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Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5: 249–252, 2002.

BOOK REVIEW

Bernd Gräfrath: Evolutionäre Ethik? Philosophische Programme, Problemeund Perspektiven der Soziobiologie. Berlin, New York: de Gruyter, 1997,249 pp. ISBN 3-11015392-0, DM 59.90, EUR 30.60.

Sociobiology doubtlessly belongs to the most interesting scientificdisciplines to arise in the last decades. According to its approach not onlythe anatomical features of animals, but also their social behaviour is theresult of an evolutionary process of selection and adaptation. Sociobiologyhas been able to show in many examples that “help” and “altruism” areexplainable through the concept of the “egoistic gene”.

Since Edward Wilson’s studies sociobiology has also been a challengefor moral philosophy, because Human-Sociobiology showed that alsohuman social behaviour becomes (better) explainable in many casesthrough sociobiological, “gene-egoistic” approaches. That is why Human-Sociobiologists believe that sociobiology has a certain “relevance” toethics, too. However, what exactly could this relevance consist in? Whatactually are the consequences for the self-understanding of moralphilosophy? Should philosophers give up their traditional task ofexplicating and justifiying moral norms under the pressure of the findingsof empirical sciences? Or should they even ignore such findings perhapssince norms are not derivable from facts and genesis and validity are to bestrictly separated in philosophical reasoning?

Bernd Graefrath takes a negotiating position: philosophy is supposedto investigate in how far both disciplines can reasonably complement eachother. The philosopher must not simply ignore the empirical sciences, butnorms do not just emerge from facts. In my opinion this compromisingcourse does not lead, however, “to Rome” once again: neither the heuristicpotential of sociobiology as a science nor the range of a theory of someinterest-based social contract theory is judged on adequately.

After a short account of the problem situation Dawkin’s theory of theegoistic gene as well as the “question of the origin and preservation ofcooperative structures” (p. 26) is expounded in chapter 2 (“The biologicalprogram of sociobiology”) according to Axelrod. This chapter does nothold anything for experts; it is supposed to form a common basis ofunderstanding.

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In chapter 3 (“The kulturphilosophische program of sociobiology”) wefind an introductory discussion on the consequences of the expoundedtheories for human self-conception. Graefrath is right to point out that thecorresponding comments of Human-Sociobiologists are philosophicallyproblematic (p. 47): On the one hand some authors want to include evencultural and intellectual phenomena (for example Dawkins with his conceptof “Meme”) in the framework of sociobiology; on the other hand Lumsdenand Wilson speak of the “free will” of human beings leaving the decisiveprecondition of traditional moral reasoning untouched: that there is an“empire of freedom” without causality. The causal explanation of mentalfeatures cannot replace a “vernünftige” (reasonable) examination of validityclaims in any case (p. 73). Graefrath overlooks, however, that this is validalso in reverse: “Rational” activities as the choice between competingtheories can be explained causally – as the economic approach has shown.And that matters for the problems of the validation of theories in similarmanner as the sociobiology does for the problem how we can justify actionsethically. We are confronted here with the problem, which strategy oftheory-building we consider as more promising. Graefrath itself concedesthat justificational programs were up to now unsuccessful (p. 220). Is itnot reasonable und comprehensive, that sociobiologists consider furtherinvestments in this program as slightly promising well?

Chapter 4 is the most extensive – perhaps too extensive – chapter (pp.76–211). In the first section different versions of Social Darwinism arediscussed. Graefrath shows convincingly that Social Darwinism not onlyfails because of the problem of naturalistic fallacy, but also it cannot answerthe question already discussed by John Stuart Mill what it means“following the example of nature”. Both, stationary state as well asdynamic development can “correspond to the nature” to the same extent.According to Wilson it is a moral demand to leave the genetic material ofmankind intact (p. 107). But even if this is regarded as a clearly formulatedpostulate, the consequences that Wilson draws from this cannot really beaccepted as sufficiently justified. For example, he regards career womenas morally problematic, because they lower the reproduction rate – against“the nature”. But why should this be a moral problem being faced withoverpopulation? According to Graefrath, Wilson does not answer thisquestion in an satisfactory manner. The same is true for the question ofhow women could be stopped from using their right to decide against achild and how coercive measures to this purpose are justifiable. ForGraefrath such considerations are not only a model example of a violationof Hume’s Law, that values and norms cannot be derived from facts, but

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also an example of Wilson’s tendency to underestimate the importance ofjustificational problems (p. 115).

But how do facts and values relate to each other really? We can avoidthe naturalistic fallacy impending here by taking existing convictions onmoral obligations as the most fitting approximation to real moralobligations (p. 139); thus such “obligations” take the form of regulativeideas.

To my mind one could pick up here the thread of interest-based ethicsand go on from here to a Hobbesian social contract theory: We do havemoral interests, too, i.e. ideas about what a world in which we like to livewith other fellow human beings should look like. However, Graefrathconsiders both approaches as unsuitable to fulfill the “reasonable duties”combined with moral philosophy (p. 189): Theories of social contractbetween rational egoists could not justify “our deepest moral convictions”(p. 117). Unfortunately, Graefrath does not clarify what these “convictions”really are – so that those defending Hobbes are left without a chance tocriticize this theory.

The following sections of the chapter contain a criticism of MichaelRuse’s metaethical scepticism and a criticism of positions aim atestablishing morality on individual preferences. Graefrath rightly criticizesthe overestimation of game-theory: evolutionary stable strategies areneither necessary nor sufficient conditions of moral acceptability (p. 167).Also “social stability” is rather a criterion of successful political reasoningthan an idea of importance for ethics (p. 171). The same is true for“survival” (p. 173), whose overestimation by Hans Jonas is correctlycriticized.

What shall we do therefore, if we want to consider sociobiologicalfindings “adequately” as moral philosophers? Graefrath ultimately makesgreater concessions to the sociobiological approach than perhaps originallyintended. Descriptive premises have, indeed, a “decisive influence on thecontents of concrete moral obligations” (p. 192). But if this is so – whydoes Graefrath oppose the Hobbesian approach that looked upon moralphilosophy as the exploration of just these empirical conditions under whichpeople can co-operate – keeping their own interests? Instead of thisGraefrath asks for “increased efforts” (p. 185) to enforce what is „morallyrequired“. He explains this using the example of the problem of the ThirdWorld. While we tend to concentrate our aid on the genetically localenvironment, it is the task of governments to expand the circle ofbeneficiaries – for instance by means of the promotion of sponsorships forchildren in the Third World (p. 208). (After all Graefrath wants to organize

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the “aid” for the Third World on the basis of voluntary actions; Peter Singercalled for tax financed transfer payments here.) This is one of the fewexamples in the book serving to demonstrate the capability of justificationalmoral philosophy – and it is unfortunately handled then so as one shouldexpect of a traditional philosopher: no strategies are developed which arelasting in the light of relevant sciences. However, exactly this weaknessof traditional moral philosophy sociobiologists had in mind, as theyformulated their attempts of reform. You might agree that sociobiology isnot the only, and – in my opinion – not even the most important empiricalscience that is relevant for ethics. However, sociobiology is methodicallyfar advanced and wants to be seen – to a certain extent – as spearhead ofnaturalism, not aiming at “demands” but at empirical findings, hence atunderstanding the reality the demands refer to.

For this reason sociobiologists could in fact put the book aside alreadyafter finishing p. 6. For there it says: “We must concede, however, that anyrealistic ethics must not make any demands, which cannot be met.” Everyscientist that understands himself as a determinist, however, will see histask now in just narrowing the field of these demands that can’t be fulfilledmore and more by a causal explanation of human behavior. According toGraefrath the sociobiological approach can settle the common moral basisthat enables us to advance to generally accepted justifications: our “moralintuitions”. Therefore, the metaethical relativism has its boundaries thatare imposed by sociobiology and that can even be explained (p. 223). Incases of conflict a consensus in principle remains possible, since we donot differ genetically in principle from each other and can thus find acommon basis. To my opinion, after reading the book an interest-basedapproach of social contract between rational egoists remains an attractivealternative, though. It doesn’t lead to scepticism: Hobbes believed thatpreferences of the members of society are recognizable (p. 117), and humanbeings can solve the emerging problems of coordination with the aid ofinstitutions.

GERHARD ENGELUniversität MainzFB 03 Rechtswissenschaften55099 Mainz, Germany