Logic Stoics Biblio One

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Annotated Bibliography on Ancient Stoic

Dialectic: A - E

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON STOIC LOGIC

Dialektiker und Stoiker. Zur Logik der Stoa und ihrer Vorlufer. Edited by Dring Klaus and EbertTheodor. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner 1993.Inhaltsverzeichnis: Vorwort 7; Abkrzungsverzeichnis 8; Teilnehmerverzeichnis 9; Wolfram Ax:Der Einfluss des Peripatos auf die Sprachtheorie der Stoa 11; Mariano Baldassarri: Ein kleinerTraktat Plutarchs ber stoische Logik 33; Jonathan Barnes: Meaning, Saying and Thinking 47;Susanne Bobzien: Chrysippus' Modal Logic and Its Relation to Philo and Diodorus 63; WalterCavini: Chrysippus on Speaking Truly and the Liar 85; Theodor Ebert: Dialecticians and Stoics onthe Classification of Propositions 111; Urs Egli: Neue Elemente im Bild der stoischen Logik 129;Michael Frede: The Stoic Doctrine of the Tenses of the Verb 141; Gabriele Giannantoni: DiePhilosophenschule der Megariker und Aristoteles 155; Karheinz Hlser: Zur dialektischen undstoischen Einteilung der Fehlschlsse 167; Katerina Ieorodiakonou: The Stoic Indemonstrables inthe Later Tradition 187; Fritz Jrss: Zum Semiotik Modell der Stoiker und ihrer Vorlufer 201;Mario Mignucci: The Stoic Themata 217; Luciano Montoneri: Platon, die ltere Akademie und diestoische Dialektik 239; Luciana Repici: The Stoics and the Elenchos 253; Andreas Schubert: Diestoischen Vorstellungen 271; Gerhard Seel: Zur Geschichte und Logik des therizn logos 291;Hermann Weeidemann: Zeit und Wahrheit bei Diodor 319; Literaturverzeichnis 331; Register343-361

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Les Stociens et leur logique. Edited by Brunschwig Jacques. Paris: Vrin 2006.Actes du Colloque de Chantilly 18-22 septembre 1976.Premire dition 1978; deuxime dition, revue, augmente et mise jour (reproduit la paginationde l'dition originale).Table des matires: Avant propos de la deuxime dition 7; Avant propos de la premire dition 11;John M. Rist: Zeno and the Origins of Stoic Logic (non revu par l'auteur) 13; Ian G. Kidd:Posidonius and Logic (revu par l'auteur) 29; Victor Goldschmidt: Remarques sur l'originepicurienne de la "prnotion" (revu par Pierre-Marie Morel) 41; Anthony A. Long: The StoicDistinction Between Truth (me altheia) and the True (to aleths) (revu par l'auteur) 61; ClaudeImbert: Thorie de la reprsentation et doctrine logique dans le stocisme ancien (revu par l'auteur)79; George Kerferd: The Problem ofsyntakatathesis and katalepsis in Stoic Doctrine (revu par

Thomas Bnatoul) 109; Urs Egli: Stoic Syntax and Semantics (revu par l'auteur) 131; PierrePachet: l'imperatif stocien (revu par l'auteur) 149; Franoise Caujolle-Zaslawsky: Le style stocienet laparemphasis (revu par l'auteur) 165; Richard Goulet: La classification stocienne des

propositions simples selon Diogne Larce, VII 69-70 (revu par l'auteur) 191; Anthony C. Lloyd:Definite Propositions and the Concept of Reference (revu par Jean-Baptiste Gourinat) 223; JacquesBrunschwig: Le modle conjonctif (revu par l'auteur) 235; Grard Verbeke: La philosophie du signechez les stociens (revu par Danielle Lories) 261; Herv Barreau: Clanthe et Chrysippe face aumatre-argument de Diodore (revu par l'auteur) 283; Mario Mignucci: Sur la logique modale desstociens (revu par Paolo Crivelli) 303; Pasquale Pasquino: Le statut ontologique des incorporelsdans l'ancien stocisme (revu par l'auteur) 333; Andreas Graeser: The Stoic Categories (revu par

l'auteur) 347; Janine Bertier: Une hnadologie lie au stocisme tardif dans le commentaired'Alexandre d'Aphrodise laMtaphysique d'Aristote (990 b 9) (non revu par l'auteur) 369;Jean-Paul Dumont:Mos geometricus, mos physicus (revu par Pierre-Marie Michel) 389; JosephMoreau: Immutabilit du vrai, ncessit logique et lien causal (revu par Valry Laurand) 405;

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otated Bibliography on Ancient Stoic Dialectic: A - E http://www.ontology.co/biblio/logic-stoics-biblio-one.htm

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Jonathan Barnes: La doctrine du retour ternel (revu par l'auteur) 421; Maria Daraki: Les fonctionspsychologiques du logos dans le stocisme ancien (non revu par l'auteur) 441; Bibliographiecomplmentaire 475; Index locorum 485-509.Achard Martin, "Logos endiathetos et thorie des lekta chez les stoiciens,"Laval Thologique et

Philosophique 57: 225-233 (2001)."This paper is a discussion of Claude Panaccio's (*) interpretation of the Stoic view oflogosendiathetos [internal discourse]. Two questions are more specifically addressed : 1) what is the

relation between logos endiathetos and lekta? and 2) is logos endiathetos tied to language or not?"

(*)Le discours intrieur. De Platon Guillaume d'Ockham (1999).

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Annas Julia. Truth and Knowledge. InDoubt and Dogmatism. Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology.Edited by Barnes Jonathan, Burnyeat Myles, and Schofield Malcolm. Oxford: Clarendon Press1980. pp. 84-104

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Baldassarri Mariano. Un trattatello plutarcheo di dialettica stoica:De E delphico cap. VI. In Studi difilosofia antica II. Como: Libreria Noseda 1993. pp. 43-65Pubblicato in tedesco in: Klaus Dring, Theodr Ebert (hers.) -Dialektiker und Stoiker. Zur Logikder Stoa und ihrer Vorlufer - pp. 33-46

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Baldassarri Mariano. Il Simposio di Bamberg sulla logica degli Stoici e dei suoi precursori. In Studidi filosofia antica II. Como: Libreria Noseda 1993. pp. 67-107

Note sul Symposion zur Logik der Stoiker und ihrer Vorlufer(Bamberg, 2-6 September 1991)

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Baldassarri Mariano. Una rilevante disciplina antica documentata in modo nuovo (Discussione). InStudi di filosofia antica II. Como: Libreria Noseda 1993. pp. 109-123A proposito del libro di Karlheinz Hlser -Die Fragmente zur Dialektik der Stoiker- Stuttgart,Frommann Holzboorg 1986-1987.

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Baldassarri Mariano. Osservazioni sull'interpretazione prantliana della logica stoica. In Studi difilosofia antica II. Como: Libreria Noseda 1993. pp. 125-138

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Barnes Jonathan. Proof Destroyed. InDoubt and Dogmatism. Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology.

Edited by Barnes Jonathan, Burnyeat Myles, and Schofield Malcolm. Oxford: Clarendon Press1980. pp. 161-181

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Barnes Jonathan. Medicine, Experience and Logic. In Science and Speculation. Studies inHellenistic Theory and Practice. Edited by Barnes Jonathan et al. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press 1982. pp. 24-68Translated in French as:Mdecine, exprience et logique, in: Revue de Mtaphysique et de Morale,1989, 94, pp. 437-481.

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Barnes Jonathan. Meaning. Saying and Thinking. InDialektiker und Stoiker. Zur Logik der Stoaund ihrer Vorlufer. Edited by Dring Klaus and Ebert Theodor. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner 1993. pp.47-61

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Barnes Jonathan.Logic and Imperial Stoa. Leiden : Brill 1997.12.Barnes Jonathan. Aristotle and Stoic Logic. In Topics in Stoic philosophy. Edited by IerodiakonouKaterina. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1999. pp. 23-53"Were Aristotle's logical writings known to the early Stoic logicians, and did Aristotle's logicalideas have any influence on the development of Stoic logic? The evidence which bears on thisquestion is perplexing: there are numerous pertinent texts which favour an affirmative answer; yetas we approach them they seem, like so many will-o'-the-wisps, to retreat -- and we are stumblingin a treacherous marsh.But the question is not without its fascination, in as much as it concerns the historical relations

between two magnificent monuments to Greek philosophical acumen; and it may stand somediscussion. Section I presents some general ruminations. Section II deals with the preliminaryquestion of whether the Stoics could in principle have read Aristotle. Section III assembles a sampleof the evidence which suggests that the Stoics did in fact read and study their Aristotle. And theremaining sections try to assess the value of this evidence.

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The question is a historical one, and it invites consideration of a certain type of historicalexplanation. It is not merely a matter of whether the Stoics were aware of the Peripateticachievement in logic: it is a matter of whether this awareness influenced their own logical thoughtsand caused them to think in this way rather than in that." p. 23Barnes Jonathan. What is a disjunction? InLanguage and learning. Philosophy of language in the

Hellenistic age. Proceedings of the Ninth Symposium Hellenisticum. Edited by Frede Dorothea andInwood Brad. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005. pp. 274-298

"That the Stoics were the instigators of the emphasis put on linguistic observations in ancientphilosophy is uncontested. To what degree they are rightly accused of paying more attention toexpressions rather than to things is quite another matter, despite the fact that this reproach wasvoiced repeatedly in antiquity by authorities such as Galen and Alexander of Aphrodisias and haslasted through the nineteenth century AD. If the Stoics have enjoyed a better press since thetwentieth century it is because they were taken to be logicians for logic's sake, committed formalistswho stopped just short of inventing the appropriate type of artificial language. That this pictureneeds revision is argued byJonathan Barnes (What is a disjunction?') in a painstaking investigationof the treatment of connectives in Apollonius Dyscolus' essay with that title and Galen'sInstitutiologica. Barnes shows that Apollonius' text is coherent and thereby undermines a long-standing

prejudice about the Stoic impact on the development of traditional grammar: contrary to what hasbeen assumed (via an unwarranted textual emendation in a crucial passage of Apollonius Dyscolus)Apollonius does not criticise the Stoics' meddling with grammar, but rather their insufficientinterest in some of its finer points. Far from adopting a purely formalistic stance, the Stoicsdistinguished between natural and non-natural disjunctions and colligations. They used theseconsiderations not only to distinguish between natural and occasional disjunctions, but also betweengrammatical and semantical nonsense. Since no other text besides Apollonius' attributes theconception of 'natural disjunctions' to the Stoics it is a question whether it actually is of Stoic originrather than derived from the Peripatetics or an invention by certain grammarians. As Barnes shows,the interconnections and boundaries between natural language and formal logic did not only play a

crucial role in the treatment of disjunctions by Apollonius Dyscolus. They are also the basis ofGalen's criticism of Stoic logic on the differentiation between complete and incomplete conflict andimplication, whose intent was to show what is and what is not a legitimate use of conjunctions. Ifthat distinction is at stake, then Galen's view on disjunctions and conjunctions turns out to becoherent, despite initial appearances to the contrary. The differing parties accused each other of nothaving paid sufficient attention to thepragmata; however, their complaint is not that the facts in theworld have been ignored, but rather that the meaning of the terms has not received sufficientattention." From theIntroduction by Dorothea Frede and Brad Inwood, pp. 11-12

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Barnes Jonathan. Grammaire, rhtorique, pistmologie, et dialectique. InLire les Stociens. Editedby Gourinat Jean-Baptiste and Barnes Jonathan. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 2009. pp.

135-149

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Becker Oskar. ber die vier "Themata" der stoischen Logik. InZwei Untersuchungen zur antikenLogik. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz 1957. pp. 27-49

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Berrettoni Pierangiolo. L'aksioma diasaphoun to mallon nella logica stoica. In Grammatica eideologia nella storia della Linguistica. Edited by Berrettoni Pierangiolo and Lorenzi Franco.Perugia: Margiacchi - Galeno 1997. pp. 1-34

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Bobzien Susanne.Die Stoische Modallogik. Wrzburg: Knighausen-Neumann 1986.Inhalverzeichnis: Einleitung 4;I. Der Axioma-Begriff der Stoiker 11;1. Die stoische Definition des Axioma-Begriffes 11; 2. Vorlufige Bestimmung derWahrheitskriterien des stoischen Axioms 14; 3. Der gleiche Satz bezeichnet verschiedeneAxiomata: das definite Axioma 17; 4. Axiomata vergehen 18; 5. Axiomata, die ihren Wahrheitswertwechseln: meta - piptonta 21; 6. Das Bestehen des dem Axioma korrespondierenden Sachverhaltswird durch das Axiome je nur fr den Zeitpunkt der Behauptung dieses Axioma behauptet 23; 7.

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Zeitbezogene Axiomata 26; 8. Wahrheitsbedingungen der zeitbezogenen Axiomata 28; 9.Wahrheitswertwechsel der zeitbezogenen Axiomata 26; 9. Axiomata mit Pseudodaten 31; 11.

Nichtzeitbezogene Axiomata 34; 12. Zusammenfassung 36;II. Die stoische Modallogik 40;1.Die Definitionen der stoischen Modalbegriffe 40; a) Interpretation und Rekonstruktionsversuchevor Frede 40; b) Fredes Rekonstruktion der stoischen Modalbegriffe 45; 2.Korrelation der stoischenAxioma- und Sachverhaltsmodi 50; 3. Die Sachverhaltsmodi und ihre berlieferten Bestimmungen

51;4. Kontingente Axiomata und Sachverhalte 56; 5. Der Ausdruck 'epidektikon alets / pseudos einai60; 6. Die Modalitten der nichtzeitbezogenen Axiomata 63; 7. Der Ausdruck 'ussere Umstndehindern...' 67; 8. Die Modalitten der zeitbezogenen Axiomata 72; a) Die Modalitten der Axiomataber die Gegenwart 73; b) Die Modalitten der Axiomata ber die Vergangenheit 76; c) DieModalitten der Axiomata ber die Zukunft 91; 9. Zusammenfassung und Schlussfolgerung bzgl.der Art der Modalitten der zeitbezogenen Axiomata 98; 10. Modalittenwechsel 103; 11. AusMglichem folgt Unmgliches 105; 12. Die Rekonstruktion des stoischen Modalsystems vonMignucci und Vuillemin 113; 13. Zusammenfassung 118; Anmerkungen 121; Symbol- undAbkrzungsverzeichnis 142; Literaturverzeichnis 143-147.

"ABSTRACT: Part I discusses the Stoic notion of propositions (assertibles, axiomata): theirdefinition; their truth-criteria; the relation between sentence and proposition; propositions that

perish; propositions that change their truth-value; the temporal dependency of propositions; thetemporal dependency of the Stoic notion of truth; pseudo-dates in propositions. Part II discussesStoic modal logic: the Stoic definitions of their modal notions (possibility, impossibility, necessity,non-necessity); the logical relations between the modalities; modalities as properties of

propositions; contingent propositions; the relation between the Stoic modal notions and those ofDiodorus Cronus and Philo of Megara; the role of 'external hindrances' for the modalities; thetemporal dependency of the modalities; propositions that change their modalities; the principle that

something possible can follow from something impossible; the interpretations of the Stoic modalsystem by B. Mates, M. Kneale, M. Frede, J. Vuillemin and M. Mignucci are evaluated.

For a shorter, updated, English version of Part I of the book see my 'Stoic Logic', in K. Algra et al.(eds), The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, Cambridge 1999, 92-157. For a shorter,updated, English version of Part II of the book see my 'Chrysippus' Modal Logic and its Relation toPhilo and Diodorus', in K. Doering, Th. Ebert (eds.),Dialektiker und Stoiker(Stuttgart 1993)63-84."Bobzien Susanne, "Stoic Syllogistic," Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 14: 133-192 (1996).""For the Stoics, a syllogism is a formally valid argument, and the primary function of their

syllogistic is to establish the formal validity of arguments. Stoic syllogistic can be understood as asystem of formal logic that relies on two types of argumental rules:' first, five rules (the accounts ofthe indemonstrables) which were used to determine whether any given argument is anindemonstrable argument (anapodeiktos logos), i.e. an elementary syllogism the validity of which isnot in need of further demonstration (D.L. 7.79), since its validity is evident in itself (Sextus,M. 2.223);2 second, one unary and three presumably binary argumental rules, called themata, whichallow one to establish the formal validity of non-indemonstrable arguments by analysing them inone or more steps into one or more indemonstrable arguments (D.L. 7. 78). The function of theserules is not to generate non indemonstrable syllogisms from indemonstrable ones, but rather toreduce given non-indemonstrable arguments to indemonstrable syllogisms. Moreover, the Stoicmethod of deduction differs from standard modern ones in that the direction is reversed. The Stoicsystem may hence be called an 'argumental reductive system of deduction'.In the following I present a reconstruction of this system of logic. The rules or accounts used forestablishing that an argument is indemonstrable have all survived, and the indemonstrables are

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among the best-known elements of Stoic logic. However, their exact role and logical status in Stoicsyllogistic are usually neglected. I expound how they are integrated in the system of deduction. Thestate of evidence for the themata is dismal -- although perhaps not hopeless. I suggest areconstruction of the themata, based on a fresh look at some of the sources, and then offer areconstruction of the general method of reduction of arguments and some general remarks on Stoicsyllogistic as a whole and on the question of its completeness (much of which will not depend onthe particular formulation of the themata I propose, but on more general considerations for a

reconstruction).Stoic logic is a propositional logic, and Stoic negation and conjunction are truth-functional. Thishas, naturally, led to comparisons with the 'classical' propositional calculus (as e.g. presented in

Principia Mathematica), including repeated examinations of Stoic syllogistic on completeness inthe modern sense. The Stoic theory of deduction invariably comes out as deficient, inferior, orsimply outlandish in such comparisons, which has evoked adjusting additions and modifications --tacit or explicit -- in previous reconstructions of the system. I suggest that this is the wrongapproach; that the classical propositional calculus is the wrong paradigm; that Stoic logic has to beconsidered first of all in its own light; and that, if one looks for comparisons with contemporarylogic, one can find some rather more interesting parallels when turning one's attention to non-truth-

functional propositional logics."

(1) By an argumental rule I mean a rule that produces arguments from (zero or more) arguments, asopposed to a rule that produces propositions from (zero or more) propositions.(2) The accounts of the indemonstrables, when interpreted as rules, are nullary argumental rules.Bobzien Susanne, "The Stoics on hypotheses and hypothetical arguments,"Phronesis.A Journal for

Ancient Philosophy 42: 299-312 (1997)."The article argues (i) that the hypothetical arguments about which the Stoic Chrysippus wrotenumerous books (DL VII 196) are the same as those mentioned five times in "Epictetus" (e.g.,Diss.I 25.11-12), and (ii) that these hypothetical arguments are formed by replacing in a non-hypothetical

argument one (or more) of the premisses by a Stoic "hypothesis" or supposition. Such "hypotheses"differ from propositions in that they have a specific logical form and no truth-value. The reason forthe introduction of a distinct class of hypothetical arguments can be found in the context ofdialectical argumentation. Some evidence for the use of Stoic hypothetical arguments in ancienttexts is discussed."

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Bobzien Susanne.Determinism and freedom in stoic philosophy. New York: Oxford UniversityPress 1998.See Chapter 3Modality, determinism, and freedom pp. 97-143.

"A considerable number of our testimonies about the Stoic doctrine of determinism are concerned

with modality. In particular the concepts of possibility and necessity were central to some parts ofits discussion. It seems that Hellenistic philosophers generally agreed that an action or, in general,activity does not depend on us and is not in our power, if it (or a corresponding proposition) isnecessary or impossible; or, put differently, that a prerequisite for something's depending on us isthat it is both possible and non-necessary. This fact is invoked both by the Stoics in defence of theirtheory and in the criticism of their opponents. But in the debate over fate and determinism,modalities played a role in a number of different contexts. They are dealt with separately in thefollowing sections:- Chrysippus rejected Diodorus' modal theory, because of its built-in necessitarian consequences(3.1.2).- Chrysippus developed his own set of modal notions, which, in themselves, do not lead tonecessitarianism and which secure a necessary condition for that which depends on us (3.1.3-5).- Some critics of Chrysippus and the Stoics developed arguments to show that there is a conflict

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between Chrysippus' modal notions and the Stoic theory of fate (3.2).-- Some later Stoics replied to this type of objection by giving an epistemic interpretation ofChrysippus' modal notions (3.3).- Critics of the Stoics objected that fate, qua Necessity, renders all events necessary; but thisobjection is not justified in Chrysippus' philosophy (3.4)." p. 97Bobzien Susanne and Mignucci Mario. Logic. III. The Stoics. In The Cambridge History of

Hellenistic Philosophy. Edited by Algra Keimpe et al. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

1999. pp. 92-176 1-7 (pp. 92-157) by S. Bobzien; 8 (pp. 157-176) by M. Mignucci.

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Bobzien Susanne. Pre-Stoics hypothetical syllogistic in Galen'sInstitutio logica. In The UnknownGalen. Edited by Nutton Vivian. London: Institute of Classical Studies, University of London 2002.

pp."The text of theInstitutio logica is not found in Khn (*) because its sole surviving MS was first

published, not long after its discovery, in 1844, and thus too late for inclusion. The reasons for onceconsidering it spurious are unconvincing. Galen'sInstitutio is one of our main witnesses for ahypothetical syllogistic which predates Stoic propositional logic. Galen draws from a number ofdifferent sources and theories including the "ancient philosophers" (hoi palaioi ton philosophon),

including Chrysippus; and the "more recent" (hoi neoteroi), post-Chrysippean Stoics or logicians ofother schools who adopted Stoic terminology and theory."

[* Karl Gottlob Khn, Claudii Galeni Opera Omnia. Leipzig: C. Cnobloch, 1821-1833, 19volumes, reprinted Hildesheim, Georg Olms,1964-1997].

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Bobzien Susanne. Logic. In The Cambridge Companion to Stoics. Edited by Inwood Brad.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003. pp. 85-123

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Bobzien Susanne. The Stoics on fallacies of equivocation. InLanguage and learning. Philosophy oflanguage in the Hellenistic age. Proceedings of the Ninth Symposium Hellenisticum. Edited byFrede Dorothea and Inwood Brad. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005. pp. 239-273

"As Susanne Bobzien shows, the Stoics had philosophical reasons for the development of strategiesto handle `lexical' ambiguities, because they regarded fallacies of ambiguity as complexes of

propositions and sentences that straddle the realm of linguistic expression (the domain of language)and the realm of meaning (the domain of logic); moreover, there is also a pragmatic component

because being deceived is a psychological disposition that can be reduced neither to language nor tomeaning. Not all arguments are, after all, as transparently fallacious as is the example that exploitsthe ambiguity of 'for men/manly' and concludes that a 'garment for men' must be courageous

because manliness is courage. Bobzien provides a detailed analysis of the relevant passages, laysbare textual and interpretative difficulties, and explores what the Stoic view on the matter impliesfor their theory of language. She points up that the Stoics believe that the premisses of the fallacies,

when uttered, have only one meaning and are true, and thus should be conceded; hence no mentalprocess of disambiguation is needed, while Aristotle, by contrast, assumes that the premissescontain several meanings, and recommends that the listeners explicitly disambiguate them. Bobzien

proffers two readings of the Stoic advice that we 'be silent' when confronted with fallacies ofambiguity, and explicates how each leads to an overall consistent interpretation of the textualevidence. Finally, she demonstrates that the method advocated by the Stoics works for all fallaciesof lexical ambiguity." From theIntroduction by Dorothea Frede and Brad Inwood, pp. 10-11

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Bobzien Susanne, "The Combinatorics of Stoic Conjunction: Hipparchus Refuted, ChrysippusVindicated," Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 40: 157-188 (2011).

26.

Bochenski Joseph.A history of formal logic. Notre Dame: Indiana University Press 1961.Translated from the German edition "Formale Logik" (1956) by Ivo Thomas.Reprinted New York, Chelsea Publishing Co., 1970.On the Stoics see Part III. The Megarian-Stoic Schoolpp. 105-251

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Brancacci Aldo. Antisthne et le stocisme: la logique. InLes Stociens. Edited by Romeyer28.


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Dherbey Gilbert and Gourinat Jean-Baptiste. Paris: Vrin 2005. pp. 55-73Brittain Charles. Common sense: concepts, definition and meaning in and out of the Stoa. In

Language and learning. Philosophy of language in the Hellenistic age. Proceedings of the NinthSymposium Hellenisticum. Edited by Frede Dorothea and Inwood Brad. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press 2005. pp. 164-209"Charles Brittain also focuses on an important aspect of the philosophical analysis of language: itsrelation to reality and to the conceptual apparatus in the human mind, which on most theories

connects reality to language. To the naive mind, a concept like 'common sense' would not seem tobe in need of development since it must have been in place since the dawn of human reasoning. Noris that the issue of Brittain's paper. Instead, he focuses on the development of a theory of commonsense that is based on the connection between a stock of rational conceptions that is the common

possession of all humans and the words which map naturally onto those conceptions and so giveexpression to them. The Stoics themselves did not maintain that everyone can acquire conceptionsthat successfully capture the essence of things; such success presupposes the uncorrupted mind ofthe wise; so these normative concepts do not seem to be an obvious source for a theory of commonconceptions that are open to all. As Brittain contends, it would nevertheless be wrong to attributesuch a theory to the later Platonists despite the fact that they advocated the existence of universally

acceptable word-meanings that are open to every human being's grasp. For Platonists regardedthese meanings as mere accidental features of the thing in question. What was needed to establish atheory of common sense was a combination of the two theories: the 'preliminary definition' of aterm with universal acceptance that lays claim to at least a partial grasp of the thing's essence. Enroute to this solution Brittain offers, inter alia, a reconstruction of the mechanism at work in theformation of common concepts with abstract and general contents and seeks to solve theconundrum of how definitions of the words corresponding to the concepts are formed. He does so

by carefully sifting through different sources that employ Stoic vocabulary (such as 'preconceptions'or 'common conceptions') but that differ significantly from the Stoic view that all humans have atleast a partial grasp of a thing's essential properties, rather than mere accidental properties. This

assumption paves the way towards a theory of 'common sense' that establishes a direct connectionbetween the concepts and the objects of the world and explains how ordinary language-speakershave at least an outline understanding of the world. Such a theory, so Brittain argues, is the upshotof Cicero's treatment of preconceptions, in the basis of definitions. The rendering of 'preconception'(prolepsis) as shared by all - by communis mens and finally by communis sensus - justifies theattribution to Cicero of at least 'a fragment of a theory of common sense' in civic and politicalmatters that everyone in principle can understand. This was a theory that deeply influenced the laterrhetorical tradition and thereby became a lasting asset in cultural history." From theIntroduction byDorothea Frede and Brad Inwood, pp. 8-9

29.

Brochard Victor, "La logique des Stociens,"Archiv fr Geschichte der Philosophie 5: 449-468

(1892).Rimprim dans: V. Brochard,tudes de philosophie antique et de philosophie moderne: XI.Lalogique des Stociens (Premire tude 220-238); XII.La logique des Stociens (Deuxime tude239-251), Paris, Vrin, 1954.

30.

Brunschwig Jacques. Proof Defined. InDoubt and Dogmatism. Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology.Edited by Barnes Jonathan, Burnyeat Myles, and Schofield Malcolm. Oxford: Clarendon Press1980. pp. 125-160

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Brunschwig Jacques. Remarques sur la classification des propositions simples dans les logiqueshellnistiques. InPhilosophie du langage et grammaire dans l'Antiquit. Bruxelles: Ousia 1986. pp.287-310Rimpim dans: J. Brunschwig,tudes sur les philosophies hellnistiques. Epicurisme, stocisme,

scepticisme, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1995.Translated as:Remarks on the classification of simple propositions in Hellenistic logics, in: J.Brunschwig,Papers in Hellenistic Philosophy, translated by Janet Lloyd, Cambridge: Cambridge

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University Press, 1994, pp. 57-71.Burnyeat Myles. Gods and Heaps. InLanguage and Logos. Studies in Ancient Greek Philosophy

Presented to G. E. L. Owen. Edited by Schofield Malcolm and Nussbaum Martha. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press 1982. pp. 315-338On the Stoic Sorite paradox.

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Burnyeat Myles. The Origins of Non-deductive Inference. In Science and Speculation. Studies inHellenistic Theory and Practice. Edited by Barnes Jonathan et al. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press 2011. pp. 193-238

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Casari Ettore. Sulla disgiunzione nella logica megarico-stoica. InActes du VIII CongrsInternationale d'Histoire des Sciences. Florence-Milan, 3-9 septembre 1956. Vol. III. Paris:Hermann et C.ie 1958. pp. 1217-1224

35.

Castagnoli Luca. How dialectical was Stoic dialectic? InAncient Models of Mind: Studies inHuman and Divine Rationality. Edited by Nightingale Andrea Wilson and Sedley David.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2010. pp. 153-179

36.

Cavini Walter. La teoria stoica della negazione. InAtti del convegno internazionale di storia dellalogica. Edited by Abrusci Michele, Casari Ettore, and Mugnai Massimo. Bologna: CLUEB 1983.

pp. 229-234

37.

Cavini Walter. Il papiro parigino 2. Testo, traduzione e commento. In Studi su papiri greci di logicae medicina. Firenze: Olschki 1985. pp. 85-126

38.

Cavini Walter. La negazione di frase nella logica greca. In Studi su papiri greci di logica emedicina. Edited by Cavini Walter et al. Firenze: Olschki 1985. pp. 7-126Indice dei Contenuti: Nota liminare 9;LA NEGAZIONE ARISTOTELICA1. La sintesi dichiarativa: supplemento di frase e contenuto descrittivo 11; 2. Negazione semplice eaffermazione trasposta 17; 3. Le asserzioni indeterminate: trasformazione predicativa ed equivocitcomposta 26; 4. Portata esistenziale dell'affermazione 36; 5. Negative categoriche 41;LA NEGAZIONE STOICA

1. Frammenti e testimonianze 47; 2. La teoria stoica degli axiomata 48; 3. Negazione semplice ecomposta 51; 4. Opposti contraddittri 57; 5. Ambiguit della negazione ordinaria 67;APPENDICE - IL PAPIRO PARIGINO 2Testo e traduzione 86; Commento 107; Bibliografia 122-126

39.

Celluprica Vincenza, "La logica stoica in alcune recenti interpretazioni,"Elenchos.Rivista di Studisul Pensiero Antico: 123-150 (1980).

40.

Celluprica Vincenza, "Diocle di Magnesia come fonte della dossografia stoica in Diogene Laerzio,"Orpheus.Rivista di Umanit Classica e Cristiana 10: 58-79 (1989).

41.

Colish Marcia L., "The Stoic Hypothetical Syllogisms and Their Transmission in the Latin Westthrough the Early Middle Ages,"Res Publica Litterarum 2: 19-26 (1979).

42.

Colish Marcia L. The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages. Leiden: Brill 1985.Vol. I: Stoicism in Classical Latin Literature (1985); Vol. II: Stoicism in Christian Latin Thoughtthrough the Sixth Century (1990).See Vol. I, Chapter One: Stoicism in Antiquity C)Logic pp. 50-60."Logic in the Stoic philosophy deals broadly with the way men think and speak about the world.The Stoics' theory of knowledge, their formal dialectic, and their theories of language, grammar,rhetoric, and poetics show an intimate relationship to their physics and ethics. The logos of thoughtand speech is a cognate of the logos as the rational principle of the universe and of the human logoswhich enables man to make the correct judgments on which his ethical life depends." pp. 50-51

43.

Corcoran John. Remarks on Stoic Deduction. InAncient Logic and Its Modern Interpretations.Proceedings of the Buffalo Symposium on Modernist Interpretations of Ancient Logic, 21 and 22April, 1972. Edited by Corcoran John. Dordrecht: Reidel 1974. pp. 169-181"The purpose of this note is to raise and clarify certain questions concerning deduction in Stoiclogic. Despite the fact that the extant corpus of relevant texts is limited, it may nevertheless be

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Textes stociens en tradition directe (livres ou fragments de philosophes stociens transmis par lespapyrus d'gypte ou d'Herculanum). Je considre d'abord les textes dont l'attribution unphilosophe dfini est certaine ou prsume telle: Chrysippe, Hirocls, Musonius Rufus; ensuite, jem'arrte sur le papyrus Parisinus 2 dont l'attribution Chrysippe a t conteste; enfin, j'examinedes cas de fausses attributions. 4. Textes stociens en tradition indirecte (les extraits de laPoliteia deZnon de Citium cits par Philodme; ceux tirs des uvres d'Ariston de Chios, d'Antipatros deTarse et de Diogne de Sleucie). 5. Pour terminer, je dresserai une liste de papyrus o se trouve

une rfrence la Stoa, aux stociens, ou des allusions des doctrines stociennes." p. 30.Les pp. 35-37 sont sur lesRecherches logiques (Logika ztmata) (fragmenta, P. Herc. 307) deChrysippe.Drozdek Adam, "Lekton. Stoic logic and ontology,"Acta Antiqua.Academiae Scientiarum

Hungaricae 42: 93-104 (2002)."For the Stoics, the lekton is as an intermediary between the thought and the object. They do notexist independently of the mind, but, at the same time, the mind does not create them. Due to thisstatus, they guarantee intersubjectivity of the rational discourse. They are incorporeals that do notexist, but subsist and the Stoic Logos-God guarantees their permanent subsistence. The lekta aresemantico-syntactic entities. Their role is analogous to the role of an interlingua used as a tool for

automated translation of languages."

52.

Dumitriu Anton.History of Logic. Tunbridge Wells: Abacus Press 1977.Revised, updated, and enlarged translation from the Roumanian of the second edition of "Istorialogicii" (4 volumes).On the Stoics see: Vol. I, pp. 216-253.

53.

Dyson Henry.Prolepsis and Ennoia in the Early Stoa. Berlin: de Gruyter 2009.54.Ebert Theodor, "The origin of the Stoic theory of signs in Sextus Empiricus," Oxford Studies in

Ancient Philosophy 5: 83-126 (1987)."In his critical discussion of the dogmatic philosophers Sextus Empiricus expounds a Stoic doctrinewhich has conveniently been labelled 'the theory of signs'. This chapter of Stoic philosophy offers a

blend of logic and epistemology, a mixture bound to attract the interest of present-day 'ancientphilosophers'. Hence, with the growing discussion focusing on the philosophy of the Hellenisticperiod, this part of Stoicism was to get a fair share of attention. (1) Controversy has beenflourishing over the merits and weaknesses of this theory; it has been compared with tenets aboutthe topic of signs held by earlier and later philosophers, yet in these discussions it has almostuniversally been taken for granted that there is a single theory of signs and that it can be attributedunqualifiedly to the Stoics. (2)Part of what I want to do in this paper is to challenge this assumption. I shall argue that the materialrelating to the theory of signs which is preserved in Sextus does not reflect Chrysippan teaching,

but goes back to Stoics antedating Chrysippus. To have a convenient term, I shall refer to the

pre-Chrysippan Stoics as 'early Stoics'. (3) I shall further argue that the theory of signs of the earlyStoics was a harvest not grown in the fields of Stoic philosophy, but that it originated from the'Dialecticians', a group of philosophers confused for a long time with the Megarians andrediscovered as a group in its own right by David Sedley. (4) I shall further try to point out somemodifications which this theory underwent as it was integrated into the epistemology of the earlyStoics. I shall not discuss the doctrine of signs advocated by the opponents of the Epicureans inPhilodemus' de Signis -- almost certainly Stoic philosophers -- a doctrine which has been ablydiscussed by David Sedley in a recent paper. (5)" pp. 83-84

(1) Cf. G. Verbeke, 'La philosophie du signe chez les Stoiciens', inLes Stoiciens et leur logique, ed.J. Brunschwig (Paris, 1978), 401-24; J. M. Rist, 'Zeno and the origins of stoic logic', ibid. 387-400;M. Baratin, 'Les origines stoiciennes de la thorie augustinienne du signe',Revue des Etudes

Latines, LIX (1981), 260-8; M. F. Bumyeat, 'The Origins of Non-deductive Inference', in Scienceand Speculation: Studies in Hellenistic Theory and Practice, ed J. Barnes et al. (Cambridge/Paris,

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1982), 193-238; D. Sedley, 'On Signs', ibid. 239-72; D. Glidden, 'Skeptic Semiotics',Phronesis, XX(1983), 213-55. For discussions in the older literature cf. R. Philippson,De Philodemi Libro qui est

peri semeion kai semeioseon et Epicureorum doctrina logica (Berlin, 1881); P. Natorp,Forschungen zur Geschichte des Erkenntnisproblems im Altertum (Berlin, 1884), 127 ff; W. Heintz,Studien zu Sextus Empiricus (Halle, 1932), 42-51; G. Preti, 'Sulla dottrina delsemeion nella logicastoica',Rivista Cntica di Storia della Filosofia, XI (1956), 5-14.(2) The only exception known to me is D. Sedley who wants to 'put into abeyance the widespread

belief that Stoic doctrine is under discussion by Sextus Empiricus throughoutMVIII. 141-298 andPHII. 97-133' (Sedley, above n. 1, 241).(3) The traditional division of Stoicism puts Chrysippus' Stoic predecessors together with his ownschool into the Old Stoa, separating it from middle Stoicism inaugurated by Panaetius. Thisclassification seems to be based on Stoic ethics, and understandably so. After all, it was their moral

philosophy which, beginning with Cicero, made the Stoics so immensely influential, and here theaffinity between Zeno and Chrysippus is clearly stronger than the one between Chrysippus andPanaetius. Yet in logic and epistemology, there is no similar relationship between Chrysippus andhis predecessors. Here the great break comes about with Chrysippus, and we should group Stoic

philosophers in this field accordingly.

(4) Cf. D. Sedley, 'Diodorus Cronus and Hellenistic Philosophy',Proceedings of the CambridgePhilological Society, CCIII, N S 23 (1977), 74- 120.(5) Cf. D. Sedley, above n 1.Ebert Theodor.Dialektiker und frhe Stoiker bei Sextus Empiricus. Untersuchungen zur Entstehungder Aussagenlogik. Gttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1991.Inhalt: Einleitung 13; I. Teil: Der Ursprung der stoischen Theorie des Zeichens. Erstes Kapitel: Diestoische Theorie des Zeichens bei Sextus Empiricus 29; Zweites Kapitel: Die stoische Theorie desZeichens vor dem Hintergrund der Berichte bei Diogenes Laertius 54; Drittes Kapitel: Dialektikerund frhe Stoiker zur Theorie des Zeichens 66; II. Teil: Die Dialektiker bei Sextus Empiricus.Viertes Kapitel: Die Dialektische Klassifikation der Aussagen bei Sextus Empiricus 83; Fnftes

Kapitel: Die Dialektische Klassifikation der Aussagen als Vorstufe der stoischen 108; SechstesKapitel: Die Dialektische und die stoische Klassifikation der Fehlschlsse bei Sextus Empiricus131; Siebtes Kapitel: Die Dialektiker ber Trugschlsse und ihre Auflsung 176; Anhang I zum II.Teil: Diodor und die 'Dialektiker' in AM 10.111 209; Anhang II zum II. Teil: Dialektiker undStoiker bei Apuleius 213; III. Teil: Der Ursprung der stoischen Theorie des Beweis. Achtes Kapitel:Der frhstoische Charakter der Theorie des Beweises bei Sextus Empiricus 219; Neuntes Kapitel:Ubereinstimmungen und Unterschiede in den Referaten des Sextus zur stoischen Beweistheorie unddas genetische Verhltnis ihrer Quellen 232; Zehntes Kapitel: Von den Dialektikern zu Chrysipp --der Weg einer Theorie in der Alten Stoa 287; Schlussbemerkung 303; Anhang: Texte aus SextusEmpiricus zu den Dialektikern und den Stoikern 311; Literaturverzeichnis 326; Register 337-346.

English translation of the first part in: The origin of the Stoic theory of signs in Sextus Empiricus(1987)

56.

Ebert Theodor. Dialecticians and Stoics on the classification of propositions. InDialektiker undStoiker. Zur Logik der Stoa und ihrer Vorlufer. Edited by Dring Klaus and Ebert Theodor.Stuttgart: Franz Steiner 1993. pp. 111-127

57.

Egli Urs, "Zur Stoischen Dialektik", 1967.Inauguraldissertation (Universitt Bern).Inhaltsverzeichnis: 1. Allgemeines zur Rekonstruktion der stoischen Dialektik 2; 2. Diokles beiDiogenes Laertios 7.49-82 8; 3. Quellengeschichtliche Nebenergebnisse zu Diogenes und Sextos59; 4. Nebenergebnisse zu Galens Einfhrung in die Logik 74; Zusammenfassung und Ausblick 87;Erklrung der wichstigsten Abkrzungen 106; Bibliographie 107-113.

58.

Egli Urs. The Stoic Theory of Arguments. InMeaning, use, and interpretation of language. Editedby Buerle Rainer, Schwarze Christoph, and von Stechow Arnim. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1983.

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pp. 79-96Contents: 1. Relevance of the topic; 2. Concepts involved; 2.1 Arguments; 2.2 Simple and logicalconcepts; 2.3 A hypothesis on Stoic deduction theory; 3. A commentary on Sextus' passage oninvalidity [Adv. Math. 8, 292-294]; 3.1 The context; 3.2 The passage; 4. Deductions; 5.Completeness; 6. Conclusion; Appendix: Possible existence of cut free systems; Bibliography."1. Relevance of the TopicThe Stoc theory of arguments to my mind illustrates one point: If certain ancient doctrines had

been properly understood, the corresponding modern theories would have been developed sooner.We would have had a propositional logic by 1800, we would have had a serious syntax long beforetransformational grammar. Stoics, in addition, had already something like a speech act theory. Inone or two cases modern theories have directly been elaborations of Stoico-Megariandevelopments: First, Prior's tense logic was influenced by reflections on Diodorus. Second, Kripke'ssemantics for modal logic was directly influenced by Prior's exposition of the theory of modality ofDiodorus Kronos. Compare his truth definition of modal statements with that of Kripke:

p is possible now iff p is true now or will be true later (Diodorus).p is possible in our world iff p is true in a world accessble from ours (Kripke).Kripke replaced points of time by possible worlds and the relation "to be now or later" by the

accessibility relation. It is not impossible that further study of Stoic theories will contribute in asimilar way to modern discussions.It has been proved by Lukasewcz and Mates that the Stoic theory of what they called syllogismscontained something we might call propositional logic in modern terms. Mates also brought up the

problem of deciding whether1) Stoics contended that their propositional logic was complete; and whether2) Stoic logic actually was complete according to modern criteria (Mates 1961, 81-82).As to the first question, the evidence that Mates adduces is not wholly conclusive, for the passagesare little more than consequences of the definition of syllogisms (= valid arguments): According tothis definition a syllogism is either a basic syllogism (anapodeiktos) or derived from basic

syllogisms by the deductive rules (themata) (DL 7.78). From this definition follows that everysyllogism (which is not basic) is derived from the basic ones -- the passages adduced by Mates say

just that. If it is not clear whether the Stoics actually held that their propositional logic wascomplete, Becker's attempt toprove the completeness of Stoic logic by reconstructing the missing

pieces of the deductive apparatus may seem futile. He has also been severely criticised by Mueller,Frede and others because it is not clear(a) whether the Stoic conditional sign ei is to be taken as a truth-functional connective or not,(b) how the Chrysippean exclusion of arguments with but one premise can be reconciled withBecker's full use of such arguments in his proofs of semantic completeness,(c) whether the completeness extended from the part of the system involving only conjunction and

negation to other connectives.I now want to reopen the question by arguing that a kind of completeness is indeed to be found inStoic passages (though not in those Mates adduced) and that an examination of the sources renderssome plausibility to the thesis that the Stoics had a system of deduction rules which can be provedadequate according to modern criteria.(Some material on the same matter is already contained in Egli 1967, 54 and Egli 1977 [Review ofFrede 1974. Gnomon 49, 1977, 784-790].)" pp. 789-80.Egli Urs. Neue Elemente im Bild der stoischen Logik. InDialektiker und Stoiker. Zur Logik derStoa und ihrer Vorlufer. Edited by Dring Klaus and Ebert Theodor. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner 1993.

pp. 129-139

60.

Evans John David Gemmill, "The Old Stoa and the Truth-Value of Oaths," Proceedings of theCambridge Philological Society 20: 44-47 (2011).

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