,

filling

in

the antitank

craters

in its

path.

Less

than

an

Sitrep,

9th Pz

Div

to

LIXeI

Corps 1225 on_13 Sep

44

LDOXI

Corps KTB

Kampfverlauf

hour

later U.S.

forces were within one mile

of

Rott, and

9th Panzer

jMCL

I P

22

5/20/2018 Aachen 1944

28/106

Division

mustered

all

ts

available

forces for a

counterattack

to

be launched

from

Kornelimuenster. General

Mueller

asked

th e

LXXXI

Corps

Operations Officer

to move all available

corps

reserves

to

Xornelimuenster.

Realizing

that

the

Stolberg

Corridor,

rather

Tel Conv Gen ueller

to

LXXXI

Corps 1340

on

3

Sep

44 LXXXI

Corps

KTB Kampfverlauf.

than the Aachener Stadtforst [Aachen Municipal

Forest

south

of

Aachen]

was the

scene

of the

VII

Corps main effort

in his sector,

General

Schack ordered 116th Panzer Division

to transfer half

th e

assault

guns of 394th Assault Gun

Brigade

to 9th

Panzer

Division

at

Kornelimuenster.

Tel Convs LXXXI

Corps

to 9th

Pz Div

1420

on

13

Sep 44 and

LXXXI

Corps to

116th

Pz

Div

1430

on 13

Sep 44 LXXCI

Corps

KTB

Kampfverlauf.

The

3d

Armored Division drive

up

the

Stolberg

Corridor

was

n

two-pronged with

one

group

attacking/the

direction

Schleclheim

Kornelimuenster,

the other toward

Rott

and

Mulartshuette. At 1630

ten American tanks

appeared before R ott while other U.S. forces

had already bypassed

the village

and

were

located

east thereof.

Tel Conv LXXXI

Corps

to

9th

Pz Div 1630

on

13

Sep

44 LXXXI

Corps

KTB

Kampfverlauf.

Headquarters

and headquarters

company

of

9th

Panzer

Division

sped

y^^^^^S ^ ~tt^

5/20/2018 Aachen 1944

29/106

unc

to Rott

in an

effort

to hold

the line

there.

Other

forces

of

Tel Cony

LXXXI

Corps to

9th Pz

Div

1730

on 13 Sep

44

LXI I

Corps

KTB

Kampfverlauf.

the

division

attempted

to

screen

off

at ziulartshuette

by

means

of

obstacles

and demolitions.

n

the early

afternoon

American

tanks

and infantry

penetrated

a German

strongpoint

south

of Schleokheim

and continued

/their

ad-

vance

toward

that village. A

race

was

now on between

U.S. armor

Tel

Cony

LXXXI

Corps to

9th Pz Div 1420

on 13 Sep

44

LXKXI

Corps

KTB Kampfverlauf.

and

three assault guns of

394th Assault

Gun Brigade

driving

on

Kornelimuenster

from

different

directions.

At

1600

eight American

tanks were

observed

on the

road

from

Nuetheim to Kornelimuenster.

The German

assault

guns were expected

in

Kornelimuenster

at

1800.

Ibid.

They arrived on

schedule,

and a

battalion

of 9th Panzer

Division,

reinforced

by

these

three

assault

guns and

a few

75-mm.

antitank

guns

which

the

division

had

picked

up

began

to

establish

a

line

of resistance

from

the

northern periphery

of Schleckheim

via the

northern

edge of

Nuetheim

to the southern periphery

of Kornelimuenster

Of

the first

eight U.S.

tanks,

four were knocked out

by

Panzerfaust,

Hand-operated

antitank

grenades.

l lNC SSHIED

24

5/20/2018 Aachen 1944

30/106

25

but fifteen

more

tanks wheeled off to right and left in an effort

to

roll

up

the

9th

Panzer Division line.*

Tel

Conv, LIXXI

Corps

to

9th

Pz

Div, 1830

on 13

Sep

44,

LXIKI

Corps

KTB Kampfverlauf;

Daily Sitrep, 9th Pz

Div,

13 Sep

44,

L XI

Corps KTB

Tagesmeldungen.

At

1845 fifteen

U.S. tanks

broke

through

the line of

bunkers

and dragons

teeth at Oberforstbach,

while

American

infantry advanced

along the road

north

of the

Aachen

Reservoir (Langfeld Nuetheim

Kornelimuenster .

Five merican

tanks attacked

Bunker

109 on

this

road about halfway between the

reservoir

and Nuetheim.* Somewhat

Tel Conv, LXXI

Corps to 9th

Pz

Div,

1915

on

13 Sep 44, IX0XI

Corps

KTB

Kampfverlauf.

later the

Germans

reported

American

forces before

Kornelimuenster,

near

Mulartshuette,

and in Hahn.

At Rott Headquarters Company of

9th

Panzer Division

and

105th Panzer Brigade

launched a counter-

attack in an effort to halt the American

drive on

Mulartshuette.*

Daily

Sitrep, 9th Pz Div, 13

Sep

44,

LXXI Corps

KTB Tages-

meldungen

German

engineers hastily began to

demolish all crossings over th e

Vicht River between

Stolberg

and Zweifall.

Tel

Cony, LXCrXI Corps

to 9th

Pz Div, 2030 on 13 Sep

44,

LIXXI

Corps

KTB,

Kampfverlauf .

At

LXXXI Corps headquarters American intentions emerged

more

5/20/2018 Aachen 1944

31/106

26

clearly.

The

corps operations

officer

called

General Mahlmann of

353d Infantry

Division

to

inform

him

that ...

the

enemy

will

probably

launch a drive bypassing

Aachen from

the

penetration area near

Kornelimuenster and Hahn

toward the second

band

of defenses

[Schill

Line].

The

three

Landesschuetzen

battalions

under the

command

of

353d Infantry

Division were alerted

to stand by

for

action.*

I=KXI

Corps also ordered 116th Panzer Division

to

transfer

Tel Cony,

LXXI

Corps to Gen Mahlmann, 2040 on

13

Sep 44,

L XX

Corps

KTB

Kampfverlauf.

the 8th Luftwaffe Fortress

Battalion

and

one

battery

of artillery

to 9th

Panzer

Division.*

Tel Conv, L XXI Corps

to

116th

Pz

Div

2320 on 13 Sep 44,

UXOXI Corps KTB

Kampfverlauf.

As 13 September 1944 drew to

a

close,

the

American

advance

against

the

LXXCI

Corps

sector

had been checked

temporarily.

The

salient

north of Hauset was

wiped out. The penetrations on

both

sides

of

Walheim

had

been sealed off in

the

line

Kornelimuenster

Hahn. The southern

prong of

the

3d Armored Division

attad

which

had advanced across

Rott, had been checked

at

Iulartshuette.*

Daily

Sitrep, A

Gp

B

0100

on 14 Sep 44,

A Gp B KTB, Tagesmeldun

The

night from

13

to

14

September

1944

passed quietly

in the

entire LXXXI Corps sector.

The Germans observed strong American

5/20/2018 Aachen 1944

32/106

UN

ED

infantry and

armored forces

assembling

in

the Schleckheim

Walheim

area

but

found Oberforstbach unoccupied.*

Lag

Sitrep,

LXI I

Corps, 0650 on

14 Sep 44 LXXXI Corps

KTB

Tagesmeldungen.

In the southern outskirts of Aachen

American reconnaissance

in the

morning of 14 September

probed the 116th Panzer

Division

front

line

at Bildcnen

toward

Bunker 189 and

Grenzhof. Then

American

infantry with strong

artillery

support

jumped

off

against

the

entire division front and

broke through

the bunker

line

in many

places.

The bunkers were bypassed

singly

and fought

down from

flank

and rear by

U.S.

infantry

while

American

tanks

followed up

the attack.*

After

noon

the bunkers

at Bildchen

and Koepfchen

Daily Sitrep, 116th Pz -Diy, C14Sep 44, X Corps KTB

Tagesmeldungen.

southwest

and south

of

Aachen

respectively)

were

in American hands.

The

116tn Panzer Division

forces were now

defending a semicircle

around Aacnen, from

Vaelser

Quartier

west of Aacnen to

the boundary

with

9th Panzer Division southeast

of the city.

Their intentions

were

to

defend

this line

and

to

counterattack

southward

whenever

possible.

Rad,

116th

Pz

Div

to

LXXXI

Corps,

1255 on 14

Sep 44,

LXXXI

Corps

KTB Meldungen

der

Div.

Iy

4A1 HEi

N

a n^^

5/20/2018 Aachen 1944

33/106

A

short

time later

the division

was

forced to admit

that all

attempts

to regain the

belt

of

bunkers

had

failed because

the

densely

wooded terrain

(Aachen

Municipal

Forest)

made

adequate

tank support and artillery

observation

impossible.*

Rad, 116th Pz Div to LeXXI

Corps, 1340

on

4

Sep

44, LXXXI

Corps

KTB

Meldungen

der

Div.

As American

forces

drew

closer to the city

the

panic in Aachen

reached

a

new

high.

According

to General

von Schwerin conditions

were

catastrophic.

No police

or civil

authorities

had yet re-

turned to

Aachen

The old museum

director

of Aachen,

accompanied

by

a few city officials

who had stayed

at

their posts,

came

to

see

von Schwerin

to

tell

him that a

group

of leading

citizens

had chosen

him the museum director,

to

form

a

provisional

city

government.

The general

gave

orders for the evacuation

to

proceed,

provided rail

and motor

transport

were

available,

but emphasized

that it would

only

result in

clogging

up

vital thoroughfares.

In

addition to having

to cope

with

the frantic

civilian

population,

116th

Panzer Division, which on 14

September

assumed

direct

command

of

all German elements in

its sector,

also

had

trouble with

the

Luftwaffe.

In

totaldisregard of the

division

commander's

orders the

Luftwaffe

attempted

to

pull

its

~iatiaircraft

batteries

out of

Aachen. Field

Marshal Gerd

von

Rtndstedt

(Commander

in

Chief

West himself

had

to interfere

reminding

Luftwaffe

anti-

aircraft

troops that

they

were to

take

orders like

everybody

else

iaLu iH[D

wi ~ly

5/20/2018 Aachen 1944

34/106

Sae

from

the superior headquarters to which

they

were

attached.

General

von

Sonwerin

also

complained that

his

Luftwaffe

fortress

batta-

lions had a

tendency to desert their positions

in the face of

even

minor attacks.*

Tel

Cony, LXXI

Corps to Gen

von

Schwerin,

0930

on 14 Sep 44,

LXXI Corps

KTB Kampfverlauf; Rpt,

A

Gp

B

to OB

WEST

1200 on

14

Sep 44, OB VW ST KTB;

Rad, 116th

Pz Div to

LXXXI Corps, 1310 on

14

ep '44, L XK

Corps

KTB Meldungen

der Div.; ETBINT 18

(Schwerin);

M S B-058 Voigtsberger).

Generalmajor

Heinrich Voigtsberger

commanded

the

60th

Panzer

Grenadier Regiment. When Count

von Schwerin

was

relieved of the

command

of

6th anzer

Division

on

15

September 1944, General

Voigtsberger became

acting

division

oommander until

the

new

com-

manding officer, Generalmajor Siegfried

von

Waldenburg,

arrived on

19

September.

Early in the afternoon of 14 September strong

American infantry

and

armored forces

rolled

up

the

bunker line from tne

direction

of Brand,

Niederforstbach

and

Oberforstbach.

By

1500

they

had

gained

a

line

extending

from

Beverbach Creek

via

Linzenshaeuschen

(on

tne

Eupen

-

Aachen Road)

to Friedrichsberg

Hill. The

116th

Panzer Division,

attempting to hold

the

line

from the

West

Wall

to

south of

Vaelser Quartier, from

there

to

north of Friedrichsberg

Hill

- Linzenshaeuschen

-

Beverbach

Creek,

had

lost

contact with

9th Panzer

Division on its

left southeast

of

Aachen.

he

Germans

noted

that their

opponents

were employing

new

tactics

to

crack

West

Wall

bunkers: the

Americans would launch

strong infantry

attacks covered

by

smoke screens while the tanks followed

to back

up the

attack and

to

support the infantry

in

knocking

out the bunkers

u

'y i

l ^^j^

5/20/2018 Aachen 1944

35/106

30

one

by one. The Americans made

heavy use

of

rtillery

and smoke

screens.

Tel

Conv,

LXXXI

Corps to 116th Pz Div,

1500 on

14 Sep

44, LXXXI

Corps

KTB Kampfverlauf;

Daily

Sitrep, 116th Pz Div,

14

Sep 44,

LXXXI Corps

KTB Tagesmeldungen.

Southeast

of

Aachen in the sector

of

9th Panzer Division the

American combat

commands resumed

their drive up the Stolberg

Corridor

in

the morning

of 14

September.

Having

taken Oberforstbach

and

Niederforstbach,

they

captured

Kornelimuenster

at

1030

and

Breinig

at

1100.

merican tanks were

observed

shortly

after

noon con-

Daily

Sitrep,

LXXXI

Corps, 2100

on 14 Sep 44,

LXXXI

Corps

KTB

Tagesmeldungen.

tinuing northeastward

from Kornelimuenster toward

Buesbach.* About

TWX

116th Pz Div to

LEXxI

Corps,

1250

bn

14 Sep

44,

LXXXI

Corps

KTB

Meldungen

der

Div.

th

same time

the

Germans reported

an

American tank

driving

from

Mulartshuette

northeastward

toward

Zweifall.

A

few

hours

later

Rad,

116th

Pz

Div

to

LXXXI

Corps,

1420

on 14

Sep

44,

LXXXI

Corps

KTB Meldungen

der

Div.

at 1715

American infantry,

tanks, and

armored

cars

entered

Zweifall.

After fifteen

minutes

the

infantry

had

captured th e

irst four bunkers Bunkers

330, 334,

335

and 336)

in

the

second

NN

sfl E

5/20/2018 Aachen 1944

36/106

UM

rFIE

band

of West

Wail fortifications,

and

the

task force

continued

eastward

through

the breach

in

the

direction

of

Vicht

and

Mausbach.*

Tel

Convs,

LXXI Corps

to 353d Inf

Div, 1715

and

1720 on

14

Sep

44,

and

LXXXI Corps

to 9th

Pz

Div, 2000 on 14

Sep 44, XXX

Corps

KTB

Kampfverlauf;

Daily

Sitrep,

LXXXI Corps,

2100

on 14 Sep

44,

LXXXI

Corps

KTB Tagesmeldungen.

In

view

of the

American

breakthrough

at

Zweifall LXXX

Corps

ordered

9th Panzer

Division

to

take command

of the

second band

of the West

Wall

along

with the Landesschuetzen

battalions

III/6

and

1/9 com-

mitted

there.

Headquarters

353d

Infantry

Division

would be

dis-

engaged

to receive

another

assignment.*

Reinforced

by

the

three

Tel

Convs,

LXXXI Corps

to

9th

Pz Div

and

353d Inf Div,

1740

on

14 Sep

44,

IXXXI Corps

KTB Kampfverlauf.

assault

guns of

394th

Assault Gun Brigade, 9th

Panzer

Division married

these

assault

guns

to a company

of motorized

infantry

and committed

these

forces

in a counterattack

against

the

American

tasK force

driving

on

Mausbacn.*

LXXXI Corps

issued

strict orders to

9th

Tel Convs,

LXXXI Corps to

9th Pz Div,

1745 and

1810 on

14

Sep

44,

LXXXI Corps

KTB

Kampfverlauf.

Panzer

Division

to

throw

back

the

Americans

before

the

end of th e

day

and

to regain

full

controlof

the second

belt

of

West Wall

bunkers.*

Tel

Cony,

LEXI

Corps

to

9th Pz

Div,

2000

on

14 Sep

44,

LXXI

Corps

KTB Kampfverlauf.

ier

5/20/2018 Aachen 1944

37/106

The front

line of

9th Panzer

Division

ow exten e from the

southern

edge of Brand southern

edge of

Buesbach

east of Zweifall

to.

he

West Wall east

of Roetgen. At 1800 the Germans reported

Evg Sitrep,

A

Gp B 1930

on

14

Sep

44,

A

Gp B

KTB

Anlagen,

Letzte Meldung [Final Sitreps],

10.VIII. 30. IX.44.

Referred

to

hereafter as

A Gp

B KTB

Letzte Meldung.

that at least

two hundred American tanks

had assembled

in

Kornelimuenster.

Additional columns

were seen moving

north fron

Walheim. Up

front

the

American

spearhead

reached the

southern

outskirts of

Stolberg at 2000. Apparently

the Americans then

de-

cided

not

to continue

their advance toward

Stolberg

and Eschweiler

that evening.

Instead,

they

worked on their encirclement of Aachen

Sitrep,

9th Pz Div,

2030

on 14 Sep 44,

LXXXI

Corps KTB

KanpFverlauf.

in the

area between

Aachen

and Stolberg.

Late

in the afternoon American

forces

broke

through

the

116th

Panzer Division

line between

Beverbach Creek

and Lindert,

two miles

west-southwest

of Brand, and stabbed

into the flank of the

60th

Panzer

Grenadier Regiment. The

116th

Panzer

Reconnaissance Battalion

was

committed

in

support

of

the

division s

flank southeast of

th e

Aachen Municipal Forest.*

Daily Sitrep,

116th

Pz Div, 14 Sep 44, LX Corps KTB

Tagesmeldun

gen.

as

L

~

5/20/2018 Aachen 1944

38/106

American tanks

and armored cars driving

north from the

Walheim Oberforstbach

Niederforstbach area pushed

through

Brand

at

1830.*

Less

than

an

hour

later at 1915

American

Sitrep,

9th Pz Div

to LX Corps, 2030 on 14 Sep 44,

LXXXI

Corps

KTB,

Kampfverlauf.

tanks captured Eilendorf

and

the

steel plant at Rothe Erde [ Red

Earth ]

east of Aachen.* The city was

now ringed

on

three sides.

Daily

Sitrep, LXXXI

Corps,

2100

on 14

Sep

44, I I Corps KTB,

Tagesmeldungen.

LWXXI

Corps

received reports

that sizeable elements of

116th Panzer

Division, Antiaircraft

Group

Aachen. nd

the Kampfkommandant were

withdrawing

to the northeast,

supposedly

in line

with an

order

issued

by Colonel von

Osterroth. General Schack

immediately

ordered

that all withdrawing elements

be rallied

and committed

in a counter-

attack

from the u''erselen area

southward toward Rothe Erde.

Contact between

116th and

9th

Panzer

Divisions

was to

be re-establish

at

all

cost through the efforts

of all

able

officers

of the

116th

Panzer Division

Headquarters. A

rear

area fortress

engineer head

quarters

received

orders to block the Autobahn to

Cologne.*

Rpt on

Situation

in

Aachen

area,

Gen

Schack,

2145 on 14 Sep

44

LXXI

Corps KTB

Kamnpfverlauf

By

special

repeat order from

Hitler Aachen was to be evacuated

if necessary by force

The

116th Panzer

Division

was ordered to

5/20/2018 Aachen 1944

39/106

S34

support the

evacuation measures by

regulating

traffic. The

police

would

also be

available after 0100

on

15

September.

They were

finally returning to Aachen.*

Tel Conv,

L~ Corps to

116th Pz

Div, 2345

on

14

Sep 44,

LXXXI Corps

KTB

Kampfverlauf.

The

mission

of 116th

Panzer

Division

on

15

September

was to

hold the Schill Line

at all cost

and to

make

an effort

to wipe

out

the American

penetrations

at Rothe

Erde and Eilendorf.

n spite

of

General

Schack s orders

the

projected

counterattack

against

this

salient

had not

yet been launched

at

daybreak.*

NLg Sitrep,

LXXXI Corps,

0550 on 15 Sep

44,

LXX

Corps

KTB

Tagesmeldungen.

The semicircular

front around

Aachen remained

intact

from

Vaelser

Quartier

to Steinebruect

in

tne

morning

of 15

September

but buckled

just

east

of Steinebrueck

when American

infantry

and

armor

pushed

the

116th

Panzer

Reconnaissance

Battalion

back to

the railroad

leading

out

of

Aachen

northeast

of

Burtscheid.

Re-

inforced

by

the

34th

Machine

Gun

Battalion,

which

had

been

rallied

after

an earlier

attempt

to withdraw,

the

reconnaissance

battalion

established

a defense

line

along

this

railway

embankment.

The

Tel Conv,

LXXXI

Corps

to

116th Pz Div,

0100,

0840 and 1130

on 15 Sep

44,

LXXI

Corps

KTB Kampfverlauf.

U~gtL rI

5/20/2018 Aachen 1944

40/106

U

ED

35

attackers

did not

immediately attempt

to

breai

through this

line.

The

Americans devoted a large

part

of

the day to the concentration

of

strong forces

in the

area

south

of

Burtscheid.

Judging from

the

movements

they

observed

and from merican

artillery

fire, the

Germans

estimated that

at least one infantry division

was assembling

south of Aachen.

Daily

Sitrep 116th

Pz

Div,

2100 on

15 Sep

44,

LXXXI

Corps

KTB Tagesmeldungen.

East

of

the

city in

and

south

of Eilendorf American tanks

and

motor transport

also continued to assemble until

according

to

German estimate U.S.

forces

there

had

been brought

up to

the

strength of about

one armored division. n view

of the

American

build-up the Germans expected

that VII

Corps would

launch its all-

out

attack

against

Aachen on

16

September. Although ground operation

Ibid.

seem

to have

been limited

to

reconnaissance

while this build-up south

and

east of Aachen

was in

progress

American artillery

subjected

Aachen and suburbs

to heavy fire.

The West

Wall bunkers

north and

t

south

of/Aachen

Stolberg

road

in

particular

re eived

strong rocket

projector

fire.

Tel

Conv, LXXXI Corps to 116th

Pz Div,

0915

on 15

Sep

44,

LXXXI Corps

KTB Kampfverlauf.

5/20/2018 Aachen 1944

41/106

U NCLASSIF

6

At

1530 on

15

September

American

infantry began

to

infiltrate

the

bunker

line south

of Rothe Erde

in the direction of Geisberg

Hill. The

Landesschuetzen

battalion

there abandoned

its positions,

but

seven German assault

guns held the

line

behind the

pillboxes.*

Tel Cony

LXXXI Corps

to 9th Pz Div,

154

on 15

Sep

44 XX

Corps KTB Kampfverlauf;

Evg Sitrep, LXXX

Corps, 1700 on 15

Sep

44, LIXXI Corps KTB

Tagesmeldungen.

At 1700 American forces jumped

off

in

simultaneous

attacks

from

the

Buschhaus

toward

Burtscheid,

and

from

Eilendorf

north

and

northeast in

the

direction

of Verlautenheide and Geisberg

Hill.

The defenders were

able to

repulse both attacks.

Thirty American

tanks rolling northward from

Eilendorf were forced

towithdraw in

the face of

concentrated German

rtillery

fire;

the

Germans

claimed

the destruction of two U.S.

tanks.*

Tel

Cony,

LXXXI

Corps to 116th

Pz Div,

1718 on

15

Sep 44,

iXXI Corps KTB Kampfverlauf;

Daily Sitrep, 116th Pz Div, 2100

on 15

Sep 44,

LXIXI

Corps

KTB

Tagesmeldungen.

In turning

back

the American drive

on

the Aachen

suburb of

Burtscheid,

the Germans

had narrowly prevented the invader

from

venturing

into the streets of tne old

Imperial

City for the

first

time.

To 116th Panzer Division

General

Schack relayed the

Hitler

order demanding

the fanatic defense of Fortress

Aachen :

In

the

event of an enemy penetration of Aachen, each and every

house

will

be

defended.

A

strategic withdrawal from

the

southern

to the

northern

periphery of tne

city

is

out

of the

question. *

ddL JRN

lE

5/20/2018 Aachen 1944

42/106

TWX

LXXXI

Corps to

116th Pz Div,

1718 on 15 Sep

44,

XXX

Corps

KTB

Befehle

an

Div.

Shortly

after midnight

on

15

September General

Schack had re-

peated

his order to 9th

Panzer Division that the

Americans

must

be

forced

out

of the

second

band

of

West

Wall

bunkers near Iausbach

at all cost.

During

the remaining hours of darkness 9th Panzer

Division made ~such preparations

for

the counterattack as it was

capable

of.

One replacement

battalion was en

route to the division;

in addition

t n tanks w r moving

up to the

front.

In

the small

hours

of the morning the

Landesschuetzen

battalion committed

on

the division s southern

wing

(probably

1/9 abandoned

its

positions;

it was

necessary

to

move

up

another battalion

(probably 328th

Re-

placement

Training

Battalion

from

Scheveriuette

in

order to plug

the gap.*

Tel

Cony,

IXOXI Corps

to 9th Pz

Div, 0015 on

15 Sep 44, L XII

Corps

KTB

Kampfverlauf;

Rad, 9th

Pz

Div to

LXXXI Corps,

0353 on

15 Sep

44,

LXXXI

Corps

KTB,Meldungen

der Div.

The

division launched

ts attack

against

the American salient

at

dawn

and

was able to

drive away

U.S.

armor

south of Mausbach.

Some

bunkers

were

apparently

recaptured

in the irst

assault;

two

bunkers

remained in American

hands. Two

hours later the

division

TWX

9th

Pz

Div

to

LXXXI Corps, 0534

on 15

Sep

44,

LXXXI

Corps

KTB Meldungen

der

Div.

5/20/2018 Aachen 1944

43/106

CLASSIFI ED

headquarters had

no

news

on the outcome

of the

counterthrust toward

Vicht and

Zweifall

otner

than

the

report

that the two

bunkers

south of

Mausbach

had

not

been

captured yet.*

For

the third time

Tel

Cony LXXXI

Corps to

9th

Pz Div 0740 on

1 5

Sep

44

LXXXI

Corps KTB Kampfverlauf.

LXXXI

Corps

ordered: 9th Panzer

Division

armor

will attac

the

enemy

and

throw

him back behind the West Wall.

There is no

time

to lose' *

Tel Cony LXXXI Corps

to

9th

Pz

Div

0925

on 15

Sep

44 LXXI

Corps KTB Kampfverlauf.

In

the

early afternoon

the

division was able

to

report

that

as a result of ts counterattack all

bunkers

of the M R

from

northeast

of

Buesbach to Zweifall

were once more

in

German hands. An

American

attack on

Buesbach had

been

repulsed by

four tanks

of 105th Panzer

Brigade

and

four

assault

guns of the division's

antitan cmnpany

committed

there

earlier in

the day.* The German

success, however

Tel

Conv

LXXXI Corps

to

9th

Pz Div

0015

on

15 Sep 44

LXXXI

Corps

KTB

Kampfverlauf;

Noon

Sitrep,

A Gp B 1400

on 15

Sep

44

A

Gp

KTB

Letzte

Meldung.

was

very shortlived.

Throughout

the day 9th

Panzer Division

had

watched

the American build-up with growing apprehension. In th e

e rly morning

the division h d expressed

concern

about

the

assembly

of

two hundred U.S. tanks in Kornelimuenster

to which more

were

5/20/2018 Aachen 1944

44/106

steadily

being added.

At 1500 a

German runner

reported a

con-

centration of eighty

U.S. tanks in Breinig.

Tel Convs,

LXXI Corps

to 9th

Pz

Div,

0015 and

1500 on 15 Sep 44,

LXXXI

Corps

K B, Kampfverlauf.

n the early afternoon

the German

attack

bogged

down

in the

face of

the

American rtillery preparation. Under the heavy

American

artillery,

tank, and mortar fire

the

division

sustained serious

losses

and was

unable to execute any movements. The Germans sensed

that the

American

attack

was imminent.*

Tel Cony, LXXXI

Corps

to

9th

Pz

Div,

1655 on

15

Sep 44, LXXXI

Corps KTB

Kampfverlauf;

Daily Sitrep, 9th

Pz

Div,

1910

on

15

Sep

44, LXXXI

Corps KTB

Tagesmeldungen.

At 1550

on 15 September

American tanks and infantry

jumped

off

from

their

assembly

area

at

Breinig

and

he