bel-truc.orgbel-truc.org/downloads/Working_Paper_1_NewYork.docx · Web viewIn 1950, NYC was classified as one of the world’s first ... The use of the city’s flood map and GIS

Jaydie Ortiz K1454060

TRANSFORMATION AND RESILINECE ON URBAN COASTS

WORKING PAPER SERIES, WORKING PAPER #1

A megacity’s resistance to transformation: New York City

Jaydie Ortiz, King’s College London


I dedicate this humble work to my partner, Inga Manuela Thiessen.

Gewidmet der Frau, die meine dunkelsten Stunden erhellte, meine Stille mit süssem Gesang erfüllte und meinen Ängsten liebevolle Worte entgegensetzte. Ohne Dich wäre diese

Errungenschaft nicht möglich gewesen. Danke für die Kraft und Stärke, mit der Du das, was ich war, herausgefordert hast, so dass ich das, was ich bin, verwirklichen konnte.

Ninakupenda Mpenzi wangu, Inga wangu.


ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This project would not have been possible without the contributions of disaster risk managers in New York City. I have had the honor of serving the city of New York alongside a group of professionals whose work and dedication is incredible, but often goes unrecognized.

Thank you to Mark Pelling for providing guidance and support, which proved instrumental to this project's development. A special thank you goes to my King’s College London Geography 2014-2015 cohort, a group who provided much needed inspiration and comedic relief during my studies. I also express my sincere gratitude to my friends and family. They sent me across the pond with unlimited amounts of encouragement and support – your faith in me made this a reality. I am humbled by your love and generosity.

Finally, I recognize all of those who came before me, who are no longer with us. Their sacrifices have made the improbable possible, I truly stand on the shoulders of giants - Maferefun Eggun.

.


ABSTRACT

This study aims to evaluate resistance towards transformative disaster risk management

(DRM) in megacities. Using the New York City (NYC) Irene and Sandy experiences as a case

study, the research explores how the unique characteristics of megacities influence and or

create resistance towards transformative DRM. The paper begins to address a gap in disaster

research: the exploration of megacity disaster governance, and will build upon existing

research on megacities and their pathways towards adaptation (Pelling 2011; Rosenzweig &

Solecki 2014; Tierney 2012; Uitto 1998). In light of the looming impacts of climate change

and our inability to secure the minimum 2C degree warming targeted by the scientific

community (Park et al 2011), the study proposes the lessons learned in the NYC present a

valuable knowledge sharing opportunity beneficial to all megacities. The knowledge shared

serves to facilitate the achievement of transformative DRM in megacity across the globe.


CONTENTS

List of Figures………………………………………………..………………………..…………..……7

List of Abbreviations………………………………………………………………………………......8

Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………….....9

Chapter 1: Literature Review……………………………..……………………………………..…..11

1.1 Governance, Disaster Governance & DRM……………………………………………….……...111.2 Adaptation: Incremental & Transformative Adaptation in DRM……………………….………..121.3 Megacities……………………………………………………………………………….………..13 1.4 Megacities and Adaptation: Exercises in resistance………………………………………….…..181.5 Knowledge sharing: How the Experiences in One Megacity Provide Knowledge for All……….211.6 Study Rationale: Gaps in Research……………………………………………………………….22

Chapter 2: Methodology, Data Collection & Ethics………………………………………..………23

2.1 Aims, Objectives & Research Questions…………………………………………………………..232.2 Methodology & Data Collection…………………………………………………………………...232.3 Sampling: Selection and Access to Participants…………………………………………………...242.4 Challenges, Limitations & Ethics………………………………………………………………….252.5 Researcher: Identity, Positionality & Bias………………………………………………………....262.6 Data Analysis………………………………………………………………………………………26

Chapter 3: Contextualizing New York City – A Megacity Model.

3.1 NYC: Among the First Megacities………………………………………………………………...283.2 New York’s Hazardous Geography & Complex Demographics………………………………......283.3 Governance & DRM: History of Being ‘NY Tough’……………………………………………...303.4 The Rockaways: Marginalization and Vulnerability………………………………………………333.5 Irene vs Sandy – Coastal Storms…………………………………………………………...……...34

Chapter 4: Findings………………………………………………………………………………..…38

4.1 Irene & Sandy Exposed People Centric Gaps in Coastal Storm Planning………………………...384.2 NYC’s Megacities Characteristics Fuel Resistance Towards Transformative DRM……………...454.3 Current & Future Policy Implications…………………………………………………………......53

Chapter 5: Conclusion - Closing Thoughts & Future Considerations for Research …………….55

AppendicesAppendix A: ………………………………………………………………………………………….58

Geography Ethics Screening From……………………………………………………………59Risk Assessment Forms……………………………………………………………………….60College Ethical Approval Letter………………………………………………………….…...70

Appendix B:…………………………………………………………………………..………………..71Respondent Coding Reference Table

Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………...…...72


LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 Percentage of the population residing in urban areas ………………………...…….15

Figure 2 Percentage urban and urban agglomerations by size Class………………………….16

Figure 3 Characteristics of Megacities & Influence on Resistance……………………………19

Figure 4 Map of New York City……………………………………………………………….29

Figure 5 Map of the New York Bight………………………………………………………….29

Figure 6 New York City Organizational chart…………………………………………………32

Figure 7 Map of the Rockaways……………………………………………………………..33

Figure 8 Satellite Image of Hurricane Irene………………………………………………….35

Figure 9 Satellite Image of Hurricane Sandy…………………………………………………..36

Figure 10 Before and after aerial photos of the Rockaways…………………………………….37

Figure 11 NYC Flood Zones…………………………………………………………………….40

Figure 12 Hurricane Sandy Inundation Zones……………………………………..………….43

Figure 13 Promenade Rehabilitation & Health Care Center in the Rockaways Irene…………44

Figure 14 Promenade Rehabilitation & Health Care Center in the Rockaways Sandy…………44

Figure 15 NYC Resistance Factor 1: Tension between State & City…………………………...46

Figure 16 NYC Resistance Factor 2: Scarcity of Resources……………………………………48

Figure 17 NYC Resistance Factor 3: Physical Disconnection from Natural Environment……..49

Figure 18 NYC Resistance Factor 4: Complex Governance……………………………………51

Figure 19 NYC Resistance Factor 5: Reliance on Technocratic Solutions……………………..52


LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CCA Climate Change Adaptation

CSP Coastal Storm Plan

DRM Disaster Risk Management

ESS Emergency Supply Stockpile

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

GIS Geographic Information Systems

LSSP Logistics Shelter Support Plan

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

NPCC New York City Panel on Climate Change

NY New York

NYC New York City

OEM Office of Emergency Management

SMNS Special Medical Needs Shelter

UN United Nations

US United States


INTRODUCTION

August 27, 2015 marked the 10-year anniversary of Hurricane Katrina, a storm that

annihilated New Orleans and claimed the lives of over 1,800 people (Frailing et al. 2015).

The storm brought embarrassment to the US Federal Emergency Management Agency, as

images of survivors trapped in poorly designed and inadequate emergency shelters without

adequate food, sanitation or water (Monteith 2010) made their way across international media

outlets. The event served as a turning point in US emergency management and brought

attention to the risks and future impacts of climate change as well as the need to develop

DRM (Miller 2012).

Recent reviews of scientific articles published on climate changed revealed over 97% of

scientists agree we have entered a period of climatic change (Cook 2013). Reports from

institutions like the Pentagon have identified climatic change as a major threat to global

security as a driver of political instability (Davenport 2014). The earth is now in period of

anthropogenic climatic change and will see a rise in temperatures, sea levels, and frequency in

extreme weather events with significant impacts on food production, rate of human

displacement, and irreversible damage to ecological systems (IPCC 2014; Van Aalst 2006).

Recent events in Philippines, New York and Bangladesh lend credibility to the claim that we

are already experiencing the ill effects of a phenomenon our modern history has yet to

contend with (Trenberth et al. 2015).

Despite their rising population density and increased exposure to disasters, megacities

have not benefited from the vast disaster research conducted to develop strategies providing

long-lasting solutions to the multi-layered and multi-dimensional set of vulnerabilities

megacities face (Blaikie et al. 2014; Watts & Bohle 1993); vulnerabilities that exist

throughout the disaster cycle. Exposing failures in the governance of society, theses

vulnerabilities impede recovery and the ability to build resilient livelihoods for those affected

by an event (Blaikie et al 2014).

Within a two-year period, the coastal megacity of New York (NYC) prepared for and

responded to the landfall of two major coastal storms: Hurricanes Irene and Sandy. The city

emerged from Irene virtually unscathed, as the storm rotated away from the city and instead,

inflicted damage to areas north (FEMA 2015). Approximately a year later, Hurricane Sandy


made landfall causing citywide damage totaling over $42 billion (Blake et al. 2013). The

worst hit areas, communities along its sprawling coastlines, were ill-prepared for the storm

surge that washed away the lives they once knew. The Rockaway Peninsula, an area of NYC

most exposed to coastal storms and flooding, was devastated.

While much attention is given to the hazardous regions of the global South, areas that by

most statistics currently endure and will experience the most severe consequences of climate

change (IPCC 2014), megacities of the North can also provide valuable case studies of how

megacity governance structures enact adaptations to climate change (Rosenzweig & Solecki

2014). Megacities, regardless of their North or South locales, share distinct characteristics

influencing their governance processes (Kubler 2012; Krass 2007), and their ability to adapt

policy and practices in response to climate change. A thoughtful analysis of how these

characteristics influence adaptation will provide insight into DRM adaptation within the

megacity context.

The aim of this study is to explore how NYC adapted its disaster risk management

(DRM) policy and plans after having experienced two major coastal storms within a two-year

period. The paper will also consider how NYC’s adaptation process provides valuable

knowledge, applicable and actionable to megacities across the globe. With a focus on the

Rockaway Peninsula, colloquially known as the Rockaways, this study will examine how

decision makers in government responded to lessons learned and how those opportunities for

improvement were translated into the city's DRM strategy as it continues to cope with

increasing hazards due to climate change (Neumann et al. 2015; O’Brien et al. 2006). Factors

of resistance will be identified and unpacked for the larger megacity context.

Chapter 1 provides a summary examination of the literature available on megacities, their

governance and larger DRM policy. Chapter 2 presents the research questions the study

intends to explore as well as the projects methodology. Chapter 3 contextualizes the research

area, detailing its relevance as a study area to the global DRM community. In chapter 4, the

findings and an analysis of the data are presented. Lastly, the study concludes with closing

thoughts and future considerations for researchers on the subject of megacities and DRM

adaptation.


CHAPTER 1 LITERATURE REVIEW

This section reviews the importance of megacities as regions in need of adaptive disaster

risk management (DRM) strategies as they face the impacts of climate change. Key concepts

such as incremental and transformative adaption, governance, disaster governance and

resistance to adaptation are covered. Focusing on megacities and identifying shared

characteristics influencing governance processes, this section will summarize current

literature on megacity governance and explore how megacity characteristics create resistance

in the pathways towards adaptation.

1.1 Governance, Disaster Governance & DRM

The subject of governance enjoys a wide body of academic literature (Birkmann et al.

2010), yet is a term that remains loosely defined in disaster research (Tierney 2012).

Governance is commonly understood as the actions and policies implemented by state actors

with the intention to benefit the public (Parker and Braithwaite 2003). Yet a broader and more

applicable definition of governance encompasses the systems and methods by which power

and decision making are shared (Lebel 2006). As global DRM efforts have taken on a more

developmentally focused approach, shifting focus from natural events to the intersection of

pre-existing human vulnerabilities and the shock imposed by an event (Quarantelli 1998), this

definition of governance is markedly distinct from the previously held definition of political

authority and state control (Freeman 1997). It aligns the concept of governance with a more

socially focused expression, and thus making it more applicable to the people-centric tilt of

DRM centered.

Governance is an action (Kooiman 2003) and its performance is the result of a wide

variety of actors and decision makers converging to influence and or create public policy

(ibid). These actors are comprised of government institutions and administrators, non-

governmental organizations (NGO’s), elements of the private sector, and civically oriented

organizations, all involved in carrying out functions that were once the domain of the state

(Agranoff & McGuire 2003). There is bourgeoning interest in the exploration of governance


as an example of social coordination (Folke et al. 2005) as outcomes of governance processes

have a profound effect on the larger society.

Subsumed under the broad umbrella of governance, and more specifically risk

governance (Tierney 2012), is disaster governance. Disaster governance focuses on the

overarching policies, legal and regulatory systems affecting DRM efforts (Blanco 2015). The

United Nations (UN) defines it as the manner by which disasters and climate change related

risks are managed (UNDP 2013). At its core, it is a form of collaborative governance, where

public policy development and decision making proactively engages various levels of

government, public and private sectors, sharing decision making and power (Emerson et al.

2012). It is highly influenced by the actors, their agendas, and the overall political climate.

There is extensive literature outside of the disasters domain exploring governance and its

capacity for adaptation. Categorized into three groups: adaptive management, cooperative

management and collaborative governance (Djalante et al. 2011) the concepts grew out of

social-ecological systems work (Holling 1978). The evolution of these management theories

coalesced into adaptive governance and featured the work of divergent fields such as political

science, environmental management, eco-systems management (Folke et al. 2005). Adaptive

governance features polycentric, flexible, mutable, and multilevel, multi-layered institutional,

collaborative and innovative processes which were both centralized and decentralized in

command (Folke et al .2005; Olsoon et al. 2004; Plummer 2009). This vast research

underscores the complexities involved in governance and justifies further research from the

DRM perspective.

1.2 Adaptation: Incremental & Transformative Adaptation in DRM

In the disasters field, it is difficult to discuss adaptation outside of the context of climate

change adaptation (CCA). Though CCA and DRM have evolved as separate disciplines

(Wamsler et al. 2013), they have experienced a recent convergence as research increasingly

links the two with the primary functions of DRM: risk reduction, response and recovery

(Coppola 2011). In this context, adaptation is aimed at enacting changes that address and

reduce risk and vulnerability, increasing the resiliency of urban populations to hazards

(Solecki et al. 2011). Adaptation is inextricably linked to resiliency, the ability of systems and

people to bounce back after a disaster, better positioned than before (Maguire & Hagan 2007).

A term ubiquitous in DRM (Pelling 2011), adaptation can both augment resiliency as well as


work against it (ibid). As theory and frame work, adaptation’s epistemistic origins are varied

and stem from social environment systems, political science, and organizational behavior

(Djalante et al. 2011).

Adaptation falls into two groups in disasters research: incremental and transformative

(Kates et al. 2012; Matyas & Pelling 2015). Focusing on the improvement of existing policies

and initiatives proven to reduce risk (Kates et al 2012), incremental adaptation seeks to make

changes in controlled, measured steps, building upon previous DRM successes. Ultimately,

the resulting adaptation keeps intact fundamental systems and processes (Handmer & Dovers

1996). CCA is especially vulnerable to incremental approaches, as it requires decision makers

to act on uncertainties (Polasky et al. 2011).

Transformative DRM strategies emerged in the late 2000’s (Matyas & Pelling 2015). A

response to incremental adaptation, transformational approaches targeted the root causes of

hazard vulnerabilities and thus, emphasized more radical system changes (Pelling 2011).

Transformative strategies often target ingrained power structures, with the aim of altering, and

in some cases upending, systems identified as the root causes of human vulnerability (Pelling

2011). Many experts in DRM argue that transformative adaptation becomes vital as disaster

risks increase due to climate change. These heightened risk demand dramatic shifts in

structures to achieve meaningful reduction and mitigation (Kates et al. 2012). Due to its call

for radical systems change, established governance structures are particularly resistance to

transformative adaptation (Howes et al. 2015) and focus on incremental adaptation which

optimizes existing strategies (Kates et al. 2012). The root societal and political causes of risk

and vulnerability have been labeled too large in scope, and even unachievable to fit into

adaptation work commonly found in DRM (Adger et al. 2009) and this view has also

contributed to the preference for incremental approaches

1.3 Megacities

The UN defines megacities as metropolitan regions with a total population of 10 million

or more (UNDESA 2008). Understood as urban areas with clearly identified boundaries,

megacities are best conceptualized as loosely drawn metropolitan areas where a concentration

of socio-economic activities are found (Kübler 2012). While megacities are a recent human

phenomenon, the factors leading to their development are not. The antecedents of the modern

day megacity trace back to the ancient cities of Rome, Mesopotamia and Chang’an. These

ancient cities grew out of concentrations of commerce and power, much like the megacity of


today whose growth, initially fueled by industrialization in the 1800’s, is driven by

globalization (Mitchell 1995). As ancient loci of commerce, civilization, art, science and

politics, these cities were the foundation of many of the globes empires. The megacity of

modernity enjoys the similar global stature, but instead of driving the creation of new nation-

states (Brenner 2004), they are driving regional cohesion and governance (ibid).

Since their initial classification in the 1950’s, megacities have emerged as DRM areas of

concern as the globe continues to experience rising urbanization driven by globalization

(Mitchell 1995). As of 2014, 28 megacities were found across the globe with a combined

population of 453 million people (UNDESA 2014). At the rate of current growth, it is

predicted the world will see at least 41 megacities by 2030 (ibid). These megacities combined

will be home to 730 million people and will represent about 14% of world's urban population

(UNDESA 2014). Today, over 418 million people, or 12% of the global population, reside in

megacities (ibid).


Fig. 1: Percentage of the population residing in urban areas 1950, 2014 &

2050 (UNDESA 2014)

1950

2014

2050


Of the 28 megacities found today, 16 are located in coastal regions and are threatened by

rising sea levels in addition to the risks posed by climate change (IPCC 2014; Pelling &

Blackburn 2014). The UN reported in 2014 54% of the global population reside in cities, a

number projected to increase to over 66% by 2050 (UNDESA 2014). This prediction

underscores the importance of establishing meaningful and effective DRM strategies specific

to megacities. Research on urbanization in the global South buttresses this recognition and as

early as 1990 urban growth was listed as a major contributor to disaster risk during the 1990

UN International Decade for Natural Disaster Reductions (UNISDR 2015).

Fig. 2: Percentage urban & urban agglomerations by size class (UNDESA 2014)

While globalization has fueled the growth of modern megacities, it has also extended the

reach of a disasters impact (Krass 2007). While the world has seen an overall decline in the

loss of life due to disasters (El-Masri & Tipple 2002), the aftermath of disasters visited upon

megacities often reverberate across borders adversely affecting financial markets and critical

supply chains (Uitto 1998). Further research on megacity DRM will ensure that the progress


realized by DRM efforts are maintained as disaster adversely affecting a megacity has the

potential to disrupt the economic, societal and political wellbeing of its surrounding region.

The majority of megacities are located in the global South and much of the population

growth projected for megacities is expected to take place in the urban regions of India, China

and throughout continental Africa (UNDESA 2014), regions which are today already

experiencing the adverse effects of climate change (IPCC 2014). Despite the vast social,

economic and political differences between cities in the global North and South, all

megacities share sets of characteristics due to their composition and position as major centers

of culture, politics and as transnational centers of economic activity (Kötter & Friesecke

2009). It is customary to find thought leaders and critical decision makers, in both the public

and private sectors, residing and working in megacities as they often weld enormous influence

on both economics and politics (Wenzel et al 2005).

Shared characteristics found in megacities:

1. All megacities are centers of global significance: Megacities both affect and

are affected by global economics, societal, and political trends (Birkmann 2010;

Kraas 2007). The policies and processes found in a megacity often stretch far

beyond their geographic boundaries (ibid). This characteristic leads to a growth

of megacity power/autonomy in relation to its national government: As centers

of economic, political and social activity, megacities often enjoy enhanced

autonomy from their larger governmental structures (Brenner 2002; Brenner

2004).

2. Organizationally complex governance structures: Megacities all possess

highly complex governance structures comprised of government, private and

civic actors. The interactions between these groups, which are often in

competition with one another, is dynamic and intricate (Kötter & Frisecke

2009). Megacities also feature an interdependence of administrative, financial,

economic, social, political, etc., (Olorunfemi 2009) and any change to a one will

have an impact on the other.

3. High competition for resources: Due to enormous population growth found in

megacities and the resulting increased resource consumption (UNDESA 2014;

IPCC 2014), megacities suffer from a persistent lack of resources leading to

severe competition. The lack of DRM funding is reflects this fact, as budgets for


DRM are often inadequate as other government functions are prioritized in light

of funding shortfalls (Tsikoudakis 2012).

4. Disconnected from natural environment and hazards: Megacities, due to

their construction and development, feature structures that remove their

inhabitants from the natural world. The result is a population that ranks natural

hazards as low priorities and often underestimates their vulnerability to natural

hazards (Mitchell 1999).

5. Reliance on technology and technocratic solutions: Cities, and by extension,

megacities, display a reliance on technocratic solutions (Lavell & Maskrey

2014). Partly tied to the need to justify investments due to limited resources,

policy makers favor initiatives with quantifiable returns on investments.

The above is not an exhaustive list of megacity characteristics and serves as an example

of characteristics that lead to shared experiences in the megacity context. It provides a helpful

starting point from which to approach megacity DRM, both in the global North and South.

1.4 Megacities & Adaptation: Exercises in Resistance

Megacities’ resistance to transformational DRM adaptive strategies and preference for

incremental adaptation are commonplace in megacity DRM, as their complexity in structure,

on all scales, makes transformative DRM approaches difficult. Even when there is significant

political will behind a policy initiative, megacities often are slow to react due to uncertainties

about the impacts of climate change and gains to be realized from adaptation (Hallegate

2009). Transformational adaptation, often targeted at root-causes, presents decision makers

with costs that are often times unquantifiable; such as the potential for disruption of long

established methods of governance. Lastly, the dynamic nature of these complex urban

environments creates a constantly changing state of ‘normal’ operations, often making hard-

won progress on transformative DRM strategies obsolete by the time they are enacted

(Tierney 2012).

Part of this resistance can be attributed to the unique set of characteristics found in

megacities, characteristics, exemplified by those identified above, which influence disaster

governance processes. Figure 3 illustrates how megacity characteristics exercise an adverse

influence on disaster governance.


Fig. 3: Characteristics of Megacities & Influence on Resistance (Authors illustration derived from cited sources)



Excluding population size, the next most defining characteristic of megacities is their role

in global processes. Yet, despite their transnational prominence, they are still subject to the

larger governing authority, authorities which exercise control and regulations outside of the

megacity jurisdiction (Kubler 2014). This dynamic often leads to power struggles, which

adversely effects disaster governance processes, processes reliant on collaboration and

negotiation (Pelling 2011). While megacities can still enact CCA initiatives, they are limited

by their status as cities, accountable to governing authorities.

In sustainability and ecology research, megacities are identified as major contributors to

climate change and environmental degradation (McArdle 2014). Not only do megacities

consume vast quantities of resources, but by their very construction they alter their natural

environments, resulting in an artificial sense of command and control of natural processes

(ibid). The result is a city that is disconnected from the environment and the hazards and

vulnerabilities presented by their geographic locations (Mitchel 1999). This disconnection

leads to a misunderstanding of the risks faced by the city.

While megacities are fueled by economic growth, they are not resource rich. Because of

their physical expansion (Mitchell 1999) and exponential population growth, megacities often

lack sufficient resources to address the divergent and demanding needs of their populations.

Even in the global North, you will find megacities operating with budget deficits and

struggling to meet its obligations to the public (Tsikoudakis 2012).

Megacities are often display largely fragmented governance structures with functions

clearly divided along core capabilities. These divisions, and the competition for resources

dedicated to each core competency, often put administrators, policy makers and other

stakeholders in opposition with one another (Tierney 2012). These competing interest and

agendas have a negative effect on the participatory governance interaction reliant on trust and

openness (Wise et al. 2014).

While not exclusive to megacities, DRM strategies reliant on technocratic objectives are

preferred in these large urban areas (Heazel et al. 2013). CCA is one of the paramount areas

of research in DRM (Wise et al. 2014) and it presents megacities with uncertainties the

technocratic approaches simply cannot contend with. The building of sea walls and hardening

of infrastructure defenses are typical forms of technocratic-based solutions requiring little

change to status quo systems (Kates et al. 2012) and present less uncertainty than initiatives

tackling root causes.


DRM today is clear on what causes a disaster: Disasters are a function of vulnerability

and hazards (Blaike et al 2014). The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction defines

vulnerability as ‘The conditions determined by physical, social, economic, and environmental

factors or processes, which increase the susceptibility of a community to the impact of

hazards.’ (UNISDR 2015, pp. 10) Yet, it is also clear that despite this acknowledgment of

what constitutes a disaster, the attempts to address root causes have been modest at best

(Kates et al. 2012; Park et al. 2011; Wise et al. 2014). By identifying large-scale factors of

resistance in megacities, those engaged in disaster governance can target their efforts at

mitigating the influence and ultimate consequence of these factors and begin to enact the

drastic change necessitated by climate change (Park et al. 2011).

1.5 Knowledge Sharing: How Experiences in One Megacity Provides Knowledge For All

Despite their contributions to the destruction of ecological sustainability, megacities are

also centers of experimentation and technological innovation in the quest to find solutions to

challenges posed by climate change (McArdle 2014 ; Solecki et al. 2011). Collaborative

organizations, such as C40 Cities, International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives,

and the Worlds Mayors Council on Climate Change Cities (McArdle 2014), comprised of

several megacities and emerging megacities, have taken a forward leaning stance on the issue.

Many cities, such as NYC have gone further than their national governments in not only

acknowledging the threats posed by climate change but in also developing solutions and

promoting innovation (Solecki et al. 2011). In 2008, NYC convened the New York City

Panel on Climate Change (NPCC), and since then, has taken a lead role towards CCA. After

his 3-term tenure as mayor, Michael Bloomberg was named Special Envoy for Cities and

Climate Change by Banki Moon, the Secretary General of the UN (McArdle 2014).

These international panels, coalitions and working groups serve as spaces of information

exchange where the failures or successes of initiatives, and supporting data are shared

amongst members. Policies, expertise, data, and resources are shared alleviating the need for

members to experiment with CCA on their own and shortening the timeline of CCA

adaptation (McArdle 2014).


1.6 Study Rationale: Gaps in Research

Current literature exploring how DRM is applied in megacities is not readily available,

though there are several works acknowledging and attempting to fill the gap (Solecki et al.

2011; Tierney 2012, Uitto 1998). Given the prediction that much of the population growth

the world will experience will result in an increase in the number of megacities (UNDESA

2014), as well as increase the size of existing ones, this study places attention on a coastal

megacity, NYC. This paper will explore how the shared characteristics of megacities

influence disaster governance in NYC context and will propose further analysis will provide

useful starting points to explore the causes of resistance in megacities. The challenges faced

by massive systems found only in megacities are obstacles communally shared, despite their

South or North geographical location.

In exploring how NYC responds to increasing demands for CCA, this study focuses on a

city with access to abundance of resources (when compared to the megacities of the global

South), political will in support of adaptation and increased public interest given recent

coastal storm events. It recognizes NYC as a mature global North megacity, whose

significance stretches far beyond its national borders. Yet, despite these favorable conditions,

NYC struggles to make significant strides in its adaptation strategies, begging the question

whether there are unexplored factors influencing resistance to transformative strategies. Using

the Rockaways as a case study, this paper will consider the capacity of NYC to enact CCA

DRM strategies by analyzing how its megacity characteristics function on its resistance

towards adaptation. The research aims to address the gap in current disaster studies and will

propose further research on megacities will serve to help achieve the DRM goals outlined in

the Sendai Framework for disaster risk reduction.


CHAPTER 2 METHODOLOGY

This section will present the study’s research methodology, research questions, and data

gathering details. It will provide an analysis of the data obtained as well as clearly identify

bias and challenges.

2.1 Aims, Objectives & Research Questions

The purpose of this study is to evaluate how a coastal megacity, NYC, experiences

resistance to transformational adaptation and how resistance is affected by megacity

characteristics influencing governance processes. The study aims to identify relationships

between megacity characteristics and expressions of resistance in disaster governance.

The research employed primary and secondary data sets and presented a retrospective

analysis of the actions taken by those involved in the DRM decision and policymaking

process in NYC during and after Hurricane Irene and Sandy.

This paper will explore and consider the following questions:

1. What are factors influencing resistance in disaster governance to

transformative adaptation in NYC, a coastal megacity?

2. How do the shared characteristics of megacities create and influence

factors of resistance to CCA in NYC?

3. Can the lessons of a megacity located in the global North create

opportunities for learning to those in the South?

2.2 Methodology & Data Collection

Much of the research conducted in social science employs qualitative research methods

and they have seemingly become the default research methodology implemented (Clearly et

al. 2014). This is not a surprising as qualitative methods lend themselves to the complexities

involved in attempting to unpack the dynamic nature of the human condition. While the study

drew on quantitative data, such as demographical statistics, a qualitative approach was taken


in this project, as it was the most adequate method to gather and analyze data relevant to the

research questions. Information about the views and experiences of the respondents was

gathered (Mullings 1999) and an in-depth qualitative analysis was conducted with ‘emphasis

on explaining the processes, changing conditions, organization, circumstance and

construction, negotiation and reconstruction of meanings and identities.’(Cloke et al. 2004,

p.150).

Data was collected during the periods of August 10 through August 31 of 2015 and

consisted of 7 semi-structured interviews. Interviews were conducted via telephone with the

respondents physically located in the NYC metropolitan area. The use of telephone interviews

allowed the respondents more flexibility and increased the willingness of those selected to

participate. This form of interview also increased the level of confidentially, as respondents

were free to select their physical locations. Confidentiality was of utmost importance as the

details of emergency planning process are often classified confidential by government

officials due to the public safety and security elements involved.

The semi-structured interviews were conducted with a set of guide questions intended to

provide uniformity in the data gathered. Opened-ended questions were utilized, with fact-

based and neutral questions posed at the beginning to develop confidence and comfort in the

interview process before more probing questions were asked (Longhurst 2003). This method

of interview allowed the researcher to gain insight into the experience of the respondents,

insights that were critical to the qualitative nature of research questions (Silverman 1993).

The open format provided opportunities for respondents to offer information not initially

considered by the researcher when developing questions. It allowed the interviews to flow

freely and provided an “openness” that a structured interviewed would have impeded (Baxter

& Eyles 1997). The interviews were audio recorded as it allowed the researcher more freedom

to engage naturally in the interview process as well maintain accurate versions of responses

(Cloke et al. 2004).

2.3 Sampling: Selection & Access to Participants

Respondents were selected based on their participation in emergency planning,

specifically coastal storm planning, within the NYC government DRM structure.

Respondents were employed with the city before, during or after Irene and Sandy. The

researcher, in her prior employment with the NYC Office of Emergency Management (OEM),


had direct access through professional networks. The sampling was intended to select

respondents who would be best suited to provide data that would satisfy the objectives of the

research topic (Longhurst 2003; Tongco 2007). Representatives from a wide variety of city

agencies were selected as to incorporate various perspectives. Respondents varied in their

decision-making capacity and all were professionals within the DRM and experienced in the

planning/response process. Participation was voluntary and respondents were afforded an

option to withdraw their responses up to one week after the interview was conducted.

2.4 Challenges, Limitations & Ethics

DRM is a public safety function NYC and it is constrained by the confidentiality often

imposed by the larger government security structure. As a result, the researcher was required

to ensure the confidentiality of the respondents and was bound by her own obligation as a

former public servant to comply with the confidentiality clauses of her previous employment

with OEM. As a result, the plans mentioned in this research are not eligible for inclusion and

specific details have been excluded. The information provided by the respondents are not

official views or positions of the City of New York.

The act of data collection is an exclusionary process, and it must be assumed that the data

collected is a window through which we peer into a large landscape – our view will be limited

by the size of the window itself (Blastland 2008). This paper recognizes the views obtained

represent a fraction of the experiences of those involved in NYC DRM. DRM in NYC is

complex and its scope is multi-hazard thus a full review would not be possible given the

limits of this project. This paper focuses on one aspect of the city’s DRM strategy, the Coastal

Storm Plan (CSP).

This study, qualitative in nature and reliant on interview based research, was limited by

the ability of participants to recall events, information and their experiences in NYC DRM.

The selection of the respondents was determined by their positions within the NYC DRM

field and the researcher recognizes that this selection, while intended to provide insight into

the planning process by those responsible for it from various perspectives, also provides a

very specific context in which the data can be applied.

Before research and data collection was initiated, the researcher obtained the necessary

approvals and permissions from Kings College London. The Geography and Social Science


and Research Ethics Panel granted project approval. A risk assessment was conducted and it

was determined this project was low risk.

2.5 Researcher: Identity, Positionality & Bias

The researcher was employed by OEM from July 2011 through September 2014, a period

encompassing the Irene and Sandy experiences, a focal point of this study. Through this

employment, the researcher was familiar with the CSP, having participated in planning

committees, such as the CSP board. The researcher also authored the city’s Logistics Shelter

Support Program (LSSP) plan and was responsible for the management of the Emergency

Supply Stockpile (ESS), the city’s cache of mass care emergency supplies. Both the CSP and

ESS are mentioned in this research. The researcher had both directly and indirectly worked

with the participants chosen for interviews and her relationship with the respondents likely

increased their comfortability throughout the interview process.

Researcher positionality and bias is a major factor of consideration when evaluating the

results and future implications of a study (Cloke et al. 2004). While most social science

research is conducted to explore how humans relate to their environments, with the aim of

improving the overall human condition, researchers must remain vigilant of how positionality

and bias often express themselves in the analysis and interpretation of results (ibid). The

objective of the study was to examine overarching factors of resistance in the adaptation

process. The analysis of the data required the researcher to be reflexive (Cloke et al. 2004)

throughout the interpretation of the respondent data. The researcher, cognizant of how her

personal experiences would influence the interpretation of the data, aimed to be as objective

as possible and made all attempts to approach to data from a position of neutrality. Given her

relationship with the respondents, the researcher also took care not to pose questions that

would infringe upon the aforementioned confidentially requirements. The researcher also

factored the bias and positionality of the respondents in the data analysis (Cloke et al. 2004).

2.6 Data Analysis

Interviews with respondents were transcribed and anonymized after the window of data

collection closed. The study relied upon secondary source data, gathered from government

agencies such as the NYC Department of Planning, FEMA and the US Census bureau. As


with any data, care must be taken in understanding its sources (Blastland 2008) and the

researcher took care to utilize data from reputable sources. The aim of this study is explore

the research questions presented, as definitive answers cannot be obtained in such a limited

piece of research. The respondent’s answers were analyzed and grouped into like responses

for interpretation.


CHAPTER 3

CONTEXTUALIZING NYC – A MEGACITY MODEL

In this chapter, we will explore the study’s geographical area, NYC, and its relevance to

the disasters field as a whole. Analyzing its geography, demographics, history, government

structure as well as recent coastal storms experiences, this section will contextualize NYC’s

significance in larger DRM research as a megacity model.

3.1 NYC: Among the First Megacities

NYC is the focal point of the New York-Newark metropolitan area. The city center

currently holds over 8.49 million inhabitants (US Census Bureau 2014) and the larger

metropolitan region is home to over 23 million residents (ibid) across 3 US states and 33

counties (Solecki 2015). In 1950, NYC was classified as one of the world’s first megacities

(Tertius 1987) and while it has not experienced the population growth of its sister cities in the

global South (UNDESA 2014), it is the largest city in the US. It is a mature and global city

and the base of international finance and politics.

3.2 New York’s Hazardous Geography & Complex Demographics

NYC’s geography features coastlines measuring over 520 miles, as it sits where East

River, Hudson River and Atlantic Ocean converge. It is especially vulnerable to the

prediction of global sea level rise and increasing extreme weather events, such as coastal

storms (Lin et al. 2010). It is vulnerable to costal storms and faces a risk of substantial

flooding as the NY Bight adds another hazardous layer to its geography (Silverman 2012).

The NY Bight is near a right angle bend at the mouth of the Hudson River where the NYC

and New Jersey coastlines meet. The bight makes NYC especially vulnerable to coastal

storms, such as hurricanes, despite its position north on the Atlantic seaboard. Any

approaching storm surge would be funneled in, with no outlet, severely flooding the city

(ibid).


Fig. 4: New York City (NYC DCP 2015)


Fig. 5: New York Bight, (NYC OEM 2015)

NYC’s severely altered landscape adds another layer of vulnerability to coastal storms.

Its mass transit system, energy supply and water distribution systems are all subterranean

systems (Wagner et al. 2014) featuring infrastructure constructed over a century ago. Its

famous skyline, featuring 100+ story skyscrapers makes the city vulnerable to the winds

accompanying coastal storms. Many of its critical facilities are located along its coastline;

nursing homes, power plants, wastewater treatment plants, the New York Stock Exchange and

the UN Headquarters are all located along its rivers (Silverman 2012).

As in any megacity, every measurable marker of diversity exists in NYC. In its 8.49

million inhabitants, the full spectrum of political, economic, ethnic, racial, educational,

religious, diversity are well represented (NYC DCP 2015; US Census 2015). Given its long

history as a center of trade, NYC is home to many immigrants: 36% of its population are

foreign born (ibid). Today, there are ethnic communities found throughout the city from every

country on earth. Over 800 languages are spoken in NYC (Roberts 2010).

While it is home to a large numbers of the wealthy, like many megacities NYC is plagued

by income inequality, unequal access to quality education, government services and features a

highly segregated community landscape (Ellen et al. 2002; Kawachi & Subramanian 2014).

In 2010, NYC was home to the poorest congressional district in the US, NY-16 where 38% of

households were below the poverty line (US CENSUS 2015). Today, the city continues to

battle income inequality and the current administration has named it one of its most pressing

issues (NYC DCP 2015).

NYC is one of the most exposed coastal megacities given its miles coastlines,

subterranean infrastructure, unique geographical location and varying social demographics. It

has recently experienced two major Hurricanes in a two-year period: Hurricane Irene in 2011

and Hurricane Sandy in 2012. The science on climate change adds further cause for a study

of a coastal megacity, as the frequency and duration of weather extremes, such as coastal

storms, are predicted to increase (Field & IPCC 2012).

3.3 Governance & DRM: History of Being ‘NY Tough’


NYC’s complex demographics and long history are reflected in its governing structure

today. It is under the jurisdiction NY State and borders hundreds of municipalities (Solecki

2015). It features a mayor-council form of government and elects a new mayor every 4 years

who shares power with 51 council members (ibid). The 5 boroughs NYC is comprised of are

divided into 59 community districts, which is the smallest and most local form of government

in NYC. The city’s government functions are divided among 50 agencies each empowered

with specific operational and administrative missions.

There is extensive literature analyzing the intensely fragmented nature of NYC

government with perhaps the most illustrative of all titles being ‘1400 governments of New

York’ (Wood 1961). Figure 6 is the organization structure of the various city agencies, all of

which have a role in the city’s DRM. The city’s disaster governance functions are not limited

to government agencies and feature a wide variety of stakeholders from the private and public

sectors. As a center of international politics and commerce, the city is home to an untold

number of NGO’s, think-tanks, and active civic groups advocating on countless issues.


Fig. 6: New York City Organizational Chart (NYC 2015)


DRM has a long history in NYC, with the origins of a centralized emergency department

reaching back to 1961 when the Mayor’s Emergency Control Board was established (NYC

OEM 2015). NYC has experienced several large disasters throughout its history, the most

famous of which has been the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Umbach 2002). After the attacks, the city

created the Office Emergency Management (OEM), a centralized emergency management

agency. Primarily funded by federal grants targeted at enhancing security and emergency

response, OEM developed robust emergency plans addressing the disaster response needs of

the city.

3.4 The Rockaways: Marginalization & Vulnerability

The Rockaways, part of the borough of Queens, is surrounded by the Atlantic Ocean and

the Long Island Sound. It is one of the city's most exposed and vulnerable areas to coastal

flooding, not only due to severe weather events, but also to tidal movements, occasional

heavy rains as well as coastal storms. It is home to approximately 120,000 people (NYC DCP

2015). In terms of infrastructure and access to the rest of the city, it is one of the isolated areas

of the city, with limited mass transit resources, aging infrastructure and little economic

activity.


Fig. 7: The Rockaways (Google Maps 2015)

The Rockaways has a unique demographic composition reflecting that of the larger city.

Its eastern and western ends exhibit economic and ethnic segregation as the western end is

comprised of a middle income single family homes and the eastern end home to a high

percentage of public housing developments (NYC DCP 2015), inhabited by households living

under the poverty line. The Rockaways also is home to a large aging population, as it has a

large concentration of nursing homes (Pollack 2012). Current statistics point to the unique

complex vulnerability factors found in the Rockaways. Worthy of consideration are the

following:

14% of Rockaway residents are over the age of 65 (NYC DCP)

65% of its population are minorities (US Census 2015)

11.5% are substance abusers (NYC 2015)

65% percentage of inhabitants suffer from some form of chronic medical

condition such as diabetes or asthma. (NYC 2015)

23% have been hospitalized due to a mental health issue (NYC 2015).

Given its geographical location, its unique demographics, and its alienation from the rest

of the city, the Rockaways is a particularly vulnerable area of NYC. Soon after Sandy made

landfall, residents of the Rockaways accused the city of failing to adequately respond to the

damage Sandy caused in the Rockaways, as the area remained without power, and cut off

from most of the city for weeks after the storm (FEMA 2015).

3.5 Irene vs Sandy - Coastal Storms

Hurricane Irene and Sandy represent two very different disasters to those in NYC DRM.

While Irene was a dangerous storm in both scale and intensity, it did not bring the wide scale

flooding and subsequent damage initially feared (Aerts & Botzen 2012). It dropped a

maximum of 7 inches of rain on the city and produced a storm surge of 4.36ft (FEMA 2015).

In the Rockaways, one of the most exposed areas of the city experienced the worst of the

storm as it is prone to flooding and beach erosion.

As Irene was approaching NYC activated its CSP and called for an unprecedented

evacuation of 375,000 residents, located in evacuation Zone A, an area encompassing all of

the Rockaways (NYC DHMH 2014). OEM coordinated the citywide response effort,


activated its shelter system, and took a number of precautionary steps in accordance with its

CSP plan.

Where Irene merely threatened, Sandy delivered. As the storm made landfall, Sandy’s

radius measured approximately 870 nautical miles, and the system engulfed the US eastern

seaboard (Blake 2013). Sandy approached the city as a post-tropical storm (Blake 2013), but

what was of more concern to officials was its trajectory. The storm had taken a northwest

turn which increased the storm surge affecting the city, and influence of the NY Bight (ibid).

The hours preceding its arrival, city officials were left stunned as the forecasts indicated the

storm would take a path that was certain to assail the city with significant storm surge. The

Rockaways braced for another storm and again the city ordered a mandatory evacuation of

Zone A.

Fig. 8: Satellite Image of Hurricane Irene (NASA 2015)


Fig. 9: Satellite Image of Hurricane Sandy (NASA 2014)

On October 29, 2012, Hurricane Sandy made landfall bringing with it a 14ft storm surge

that resulted in a series of emergency events, in what R7 called ‘a doomsday domino

reaction’. Hurricane Sandy left 2 million without power, forced the emergency evacuation of

several hospitals, medical care facilities, and severely constrained supply chains. The

Rockaways were especially devastated and its vulnerable population endured the worst of the

storm.


Fig. 10: Before and after aerial photos of the Rockaways (NOAA 2015).


CHAPTER 4 FINDINGS

In this chapter, the findings and analysis of the interview data are applied to the research

questions. Where appropriate, factors of resistance are linked to shared megacity

characteristics.

4.1 Irene & Sandy Exposed People Centric Gaps in Coastal Storm Planning

In 2000, NYC released its city-wide emergency Coastal Storm Plan (CSP) (NYC OEM

2015). The CSP, developed through the Coastal Storm Planning Board comprised of a long

list of city agency representatives, was a hazard-focused plan employing a scenario where a

coastal storm approached the city resulting in storm surge flooding and damage to

infrastructure. Agency representatives were responsible for a particular facet of the plan, such

as sheltering, transportation, public health needs and so forth. The plan allocated core

operational competencies, such as the management of shelters, debris removal, and security to

agencies responsible for these functions under normal operating conditions. The timeline of

the CSP featured 3 distinct sections: period before landfall, zero-hour or landfall, and the

post-landfall period. The hours before landfall provided the city and its residents the

opportunity to mobilize resources, shut down critical infrastructure and order evacuations.

The hours immediately after are focused on life-safety and mass care initiatives, as well as

infrastructure assessments and repairs. The CSP did not include recovery planning and to

date this is a gap the city struggles to address (R1, R2, R3 and R5).

The CSP received a major update in 2006, driven by the lessons learned from the Katrina

response failures. Mayor Bloomberg, a long-time advocate for CCA (McArdle 2014; Wagner

et al. 2014), directed NYC OEM to revise the CSP to address the city’s increasing

vulnerability to coastal storms. With strong political backing, OEM steered renewed planning

efforts and updated the CSP with several logistical components designed around the

sheltering of evacuees, a major issue during Hurricane Katrina. R2, directly involved in the

planning process, recounted how the adaptation of the plan faced little resistance as the

“memory of Katrina” and the “thought of a similar event happening in NYC” was an

unacceptable risk to everyone in NYC government.


Central to the CSP were a series of pre-emptive defensive measures enacted during the

before landfall period. Evacuation orders, the shutdown of mass transportation systems, the

powering down of electrical grids, disruption of gas lines, opening of emergency evacuation

shelters, mobilization and staging of equipment and supplies were all planned to occur within

this pre-landfall period. The plan relied heavily on the logistical capabilities of the city and

OEM's internal logistics unit spearheaded the plan development (R3; Gibbs & Holloway

2012).

The CSP attempted to include people-centric strategies, such as accommodation for pets

and their owners within the same shelter, a direct takeaway from Katrina, where many pet

owners chose not to evacuate because they would not be able to include their pets (Hunt et al.

2012). Yet, even the most humanitarian facets of the plan, the LSSP and ESS, focused on the

mass care and sheltering of up to 70,000 evacuees for 5 days, lacked any meaningful human

vulnerability analysis. Despite a highly diverse demographic, the CSP treated every

community district the same. The only vulnerability factor considered was an areas location

on the city’s flood zone map which (NYC OEM 2015). The city’s 59 community districts, the

most localized political grouping found in NYC, were otherwise treated equally under the

plans assumptions. The result was a plan that allowed a shelter servicing community districts

4 & 5, with a mean household income of $153,649, to receive the same support and supplies

as community district 14, located in the Rockaways, an area with a medium income of

$47,218 (NYC DCP 2015). DRM literature shows that a household’s income level plays a

critical role in their resiliency towards hazardous events (Blaikie et al 2014). In a megacity

like New York, there are a number of demographical variances found throughout the city, of

which income is the most readily available to DRM planners (US Census 2015). The CSP

only considered the physical proximity to a flood zone excluding an obvious social

vulnerability factor. The lack of vulnerability analysis was factor that resulted in an uneven

distribution of supplies and unexpected burn rates, one of the many issues the shelter system

faced (R5 2015).


Fig. 11: NYC Flood Zones (NYC OEM 2015)

On August 26, 2011, NYC activated the CSP and for the first time in its history, ordered

an evacuation of Zone A. The city emergency shelter system was also activated and the city

began to take the preparatory actions as outlined in the CSP. Despite little storm damage to

NYC, there was a significant amount of resources mobilized and deployed to support the

evacuation orders, namely the shelters and evacuees. Soon after the order was issued, OEM

found itself struggling with issues pertinent to the Rockaways (R7). Of paramount concern

was the lack of emergency planning found in private nursing homes, numerous in the

Rockaways. The regulation and licensing of the private long-term care facilities fell under the

LEGEND


jurisdiction of NY State (Gibbs & Holloway 2013), yet their physical location in the

Rockaways made the city responsible for their well-being during an emergency response.

With little enforcement of state regulations, the majority of nursing homes failed to establish

actionable emergency evacuation plans. During Irene and Sandy, the city was forced to find

transportation and shelter for patients in the care of these facilities. The city was left with

little alternative than to evacuate long-term care patients to Special Medical Needs Shelters

(SMNS) within the emergency shelter system. The data gathered from the respondents (R1,

R2, R3, R6 & R7) showed that during the Irene response of primary concern was the ability to

mobilize an evacuation transportation team to support these nursing homes.

Other issues, namely focused on the shelter experience, were identified by R1, R2, R3

and R7. Though the city had issued an evacuation order, officials were not prepared for the

number of people requiring transport to emergency shelters, specifically those with mobility

issues (R7). The allocation of shelter staff was also of major concern during Irene. The CSP

called for the city’s evacuation shelters to be staffed by civil servants, previously identified

and trained to fill the emergency role during a city-wide event, however, execution of this

facet of the plan was problematic due to the segregated nature of the city’s civil servant labor

force. The participation of the those identified fell to individual agencies to enforce yet no

formal commitment to staff shelters was established among the city agencies (R1).

Approximately 24 hours after the evacuation order was issued, the shelters were closed and

evacuees were allowed to return to their homes. Delaying the closure of the shelters was the

unprecedented issue providing of transportation to evacuees which did not have the means to

coordinate their return home (R5). To put this into context, a fare on the NYC mass transit

system was $2.50 at the time and many evacuees did not even have the means to pay for their

return fare home (R5).

The city emerged from Irene with little damage and, for the most part, successfully

implemented its CSP. According to R3, this may have left those engaged in the response

efforts with a sense of ‘false’ confidence in their ability to ‘handle the next event’ (R3). OEM

began its analysis of the response as well as its preparation for the next coastal storm season.

OEM brought to the CSP board many of the issues it faced during the Irene experience and it

was during board meetings that the lack of emergency planning at private nursing homes

within city limits became a known issue to decision makers. In response to the lack of

evacuation transport, and the realization that the emergency shelter system could be the

shelter of last resort for healthcare facilities, OEM made slight changes to its emergency


supply stockpile and executed emergency transportation contracts in anticipation of the next

event.

It was clear to the city as Sandy approached the storm would prove to be a very different

event than Irene. Soon after making landfall, a storm surge of over 14ft (Blake et al. 2013)

flooded the coastal areas of NYC. Disasters, though usually caused by an initial triggering

event, quickly evolve into a myriad of adverse conditions, often built upon the former

(Mitchell 1995) in any region. This is especially true of megacities where disasters inevitably

become a mix of social, technological and environmental hazards (ibid). Sandy resulted in

sequence of events that moved the city from one life safety response to another. As with Irene

an evacuation order of zone A was ordered, the shelters were activated and the staging of

equipment and supplies was coordinated.

As the storm surge made its way inland, the city was soon faced with an unprecedented

crisis: the emergency evacuation of hospitals and long-term medical facilities due to flooding.

Although hospitals in NYC are required to have in place emergency generators, no regulation

mandating their physical location above possible flood water levels was in place. In fact,

many facilities installed generators in basements or ground floors (R1). As the city lost power

south of 42nd street due to an explosion at an electrical plant located on the east river, several

hospitals, also located on the river, found their generators and other critical infrastructure

flooded.


Fig. 12: Hurricane Sandy inundation zones — New York City metropolitan area,

October 2012 (CDC 2015)

Private nursing homes in the Rockaways, once again, presented emergency managers

with a challenge. The city and state did not issue an evacuation order of medical facilities, and

as a result, nursing homes were not evacuated before the storm. Part of this was due to the

mayor delaying the evacuation order as forecasts continued to change (R3). While NYC

benefits from advance notice of a coastal storm’s approach, it is not afforded any certainty as

to the final trajectory or impact. This uncertainty, left city officials increasingly wary of

issuing an expensive evacuation order without being certain of its necessity.

The city’s SMNS facilities were not prepared for patients requiring long-term and intense

medical care, and medical facilities did not make provision to ensure staff would accompany

their residents. This had an adverse impact on patient overall care as well as the general


conditions of the shelters themselves (R6). While SMNS facilities were staffed with medical

professionals they were soon overwhelmed by the demands presented by patients requiring

intensive care (R1).

Fig. 13 Promenade Rehabilitation & Health Care Center in the

Rockaway evacuated during Hurricane Irene. Credit Stolarik/The New

York Times (Baker & Barbaro 2011)


Fig. 14 Promenade Rehabilitation & Health Care Center in the Rockaways After Hurricane Sandy. Credit Chang W. Lee/The New York Times (Powell & Fink 2012)

General population shelters also experienced major issues during Sandy, the first of

which was the length sheltering. The CSP assumed a 5-day sheltering operation yet during

Sandy they were in operation for over 23 days (Gibbs & Holloway 2013). The lack of human

vulnerability analysis left the city scrambling to answer the needs of those segments of the

population most reliant on government service - the impoverished of the Rockaways (Suaiya

et al. 2014). Those living in poverty are the most affected by disasters as they live on the

precipice of disaster in their everyday existence (Fothergill & Peek 2004). The lack of any

meaningful analysis of the vulnerabilities faced by its population left the city unprepared to

deal with the numbers of people who had no other recourse than to stay at the evacuation

shelters (R5).

Communications was also an area of concern during both Irene and Sandy. When the

mayor issued the evacuation order many of the communications to the public featured

technical information. The use of the city’s flood map and GIS mapping technology, while

illustrative of the predicted impact of the storm and useful in preparedness material, were not

easily understood by the general public (Zarcadoolas et al. 2007). The city made reasonable

attempts at communicating the risks associated with Sandy, issuing notices in various

languages, unfortunately, many residents did not evacuate as the concept of a storm surge was

not communicated effectively (Morrow 2015). The lack of compliance with the evacuation

order complicated the response efforts. R3 expressed frustration at the public's inability to

take personal accountability for their safety by ignoring the warnings of city officials.

4.2 NYC’s Megacities Characteristics Fuel Resistance Towards Transformative DRM

Resistance Factor 1:

Tensions between State & City

Despite the significant issues related to evacuation of nursing homes as made evident in

Irene and again during Sandy, and the glimpse into the lack of emergency planning in the

medical sector during what R1 and R2 called a "dry run", there was little done in the year

between Irene and Sandy to address the issues. Though the state and the city are close

planning partners, the state has to date refused to collaborate with the city on addressing the


lack of emergency planning found in private nursing homes (R3). During Sandy, this failure

resulted in over 6,300 patients being transferred to inadequate SMNS and general population

shelter facilities (Gibbs & Holloway 2013). R6 recalled reports of blankets and other bedding

used as “adult diapers” as the shelters were ill equipped to deal with the physical care needs of

this population. R1 recounted how there were no systems in place to track where the patients

had gone and shelter staff were forced to rely on color-coded index cards as a means of

identification.

Fig. 15 NYC Resistance Factor 1: Tension between State & City (Authors Illustration

derived from sources cited)

Megacity Characteristic – NYC Resistance Factor 1:

Tension between State & City


The inability to transform current DRM policy to address the neglect demonstrated

nursing home administrators is a significant issue in the city’s CSP. In response, OEM has

taken an incremental approach by adapting its ESS medical supplies and the CSP to reflect

the increasing demands on SMNS shelters but these incremental adjustments do not address

the issues raised by the Sandy event. While the official Sandy related death toll was recorded

at 43 (Gibbs & Holloway 2013) and no deaths were recorded during the evacuation of

hospitals and healthcare centers (ibid), it is unclear what effects the evacuation and

subsequent lapses in care had on these patients.


Scarcity of Resources

R1 reported budgetary concerns are a major decision factor in DRM, a statement echoed

by all of the respondents. During Irene, the city “waited until the FEMA folks assured them

of a declaration” before issuing an evacuation order (R5). FEMA will reimburses the costs

incurred associated with an emergency response if a presidential disaster declaration is issued

(FEMA 2015). Because of the lack of funds available to support DRM, city officials were

hesitant to commit to the large costs, understood to be “in the tens of millions” (R5), by

issuing an evacuation order without the guarantee of FEMA financial support. The scarcity of

resources and the unwillingness of agencies to commit resources from their day-to-day

operations without assurances of reimbursement delayed the evacuation orders of both Sandy

and Irene (R2, R5). It also played a significant role in the lack of shelter staff committed to

the response effort. R5 recounted how shelter staff trainee numbers were always a concern at

CSP board meetings as agencies did little to enforce staff participation and R2 reported low

morale among shelter staff, as “they felt thrown into a response effort with little training.”


Fig. 16 NYC Resistance Factor 2: Scarcity of Resources (Authors illustration derived from cited sources)


Misunderstanding of Hazards due to Physical Disconnect from Natural Environment

NYC is one of the most human altered landscapes on earth. This alteration has left the

city disconnected from its natural environment, resulting in an inability to recognize natural

hazards. Land use policies do not take into account increasing coastal hazards as throughout

its history the city has developed its coastlines (Rosenzweig & Solecki 2014; Wagner et al.

2014). The city, under the Bloomberg administration, oversaw a push of coastal revitalization


Scarcity of Resources


plans, which sought to transform its historically industrial coastline into livable and ‘green’

areas. This initiative led to the creation of more housing in flood zones, which was in direct

contradiction with the city’s NPCC report identifying the need to preserve and re-establish

coastal wetlands (NPCC 2009). While the city sought to strengthen its resiliency through

preparedness programs and outreach (NYC OEM 2015), it did little to adapt its critical aging

infrastructure to the risks posed by climate change, partly due to an underestimation of risks

and lack of funds to support meaningful adaptation (R2). When Sandy made landfall, the

storm surge flooded the city’s subway system, caused an explosion at one of its power plants

and crippled its fuel supplies. The locale of critical infrastructure facilities in flood zones

exacerbated the impacts of the storm surge complicating response and recovery efforts.


Physical Disconnection from Natural Environment


Fig. 17 NYC Resistance Factor 3: Physical Disconnection from Natural Environment

(Authors illustration derived from cited sources).

Since Sandy, a series of defense measures, outlined in citywide resiliency plan (NYC

2015) have been taken to strengthen the city’s infrastructure. The development of NYC’s

coastal areas continues, despite the increased awareness of flooding hazards, and points to the

city’s continued resistance towards a more transformative approach, such as the rededication

of flood zones to marshland. The over confidence in engineering solutions to build back

“better and stronger” (ibid) has resulted in little room for debate on whether or not these

coastal areas, which will only experience more floods as sea-levels rise, should be repurposed

as the city continues its encroachment on flood prone areas.


Complex Governance


Negotiation, trust, and collaboration are key components to disaster governance and the

attitudes of the actors and stakeholders involved determine outcomes (Pelling 2011; Tierney

2012). The attitudes of policymakers and actors continue to prove to be a major factor of

resistance in NYC DRM. There is a sentiment of unwillingness to take responsibility and to

collaborate on planning, as indicated by R1, R2, R3, R4 and R7. R3 went so far as to call the

CSP board ‘a lame duck’ insisting that all of the major adaptations made to its CSP plan have

been recommended outside of the CSP Board and operationalized by OEM. The lack of

confidence in such a central piece to NYC DRM is a significant issue the city will have to

overcome.


Fig. 18 NYC Resistance Factor 4: Complex Governance (Authors illustration derived from cited sources)


Reliance on Technocratic Solutions

The treatment of hazards and vulnerabilities as objects instead of expressions of complex

relationships between people, political economies and the environment fosters reliance on

technocratic solutions (Lavell & Maskry 2014). The city’s CCA DRM efforts after Sandy

have included the introduction of physical defense structures, such as sea walls and programs

to ‘build back better’. Critical infrastructure facility defenses were hardened while more

transformative solutions, such as the relocation of infrastructure, have not been pursued. This


Complex Governance


is partially attributed to the uncertainty decision maker’s face when planning for future

hazards. R2 states ‘planning partners no longer are interested in talking about hurricanes and

everyone calling Sandy a one in a hundred year storm has made matters worse.’

Fig. 19 NYC Resistance Factor 5: Reliance on Technocratic Solutions (Authors

illustration derived from cited sources)

The lack of a comprehensive vulnerability analysis can also be attributed to this

preference for technocratic solutions. All of the respondents agreed current planning lacks the

social and physical vulnerability analysis often found in the global South but varied in how


Reliance on Technocratic Solutions


they prioritized its inclusion in future DRM CCA efforts. R1, R2, R5 and R6 were the most

open to the inclusion of vulnerability analysis in DRM planning, while R3 and R7 were the

most resistant stating that ‘the public must take responsibility for not heeding the mayor’s

order’ (R3 2015). While the city has made significant strides in responding to a significant

gap in its CSP, as exemplified by the Americans with Disabilities Act CSP provisions and

emergency feeding plans (Solecki 2015), it continues to lag behind in developing strategies

that reflect the diversity of its population and its varying states of vulnerability. To date, none

of the respondents are aware of an in-depth vulnerability analysis effort, and plans continue to

focus on storm surge inundation levels as the core of CSP planning assumptions.

4.3 Current and Future Policy Implications

The experiences of Irene and Sandy had a significant impact on future DRM in NYC, as

made evident by the extensive Sandy After Action Report (Gibbs & Holloway 2013), the city

council hearings held to examine the planning and response operations (ibid) and the renewed

focus on resiliency (NYC 2015). The shortfall in the sheltering system during Sandy led to a

lawsuit against the city filed by several special needs advocacy groups. The city has entered

into a settlement with these groups and has committed itself to various, incremental

adjustments to its operational plans, which begin to take into account the needs of its mobility

impaired demographic and the special medical needs of the city as a whole.

Furthermore, the events of Hurricane Irene and Sandy have brought the city’s DRM to

the forefront of everyday operations. R3 reports that many of the city agencies have

established their own emergency units, reflecting an understanding that effective DRM will

require a significant commitment of resources moving forward. The DeBlasio administration,

which took office in 2014, has made emergency response a focal point in its vision for the city

(NYC 2015). DRM is no longer only discussed at the precipice of an event, but instead is a

part of day-to-day operations (R2).

The challenges faced by policy makers in NYC can be extrapolated to their peers in other

megacities. The questions surrounding climate change risks and the benefits of

transformative adaptation will continue to challenge transformative visions with

implementation challenges (Lempert & Collins 2007), and it is clear how as a megacity, the

characteristics explored in this study have resulted in greater displays of resistance in NYC.

NYC’s long-standing bureaucracy, which segregates areas of responsibility to specific


agencies for management (Dryzek 1992), is an impediment to multilateral and collaborative

decision making process necessitated by CCA. Managing relationships among actors

continues to prove difficult.

While contributors to resistance, megacity characteristics have presented unique

opportunities as well. Their status as global areas of importance have resulted in visionary

policies, which have served as examples for others to follow. NYC, while struggling with its

resistance to transformative CCA, has used its recent experiences to elevate their concerns to

national and transnational forums. The C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, 100 Resilient

Cities Centennial Challenge, Rockefeller Foundation are all examples of knowledge sharing

and policy driving forums, and many of these groups members linked by megacity status,

geography and other defining factors (McArdle 2014). Participation in these groups allows

members to share knowledge, expertise and even resources (ibid) accelerating the

implementation of transformative CCA in regions that will not have the time to experiment

with their own attempts at CCA given the need to act in response to the climate change crisis.


CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION - CLOSING THOUGHTS & FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS FOR RESEARCH

“What started out as a natural disaster became a man-made one — a

failure of government to look out for its own citizens.” US President

Barack H. Obama, speaking at the 10-year anniversary commemoration

of Hurricane Katrina (Tao 2015)

The prevailing academic understanding of what constitutes a disaster is clear: it is not an

event that brings a disaster but instead, failing political and economic structures that leave

individuals in chronic states of vulnerability (Blaikie et al. 2014). Disasters are failures in the

social contracts between a state and the people it is obligated to serve. Megacities represent

especially hazardous areas for human beings, as the vulnerabilities faced by their inhabitants

are not only complex due to the strains posed by exponential population growth, but are

difficult to address given their complex governance structures. These structures, with long

entrenched positions of slow and incremental adaptation are particularly resistance to the

transformative adaptation DRM required to address the severe impacts of climate change.

The NYC Irene and Sandy Rockaway case study provides DRM practitioners with an

opportunity to explore how shared megacity characteristics influence disaster governance and

impact resistance. The statistics are clear, population shifts from rural to urban areas are

expected to increase and as the globe adds another billion people to its total population

(UNDESA 2014). The majority of our future populations will live their lives in sprawling

metropolises (Hoffmann-Martinot & Sellers 2005). At the same time, the likelihood of

maintaining a +2 C degree average temperature target is unlikely and the consequences of this

failure will prove catastrophic to megacities across the globe.

While it has been morally appropriate to focus on DRM solutions tailored towards the

global South (Rodima-Taylor et al. 2012), whose inhabitants unjustly bear the burden of

climate change, this paper has shown how the lessons of a megacity in the North can be

applied to megacities all over the world. Following the current models of participatory


governance, megacities can further knowledge sharing and collaboration in finding long

lasting solutions to the risks imposed by climate change (McArdle 2014). Many in DRM have

expressed frustration at the lack of significant adaptation in policy and planning, which has

featured incremental rather than transformative change (Berrang-Ford et al. 2011; Ford et al.

2011; Park et al. 2012; Tompkins et al. 2010). Megacities, as cultural, political and economic

loci are positioned to steer the global debate towards a direction where action, and not

rhetoric, become primary objectives (Brenner 2004; Birkmann 2010; Krass 2007). NYC, its

leaders and citizens have made a conscious decision to tackle the challenges posed by climate

change and there is much to learn in its struggle to adapt to its dramatically increasing

hazards. NYC will not exist, as it is known today, if drastic measures are not taken both

locally and globally to address the climate change crisis.

Given the large-scale potential for economic and human costs, the gap in DRM literature

focusing on megacities is alarming. The expressions of resistance identified in this study are

specific to NYC but their relevance to other megacities merits further exploration as they have

been influenced and, in some cases created by, shared megacity characteristics. This research

has attempted to link resistance to adaptation to megacity characteristics, characteristics that

exist in other metropolises, in both the global North and South (Kotter & Friesecke 2009;

Krass 2007). While NYC’s DRM struggles and successes after Irene and Sandy do not

provide a blueprint easily followed by other megacities, they do provide experiences that can

be analyzed and made actionable by other megacities.

Also worthy of consideration, while not explored in this paper, are the capitalist

influences on social policy. Though all respondents agreed that a human vulnerability

analysis would be beneficial to DRM in NYC, they all expressed the “need to prepare the

public” R2 and to “communicate risks and dangerous” R3 so that citizens would be more

“personally accountable” R5 for their outcomes. The lack of social safety nets and the

relentless destruction of the welfare state is now a global trend as the world embraces the

capitalistic political economy of the global North (Caraley 1996). If disaster are failures the

contract between a citizenry and its government, what can be said about governments that

place their contractual obligations back on the citizen they are obligated to serve?

Actors and stakeholders involved in disaster governance are challenged to produce

meaningful policy responses to an impending climate change crisis. A crisis that cannot be

easily imagined, despite increasingly sophisticated computer simulations and data forecasts.


Like any social participatory process, there will be obstacles to overcome, usually human in

origin and expression (Pelling 2011). The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction

2015-2030 is explicit in its support for international knowledge sharing as a method for

achieving global disaster risk reduction. As megacities form international partnerships and

coalitions in the quest towards CCA, they are positioned to leverage the experiences,

successes and failures of their partners via these international networks (McArdle 2014). As

R5 states ‘Resistance is a people problem’, and its solution will require people to solve age

old questions about the nature of human interaction and collaboration. The future of our

species and ultimately of our planet depends on our ability to solve these questions. Collective

learning has been the keystone of human progress and may very well prove to be critical in

this epic challenge.

Hurricane Katrina, and to a lesser extent, Hurricane Sandy, reminded the one of the most

powerful nations on earth of an indelible truth: disasters are equalizers. The lessons learned

in NYC are applicable to every megacity today. At the time this research was concluded,

there were 3 category 4 storms in the Pacific (Lee 2015) and research linking climate change

impacts to political insecurity in the Mideast (Kelly et al. 2015), exacerbating a human

displacement crisis the wealthy nations of western Europe struggle to cope with is now

making its way into main stream media. While transformation adaptation is not the Rosetta

Stone to the challenges currently faced by DRM, in the face of unimaginable future a +2C

degree world will offer, it may prove to be our only option.


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bel-truc.orgbel-truc.org/downloads/Working_Paper_1_NewYork.docx · Web viewIn 1950, NYC was classified as one of the world’s first ... The use of the city’s flood map and GIS