REVIEWS

Lebensprozesse und wissenschaftliches Denken. Zur Logik der Lebendigkeit und ihrer Erstarrung in den Wissenschaften, by Hubert Hendrichs. FreiburglMunchen: Verlag Karl Alber, 1988, 338 pages.

Reviewed by Peter Meyer Buchenstrasse 19, D-8902 Neusaess 4, FRG

Hubert Hendrichs, who specializes in mammalian ethology at the University at Bielefeld, FR Germany, here presents a critical analysis of some of the most intriguing issues of current theoretical biology, selecting certain elements of Darwinian evolutionary theory, sociobiology, self-organization theory, and systems-theory for discussion from his anti-reductionist and holistic point of view.

According to Hendrichs, mammalian behavior, including ours (pp. 15, 30), has to be considered as one of the most complex processes in the universe. The majority of biological theories are not suited, however, to account for this complexity. Consistent with the manner of Western science, these theories apply categories to the study of these processes that isolate some aspects from the course of nature and thereby hypostatize them (p. 208).

Taking exception to such simplistic models of organismic processes, as for instance in the terms of utility theory (pp. 6, 25), the author stresses that holistic approaches should pay attention to states of disequilibrium or of misunderstanding in social interaction, and princi- pally to the potentially positive, curative impact of the holistic system on component organ- isms as well as on the systems themselves. While for instance tribal hunters in Africa and other parts of the world usually seem to be able to perceive even minute details of mamma- lian behavior, modem science’s methodology of isolating organisms from their habitat and social setting necessarily brings about simplistic accounts of behavior.

This book traces the roots of these shortcomings of modem science to Newtonian mechanistic cosmology and Darwinism (p. 167). Hendrichs suggests that some of Darwin’s basic assumptions are fallacious-mainly the ideas of ‘scarcity and resources’ and of ‘fitness’ (P. 52).

According to Hendrichs, Darwinian ‘scarcity of resources,’ which functions as a precon- dition for the operation of selection and is in turn thought to be brought about by the Malthusian trend toward overpopulation, must not be considered a common situation. Quite to the contrary, most populations do not grow beyond a lower limit of resources available in any given environment (p. 41). Limitation of population growth may be attributed to some impacts of the social system on reproduction (p. 68). Due consideration needs to be given to the operation of holistic forces in organismic behavior.

Journal of Social and Biological Strucrures 13(2):175-183. ISSN: 0140-1750

Copyright 0 1990 by JAI Fms, Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

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‘Fitness,’ another major Darwinian concept, also needs to be closely examined (p. 144). According to the author, the basic assumption according to which the number of offspring can be regarded as the criterion of selective success of ‘fitness’ is also fallacious-fitness cannot be operationalized in this way. Furthermore, the number of offspring does not play a decisive part in the reproduction of the higher vertebrates.

Hendrichs’ criticisms carry some far reaching implications for analyzing combative behavior and dominance hierarchies. Consistent with his holistic view of behavior, Hendrichs suggests (p. 109) that isolating the more destructive aspects of agonistic behavior from their general frame of reference does not make sense. Viewed as a part of the holistic social process, agonistic behavior may be understood as a means of adjusting the individual organ- ism to the requirements of social life (p. 109).

According to Hendrichs, the understanding of social life may be enhanced by a discrimi- nating use of the concept of ‘social power’ (p. 107). While this concept has not been used by ethologists so far, it would seem suited to denoting an animal’s ability to influence its conspecifics and to distinguishing this ability from other forms of power which are based on an animal’s willingness to resort to brute force. The use of such forms of power causes stress within a given population and may eventually lead to the death of some of the animals, whereas the former type of power brings about a reduction of violent acts and ensuing stress.

Similarly, a discriminating use of the concept of ‘social power’ along the lines of the author’s analysis could well further ethologists’ understanding of social life. Adoption of these concepts could also entail benefit from the experiences of other social sciences where their use has the weight of a long tradition. Political scientists suggested long ago that ‘authority’ and ‘social power’ should be delimited. Frans de Waal’s findings on ‘chimpanzee politics’ and Michael Chance’s attention theory as well as other developments point to closer and potentially fruitful links between different social sciences.

Hendrichs’ critical assessment of the ability of Darwinian approaches to account for the total complexity of social life obviously involves strong reservations about sociobiology. It is not suited to account for social behavior at all (p. 137). Hendrichs suggests that sociobiologists’ findings about the function of ‘infanticide’ remain to be empirically corroborated (p. 149), and their concept of ‘altruism’ has to be considered erroneous (p. 144).

According to Hendrichs, orthodox Darwinism as well as sociobiology should be refuted not only because of their fallacious concepts of fitness and altruism, but primarily because of their extremely limited concept of rationality (p. 161). Hendrichs suggests a more comprehen- sive concept of the rationality underlying natural processes, whereas modem Darwinism is based on assumptions of random events and selective forces which may be understood in terms of game theory. Contrary to Darwin&m’s insistence on reproduction, such a more comprehensive concept should be able to account for the ‘dialectical’ nature of processes, the occurrence of disequilibria and other disturbances which living systems can cope with to some extent (p. 166).

Social systems may apply social power as a means of preventing the stress in individual organisms likely to arise from situations of solitary helplessness. Related forces would be the ability of individual organisms to perceive distant events through a sort of emotional link to a group’s structure (pp. 156, 163).

The emotional states of an individual wolf would, for instance, not be understood unless they were related to the pack’s social dynamics which initially had brought them about. This interrelation between emotional states and group behavior may be regarded as an example of holistic properties of social systems.

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Large sections of the book delve into the history of biophilosophy: the mechanistic- materialistic cosmology dating back to Newton and Hobbes and the systems-theoretic and holistic tradition going back to Posidonius and Plotinus, to name but two strands. Hendrichs feels that such holistic approaches are much better suited to account for the total complexity of behavior than Darwinism, which is only one of the more recent branches of mechanistic cosmology. Among the merits of Hendrichs’ book is its pointing to numerous shortcomings of Darwinism and its underlying concepts of biophilosophy. Hendrichs’ arguments for the analysis of holistic properties bring some fresh insights into aspects of social life which have heretofore gone unnoticed.

Hendrichs’ critique cannot, however, be considered totally convincing. For instance he resorts (p. 111) to the same utility model underlying Darwinism that he criticizes in other sections. A more serious objection can be raised to Hendrichs’ cryptic notion of harmony in social life. While it may, for instance, not be denied that ‘authority’ reduces the number of violent acts within populations, it does not completely eliminate them. ‘Authority’ may prevent some violent acts, but does it prevent all? And does ‘authority’ or some sort of ‘natural law’ (p. 248) keep tribal mankind from destructive warfare? The answer to both questions would certainly have to be ‘no.’

These parts point to some cryptic notions of harmony which are concomitants to other systems-theoretical approaches as well. Social strife, which from the perspective of an individual embedded in a social system can assume magnificent proportions, easily seems negligible from the quasi-Olympian perspective of the systems theorist.

In total, the merits of Hendrichs’ book outweigh these minor shortcomings. It certainly deserves wide reading among those interested in animal as well as human social behavior.

ConfrontingCreationism:DefendingDarwin, edited by D.R. Selkirkand F.J. Burrows. New South Wales, Australia: NSW University Press, 1987, xii + 157 pages.

Reviewed by Hugh Lehman University of Guelph, Canada

This book arises out of the distress caused to scientists by the success of anti-evolutionists (creationists) at influencing the teaching of biology and other related sciences. As in the United States, creationists have succeeded in getting doctrines of “creation science” intro- duced into school curricula in Australia (page xi). I am completely sympathetic to this distress. In my view, creation science is a sham, as Michael Ruse and others have suggested.

The book consists of the proceedings of a symposium, called “In Defense of Science.” The chapters of the book are papers by Ronald Strahan, Michael Archer, Ronald Brown, Alex Richie and Ian Falconer. The book purportedly was written for high school science teachers. Its purposes are to clearly explain the nature of the evidence supporting the reality of evolution, to reply to the objections to evolution which fundamentalist creationists advance, to defend the contention that modem evolutionary theory is scientific whereas the accounts of