BOOK REVIEW

Felix Muhlholzer: Wissenschaft

Reclam, Stuttgart 2011, 146 pp, €9.90, ISBN: 978-3150203354

Daniel Minkin

Published online: 25 March 2014� Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Felix Muhlholzer’s book Wissenschaft (‘‘Science’’) appeared in the series ‘‘Grundwissen

Philosophie’’ (‘‘Basic Knowledge in Philosophy’’), whose aim is to give an introduction to

different philosophical topics. Thus, Muhlholzer’s Wissenschaft can be read with profit by

beginners, while not providing a straightforward introduction to the subject. Rather, the

author puts forward an argumentation of his own, and in so doing, chooses to ignore some

essential questions and problems of the Philosophy of Science.1 Therefore my review will

not discuss the didactic qualities of the book, but concentrate on the author’s

argumentation.

In seven chapters, he presents ‘‘some thoughts’’ (10) concerning the central issues of

science and scientific objectivity. The author’s argumentation rests, I think, on four main

aspects: normativity, the concept of scientific man (wissenschaftlicher Mensch), that of

lifeworld (Lebenswelt) and finally Kuhn’s Philosophy of Science.

The first chapter (‘‘Philosophy of Science’’, 14–18) sets the course for an elucidation of

the practice of philosophers of science. As Muhlholzer puts it: ‘‘Simple prudence suggests

that Philosophy of Science respects scientific practice and remains, as far as possible,

descriptive, i. e., tries to illuminate sciences—and in particular their normative practices—

descriptively.’’ (16, my emphasis). What is meant by ‘‘simple prudence’’ is (at this point)

not clear. I shall come back to this point in my discussion of Muhlholzer’s view.

In the second chapter (‘‘The Concept of Science’’, 19–29) Muhlholzer draws on Herman

Weyl’s characterization of the role that objectivity plays in science. Here, the author says

nothing about the concept, except that he considers it more important for a description of

scientific practice than the concept of truth. Subsequently, Muhlholzer points to the

D. Minkin (&)Philosophisches Institut, University of Duesseldorf, Universitatsstr. 1, 40225 Dusseldorf, Germanye-mail: danminkin@msn.com

1 On the one hand, some very influential positions are not mentioned or only implied, e.g. Popper’sFalsificationism, Lakatos’ approach to research programs or van Fraassen’s Constructive Empiricism. Onthe other hand, a lot of more specific issues are also not considered, e.g. Nancy Cartwright’s dilemmaconcerning the truth of natural-law-assertions or the regress-argument concerning the relationship betweenexperiments and theories.

123

J Gen Philos Sci (2014) 45:213–216DOI 10.1007/s10838-014-9249-5

problem of drawing a line between science and pseudoscience and suggests rightly that all

previous attempts at establishing such a distinction have failed. As an alternative approach,

he introduces the concept of scientific man—the second main aspect of Muhlholzer’s

book—drawing on a text by Albert Einstein. According to Muhlholzer’s interpretation of

Einstein, a scientific man can easily be described as a European Enlightenment scientist:

He lets nothing prevail, but ‘‘(a) the given in the experience[,] together with (b) the laws of

thought’’.2 His actions and endeavors are enabled and underpinned by a ‘‘non-neurotical

basic trust in the approachability of the world, if one looks at the world in a scientific way’’

(27). This idea is more precisely illustrated in the following chapters.

Muhlholzer is concerned with the first point, the sensory given, in chapter three (‘‘The

Empirical Basis’’, 30–39). Starting from an examination of experimentation he introduces

the concept of lifeworld (‘‘Lebenswelt’’/‘‘Lebensweltliches’’), the third pillar of the book.

In borrowing this concept from Husserl, the author intends to address ‘‘a very basic and

familiar way of perceiving and acting’’ (37). These actions and perceptions are conceived

as intersubjective practice: ‘‘on an intersubjective level, [we] widely agree in our lifeworld

actions and judgements’’ (ibid., emphasis in original). The concept of lifeworld is used to

identify the foundation of scientific objectivity. According to Muhlholzer, lifeworld actions

are not governed by scientific standards, but reveal the kind of intersubjectivity that is

necessarily part to scientific objectivity. For the author, a naturalistic proposal like the one

provided by Quine cannot account for this (cf. 36). Furthermore, the implicit presuppo-

sition of lifeworld actions is—as revealed in discussions on folk psychology—up to a

certain extent immune to the proofs of its own falsehood and therefore more stable than

scientific theories. On these grounds Muhlholzer concludes the third chapter by stating: ‘‘I

think that lifeworld actions should be accepted as the basis endowing scientific disciplines

with objectivity.’’ (39, my emphasis).

In the following—fourth—chapter (‘‘What is a Scientific Theory’’, 40–71) Muhlholzer

again takes up the concept of lifeworld, distinguishing it from the field of the scientific-

theoretical. In order to describe the standards of the latter, the author discusses Kuhn’s

Philosophy of Science, the fourth central aspect of his book. In this discussion, the term

‘‘paradigm’’ in the sense of ‘‘shared examples’’ (Kuhn 1970, 187) is distinguished quite

correctly from the expression ‘‘disciplinary matrix’’,3 which was introduced by Kuhn

himself (cf. ibid.). The further development of this concept by Phillip Kitcher is also

considered. Furthermore, Muhlholzer takes on the concept of reference. To clarify this

topic and the connection to Kuhn’s Philosophy of Science he employs Quine’s, and

respectively Davidson’s scenario of Radical Interpretation. This scenario is then trans-

ferred to the scientists’ use of their language (cf. 53ff.).

The topic of reference is brought up again by Muhlholzer in the sixth chapter (‘‘Changes

in Theories and Scientific Progress’’, 80–99), which continues his discussion of Kuhn’s

Philosophy of Science. Besides arguing against a new approach to Kuhn’s incommensu-

rability thesis, the second part of the chapter provides an attempt at refuting it. While

rejecting the incommensurability thesis as an assertion about the dissimilarity of exten-

sions4 of the terms constituting the vocabularies of different theories, he also wants to show

2 The expression ‘‘laws of thought’’, Muhlholzer rightly notes, can be criticized from a philosophical pointof view (cf. 26).3 For a problematization of the Disciplinary-matrix-modell: cf. Hoyningen–Huene 1989.4 Muhlholzer does not mention the term ‘‘extension’’. Though he problematizes the preferred term ‘‘ref-erence’’, he sticks to its use. ‘‘Extension’’ appears more adequate to me, because here it has nothing to dowith proper names, which refer to particulars, but with universal terms.

214 D. Minkin

123

that it is possible to constitute a ‘‘constancy of reference’’ (96). He thus introduces the idea

of ‘‘scientific interpretation’’ (93, emphasis in original), which allows for semantic rela-

tivism as a means to create constancy of reference for those periods of normal science in

which one is involved. This idea seems tempting, primarily because such stories of sci-

entific interpretations exist. We would, for instance, never be in the position today to

understand the practice of the phlogiston theorists, unless we could construct or reconstruct

‘‘their’’ reasons. The fact that the extension of ‘‘phlogiston’’ in the way we—as opposed to

the phlogiston theorists—use the term today is an empty set, is of secondary importance in

this context.

The last chapter (‘‘Scientific Objectivity’’, 100–120), finally, intends to make clear what

can be understood by ‘‘scientific objectivity’’. The author begins quite rightly with an

investigation of the concept of nature, the latter being the authority which confirms or

falsifies scientific explanations. Muhlholzer’s primary objective is to show that the

deployment of laws of nature is accompanied by a ‘‘subjective moment’’, meaning

‘‘‘coming from the subject of cognition’’’ (104). At the end of the book, a version of a

consensus theory concerning truth and objectivity is offered. According to Muhlholzer,

however, this theory does not correspond to the one widely accepted in sociology; namely

that the consensus, e.g. regarding laws of nature, posits the basis of scientific objectivity.

Rather, for Muhlholzer, the consensus depends on the elementary practice of the lifeworld,

which was the subject of the third chapter.

To conclude, I would like to provide a critical evaluation of Muhlholzer’s views,

beginning with the topic of normativity. As far as the author’s claim of being as descriptive

as possible is concerned, Muhlholzer meets one’s expectations. Whether his generalization

of this claim is convincing, however, remains doubtful. Therefore, what is meant by

‘‘simple prudence’’ remains equally unclear. However, Muhlholzer’s view is not confirmed

by a consensus in the Philosophy of Science. For instance, Wolfgang Detel points out:

‘‘[J]ust as Logics makes normative recommendations for the construction of good or

compelling arguments, Philosophy of Science makes [explicit] standards of scientific

rationality and scientific ethics.’’ (Detel 2007, 124, emphasis in original). In the end, for

Detel, the scientific recommendations turn out to be Hypothetical Imperatives (cf. Detel

2007, 124).

With regard to his discussion of the Kuhnian incommensurability thesis, the author’s

attempt at introducing the concept of constancy of reference is not satisfying, because he

provides no description of what a scientific interpretation would imply. Here the David-

sonian idea of an interpretation situation could help. In such situations, however, the

scientific interpreter has to observe the interpreted scientific person, formulate axioms,

allege T-Theorems and correct his own assumptions. All this is not possible when dealing

with different disciplinary matrices, because the common situation does not exist. Even the

argument that it is possible to reconstruct a common situation, i.e. rebuild that situation, is

no help, as one would presuppose that the reference of the expressions in the source which

should help rebuild the situation are constant or clear. But if this is given, no scientific

interpretation is needed anymore.

Finally, the question remains what the concepts of scientific man and lifeworld actually

achieve. So, the question arises, why there should be only one scientific man. In classical

ethology, experiments obviously have another relevance than in experimental physics.

Could the concept of scientific man be applied to these different scientific disciplines, if

made sufficiently clear? Muhlholzer does not provide the reader with an answer to this

question. The concept of lifeworld was established with the aim of fulfilling the demand

for intersubjectivity within scientific objectivity. But as shown above, this concept is

Felix Muhlholzer: Wissenschaft 215

123

elucidated by drawing on the concept of intersubjectivity (see p. 2). Therefore the difficulty

with intersubjectivity is only displaced.

But what presents the biggest problem, however, is the consensus theory suggested by

Muhlholzer. This thesis commits him to a dispositional theory of linguistic meaning. In this

respect he says: ‘‘Now, what we have achieved is a social fact with regard to ‘nature itself’,

precisely the intersubjective coincidence which depends on our natural inclination to

respond in a certain way to certain stimuli’’ (118, my emphasis). But at least since Kripke’s

comment (cf. Kripke 1982) on Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations a purely dis-

positional semantics seems untenable. This is due to the fact that it is hard to see how this

kind of semantics could make sense of the normativity which is obviously implied in our

natural language. This is not to say that Kripke’s and Wittgenstein’s arguments refute the

skeptical arguments concerning linguistic normativity. There are a lot of skeptics in this

respect.5 But for adopting such a skeptical position we need arguments, i.e. we need

something more than a purely dispositional theory, and I doubt whether Muhlholzer can

provide that.

Certain philosophical doubts aside, this book is suitable for readers wanting to begin to

explore the realm of the Philosophy of Science, but this is not to say that Wissenschaft

gives a straightforward introduction to this field.

References

Detel, W. (2007). Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie. In W. Detel (Ed.), Grundwissen Philosophie (Vol.2). Stuttgart: Reclam.

Hoyningen–Huene, P. (1989). Die Wissenschaftsphilosophie Thomas S. Kuhns: Rekonstruktion undGrundlagenprobleme. Braunschweig/Wiesbaden: Vieweg.

Kripke, S. (1982). Wittgenstein uber Regeln und Privatsprache. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. (German translationof Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language).

Kuhn, T. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

5 I am grateful to Michael Anacker for showing me the great importance of this point.

216 D. Minkin

123