Labor Code Art 156-167

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LABOR CODE

BOOK FOUR

HEALTH, SAFETY AND SOCIAL WELFARE BENEFITS

Title I

MEDICAL, DENTAL AND OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY

Chapter I

MEDICAL AND DENTAL SERVICES

Art. 156. First-aid treatment. Every employer shall keep in his establishment such first-aid medicines and

equipment as the nature and conditions of work may require, in accordance with such regulations as the

Department of Labor and Employment shall prescribe.

The employer shall take steps for the training of a sufficient number of employees in first-aid treatment.

Art. 157. Emergency medical and dental services. It shall be the duty of every employer to furnish his

employees in any locality with free medical and dental attendance and facilities consisting of:

a. The services of a full-time registered nurse when the number of employees exceeds fifty (50) but not

more than two hundred (200) except when the employer does not maintain hazardous workplaces,

in which case, the services of a graduate first-aider shall be provided for the protection of workers,

where no registered nurse is available. The Secretary of Labor and Employment shall provide by

appropriate regulations, the services that shall be required where the number of employees does

not exceed fifty (50) and shall determine by appropriate order, hazardous workplaces for purposes

of this Article;

b. The services of a full-time registered nurse, a part-time physician and dentist, and an emergency

clinic, when the number of employees exceeds two hundred (200) but not more than three

c. The services of a full-time physician, dentist and a full-time registered nurse as well as a dental clinic

and an infirmary or emergency hospital with one bed capacity for every one hundred (100)

employees when the number of employees exceeds three hundred (300).

In cases of hazardous workplaces, no employer shall engage the services of a physician or a dentist who

cannot stay in the premises of the establishment for at least two (2) hours, in the case of those engaged

on part-time basis, and not less than eight (8) hours, in the case of those employed on full-time basis.

Where the undertaking is non-hazardous in nature, the physician and dentist may be engaged on

retainer basis, subject to such regulations as the Secretary of Labor and Employment may prescribe to

insure immediate availability of medical and dental treatment and attendance in case of emergency. (As

amended by Presidential Decree NO. 570-A, Section 26)

Art. 158. When emergency hospital not required. The requirement for an emergency hospital or dental

clinic shall not be applicable in case there is a hospital or dental clinic which is accessible from the

employers establishment and he makes arrangement for the reservation therein of the necessary beds

and dental facilities for the use of his employees.

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Art. 159. Health program. The physician engaged by an employer shall, in addition to his duties under

this Chapter, develop and implement a comprehensive occupational health program for the benefit of

the employees of his employer.

Art. 160. Qualifications of health personnel. The physicians, dentists and nurses employed by employers

pursuant to this Chapter shall have the necessary training in industrial medicine and occupational safety

and health. The Secretary of Labor and Employment, in consultation with industrial, medical, and

occupational safety and health associations, shall establish the qualifications, criteria and conditions of

employment of such health personnel.

Art. 161. Assistance of employer. It shall be the duty of any employer to provide all the necessary

assistance to ensure the adequate and immediate medical and dental attendance and treatment to an

injured or sick employee in case of emergency.

Chapter II

OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY

Art. 162. Safety and health standards. The Secretary of Labor and Employment shall, by appropriateorders, set and enforce mandatory occupational safety and health standards to eliminate or reduce

occupationalsafety and health hazards in all workplaces and institute new, and update existing,

programs to ensure safe and healthful working conditions in all places of employment.

Art. 163. Research. It shall be the responsibility of the Department of Labor and Employment to conduct

continuing studies and research to develop innovative methods, techniques and approaches for dealing

with occupational safety and health problems; to discover latent diseases by establishing causal

connections between diseases and work in environmental conditions; and to develop medical criteria

which will assure insofar as practicable that no employee will suffer impairment or diminution in health,

functional capacity, or life expectancy as a result of his work and working conditions.

Art. 164. Training programs. The Department of Labor and Employment shall develop and implement

training programs to increase the number and competence of personnel in the field of occupational

safety and industrial health.

Art. 165. Administration of safety and health laws.

a. The Department of Labor and Employment shall be solely responsible for the administration and

enforcement of occupational safety and health laws, regulations and standards in all establishments

and workplaces wherever they may be located; however, chartered cities may be allowed to conduct

industrial safety inspections of establishments within their respective jurisdictions where they have

adequate facilities and competent personnel for the purpose as determined by the Department of Labor

and Employment and subject to national standards established by the latter.

b. The Secretary of Labor and Employment may, through appropriate regulations, collect reasonable

fees for the inspection of steam boilers, pressure vessels and pipings and electrical installations, the test

and approval for safe use of materials, equipment and other safety devices and the approval of plans for

such materials, equipment and devices. The fee so collected shall be deposited in the national treasury

to the credit of the occupational safety and health fund and shall be expended exclusively for the

administration and enforcement of safety and other labor laws administered by the Department of

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Labor and Employment.

Title II

EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION AND STATE INSURANCE FUND

Chapter I

POLICY AND DEFINITIONS

Art. 166. Policy. The State shall promote and develop a tax-exempt employees compensation program

whereby employees and their dependents, in the event of work-connected disability or death, may

promptly secure adequate income benefit and medical related benefits.

Art. 167. Definition of terms. As used in this Title, unless the context indicates otherwise:

a. "Code" means the Labor Code of the Philippines instituted under Presidential Decree Numbered four

hundred forty-two, as amended.

b. "Commission" means the Employees Compensation Commission created under this Title.

c. "SSS" means the Social Security System created under Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred sixty-one, as amended.

d. "GSIS" means the Government Service Insurance System created under Commonwealth Act

Numbered One hundred eighty-six, as amended.

e. "System" means the SSS or GSIS, as the case may be.

f. "Employer" means any person, natural or juridical, employing the services of the employee.

g. "Employee" means any person compulsorily covered by the GSIS under Commonwealth Act

Numbered One hundred eighty-six, as amended, including the members of the Armed Forces ofthe Philippines, and any person employed as casual, emergency, temporary, substitute or

contractual, or any person compulsorily covered by the SSS under Republic Act Numbered Eleven

hundred sixty-one, as amended.

h. "Person" means any individual, partnership, firm, association, trust, corporation or legal

representative thereof.

i. "Dependent" means the legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted or acknowledged natural child who

is unmarried, not gainfully employed, and not over twenty-one (21) years of age or over twenty-one(21)

years of age provided he is incapacitated and incapable of self-support due to a physical or

mental defect which is congenital or acquired during minority; the legitimate spouse living with the

employee and the parents of said employee wholly dependent upon him for regular support.

j. "Beneficiaries" means the dependent spouse until he/she remarries and dependent children, who

are the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parents and subject to the

restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants,

who are the secondary beneficiaries: Provided, That the dependent acknowledged natural child

shall be considered as a primary beneficiary when there are no other dependent children who are

qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit.

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k. "Injury" means any harmful change in the human organism from any accident arising out of and in

the course of the employment.

l. "Sickness" means any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the

Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof that the risk of contracting the

same is increased by working conditions. For this purpose, the Commission is empowered to

determine and approve occupational diseases and work-related illnesses that may be considered

compensable based on peculiar hazards of employment.

m. "Death" means loss of life resulting from injury or sickness.

n. "Disability" means loss or impairment of a physical or mental function resulting from injury or

sickness.

o. "Compensation" means all payments made under this Title for income benefits and medical or

related benefits.

p. "Income benefit" means all payments made under this Title to the providers of medical care,rehabilitation services and hospital care.

q. "Medical benefit" means all payments made under this Title to the providers of medical care,

rehabilitation services and hospital care.

r. "Related benefit" means all payments made under this Title for appliances and supplies.

s. "Appliances" means crutches, artificial aids and other similar devices.

t. "Supplies" means medicine and other medical, dental or surgical items.

u. "Hospital" means any medical facility, government or private, authorized by law, an active member in

good standing of the Philippine Hospital Association and accredited by the Commission.

v. "Physician" means any doctor of medicine duly licensed to practice in the Philippines, an active

member in good standing of the Philippine Medical Association and accredited by the Commission.

w. "Wages" or "Salary", insofar as they refer to the computation of benefits defined in Republic Act No.

1161, as amended, for SSS and Presidential Decree No. 1146, as amended, for GSIS,

respectively, except that part in excess of Three Thousand Pesos.

x. "Monthly salary credit" means the wage or salary base for contributions as provided in Republic Act

Numbered Eleven hundred sixty-one, as amended, or the wages or salary.

y. "Average monthly salary credit" in the case of the SSS means the result obtained by dividing the

sum of the monthly salary credits in the sixty-month period immediately following the semester of

death or permanent disability by sixty (60), except where the month of death or permanent

disability falls within eighteen (18) calendar months from the month of coverage, in which case, it i s

the result obtained by dividing the sum of all monthly salary credits paid prior to the month of

contingency by the total number of calendar months of coverage in the same period.

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z. "Average daily salary credit" in the case of the SSS means the result obtained by dividing the sum of

the six (6) highest monthly salary credits in the twelve-month period immediately preceding the

semester of sickness or injury by one hundred eighty (180), except where the month of injury falls

within twelve (12) calendar months from the first month of coverage, in which case it is the result

obtained by dividing the sum of all monthly salary credits by thirty (30) times the number of

calendar months of coverage in the period.

In the case of the GSIS, the average daily salary credit shall be the actual daily salary or wage, or

the monthly salary or wage divided by the actual number of working days of the month of

contingency.

aa. "Quarter" means a period of three (3) consecutive months ending on the last days of March, June,

September and December.

bb. "Semester" means a period of two consecutive quarters ending in the quarter of death, permanent

disability, injury or sickness.

cc. "Replacement ratio" - The sum of twenty percent and the quotient obtained by dividing three

hundred by the sum of three hundred forty and the average monthly salary credit. dd. "Credited years of

service" - For a member covered prior to January, 1975, nineteen hundred seventy-five minus the

calendar year of coverage, plus the number of calendar years in which six or more contributions have

been paid from January, 1975 up to the calendar year containing the semester prior to the contingency.

For a member covered on or after January, 1975, the number of calendar years in which six or more

contributions have been paid from the year of coverage up to

the calendar year containing the semester prior to the contingency.

ee. "Monthly income benefit" means the amount equivalent to one hundred fifteen percent of the sum

of the average monthly salary credit multiplied by the replacement ratio, and one and a halfpercent of the average monthly salary credit for each credited year of service in excess of ten

years: Provided, That the monthly income benefit shall in no case be less than two hundred fifty

pesos

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G.R. No. 91298 June 22, 1990

CORAZON PERIQUET, petitioner,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and THE PHIL. NATIONAL CONSTRUCTIONCORPORATION (Formerly Construction Development Corp. of the Phils.), respondents.

Tabaquero, Albano & Associates for petitioner.

The Government Corporate Counsel for private respondent.

CRUZ, J .:

It is said that a woman has the privilege of changing her mind but this is usually allowed only in affairs of theheart where the rules are permissibly inconstant. In the case before us, Corazon Periquet, the herein petitioner,exercised this privilege in connection with her work, where the rules are not as fickle.

The petitioner was dismissed as toll collector by the Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines,private respondent herein, for willful breach of trust and unauthorized possession of accountable toll ticketsallegedly found in her purse during a surprise inspection. Claiming she had been "framed," she filed acomplaint for illegal dismissal and was sustained by the labor arbiter, who ordered her reinstatement within tendays "without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and with fun back wages to be computed from thedate of her actual dismissal up to date of her actual reinstatement." 1 On appeal, this order was affirmed intoto by public respondent NLRC on August 29, 1980. 2

On March 11, 1989, almost nine years later, the petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of executionof the decision. The motion was granted by the executive labor arbiter in an order dated June 26, 1989, whichrequired payment to the petitioner of the sum of P205,207.42 "by way of implementing the balance of the

judgment amount" due from the private respondent. 3 Pursuant thereto, the said amount was garnished by theNLRC sheriff on July 12, 1989. 4On September 11, 1989, however, the NLRC sustained the appeal of theCDCP and set aside the order dated June 20, 1989, the corresponding writ of execution of June 26, 1989, andthe notice of garnishment. 5

In its decision, the public respondent held that the motion for execution was time-barred, having been filedbeyond the five-year period prescribed by both the Rules of Court and the Labor Code. It also rejected thepetitioner's claim that she had not been reinstated on time and ruled as valid the two quitclaims she had signedwaiving her right to reinstatement and acknowledging settlement in full of her back wages and other benefits.The petitioner contends that this decision is tainted with grave abuse of discretion and asks for its reversal. Weshall affirm instead.

Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides:

SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. A judgment may be executed onmotion within five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final andexecutory. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a

judgment may be enforced by action.

A similar provision is found in Art. 224 of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 6715, viz.

ART. 224. Execution of decision, orders, awards. (a) The Secretary of Labor andEmployment or any Regional Director, the Commission or any Labor Arbiter or Med-Arbiter, orthe Voluntary Arbitrator may, motu propio, or on motion of any interested party, issue a writ ofexecution on a judgment within five (5) years from the date it becomes final and executory,

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requiring a sheriff or a duly deputized officer to execute or enforce a final decision, order oraward. ...

The petitioner argues that the above rules are not absolute and cites the exception snowed in Lancita v.Magbanua, 6 where the Court held:

Where judgments are for money only and wholly unpaid, and execution has been previouslywithheld in the interest of the judgment debtor, which is in financial difficulties, the court hasno discretion to deny motions for leave to issue execution more than five years after the

judgments are entered. (Application of Molnar, Belinsky, et al. v. Long Is. Amusement Corp., IN.Y.S, 2d 866)

In computing the time limited for suing out of an execution, although there is authority to thecontrary, the general rule is that there should not be included the time when execution isstayed, either by agreement of the parties for a definite time, by injunction, by the taking of anappeal or writ of error so as to operate as a supersedeas, by the death of a party, orotherwise. Any interruption or delay occasioned by the debtor will extend the time within whichthe writ may be issued without scire facias.

xxx xxx xxx

There has been no indication that respondents herein had ever slept on their rights to havethe judgment executed by mere motions, within the reglementary period. The statute oflimitation has not been devised against those who wish to act but cannot do so, for causesbeyond their central.

Periquet insists it was the private respondent that delayed and prevented the execution of the judgment in herfavor, but that is not the way we see it. The record shows it was she who dilly-dallied.

The original decision called for her reinstatement within ten days from receipt thereof following its affirmance bythe NLRC on August 29, 1980, but there is no evidence that she demanded her reinstatement or that shecomplained when her demand was rejected. What appears is that she entered into a compromise agreementwith CDCP where she waived her right to reinstatement and received from the CDCP the sum of P14,000.00

representing her back wages from the date of her dismissal to the date of the agreement. 7

Dismissing the compromise agreement, the petitioner now claims she was actually reinstated only on March16, 1987, and so should be granted back pay for the period beginning November 28, 1978, date of herdismissal, until the date of her reinstatement. She conveniently omits to mention several significantdevelopments that transpired during and after this period that seriously cast doubt on her candor and bonafides.

After accepting the sum of P14,000.00 from the private respondent and waiving her right to reinstatement in thecompromise agreement, the petitioner secured employment as kitchen dispatcher at the Tito Rey Restaurant,where she worked from October 1982 to March 1987. According to the certification issued by thatbusiness, 8 she received a monthly compensation of P1,904.00, which was higher than her salary in the CDCP.

For reasons not disclosed by the record, she applied for re-employment with the CDCP and was on March16,1987, given the position of xerox machine operator with a basic salary of P1,030.00 plus P461.33 inallowances, for a total of P1,491.33 monthly. 9

On June 27, 1988; she wrote the new management of the CDCP and asked that the rights granted her by thedecision dated August 29, 1980, be recognized because the waiver she had signed was invalid. 10

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On September 19, 1988, the Corporate Legal Counsel of the private respondent (now Philippine NationalConstruction Corporation) recommended the payment to the petitioner of the sum of P9,544.00, representingthe balance of her back pay for three years at P654. 00 per month (minus the P14,000.00 earlier paid). 11

On November 10, 1988, the petitioner accepted this additional amount and signed another Quitclaim andRelease reading as follows:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

THAT, I CORAZON PERIQUET, of legal age, married and resident of No. 87 Annapolis St., Quezon City,hereby acknowledged receipt of the sum of PESOS: NINE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FORTY FOURPESOS ONLY (P9,544.00) Philippine currency, representing the unpaid balance of the back wages due meunder the judgment award in NLRC Case No. AB-2-864-79 entitled "Corazon Periquet vs. PNCC- TOLLWAYS"and I further manifest that this payment is in full satisfaction of all my claims/demands in the aforesaid case.Likewise, I hereby manifest that I had voluntarily waived reinstatement to my former position as TOLL TELLERand in lieu thereof, I sought and am satisfied with my present position as XEROX MACHINE OPERATOR in theCentral Office.

Finally, I hereby certify that delay in my reinstatement, after finality of the Decision dated 10 May 1979 was dueto my own fault and that PNCC is not liable thereto.

I hereby RELEASE AND DISCHARGE the said corporation and its officers from money and all claims by wayof unpaid wages, separation pay, differential pay, company, statutory and other benefits or otherwise as maybe due me in connection with the above-entitled case. I hereby state further that I have no more claims or rightof action of whatever nature, whether past, present, future or contingent against said corporation and itsofficers, relative to NLRC Case No. AB-2-864-79.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 10th day of November 1988 at Mandaluyong,Metro Manila. (Emphasis supplied.) 12

The petitioner was apparently satisfied with the settlement, for in the memorandum she sent the PNCCCorporate Legal Counsel on November 24, 1988, 13 she said in part:

Sir, this is indeed my chance to express my gratitude to you and all others who have helpedme and my family enjoy the fruits of my years of stay with PNCC by way of granting anadditional amount of P9,544.00 among others ...

As per your recommendation contained therein in said memo, I am now occupying theposition of xerox machine operator and is (sic) presently receiving a monthly salary ofP2,014.00.

Reacting to her inquiry about her entitlement to longevity pay, yearly company increases and other statutorybenefits, the private respondent adjusted her monthly salary from P2,014.00 to P3,588.00 monthly.

Then the lull. Then the bombshell.

On March 11, 1989, she filed the motion for execution that is now the subject of this petition.

It is difficult to understand the attitude of the petitioner, who has blown hot and cold, as if she does not knowher own mind. First she signed a waiver and then she rejected it; then she signed another waiver which shealso rejected, again on the ground that she had been deceived. In her first waiver, she acknowledged fullsettlement of the judgment in her favor, and then in the second waiver, after accepting additional payment, sheagain acknowledged fun settlement of the same judgment. But now she is singing a different tune.

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In her petition she is now disowning both acknowledgments and claiming that the earlier payments both ofwhich she had accepted as sufficient, are insufficient. They were valid before but they are not valid now. Shealso claimed she was harassed and cheated by the past management of the CDCP and sought the help of thenew management of the PNCC under its "dynamic leadership." But now she is denouncing the newmanagement-for also tricking her into signing the second quitclaim.

Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily entered intoand represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simplybecause of a change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from anunsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will stepin to annul the questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the person making the waiver did sovoluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible andreasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking. As in this case.

The question may be asked: Why did the petitioner sign the compromise agreement of September 16, 1980,and waive all her rights under the judgment in consideration of the cash settlement she received? It must beremembered that on that date the decision could still have been elevated on certioraribefore this Court andthere was still the possibility of its reversal. The petitioner obviously decided that a bird in hand was worth twoon the wing and so opted for the compromise agreement. The amount she was then waiving, it is worth noting,had not yet come up to the exorbitant sum of P205,207.42 that she was later to demand after the lapse of eight

years.

The back pay due the petitioner need not detain us. We have held in countless cases that this should be limitedto three years from the date of the illegal dismissal, during which period (but not beyond) the dismissedemployee is deemed unemployed without the necessity of proof. 14Hence, the petitioner's contention that sheshould be paid from 1978 to 1987 must be rejected, and even without regard to the fact (that would otherwisehave been counted against her) that she was actually employed during most of that period.

Finally, the petitioner's invocation of Article 223 of the Labor Code to question the failure of the privaterespondent to file a supersedeas bond is not well-taken. As the Solicitor General correctly points out, the bondis required only when there is an appeal from the decision with a monetary award, not an order enforcing thedecision, as in the case at bar.

As officers of the court, counsel are under obligation to advise their clients against making untenable andinconsistent claims like the ones raised in this petition that have only needlessly taken up the valuable time ofthis Court, the Solicitor General, the Government Corporate Counsel, and the respondents. Lawyers are notmerely hired employees who must unquestioningly do the bidding of the client, however unreasonable this maybe when tested by their own expert appreciation of the pertinent facts and the applicable law and jurisprudence.Counsel must counsel.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

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JEROMIE D. ESCASINAS and

EVAN RIGOR SINGCO,Petitioners,

- versus -

SHANGRI-LAS MACTAN

ISLAND RESORT and DR.

JESSICA J.R. PEPITO,

Respondents.

G.R. No. 178827

Present:

QUISUMBING,J., Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,

NACHURA,*

BRION, and

PERALTA,**

JJ.

Promulgated:

March 4, 2009

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Registered nurses Jeromie D. Escasinas and Evan Rigor Singco (petitioners)

were engaged in 1999 and 1996, respectively, by Dr. Jessica Joyce R. Pepito

(respondent doctor) to work in her clinic at respondent Shangri-las Mactan Island

Resort (Shangri-la) in Cebu of which she was a retained physician.

In late 2002, petitioners filed with the National Labor Relations Commission

(NLRC) Regional Arbitration Branch No. VII (NLRC-RAB No. VII) a

complaint[1]

for regularization, underpayment of wages, non-payment of holiday

pay, night shift differential and 13th

month pay differential against respondents,

claiming that they are regular employees of Shangri-la. The case was docketed

as RAB Case No. 07-11-2089-02.

Shangri-la claimed, however, that petitioners were not its employees but of

respondent doctor whom it retained via Memorandum of Agreement(MOA)[2]

pursuant to Article 157 of the Labor Code, as amended.

Respondent doctor for her part claimed that petitioners were already

working for the previous retained physicians of Shangri-la before she was retained

by Shangri-la; and that she maintained petitioners services upon their request.
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By Decision[3]

of May 6, 2003, Labor Arbiter Ernesto F. Carreon declared

petitioners to be regular employees of Shangri-la. The Arbiter thus ordered

Shangri-la to grant them the wages and benefits due them as regular employees

from the time their services were engaged.

In finding petitioners to be regular employees of Shangri-la, the Arbiter

noted that they usually perform work which is necessary and desirable to Shangri-

las business; that they observe clinic hours and render services only to Shangri -

las guests and employees; that payment for their salaries were recommended to

Shangri-las Human Resource Department (HRD); that respondent doctor was

Shangri-las in-house physician, hence, also an employee; and that the MOA

between Shangri-la and respondent doctor was an insidious mechanism in order

to circumvent [the doctors] tenurial security and that of the employees under her.

Shangri-la and respondent doctor appealed to the NLRC. Petitionersappealed too, but only with respect to the non-award to them of some of the

benefits they were claiming.

By Decision[4]

dated March 31, 2005, the NLRC granted Shangri-las and

respondent doctors appeal and dismissed petitioners complaint for lack of merit,

it finding that no employer-employee relationship exists between petitioner and

Shangri-la. In so deciding, the NLRC held that the Arbiter erred in interpreting

Article 157 in relation to Article 280 of the Labor Code, as what is required under

Article 157 is that the employer should provide the services of medical personnel

to its employees, but nowhere in said article is a provision that nurses are requiredto be employed; that contrary to the finding of the Arbiter, even if Article 280

states that if a worker performs work usually necessary or desirable in the business

of the employer, he cannot be automatically deemed a regular employee; and that

the MOA amply shows that respondent doctor was in fact engaged by Shangri-la

on a retainer basis, under which she could hire her own nurses and other clinic

personnel.

Brushing aside petitioners contention that since their application for

employment was addressed to Shangri-la, it was really Shangri-la which hired

them and not respondent doctor, the NLRC noted that the applications for

employment were made by persons who are not parties to the case and were not

shown to have been actually hired by Shangri-la.

On the issue of payment of wages, the NLRC held that the fact that, for

some months, payment of petitioners wages were recommended by Shangri-las
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HRD did not prove that it was Shangri-la which pays their wages. It thus credited

respondent doctors explanation that the recommendations for payment were based

on the billings she prepared for salaries of additional nurses during Shangri-las

peak months of operation, in accordance with the retainership agreement, the

guests payments for medical services having been paid directly to Shanrgi-la.

Petitioners thereupon brought the case to the Court of Appeals which, by

Decision[5]

of May 22, 2007, affirmed the NLRC Decision that no employer-

employee relationship exists between Shangri-la and petitioners. The appellate

court concluded that all aspects of the employment of petitioners being under the

supervision and control of respondent doctor and since Shangri-la is not principally

engaged in the business of providing medical or healthcare services, petitioners

could not be regarded as regular employees of Shangri-la.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied byResolution

[6]of July 10, 2007, they interposed the present recourse.

Petitioners insist that under Article 157 of the Labor Code, Shangri-la is

required to hire a full-time registered nurse, apart from a physician, hence, their

engagement should be deemed as regular employment, the provisions of the MOA

notwithstanding; and that the MOA is contrary to public policy as it circumvents

tenurial security and, therefore, should be struck down as being void ab initio. At

most, they argue, the MOA is a mere job contract.

And petitioners maintain that respondent doctor is a labor-only contractor

for she has no license or business permit and no business name registration, which

is contrary to the requirements under Sec. 19 and 20 of the Implementing Rules

and Regulations of the Labor Code on sub-contracting.

Petitioners add that respondent doctor cannot be a legitimate

independent contractor, lacking as she does in substantial capital, the clinic

having been set-up and already operational when she took over as retained

physician; that respondent doctor has no control over how the clinic is being run,

as shown by the different orders issued by officers of Shangri-la forbidding her

from receiving cash payments and several purchase orders for medicines and

supplies which were coursed thru Shangri-las Purchasing Manager, circumstances

indubitably showing that she is not an independent contractor but a mere agent of

Shangri-la.

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In its Comment,[7]

Shangri-la questions the Special Powers of Attorneys

(SPAs) appended to the petition for being inadequate. On the merits, it prays for

the disallowance of the petition, contending that it raises factual issues, such as the

validity of the MOA, which were never raised during the proceedings before the

Arbiter, albeit passed upon by him in his Decision; that Article 157 of the LaborCode does not make it mandatory for a covered establishment to employ health

personnel; that the services of nurses is not germane nor indispensable to its

operations; and that respondent doctor is a legitimate individual independent

contractor who has the power to hire, fire and supervise the work of the nurses

under her.

The resolution of the case hinges, in the main, on the correct interpretation

of Art. 157 vis a vis Art. 280 and the provisions on permissible job contracting of

the Labor Code, as amended.

The Court holds that, contrary to petitioners postulation,Art. 157 does not

require the engagement of full-time nurses as regular employees of a company

employing not less than 50 workers. Thus, the Article provides:

ART. 157.Emergency medical and dental services. It shall bethe duty of every employer to furnish his employees in any locality

with free medical and dental attendance and facilities consisting of:

(a) The services of a full-time registered nurse when

the number of employees exceeds fifty (50) but

not more than two hundred (200) except when the

employer does not maintain hazardous

workplaces, in which case the services of a graduatefirst-aider shall be provided for the protection of the

workers, where no registered nurse is available. The

Secretary of Labor shall provide by appropriateregulations the services that shall be required where

the number of employees does not exceed fifty (50)and shall determine by appropriate order hazardousworkplaces for purposes of this Article;

(b) The services of a full-time registered nurse, a

part-time physician and dentist, and an

emergency clinic, when the number of employees
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exceeds two hundred (200) but not more than

three hundred (300); and

(c) The services of a full-time physician, dentist andfull-time registered nurse as well as a dental clinic,

and an infirmary or emergency hospital with one bedcapacity for every one hundred (100) employeeswhen the number of employees exceeds three

hundred (300).

In cases of hazardous workplaces, no employer shall engage the

services of a physician or dentist who cannot stay in the premises of theestablishment for at least two (2) hours, in the case of those engaged on

part-time basis, and not less than eight (8) hours in the case of those

employed on full-time basis. Where the undertaking is nonhazardous

in nature, the physician and dentist may be engaged on retained

basis, subject to such regulations as the Secretary of Labor may

prescribe to insure immediate availability of medical and dentaltreatment and attendance in case of emergency. (Emphasis and

underscoring supplied)

Under the foregoing provision, Shangri-la, which employs more than 200

workers, is mandated to furnish its employees with the services of a full-time

registered nurse, a part-time physician and dentist, and an emergency clinic which

means that it should provide or make available such medical and allied

services to its employees, not necessarily to hire or employ a serviceprovider. As held inPhilippine Global Communications vs. De Vera:

[8]

x x x while it is true that the provision requires

employers to engage the services of medical

practitioners in certain establishments depending on the

number of their employees, nothing is there in the law

which says that medical practitioners so engaged be

actually hired as employees, adding that the law, aswritten, only requires the employer to retain, not

employ, a part-time physician who needed to stay in thepremises of the non-hazardous workplace for two (2) hours.

(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

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The term full-time in Art. 157 cannot be construed as referring to the type

of employment of the person engaged to provide the services, for Article 157

must notbe read alongside Art. 280[9]

in order to vest employer-employee

relationship on the employer and the person so engaged. SoDe Vera teaches:

x x x For, we take it that any agreement may providethat one party shall render services for and in behalf of

another, no matter how necessary for the lattersbusiness, even without being hired as an employee. This

set-up is precisely true in the case of an independent

contractorship as well as in an agency agreement. Indeed,

Article 280 of the Labor Code, quoted by the appellate

court, is not the yardstick for determining the existence

of an employment relationship. As it is, the provision

merely distinguishes between two (2) kinds ofemployees, i.e., regular and casual. x x x[10](Emphasisand underscoring supplied)

The phrase services of a full-time registered nurse should thus be taken to refer

to the kind of services that the nurse will render in the companys premises and to

its employees, not the manner of his engagement.

As to whether respondent doctor can be considered a legitimate independent

contractor, the pertinent sections of DOLE Department Order No. 10, series of

1997, illuminate:

Sec. 8. Job contracting. There is job contracting permissible

under the Code if the following conditions are met:

(1) The contractor carries on an independent business and

undertakes the contract work on his own account under his ownresponsibility according to his own manner and method, free from the

control and direction of his employer or principal in all matters

connected with the performance of the work except as to the resultsthereof; and

(2) The contractor has substantial capital or investment in theform of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, and other

materials which are necessary in the conduct of his business.

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Sec. 9. Labor-only contracting.(a) Any person who undertakes

to supply workers to an employer shall be deemed to be engaged inlabor-only contracting where such person:

(1) Does not have substantial capital or investment in the

form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises and other

materials; and

(2) The workers recruited and placed by such persons are

performing activities which are directly related to the principal

business or operations of the employer in which workers are

habitually employed.

(b) Labor-only contracting as defined herein is hereby prohibited

and the person acting as contractor shall be considered merely as anagent or intermediary of the employer who shall be responsible to theworkers in the same manner and extent as if the latter were directly

employed by him.

(c) For cases not falling under this Article, the Secretary of Laborshall determine through appropriate orders whether or not thecontracting out of labor is permissible in the light of the circumstances of

each case and after considering the operating needs of the employer andthe rights of the workers involved. In such case, he may prescribe

conditions and restrictions to insure the protection and welfare of theworkers. (Emphasis supplied)

The existence of an independent and permissible contractor relationship is

generally established by considering the following determinants: whether the

contractor is carrying on an independent business; the nature and extent of the

work; the skill required; the term and duration of the relationship; the right to

assign the performance of a specified piece of work; the control and supervision of

the work to another; the employer's power with respect to the hiring, firing and

payment of the contractor's workers; the control of the premises; the duty to supply

the premises, tools, appliances, materials and labor; and the mode, manner and

terms of payment.[11]

On the other hand, existence of an employer-

employee relationship is established by the presence of the following

determinants: (1) the selection and engagement of the workers; (2) power of

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dismissal; (3) the payment of wages by whatever means; and (4) the power to

control the worker's conduct, with the latter assuming primacy in the overall

consideration.[12]

Against the above-listed determinants, the Court holds that respondentdoctor is a legitimate independent contractor. That Shangri-la provides the clinic

premises and medical supplies for use of its employees and guests does not

necessarily prove that respondent doctor lacks substantial capital and

investment. Besides, the maintenance of a clinic and provision of medical services

to its employees is required under Art. 157, which are not directly related to

Shangri-las principal businessoperation of hotels and restaurants.

As to payment of wages, respondent doctor is the one who underwrites the

following: salaries, SSS contributions and other benefits of the staff[13]

; group life,

group personal accident insurance and life/death insurance[14]

for the staff with

minimum benefit payable at 12 times the employees last drawn salary, as well as

value added taxes and withholding taxes, sourced from her P60,000.00 monthly

retainer fee and 70% share of the service charges from Shangri-las guests who

avail of the clinic services. It is unlikely that respondent doctor would report

petitioners as workers, pay their SSS premium as well as their wages if they were

not indeed her employees.[15]

With respect to the supervision and control of the nurses and clinic staff, it is

not disputed that a document, Clinic Policies and Employee Manual [16]claimedto have been prepared by respondent doctor exists, to which petitioners gave their

conformity[17]

and in which they acknowledged their co-terminus employment

status. It is thus presumed that said document, and not the employee manual being

followed by Shangri-las regular workers, governs how they perform their

respective tasks and responsibilities.

Contrary to petitioners contention, the various office directives issued by

Shangri-las officers do not imply that it is Shangri-las management and not

respondent doctor who exercises control over them or that Shangri-la has controlover how the doctor and the nurses perform their work. The letter

[18]addressed to

respondent doctor dated February 7, 2003 from a certain Tata L. Reyes giving

instructions regarding the replenishment of emergency kits is, at most,

administrative in nature, related as it is to safety matters; while the letter[19]

dated

May 17, 2004 from Shangri-las Assistant Financial Controller, Lotlot Dagat,

forbidding the clinic from receiving cash payments from the resorts guests is a
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ESCASINAS vs SHANGRI-LAS MACTAN ISLAND RESORT Case DigestJEROMIE D. ESCASINAS and EVAN RIGOR SINGCO v. SHANGRI-LAS MACTAN ISLAND RESORT andDR. JESSICA J.R. PEPITO580 SCRA 604 (2009)

DIGEST

FACTS: Jeromie D. Escasinas and Evan Rigor Singco were registered nurses, engaged by respondent Dr.Jessica Joyce R. Pepito to work in her clinic at respondent Shangri-Las Mactan Island Resort (Shangri-La).Escasinas and Singco filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint forregularization, underpayment of wages, non-payment of holiday pay, night shift differential and 13th month payagainst Shangrila et al., claiming that they are regular employees of Shangri-La.

Shangri-la claimed that Escasinas and Singco were not its employees but of Dr. Pepito, whom it retained viaMemorandum of Agreement (MOA) pursuant to Article 157 of the Labor Code. Dr. Pepito for her part claimedthat Escasinas and Singco were already working for the previous retained physicians of Shangri-la before shewas retained. Escasinas and Singco, however, insist that under Article 157 of the Labor Code, Shangri-la isrequired to hire full-time registered nurse, hence their engagement should be deemed as regular employment.They maintain that Dr. Pepito is a labor-only contractor for she has no license or business permit and nobusiness name registration as mandated by Sec. 19 and 20 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of theLabor Code.

The labor arbiter declared Escasinas and Singco to be regular employees of Shangri-la. The National LaborRelations Commission, on the other hand, granted Shangri-las and Dr. Pepitos appeal and dismissedEscasinas and Singco complaint for lack of merit, finding that no employer-employee relationship existsbetween Shangri-la and petitioners.

ISSUES: Whether or not Escasinas and Singco are regular employees of Shangri-la and Dr. Pepito

HELD:The requirements for the existence of an employer-employee relationship are different from therequisites for the existence of an independent and permissible contractor relationship.

The existence of an independent and permissible contractor relationship is generally established byconsidering the following determinants: whether the contractor is carrying on an independent business; thenature and extent of the work; the skill required; the term and duration of the relationship; the right to assign the

performance of a specified piece of work; the control and supervision of the work to another; the employer'spower with respect to the hiring, firing and payment of the contractor's workers; the control of the premises; theduty to supply the premises, tools, appliances, materials and labor; and the mode, manner and terms ofpayment.

On the other hand, existence of an employer- employee relationship is established by the presence of thefollowing determinants: (1) the selection and engagement of the workers; (2) power of dismissal; (3) thepayment of wages by whatever means; and (4) the power to control the worker's conduct, with the latterassuming primacy in the overall consideration.

Against the above-listed determinants, the Court holds that Dr. Pepito is a legitimate independent contractor.That Shangri-la provides the clinic premises and medical supplies for use of its employees and guests do notnecessarily prove that respondent doctor lacks substantial capital and investment. Besides, the maintenance ofa clinic and provision of medical services to its employees is required under Art. 157, which are not directlyrelated to Shangri-las principal business operation of hotels and restaurants.

As to payment of wages, Dr. Pepito is the one who underwrites the following: salaries, SSS contributions andother benefits of the staff; group life, group personal accident insurance and life/death insurance for the staffwith minimum benefit payable at 12 times the employees last drawn salary, as well as value added taxes andwithholding taxes, sourced from her P60,000.00 monthly retainer fee and 70% share of the service chargesfrom Shangri-las guests who avail of the clinic services. It is unlikely that Dr. Pepito would report Escasinasand Singco as workers, pay their SSS premium as well as their wages if they were not indeed her employees.

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With respect to the supervision and control of the nurses and clinic staff, it is not disputed that a document,Clinic Policies and Employee Manual claimed to have been prepared by Dr. Pepito exists, to whichEscasinas and Singco gave their conformity and in which they acknowledged their co-terminus employmentstatus. It is thus presumed that said document, and not the employee manual being followed by Shangri-lasregular workers, governs how they perform their respective tasks and responsibilities.

Contrary to Escasinas and Singco contention, the various office directives issued by Shangri- las officers do not

imply that it is Shangri-las management and not Dr. Pepito who exercises control over them or that Shangri-lahas control over how the doctor and the nurses perform their work.

In fine, as Shangri-la does not control how the work should be performed by Escasinas and Singco, it is notEscasinas and Singcos employer

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OCEAN BUILDERS

CONSTRUCTION CORP.,

and/or DENNIS HAO,Petitioners,

- versus -

SPOUSES ANTONIO and

ANICIA CUBACUB,Respondents.

G.R. No. 150898

Present:

CARPIO MORALES, Chairperson,

BRION,BERSAMIN,

VILLARAMA, JR., and

SERENO,JJ.

Promulgated:

April 13, 2011

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Bladimir Cubacub (Bladimir) was employed as maintenance man by

petitioner company Ocean Builders Construction Corp. at its office in Caloocan

City.

On April 9, 1995, Bladimir was afflicted with chicken pox. He was thus

advised by petitioner Dennis Hao (Hao), the companys general manager, to rest

for three days which he did at the companys barracks where he lives free of

charge.

Three days later or on April 12, 1995, Bladimir went about his usual chores

of manning the gate of the company premises and even cleaned the company

vehicles. Later in the afternoon, however, he asked a co-worker, Ignacio Silangga

(Silangga), to accompany him to his house in Capas, Tarlac so he could

rest. Informed by Silangga of Bladimirs intention, Hao gave BladimirP1,000.00

and ordered Silangga to instead bring Bladimir to the nearest hospital.

Along with co-workers Narding and Tito Vergado, Silangga thus brought

Bladimir to the Caybiga Community Hospital (Caybiga Hospital), a primary-care

hospital around one kilometer away from the office of the company.

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The hospital did not allow Bladimir to leave the hospital. He was then

confined, with Narding keeping watch over him. The next day, April 13, 1995, a

doctor of the hospital informed Narding that they needed to talk to Bladimirs

parents, hence, on Silanggas request, their co-workers June Matias and JoelEdrene fetched Bladimirs parents from Tarlac.

At about 8 oclock in the evening of the same day, April 13, 1995,

Bladimirs parents-respondent spouses Cubacub, with their friend Dr. Hermes

Frias (Dr. Frias), arrived at the Caybiga Hospital and transferred Bladimir to the

Quezon City General Hospital (QCGH) where he was placed in the intensive care

unit and died the following day, April 14, 1995.

The death certificate issued by the QCGH recorded Bladimirs immediate

cause of death as cardio-respiratory arrest and the antecedent cause aspneumonia. On the other hand, the death certificate issued by Dr. Frias recorded

the causes of death as cardiac arrest, multiple organ system failure, septicemia and

chicken pox.

Bladimirs parents-herein respondents later filed on August 17, 1995 before

the Tarlac Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Capas a complaint for damages against

petitioners, alleging that Hao was guilty of negligence which resulted in the

deterioration of Bladimirs condition leading to his death.

By Decision of April 14, 1997,[1]

Branch 66 of the Tarlac RTC at Capas

dismissed the complaint, holding that Hao was not negligent. It ruled that Hao was

not under any obligation to bring Bladimir to better tertiary hospitals, and

assuming that Bladimir died of chicken pox aggravated by pneumonia or some

other complications due to lack of adequate facilities at the hospital, the same

cannot be attributed to Hao.

On respondents appeal, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of June 22,

2001, reversedthe trial courts decision, holding that byHaos failure to bring

Bladimir to a better-equipped hospital, he violated Article 161 of the Labor

Code. It went on to state that Hao should have foreseen that Bladimir, an adult,

could suffer complications from chicken pox and, had he been brought to hospitals

like St. Lukes, Capitol Medical Center, Philippine General Hospital and the like,

Bladimir could have been saved.
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Thus the appellate court disposed:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Capas,

Tarlac, Branch 66 in Civil Case No. 349 dated April 14, 1997 is hereby

REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one rendered holding the

defendants solidarily liable to plaintiffs-appellants for the following:

1. P50,000.00 for the life of Bladimir Cubacub;

2. P584,630.00 for loss of Bladimirs earning capacity;

3. P4,834.60 as reimbursement of expenses incurred at Quezon

City General Hospital as evidenced by Exhibits E to E-14

inclusive;

4. P18,107.75 as reimbursement of expenses for the 5-day wake

covered by Exhibits F to F-17;

5. P30,000.00 as funeral expenses at Prudential Funeral Homescovered by Exhibit I;

6. P6,700.00 for acquisition of memorial lot at

Sto. Rosario Memorial Parkcovered by Exhibit J;

7. P50,000.00 as moral damages;

8. P20,000.00 as exemplary damages;

9. P15,000.00 as attorneys fees and

10. Cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.[2]

The motion for reconsideration was denied by Resolution[3]

of November 26,2001, hence this petition.

Petitioners maintain that Hao exercised the diligence more than what the law

requires, hence, they are not liable for damages.

The petition is meritorious.
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At the onset, the Court notes that the present case is one for damages based

on torts, the employer-employee relationship being merely incidental. To

successfully prosecute an action anchored on torts, three elements must be

present, viz: (1) duty (2) breach (3) injury and proximate causation. The assaileddecision of the appellate court heldthat it was the duty of petitioners to provide

adequate medical assistance to the employees under Art. 161 of the Labor Code,

failing which a breach is committed.

Art. 161 of the Labor Code provides:

ART. 161. Assistance of employer. It shall be the duty of any

employer to provide all the necessary assistance to ensure the adequate

and immediate medical and dental attendance and treatment to an injured

or sick employee in case of emergency. (emphasis and underscoringsupplied)

The Implementing Rules of the Code do not enlighten what the phrase adequate

and immediate medical attendance means in relation to an emergency. It would

thus appear that the determination of what it means is left to the employer, except

when a full-time registered nurse or physician are available on-site as required,

also under the Labor Code, specifically Art. 157 which provides:

Article 157. Emergency Medical and Dental Services. It shall

be the duty of every employer to furnish his employees in any localitywith free medical and dental attendance and facilitiesconsisting of:

(a) The services of a full-time registered nurse when thenumber of employees exceeds fifty (50) but not more than

two hundred (200) except when the employer does not

maintain hazardous workplaces, in which case, the servicesof a graduate first-aider shall be provided for the protection

of workers, where no registered nurse is available. The

Secretary of Labor and Employment shall provide by

appropriate regulations, the services that shall be requiredwhere the number of employees does not exceed fifty (50)and shall determine by appropriate order, hazardous

workplaces for purposes of this Article;

(b) The services of a full-time registered nurse, a part-time

physician and dentist, and an emergency clinic, when the

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number of employees exceeds two hundred (200) but not

more than three hundred (300); and

(c) The services of a full-time physician, dentist and a full-timeregistered nurse as well as a dental clinic and an infirmary or

emergency hospital with one bed capacity for every onehundred (100) employees when the number of employeesexceeds three hundred (300). (emphasis and underscoring

supplied)

In the present case, there is no allegation that the company premises are

hazardous. Neither is there any allegation on the number of employees the

company has. If Haos testimony

[4]

would be believed, the company had onlyseven regular employees and 20 contractual employees still short of the

minimum 50 workers that an establishment must have for it to be required to have

a full-time registered nurse.

The Court can thus only determine whether the actions taken by petitioners

when Bladimir became ill amounted to the necessary assistance to ensure

adequate and immediate medical . . . attendance to Bladimir as required under

Art. 161 of the Labor Code.

As found by the trial court and borne by the records, petitioner Haos advice

for Bladimir to, as he did, take a 3-day rest and to later have him brought to thenearest hospital constituted adequate and immediate medical attendance that he

is mandated, under Art. 161, to provide to a sick employee in an emergency.

Chicken pox is self-limiting. Hao does not appear to have a medical

background. He may not be thus expected to have known that Bladimir needed to

be brought to a hospital with better facilities than the Caybiga Hospital, contrary to

appellate courts ruling.

AT ALL EVENTS, the alleged negligence of Hao cannot be considered asthe proximate cause of the death of Bladimir. Proximate cause is that which, in

natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause,

produces injury, and without which, the result would not have occurred.[5]

An

injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or failure to act, whenever it

appears from the evidence in the case that the act or omission played

asubstantialpart in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage, and
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that the injury or damage was either a direct resultor a reasonably probable

consequence of the act or omission.[6]

Verily, the issue in this case is essentiallyfactualin nature. The dissent,

apart from adopting the appellate courts findings, finds that Bladimir contractedchicken pox from a co-worker and Hao was negligent in not bringing that co-

worker to the nearest physician, or isolating him as well. Thisfinding is not,

however, borne by the records. Nowhere in the appellate courts or even the trial

courts decision is there any such definite finding that Bladimir contracted chicken

pox from a co-worker. At best, the only allusion to another employee being

afflicted with chicken pox was when Hao testified that he knew it to heal within

three days as was the case of another worker, without reference, however, as

to when it happened.[7]

On the issue of which of the two death certificates is more credible, thedissent, noting that Dr. Frias attended to Bladimir during his last illness, holds

that the certificate which he issued citing chicken pox as antecedent cause

deserves more credence.

There appears, however, to be no conflict in the two death certificates on the

immediate cause of Bladimirs death since both cite cardio-respiratory arrest due to

complications from pneumonia per QCGH, septicemia and chicken pox per Dr.

Frias. In fact, Dr. Frias admitted that the causes of death in both certificates were

the same.[8]

Be that as it may, Dr. Frias could not be considered as Bladimirs attending

physician, he having merely ordered Bladimirs transfer to the QCGH after seeing

him at theCaybiga Hospital. He thereafter left Bladimir to the care of doctors at

QCGH, returning to Capas, Tarlac at 4 oclock the following morning or eight

hours after seeing Bladimir. As he himself testified upon cross-examination, he

did notpersonally attend to Bladimir anymore once the latter was brought to the

ICU at QCGH.[9]

It bears emphasis that a duly-registered death certificate is considered a

public document and the entries therein are presumed correct, unless the party who

contests its accuracy can produce positive evidence establishing otherwise.[10]

The

QCGH death certificate was received by the City Civil Registrar on April 17,

1995. Not only was the certificate shown by positive evidence to be

inaccurate. Its credibility, more than that issued by Dr. Frias, becomes more
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pronounced as note is taken of the fact that he was not around at the time of

death.

IN FINE, petitioner company and its co-petitioner manager Dennis Hao are

not guilty of negligence.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged Decision of

the Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and the complaint is hereby DISMISSED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALESAssociate Justice

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Ocean Builders vs. Sps. Cubacub

Ocean Builders Construction Corporation vs. Spouses Cubacub

G.R. No. 150898, April 13, 2011

Digest

Facts: Bladimir Cubacub was employed as maintenance man by petitioner company Ocean Builders Construction Corp. at

its office in Caloocan City. On April 9, 1995, Bladimir was afflicted with chicken pox. He was thus advised by petitioner

Dennis Hao, the companys general manager, to rest for three days which he did at the companys barracks where he lives

free of charge.

Later in the afternoon, however, he asked a co-worker, Ignacio Silangga, to accompany him to his house in Capas, Tarlac

so he could rest. Informed by Silangga of Bladimirs intention, Hao gave Bladimir P1,000.00 and ordered Silangga to

instead bring Bladimir to the nearest hospital.

Bladimir was brought to the Caybiga Community Hospital, a primary-care hospital around one kilometer away from the

office of the company. At about 8 oclock in the evening of the same day, April 13, 1995, Bladimirs parents -respondent

spouses Cubacub, arrived at the Caybiga Hospital and transferred Bladimir to the Quezon City General Hospital where he

was placed in the intencive care unit and died the following day.

The death certificate issued by the QCGH recorded Bladimirs immediate cause of death as cardio-respiratory arrest and

the antecedent cause as pneumonia.

Bladimirs parents-herein respondents later filed on August 17, 1995 before the Tarlac Regional Trial Court a complaint

for damages against petitioners, alleging that Hao was guilty of negligence which resulted in the deterioration ofBladimirs condition leading to his death.

Issue: Whether the manager was guilty of negligence for not bringing his employee, who later died, to a better hospital,

and hence liable for torts based on Article 161 of the Labor Code.

Held:No,the manager, Hao, was not guilty of negligence for not bringing his employee, who later died, to a better

hospital.

ART. 161. Assistance of employer.It shall be the duty of any employer to provide all the necessary assistance to ensure

the adequate and immediate medical and dental attendance and treatment to an injured or sick employee in case of

emergency.

Haos advice for Bladimir to, as he did, take a 3-day rest and to later have him brought to the nearest hospital constituted

adequate and immediate medical attendance that he is mandated, under Art. 161, to provide to a sick employee in an

emergency.

Chicken pox is self-limiting. Hao does not appear to have a medical background. He may not be thus expected to have

known that Bladimir needed to be brought to a hospital with better facilities than the Caybiga Hospital.

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At all events, the alleged negligence of Hao cannot be considered as the proximate cause of the death of Bladimir. An

injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or failure to act, whenever it appears from the evidence in the case that

the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage, and that the injury

or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission.

Caveat: Anyone who claims this digest as his own without proper authority shall be held liable under the law of

Karma.

Documents

Labor Code Art 156-167