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    Educational Psychology Review, Vol. 12, No. 4, 2000

    Stage, Sequence, and Sequels: ChangingConceptions of Morality, Post-Kohlberg

    Mary Louise Arnold1

    The years since Kohlbergs death have marked a pivotal stage in morapsychology. The field is addressing a number of critical questions and pursuing new themes and approaches as it continues to (re)define itself in thcourse of its own development. This paper presents a brief overview of som

    of these emerging themes within the context of the traditional cognitivedevelopmental approach to moral socialization. In particular, it highlighchanging conceptions of the moral person and raises questions about thimplications of these changes for the role of reason in contemporarmoral psychology.

    KEY WORDS: moral development; moral reasoning; moral self; Kohlberg; moral psycholog

    INTRODUCTION

    For many readers, the title of this paper is likely to invoke a welknown chapter in the 1969 Goslin Handbook in which Lawrence Kohlberfirst fully elaborated the cognitive developmental approach to moral socia

    ization (Kohlberg, 1969). In the intervening 30 years, the notion of stagand sequence has largely dominated moral psychology, and it now alsh t fitti d i ti f th l ti f thi di it l

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    and pursuing new topics and approaches as it continues to (re)define itsein the course of its own development. The purpose of this paper is tpresent a brief overview of some of these emerging themesor sequelsto Kohlbergs stage theorywithin the broader context of the traditionacognitivedevelopmental approach to moral socialization.

    In many respects the cognitivedevelopmental paradigm within morpsychology has had a rather turbulent history. First introduced by Baldwi(1906), then taken up but quickly abandoned by Piaget (1932/1965), manyears passed before it was reintroduced and fully delineated by Kohlber(1981, 1984). Described at the time as an odd duck swimming againsthe tide within the social sciences (Brown and Herrnstein, 1975), arguabl

    Kohlberg soon came to revolutionize the study of morality, and his morastage theory is generally acknowledged to have dominated the field evesince (e.g., Kurtines and Gewirtz, 1991; Modgil and Modgil, 1986; Turie1998). From the start, Kohlbergs theory has provoked controversy anstimulated heated debate. However, just as he tenaciously defended thcognitive developmental approach, Kohlberg also listened carefully to hcritics as he continued to revise and reformulate his theory throughout h

    career, admittedly eating his own words (Kohlberg, 1973a) while doinso. The legacy of this revisionist spirit is aptly reflected in Rests (1989suggestion a decade ago that moral psychologists continue to be as boland daring as Kohlberg had been in his unrelenting effort to advance thstudy of morality.

    A strong revisionist spirit does prevail among cognitivedevelopmentalists todayand many of the current initiatives being undetaken in moral psychology are, indeed, both bold and daring. They encompass a wide range of topics and approaches, challenging some of the centratenets of Kohlbergs theory. The breadth and variety of these initiativedefy easy (and certainly brief) synthesis. To attempt even a cursory overvieof them here is a daunting task. Therefore, my intent is to delimit thscope of this review by focusing on only a few related themes reflected icontemporary sequels to Kohlbergs theory, and, most specifically, on thchanging conceptions of the moral person and the implications of thes

    changes for the role of reason in moral psychology.Reason is at the heart of the cognitivedevelopmental approach t

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    tions regarding the role of reason in contemporary moral psychology. Accordingly, this review begins with a brief summary of Kohlbergcommitment to reason, as a backdrop against which recent research cabe interpreted. I then present an overview of some emerging themes withithe cognitivedevelopmental paradigm, concluding with brief consideratioof the role of reason within the context of these new developments.

    THE ROLE OF REASON IN KOHLBERGS THEORY

    Within the cognitivedevelopmental paradigm (Kohlberg, 1981, 198

    Piaget, 1932/1965; Rest, 1983; Turiel, 1998) the most distinguishing charateristic of morality is the human capacity to reason. Moral judgment halong been regarded as the single most important or influential factoranthe only trulymoraldeterminant of a persons moral behavior (Kohlber1984). Although Kohlbergs position on the role of reason in moral functioning undoubtedly shifted during his career, certainly the strength of hcommitment to reason as the core of morality never wavered. The ke

    tenets of this commitment are explicated throughout his writings (Kohlber1981, 1984) and will be summarized here only briefly.Essentially, Kohlbergs commitment to reason is grounded in a blen

    of philosophical assumptions regarding the nature of morality itself anpsychological beliefs about the developmental process by which a persocomes to understand the social world. Following Kant, Kohlberg believethat morality is an experiential domain that is differentiated from otherby its dependence on a persons capacity to reason. By definition, moralitrequires that a persons actions be rational, motivated by purpose or intenand carried out with autonomous free will. Building on these assumptionis a set of psychological beliefs about the way a persons capacity for morareason develops. In the tradition of Baldwin (1906) and Piaget (1932/1965Kohlberg believed that the developing person actively constructs or makemeaning of the social environmentand that there is a structure oform to this reasoning that develops in qualitatively more mature stages

    as a result of social experience. As is well known, Kohlbergs six-stagtheory provides one account of the way a persons moral judgment assume

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    criteria of justice (Kohlberg, 1973b). Moreover, in his view, knowledgitself is motivating. Inherent in reason is an impinging or binding qualitthat motivates a person to act in accordance with his or her judgmen . . . perceived injustice is disequilibrating and action toward justice equilbrating (Kohlberg, 1986, p. 499). Although Kohlberg (Kohlberg anCandee, 1984) later admitted to having underestimated the complexity othe relation between moral stage and action and revised his thinking tinclude two intervening cognitive functions to explain ita prescriptivjudgment of the moral right and a personal judgment of responsibility tact accordinglyhe still held to his conviction that it is the logic of persons reasoning that most strongly influences his or her moral behavio

    It is in this respect, therefore, that reason constitutes the essential core obackbone of a persons moral maturity in Kohlbergs theory.

    As one might expect, Kohlbergs commitment to reason has stimulatemuch critical debate throughout his theorys history. The role of reasohas been challenged on many grounds, and is complicated by its entanglement with the developmental stage concept and related measurement issueMost notably, Kohlberg has been consistently criticized by both philoso

    phers and psychologists for granting reason far too much power. In emphasizing reason to the extent he did, he has been accused of disregardinother factors also typically associated with moral functioning, such as emotion (e.g., Gibbs, 1991; Hoffman, 1987) and traits or habits of characte(e.g., Kilpatrick, 1992; Peters, 1982). Even when reason is credited witcentral importance, the theory has been plagued by criticism of its failurto provide compelling evidence of the role of reason in interaction witother components of morality, and of its link to moral behavior in particula(e.g., Blasi, 1980; Kutnick, 1986).

    The universality of Kohlbergs stages of moral reasoning has also beepersistently challenged, again from various perspectives. Culturalists, foexample, have repeatedly challenged the appropriateness and applicabilitof Kohlbergs moral stages to the customs and traditions of life in othesocieties (e.g., Shweder, 1990; Simpson, 1974). Closer to home, particulaists have argued that Kohlbergs stages of reasoning have little meanin

    abstracted from the social context of daily moral life (e.g., Blum, 1990Feminists (among others) have criticized the hegemony of justice reasonin

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    being artificial and too abstruse (e.g., Haan, 1977); the reliability and validitof his Moral Judgment Interview scoring system have been a source ocontinual dispute, despite extensive revisions (Colby and Kohlberg, 1987the developmental properties of his moral stages have been found suspec(e.g., Kurtines and Greif, 1974; Fischer, 1983); and even their conceptuadifferentiation has been questioned, especially at the postconventional lev(e.g., Gibbs, 1977; Puka, 1990), to cite only some of the most common complaints.

    However, one of the most damning criticisms of Kohlbergs theor(and one that is embedded in many cited above) concerns the perceptioof the moral person that its emphasis on reason has created. A number o

    critics have characterized the moral reasoner in Kohlbergs model (evenand somewhat ironically, the mostmaturereasoner) as a cold, rationalistidisembodied person, out of touch with the realities of everyday life (seBoyd, 1989), a personification well reflected in the gripping subtitle, OHow to Reach Stage 6 and Remain a Bastard (Straughan, 1986).

    In sum, although Kohlbergs vast legacy to moral psychology is widelacknowledged to far outweigh the shortcomings of his theory, in recen

    years there has been a growing sense within the cognitivedevelopmentaparadigm that a more comprehensive theory of morality is long overdueAfter having focused so squarely on moral judgment for so long, it watime to put reason into larger perspective and redirect attention to thereastudy of moralityto understanding how people actually function in thsocial worldas Kohlberg himself was again doing in the Bronx schooin the years before his death. As recently expressed by one prominencognitivedevelopmentalist, the study of morality has suffered from particular skew, which may now constrain our ability to develop a morholistic understanding of moral functioning and its development, and perhaps it can no longer be considered a progressive research enterprise(Walker, Pitts, Hennig, & Matsuba, 1995, p. 373).

    EMERGING THEMES IN CONTEMPORARY MORAL

    PSYCHOLOGY

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    significant ways, and all are drawing from advances in other areas of social science.

    One major theme that is reflected in several strands of current researchfor example, focuses on re-examining and redefining the moral domainMost notably, the distinctiveness of morality from other domains of sociaexperience, such as social conventions and personal preferences, has nobeen more clearly delineated (Turiel, 1983, 1998). From another vantagpoint, the richness of the moral domain across cultures has been elaboratein terms of distinct conceptual foundations, such as autonomy, communitand divinity (Shweder, 1990). The boundaries of the moral domain havnow been extended well beyond those of justice to encompass other orienta

    tions to moral experience, such as care (Gilligan, 1982) and filial piet(Walker and Moran, 1991); its sociological parameters are being examineand extended (Snarey, 1995); and, its landscape is being recharted with thhelp of ordinary people (Walker and Pitts, 1998; Walkeret al., 1995). Ivarying ways, all of these initiatives are attempting to make our conception(s) of morality more representative of the diversity of individual social experience.

    In recent years, moral psychology has also become considerablmore sensitive and attentive to the varieties and vicissitudes of moraexperience in everyday life (see, in particular, Killen and Hart, 1995and especially to the influence of social context on moral functionin(e.g., Helwig, 1995, Snarey, 1995, Youniss and Yates, 1997). A numbeof studies have examined the impact of varying situational contexts (e.gfree trade, drug use) on moral judgment, frequently demonstrating threat to the consistency of moral stage reasoning (or structural wholeness) central to Kohlbergs theory (Krebs, Vermeulen, Carpendale, anDenton, 1991). Similarly, more contextually specific measures of morajudgment and educational programs have recently been developed tmore appropriately address the special needs of diverse populationsuch as those designed to equip antisocial youth to think and aresponsibly (Gibbs, Potter, and Goldstein, 1995).

    Contemporary moral psychologists have also begun to adopt mor

    varied methodological approaches to the study of moral development. Foexample, strongly influenced by the sociocultral framework, Tappan (1997

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    of the idiographic approach known as assisted autobiography to studthe life histories of people committed to moral excellence.

    All of these themes (and others) have contributed in varying ways tmore contemporary conceptions of morality and ways to study it. Eitheexplicit or implicit within several of them, however, is another theme thahas recently emerged as a focus of attention within moral psychologychanging conceptions of the moral persona theme that is reflected varously in research on the moral self, moral identity, and moral personalityAlthough moral psychology has undoubtedly always had the moral agentas its ultimate concern, curiously his or her nature or personality has remained somewhat veiled within earlier cognitivedevelopmental theor

    The predominant emphasis on reason within Kohlbergs theory regardlehow justified it may be as the core or structural backbone of morapersonhoodprovides only one perspective on moral maturity. Severacontemporary cognitivedevelopmentalists now acknowledge that this biahas resulted in an impoverished description of the moral agent, and thathere is a need for a more full-bodied account of moral functioningtput some flesh on bare bones (Walker et al., 1995, pp. 390, 404, respec

    tively). Several initiatives are now being undertaken to do this.

    Changing Conceptions of the Moral Person

    The theoretical underpinnings for research on the moral persohave existed for some time in the writings of several developmentalist(e.g., Blasi, 1983, 1995; Rest, 1983; Davidson and Youniss, 1991). In hfour-component model of morality, for example, Rest (1983) cites selidentity as a moral being as one potential explanation for a personmotivation to assign higher priority to moral values than to othecompeting values in moral decision-making. Similarly, Davidson anYouniss (1991) have proposed a compelling conceptual analysis of thlink between moral cognition and identity, placing particular emphason the role of social context.

    The most extensive conceptual account of the moral person, howeveis presented in Blasis self-model of moral functioning (Blasi, 1983, 1995

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    Rather, he argues that the tendency for a person to behave morally ilargely dependent on the extent to which moral beliefs and values arintegrated in the personality, and in ones sense of self. The influence oumoral beliefs have on our lives, therefore, is contingent on the personaimportance that we as individuals attach to themwe must identify anrespect them as our own . . . determining their rank in our motivationhierarchy . . . and building on them our most intimate sense of ourselvewhat we think we deeply and truly are (Blasi, 1990, p. 56).

    Guided by these various conceptual analyses, recent empirical worhas begun to explore more specifically the characteristics of the morapersonality across the lifespan. These studies have had varying startin

    points and are framed around varying guiding questions: How do peoplunderstand morality and its importance to them? What role does moralitplay in the larger context of peoples everyday lives? What explains, anhow does one acquire, a sense of moral identity and a commitment tsocial responsibility? How do people conceptualize the moral domain, morgenerally, and their personal experiences within it?

    One strand of research on the moral person has aimed at understandin

    the nature of moral excellence, the exemplary behavior of people who ardistinguished for their personal moral commitment (e.g., Colby & Damon1992; Hart and Fegley, 1995). For example, Colby and Damon (1992conducted extensive personal interviews with 23 individuals whose liveexemplify an unfailing commitment to moral causes, such as the preservation of civil liberties and the challenges of overcoming poverty. Despitvast differences in their personalities, social circumstances, and moral visionwhat emerged from this research as the most distinguishing characteristiof these exemplary individuals was the extent to which they identifiethemselves as agents of moral good and relentlessly pursued these goaleven in the face of insurmountable obstacles. In keeping with Blasis theorit appeared that through the course of their lives their moral vision habecome seamlessly integrated with their personal goals and with theconceptions of who they are as people. Interestingly, however, the maturitof their moral reasoning was not a distinguishing characteristic, varyin

    from Stages 3 to 5 in Kohlbergs model. These findings have led Colband Damon (1992, p. 309) to conclude that [t]he critical issue in mora

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    Yates, Fegley, and Wilson, 1995; Youniss and Yates, 1997). With the goaof examining how altruistic adolescents understand their social worlds andparticularly, how they understand themselves, Hart and Fegley conductelengthy interviews of 15 inner-city, minority adolescents who had beenominated by community leaders for their exceptional commitment to thneeds of others, such as donating large blocks of time to social servicagencies and working in community soup kitchens. Their analyses of severfacets of self-concept and other forms of social understanding revealed clear synthesis of the adolescents sense of self and their moral commitmenconsistent with Colby and Damons (1992) findings. For example, the selconcepts of these young exemplars were distinguished from more typica

    adolescents in several ways: They were more likely to describe themselvein terms of moral traits and goals, to view themselves as having a greatesense of stability and continuity over time, to be more oriented towartheir personal ideals and parental values, and to articulate theories of sein which personal beliefs and philosophies are important. However, likColby and Damons (1992) adult sample, these exemplary adolescents dinot differ significantly from other adolescents in the maturity of their mora

    judgment, as defined by Kohlbergs theory. On the basis of this and othefactors, Hart and Fegley (1995) concluded that this degree of moral commiment cannot be reduced to general developmental sophistication; and, likColby and Damon (1992), they suggest that although moral judgment an important aspect of moral behavior, its maturity is of limited influencein these contexts. Closely related research on moral commitment in adolescence has recently been conducted by Youniss and Yates (1997). Derivefrom a conceptual framework somewhat different from Kohlbergs, thehave conducted more extensive, longitudinal explorations of the developmental processes by which youth acquire a sense of moral or civic identitand social responsibility, through a sustained commitment to communitservice.

    Another strand of contemporary research focusing on the moral persoconsists of studies of subjective or personal conceptions of morality anmoral experience, and the importance morality plays in everyday life. I

    a study designed to explore the integration of morality in the adolescenself, for example, Arnold (1993) investigated adolescents conceptions o

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    across ages, the adolescents varied greatly in their virtue choices, witsome identifying exclusively with moral qualities and others ascribing nimportance to them. They also varied in their explanations of the personimportance of these qualities. Irrespective of their virtue choices, for somthe motivation to be a good person was defined in purely moral termand was accompanied by a keen sense of personal agency and emotionaresonance; in contrast, others were more clearly motivated by personaachievement and self-interest, with little (if any) evidence of a concerfor others. Moreover, in keeping with Hart and Fegleys (1995) findingadolescents who did reveal a strong sense of moral self were also morlikely than adolescents who did not to display exemplary patterns of mora

    conduct, as rated by their classroom teachers; however, they did not diffefrom others in the maturity of their moral judgment.

    In a series of studies focusing on naturalistic conceptions of moralityWalker and his colleagues (Walker et al., 1995; Walker and Pitts, 1998have recently explored how people across the lifespan understand anexperience morality in everyday life. In extensive open-ended interview80 middle-class Canadians, aged 1684, were asked a series of question

    about moral experience, including examples of real-life moral dilemmaand their experiences living through them, and their conceptions of thmoral domain, broadly defined. Content analyses of the interviews revealevarious dimensions of moral life, several of which contribute further to ouunderstanding of the nature of the moral person. In particular, it washown that peoples experiences of moral conflict, as revealed in their selgenerated dilemmas, focused most typically on personal relationships anintrapsychic issues, rather than on issues of justice. In recalling their feelingand motivations in handling real-life conflicts, the participants cited a number of intrapersonal factors: Typically, they expressed high degrees of angand confusion and tended to rely on intuition, conscience, or gut reactionto evaluate the morality of their decisions, rather than on reflectivity; andthey also frequently cited the influence of practical considerations and oreligion and faith on their moral experiences. On the basis of these analyseit was evident to Walker and his colleagues that, for some people, moralit

    was rooted in the heart of their being, whereas for others it was far lesimportant. In addition, in describing their conceptions of highly mora

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    to the cognitivedevelopmental paradigm. By more closely attending tthe contextual and subjective features of morality in everyday life, thcontemporary work lays the foundation for a more comprehensive understanding of the nature of the moral person. Current research on this themin particular, is providing valuable insights into characteristics of the personeglected in our traditional model. The research illuminates some of thintrapersonal dimensions of moral experience, such as the values and goathat shape and give meaning to life and the affective dynamics of moraexperience. In some respects, contemporary research hints at a return tnotions of character banished from the cognitive-developmental paradigm by Kohlberg years ago. By doing so, these studies have, indeed, begu

    to provide a more full-bodied account of moral functioningto put somflesh on bare bones (Walker et al., 1995, p. 404).

    At the same time, however, this recent research presents a quite diffeent conception of moral maturity from that portrayed in earlier cognitivedevelopmental theory. As discussed above, in Kohlbergs model, mormaturity is characterized most specifically by a persons capacity to reasonreason provides the backbone or structural framework on which peopl

    make meaning of moral situations. However, in attempting to expand othis conceptionor, in sustaining Walkers metaphor, to put flesh obare bonesthese recent studies suggest that other characteristics of thperson, specifically the way a persons moral values and beliefs are integrated into his or her sense of self or identity, are the critical factor, witlittle (if any) evidence of the influence of moral stage development. Athough these contemporary developmentalists (e.g., Walker et al., 1995nevertheless continue to acknowledge the importance of moral judgmento moral maturity, their research leaves lots of ambiguity about the statuof reason in the contexts they have studied. Without greater clarity on thissue, readers are left wondering what, exactly, constitutes the bare bonesto which they need to add flesh. Or, more pointedly, to extend thmetaphor, what can one say about the strong Kohlbergian identificatioof reason as the core or backbone of moral maturity as a result of thesrecent empirical findings? Such questions encourage cognitive

    developmentalists to reconsider the role of reason in conceptions of mormaturity in the context of this current work.

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    tions about the role of reason in conceptions of moral maturity. Morspecifically, it seems to raise two kinds of questions in particular: One kinconcerns the psychological aspects of moral development, and asks: Dthese recent findings on the nature of the moral person cause one to questiothe relevance of reason to a persons moral behavior or commitment? Whais the current status of moral reasoning in changing conceptions of thmoral person? A second set of questions pertains to the implications othese recent findings for the way psychologists study morality and mordevelopment: Is contemporary psychology still committed to the role oreason in the study of morality? Or, are these studies calling into questioKohlbergs central criterion for the psychological study of morality, th

    belief that it requires us to access a persons own reason-based understanding of his or her moral experience? In both cases, consideration of thesquestions depends largely on the interpretation of the role of reason iKohlbergs theory. As summarized at the outset, Kohlbergs commitmento reason as the core of morality is multifaceted, and each facet is relevanto our consideration of these questions.

    The most typical interpretation of the role of reason in Kohlberg

    theory, and the most salient within the context of the research reviewehere, concerns the developmental stage concept for which his theory is beknown. This interpretation suggests that moral reason necessitates a stageof-moral-judgment analysis, in keeping with Kohlbergs claim that morastages constitute formal structures of reason, with an inherent logic thainfluences both the adequacy of a persons moral judgment and the commiment to act on it. In this recent research, however, a stage-developmeninterpretation of moral reason as the crucial factor in moral commitmenis not supported: These studies have shown that in various contexts morastage is not related to behavior, whereas another characteristic of the person, notably a sense of moral identity, is related.

    The complexity of the judgmentaction problem in moral psychologis well documented in the theoretical literature (see, in particular, Blas1980; Rest, 1983; Thoma, 1994), and the fact that no stage relations havbeen observed in the contemporary, empirical research reviewed here doe

    not necessarily mean that maturity of moral judgment is irrelevant. Therare a number of possible explanations for these recent findings. For exam

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    Kohlbergs theory. One question that logically arises from this research iWhen do people need sophisticated moral judgment and when do thenot? Or, from an empirical perspective: In what contexts does moral stagreasoning relate to moral commitment and when does it not?

    In attempting to answer these questions, at least two critical factorappear worthy of attention: the kind of social problem or situation at issueand the nature of the person who chooses to address it. Quite likely, sommoral situations do require sophisticated, analytical thought for an adequatresolution (such as the kind of complex issues routinely deliberated bSupreme Court Justices); whereas others (such as the interpersonal issuesurrounding life-choice issues) may not, regardless of their significance t

    the individual. Irrespective of a particular kind of moral situation, howevepeople differ in what is salient in their personal experience, and they mawell orient and respond differently to moral situations (even thesame morsituation), thus revealing a variety of moral personalities (Flanagan, 1991In Colby and Damons research, for example, all their exemplary particpants shared an intense commitment to moral causes; however, there waconsiderable variation in the specific problems they identified, in the

    individual perceptions of them, and in their personal motivations for addressing them. Conceivably, some may have perceived their commitmentprimarily in terms of social justice (as epitomized by some interpretationof Martin Luther King, for example), and they may have sought to remedthem in a highly analytical, reasoned manner. Others, however, may havperceived and responded to similar (or different) social ills with a morpurely empathic or altruistic sensitivity toward human suffering (as epitomized, perhaps, by Mother Theresa). In both sets of cases, a strong moraself or personality is clearly evident, but the role of complex moral reasoninis likely far more relevant in the former cases than in the latter. Moreoveboth instances present valid conceptions of moral maturity and should bequally represented and valued in moral development theory. To datemethodological analyses have typically obscured such distinctions, but aindividual case analysis of Colby and Damons data would presumably tethis possibility. In the studies of Hart and Fegley (1995) and Arnold (1993

    the lack of a judgment-action relation is much less surprising, given thlimited variance in the participants developmental stages and the kinds o

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    relation, it appears that cognitivedevelopmentalists still have not yet adequately explored the empirical means of testing it. The methodologicachallenge is now to overcome the ambiguity in these recent findings and tinvestigate the ways that moral reasoning and moral commitment interacheeding more precisely than in the past the significance ofboththe kindof problems that arise in everyday life and the nature of the people whchoose (or choose not) to address them.

    On the other hand, a reassessment of the role of moral stage reasoninalso may mean that we eventually largely reject the stage concept (as large contingent of cognitive developmentalists already has) and considealternative ways of looking at moral reasoning, such as cognitive schemas,

    scripts and products now being used in other areas of psychology, anwhich Rest and his colleagues are pursuing in their neo-Kohlbergian modeof moral development (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, and Thoma, 1999). Despithow enlightening such approaches may prove to be, however, they may werepresent a sharp departure from the fundamental tenets of the structuraliparadigm as originally conceived by Baldwin (1906) and Piaget (1932/1965

    Another facet of Kohlbergs commitment to reason as the core o

    moralitya less constrained interpretation, but conceptually more fundamental to his theory pertains to the concept of moral meaning-makingand to his belief that moral psychologists must attend to the way a persounderstands and interprets his or her own social reality. There are at leatwo levels on which this facet of moral reason can be interpreted. A relatively loose interpretation of moral meaning-making requires us to attenclosely to the persons self-awareness of his or her psychological stateas compared, for example, to Freudian notions of anxiety reduction obehavioristic response mechanisms. In all instances, it appears that thcontemporary studies reviewed here have been true to this empirical phenomenological approach. The continued use of extensive interviewing procedures in current research, alone, confirms an obvious appreciation thait is only through careful analyses of a persons thoughts that his or hemoral experience can be examined legitimately.

    A second interpretation of the meaning-making facet of Kohlberg

    commitment to reason in moral psychology is more fundamental to htheory, and goes to the very nature or definition of morality. This interpreta

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    The relevance of this interpretation of moral meaning-making is raiseby one of Walker and his colleagues (Walker et al., 1995) recent findingMany of the people they interviewed claim to depend primarily on gureaction, intuition, or conscience to determine the rightness of their realife moral decisions, rather than on reasoned personal reflection. Without more precise analysis of this response pattern, one can only speculate oits true significance. However, it raises the question whether a gut reaction (as opposed to deliberate thought) does, indeed, constitute legitimatgrounds for morality. Presumably, if moral psychologists were to accepthis manner of moral decision-making (if one can even call it that in thinstance) we would risk losing the very core of moralityby definition

    the rationality or conceptual backbone of morality would have dissolvedMoreover, would we not also risk taking ourselves back where Kohlberbegan, when the study of morality was not necessarily realmorality?

    Again, such descriptions of real-life moral experience raise new methodological challenges, and seem to beg the question: But, what is it thaevokes a persons gut reaction? What gives the gut this sense orightness? Although, at face value, such descriptions may appear t

    suggest that people have no need to think deliberately in moral situationthere are various interpretations of this response pattern. One interpretation does imply a denial (of one sort or another) of the relevance of morareasoning, at least in some situations and for some people. For examplerelying on ones intuitive gut reaction can imply a persons lack of abilitor skill to be systematically reflective about moral issues, or a personatendency not to give explicit attention to reason in moral situations (ofteresulting, perhaps, in a tendency to express relativistic thoughts or beliefs). In such cases, it might well be valid to conclude that reasoning, pese, plays little (if any) role in moral life. Alternatively, however, it is alsplausible that some people simply do not need to think deliberately oponderously in all situations. Their moral beliefs and values may be sdeeply integrated in the self and, therefore, have become so habitual thathey truly are intuitive, and a particular course of action does, indeedsimply feel right. Here, though, it would be wrong to conclude that

    persons conduct is not grounded in moral reason. Until such time apsychologists have greater clarity as to what is behind such vague expres

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    of the ways that moral psychologists are beginning the process of puttinflesh on [the] bones (Walker et al., 1995) of an earlier conception omoral maturity. As a result of these efforts, however, there now appearto be considerable ambiguity surrounding the status of reason in understandings of moral experience, at least as it was originally elaborated iKohlbergs theory.

    Assuredly, this current work has continued to honor the phenomenological, meaning-making criterion of morality and, thereby, has remainetrue to the study of morality in the spirit of the cognitivedevelopmentatradition. What does seem to be called into question is the relevance odevelopmental stages of reasoning to moral commitment; and, unquestion

    ably, it is the developmental qualities of moral reason that comprise onof the most significant aspects of Kohlbergs legacy. As discussed abovehowever, even this interpretation of the role of moral reason cannot easilbe discredited on the basis of the evidence provided to date. Thus, despitthe many strengths of this contemporary work, and its valuable contributions to moral development theory, it may be much farther from posing major threat to reason, as the backbone of morality, than some of th

    rhetoric surrounding it might have us believe. At the very least, thesstudies raise new challenges and encourage us to seek clarification of the roof reason in future empirical work. In the interim, however, any rejection odenigration of the relevance of reason, in my view, would be prematurenot tantamount to throwing the reasoning person out with the moral bathwater.

    I readily acknowledge that I have devoted more time in this reviewto raising some of the questions that have emerged from this new worthan in attempting to answer them. My purpose, essentially, has been tconvey the lack of clarity that currently exists within the field regardinthe role of reason in moral psychology and to suggest some of the kindof work needed to elucidate these issues. In many respects, contemporarresearch continues to wrestle with much the same challenge that Kohlberfaced over 30 years agothe challenge of finding effective means to studthe developing persons understanding of the social world, while also re

    specting the uniqueness of morality itself. By comparison, however, contemporary moral psychologists do so with the great benefit of hindsight

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