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Montenegro in Transition - Problems of Identity and Statehood

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Page 1: Montenegro in Transition - Problems of Identity and Statehood
Page 2: Montenegro in Transition - Problems of Identity and Statehood

Montenegro in Transition

Problems of Identity and Statehood

byFlorian Bieber (ed.)

Nomos VerlagsgesellschaftBaden-Baden

Page 3: Montenegro in Transition - Problems of Identity and Statehood

Die Deutsche Bibliothek – CIP-Einheitsaufnahme

Ein Titeldatensatz für diese Publikation ist beiDer Deutschen Bibliothek erhältlich. (http://www.ddb.de)

ISBN 3-8329-0072-1

1. Auflage 2003© Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 2003. Printed in Germany. Alle Rechte,auch die des Nachdrucks von Auszügen, der photomechanischen Wiedergabe und derÜbersetzung, vorbehalten. Gedruckt auf alterungsbeständigem Papier.

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved, whether the whole or part ofthe material is concerned, specifically those of translation, reprinting, re-use of illustra-tions, broadcasting, reproduction by photocopying machine or similar means, and stor-age in data banks. Under § 54 of the German Copyright Law where copies are made forother than private use a fee is payable to »Verwertungsgesellschaft Wort«, Munich.

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5

CONTENTS

Page

Preface

7

Florian Bieber Montenegrin politics since the disintegration of Yugoslavia 11

Beáta Huszka The dispute over Montenegrin independence 43

Wim van Meurs The Belgrade Agreement: Robust mediation between Serbia and Montenegro 63

Sr

đ

a Pavlovi

ć

Who are Montenegrins? Statehood, identity, and civic society 83

Š

erbo Rastoder A short review of the history of Montenegro 107

Dragan

Đurić

The economic development of Montenegro 139

Franti

š

ek

Š

ístek National minorities in Montenegro afterBohdana Dimitrovová the break-up of Yugoslavia 159

The authors 181

Bibliograph

y

183

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7

Florian Bieber

Preface

Montenegro has been a much-neglected part of the former Yugoslavia. Few books and ar-ticles, and only occasional media coverage, have marked this probably least-known re-public of the former Yugoslavia in the western perception.

1

Responsible for this has beenits small size (less than 700 000 people) and that Montenegro has been spared of war (theonly republic of former Yugoslavia to have avoided conflict). The current volume is notwritten in anticipation of conflict, but is rather aimed at filling an important gap in under-standing former Yugoslavia during the past decade.

It is exactly the absence of conflict in Montenegro which means that Montenegro meritsmore, rather than less, attention. One of the underlying threads of this book is the attemptto understand why Montenegro has been spared of the wars which devastated large partsof the former Yugoslavia. The answer is not simple. In the early 1990s, Montenegro sup-ported the Serbian government’s war aims in Croatia and Bosnia; it was thus an accom-plice (albeit partly unwilling) to the crimes committed in its western neighbours. At thesame time, a strong anti-war movement, which rejected the extreme Serbian nationalismof the early 1990s, also existed. Later, Montenegro broke with Serbia only shortly beforeSerbia became immersed in the Kosovo war, engaging in the large-scale expulsion of Al-banians and experiencing NATO bombing.

There is, however, more than a collection of ‘lucky’ circumstances to explain whyMontenegro has evaded war. Considerably better inter-ethnic relations have prevented anescalation of majority-minority relations, which would have been conducive to conflict orwar, as

Franti

š

ek

Š

ístek

and

Bohdana Dimitrovová

explain in their chapter on minorities.In addition, national homogenisation – the process in which the different nations offormer Yugoslavia were mobilised by the political elites to put ‘national interests’ beforeall other concerns – was only partially successful in Montenegro. Montenegro has seencompetition between two national identities during the past decade, reflecting an earlierdivision among the inhabitants of Montenegro as exemplified in

Š

erbo Rastoder

’s

surveyof Montenegrin history. The dispute between Serbian and Montenegrin national identitywas, essentially, a conflict over who Montenegrins are, a question posed by

Sr

đ

a Pav-lovi

ć

in his chapter on identity. This debate is far from being resolved and, as such, it hasconfronted the majority population with each other during the 1990s, rather than againstthe ‘other’, as happened elsewhere in former Yugoslavia.

The debates over identity were themselves deeply political in nature, shaping partychoices and informing the preference for the kind of state in which the citizens of Mon-tenegro wanted to live. The issue of independence and secession from Yugoslavia wascertain in the other republics of former Yugoslavia, at least among the dominant popula-tion group, but Montenegro was the exception. In the first half of the 1990s, a clear major-ity of Montenegrins supported a joint state with Serbia. Only in the second half of the pastdecade has public opinion begun to turn in favour of independence. Throughout this pe-

1 The Library of Congress and Amazon list only a handful of books published on Montenegrosince 1990. The same can be said for French or German language publications.

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Florian Bieber

8

riod, however, there has been no clear majority for either choice. Montenegrins are deeplydivided over which state will best represent their interests. In addition to identity, the de-bates over the Republic’s status have been considerably informed by economic considera-tions, as

Beáta Huszka

explores in her chapter on the dispute over Montenegrin independ-ence in recent times. In addition to the intra-Montenegrin debates over relations withSerbia, the process of redefining ties with Serbia have shaped Yugoslav and Montenegrinpolitics. The agreement reached in March 2002 through European Union mediation andpressure has put an end to ‘Yugoslavia’ and has established ‘Serbia and Montenegro’ as a(possibly) temporary solution. As

Wim van Meurs

explains, the Belgrade Agreement hasthe potential to transform relations between the two republics; at the same time, it mightalso be a mere stopgap before Montenegro achieves independence after the three-yearmoratorium contained in the Agreement.

The debates over Montenegro’s status have been the primary political issue for yearswhile not being the most important concern for most Montenegrins. A number of opinionpolls over the past few years have repeatedly shown that the economy and jobs are by farthe most important issues.

2

In fact, the ‘anti-bureaucratic revolution’ in 1988/9, whichbrought to power a new pro-Serb leadership, was motivated not only by nationalism butalso as much by economic concerns. As one of the less-developed and poorer republics ofYugoslavia, the precarious economic position of Montenegro has been a continuous issue.Milo

Đ

ukanovi

ć

sidelined the conservative forces within his ruling party in 1997 by en-gaging in the rhetoric of reform. In the process, some steps towards the transformation ofthe economy and society have been made. Nevertheless, as

Dragan

Đ

uri

ć

analyses in hischapter on the economic and social situation facing Montenegro, the reforms have ex-hausted themselves largely in rhetoric and have failed to bring about the desired improve-ment in citizens’ quality of life.

3

The elections of October 2002 signalled continuity with the sustained success of theDemocratic Party of Socialists – in power without interruption since the end of commu-nism – and the stable and nearly even division of Montenegrin society into the supportersand the opponents of independence.

More than ten years since the disintegration of Yugoslavia, Montenegro is both luckyand unfortunate. It is lucky because it has avoided war and has not seen inter-ethnic rela-tions poisoned by ethno-nationalist mobilization as elsewhere in former Yugoslavia. It isunfortunate because its economic and social situation leaves it in a precarious position,with not much chance for improvement in the short or the medium term, irrespective ofwhether Montenegro is independent or remains part of a union with Serbia. It is also un-fortunate because the political divide over status vis-à-vis Serbia has papered over other,more pragmatic, divisions in the political system, making reforms more difficult to ac-

2 See opinion polls by CEDEM, CfT and NDI. In March 2001, for example, during the elec-tion campaign and in the midst of bitter discussions on independence, 49% of those surveyedlisted the economy as the most important issue while only one-third mentioned the statusquestion. When combining first and second priorities, the distance increases to 87% to 52%.See NDI:

Economy is Most Important Issue for Prospective Voters in Montenegro,

Podgo-rica, 28.3.2001.

3 In 2002, over 80% live on the edge of subsistence while 20% live in poverty. See SenkoCabarkapa: ‘

Đ

ukanovi

ć

Seeks Another Chance’,

IWPR Balkan Crisis Report

17.10.2002.

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Preface

9

complish. In fact, this deadlock might have been both Montenegro’s reason for avoidingconflict and also its reason for the particularly difficult road towards democratisation andeconomic transition.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the editors of the

South-East Europe Review

, Peter Scherrer andCalvin Allen, for supporting this project and making possible this timely production.Thanks are also due to Ivana Prazi

ć

for translating into English the historical review by

Š

erbo Rastoder

.

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11

Florian Bieber

Montenegrin politics since the disintegration of Yugoslavia

Introduction

Montenegrin politics, unlike those of most of the other former Yugoslav republics, hasbeen a story of continuity throughout the 1990s. In the absence of war, Montenegro hasexperienced few radical breaks. The most important break was arguably the fall-out of Milo

Đukanović

with Slobodan Milo

šević

and Momir Bulatovi

ć

in 1997, whichushered in a period of political re-orientation towards the west and a democratisation ofpolitical life through the disintegration of the dominant Democratic Party of Socialists(

Demokratska partija socijalista

, DPS). This turning-point, as this chapter will argue, wasnevertheless embedded in a gradual process of continuous alienation between Montenegroand Serbia, beginning in 1991, and a reflection of the inner-Montenegrin divide over rela-tions with Serbia which informed the political agenda of the 1990s.

An examination of political developments in Montenegro is not only relevant becauseMontenegro has been largely neglected in comparison to that of the other successor states offormer Yugoslavia. That no war occurred in Montenegro, and that it remained as the onlyformer Yugoslav republic in a joint state with Serbia, have made Montenegro an exceptionworth examining more closely. The politics of identity informed political discourse in a sim-ilar fashion to the other countries of former Yugoslavia, but the debates of identity and state-hood pitted not majority against minority, but split the majority population in an unresolveddebate over Montenegrin national identity and the state in which to live.

This chapter will trace chronologically the evolution of key political developments, be-ginning with the ‘anti-bureaucratic revolution’, which brought the Communist era to anend, and closing with the creation of the (temporary) union of ‘Serbia and Montenegro’ in2002. This discussion is shaped by four threads:• the relationship between the government of Montenegro on the one side and of Serbia

and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the other• internal debates over Montenegrin identity and the relationship towards Serbia• the process of democratisation in a political system which has, to date, not seen a

change of government through elections• the role Montenegro played in the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, as well as the impact of

the war in Kosovo.

From one one-party rule to another: the ‘anti-bureaucratic revolution’

Montenegro under Communist rule was, together with Bosnia and Macedonia, one of theless developed republics. Its small size, approximately one-third of the next largest repub-lic, made Montenegro a particular case. Arguably, the Republic has been peripheral in post-war Yugoslavia and did not possess the same weight in inter-republican debates as, for ex-ample, did Croatia, Slovenia or Serbia. Caught in the ambiguities of Montenegrin identity,the Republic was both the ‘homeland’ of the Montenegrin people while, at the same time, asignificant share of Montenegrins identified themselves as Serbs.

1

The nationalist revivalof the late 1960s and early 1970s in Yugoslavia also affected Montenegro. In Montenegro,

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Florian Bieber

12

however, it expressed itself rather as Serbian nationalism

2

than as a distinct Montenegrinnationalism. This would find its explicit expression only considerably later.

Table 1 – Shifting population of Montenegro

Population Census (1981, 1991)

3

Yugoslavia developed into a decentralised federation during the 1960s and 1970s, andMontenegro participated in the debates over the redistribution of resources within Yugo-slavia together with the other lesser-developed republics which profited from the FederalFund for the Development of the Under-developed Republics (FARDUK, 1964-1990).

4

Montenegro’s participation in these discussions and the:

Recurring struggle over the redistribution of income necessitated an articulation and de-fense of a specific Montenegrin interest which in turn regularly reinforced a sense of a spe-cific Montenegrin identity.

5

The response to the earthquake in 1979, which devastated parts of the Montenegrin coast,including Kotor and Budva, is a case in point. Montenegro was excluded from the inter-re-publican debates over compensation. The final aid package was considerably smaller thanhoped for: Slovenia and Croatia had argued for more aid, while Serbia kept support to a min-imum. Given that Serbia was deemed responsible for the lower than expected quantity ofaid, it strengthened the more anti-Serb wing within the Montenegrin leadership.

6

1 On the issue of Montenegrin identity, see

Sr

đ

a Pavlovi

ć

: ‘Who are Montenegrins?’ this volume.2 Sabrina Petra Ramet:

Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia. 1962-1991,

2nd

Ed.(Bloomington, In.: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 116; Marko Andrijevich: ‘Politics inMontenegro’, in Sabrina Petra Ramet and L.S. Adamovich (eds.):

Beyond Yugoslavia: Politics,Economics and Culture in a Shattered Community

(Boulder, Co.: Westview, 1995), p. 210.

1981 1991

No. % No. %

Montenegrins

400 488 68.5 380 467 61.9

Muslims

78 080 13.4 89 614 14.6

Serbs

19 407 3.3 57 453 9.3

Albanians

37 735 6.5 40 415 6.6

Yugoslavs

31 243 5.3 26 159 4.3

Croats

6 904 1.2 6 244 1.0

Roma

1 471 0.3 3 282 0.5

Total

584 310 615 035

3 Source: Federal Statistical Office. The number of Roma is almost certainly higher than offi-cial numbers indicate.

4 Ramet:

Nationalism and Federalism

, pp. 150-158.5 John B. Allcock: ‘Montenegro’, in David Turnock and Francis W. Carter (eds.):

The Statesof Eastern Europe. South-Eastern Europe,

Vol. 2 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), p. 185.6 Ramet:

Nationalism and Federalism

, p. 160.

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Montenegrin politics since the disintegration of Yugoslavia

13

The most pressing problem of the Montenegrin leadership in the 1980s, however, hadbeen the economic crisis of the Republic. The Republic, together with Kosovo and Mace-donia, was forced to declare bankruptcy in 1987. At the time, it had only 40 000 workers,with 6 000 having lost their job during the economic crisis of the late 1980s.

7

It wasagainst this backdrop that the mass protests took place which eventually led Montenegroto join Serbia during the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

The Communist era came to an end as part of the so-called ‘anti-bureaucratic revolu-tions’ which were instigated by the new strong man of Serbia, Slobodan Milo

šević

. Aftertaking power in Serbia in 1987/8 in an internal coup against his mentor, Ivan Stamboli

ć

,he sought to extend his influence to the two autonomous provinces, Vojvodina and Kos-ovo, as well as Bosnia and Montenegro. Breaking with the previous rules of not conduct-ing intra-party conflicts in public, Milo

šević

used mass mobilisation in well-organisedprotests to put pressure on his opponents. This tool was not so much invented byMilo

šević

as represented the instrumentalisation of extra-party grievances and dissatisfac-tion which could have lead to protests, as occurred in the rest of central and eastern Eu-rope in autumn 1989.

Mobilisation for the protests was facilitated by the regime’s control of the media, aswell as the whole apparatus of the Serbian party and authorities, including party members,reserve offices and secret services.

8

Milovan

Đ

ilas assessed the protests accordingly:

Though there are aggressive groups in the Serbian movement, this is Communist nationalismand it is highly disciplined… We call them spontaneous. But it is partly organised spontaneity.

9

After the protests – in conjunction with an internal party coup – had succeeded in repla-cing the political leadership of Vojvodina in summer 1988 with new pro- Milo

šević

authori-ties, the demonstrations focused on Montenegro. Here, protests had taken place throughoutSummer 1988 with several tens of thousands of participants. A few days after the fall of theVojvodina leadership, the Montenegrin leadership drew on a massive police response tosuppress the protests. The use of the police led to harsh attacks not only by the Serbian lea-dership,

10

but also by Serbian intellectuals. The writer and leading nationalist intellectualDobrica

Ćosić

, for example, wrote a letter of protest to the Montenegrin leadership in thename of the Committee for the Defence of the Freedom of Thought and Expression: 11

We appeal to your civic consciousness and political responsibility, to which you are bound bylaw and your oath of office, to do everything in order to establish democratic relations and the

7 Branka Magaš: The Destruction of Yugoslavia, Tracking the Break-Up, 1980-92 (Verso:London/New York, 1993), p. 170.

8 Vreme 10.2.1992; Laura Silber and Allan Little: The Death of Yugoslavia (London: Penguin/BBC, 1995), p. 61.

9 Quoted from David Selbourne: Death of the Dark Hero, Eastern Europe 1987-1990 (Lon-don, 1991), p. 109.

10 Veljko Vujačić: Communism and Nationalism in Russia and Serbia, unpublished Ph.D. dis-sertation (Berkeley: University of California, 1995). p. 347.

11 The Committee originally protested against human rights violations in Yugoslavia but, in the cli-mate of nationalist mobilisation, focused increasingly on the ‘mistreatment’ of Serbs. A numberof its members were leading nationalist intellectuals, including Ćosić and Kosta Čavoški.

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Florian Bieber

14

rule of law in your republic, that you prevent any limitation on free democratic and patrioticthought and aspirations, that you prevent violence against citizens who are not satisfied withthe existing state of society and who are concerned about the future.12 (author’s emphasis)

The Montenegrin party leadership, however, rejected all criticism and won a vote ofconfidence in October 1988,13 although renewed protests on 11 and 12 January 1989spelled the coming of the end; the leadership resigned and was replaced by a new eliteloyal to Milošević.14

The ‘anti-bureaucratic revolution’ was driven by the nationalist mobilisation whichtook place in the late 1980s among Serbs.15 Without exploring in detail the reasons for theideology behind this mobilisation, it should be mentioned that the movement emerged as aresult of four factors:a. broad societal groups dissatisfied with the economic, social and political status quob. nationalist intellectualsc. ethnic entrepreneurs in the League of Communists of Serbiad. an institutional system in late communist Yugoslavia which was conducive to the pri-

macy of ethnicity.16

The concepts in the new Serbian nationalism were developed by Serbian intellectuals inthe 1970s and 1980s, gaining prominence with the publication of an (incomplete) memo-randum of the Serbian Academic of Arts and Sciences (Srpska akademija nauka i umet-nosti, SANU). This memorandum, echoing existing concepts, suggested that Serbs weredisadvantaged in Communist Yugoslavia. Focusing specifically on the supposed discrimi-nation against Serbs in Kosovo, leading to their mass-emigration, the memorandum as-serted that Serbs were also suffering in the other republics (and especially in Croatia). 17

The memorandum introduced two ideas into the Yugoslav discourse which were to remainan important aspect of Serbian nationalism during the 1990s. Firstly, Yugoslavia as it ex-isted was considered to be disadvantaging Serbs. Secondly, Serbs were portrayed as thevictims of other Yugoslav nations. The ideas formulated in the memorandum and propa-gated by a significant number of Serbian intellectuals, both in opposition and in pro-regimecircles and in key cultural institutions, fell on fertile ground as Kosovo had been on thepublic agenda in Serbia since the suppressed protests of Kosovo Albanians in 1981 de-

12 CADDY Bulletin 50 (1988).13 Tanjug 1.11.1988.14 The change first occurred in the Party; in March, the members of the Presidency changed, fol-

lowed by a new parliament, whose members were not elected from multi-party elections, in June1989. Bulatović and Đukanović rose to the top leadership of the League of Communists duringthis time, assuming the offices of President and Prime Minister after the 1990 elections. For a listof the new office holders, see Slobodan M. Dragović: Crnogorski Ustavi. Organizacija i sas-tav organa vlasti – poslanci i ministri – (od 1946. do 1998), (Podgorica: Službeni List Repub-like Crne Gore, 1999), pp. 165-72. On the whole ‘anti-bureaucratic revolution’ in Montenegro,see Veseljko Koprivica and Branko Vojičić: Prevrat '89 (Podgorica: LSCG, 1994).

15 Nationalist mobilisation took place simultaneously among Kosovo Albanians and was fol-lowed somewhat later in 1989/90 as regards Croats and Muslims/Bosniaks.

16 For more on this issue, see Florian Bieber: ‘Serbischer Nationalismus vom Tod Titos zumSturz Miloševićs’, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (Vienna: University of Vienna, 2001).

17 Kosta Mihailović and Vasilije Krestić: Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciencesand Arts. Answers to Criticisms (Beograd: Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995).

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Montenegrin politics since the disintegration of Yugoslavia

15

manding that Kosovo be recognised as a republic within Yugoslavia. The media and Ser-bian politics focused on Serbian emigration from the province and accused Albanians ofengaging in a deliberate and well-organised campaign against Kosovo Serbs. These unre-solved grievances coincided with Serbian and Yugoslav party elites being unable to over-come the deepening economic crisis and political vacuum after the death of Tito in 1980.

Against such a backdrop, Milošević rose to power on the promise to protect KosovoSerbs and to ‘correct’ the injustices of the Communist Yugoslav system. This nationalmovement, deliberately mobilised in the media, had only amorphous goals. The most im-mediate goal was a re-centralisation of Yugoslavia and the overthrow of republican andprovincial elites which were portrayed as anti-Serb.18 During the protests, the Montenegrinelite was likened to Vuk Branković, the mythological Serbian traitor at the Kosovo battle in1389, while a personality cult surrounding Milošević described him as a ‘saviour’.19

The protests in Montenegro, as elsewhere in Yugoslavia, did not rest on Serbian nation-alist demands alone, but also incorporated dissatisfaction with the economic and social de-velopment of the country.20 In 1987, Montenegro found itself in a severe economic crisis.Massive job cuts threatened the employment of many workers in large enterprises in theRepublic.21 The protests of 8 October 1988 began as protests of workers demanding animprovement in their job situation. During the course of the demonstrations, KosovoSerbs, who had been the backbone of the protests elsewhere in Yugoslavia that year,joined them. Branka Magaš has described how, in a matter of days, the demonstrationswere transformed. In the beginning, the protestors demanded bread and work; by the endof the same day, the message of the protests had already been transformed, praisingMilošević and branding the Montenegrin leadership as anti-Serb.22 The social unrestwhich was expressed here, as in the other Yugoslav republics and, a year later, elsewherein eastern Europe, had found a safety valve. Disappointment over the lack of reform,bankrupt companies, inflation and job losses found their outlet through nationalism. Theabsence of significant reform-oriented figures in the party leadership rendered more diffi-cult the emergence of an alternative to nationalist mobilisation. The party leadership ofMontenegro, as had been the case in Vojvodina, Bosnia, Macedonia and Kosovo, couldoffer no convincing programme of reform to counter the nationalist protests. Thus, as oneobserver noted on a demonstration Belgrade – which could equally apply to Montenegro –that the protesters ‘came as workers and went home as Serbs.’ 23

18 Nebojša Popov: ‘Le Populisme Serbe’, Les Temps Modernes Vol. 49 No. 573 (1994), pp. 22-63; ‘Le Populisme Serbe (suite)’, Les Temps Modernes Vol. 49 No. 574 (1994), pp. 22-84.

19 Ivan Čolović: Bordell der Krieger. Folklore, Krieg und Politik (Osnabrück: Fibre, 1994),pp. 11-26, 140.

20 Jens Reuter: ‘Inflation und sinkender Lebensstandard in Jugoslawien’, Südosteuropa Vol. 38No. 10 (1989), pp. 565-572.

21 In Montenegro in 1988, the average spending on food amounted to 55.1% of salary, whereasin Slovenia it was less than half this figure (26.9%). Wolfgang Oschlies: ‘Jugoslawien 1988 –Eine kurze Bestandaufnahme’, Südosteuropa Vol. 38 No. 1 (1989), p. 21.

22 Magaš: The Destruction of Yugoslavia, pp. 170-171.23 Jagoš Đuretić, quoted from Slavoljub Đukić: Između slave i anateme. Politička biografija

Slobodana Miloševića (Beograd: Filip Višnjić, 1994), p. 106. Ivan Čolović describes thistransformation on the basis of the slogans used by the demonstrators. Čolović: Bordell derKrieger, pp. 138-142.

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16

The first elections and the road to warIn the course of 1990, elections were held in all the republics of Yugoslavia. As the fed-eral state had, on all measures, ceased to function and no country-wide elections werescheduled, the conditions for these first multi-party elections varied greatly between therepublics: whereas they were relatively free in Slovenia and Croatia, they were called onlyreluctantly in Montenegro and Serbia. In Montenegro, the elections were dominated bythe League of Communists (Savez Komunista Crne Gore, SK CG) which, in Montenegro,alone among the republics, did not bother to rename itself prior to the elections. It also didnot adopt significant programme changes ahead of the elections, such as the endorsementof privatisation, as other successor parties to the League of Communists had done. 24

The Communist Party was able to secure an overwhelming victory unmatched elsewherein former Yugoslavia, winning over 50 per cent of the votes and two-thirds of the seats inparliament. The runner-up was the Yugoslav-wide United Reform Forces, founded by Yu-goslav Prime Minister Ante Marković as a political alternative to the nationalist parties andthe disintegrating League of Communists of Yugoslavia. The Marković alliance comprisedseveral liberal and social democratic movements and parties, thus presenting the only liberaldemocratic alternative to the regime. The third strongest party, the People’s Party ( NarodnaStranka, NS) would undergo numerous programme changes in the 1990s but, in the firstelections, represented an extreme Serb nationalist platform, advocating the unification ofboth republics as well as the creation of an expanded Serbian nation-state. As such, the partydisplayed some similarities with the Serbian Democratic Party in Croatia and in Bosnia,which sought to represent ‘Serb’ interests in these two republics. The Democratic Coalition(Demokratska koalicija, DK) comprised of an Albanian and a Muslim party, won approxi-mately 10 per cent of the vote, an electoral success which was not repeated in subsequentelections when the parties of the different minorities ran separately. 25

Table 2 – First free elections in Montenegro, 9 December 199026

The overwhelming victory of the League had three reasons: Firstly, the ‘anti-bureau-cratic revolution’ in the Republic had happened less than two years prior to the elections

24 Vladimir Goati: Izbori u SRJ od 1990 do 1998: volja građana ili izborna manipulacija(Beograd: CeSID, 1999), p. 36.

25 For more on this, see František Šístek and Bohdana Dimitrovová: ‘National Minorities inMontenegro after the Break-up of Yugoslavia’, this volume.

Party/Coalition

Number of votes Percentage Members in Parliament

Percentage

SK CG 171 316 56.16 83 66.4

SRSJ CG 41 346 13.56 17 13.6

NS 39 107 12.82 13 10.4

DK 30 760 10.08 12 9.6

Others 11 354 3.80 – –

26 Source: Vladimir Goati: Partije Srbije i Crne Gora u političkim borbama od 1990. do 2000.(Bar: Conteco, 2000), p. 260.

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Montenegrin politics since the disintegration of Yugoslavia

17

and the Serbian nationalist movement in Montenegro, represented by the new leadershipof SK CG, Momir Bulatović and Milo Đukanović, continued to be genuinely popularwithin the Republic, as was the case in Serbia in elections which took place at the sametime. Secondly, the Communist system, despite being discredited, was still more popularthan elsewhere.27 Thirdly, the conditions for the elections were hardly free and fair; infor-mation about the political alternatives were limited and – where available – usually aimedat discrediting the opposition. 28

In the presidential elections, which took place simultaneously, Momir Bulatović won inthe second round with 76.1% of the votes. In addition to the President, a four-memberpresidency was elected, comprising one member of the SK CG, two members of theUnited Reform Forces and one independent candidate. The presidency, which was laterabolished, was powerless; the President himself yielded even less power than the SerbianPresident. The influence of Bulatović derived mostly from his leadership of the League ofCommunists and support (and pressure) from Serbia.29

Despite the resounding victory of the SK CG, the low turnout (76%) and the high num-ber of abstentions (24.3%) point to some dissatisfaction and/or suspicion in the populationwhich did not translate into the electoral results.30

The SK CG, which renamed itself the Democratic Party of Socialists 31 after the elec-tions, pursued a double strategy. On the one side, it collaborated closely with the SocialistParty of Serbia (Socijalistička Partija Srbije, SPS) and followed the general line of theSerbian President; on the other, it sought to preserve some degree of Montenegrin sepa-rateness, resisting the call for unification with Serbia which had been put forward force-fully by some intellectuals and parties in the early 1990s. 32

Soon after the first elections, Montenegro found itself intrinsically involved in the warin Croatia.33 After Croatia had declared its independence in June 1991, the country slowlybegan sliding into war as a result of the escalating fighting between Serb paramilitaries,the Yugoslav army (Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija, JNA) and the nascent Croatian army.The aim of the JNA and the Serbian paramilitaries was to take control of parts of Croatiawhere Serbs lived (as minority or majority) and attach these to Serbia. The fighting thusfirst focused on Slavonia, Krajina, Lika and Kordun, far from the Montenegrin border. Inthis first phase of the war, Montenegro was only indirectly involved, as its soldiers contin-ued to be recruited to the army.34

27 See Lenard J. Cohen: Broken Bonds. The Disintegration of Yugoslavia (Boulder, Co: West-view, 1993), pp. 158-159.

28 Goati: Izbori u SRJ, pp. 34-40.29 ibid., pp. 48.30 ibid., pp. 29, 32.31 For a self-presentation of the Party, see www.dps.cg.yu.32 Ramet: Nationalism and Federalism, p. 212; Allcock: ‘Montenegro,’ p. 186.33 On this, see the statements of Nikola Samardžić, Montenegrin Minister of Foreign Affairs in

1991/2 as a witness during the Milošević trial at the ICTY. See ICTY: ‘Transcripts Milošević,Kosovo, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (IT-02-54)’, The Hague, 8.10.2002, available at:www.un.org/icty/ transe54/021008IT.htm.

34 Montenegrins were actually over-represented among army officers (6.2% compared to Mon-tenegro’s 2.5% share of the Yugoslav population). Balkan War Report, January 1993, p. 6.

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Montenegro, officially, did not support the war enthusiastically and withdrew its reser-vists in October 1991 from Croatia.35 At the same time, Montenegro also broke ranks withSerbia during one of the international efforts to end the war. An EC-sponsored peace con-ference for the former Yugoslavia in September-October 1991 in Geneva sought to securethe support of the former Yugoslav republics for the Carrington Plan. The plan, named af-ter the main European Community negotiator for Yugoslavia, foresaw an à la carte Yugo-slavia from which the Republics could choose their degree of sovereignty and their partic-ipation in joint Yugoslav institutions. Milošević opposed the plan as it would not reversethe declaration of independence of Croatia and allowed only for very limited central con-trol of the new state. Contrary to expectations, Momir Bulatović supported the plan afterreceiving the backing of the Montenegrin parliament.36 This policy shift came as a sur-prise and shock to Serbia, which had expect to receive Montenegro’s support. The simul-taneous demand of Bulatović to withdraw Montenegrin soldiers from the front in Croatialed to Borisav Jović, Serbian member of the Yugoslav presidency, exclaiming that ‘[t]hisis nothing short of treason.’37 The response of Milošević, reported by an EC diplomat dur-ing a coincidental meeting with the Serbian President in the toilet, was that, ‘ Bulatovićwill soon be dismissed of his functions…’38 Under pressure from nationalist politicians inMontenegro (and Serbia) and under attack from the Serbian leadership as supported by themedia, Bulatović eventually went back on his support.39 In the subsequent negotiations,the Montenegrin and Serbian delegation insisted that old Yugoslavia would continue toexist for those willing to partake of it, rather than endorse the creation of a new state, thusundermining the plan for a new confederation.40

The hesitation of the Montenegrin authorities stood in contrast to the enthusiastic par-ticipation of Montenegrin soldiers and reservists in the JNA campaign to conquer theKonavle region of Croatia. In October 1991, only a few Serbs lived in this area, whichstretched north from the Montenegrin border, but the Yugoslav army conquered most ofthe Croatian coast between Neum, the Bosnian outlet to the Adriatic, and the Montenegrinborder, while it also laid siege to Dubrovnik. The army quickly managed to take most ofthe smaller towns in the areas surrounding the old city, but the siege of Dubrovnik was amajor political defeat for the Yugoslav/Serb forces as the senseless shelling of the citydemonstrated the ruthlessness of the Serbian (and Montenegrin) leadership. In the area ad-jacent to the Montenegrin border, extending to Cavtat, a resort in the proximity of Du-brovnik, reservists who were largely Montenegrin engaged in a massive looting and pil-laging campaign which left most villages in the area completely destroyed. 41 Thecampaign was partly organised by the JNA in conjunction with officials in Montenegrowho sought to gain personally from it.42

35 Andrijevich: ‘Politics in Montenegro’, pp. 244-245.36 Vreme 28.10.1991.37 Borisav Jović: Poslednji Dani SFRJ (Kragujevac: Prizma, 1996), p. 402. Jović describes the

whole episode in detail, pp. 399-407.38 Henry Wynaendts: L’Engrenage. Chronique Yougoslaves, Juillet 1991-Août 1992 (Paris:

Denoël, 1993), p. 125. It is not without irony that it was Miloševićs opponent Đukanovićwho would accomplish this six years later.

39 Velizor Brajović: ‘Hard Lines in Montenegro’, Yugofax, 31.10.1991, p. 3; Vreme 4.11.1991.40 Silber and Little: The Death of Yugoslavia, pp. 213-216.

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Despite the ferocious campaign of the JNA in Konavle, the only serious point of con-tention for Montenegro with Croatia was the narrow Prevlaka peninsula. Prevlaka offi-cially belonged to Croatia, but its strategic position, overlooking the entrance to the BokaKotorska – the Bay of Kotor – meant that control of the peninsula would allow for controlover entrance into the bay, including the only remaining naval base of the Yugoslavarmy.43 In October 1992, a year after the beginning of the campaign, Yugoslav PresidentDobrica Ćosić and Croat President Franjo Tuđman reached an agreement on the with-drawal of JNA troops from the areas surrounding Dubrovnik and the demilitarisation ofPrevlaka under UN-supervision – until late 2002.44

The advent of war also further polarised divisions within Montenegro over Montene-grin identity and relations with Serbia. During the ‘anti-bureaucratic revolution’, the oldauthorities were branded as ‘anti-Serbian’ and ‘treacherous’. This discourse persistedthroughout the early 1990s, when the war in Croatia and Bosnia created a sharp contrastbetween the supporters of Serb nationalism, who mostly supported the war in its earlystage, and the supporters of Montenegrin nationalism, who opposed it. In these confronta-tions, the Serbian Orthodox Church played a particularly pronounced role due to the ex-treme nationalism of Amfilohije Radović, the Montenegrin archbishop of the Serbian Or-thodox Church.45

Debates during autumn 1991 over the future of Montenegro exemplified the lines ofconfrontation within the Republics politics. On the one side stood the Liberal Alliance ofMontenegro (Liberalni savez Crne Gore, LSCG), 46 which advocated Montenegrin inde-pendence and which accused its opponents of being:

41 ibid., pp. 201-204; Nikola Samardžić remarked during the Milošević trial that the campaignin Croatia, ‘…was an unjust war against Croatia, a war in which Montenegro disgraced itselfby putting itself in the service of the Yugoslav army and Slobodan Milošević, and this shamewill remain with us for perhaps another 100 years. Nothing more shameful has been done inMontenegro in its history for many hundreds of years’, ICTY: ‘Transcripts Milošević, TheHague, 8.10.2002, p. 1191, available at www.un.org/icty/transe54/021008IT.htm. SimilarlyĐukanović apologised in 2000 for the role played by Montenegro: ‘I wish to request forgive-ness from the citizens of the Republic of Croatia for all the suffering and material lossesinflicted during these tragic events by Montenegrins in the ranks of the Yugoslav Army.’‘Montenegro Asking Forgiveness From Croatia,’ New York Times 25.6.2000.

42 Seki Radonjić: ‘Four Million Marks – for the ‘Liberator’’, AIM 31.5.1994.43 Vreme 12.10.1992.44 Velizar Brajović: ‘Peace in Prevlaka: So Why War in Dubrovnik?’ Balkan War Report

October 1992, p. 2. UN observers remain on the peninsula in 2002. Earlier attempts at a set-tlement between Montenegro and Croatia have failed because of obstruction by the Yugo-slav authorities. An agreement signed in December 2002 ended the UN presence andforesaw the transformation of Prevlaka into a tourist resort. Beta, 11.12.2002.

45 Vreme 4.11.1991. See, for example: Jagnje božije i zvijer iz bezdana. Filosofija rata (Cetinje:Svetigora, 1996). This volume contains contributions by Radovan Karadžić, scholars and anumber of clerics, especially from Montenegro. It seeks primarily to justify the Serbian war inBosnia and provide for a general ‘philosophical’ opposition to the anti-war literature publishedin Yugoslavia. See Stjepan Gredelj: ‘Klerikalizam, etnofiletizam, antiekumenizam i (ne)tole-rancija’, Sociologija Vol. 41 No. 2 (April-June 1999), pp. 157-158.

46 For a self-presentation of the Party, see www.lscg.crnagora.com/index.htm.

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Against the separation of Montenegro from the Yugoslav chaos and madness. They are the onespushing us into the state whose very existence, framework and ethnic make-up are uncertain.47

The Alliance, founded in Cetinje – the historical capital of Montenegro – which also be-came the party’s stronghold, appealed to a separate Montenegrin identity and drew on thehistorical legacy of independent Montenegro. Unlike most other independence/nationalistmovements, however, it neither advocated the use of force, nor did it express hostility to-wards minorities. A strong theme in the rhetoric of the Alliance has been its critique ofSerbian nationalism, the participation of Montenegro in the war in Croatia and the SerbianOrthodox Church.48 In consequence, the party supported the re-establishment of the Mon-tenegrin Orthodox Church in 1993 (see below) as a means of reaffirming the autonomy ofMontenegro. Otherwise, its programme emphasised liberal economic and social policieswhich stood, however, in the background of the political debates during the 1990s. 49

The People’s Party stood at the other end of the political spectrum, advocating close tiesbetween Serbia and Montenegro, including at times even a merger of the two Republics.The Party, founded by Novak Kilibarda, accused Bulatović over his acceptance of theCarrington Plan and maintained close links with the Serbian Democratic Party (Srpskademokratska Stranka, SDS) in Croatia and Bosnia; later on it also established close linkswith the Democratic Party of Serbia (Demokratska stranka Srbije, DSS). The Party sup-ported some of the policies of the Milošević regime originally, but its anti-communiststance led it to keep a distance both from the DPS in Montenegro and from Milošević. Es-pecially in conjunction with the Serbian opposition in 1992/3 in DEPOS, which criticisedthe regime for its policies in Bosnia, the NS also managed to distance itself from its earlypledge of full support of the war. Throughout the 1990s, the People’s Party moved awayfrom the extreme Serbian nationalism which it had originally endorsed. It did, however,remain a party which appealed to a constituency who considered themselves to be Serbsand which continuously emphasised the Serbian identity of Montenegro. 50

The DPS sought to occupy a somewhat middle ground in Montenegrin politics. Mostlyaligning itself with Milošević (albeit with some hesitation), it nevertheless sought to safe-guard the separateness of Montenegro while, at the same time, vehemently opposed theLiberal Alliance’s claims for secession.51

The internal debates over the future of Montenegrin relations with Serbia remained un-resolved throughout the 1990s, a situation recalled at regular intervals in the light of theconflicts with the regime in Belgrade.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at war with Bosnia and itselfThe establishment of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1992 failed to bring the debateover Montenegro’s status to a close. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was a quick andsomewhat surprising creation of the Montenegrin and Serbian political elites who met in theMontenegrin mountain resort of Žabljak in April 1992. Discussions had taken place on the

47 Party President Slavko Perović, quoted from Vreme 30.12.1991. 48 ‘Programme of the Liberal Alliance of Montenegro’, Yugoslav Survey, No. 1 (1993), pp. 98-100.49 See Janusz Bugajski: Political Parties of Eastern Europe (Amronk, NY/London: M.E.

Sharpe, 2002), pp. 503-506.50 ibid., pp. 506-507.51 Vreme 30.12.1991.

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creation of a third Yugoslavia throughout early 1992, but the creation of FRY was unex-pected.52 During earlier debates, two options were most prominent: on the one side stood theoption of creating a looser union with Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia; at the other ex-treme was the creation of a union of ‘Serbian states’, which would have included the SerbianRepublic in Krajina (Republika Srpske Krajine, RSK) and in Bosnia (Republika Srpska,RS).53 Both options failed, for a variety of reasons, but Montenegro remained committed toa joint state with Serbia, as Momir Bulatović had declared in January 1992.54 A referendumin Montenegro, which took place on 1 March 1992, confirmed Montenegro’s commit-ment;55 some 95.4 per cent of the electorate supported the question asked in the referendum:‘Would you want a sovereign Montenegro to stay in the association with other Yugoslav re-publics who wish the same?’ The success of the referendum was somewhat diminished bythe relatively low turnout of 66.04 per cent, partly resulting from the call for a boycott bysome opposition parties and by the Albanian and Muslim communities. 56

The new Yugoslav Constitution was passed by the ‘remnants of the remnants’ 57 of the Fed-eral Chamber of the Assembly of Socialist Yugoslavia on 27 April 1992. The term of the dep-uties had already expired one year earlier, not to mention that they were ‘elected’ in 1986,well before the first free elections in 1990. Only the deputies from Montenegro and Serbiaparticipated – a mere 73 people were present (from a total of 100 deputies from Serbia andMontenegro), out of, altogether, 220 deputies previously elected to the parliament. Legally,the gathering did not reach the necessary quorum to constitute a session of the old Yugoslavparliament.58 The decision to create the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by deputies whoseterm expired and who had not been freely elected was meant to suggest continuity to the So-cialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ). These flaws at the birth were indicative, how-ever, of the weak foundations on which the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia rested. 59

52 On the debates and conflicts between Montenegro and Serbia surrounding the establishment ofFRY, see Esad Kočan: ‘Montenegro and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’, AIM 28.3.1996.

53 Neue Züricher Zeitung 13.2.1992; Neue Züricher Zeitung 6.1.1992. 54 Politika 11.1.1992.55 It should be noted, however, that, by that time, the term ‘Yugoslavia’ had already ceased to

be a meaningful concept. On the run up to the referendum, see Vreme 27.1.1992.56 Slobodanka Kovačević and Putnik Dajić: Hronologija Jugoslovenske Krize, 1942-1993

(Beograd: Institut za Evropske Studije, 1994), p. 52. In communes with a strong minority pop-ulation, such as Ulcinj and Rožaje, only 17.54% and 10.85% of eligible voters participated. Seethe website of the electoral commission at: www.izbori.cg.yu/retropektiva/re92.htm.

57 Slobodan Antonić: ‘Yugoslav Federalism: Functioning of the Federal and Republican Parlia-ments’, in Vladmir Goati (ed.): Elections to the Federal and Republican Parliaments ofYugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 1990-1996 (Berlin: Sigma, 1998), p. 53.

58 Monika Beckman-Petey: Der jugoslawische Föderalismus (Munich: Südost-Institut, Olden-bourg, 1990), pp. 142-143.

59 For a detailed analysis of the structural and legal problems of FRY, see Dejan Guzina: ‘Nation-alism in the Context of an Illiberal Multinational State: The Case of Serbia’, unpublished Ph.D.dissertation (Ottawa: Carleton University, 2000), pp. 180-192; Florian Bieber: ‘Delayed Tran-sition and the Multiple Legitimacy Crisis of Post-1992 Yugoslavia’, in Dimitris Keridis (ed.):New Approaches to Balkan Studies (Dulles, VA: Brassey, 2002); see also, from a nationalistperspective, Kosta Čavoški: Half a Century of Distorted Constitutionality in Yugoslavia(Beograd: Centre for Serbian Studies, 1997), p. 36.

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Subsequently, the first elections to the Chamber of Citizens 60 of the Federal Assemblyin May 1992 were boycotted by all the opposition parties in Serbia and Montenegro. Theonly three major parties which participated and which won mandates were the governingDPS, the Serbian Radical Party (Srpska radikalna stranka, SRS), which ran for the firsttime in elections in Serbia and Montenegro with the implicit support of the governing par-ties, and the League of Communists–Party for Yugoslavia (Savez kommunista–pokret zaJugoslaviju, SK-PJ), a neo-communist movement, closely associated with the army andMiloševićs wife, Mirjana Marković.61 The boycott lead to a similarly low turnout as inSerbia, with only 56.7 per cent of eligible voters participating. 62 Protests by the oppositionand an overall weak position of the authorities in both republics, especially in Serbia,forced new elections for the Federal Parliament in December 1992. These coincided inboth republics with early presidential and parliamentary elections.

Soon after the creation of the new federal state, relations between Serbia and Montenegrowere already deteriorating. 63 During the run-up to the December 1992 election, a serious fall-out – the most serious next to the final break in 1997/8 – occurred between the DemocraticParty of Socialists and the Socialist Party of Serbia. As a response to Bulatovićs initial sup-port for the Carrington Plan in October 1992, and due to his wavering support for the Serbianwar effort in Bosnia, the Socialist Party supported Brankov Kostić, his main contender duringthe Montenegrin presidential elections. At the same time, the DPS had supported the refor-mist Yugoslav government headed by Milan Panić,64 preventing its fall in the run-up to theelections by not supporting a motion of no confidence. Subsequently, Bulatovi ć and his Partyeven supported the candidacy of Panić against Milošević for the Serbian presidency.

The favourite of the Serbian Socialists, Branko Kostić, had been previously the Mon-tenegrin member of the last Yugoslav Presidency and he was a member of the DemocraticParty of Socialists. At the same time, he ran as a candidate of the Association of Warriorsfrom the 1991/92 war (Udruženja ratnika 1991/2), advocating a considerably more radi-cal pro-Serbian line and active support for the Serbian side in the Bosnian war. 65

In October 1992, the government passed a new constitution, reflecting the growing dis-tance from the Serbian regime. Unlike the Serbian Constitution, it contains no nationalistreferences, lists a number of minority rights (Art. 67-76) and institutes a president withlimited powers (Art. 86-90).66 This switch towards moderation was criticised by the oppo-

60 In the bicameral parliament, the other chamber (the Chamber of Nations) is elected by therespective republican parliaments.

61 In 1994, this Party merged with other similar splinter parties to form JUL. JUL gained con-siderable influence with the Serbian and Yugoslav authorities by being part of a coalitionwith SPS, although its public support remained low in Serbia and Montenegro. As it ranmostly alone in Montenegro, its low level of support was visible: it gained 1 668 votes in the1996 elections and 345 in 1998. See Goati: Izbori u SRJ, p. 187, 206.

62 ibid., pp. 59-6463 Velizar Brajović: ‘Divorce Proceedings’, Yugofax, 29.6.1992, p. 7.64 The support for Panić was surprising, as DPS had originally insisted that the Prime Minis-

ter’s position should be filled by a Montenegrin as the Presidency had been filled by DobricaĆosić, a Serb. Vreme 22.6.1992.

65 Goati: Izbori u SRJ, pp. 180-181.66 Constitution of Montenegro, 12.10.1992.

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sition as insincere. The President of the Social Democratic Party (Socijaldemokratska par-tija, SDP),67 Žarko Rakčević, commenting on DPS policy, remarked that ‘the ruling partyis acting as if we were for the war option a year ago, not them.’ 68

In the first round of the presidential elections, Novak Kilibarda, candidate of the Peo-ple’s Party, gathered 9.03 per cent of the vote, while Slavko Perović achieved the best re-sult ever for the Liberal Alliance by obtaining 18.33 per cent. Both were clearly beaten bythe two DPS candidates, Momir Bulatović (42.83%) and Branko Kostić (23.74%), con-firming not only the internal divisions of the party, but also its absolute dominance ofMontenegrin politics. In the second round of the elections, the Socialdemocrats and theLiberal Alliance supported Bulatović in light of the nationalist rhetoric of Kostić. Hence,Bulatović was able to win a resounding victory by gathering 63.29 percent of the vote inthe second round. The victory of Bulatović confirmed the limits of the influences of theSerbian regime on Montenegrin politics.69

Table 3 – Result of the Parliamentary elections, 20 December 199270

In the parliamentary elections, taking place simultaneously, the DPS managed to defendits dominance but failed to gain an absolute majority as it had in the 1990 elections. Theelectoral victory was, nevertheless, considerable, considering that in no-other post-com-munist country had the successor to the Communist Party managed to continue to governwith such a strong majority. As Vladimir Goati points out, not even in Serbia did the SPSmanage to garner similar support.71 In part, the success of the DPS was based on strong-arm tactics against the opposition parties, especially the Liberal Alliance. 72 The Liberal

67 For a self-presentation of the Party, see www.sdp.cg.yu.68 Vreme 19.10.1992. The Socialdemocrats pursued a similar line to the LSCG without the

same emphasis on independence.69 Goati: Izbori u SRJ, pp. 180-184.

Party Number of votes Percentage Members in Parliament

Percentage

DPS 125 578 43.78 46 54.0

NS 37 532 13.08 14 16.5

LSCG 35 564 12.40 13 45.3

SRS 22 265 7.76 8 9.4

SP CG 12 994 4.53 4 4.7

Others 52 906 18.40 – –

70 Source: ibid., pp.299-300. The results for the Federal elections held the same day werelargely similar, with the only notable exception being that the SRS fared better in the federalelections, gaining 11.5% of the vote, nearly equal to that of the NS and SP CG. The LiberalAlliance boycotted the federal elections; thus, most votes went to the SP instead who pur-sued largely similar policies, ibid., p. 292.

71 ibid., pp. 179.72 Velizar Brajović: ‘Rolling Logs Used to Suppress Opposition Politicians’, Balkan War

Report November/December 1992, 18-19.

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Alliance and the People’s Party were equal in strength to each other, compared to the1990 elections, but the main new party was the Serbian Radical Party, which had alreadygathered nearly eight per cent of the vote in the May federal elections. Its extreme Serbiannationalist position towards minorities and support for the war in Bosnia (includingthrough its own paramilitary units) was, at the time, supported by the Serbian authoritieswho relied on the Radicals for support in the Serbian and federal parliaments. 73

The disenchantment of the DPS with the Socialist Party in Serbia became visible whenthe DPS decided to form a grand coalition with the Socialdemocrats, the People’s Partyand the Liberal Alliance. This represented an attempt to stabilise itself after the protractedworsening of relations with the authorities in Belgrade, and given the threat posed by theSerbian Radical Party and the paramilitaries who were active in Montenegro, especially inthe northern areas where lived both the Bosniak-Muslim minority and a large number ofsupporters of Serb nationalism.74 The moderation of the authorities was partly connectedto the dire economic situation in Montenegro after the imposition of sanctions, 75 which af-fected Montenegro arguably more than they did Serbia, and the genuine unpopularity ofthe war in Bosnia, which affected Montenegro strongly as a result of the influx of Serbian(but also Bosniak) refugees from Herzegovina.76 The rift between Montenegro and Serbialasted nearly two years – from late 1991, following the failed Montenegrin support for theCarrington Plan and the refusal to send soldiers to fight in Croatia, until mid-1993. Duringthis period, some of the techniques employed by the Milošević regime following the com-plete break in relations between the two republics in 1998 were tried for the first time. Inresponse to a rapprochement with Albania, for example, the Serbian authorities stoppedsome trucks crossing the Montenegrin-Serbian border. The temporary embargo on Mon-tenegro was justified by a ban on the export of goods from Serbia, which were deemed‘strategic’ during times of crisis. In fact, the blockade created serious shortages in basicproducts in Montenegro, with the aim of putting the leadership under pressure. 77

Similarly, the Serbian authorities accused minorities in Montenegro of supporting se-cessionism, while the minorities themselves were under pressure from Serbian extremenationalist organisations, especially in the Sandžak region.78

The worsening of relations between the DPS and SPS was only temporary and was over-come with a change in policy by the Socialist Party. For similar reasons as the DPS morethan one year earlier in Montenegro, the Milošević regime in Serbia distanced itself from itsformer proxies in Bosnia and subsequently adopted a ‘peace policy’, advocating termination

73 Vreme 28.12.1992.74 Vreme 28.6.1993.75 The absence of tourists and the suspension of naval trade took especial toll. The decision of

the federal authorities to introduce visas for all countries who themselves required one wors-ened Serb-Montenegrin relations as it prevented even the small trickle of visitors that visitedMontenegro. Vreme 26.4.1993; Vreme 29.11.1993.

76 A darker chapter in Montenegrin politics during this period was the extradition of Muslim refu-gees from Bosnia to the authorities in Republika Srpska. A number of these refugees were sub-sequently killed or used in exchange for imprisoned Serbs. See Vreme 11.4.1994.

77 Vreme 13.9.1993.78 Velizar Brajović: ‘Belgrade Disciplines its Former Ally’, Balkan War Report August/Sep-

tember 1993, p. 25.

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of the war in Bosnia. Under the slogan ‘Mir nema alternativu’ (Peace has no alternative),SPS ended its alliance with the Radical Party and endorsed the Vance-Owen peace plan. TheParty emphasised the need for economic improvement and moderate reforms, 79 leading upto the reforms of the head of the central bank, Dragoslav Avramović, which put an end toYugoslav hyperinflation in early 1994.80

In Montenegro, the sanctions, as well as the pyramid schemes which had been set upwith the implicit consent of the Yugoslav authorities during the period of hyperinflation,led to the emergence of a new elite of nouveaux riches, closely tied to the ruling party andto organised crime.81 Prominent here was the ‘banker’ Jezdimir Vasiljević, who operatedone of the banks which promised two-digit monthly earnings on foreign currency hold-ings, who gained strong influence in Montenegro in 1992/93, allowing him to rent the lux-ury hotel resort Sveti Stefan.82 After the collapse of the schemes in March 1993, and theflight of Vasiljević into exile, his influence ended.

Reminiscent of later confrontations within the ruling Party of Democratic Socialists, thefollowers of President Momir Bulatović (including the current head of the Socialist Peo-ple’s Party Predrag Bulatović) accused the Prime Minister of enriching himself. At thetime, unlike in 1997, the president defended Đukanović as:

… A man who I want to honour because he and his government, in a typical, almost magical,way, did everything possible to ease the huge difficulties and prevent much greater povertywhich has been imposed by historic developments, the sanctions of the international commu-nity and the evil times we live in. The support I gave him, not just as President, but first of allas a man who thinks in a similar way and above all as a friend, was certainly not enough toease the huge burden he carried.83

The reasons for the policy shift in the case of Montenegro and Serbia were similar – theeffects of the sanctions and economic decline, as well as the declining popularity of the re-gime – the only difference was the one-year time-lag between the two republics. Similar tothe SPS in Serbia, Bulatović actively supported the Vance-Owen plan, but shied away fromconfronting nationalism in the country or the Party’s role in the conflict. The call for apeaceful end to the war was thus not matched by change in the underlying assumptionswhich had allowed it to take place. This development nevertheless facilitated a rapproche-ment between the two ruling parties. Within Montenegro, the Liberal Alliance and the So-

79 Zoran Đ. Slavujević: ‘The Issues: Dimensions of Electoral Confrontations’, in VladimirGoati (ed.): Elections to the Federal and Republican Parliaments of Yugoslavia (Serbia andMontenegro) 1990-1996 (Berlin: Sigma, 1998), pp. 101-102.

80 In January 1994, inflation reached the monthly rate of 313 563 558%, i.e. 2% per hour or62% per day. On hyperinflation and the regime’s responsibility, see Mlađan Dinkić:Ekonomija destrukcije (Beograd: Stubovi Kulture, 2000). In late 1993, Đukanović evenwant as far as justifying hyper-inflation: ‘We have chosen inflation on purpose. We areprinting money in order to provide for bare survival.’ Dragan Đurić: ‘How to Survive’,AIM, 20.12.1993.

81 Vreme 14.12.1994.82 Dinkić: Ekonomija destrukcije, pp. 167-171.83 Vreme 12.9.1994.

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cialdemocrats criticised the DPS for its inadequate transformation, marking the end of theMontenegrin ‘grand coalition’.84

The brief coalition episode illustrated the difference in the tools employed by the re-gimes in Montenegro and Serbia. SPS also formed coalitions, especially after the 1993elections with New Democracy, a moderate pro-western party, but it demonstrated lesswillingness to co-operate with the larger opposition parties. 85

In addition to the rapprochement of the policies of the ruling parties of Montenegro andSerbia, pressure from the dominant partner in the new Yugoslav federation played an im-portant role in pushing President Bulatović and the Democratic Party of Socialists towardscloser alliance with Serbia. Serbia sought to obstruct any rapprochement between Mon-tenegro and its neighbours, Croatia and Albania, or western countries (especially Italy).The pressure was exemplified by the expansion of the Yugoslav army presence in the Re-public and the abolition of the separate Montenegrin Ministry of Defence, as well as bytalk of merger between SPS and DPS, albeit that this was rejected by the DPS. 86

In between the end of the crisis between the two parties in 1993/4 and the conflict be-tween Đukanović and Milošević in 1997, relations between the governments of the tworepublics were generally cordial. At the same time, Montenegro maintained a distinct ap-proach and continued to criticise varying aspects of Serbia’s dominance in the Federa-tion,87 begging a journalist from the independent newspaper Naša Borba to ask: ‘Are theregimes in Serbia and Montenegro identical twins or just “simple ones”, which differ alsoin their character?’88

Juxtaposed to the ongoing variations in the relationship between the governments inBelgrade and Podgorica, the intra-Montenegrin dispute over relations with Serbia and Ser-bian identity remained potent. With the re-establishment of the Montenegrin OrthodoxChurch (MOC) in 1993, the debate gained an additional dimension. The Montenegrinchurch had been merged into the Serbian Orthodox Church in 1920 after Montenegro wasabsorbed into Yugoslavia. In Communist Yugoslavia, the Macedonian Orthodox Churchsplit from the Serbian Orthodox Church (with the encouragement of the Communist lead-ership), but this did not take place in Montenegro. In the early 1990s, however, the repre-sentatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) in Montenegro had become some of themost virulent advocates of Serbian nationalism while, at the same time, a movementemerged for the re-establishment of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church. In October 1993,the Montenegrin Orthodox Church was re-established with Bishop Antonije Abramovi ć atits helm.89 The church did not gain significant acceptance by the authorities, nor did itgain a noteworthy share of followers, but it did pose a challenge to the Serbian Orthodox

84 Vreme 10.5.1993; Vreme 20.9.1993.85 Some discussions between the SPS and the Democratic Party did, however, take place in

1993/4.86 Velizar Brajović: ‘The Last Days of Montenegro?’, Balkan War Report February 1994, p. 17;

Velizar Brajović: ‘The Iron Embrace of Belgrade’, War Report, July/August 1995, p. 12-13.87 The issues of contention ranged from the Serbian take-over of JAT to a different approach on

privatisation and the structure of the federal state. See Vreme 23.4.1996.88 Naša Borba 1-2.7.1995.89 See the self-presentation of the Church at: www.moc-cpc.org. For a presentation of the Ser-

bian Orthodox Metropolitanate of Montenegro and the Littoral, see www.mitropolija.cg.yu.

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Church.90 This arose mostly from the situation that two separate orthodox churches rarelyoperate on the same territory. Thus, any recognition of the Montenegrin Orthodox Churchwould simultaneously mean the end of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Montenegro. Fur-thermore, as the Montenegrin Orthodox Church laid claim to the properties of the SOC,which it had acquired in 1920 through the abolition of the Montenegrin church, the co-ex-istence of the two churches was difficult, if not inconceivable. 91 As a result, relations be-tween the churches and their followers have been tense, with clashes erupting frequentlyat parallel celebrations of Christmas.92

Of the political parties, the Liberal Alliance endorsed the re-establishment of the MOCand the SDP called for the church’s recognition during the 1990s, whereas the People’sParty and the pro-Serb wing of DPS (after 1998, the SNP) opposed recognition and sup-ported the claims to exclusivity of the Serbian Orthodox Church. Even after adopting apro-independence course, the Democratic Party of Socialists kept its distance from theMontenegrin Orthodox Church.93 From 1999, the government began carefully to adoptthe middle ground. In January 2000, the authorities allowed for the recognition of thechurch as one of the country’s religious communities. The position of the government re-garding the takeover by the Montenegrin Orthodox Church of churches controlled by theSerbian Orthodox Church has been more ambivalent. The Minister of Religion has con-demned such incidents but these were often helped or, at least, not hindered by the Mon-tenegrin police.94

During this period, the People’s Party moderated its position regarding Serbian nationa-lism, as exemplified by the following statement of Novak Kilibarda, the Party’s President:

The People's Party is constantly accused of being a Party which supports the idea of aGreater Serbia and wishes to incorporate Montenegro into Serbia. However, we haveproved that we are the most serious guardians of both the federal state and of Montenegro'sstatehood. Montenegro has to be equal in every respect with Serbia.95

Dayton and beyondThe end of the war in Bosnia had a profound impact on Montenegro and the Federal Re-public of Yugoslavia. On the one side, the Milošević regime presented itself as a success-ful peacemaker and succeeded in ending the sanctions. On the other, the peace effectivelyworked in the hands of the opposition – both within Serbia and in Montenegro.

The rapid improvement of relations between FRY and the west in late 1995 and early1996 was taken by the Montenegrin government of Milo Đukanović as an opportunity tobuild closer economic and political ties with western countries while loosening the federa-

90 Velizar Brajović: ‘Church Wars’, Balkan War Report, December 1993, p. 10.91 Veseljko Koprivica: ‘Bloodshed Threatening’, AIM 23.12.2002.92 Gordana Borović: ‘A Concert with the Patriarch and a General’, AIM 15.1.2001; Draško

Duranović: ‘Yule-Logs of Discord’, AIM 7.1.2002.93 Beta 8.1.1998.94 Free B92 25.12.2000.95 Interview with Kilibarda, Vreme 22.2.1993. The NS did, however, maintain its approach of

seeking to rehabilitate the Ćetnik movement in Montenegro and calling for ‘reconciliation’between Partizans and Četnici. Duško Vuković: ‘Widening of the Breach in the History ofthe Victors’, AIM 7.7.1994.

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tion with Serbia. This approach, to be pursued more vigorously in 1997, solicited consid-erable criticism on behalf of the Serbian authorities and, especially, the more conservativewing of the regime around the Yugoslav Left (Jugoslovenska Levica, JUL) andMiloševićs wife, Mirjana Marković.96

In Montenegrin domestic politics, the end of the war in Bosnia did not pass withouthaving an impact on the political scene. Mirroring the changes among the Serbian opposi-tion parties, the People’s Party tuned down its Serbian nationalist rhetoric and welcomedthe peace agreement in Bosnia. The Party, however, remained staunchly opposed to Mon-tenegrin independence as advocated by the other two major opposition parties, the SocialDemocratic Party – which took a gradualist approach, giving greater importance to politi-cal and economic reform – and the Liberal Alliance.97 This moderation made way for theestablishment of the coalition Narodna sloga (People’s Unity) between the Liberal Alli-ance and the People’s Party ahead of the parliamentary elections in November 1996. Asindicated by the coalition’s name, it sought to overcome (or postpone) the fundamentaldispute between ‘Greens’ and ‘Whites’, i.e. supporters of Montenegrin identity and propo-nents of Montenegro’s Serbdom, in order to oust DPS from power. The coalition wasjoined, however, neither by the Social Democratic Party nor by the parties of the nationalminorities, preventing the establishment of one united opposition block. 98 The dominanceof the DPS, furthermore, allowed it to change the electoral rules in its own favour, as ithad done in previous elections, and to conduct a lavish election campaign, beating the op-position in terms of money spent by a margin of 10:1.99

Table 4 – Results of the Parliamentary elections, 3 November 1996100

96 Velizar Brajović: ‘Moving West’, War Report November/December 1995, p. 15.97 Esad Kočan: ‘How Dayton Affected Montenegro’, AIM 28.11.1995.98 Draško Đuranović: ‘Unlikely Allies in Podgorica’, War Report September 1995, p. 14;

Draško Đuranović: ‘Bargaining to the Last Breath’, AIM 5.10.1995; Draško Đuranović:‘The Almost United Front’, War Report October 1996, p. 31.

99 Esad Kočan: ‘Joint Opposition List-The Only Weapon Against DPS Absolutism’, AIM29.6.1996; Draško Đuranović: ‘In the Shadow of Big Brother’, AIM 2.11.1996.

Party/Coalition Number of votes Percentage Members in Parliament

Percentage

DPS 150 237 51.2 45 63.4

Narodna Sloga 74 963 25.6 19 25.6

SDA 10 167 3.5 3 3.5

DS CG 5 289 1.8 2 2.8

DUA 3 849 1.3 2 2.8

Others 48 698 16.6 – –

100 Source: Goati: Izbori u SRJ, pp. 301. The results of the federal elections held the same daygave the DPS a similarly strong lead and, while the LSCG boycotted the elections, both theNS and the SDP together gained more votes than Narodna Sloga at the republican level(32.11% vs. 25.6%), ibid. p. 293.

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The results of the elections were, therefore, a resounding defeat of the opposition, withthe DPS gaining votes compared to earlier elections and defending its majority in parlia-ment. The NS-LSCG coalition actually gathered less support than the two parties hadgained individually in 1992, while the SDP failed to enter parliament altogether. 101 Theelections confirmed the overwhelming predominance of DPS, which continued to receiverelatively stable support. With the exception of the weakening of the Serbian nationalistSRS, the results of the elections throughout the first half of the 1990s expressed relativelystable support for all the different political parties.

The National Unity coalition alleged electoral fraud in Montenegro, but the lack of clearevidence failed to create mass mobilisation, in contrast to Serbia where the opposition coa-lition Zajedno succeeded in mobilising month-long street protests after the local elections,also taking place in November 1996, were forged in favour of the ruling coalition. The Ser-bian protests had a profound impact on the Montenegrin political scene and facilitated theconfrontation between Bulatović and Đukanović. During the early phases of the protests,the Montenegrin authorities prevented any detailed reporting and sought to suppress pro-tests in Montenegro itself by Narodna sloga, which was seeking to emulate the Serbiandemonstrations.102 With the continuation and the sheer size of the protests in Serbia, theDemocratic Party of Socialists changed its policy and allowed the state media to reportopenly from the Serbian demonstrations, including re-broadcasts of CNN. 103 In an apparentendorsement of the protesters claim, Svetozar Marović, Speaker of the Parliament, stated:

It all costs us tremendously, it conflicts FRY with the world again, postpones the return ofour country into international institutions and prevents prospects of the revival of our econ-omy and the creation of conditions for the normal life of our citizens. Nobody has the rightto do that. Not even the President of Serbia has the right to do that, but especially his wifewith the phantom organisation which has initiated so many problems in Serbia.104

Bulatović and Đukanović both called for the recognition of the election results, butthe attacks on SPS and JUL, initiated by Marović and Đukanović, marked a departurefrom previous disputes in which the Montenegrin DPS elite had refrained from openlyattacking the Serbian regime. As one journalist reported in January 1997, the break be-tween Đukanović and Bulatović over the protests became increasingly apparent:

Marović's and Đukanović's criticism of the authorities in Serbia (read: Milošević) is radical. Bu-latović's criticism sounds as if forced out and calculated to preserve the political mentor fromTolstoy Street [the residence of Milošević in Belgrade].105

101 ibid., pp. 185-187; Željko Ivanović: ‘Cleaning House’, AIM 6.11.1996.102 Arguably, only the failure of the Montenegrin protests permitted the regime to allow media to

report more openly about the demonstrations in Serbia. Esad Kočan: ‘Echo in the Valley ofTears’, AIM 1.12.1996.

103 Draško Đuranović: ‘Washing Hands’, AIM 11.12.1996.104 Darko Šuković: ‘Trio at the Turning-Point’, AIM 20.1.1997.105 ibid.

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The break with Serbia: democratisation without ‘regime change’Early on in the dispute within the Democratic Party of Socialists, the lines of division hadalready become apparent between Momir Bulatović on the one side and Svetozar Marovićand Milo Đukanović on the other, but the final split of the DPS would constitute a year-long process.

In an interview with the Belgrade weekly Vreme, Đukanović accused Milošević ofhaving become a ‘man with obsolete political beliefs’. 106 At the same time, he did not ad-vocate any greater sovereignty for Montenegro, nor did he support the Serbian oppositioncoalition Zajedno explicitly:

In the battle for power in Serbia, we did not support anyone, neither personally, nor as a po-litical party.107

This interview was the immediate cause of confrontation between Milošević andĐukanović. During a meeting of the DPS main board in March 1997, Bulatović sidedwith Milošević and demanded the dismissal of government members who had supporteda position similar to Đukanović. The Party’s board mostly supported Bulatović, leading toĐukanovićs resignation as Vice-President of DPS.108 The Prime Minister, however, re-fused to dismiss the Minister of Culture, the Deputy Prime Minister and the head of statesecurity as had been demanded; the only gesture was the dismissal of the head of the Mon-tenegrin trade representation in Washington and the publication of a conciliatory state-ment. The confrontation in its early stages seemed to put Bulatović, as head of the Partyand President of the Republic, in a stronger position, but the outcome was far from a fore-gone conclusion.109

The increasingly public nature of the dispute also involved non-party actors, with stu-dent organisations and intellectuals taking sides in the protracted conflict. 110 By April, theoriginal support for Bulatović had shrunk, with all three Vice-Presidents of the Party op-posing him. Following the failure to depose Đukanović from office, the Bulatović wing ofthe party made conciliatory gestures towards the Prime Minister, supporting his positionas Vice-President of DPS in the attempt to prevent him or Marović from running againstBulatović in the 1997 presidential election.111

The conflict soon re-erupted as Đukanović and Marović opposed Milošević’s attemptto increase the competences of the federal presidency ahead of his attempt to switch to thispost from the Serbian presidency, which he could no longer occupy after two terms of of-fice. The Đukanović faction within DPS was able to block changes to the federal constitu-tion, but it failed to prevent the election of Milošević to the Yugoslav presidency: at ameeting of the DPS board, 51 voted in favour of Miloševićs candidacy with 41 against. Ina rushed process, Milošević was subsequently elected by the Yugoslav parliament, withthe votes of the DPS deputies, to succeed Zoran Lilić.112

106 Vreme 22.2.1997.107 ibid.108 Nebojša Redžić: Đukanović Did Not Say His Last Word’, AIM 27.3.1997.109 Vreme 29.3.1997; Vreme 5.4.1997.110 Vreme 12.4.1997111 Vreme 17.5.1997.112 Robert Thomas: The Politics of Serbia in the 1990s (London: Hurst, 1999), pp. 336-9.

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The decisive election campaign for the Montenegrin presidency began shortly thereaf-ter, with Đukanović emerging as the DPS candidate. Bulatović called a separate partycongress in Kolašin with supporters mostly from northern Montenegro.113 Subsequently,the two rival wings of DPS separately nominated Bulatović and Đukanović for the elec-tion. The outcome of the October 1997 elections, unlike the previous presidential (andparliamentary) elections, was entirely open. The Đukanović wing of the DPS controlled16 municipalities, while Bulatović controlled only five, although he could also rely on thesupport of Serbia. Bulatović essentially advocated maintaining the status quo and warnedof any move towards secession. Đukanović, on the other hand, presented an electoralplatform of economic and political reforms, as well as closer ties with the west. He there-fore received support both from Serbian opposition parties and from Montenegrin opposi-tion and minority parties, who did not put forward their own candidates. Đukanović didnot advocate Montenegrin independence during the campaign but instead called for theestablishment of a functional institutional framework with Serbia and a higher degree ofautonomous decision-making in Montenegro.114

In the first round, Bulatović gained slightly more votes than Đukanović, only to bedefeated by a margin of approximately 5 000 votes – 50.79 per cent to 49.2 per cent – inthe second round.115 Bulatović accused Đukanović of electoral fraud, as he was able tocontrol the state media and the institutions carrying out the elections. 116 The interna-tional observation mission of the OSCE, however, generally found that the ‘final resultsreflect the will of the voters.’117 During the transition of the presidency from Bulatovićto Đukanović, demonstrations organised by the Bulatović faction of the DPS becameviolent and a major confrontation was only narrowly avoided. Directly aimed at pre-venting Đukanović from taking office, the incidents sought to destabilise the transitionand were the closest Montenegro has come to an armed clash in recent years. 118 The un-willingness to recognise Đukanović as President and the readiness of the supporters ofBulatović to start violent protests put an end to any possibility of reconciliation betweenthe two wings of the DPS.

As Vladimir Goati points out, for the second time in Montenegrin presidential electionsthe candidate supported by the SPS and the Belgrade authorities was defeated in Montene-gro. Whereas Bulatović was the candidate representing Montenegrin political autonomyin 1992 against Branko Kostić, Đukanović took his place in 1997.119

The split between Đukanović and Bulatović also put an end to the unprecedented dom-inance DPS had enjoyed in Montenegro during the first half of the 1990s. In March 1998,the Bulatović wing of the DPS renamed itself, thus abandoning its claim to the wholeParty, naming itself the Socialist People’s Party (Socijalistička narodna partija, SNP).120

113 Vreme 9.8.1997; Vreme 26.7.1997.114 See, for example, his interview in Vreme 27.10.1997.115 Goati: Izbori u SRJ, pp. 187-200. 116 Vreme 1.11.1997; Vreme 25.10.1997.117 OSCE/ODHIR: Republic of Montenegro. Presidential Election 5th and 18th October 1997.

Final Report, 1997, p. 5118 Vreme 24.1.1998.119 Goati: Izbori u SRJ, p. 182.120 For the self-presentation of the Party, see www.snp.cg.yu.

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In parliament, the DPS had lost 17 of its 45 seats, forcing it into a coalition with the Peo-ple’s Party and the two Albanian parties. This coalition accelerated the pluralisation of thepolitical scene in Montenegro and resulted in new elections on the insistence of the formeropposition parties.

Prior to the elections, the DPS formed a coalition, Da živimo bolje (For a better life),with the Social Democratic Party and the People’s Party. The five-point programme of thecoalition argued in favour of: (a) international links in the economy; (b) privatisation andeconomic reform; (c) rule of law; (d) democratisation; and (e) social justice and security.The Liberal Alliance supported a similar agenda but, as it placed greater emphasis on theRepublic’s independence and considered the DPS to be discredited, it did not join the pre-election coalition. The campaign of the SNP was mostly directed against the DPS-led coa-lition and emphasised the need to protect the union with Serbia. 121

Considering that the elections in May 1998 were, thematically, an extension of the 1997presidential elections, the reformist spectrum of Montenegrin politics gained considerablestrength. Da živimo bolje gained nearly one-half of the votes whereas the SNP gainedonly slightly more than one-third. One of the losers of the elections was the Liberal Alli-ance, which saw its support drop as DPS took over elements of its programme and as theharsh confrontation between SNP and DPS squeezed the smaller parties. Similarly, thesupport for minority parties declined as minorities overwhelmingly supported Da živimobolje.122

Table 5 – Results of the Parliamentary elections, 31 May 1998123

The Montenegrin elections confirmed the dominance of the Đukanović wingof the DPS, but Momir Bulatović was elected Prime Minister of Yugoslavia the same

121 Goati: Izbori u SRJ, pp. 202-203.122 ibid., pp. 204-206. The two main Albanian parties only entered parliament through a special

electoral regulation which reserved five seats in predominantly Albanian municipalities,freeing them effectively from the threshold and assured them one seat each with only one percent of the vote. This regulation has been criticised by the OSCE election observers but wasmaintained in subsequent elections (reduced to three seats in the October 2002 elections).OSCE/ODIHR: Republic of Montenegro (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia). ParliamentaryElections, 31 May 1998, 1998, pp. 5-6.

Party/Coalition Number of votes Percentage Members in Parliament

Percentage

Da æivimo bolje (DPS, NS, SDP)

170 080 49.5 42 53.8

SNP 123 957 36.1 29 37.2

LSCG 21 612 6.3 5 6.4

DS 5 425 1.5 1 1.2

DUA 3 529 1.0 1 1.2

123 Source: Goati: Izbori u SRJ, pp. 303.

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month by the Socialist Party and JUL, as well as six DPS deputies who had joined theSNP, ignoring that their mandates had been revoked by the Montenegrin parliament. 124

Between the inauguration of Đukanović as President and the fall of Milošević two anda half years later, in October 2000, tensions between Serbia and Montenegro steadily in-creased. In the light of the escalating conflict in Kosovo and the participation of the Ser-bian Radical Party in the Serbian government in early 1998, the Serbian authoritiesadopted an increasingly belligerent tone, using the considerable army presence in the Re-public to put pressure on the Montenegrin authorities. Simultaneously, the Đukanovićgovernment adopted an increasingly independence-minded policy, leading eventually tothe outright call for Montenegro’s secession from Serbia. Montenegro effectively endedmost economic ties with Serbia, including the adoption of the German Mark in 1999 as aparallel currency – and, in 2000, as an exclusive one (before switching to the Euro from2002). In 1999, Montenegro also unilaterally abolished visa requirements for foreign na-tionals.125 All these steps were met by the Serbian and Yugoslav authorities with thegreater isolation of Montenegro from the Serbian market, including the establishment ofcheckpoints at the border between the two republics – thus, in fact, re-affirming the sepa-ration of Montenegro.

The escalation of the war in neighbouring Kosovo proved to be a serious challenge toMontenegro. With the first threat of NATO air strikes against Serbia in October 1998, therepression of the Milošević regime against the independent media and the political oppo-sition increased, raising fears of a more forceful intervention in Montenegro. With the be-ginning of the NATO air strikes on Yugoslavia and the mass expulsion of Albanians fromKosovo, Montenegro became directly affected by the conflict. The NATO bombingsthemselves affected Montenegro only marginally, being aimed at sites of the Yugoslavarmy, but the fighting in Kosovo affected Montenegro directly through a considerable in-flow of refugees, adding to the number of refugees which had moved to Montenegro dur-ing the wars in Croatia and Bosnia. In the summer and autumn of 1998, some 50 000 Al-banians fled to Montenegro, although some of these returned following the ‘ceasefire’negotiated between Richard Holbrooke and Milošević in October 1998. By the end of theKosovo war in June 1999, some 80 000 Albanian refugees had fled to Montenegro,amounting to over 10 per cent of the population of the Republic. Most refugees were ac-commodated privately with Albanian families, but the sheer number involved placed aneconomic burden on Montenegro and, similar to Macedonia, affected the balance betweenthe nations living in Montenegro.126 Despite heightened tensions between the governmentand the Liberal Alliance on one side, and the army and the Socialist People’s Party on theother, no conflict erupted since the feared crackdown on Montenegro for its independentpolicy did not take place.127

At the end of the war and the effective ‘loss’ of Kosovo for the Yugoslav government, itwas evident that the effect of the conflict was three-fold. Firstly, the international isolationof Milošević, coupled with the indictment against him by the ICTY tribunal at The Hague,

124 ibid, pp. 209-210.125 See Beáta Huszka’s chapter on ‘The Dispute over Montenegrin Independence’, this volume.126 Monitor 28.5.1999.127 Srđan Darmanović: ‘Montenegro Survives the War’, East European Constitutional Review

Vol. 8 No. 3 (Summer 1999), pp. 66-67.

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indicated – unlike five years earlier during the war in Bosnia – that there was no return tointernational respectability for the Milošević regime. The split between Montenegro’s pro-western policies and Serbia was thus not reparable as long as the Serbian regime remainedin place. The loss of the war for Serbia, and the relatively unscathed state in which Mon-tenegro emerged from the conflict, seemed to confirm Đukanovićs policies. Secondly,the Kosovo war increased support in Montenegro for independence and strengthened theresolve of the Montenegrin government to pursue this option. For the first time, a narrowmajority supported Montenegrin independence in opinion polls, whereas the Federal Re-public of Yugoslavia declined considerably in popularity.128 Thirdly, Western countries,for the first time since the disintegration of Yugoslavia, sought actively to support politicalalternatives to Milošević within FRY, extending both financial and logistical aid to the re-gime’s opponents in Serbia itself and helping the Đukanović government. The Montene-grin authorities had already received western aid before the Kosovo war, but this increasedsubstantially at its end. In 2000 alone, the United States and the European Union gaveMontenegro direct aid amounting to over $90m.129

Within Montenegro, the war further deepened the divide between the pro- MiloševićSNP and the governing coalition on account of the increasing threats by the Serbian au-thorities against the Montenegrin government. In this climate, the Liberal Alliance with-drew its support for the Da živimo bolje coalition in the local councils of Podgorica andHerceg Novi in the attempt to benefit from the increased pro-independence sentiment inearly local elections. These, held in June 2000, turned into a national competition betweenthe opponents and the supporters of Montenegrin independence. The coalition Za Jugo-slaviju, consisting of the SNP, JUL, the Serbian People’s Party, the Serbian Radical Partyand some other minor parties ran against the DPS-SDP coalition. The result of the electionwas inconclusive, as the DPS-SDP increased their share of the vote in Podgorica, allowingthem to govern without the Liberal Alliance, whereas in Herceg Novi the SNP-led coali-tion won two seats, allowing it to govern in the town. Local issues, such as the lack ofpopularity of the DPS candidate in Herceg Novi, certainly shaped the outcome, but the re-sults indicated a country-wide stalemate between the two groupings. In Herceg Novi, thelarge number of Bosnian and Croatian Serbs who had acquired Yugoslav citizenship alsohelped facilitate the victory of the SNP coalition. The main loser in the elections was theLiberal Alliance, which was punished by the voters for having triggered them. 130

It was not until the fall of the Milošević regime following the electoral victory of the Ser-bian opposition in the federal presidential and parliamentary elections on 24 September2000 that the deadlock in Montenegro was broken and a political re-alignment occurred. In-ternal conflicts over the future status of Montenegro in Yugoslavia were juxtaposed withconflicting views on Milošević and the Serbian regime. This led, for example, to the partici-pation of the People’s Party in a DPS government despite its support for the continuation ofYugoslavia, which would have placed it closer to the SNP. Contrary to the expectations (andthe hopes) of many observers, the fall of Milošević thus resulted in the dispute on indepen-

128 Zoran Radulović: ‘Nobody believes in the Federation’ AIM 24.9.1999. 129 Anne Swardson: ‘Montenegro Seen As Beacon of Hope’, Washington Post 24.5.2000, p. A25.130 OSCE/ODIHR: Montenegro. Early Municipal Elections (Podgorica and Herceg Novi), 11

June 2000. Final Report, Warsaw, 18.8.2000.

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dence gaining in importance.131 At the same time, however, the supporters of Montenegrinindependence lost in Milošević one key reason for pursuing separation from Yugoslavia.

The intra-Montenegrin re-alignment was matched by a change in alliances between Ser-bia and Montenegro. After the break between DPS and SPS, the Serbian opposition de-veloped increasing contacts with Đukanović and, in particular, the Democratic Party(Demokratska Stranka, DS) of Zoran Đinđić sought closer co-operation with the DPS af-ter the worsening of the repression in Serbia.132 The DS did not support the DPS policy ofMontenegrin independence, but the links strengthened after Đinđić fled to Montenegroduring the Kosovo war in fear of repression by the Belgrade authorities. 133

Changes to the Yugoslav Constitution and the setting of Yugoslav presidential and par-liamentary elections for July 2000 nevertheless led to a worsening in relations between theSerbian opposition and the Montenegrin government.134 The Serbian opposition saw theelections as an opportunity to change the regime but Đukanović rejected participation onthe grounds that this would have legitimised the constitutional changes which drasticallyreduced the powers of Montenegro. Earlier, Đukanović had been considered as a possiblecandidate of a joint Yugoslav opposition. With his Party’s decision to boycott the elec-tions, as well as the choice of the nationalist Vojislav Koštunica as the presidential candi-date for the Serbian opposition, Đukanović fell out of favour with the Serbian opposition.

Despite the electoral success of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia ( Demokratskaopozicija Srbije, DOS), the coalition did not gain enough seats in the federal Parliament togovern alone. It was thus forced to enter a coalition with the SNP which, together with theSerbian People’s Party (Srpska narodna stranka, SNS),135 took all the Montenegrin seatsin a record low turnout of 28.2 per cent.136 Prior to the elections, there had been contactsbetween DOS and SNP in the attempt to isolate SPS.137 The coalition between SNP andDOS ushered in partial reforms within the Socialist People’s Party. The ‘Belgrade wing’of the Party surrounding Momir Bulatović138 was pushed out and a more moderate wingunder the leadership of Predrag Bulatović139 took over. The Party maintained its conser-vative-nationalist profile and continued to support firm union with Serbia, but at the same

131 Monitor 8.9.2000.132 Thomas: The Politics of Serbia in the 1990s, p. 380.133 Dejan Anastasijević: Out of Time. Drašković, Đinđić and the Serbian Opposition against

Milošević (Prague/London: Institute for War and Peace Reporting/Central Europe Review,2000), p. 143.

134 Blic 6.7.2000; Vreme 15.7.2000; Vreme 22.7.2000. An analysis of the constitutional amend-ments can be found in International Crisis Group: Current Legal Status of the FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and Serbia and Montenegro, 19.9.2000.

135 The SNS split off from the NS as the latter sought a more accommodating policy towardsĐukanović. Subsequently, the Serbian People’s Party has been pursuing a strict Serbiannationalist line, including occasional verbal attacks on minorities. For a self-presentationof the Party, see: www.sns.cg.yu.

136 Vladimir Goati: Elections in FRY. From 1990 to 1998. Addendum: Elections 2000 (Beograd:CeSID, 2001), pp. 240-241.

137 Monitor 25.8.2000.138 Bulatović subsequently founded the People’s Socialist Party (Narodna sočijalistička

stranka, NSS) which has been a marginal party, gaining merely 2.9% of the vote in the 2001elections.

139 Not related to Momir Bulatović.

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time ended (belatedly) its support for Milošević. In the course of the post-Milošević po-litical re-alignment in Montenegro, the People’s Party140 left the Đukanović coalition inearly 2001 after the coalition’s espousal of the independence cause. Alongside the SNS, itsided instead with the SNP.

Subsequent to the fall of Milošević, Montenegrin politics has thus seen the formation ofthree main groupings. Firstly, there is the Democratic Party of Socialists and the SocialDemocratic Party, both supporting independence, the former more hesitantly than the lat-ter. Secondly, the alliance of SNP, NS and SNS represents the main supporters of Yugo-slavia. This coalition has continuously accused the government of corruption and enrich-ment. Thirdly, the Liberal Alliance stands alone as a party. It supports the pro-independence policy of the government but remains deeply sceptical of the DemocraticParty of Socialists and the slow pace of reforms and of steps towards independence, onwhich issue the Liberals have repeatedly called for the holding of a referendum.

The departure of the People’s Party from the governing coalition led to early electionsin April 2001, the third set since 1992. The electoral campaign centred on the future of re-lations with Serbia after Milošević and on the accusations of corruption against the gov-ernment.141

The election results indicate the extremely polarised political scene in Montenegro,with the pro-independence parties gaining only a slight advantage over the pro-Yugoslavbloc. Failing to win an outright majority, the DPS-SDP coalition formed a minority gov-ernment with the support of the Liberal Alliance.

Table 6 – Results of the Parliamentary elections, 22 April 2001142

The DPS-led government after the 2001 elections thus lacked the necessary decisivestability in negotiations over the future status of Montenegro. Both the Social Democratsand the Liberal Alliance argued for a referendum to be held in 2001. The DPS supported

140 The NS also dismissed its President, Novak Kilibarda, who had been close to Đukanović.He had been the representative of the Montenegrin Trade Mission in Bosnia. His subsequentNational Unity Party (Narodna sloga) gathered only 0.1% of the vote in the 2001 elections.

141 International Crisis Group: Montenegro: Time to Decide. Pre-election Briefing, Podgorica/Brussels, 18.4.2001.

Party/Coalition Number of votes Percentage Members in Parliament

Percentage

Pobjeda je Crna Gora (DPS, SDP)

153 946 42.0 36 46.7

Zajedno za Jugosla-viju (SNP, NS, SNS)

148 513 40.6 33 42.9

LSCG 28 746 7.9 6 7.8

DUA 4 232 1.2 1 1.3

DS 3 570 1.0 1 1.3

142 OSCE/ODIHR: Republic of Montenegro. Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. ParliamentaryElection, 22 April 2001, Warsaw, 12.6.2001, p. 17.

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this in public but the narrow margin of support for independence in opinion polls, and theprotracted debates with the opposition over the technicalities of such a referendum, de-layed the calling of one. During the debates on the future shape of relations between Ser-bia and Montenegro, the coalition Zajedno za Jugoslaviju formulated a joint platform withthe governing parties in Serbia, making the negotiations effectively both internal and bi-lateral at one and the same time.

By autumn 2001, the negotiations process appeared to be moving towards a referendumin Montenegro as the result of several rounds of failed negotiations. With the forceful in-tervention of the European Union during winter 2001/2, however, the fortunes changed infavour of a joint state for which a variety of plans circulated throughout February andMarch 2002. Finally, on 14 March 2002, the Montenegrin, Serbian and Yugoslav govern-ments signed an Agreement on transforming Yugoslavia into a Union of Serbia and Mon-tenegro. Montenegro obliged itself not to carry out a referendum for at least three years,but the structure of the Union was largely left often to later negotiations. 143

Neither the Liberal Alliance nor the Social Democratic Party supported the Agreementand both complained of not having been involved in the negotiations. Shortly after thesigning of the Agreement, the minority government of Filip Vujanović lost the support ofthe Liberal Alliance and, at the same time, the ministers of the Social Democratic Party,including the minister of foreign affairs, Branko Lukovac, resigned. 144 The Agreement it-self nevertheless managed to muster sufficient support as the DPS and the pro-Yugoslavparties voted in favour.145

The resulting governmental crisis was accentuated by the inability of the leading partiesto form a new coalition. After the local elections in Montenegro in May, the Liberal Alli-ance formed coalitions at the local level with Zajedno za Jugoslaviju in the attempt to oustthe DPS from power in a number of communities. This local co-operation was then trans-ferred to the caretaker Parliament, which was confronted with a narrow alliance betweenLSCG and the pro-Yugoslav parties. This alliance, formed despite the large differences invirtually every political aspect, was established with the sole aim of ousting the DPS frompower. During spring and summer 2002, the alliance was able to change a number of lawson the media and elections, taking de facto control of the state media which had earlierbeen influenced by the Democratic Party of Socialists. 146

The October 2002 elections brought a degree of clarification and certainty into theMontenegrin political scene subsequent to the signing of the Belgrade Agreement. TheDPS managed to increase its share of the vote to a level approaching that of the 1998 elec-tion results, when its partner included, in addition to the Social Democrats, the People’sParty which had since joined the pro-Yugoslav bloc.

143 On this issue, see the chapter by Wim van Meurs on ‘The Belgrade Agreement: RobustMediation between Serbia and Montenegro’, this volume.

144 Darko Šuković: ‘New Round of Imbroglio’, AIM 21.4.2002.145 MNToday 10.4.2002.146 The new media regulations had to been amended after protests from the media (including a

news announcer who walked off air during the main news programme) and from interna-tional organisations that these allowed excessive government control over the media. BojicaBošković: ‘Political Crisis Ended?’, Balkan Reconstruction Report 16.9.2002.

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Table 7 – Results of the Parliamentary elections, 20 October 2002147

In addition to an effectively small degree of general change, the 2002 Montenegrinelections signalled the support of the majority of voters for a careful path towards greaterautonomy: the Liberal Alliance lost much of its support, mostly due to its curious alliancewith the pro-Yugoslav SNP, NS and SNS. As a continuation of earlier themes, the elec-tions were largely fought over the issue of future relations with Serbia. Concerns over cor-ruption played a prominent role in the campaign, but failed to translate into votes for theopposition.148 In the aftermath of the elections and in preparation for the (failed) presiden-tial elections in December 2002, Đukanović surprisingly switched his presidential officewith the position of prime minister. Filip Vujanović, the former prime minister, was to re-place him as president. The presidential elections on 22 December 2002, however, faileddue to low turnout, after the Coalition “Together for Change” and the Liberal Alliancecalled for a boycott and now major opposition party put up candidates. 149 Despite theoverwhelming victory of Filip Vujanović with approximately 84 % of the vote, the DPSappeared considerably less victorious than in October 2002 and the polarization of theparty system gained ground.150

ConclusionsIn examining the Montenegrin political scene in recent years, major differences with politi-cal life in the other Yugoslav successor republics can be detected. Despite significant politi-cal shifts and phases of considerable instability, political alignments have remained surpris-ingly stable throughout the 1990s. The pro-Serbian bloc, represented by Branko Kostić in1992, Momir Bulatović in 1997/8 and by the SNP-led coalition since 2000, has consistentlygathered between one-third and just less than one-half of the votes. The political parties and

Party/Coalition Percentage Members in Par-liament

Percentage

Demokratska lista za evropsku Crnu Goru (DPS, SDP)

47.7 39 52.0

Zajedno za promene (SNP, NS, SNS) 37.8 30 40.0

LSCG 5.7 4 5.3

Patriotska koalicija za Jugoslaviju (SRS, NSS, JUL)

2.7 –

Demokratska koalicija – albanci zajedno (DUA, DS)

2.5 2 2.7

147 Source: www.cesid.org.yu; www.cemi.cg.yu.148 See Cemi: Monitoring medija na izborima 2002, Podgorica, October 2002, available at.

www.cemi.cg.yu.149 Similar to the Serbian presidential elections, Montenegrin presidential elections require a

turnout of 50 % to be valid. This caused presidential elections in Serbia to fail once in 1997and twice in 2002.

150 See James Palmer: ‘Montenegro poll invalid after just 46% turn out to vote,’ The Independ-ent 23.12.2002; www.cesid.org.yu.

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candidates running for an autonomous, yet not necessarily independent, Montenegro usuallygather 40-50 per cent of the vote while outright independence parties and groupings succeedin gathering around one-tenth of the vote. The radical Serb nationalist position of the Yugo-slav bloc subsided throughout the 1990s while the parties in favour of greater Montenegrinsovereignty inched towards outright independence, but the overall stability of the Mon-tenegrin scene has been particularly noteworthy.

Within this political system, the dominance of the Democratic Party of Socialists has beenremarkable. The DPS is the only party in former Yugoslavia, and across all of the Balkansfor that matter, which has managed to maintain power throughout the transition period. TheParty has undergone several transformations, first during the ‘anti-bureaucratic revolution’and again after the break with Milošević, but it has remained structurally similar through-out. Due to its uninterrupted rule, it furthermore remains closely intertwined with the admin-istration. This particularity begs the question as to whether Montenegro can be considered tobe a fully-fledged democracy, considering that a change in government is one of its definingcriteria. We can consider Montenegro as a classic case of a hybrid regime in the post-Com-munist era: not yet qualifying as a liberal democracy, it nevertheless does not constitute anauthoritarian system. Generally, we can distinguish the period between 1990 and 1997 fromthe subsequent period. In 1990-1997, regular elections were held, which may have lackedsome criteria in judging them as free and fair but which, nevertheless, allowed for meaning-ful competition. It was the control of resources and the media which maintained the domi-nance of the DPS. According to Larry Diamond’s recent conceptualisation of hybrid re-gimes, Montenegro during this period would have qualified as a competitive authoritariansystem, wherein elections took place but the dominance of one party was secured throughthe manipulation of the electoral process and via other institutional and extra-institutionalmeans. The split of the DPS in 1997/8 marked a transformation to a system oscillating be-tween an ‘ambiguous’ regime151 and an electoral democracy. Here, the fairness of electionsis more respected and the instruments of control over the democratic process diminished. 152

In addition to these considerations on the political system, two explanations of the under-lying divisions in the political spectrum on the issue of independence need to examined: thehistorical and geographical divide of Montenegro; and the role of the tribe ( pleme).

Firstly, common discourse on the division between pro-Serb and pro-independence sup-porters has identified a divide between the north and the south of the country, or between ‘oldMontenegro’ and the territories which became part of Montenegro only during the course ofthe 20th century. This divide is further reinforced by the differences in economic developmentand geographical location. The coastal regions have been economically better off, largely as aresult of tourism, than the northern areas which are relatively remote. Additionally, the prox-imity to Serbia has, naturally, led to more intense contacts than elsewhere in Montenegro.

This explanation remains relevant, but the division over Montenegrin independence ismuch less geographically concentrated than is usually perceived. As the results of the localelections in 2002 highlight (see Table 8), pro-independence parties have generally been

151 The ambiguousness in the case of Montenegro derives from two features: (a) the system stillhad not seen a change of government; and (b) the regime was in transition and, since 1997/8,no stable or permanent regime has emerged.

152 Larry Diamond: ‘Thinking about Hybrid Regimes’, Journal of Democracy Vol. 13 No. 2(April 2002), pp. 21-36.

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strong on the coast and in the historical heartland of Montenegro (Cetinje), whereas pro-Yu-goslav parties gained most local authorities in northern Montenegro, but the margin of vic-tory is, in a number of cases, narrow.

Table 8 – Results of the local elections, 15 May 2002153

The historical divide, although indicative, has been offset by two factors. Firstly, as mostminorities have generally supported the DPS and other pro-independence parties, this has re-duced support for pro-Yugoslav forces in the Sandžak region where Bosniaks and Albanianslive. Secondly, the large number of Serbian refugees from Croatia and Bosnia (Herceg-Novi), or Serbs from Serbia (Budva), living in some of the coastal cities has diminished thesupport for pro-independence parties. Irrespective of these two trends, the results of the 2002

Pro-independence Votes Pro-Yugoslav Votes

Coast & Old Montenegro

Bar 55.8 33.7

Budva 49.8 46.2

Cetinje 88.4 9.0

Herceg-Novi (2000) 48.8 49.7

Kotor 53.8 42.8

Tivat 55.4 38.3

Ulcinj 26.1 12.2

Central Montenegro

Danilovgrad 52.8 42.2

Nikšić 43.8 52.9

Podgorica (2000) 57.2 34.9

Northern Montenegro

Andrijevica 31.8 66.7

Berane 47.0 49.9

Bijelo Polje 57.3 38.6

Kolašin 41.4 54.8

Mojkovac 45.8 51.2

Plav 53.5 20.1

Pljevlja 39.3 58.3

Plužine 25.3 67.1

Rožaje 69.1 5.0

Šavnik 46.2 52.7

Žabljak 41.2 57.9

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local elections, along with other results, indicate that the division over the status of Montene-gro runs across the country and across its cities and towns.

Similarly to the historical divide, the role of tribal affiliations has been often been con-sidered worthy as an explanation for political divisions in Montenegro. Affiliation withtribes, i.e. groups of extended relatives, has persisted longer in Montenegro than in otherparts of south-eastern Europe, largely due to its geographical specificities. By the 1950s,however, the central government had marginalised the tribes as a threat to the authority ofthe state, especially in such a semi-totalitarian system as was Communist Yugoslavia. 154

Karl Kaser has pointed out that the clan-structures in south-eastern Europe have been re-placed in the post-communist era with clientelistic networks. These have some structuralsimilarities but they do not constitute continuity with the earlier tribal system. 155

In the 1990s, the tribal origins of political figures did not play a significant role in se-curing political allegiances among the electoral constituencies. 156 In as far as tribal affilia-tions still mattered in some parts of Montenegro, they had become largely de-politicised.Since 1999, the Socialist People’s Party has attempted to mobilise traditional tribal affilia-tions against the Montenegrin government. In a number of tribal meetings, organised bythe SNP and the Serbian Orthodox Church, the assembled participants have expressedtheir support for union with Serbia and have threatened the use of force in case the gov-ernment took steps to secede from Yugoslavia:

By seceding from Serbia, Montenegro would not just trample on its ancestral guidingthoughts, deny its pledges, humiliate the dead and desecrate holy relicts, but it would alsothreaten itself and its survival.157

Despite these people’s assemblies not being well attended, the threat of the use of force,coupled with the high degree of private ownership of weapons, presented a threat in theperiod of political uncertainty between the end of the Kosovo war and the fall of

153 The figures include DPS, SDP and LSCG on the side of the pro-independence parties andSNP, SNS, NS, NSS & SRS as the pro-Yugoslav parties. Smaller parties and ethnic minorityparties, which made significant gains only in Ulcinj, Rožaje and Plav, have been excluded.This essential division has not been reflected in the subsequent local governments, as theextremist coalition of SRS and NSS has been excluded from local power, whereas the SNP,NS and SNS have formed coalitions with LSCG in a number of areas. Note that the electionsresults for Podgorica and Herceg-Novi are for the local elections held on 11.6.2000. Sources:Centar za Slobodne Izbore i Demokratiju: Oko izbora 8: Izveštaj sa lokalnih izbora zaodbornika 19 skupština opština Crne Gore (15. maja 2000. godine), Belgrade, May 2002;OSCE/ODIHR: Montenegro. Early Municipal Elections (Podgorica and Herceg Novi), 11June 2000. Final Report, Warsaw, 18.8.2000.

154 Christopher Boehm: Montenegrin Social Organisation and Values: Political Ethnography ofa Refugee Area Tribal Adaptation (New York: AMS Press, 1983).

155 Karl Kaser: Freundschaft und Feindschaft auf dem Balkan (Klagenfurt: Wieser, 2001),pp. 88-89.

156 Steven C. Calhoun, in an article on tribes in Montenegro today, examines tribal affiliationsin contemporary Montenegro (from the angle of US military policy), while over-stating theimportance of tribal membership in the political choices of their members. See Steven C.Calhoun: ‘Montenegro’s Tribal Legacy,’ Military Review (July-August 2000), pp. 32-40.

157 SRNA 26.11.2001.

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Milošević.158 The well-known Montenegrin university professor Milan Popović com-ments that these tribal gatherings are a:

Grotesque mixture of pre-modern historical forms (tribal gatherings) and quiet modern po-litical contents (party political life).159

Altogether, the attempts to revitalise the tribes for political ends has been only partlysuccessful; the SNP has continued to draw participants to these folkloristic gatherings, butthey have failed to develop them into mass movements which would underline the Party’spolitical agenda.160

Montenegrin politics has, throughout the past decade, differed in one more aspect fromthe other post-Yugoslav states: despite the high number of minorities, amounting to at leastone-quarter of its population, political discourse along ethno-nationalist lines has been con-siderably less significant than elsewhere. Furthermore, minority parties have been consider-ably less successful in gathering the near-exclusive support enjoyed by their counterpartselsewhere in former Yugoslavia. Instead, minorities have voted for, and have been repre-sented in, a number of mainstream parties, especially the DPS, SDP and LSCG. 161 Amongthe leading parties, nationalism has played a role in the political discourse, especially in theearly 1990s, but, after 1993, attacks on minorities have been rare and the main targets of Ser-bian nationalist parties have been the pro-independence parties rather than minorities. 162 Theintra-Montenegrin dispute over identity and relations with Serbia have together overshad-owed the ethnification of politics common to other post-Yugoslav states.

The different dynamics of minority-majority relations in Montenegro is indicative of thecurious role of national identity and nationalism in Montenegro. Excluding minorities, thereare in fact two nationalisms among the majority populations: Serbian and Montenegrin na-tionalism. The former was particularly virulent in the early 1990s, but the latter grew stead-ily throughout the decade. Montenegrin nationalism has been exceptional, as its proponents(foremost the Liberal Alliance) have linked it explicitly with tolerance and inter-ethnic co-existence. Even the traditional myth-making linked the pre-Yugoslav independent state witha policy of tolerance towards minorities. At the same time, Montenegrin nationalism is stillnot clearly delimited and has not become a broad mass movement, as have other national-isms in former Yugoslavia. Possessing nevertheless a considerable history, it is still verymuch a national identity in the making, the success of which will both determine and be de-termined by the eventual status of Montenegro.

158 Zoran Radulović: ‘”People's Assemblies” In Montenegro’, AIM 12.9.1999.159 As Milan Popović points out, these meetings ‘almost exclusively consisted of the members

of the SNP… The author of this article [Popović], for example, is a member of the Kuči tribebut he has never been invited to and allowed to participate in the gatherings of this newly-established SNP-Kuči community.’ Milan Popović: Montenegrin Mirror. Polity in Turmoil(1991-2001) (Podgorica: Nansen Dialogue Centre, 2002), p. 22.

160 Jean-Arnault Dérens: ‘Im Banne der Vergangenheit’, Die Wochenzeitung 30.5.2002.161 See the chapter by František Šístek and Bohdana Dimitrovová: ‘National Minorities in Mon-

tenegro after the Break-up of Yugoslavia’, this volume.162 There have been some exceptions. Especially in 2001, pro-Yugoslav parties have attacked

minorities either for supposed terrorist activities or for deciding the future status of Montene-gro. See Florian Bieber: ‘The Instrumentalisation of Minorities in the Montenegrin Disputeover Independence,’ ECMI Brief 8 (March 2002).

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Beáta Huszka

The dispute over Montenegrin independence

IntroductionFollowing the coming to power of the democratic regime in Yugoslavia, the most pressingissue – apart possibly from the ongoing unresolved status of Kosovo – has become the sta-tus of Montenegro within (or outside) the federation. The significance of the Montenegrinquestion lies not only in that it will determine the existence of Yugoslavia itself, but itsoutcome may also threaten the fragile stability of the Balkans. Montenegro gaining inde-pendence may possibly endanger the Dayton Peace Accords for Bosnia-Herzegovina andfurther destabilise Kosovo and Macedonia, and, therefore, western leaders have not beenin favour of it.

Not only were international reactions to Montenegrin separatism not particularly wel-coming, but the citizens of Montenegro have also been deeply divided about the repub-lic’s relations with Serbia. This division is rooted in the undefined nature of Montenegrinidentity as related to its Serbian counterpart; both are Orthodox Christian and speak thesame language. Certainly, the boundaries between Serbian and Montenegrin identity arerather fluid, with the people of the republic being unable to agree where they want to be-long: about one-half of its citizens wants independence while the other half would main-tain a joint state with Serbia.1

The question of independence (re-)appeared on the political agenda under Milo šević,when Montenegro stepped on the road towards independence, characterised by a rapid de-crease in the functional, institutional and economic links between the two republics. 2 Aspart of this process, budgetary transfers between Podgorica and Belgrade ceased in 1998and Montenegro started to pursue an independent economic and fiscal policy. Podgoricahas also managed to obtain substantial financial support from the United States and theEU,3 and was considered a success story compared to Serbia. Montenegrin rhetoricstressed a pro-western orientation, free market reform, protection of minority rights andadherence to the rule of law. Advocates of independence emphasised that Montenegrin in-dependence would not be nationalist for it would be based on the principles of democracy,pluralism, multi-ethnicity and international co-operation.4 On the whole, the main argu-ment for independence amongst the Montenegrin leadership during the Milo šević era wasSerbia’s own lack of democracy. After this obstacle had been removed, however, the aspi-rations for independence remained.

Conflict between Serbia and Montenegro concerning the issue of Montenegrin inde-pendence manifested itself primarily as a debate over the constitutional arrangement of

1 United States Institute of Peace (USIP): Serbia and Montenegro. Reintegration, divorce orsomething else? Special Report, Washington, 2.4.2001.

2 Applying a western currency and putting trade barriers on Serbian imports can be mentionedamong the measures that were applied.

3 USIP, op. cit.4 Testimony of Janusz Bugajski, Center for Strategic and International Studies: Promoting and

Protecting Democracy in Montenegro, Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe,Washington, 1.2.2000.

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the federation. However, the debate on the constitutional situation is only one aspect ofthe conflict, which involves many more other factors through which Montenegrin aspira-tions for independence have been expressed and which have directly or indirectly contrib-uted to the escalation of the crisis, such as competing elite interests, the interference of theinternational community and also economic considerations. These different aspects areclosely linked with each other – reflected in that the key issue over which the politicalelite has become divided is the question of status5 – and, as a result of elite rivalries, pub-lic opinion has started to transform. A change in public opinion in favour of independencewas an indirect outcome of the constitutional debate and a direct outcome of the elite’scampaign; however, after these pro-independence dynamics started in Montenegrin soci-ety, they could not be sidetracked, which is one explanation why the aspirations for inde-pendence did not reduce after October 2000. Despite some increase in support for inde-pendence, there has not been a dramatic shift in public opinion in recent years. Theinternational community also played a crucial role in the course of events; without itshelp, Montenegro probably would not have been successful in its attempt to increase itsautonomy to the extent of de facto independence.

This chapter will investigate why Montenegro’s unique case does not fit into the ethno-national paradigm. Unlike in other cases of former Yugoslavia, the recent and ongoing as-pirations for independence have not been driven solely (or even primarily) by nationalisticaspirations or identity considerations, but rather by various interests. The chapter will out-line the debate over independence among the political elite of Montenegro and betweenthe political elite of the republics, with the aim of pinpointing the main arguments beingput forward on the pro- and anti-independence sides. By shedding light on the differentdynamics and processes of Montenegrin politics, the various interests behind a particularpolitical position on the status question can be detected. The second half of this chapterconcentrates on the economic aspects of the independence issue for two reasons. First ofall, economic considerations played a crucial role in placing Montenegrin independenceon the political agenda – and then keeping it there. Secondly, politicians have tended touse economic arguments to support their particular position; it is, therefore, useful to ex-amine these arguments and to try to assess their validity.

The struggles of the elite and public attitude towards independenceThe political leadership of Montenegro had been a loyal partner of Milo šević as far as1997. Up to that point, the government and president had made only a few attempts to ex-press opposition to the policies of the Serbian and the Yugoslav authorities. Those amongthe political elite of Montenegro who held a different opinion to the ‘mainstream’ ex-com-munists, as represented by Đukanović and Bulatović, had already left the government bythe beginning of the nineties.6 It should be pointed out, however, that not only had the po-

5 Since 1998, the Democratic Party of Socialists (Demokratska partija socijalista, DPS), theSocial Democratic Party (Socijaldemokratska partija, SDP) and the Liberal Alliance ofMontenegro (Liberalni savez Crne Gore, LSCG) have been the ones pushing for independ-ence; in contrast, the People's Party (Narodna stranka, NS), the Socialist People’s Party(Socijalistička narodna partija, SNP) and the Serbian People’s Party (Srpska narodnastranka, SNS), which form the principal opposition to Đukanović's government, have beenurging the re-establishment of closer links with Serbia.

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litical elite been fairly united regarding both Montenegro’s part in the federation and Ser-bia, but also that the majority of the public supported the preservation of the Yugoslavfederation in its existing form up until the late 1990s. According to surveys, 7 until 1999 atwo-thirds majority of the Montenegrin public considered the federation to be the best so-lution for both Serbia and Montenegro, and these included a majority of DPS members.This attitude towards the federation was in line with public opinion on Milo šević, themost popular politician in Montenegro until the mid-nineties and who enjoyed evenstronger support there than in Serbia.8 It should be noted, however, that support in the1990s for the federation rarely focused on the abstract political system but signified ratheran endorsement of close alignment with Serbia, including an endorsement of the politicsof Milošević.

The changing dynamics among the elite and the public of Montenegro have been a re-sponse to outside circumstances – such as Serbian disregard of the federal constitution,economic decline and the devastating international image of Yugoslavia – but these dy-namics did contribute to the amplification of ambitions for independence in Montenegro.The emergence of these dynamics will be explored to identify the specific interests whichmight be held responsible for keeping the status issue on the agenda today. The elite, nat-urally, played a crucial role in turning public opinion in favour of independence, therebystarting certain dynamics that could not simply be deflected or shut down after the demo-cratic changes which took place in Serbia. Interestingly, elite debates in Montenegro, andalso between Montenegro and Serbia, had arrived at a consensus in November 2001, ac-cording to which the constitutional crisis should have been resolved by the holding of areferendum in Montenegro, thereby allowing for the option of Montenegrin independ-ence.9 It could be argued that, if the constitutional decision had been left to the elites of thetwo republics, and had the EU not interfered, the likely outcome would have been a refer-endum in Montenegro and the separation of the two republics. 10

Public opinion and political disputes over independenceIn the wake of the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1996, most sanctions were lifted fromFRY although an ‘outer wall’ was left in place preventing Yugoslavia from gaining accessto the international financial institutions.11 By 1996, the economy had been devastated bythe hyperinflation of the early 1990s, high unemployment and a sinking standard of living,

6 Montenegrin communists, renamed the Democratic Party of Socialists, retained power inelections in 1991. The more anti-Milošević wing of the party resigned from the governmentat the beginning of 1990. European Stability Initiative (ESI): Autonomy, Dependency, Secu-rity: The Montenegrin Dilemma, Podgorica, 4.8.2000, p. 3.

7 ‘Public Opinion on the Relations of Serbia and Montenegro’, Yugoslav Survey No. 1 (2001),p. 42.

8 ibid.9 International Crisis Group (ICG): Still Buying Time: Montenegro, Serbia and the European

Union, Brussels, 7.5.2002, p. 5.10 ibid., p. 6.11 The ‘outer wall’ was preserved to keep up pressure on the Yugoslav government regarding

its policies in Kosovo and was also due to the insistence of Yugoslavia that it acted as thesole successor to the previous socialist Yugoslavia.

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thus placing an enormous amount of pressure on the political elite. 12 These circumstancescreated the room (and the necessity) for Milo Đukanović, Prime Minister of Montenegroat the time, to break with the political regime in Belgrade. This was further facilitated bythe change in the Serbian political climate which took place in 1997: in the winter of1996/97, mass demonstrations took place in Serbia to compel Milo šević to acknowledgethe result of the local elections, according to which the opposition came into power inmany cities throughout Serbia, including the biggest ones: Belgrade; Novi Sad; and Ni š.13

These two factors, the disastrous economic situation and the political events of 1997,made Đukanović’s success possible; however, it seemed at first that he would lose politi-cal power as had everyone else who had turned against Milošević.

Đukanović expressed his break with the regime in Belgrade through an interview deliv-ered to the independent Belgrade weekly Vreme in February 1997:

It would be completely wrong for Slobodan Milošević to remain in any place in the political lifeof Yugoslavia. … Milošević is a man of obsolete political ideas, lacking the ability to form astrategic vision of the problems this country is facing, surrounded by unsuitable individuals whoare following the time-tested method of many authoritarian regimes.14

Gradually, a majority emerged in his support in the party: firstly, the municipal DPSparty committees in Cetinje and Nikšić proposed his re-election as party vice-president;and then, in July 1997, the DPS main board appointed him as the party’s candidate for thepresidential election. Of the whole government, only one minister stayed loyal to Presi-dent Momir Bulatović; as a result, Bulatović was forced out of the DPS, subsequently tocreate his own party, the Socialist People’s Party.15

The presidential elections of 1997 confirmed that Đukanović had succeeded in winningthe favour not only of the majority of his own party but also of that of the public. He ranfor the presidency with a rhetoric emphasising a pro-western orientation, free market re-form, the rule of law and minority rights, and managed to win – albeit very narrowly, with50.8 per cent of the votes – in the second round. This reflected the very strong division ofthe country and the split of the population into two opposing camps of almost equal size.The northern municipalities of Andrijevica, Plužine and Pljevlja were (and still are) thestrongest supporters of the SNP, while Đukanović enjoyed strongest support in the areasinhabited by Muslims in Rožaje (92 per cent) and Albanians in Ulcinj (85 per cent), aswell as in the historical heartland of Montenegro, such as Cetinje (84 per cent). 16 The ma-jor issue along which the two camps were divided was the status of the republic: one campopting for an independent Montenegro; the other for sustaining the federation with Serbia.

Since 1997, Đukanović began increasingly to distance Montenegro from Belgrade, al-though without expressing open aspirations for independence. Until 1999, those in favourof independence within DPS did not surpass the number of those favouring a common

12 ESI (2000), op. cit., p. 4.13 ibid.14 Interview with Milo Đukanović, Vreme 22.2.1997, quoted in ibid.15 ibid. He has since been sidelined in the SNP and has founded the marginal People’s Socialist

Party of Montenegro (Narodna Socijalistička Stranka, NSS).16 ibid.

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state while, among the public, the absolute majority would still have supported the federa-tion. Until 1999, two-thirds of the population supported a common state and only after1999 did this number fall to a simple majority. Interestingly, this balance radically tippedin 2001, after the victory of democratic forces in Serbia, when those wanting independ-ence outnumbered their opponents. By that time, three-quarters of DPS voters were al-ready supporting separation.17

Citizens of Montenegro are polarised on the question of independence according bothto nationality and their party preferences. Generally speaking, Serbs would not support in-dependence or a confederal arrangement of the two republics, together with about one-half of Montenegrins;18 these two groups constitute the supporters of the ‘Together forYugoslavia’ coalition which consists of the SNP, the NS and the SNS. On the other side,minorities – Albanians, Croats and Bosniaks-Muslims – and the other half of Mon-tenegrins together make up the electoral basis of the ‘Victory for Montenegro’ 19 coalitionand the Liberal Alliance.20

Based on an opinion poll conducted by the Centre for Political Studies of the Institute ofSocial Science, if a referendum had been held in March 2001, 55 per cent of voters wouldhave opted for independence and 45 per cent for the preservation of the federation, 21 ifthey had to choose between these two options.22 The question arises as to why the major-ity favours independence from Serbia; more precisely, what do people expect to gain fromseparation? This is an especially crucial question, since public support for independenceincreased after the democratic changes came about in Serbia. Furthermore, it is worth not-ing that the more educated and wealthier strata have generally been more optimistic re-garding the consequences of separation from Serbia, while the less educated and poorercitizens have expressed greater pessimism.23

Obviously, people have different expectations from a ‘divorce’ and, in order to shedlight on what considerations might stand behind the existing secessionist aspirations, it isworth mentioning the findings of some surveys. According to the above-mentioned poll, arelative majority of Montenegrins expect from independence from Serbia faster economicdevelopment, an improvement in their overall political situation, a more advantageous in-ternational position, the strengthening of their democratic development, greater interna-tional assistance to Montenegro and faster accession to the EU. 24 Based upon the resultsof another poll conducted by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) in April 2001, re-

17 Yugoslav Survey, op. cit., p. 43.18 We are referring here to national identity rather than citizenship.19 This is a coalition of the DPS and SDP formed before the elections of 2001. In 1998, the

DPS formed a coalition with the SDP and the NS, which was called ’For a Better Life’. See‘Pre-term elections in Montenegro, 22 April 2001’, Yugoslav Survey No. 2 (2001), p. 15.

20 ‘Public Opinion’, p. 41.21 This survey was conducted by the Centre for Political Studies of the Institute of Social Sci-

ence in the period 24-31 March 2001, entitled Relations of Serbia and Montenegro – Spring2001. See Public Opinion’.

22 When considering other options in addition, support for the two options appears in fact lesspolarised, with considerable support for an intermediate solution.

23 ‘Public Opinion’, p. 44.24 ibid.

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spondents noted most frequently an improvement in tourism and EU integration if Mon-tenegro became an independent state.25

Naturally, political parties have played a crucial role in the gradual transformation ofpublic opinion by presenting arguments which support their position on the status ques-tion. It can be noted in general that arguments which refer to identity and historical rea-sons are overly dominant. Pro-federation parties usually pose the question of why the tworepublics should separate since Montenegrins and Serbians belong to the same nation, asevidenced by having the same language, religion and history. 26 On the other hand, advo-cates of Montenegrin independence point to Montenegro having always been a distinct,separate country, illegally incorporated into Yugoslavia against its will as a result of Ser-bian manipulation.27

Besides the historical identity arguments, other considerations which are frequentlyheard relate to the economic situation of Montenegro and the real or supposed agenda ofthe pro- and anti-independence advocates. A representative of the supporters of Yugosla-via, Dragan Koprivica, Vice-President of the SNP and a staunch defender of close tieswith Serbia, explains his party’s pro-federation position – besides emphasising the com-mon identity and history with Serbia – by drawing an unpleasant picture about the currentpro-independence government. He argues that Đukanović is, in reality, not so much inter-ested in Montenegrin independence but rather in gaining unlimited power. To strengthenhis opinion, he points out how Đukanović used to be a great supporter of Yugoslavia, af-ter which he transformed himself into the greatest promoter of independence. Further-more, he notes that Đukanović practises unlimited control over the media, the economyand other spheres of public life. In Koprivica’s opinion, Montenegro’s economy is basedon smuggling and corruption, which provides the government with considerable gains.This is also why, besides the oft-claimed argument of regional stability, the internationalcommunity – together with the SNP – does not want Montenegro to gain independence:Montenegro would thus become an uncontrolled ‘island’ of the grey economy. He also ex-presses his doubts about the economic and political viability of such a small country.However, his major argument against independence is, ‘Why separate, if staying togetheris normal? It goes without saying…’28

The pro-independence parties also add their own arguments to the historical and iden-tity-based reasoning behind Montenegrin independence. Miodrag Vičković, President ofthe Liberal Alliance, emphasises that Montenegro has the right to be independent, havingreceived this right at the Berlin Congress (1878) and having subsequently maintained itafter the disintegration of Yugoslavia. He explains that Montenegro’s citizens voted forstaying together with Serbia in 1992 only as a result of manipulation by Milo šević. Hevoices his distrust towards Serbia’s real willingness to treat Montenegro as an equal part-ner, for – he argues – Serbia always wanted to ‘centralise Montenegro into Serbia.’ Vičk-ović further mentions a common argument among supporters of independence, namelythat the difference in size does not allow the creation of an equal federation. Altogether,he uses more economic arguments than do most proponents of a federation. He portrays

25 National Democratic Institute (NDI): Key Findings, Track One, Podgorica 11.4.2001, p. 17.26 Interview of the author with Dragan Koprivica, Podgorica, 22.5.2002.27 Interview of the author with Miodrag Vičković, Podgorica, 24.5.2002.28 Interview with Koprivica.

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Montenegro as a country equipped with all the necessary resources for functioning inde-pendently; however, alongside politicians on the pro-Yugoslav side, he blames the currentgovernment for the same crimes. In his opinion, Đukanović betrayed his own peoplesince he spoiled the chance of establishing independence with the creation of the ‘crimi-nalised zone’. It is worth pointing out that the pro-independence camp is far from unified.The Liberal Alliance generally distrusts the DPS and recently, after the municipal elec-tions in May 2002, joined a coalition at the local level with the SNP and, at the republicanlevel, dropped its support for the minority government of the DPS and the SDP.

Altogether, with the help of the media, the political elite has managed to keep the statusissue in the focus of public attention. Thereby, political parties could avoid having to dealwith economic transition and reforms, and could also appear as important players on thepolitical scene by representing a strong position on independence. It can also be arguedthat the reason why independence became more and more popular in Montenegro wasthat, initially, the reformist, pro-western and democratic agenda was represented by thoseparties who were pro-independence; moreover, Montenegro’s stepping out on the road ofdemocratic transition was, at the same time, stepping on a path which led to a higher levelof autonomy and, eventually, independence. The dynamics of change in public opinionhave also contributed to keeping the question on the political agenda, which is a good il-lustration of how ‘the genie cannot be put back into the bottle’, no matter how realistic orunrealistic these expectations are in terms of establishing an independent Montenegro.

It should be noted, however, that the constitutional issue is far from being the most im-portant one for the people of Montenegro. According to an opinion poll conducted in No-vember 2001,29 people ranked the status question behind the economic situation which in-cluded, among others, unemployment and the revival of industry. Another survey, carriedout by NDI in April 2001, revealed similar results, with respondents naming the economicsituation as the most important issue (49%), above that of status (23%) 30 (see Graph 1):

Graph 1 – Most important issues among Montenegrin citizens, 200131

Montenegrin citizens do not only consider the status issue as secondary but, based on anopinion poll from January 2002, they also express generally strong distrust of all political

29 Centar za tranziciju: Governing the State, Montenegro’s citizens’ opinion and attitudes, Jan-uary 2002, p. 11.

30 NDI: Key Findings, p. 9.31 ibid.

0 10 20 30 40 50 60

Economy/Jobs

State Status

Ethnic Relations

Salary, Pension, Corruption

Relations with Serbia

International Financial Aid

8/11/2001

18/9/2001

30/6/2001

8/4/2001

19/3/2001

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parties, institutions and authorities, among which the executive authority ranked the worst(60.5% of respondents expressed distrust in the government while only 13.1 per cent ex-pressed trust).32 This poll identified a considerable degree of discontent with the govern-ment: the majority of respondents (66.8%) stated that they were discontented or highly dis-contented with the way Montenegro was governed.33 Less than 15 per cent of those askedsaid they trusted the parliament of Montenegro, a figure which is part of a downward trend.Among political institutions, the President enjoyed the highest level of trust, but the degreeof trust decreased from 39 to 13 per cent between April and October 2001. 34 Furthermore,citizens regard the political leadership before 1989 as more professional and more compe-tent than the present political elite in the fulfilment of its duties of governing the state andserving the common interests of people. In the same poll – in line with this lack of trust to-wards the political elite – respondents expressed their preference of having a governmentformed by experts rather than politicians and favoured that most important government de-cisions should be approved in referenda. According to these answers, citizens generallyprefer more direct involvement in political decision-making through referenda. 35

There is an additional problem in Montenegro: there has been no democratic, reform-oriented alternative to the present regime. The SNP, which supported Milo šević until hisfall in October 2000, has not been a particularly promising alternative to the governingDPS-led coalition. According to an opinion poll conducted in June 2001, 36 many citizensare frustrated with this lack of a political alternative, which is well-expressed in the above-mentioned high level of distrust in the existing political institutions, including both gov-erning and opposition parties. Nebojša Medojević, an independent Montenegrin econo-mist, explains this general lack of trust in the entire political sphere by reference to the un-fulfilled promises of the ‘For a Better Life (Da živimo Bolje) government, which was theelection slogan of the DPS/SDP/NS coalition in 1998, and by the general loss of faith inthe reform process. The amount of international financial aid flowing into Montenegro hasbeen widely reported, in the light of which the reform process appears to be very disillu-sioning especially from the aspect of creating new jobs, improving the standard of living,entering new foreign markets and managing an ‘honest’ privatisation process.

Not only did the promised reforms not bring about an improvement in the quality of lifebut, while some gained enormous wealth through corruption and smuggling, the wider strataof society lost out in the transformation process in decreased wages and the loss of jobs.Moreover, as the government only unconvincingly attempted to curb the grey economy, ci-tizens have demonstrated an indifferent or cynical attitude towards politicians and the rule oflaw.37 There has been a widely-held perception among citizens that, instead of intensifyingreforms in Montenegro, the political elite monopolised its position in the sphere of economyand politics, creating an intertwined web of connections between the business and the politi-

32 Centar za tranziciju, op. cit., p. 14.33 ibid, p. 19.34 Nebojša Medojević: Risk Reporting, Country Report Montenegro, mimeo, 2002, p. 6.35 Centar za tranziciju, op. cit., p. 30. A different opinion poll arrived at similar results: Centre

for Democracy and Human Rights/Polling Agency ‘Damar’: Public Opinion in Montenegro2002, Podgorica, January 2002.

36 Medojević, op. cit. 37 ibid, p. 8.

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cal spheres.38 Through these, the political elite has been able to control all segments of soci-ety;39 or, in the words of Medojević: ‘Montenegrin society is captured by political parties.’40

The ‘social elite’ (universities, independent media, NGOs, unions), Medojevi ć argues, hasexpressed little criticism of this process but, rather, has represented the interests of the rulingpolitical elite and thereby contributed to the delay in the transition in Montenegro. Me-dojević identifies the causes of this phenomenon as the redistribution process under sanc-tions between 1992 and 1995, when a new class of ‘capitalist oligarchs’ emerged in co-ope-ration with the political elite.41 Those in power have been in a privileged position for morethan a decade, which made the creation of political and economic monopolies relativelyeasy. This intermingled nature of politics and economics stands as a barrier to the implemen-tation of radical reforms and transition in the economic sphere and the administration. Fur-thermore, it might be a reason why the elite, being in power since 1997 at least, supportsMontenegrin independence: obviously, this way it can more easily preserve its special posi-tion. Montenegro gaining independence would mean a lack of fundamental changes in do-mestic political and economic relations as a result of which the elite, which holds key politi-cal and business positions, could stay easily in place.

Political conflicts in MontenegroEven within the ‘For a Better Life’ coalition formed by the DPS and two other politicalparties, the Social Democratic Party and the People’s Party, there were still major disa-greements about the referendum on independence in mid-2000. Only the SDP was press-ing clearly for an early referendum to be held, while the People’s Party opposed one andthe DPS was divided.42 When finally the Assembly of Montenegro decided to form theReferendum Law Drafting Committee, the NS decided to withdraw from the ruling coali-tion.43 The most fervent supporter of a referendum was the Liberal Alliance of Montene-gro, which offered its support to the minority government, arguing that there was no needfor pre-term elections.44

In the SNP, which has been the primary representative of pro-Serbian interests, atti-tudes toward the opponents of the party has differed between party members active at the

38 ibid, p. 6.39 Đukanović rewarded his allies generously with significant positions in the political and eco-

nomic sphere: Banjević was named director of the aluminium plant in Podgorica; Pejanović-Đurišić the President of the Managing Board of Montenegrin Telecom; Vujanović wasappointed Prime Minister; and Maras the Minister of the Interior. It is a general characteris-tic of Montenegro that politics and economics are, generally, strongly interlinked, which isillustrated by several examples, such as Svetozar Marović being not only a DPS Vice-Presi-dent, but also the President of the Managing Board of Budvanska Riviera, which controlssome twenty hotels in and around Budva; the Director of Budvanska Riviera used to be theMinister of Tourism in Đukanović’s third government; a former Minister of Finance is nowPresident of the Monetary Council and director of the Montenegrobank; and the list could befurther continued.

40 ibid, p. 2.41 ibid.42 ESI (2000), op. cit., p. 18.43 ‘Pre-term elections’, p. 5.44 ibid.

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federal level and those based in Montenegro. Momir Bulatović, based in Belgrade – asfederal Prime Minister until the fall of the Milošević regime in October 2000 – and hissupporters sided with Milošević, and were very unwilling to get involved in any construc-tive dialogue with the Montenegrin government; while a wing within the SNP, participat-ing in everyday political life in Montenegro, was more open to dialogue and showed morerespect to the political process taking place there.45

In general, relations between the SNP and the governing parties, i.e. the DPS and its al-lies, have been tense. This is reflected in the SNP’s co-operation with Milo šević in the ab-rogation of Montenegro’s power within the federation, since SNP deputies have consti-tuted the sole representation of Montenegro at the federal level since 1998, despite theDPS-led coalition having the right, according to the election results of Montenegro, to ap-point Montenegrin deputies to the federal assembly.46 Moreover, the amendments to thefederal constitution in 2000, which secured the exclusion of Montenegro’s governmentfrom the federal political process, were brought about with the assistance of the Mon-tenegrin opposition parties.47 In September 2000, with the federal elections being boy-cotted by the Montenegrin governing coalition, because they did not accept the federalconstitution, the Montenegrin opposition did so participate, thereby continuing to be theexclusive representative of Montenegro at the federal level. 48 In September 2001, whenKoštunica attempted to re-start dialogue on the constitutional crisis between the leaders ofthe two republics, the Montenegrin Prime Minister and President refused to participate be-cause the federal Prime Minister, Dragiša Pešić, an SNP member, was also invited.49

There was not much communication between the Milošević regime and the Mon-tenegrin government, but the contact of the new democratic government of Serbia withMontenegro’s government was marked by bitterness and frustration, mainly because DOSleaders had a hard time understanding why Montenegro was not willing to live togetherwith a democratic Serbia, when it was apparently able to do so with Milo šević, i.e. it hadnot pursued independence for most of the Milošević era. After the election in September2000, the Montenegrin government did not recognise Koštunica as federal President be-cause it was unwilling to recognise the federal arrangement as legitimate; however, it didwelcome the victory of Serbian democratic forces. Also, after the elections, DOS had toform an alliance with the SNP in order to secure a parliamentary majority at the federallevel, which increased the conflict-oriented climate between the federal authorities and theMontenegrin government. Interestingly, before the elections, DOS and Đukanović’s gov-

45 ibid, p. 6. 46 The Federal Parliament consists of two chambers. The representatives of the Chamber of the

Republics are elected by the republican parliaments while the representatives of the Cham-ber of Citizens are directly elected in each republic. After the split in DPS in 1998, the Fed-eral Parliament ignored the Montenegrin Parliament’s decision to revoke the mandates ofSNP deputies to replace them with DPS deputies. Subsequently, the Montenegrin authoritiesceased to recognise and participate in the federal institutions.

47 ESI (2000), op. cit., p. 14.48 ESI (2001a): Sovereignty, Europe and the Future of Serbia and Montenegro, A Proposal for

International Mediation, 12.2.2001, p. 3, available at www.esiweb.org/pages/rep/rep_mon4.html.49 ESI (2001b): Politics, Interests and the Future of Yugoslavia: an Agenda for Dialogue,

26.11.2001, p. 3.

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ernment had supported each other diplomatically and, moreover, G17 – the economicthink tank, which gave DOS its programme – even advised Montenegro in its economicreforms.50

Emergence of consensus in YugoslaviaIn April 2001, the pro-independence coalition achieved a narrow victory in early electionsin Montenegro, as a result of which the governing coalition of DPS and the SDP had todepend on the support of the Liberal Alliance. In light of the election results, Đukanovićdid not dare initiate the referendum in July 2001, which was the previous plan, but post-poned it to early 2002.

An intense debate then started among the political parties about the exact procedure forthe referendum. The pro-Yugoslav opposition insisted that Montenegrins residing in Ser-bia should be allowed to participate, as well as that a pro-independence outcome wouldonly be valid if the majority of all registered voters voted for independence. This wouldhave required the amendment of the existing referendum law, which demanded a simplemajority of those actually voting.51 The pro-Yugoslav opposition threatened the govern-ment with a boycott of the referendum if the proposed changes were not made to the refer-endum law. On the other hand, the radical pro-independence party, the Liberal Alliance,together with the SDP, also recommended a change in the law to endure that the participa-tion of less than 50 per cent of the electorate would not invalidate the result. The interna-tional organisations consulted opposed this proposal, because – they argued – such a pro-cedure would undermine the legitimacy of a pro-independence vote. 52 Theyrecommended the requirement that a qualified majority be retained but, at the same time,they opposed the demand of the pro-Yugoslav parties to allow Montenegrins residing inSerbia to vote:

In the case of a positive result, a referendum on independence would have to be confirmedby a two-thirds majority of the Assembly of Montenegro; it is in full accordance with inter-national standards that the referendum law requires that voters must have residence in Mon-tenegro.53

The political positions regarding the referendum seemed to be irreconcilable, but thedynamics between the Montenegrin and the Serbian political leaderships surprisingly ledto the reaching of a wide consensus on the issue, which might have resulted in Montene-gro eventually becoming independent. In October 2001, the Serbian and Montenegrinleaders agreed during a meeting in Belgrade that, because they could not agree on the con-

50 ESI (2001a), op. cit., p. 2.51 ICG, op. cit., p. 3.52 OSCE/OHDIR: Ocjena OEBS/BDILJP zakona o referendumu Republike Crne Gore,

Savezna Republika Jugoslavija, Warsaw, 6.7.2001; OSCE/OHDIR: Stučno mišljenje o pred-logu zakona o referendumu o državnom statusu Republike Crne Gore, Savezna RepublikaJugoslavija, Warsaw, 5.11.2001; European Commission for Democracy through Law(Venice Commission): Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Interim Report on the ConstitutionalSituation, Strasbourg, 22.10.2001, CDL (2001) 105 fin.

53 European Commission for Democracy through Law: Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.Interim Report.

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stitution of a joint state, the crisis should be dealt with through a referendum in Montene-gro. After this ‘agreement’ – or, rather, the acknowledgement of an unbridgeable disa-greement – negotiations in Montenegro yielded the arrival of a consensus according towhich the SNP would not boycott a referendum and would give up on insisting upon theparticipation of Montenegrins living in Serbia, ‘If an independence decision were reachedhonestly.’54 The debate continued about what the required majority should be, yet therewas a realistic perspective of settling on a common position. At this point, the EU inter-vened, emphasising its preference for ‘A democratic Montenegro in a democratic FRY’ inorder to preserve the stability of the region.55

Economic aspects of the independence questionThe emergence of the political dispute between Serbia and Montenegro following 1997was, partially, a response by Serbia to the small republic’s distancing of itself from thefederation in economic terms. Furthermore, the exact nature of future economic relationsbetween Serbia and Montenegro has been one of the most contested issues in the debatesover a common constitution. In addition, the international community primarily exertedits influence on the two republics in the economic domain, initially by supporting Mon-tenegro financially in its break with Milošević. After Montenegro became dependent onforeign aid, the EU and the US managed to enforce their will during the constitutional de-bate, successfully using their economic and financial influence. The importance of eco-nomic considerations could also have been noticed during the public debate about inde-pendence, since some of the most oft-heard arguments of the pro-independence politicalelite were of an economic nature.

The break with Belgrade – the first steps towards independenceAs discussed above, Đukanović turned openly against Milošević in 1997 and embarkedon a path of distancing his republic from Belgrade, primarily by economic means. 56 From1998, Montenegro ceased to be closely integrated with Serbia economically and started toestablish its autonomy by taking decisive steps towards an independent economy.Throughout 1998, payment transactions between the Montenegrin and the federal budgetgradually stopped. In 1999, Montenegro ceased to require visas from foreigners enteringits territory and introduced its own customs duties on its borders; in response, Serbia be-gan collecting customs on its borders with Montenegro. In the same year, Montenegro in-troduced the German Mark as a parallel official currency next to the Yugoslav Dinar,thereby phasing out the Yugoslav monetary system. As a result, all electronic transactionsbetween the two republics eventually stopped. By November 2000, the Mark had becomethe sole currency of Montenegro, before being replaced by the Euro in early 2002. In2000, Serbia introduced a trade blockade against Montenegro for all goods except alumin-ium and steel. Furthermore, Montenegro started to establish its own trade representation –de facto embassies – in Washington, Brussels, London, Rome, Ljubljana, Sarajevo andBerlin. This process culminated in Yugoslavia opening a ‘representative office’ in

54 ‘Speech by Bulatović in Podgorica’, VIP Daily News Report, 20.11.2001.55 ICG, op. cit., p. 6.56 ESI (2000), op. cit., p. 4.

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Podgorica in 2001, reflecting the federal government’s virtual lack of influence on deci-sions taken in Podgorica.

As a result, very few institutional connections between the two republics remained. Be-sides the existing managerial and infrastructure links in the electricity sector, chief amongthose that did remain were that Montenegrins still served in the Yugoslav army, used Yu-goslav passports and participated in negotiations with the international organisations aspart of the Yugoslav delegation.57 It should also be mentioned that Montenegrins couldstill access Serbian higher education and health service, both of which are significant con-sidering the weaknesses of the Montenegrin public sector.

The immediate effect of introducing the Mark was a drop in inflation from 23.3 to 4.6per cent, a positive consequence of breaking with the irresponsible monetary policies ofBelgrade.58 However, inflation stayed in Montenegro even with the Mark and prices con-tinued to rise further and remain higher than they were in Serbia. During 2000, prices kepton rising in a worrying proportion: from 1999 to 2000 the consumer price index increasedby 24.7 per cent and the retail price index by 26 per cent; 59 in 2001 and 2002 the inflationrate increased further.60

The severing of economic ties between Montenegro and Serbia caused serious chal-lenges to the Montenegrin economy. Montenegro had to look for new markets in the re-gion which meant, for instance, the replacement of subsidised food imports from Serbiawith market-priced goods from Slovenia, Croatia, Italy and other western countries. 61 Fur-thermore, due to the trade blockade, Montenegrin industrial products were no longer soldin Serbia.62 The cessation of electronic payment transactions between the banks of the re-publics also challenged the Montenegrin economy, causing companies either to turn to abarter system or to make the effort to keep transfers going, the latter of which often in-volved resorting to illegal means.63

Altogether, the sanctions on FRY and the trade blockade from Serbia further pushedMontenegro down the road of economic decline.64 Subsequently, large amounts of west-ern aid have been made available since 1998 to stabilise the economy and to help over-come the hardships caused by the Serbian trade embargo. Aid from the EU and the USwas aimed at financing the social funds; helping the government pay for electricity im-ports, medical supplies and food; and also supporting infrastructure projects. However,the foreign aid only managed to subsidise a highly inefficient economy and did not putsufficient pressure on the Montenegrin government to turn the rhetoric of reform into real-ity; the aid was given to keep the west’s anti-Milošević ally in power under the shadow ofthe threat of war, and rational economic consideration could therefore not play a signifi-cant role in the process of granting aid until autumn 2000. 65 The chronic dependency on

57 ESI (2001a), op. cit., p. 5.58 ESI (2000), op. cit., p. 15.59 Montenegro Economic Trends, October 2000, p 13.60 Montenegro Economic Trends, March 2002, p. 14.61 ibid.62 ESI: Montenegro: A Balancing Act, September 1999, p. 2.63 ibid64 See Dragan Đurić’s chapter on The Economic Development of Montenegro, this volume.65 ESI (2000), op. cit., p.4.

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foreign aid remains a major weakness of the Montenegrin economy; in 1999 and 2000, thesums of committed aid by the EU and the US amounted to at least DM 485m. 66

It has been noted by international analysts that, even though the Montenegrin govern-ment wears a reformist ‘label’, the transition process has barely begun and the reformistrhetoric has brought scarce relief to the deep economic crises of the republic.67 DanielGros, of the Centre for European Policy Studies, has suggested that Montenegro seems tobe currently caught in a so-called ’self-made poverty trap’, in which the government doesnot dare reform the existing dysfunctional economic structure because it fears the possi-ble social consequences, as a result of which it could lose political power. In such a situa-tion, the government tends to continue with bad policies and the country becomes evenpoorer.68

Economic reality and the reform processCompared to Serbia, the economic situation in Montenegro has appeared to be better inthe last few years from the point of view of the standard of living. Average wages weretwice average wages in Serbia in 2001, as illustrated in Table 1:

Table 1: Basic macroeconomic indicators, 200169

However, according to the analysis of the European think tank, the European StabilityInitiative, unconditional western aid can be regarded as being mainly responsible for therelatively ‘high’ wages, since foreign financial support allowed the Montenegrin govern-ment to increase subsidies to struggling companies, pay social transfers, expand adminis-tration and increase salaries in the public sector. At the same time, higher wages did notmean a higher standard of living since prices were also considerably higher in Montene-gro than in Serbia. For example, in 2001, despite a slight increase in nominal salaries (by4%), real salaries decreased by 19 per cent due to a rise in consumer prices. 70 Moreover,the impoverishment of society is an equally pressing issue in Montenegro as in Serbia, re-flected as it is in the growth of the grey economy, which represents about 30 per cent ofthe Montenegrin labour force, as well as by the high unemployment rate of 29 per cent

66 ESI (2001c): Rhetoric and Reform, A Case Study of Institution Building in Montenegro1998-2001, Podgorica and Berlin, 1.7.2001, p. 21.

67 ibid.68 Daniel Gros: ‘Montenegro 2010’, in Nicolas Wythe (ed.): The Future of Montenegro. Pro-

ceedings of an Expert Meeting, 26 February 2001 (Brussels: Centre for European PolicyStudies, 2001), pp. 65-79.

GDPgrowth in %

Industrial production(% change)

CPI Unemploy-ment rate

Av. monthly wage ($)

Real net wage (% change)

Gross ext. debt in $bn

FRYMontenegroSerbia

4.54.54.5

-3.5-0.8-1.4

n.a26

41.9

2929

29.2208102

9.29.59.1

11.40.2

11.2

69 Source: IMF country information, state statistical offices and national banks of the countries,Montenegro Economic Trends, March 2002, p. 79.

70 Medojević, op. cit., p. 9.

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and the growth in the relative number of pensioners.71 Furthermore, a huge economic gapcan be perceived between different regions, especially between the poorer north and thericher coastal region, but also between different strata of society.

Altogether, the state of the Montenegrin economy does not present a very promisingpicture, characterised as it is by politics dominating the economic sphere, a constantlygrowing public sector, a huge and unsustainable budget deficit, growing arrears accumu-lated by the social funds, a banking sector burdened by bad debts, state credits lent tocompanies which will be never returned, a weak ability to attract foreign working capital,un-enforced laws, an uncertain privatisation process and the generally unfavourable busi-ness environment.72

The absence of substantial reform can be viewed as a real obstacle for the proponents ofMontenegrin independence, but the low degree of economic integration in the region runsagainst the arguments of those who argue for a federal arrangement with Serbia on eco-nomic grounds. Montenegro is not intensively integrated economically in the region ofsouth-eastern Europe – a typical characteristic of all the countries in the region – and,even though it fosters the strongest relations with Serbia, these are still relatively weakcompared to its relations with developed countries. Certainly, the low degree of economicinterconnectedness with Serbia is primarily the result of the political situation in the sec-ond half of the 1990s. However, it would be quite difficult to assess what would be the‘natural’ level of economic relations between the two republics without the complicatedand tense political situation. In the region, Montenegro’s most important trading partner isSerbia, with about 5.4 per cent of all exports directed to Serbia and Kosovo, and 11.9 percent of all imports coming from there. Furthermore, Montenegro has recently made seri-ous progress in trade relations with Serbia – especially after the political changes – ac-cording to which imports from Serbia increased by 241 per cent in 2001 over the previousyear. Financial transactions with Serbia also improved in 2001 as a result of an increase intrade transactions and in tourism.73 The structure of the economy of both republics, aswell as the regional experience, does, however, suggest that there is a ceiling to the degreeof economic co-operation and integration which is possible. 74

The economic debate about independenceDuring the constitutional debate, several economic arguments were put forward regardingwhat would be best for Montenegro from the economic aspect. Economic arguments sup-porting independence aim at demonstrating that Montenegro could become viable as anindependent state. However, even on the pro-independence side, economists do not denythat the macroeconomic position of Montenegro is very unstable. 75 Veselin Vukotić, amember of the Montenegrin Institute for Strategic Studies and Prognosis, explains this in-

71 Montenegro Economic Trends, March 2002, p. 29.72 ESI (2001c), op. cit., p. 25; see also Dragan Đurić’s chapter on The Economic Development

of Montenegro in the present volume.73 Montenegro Economic Trends, March 2002, p. 85.74 Milica Uvalić: ‘Economic Co-operation between Serbia and Montenegro’, in Florian Bieber:

Negotiating and Capacity Building in Montenegro. Workshop 3: Economic Developmentand Co-operation, Kotor, 22 March 2002, ECMI Report No. 28 (June 2002), pp. 30-40;Vladimir Gligorov: ‘Serbia and Montenegro: A New Beginning’, ibid., pp. 18-29.

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stability with reference to three major ‘external’ ‘shocks’ which can be held responsiblefor Montenegro’s weak economic performance.76 The first ‘shock’ has been the continu-ous economic recession, as a result of which, in 2000, Montenegro’s GDP was only 50 percent of its 1989 level. Secondly, the ‘demographic chaos’ of former Yugoslavia has re-sulted in a 13 per cent increase in the population over the last ten years due to the large in-flux of refugees. And thirdly, the transition process in Montenegro has been delayed atleast seven years.

The first and the last argument are, however, rather problematic: the low level of GDPin 2000 is not an ‘unfortunate’ external circumstance but a consequence of the delayedtransition, postponed even after 1997. Furthermore, one should consider who is responsi-ble for the delay in the transition since the political elite in power has, more or less, beenthe same from the beginning of the 1990s until today. Nevertheless, Vukoti ć acknowl-edges that the implementation of a faster economic reform process and a radical establish-ment of new institutions, and also integration into the regional markets of former Yugo-slavia, are urgently needed. He also admits that, presently, Montenegro is incapable ofimplementing economic reforms and reaching macroeconomic stability without foreignassistance.77

Most supporters of independence acknowledge that, at present, Montenegro cannot func-tion on its own – but that it could do so if it fulfilled some preconditions, as the republicdoes have the potential to become viable independent of Serbia. Undeniably, Montenegro’seconomy cannot currently function without outside support; therefore, it cannot be consid-ered to be viable in its present state. This is a matter of fact, but this circumstance has littleto do with independence or non-independence. Serbia is certainly not in a position to ‘res-cue’ Montenegro since the economic situation in Serbia is even worse, regardless of theeconomic indicator used, as indicated in the Table above. Montenegro’s current economicdifficulties have to be solved irrespective of the status question especially since, even if itwanted to, it could not depend on Serbia, as Serbia has little to offer at the moment.

Several theories have been advanced about the means for Montenegrin economic via-bility. According to Vukotić:

Montenegro possesses the necessary resources, human capital and government organisationto finance itself independently, and to finance itself in the long term from its own reve-nues.”78

In his opinion, Montenegro’s development should be based on services, knowledge andinformation. Nebojša Medojević holds a similar position, according to him, Montenegro’schance for development lies in the creation of so-called ‘value-added products’, meaning

75 In what follows I refer primarily to the argumentations of Veselin Vukotić and NebojšaMedojević.

76 Veselin Vukotić: ‘The Economic Situation and Economic Reforms in Montenegro’, in: TheFuture of Montenegro. Proceedings of an Expert Meeting, 26 February 2001 (Brussels:Centre for European Policy Studies, 2001), p. 47.

77 ibid. Even Daniel Gros concurs, suggesting that the support of the international financialinstitutions is crucial in the short term, despite the dangers of the emergence of a poverty trapin Montenegro. Gros, op. cit.

78 Vukotić, op. cit., p. 48.

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the small-scale service of exclusive products, such as health and medical tourism, the pro-duction of hi-tech goods and software engineering.79

In addition, Vukotić draws attention to a list of the resources that provide Montenegrowith the necessary potential for development, such as its agriculture; coastline; the capacityto produce aluminium, iron, bauxite, salt and coal; its maritime industry; a highly-educatedpopulation; and, last but not least, a special opportunity for tourism. 80 Both experts empha-sise that, without a radical reform of institutions and the setting of new rules, these remain,however, only potential resources. Gros concurs and insists that the implementation of a‘big bang reform’ would be a necessary precondition.81 He views Montenegro’s future inthe creation of an open economy, a natural consequence of the small size of the republic. Inorder to achieve a high degree of openness, meaning a high level of exports relative toGDP, a stable currency and a very liberal and transparent trade policy are required. 82 Theseare definitely on the way in Montenegro, if one considers the introduction of the DM andthe Euro, and the steps which have been taken to create a liberal trade regime.

However, the most frequent and almost commonplace development plan for Montene-gro is based on the republic’s potential for tourism. Undeniably, Montenegro has great po-tential in the tourism sector, taking into account its unspoiled nature, unique landscape,culture, a small town milieu and its beaches. Despite this opportunity, little has been donein the last decade to exploit this potential, reflected in that, of a range of 24 activities, tour-ism took 18th place in terms of the share in GDP of its turnover in the 1985-1999 period. 83

Furthermore, this is primarily not due to a lack of interest by tourists since, in the summerof 2001, the number of visitors exceeded the number predicted, for which the Mon-tenegrin tourist industry was completely unprepared. The frequent problems appearing inthe tourist sector are, among others, the shortage of drinkable water, dirty beaches, com-plicated and long customs administration procedures, the lack of a developed infrastruc-ture and insufficient accommodation capacities. Until now, Montenegrin tourism has beenbased on domestic guests, whereby 84 per cent of all guests come from Serbia and Mon-tenegro. A key problem in attracting foreign visitors has been the absence of substantialforeign investment. However, that would require more favourable conditions such as im-proving the infrastructure, establishing a clear legal framework and setting some addi-tional incentives for foreign investors.84

There are many ideas for turning Montenegro into a prosperous and viable country, butall these scenarios require the fulfilment of the several preconditions mentioned earlier.However, recent years do not testify to a strong commitment on the part of the govern-ment to implement radical reforms in the sphere of economics and administration thatwould bring about a real transition. Furthermore, if in the area of tourism, with its obviouschance to make profits, almost nothing has been done, how great can be the expectationthat all the steps proposed by the economic experts quoted above will be taken? Certainly,Montenegro needs economic development and a real transition, regardless of the outcome

79 Interview by the author with Nebojša Medojević, Podgorica, 23.5.2002.80 Vukotić, op. cit., p. 54.81 Gros, op. cit.82 ibid.83 Montenegro Economic Trends, December 2001, p. 44.84 Montenegro Economic Trends, July 2001, p. 68.

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of the status issue. If the reform process fails and the country stays caught in a povertytrap, Montenegro will be poor with or without Serbia. Therefore, the question is notwhether Montenegro could become viable as an independent country. The question is howthe necessary reforms could be conducted in the best way to create the preconditions fordevelopment. To put it in another way, in which case could the transition and reform proc-esses be carried out in a more efficient way, if Montenegro becomes independent or if itremains part of some kind of common state with Serbia?

The promoters of independence hold the position that Montenegro could be reformedmore quickly independently from Serbia. To support this position, Vukoti ć argues that,due to the relatively small size of Montenegro in a common state with Serbia (about 5%),Montenegro’s influence on monetary policy, foreign trade policy and tax policy would beirrelevant. Besides, he further points to the different structure of the two economies, ac-cording to which Montenegro is oriented towards tourism and services, and Serbia to agri-culture and industry; to the different stage of the reforms reached so far by the two repub-lics; and to the argument that sustaining federal institutions in addition to republican onesis expensive and superfluous. He argues that reforms have to be conducted at the republi-can level anyway; therefore, having a federal administration would be pointless. 85

The economic analysts of Monet86 have been cautious about taking a clear position onindependence; rather, they emphasise the disadvantages to the present form of arrange-ment from an economic point of view. They also draw attention to the differences be-tween Serbia and Montenegro in terms of size and in development strategies, but point inaddition to further points of departure, such as the achieved stage of privatisation, thelevel of customs tariffs, and trade and monetary policy. Monet experts argue that sustain-ing a federation with Serbia, even from the aspect of gaining access to a larger market,would not provide a significant advantage for Montenegro since it has already managed tofind new markets in the region and does not need Serbia. Furthermore, they point out thatMontenegro cannot afford a federal system which would be not only expensive but alsothreatening to business due to the growing nature of bureaucracy and the overlap in theauthorities.87

Nebojša Medojević emphasises similar arguments in favour of independence. He pointsto the need for a clear legal framework in order to engage in successful development. Inhis view, such a framework can only be achieved through independence. He argues that,in a federation, innumerable problems will emerge from the creation of spheres of respon-sibilities. Therefore, the constitutional question has to be solved first – preferably in theform of Montenegrin independence – before the real problems of transition and reformscan be tackled.88

At the same time, the promoters of independence generally agree that Montenegroneeds to establish serious functional relations with Serbia and that, instead of fightingover the constitutional settlement, talks between the two republics should focus on howthe exact form of these functional ties should be defined. According to the supporters ofMontenegrin independence, Montenegro and Serbia should ensure the free flow of people,

85 Vukotić, “The Economic Situation,” p.56.86 Monet is a joint project of ISSP in Podgorica and CEPS in Belgium87 Montenegro Economic Trends, March 2002, pp. 45.88 Interview with Nebojša Medojević.

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services, goods and capital; harmonise their tax and tariff regimes; and remove obstaclesin payment procedures. Actually, these goals have anyway been set by the new agreementon the constitution of the joint state of Serbia and Montenegro, with the essential differ-ence that the new constitutional agreement envisages the creation of federal institutionsdespite economic policy remaining within the purview of the republics. 89

On the other side, few pro-federation economic arguments are heard, except for thosementioned earlier concerning corruption and the advantages of a larger market. Economicarguments against independence have been emphasised particularly by EU representa-tives, according to whom:

…the benefits of the bigger market will be lost, foreign investments will be discouraged andthe lack of a common trade policy would be an obstacle to EU and WTO integration. Earlyadoption of the Euro might involve substantial economic risks and costs.90

In response to these arguments, the Montenegrin authorities point out that their eco-nomic policies and reforms are compatible with EU integration. The government furtherargues that the introduction of the DM and the Euro has been a success and that it does notwish to return to the Dinar. It also notes that convergence with Serbia’s higher tariff ratesis unacceptable for Montenegro, which wants to build an open economy fitting its smallsize. Acknowledging that closer integration with Serbia would be desirable for Montene-gro, the authorities note at the same time that the biggest obstacle to creating a joint mar-ket is Serbia’s delay in giving up price controls.

According to Medojević, the status question as far as Serbia is concerned does not in-volve economic considerations at all; it is only about identity, power and politics. It can beconcluded that determining the status question based purely on economic arguments doespresent a challenge; however, it is also true that settling the constitutional issue is a prereq-uisite for solving the difficult economic situation of Montenegro. Ending the constitutionaldebate by declaring independence would be simpler than trying to arrange a functioningfederation; however, if half the country opposes such an outcome, it is questionablewhether, in the absence of a general consensus, separation would indeed bring about politi-cal peace and stability. Nevertheless, as the figures analysed here indicate, the economy ofMontenegro is in a tough situation and the economic policies conducted thus far do not tes-tify to a commitment to a far-reaching reform process. In addition, no matter how capableMontenegro could be of functioning as a separate economy, the present arguments for inde-pendence are, in an economic sense, more vision than reality.

ConclusionRelations between Serbia and Montenegro have arrived at a turning point after many yearsof conflict. Yet, it is difficult to predict what kind of process has been initiated by the sign-ing of the Agreement on the common state in March 2002; it could equally be the begin-ning of the integration or the disintegration of the two republics, depending on their par-ticular interests and the position of the European Union. Even though the republics have

89 Proceeding Points for the Restructuring of Relations Between Serbia and Montenegro, Bel-grade, 14.3.2002, p. 3, available at: www.gov.yu.

90 Statement issued by Javier Solana’s office in February 2002, contained in ICG, op. cit., p. 8.

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the right to leave the joint state after three years, it is the concrete steps that will be takenin the interim which will determine the final outcome of the status question. If both movetowards establishing closer links and institutionalising these at the federal level, then leav-ing the new union would obviously be more difficult and expensive than staying in it.

However, the dispute over Montenegrin independence will continue even if the defini-tion of status has been postponed. Political dynamics and the various political and eco-nomic interests which have been fuelling the debate over the republic’s independence willalso be seeking to influence the course of events in the future. Elite interests will also acton the status issue, with some parties being highly dissatisfied with the provisions of theAgreement. These parties, such as the Liberal Alliance, have further emphasised theircommitment to independence, but Đukanović has also tried to convince the public that heand his party remain a faithful advocate of independence. It thus remains to be seenwhether the dispute can be transformed from the dilemma between independence andmaintaining a joint state with Serbia into a discussion on what practical ties the two repub-lics wish to create.

It does, however, remain a question as regards how public opinion will develop con-cerning the issue of Montenegrin independence; whether Montenegrin citizens will bewilling to accept staying within a joint state with Serbia. This development will depend onthe success of the new state, especially on how the standard of living changes in the nextthree years, but political rhetoric will also exert a big influence on public opinion. A newaspect to the status issue, which might even be decisive in the future, is the transformationof Serbian public opinion. When the Serbian government begins to take over some of thefederal competencies, the trend of public opinion in both republics may generate a mo-mentum towards disintegration which might carry both to an eventual formal separation.At the end of the day, according to the Agreement, the opinion of the public will decidewhether the common state should be retained or not. The involvement of the EU, how-ever, can again determine the exact outcome of the status question. The EU’s role inpressing the Agreement means that it cannot now disengage, especially considering theStabilisation and Association Process in which Serbia and Montenegro have become in-volved.

After all – if Nebojša Medojević is correct that the only importance of the status ques-tion lies in the creation of a clear legal situation – the issue of whether to retain such aloose federation or to create an independent Montenegro may not make a significant dif-ference in practical areas, including in the implementation of reforms in the economy andthe administration. Economic and functional relations between Serbia and Montenegrowill not be determined by defining the status of the country, because these relations canstay at their present under-developed level either within the joint state envisaged by theagreement or between two independent states. Therefore, it is both the concrete economicinterests and the extent of the willingness to co-operate that will determine the level andquality of functional relations between the two republics. This will probably serve as a hottopic for debate in Montenegro and within the whole state, not only at present but also forthe foreseeable future.

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Wim van Meurs

The Belgrade Agreement: Robust mediation between Serbia and Montenegro*

Introduction: Serbia and MontenegroOn 14 March 2002, in the presence of the EU High Representative for Common Foreignand Security Policy (CFSP), Yugoslav, Serbian and Montenegrin representatives signedan agreement with ‘Proceeding points for the restructuring of relations between Serbiaand Montenegro’, now known as the Belgrade Agreement. For all the talk of ‘history inthe making’, in the initial reactions to the Agreement between Belgrade and Podgorica,the spotlight has actually been on the dustbin of history: Miloševićs ‘Third Yugoslavia’ isdead and there will be no more incarnations. First reactions to the new-born ‘Serbia andMontenegro’ covered a whole spectrum of emotions, ranging from ‘a freak of a state’ or ‘arotten compromise’ to ‘a new beginning.’1 The fact is that Javier Solana seems to havefound a middle way – in between federation and confederation 2 – at least for the time be-ing. In three years (at most!), the day of reckoning will come. For the time being, the polit-ical deadlock has been broken and a window of opportunity has been created for reformpolicies and regional co-operation. A comparison between the Agreement of 14 Marchand the two ‘platforms’ that defined the negotiating positions one and a half years agothrows the embedded compromises and innovations into relief. A second comparison withthe political realities in Belgrade, Podgorica and Brussels reveals the Agreement’s limita-tions and deficits. Despite all the sobering thoughts, however, the symbolic value and re-gional consequences of the Belgrade Agreement should not be dismissed too lightly: thedice have been cast and political actors will have to reposition themselves accordingly.

Breaking the deadlockRelations between Belgrade and Podgorica had been deadlocked ever since Milo Đukanovićand his Democratic Party of Socialists (Demokratska partija socijalista, DPS) beatMiloševićs allies in Montenegro on a pro-independence ticket in both the 1997 presidentialand the 1998 parliamentary elections. His victory revealed the fundamental flaw in the two-state federation created in 1992 from the remainder of Tito’s Yugoslav Federation: Serbia isfifteen times bigger than Montenegro in terms both of territory and population. Consequently,the equality of the two unequal partners in the new mini-federation deviated absurdly fromthe democratic principle of ‘one person – one vote.’ As long as Miloševićs Socialist Party(Socijalistička partija Srbije, SPS) ruled de facto in both republics and at the federal level,this structural problem could be ignored. With Montenegro’s pro-western reform policies andSerbia’s nationalist paralysis becoming increasingly divergent, Montenegro became inde-pendent in all but name and the Yugoslav Federation became a dead letter. On the eve of the

1 ‘Balkan Media Divided on Historic Deal’, BBC News 15.3.2002.2 For want of a better term, the new entity under international law is referred to here as ‘state’,

‘union’ and ‘federation’ interchangeably.

* An earlier version of this paper was written in the framework of the joint south-east Europeactivities of the Bertelsmann Foundation and the Centre for Applied Policy Research.

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epochal elections in the autumn of 2000, Milošević eliminated the legal principle of equalitybetween the two constituent republics to restore Serb hegemony.3

The deadlock became an acute political dilemma after the ousting of Milošević. MiloĐukanović had made his political fortune on the independence ticket but, under the newcircumstances, he was driven by his supporters and political allies to go for a referendum,knowing well that the population was equally divided on the issue and that the west wasprepared to go to great lengths to prevent such a referendum. 4 Actually, in 1997, expect-ing Milošević to lose power as a consequence of the civic protests in Serbia over electoralfraud in the local elections in November 1996, Đukanović miscalculated and opted for in-dependence. In 2000, expecting Milošević to win the elections, he again miscalculatedand boycotted the federal elections. As a consequence, his natural allies, the reform-ori-ented and pro-western coalition, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia ( Demokratska opo-zicija Srbije, DOS), took power in Serbia but had, at the federal level, to form a coalitionwith the reactionary Montenegrin opposition.

The March 2002 breakthrough, after many rounds of fruitless negotiations, is not to beblamed solely on ‘diplomatic arm-twisting’ by Javier Solana. All the players came to real-ise that they had outmanoeuvred themselves (and others) into a ‘lose-lose’ situation, sothe conditionality of the EU perspective provided economic incentives as well as a wel-come excuse. Zoran Đinđić must have realised that the stand-off and bickering over com-petencies between the federation and the republic was to the detriment of the drive for re-form and international credibility of his political programme. His political competitor,Vojislav Koštunica, saw his lead in popularity diminish in comparison with Đinđić, Mi-roljub Labus and other reformers – a development partly due to the powerlessness of hispresidential position. Last, but not least, the nationalist opposition of former Milo ševićparties witnessed the once-proud Yugoslavia become defunct, with a quasi-independentstate in Montenegro and a quasi-protectorate in Kosovo.

In Podgorica, a narrow victory in the parliamentary elections of 22 April 2001 and therising popularity in recent polls of the Socialist People's Party (Socijalistička narodnapartija, SNP) determined Đukanovićs reluctance to implement his promise for a referen-dum on independence. Torn between his coalition partners who wanted the referendumnow and the pro-Yugoslav opposition with the polls showing a waning majority in favourof independence (to the extent that the votes of the ethnic minorities (in favour) would ac-tually decide the independence question),5 Đukanovićs political survival depended onfinding an elegant way of backtracking on the ‘path of independence’, and he knew thatall along.

The EU as honest broker?Ever since Javier Solana took on the ‘mission impossible’ to find the middle ground be-tween Belgrade and Podgorica, criticism became louder and louder. Surprisingly,Solana’s main critics were not found in Đukanovićs Democratic Party of Socialists.Rather, the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) and the International Crisis Group

3 Mark Thompson: ‘Yugoslavia’s Death is Balkans’ Gain’, BBC News Online 15.3.2002.4 ICG: ‘Montenegro: Resolving the Independence Deadlock’, Podgorica, Brussels, 1.8.2001.5 ICG: ‘Montenegro – Time to Decide: Pre-Election Briefing’, Brussels, 18.4.2001.

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(ICG) in Brussels published an open letter to Solana concerning Montenegro. One part oftheir critique concerned the EU’s methods of ‘applying extreme pressure to just one side’in order to ‘bulldozer’ Podgorica towards the EU’s preferred solution. 6

Solana did indeed, as several participants in the negotiations have indicated, make am-ple use of a prospective Stabilisation and Association Agreement between ‘Yugoslavia’and the EU, with its immediate economic advantages and its alluring promise of futureEU membership, as something which had a high symbolic value domestically. Thus, theEU used its hegemony as a regional economic power to force a state union on ‘unwillingpartners.’ After the initial euphoria of finally having democratic negotiation partners, andtwo constructive and apparently compatible platforms, the actual talks between Belgradeand Podgorica had soon stalled in a ‘consent not to consent’ and had to be revitalised byEU intervention and mediation in December 2001.7 No doubt, Solana’s role went far be-yond ‘good offices,’ but eventually the principle of ‘regional ownership’ will require ademocratic verification by parliament of the political solution. 8 In a democratic and con-stitutional quagmire like the Yugoslav case, with contradictory constitutional provisionsas well as executive and legislative institutions of varying democratic quality, output legit-imacy and political responsibility have an importance beyond the arithmetic of the ballotbox and the sophistry of constitutional lawyers.

The other half of the critique concerns the actual ‘dictated’ outcome of the negotiations –‘a democratic Montenegro in a democratic Yugoslavia.’ This solution is considered ‘eco-nomically and politically unwise.’9 Solana’s attempts to keep Serbia and Montenegro to-gether were, more often than not, understood as a blunt attempt to save the status quo of the‘good old’ Yugoslav Federation with some minor, cosmetic modifications. Consequently,the EU would end up polarising the parties and providing quasi support to the line of the re-actionary SNP nationalists in Montenegro and the parties of the former Milošević coalitionin Serbia. Pro-independence Montenegrin parties, western think tanks and even some Ser-bian intellectuals carried this argument.10 Proponents of Montenegro’s independence con-sistently painted a black-and-white picture of FRY as the state associated with the reaction-ary and repressive Milošević regime and of Montenegro as a paradise of pro-Europeanreforms.

There certainly is reason to doubt the original optimism of the Đinđić team, while thereis ample evidence of ‘lagging reforms’ in Serbia, due at least partly to the power strugglebetween Koštunica and Đinđić. The Milošević past, however, makes a Yugoslavia nei-

6 ICG/CEPS media release: ‘EU Pressure on Montenegro is ‘Unwise’’, Brussels, 14.2.2002.7 Darko Šuković: ‘Serbian and Montenegrin Experts on the Future of Yugoslavia’ AIM

13.1.2002; ‘Montenegro als Test für die EU-Außenpolitik’, Neue Züricher Zeitung21.2.2002, p. 7.

8 Veseljko Koprivica: ‘Montenegro Following the Visit of Javier Solana. Good Services Mis-sion’, AIM, 16.12.2001; Wim van Meurs: Negotiating the Balkans. A Regional Approach toa Negotiated Arrangement for the Balkans on the Way to Europe, Gütersloh: BertelsmannFoundation, 2001, pp. 1-2.

9 ICG/CEPS media release: ‘EU Pressure’.10 Morton Abramowitz: ‘Let the Montenegrins Have Their Say,’ International Herald Tribune,

1.12.2001; RFE/RL Newsline 11.3.2002.

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ther illegitimate as a state nor reform-resistant per se. Nor is Montenegro an unqualifiedsuccess story in terms of political and economic reform.

The argument that Yugoslavia in its three forms – the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats andSlovenes (1918-1945); the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1945-1992); and theFederal Republic of Yugoslavia (1992-2002) – was ‘a historic error’ 11 or that ‘the FRY isan anti-European and anti-democratic state’12 reintroduces the ideal of nation-state and theprimacy of national self-determination through the backdoor. Qualifying for ‘Europe’ de-pends on functional states and their capability of reform towards a pluralist democracyand the market economy. In this respect, Serbia and Montenegro each have their own spe-cific problems and deficits, but both still have a long way to go. Neither a nation-state nora federation constitutes a panacea for these reform challenges.

Milo Đukanović – by now the longest-ruling president in the region – was not born adissident to Milošević and conservative nationalism. Nevertheless, once the break be-tween Belgrade and Podgorica had become irreversible, a pro-western reform orientationwas the only option for the quasi-independent mini-state. Despite a series of political, ad-ministrative and economic reforms, Montenegro is still among the world’s leaders interms of international assistance per capita: the accusation of ‘simulated reforms’ toplease western donors seems plausible.13 A significant part of economic activity – accord-ing to some estimates, 40 to 60 per cent – is related to the shadow economy, mainly carrackets and cigarettes smuggling. The involvement of political parties and parts of thestate administration is a foregone conclusion. The state needs foreign aid for social peacein a poverty-ridden country of rising unemployment, frequent electric power cuts and highinflation. The successful early introduction of the Euro (replacing the German Mark as thenational currency) may as such have been an administrative and logistic achievement. Itis, however, by no means an indication of economic strength or aptitude: Podgorica is notbound by any criteria of economic convergence and the Euro is more convenient for legaland not-so-legal international dealings than for an ailing local economy. Montenegro’seconomic openness (3 per cent tariff average; 10 per cent for Serbia) may be an asset, buttourism certainly is not its main industry at the moment. 14 To what extent Montenegro re-ally will be able to consolidate its head start in economic reforms into a national economythat is healthy, sustainable and socially equitable remains to be seen. For the time being,Montenegro’s reform economy has all the characteristics of a political myth. 15

11 Matthias Rüb: ‘Etwas ganz Neues im Südosten’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 15.3.2002,p. 1.

12 Monitor 21.12.2001.13 European Stability Initiative: ‘Rhetoric and Reform. A Case Study of Institution Building in

Montenegro 1998-2001’, Podgorica, Berlin 1.7.2001; Nebojša Medojević: ‘Montenegro –Land of Frozen Reforms’, in Wim van Meurs (ed.): Prospects and Risks Beyond EUEnlargement, Vol. 2, South Eastern Europe: Weak States and Strong International Support,(Leverkusen: Leske + Budrich, 2002), pp. 173-191.

14 ICG/CEPS media release: ‘EU Pressure’.15 Zoran Radulović: ‘Montenegro: Economic Collapse Threatens Independence’, IWPR Balkan

Crisis Report 9.11.2001; Martin Woker: ‘Montenegro als Test für die EU-Außenpolitik’,Neue Züricher Zeitung 21.2.2002, p. 7.

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Once both Koštunica and Đinđić had expressed their willingness to consider a newform of federation with Montenegro (albeit not at all costs), Solana indeed ended up sid-ing with the reactionary forces on the federal level and in Montenegro, cajoling the re-form-oriented, pro-independence parties into making major concessions to their pro-gramme. Notably, however, the concessions involved their objective of nationalindependence, not their reform agenda. Surely, a strong two-thirds majority in Montene-gro in favour of independence would have had an impact on the EU approach, but a ‘50per cent plus one’ approach to such a fundamental issue of state sovereignty is neither par-ticularly stabilising nor democratic.16 Therefore, the Agreement insists on laws on a refer-endum ‘taking full account of internationally recognised standards,’ although this basi-cally implies a negative criterion, as no such international norms for referenda exist. 17

At least in its public policy, the EU has failed to distance its objective of regional stabi-lisation from the die-hard conservatism of the local pro-Yugoslav forces. 18 Miraculously,the eventual agreement favours the reformers rather than the reactionaries: a temporaryfreezing of the status issue in the form of ‘Serbia and Montenegro’ allows pro-westernpoliticians to pursue their reform agendas with both more drive and more concord – as thereform process towards regional and, primarily, European integration offers a broad basisof consensus.

In sum, after the peaceful settlement of the conflict in Southern Serbia and the OhridAgreement of 13 August 2001 defining the road to a new inter-ethnic arrangement in Mace-donia, the creation of ‘Serbia and Montenegro’ marks a third feat for Javier Solana, the Eu-ropean Union’s High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (EUHR).In all three cases, however, due to the fragility of the arrangements and the volatility of polit-ical aspirations, today’s triumph can easily become tomorrow’s Pyrrhic victory.

The terms of the AgreementEssentially, the Belgrade Agreement of 14 March 2002 was the outcome of trilateral ne-gotiations between the governments of Montenegro, Serbia and Yugoslavia with theEUHR as mediator and ‘witness’ to the agreement. The agreement constituted a compro-mise between the Montenegrin negotiation position, brought to paper by Đukanović on 28December 2000, and the joint reply by Koštunica and Đinđić, presented on 10 January2001.19

The 2000 Đukanović platform dwelled on the injustices of past Montenegro-Serbia rela-tions and Montenegro’s ‘inalienable right to self-determination’ (more than one-third of theplatform text!), whereas the preamble of the response by Koštunica and Đinđić highlightedthe merits of federal arrangements and the historic and cultural ties, as well as joint eco-nomic interests. The 14 March agreement contains only one terse reference to ‘elements ofSerbian and Montenegrin statehood, stemming from the present-day factual situation and the

16 Dušan Reljić: ‘Montenegros Zukunft nach wie vor ungewiß’, SWP-Aktuell No. 3, 2002.Compare Morton Abramowitz: ‘Let the Montenegrins Have Their Say’.

17 Compare Monitor, 11.1.2002.18 Florian Bieber: ‘The instrumentalisation of minorities in the Montenegrin dispute over inde-

pendence’, ECMI Brief 8 (March 2002), pp. 7-8.19 For the full texts of the two documents, see CEPS: Europa South-East Monitor, No. 19 (Jan-

uary 2001).

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historic rights of the two member states.’ In Đukanovićs vision, the sovereignty and equal-ity of the republics was key, while Belgrade argued on the basis of the ‘equality and opera-bility’ of the new federation.

In the foremost set of issues, concerning international status and representation, the cur-rent agreement predominantly follows the Belgrade position with a veto on unilateral seces-sion by referendum and one international-law subject. Montenegro will not have interna-tional legal personality but, in return, the west, for the first time, has accepted the option of areferendum on independence after three years. To protect Montenegro from being swampedby Serbs in the joint institutions and representative positions, some (rather specific) safe-guards have been built in for proportional international representation by rotation. Electionsat both levels and the constitutional amendments both set the new state apart from the cur-rent deficient FRY, without giving up implicit succession under international law.

Table 1 – International status and representation

Typically, as far as the more tangible issues are concerned of the relations between stateand member states, and the division of competencies, the Agreement is largely uninforma-tive. Implicitly, it dissociates itself from Đukanovićs vision of sovereign states delegatingpart of their competencies to a subsidiary federal level. The Belgrade position containedtwo potentially conflicting definitions of the federal competencies:

International status International representation

Referendum, elections and constitution

Đukanović Platform (28.12.2000)

Independent and inter-nationally-recognised states

Member-states autono-mous in diplomatic representation. Harmo-nisation and co-ordina-tion within the Union

Referendum on inde-pendence and future union in Serbia and Montenegro

Koštunica-Đinđić Platform (10.01.2001)

Internationally recog-nised federation with two federal units

By the federation Constitutional amendments

Serbia and Monte-negro Agreement (14.03.2002)

Internationally recog-nised state with two republics

Joint proportional rep-resentation. Parity in UN, OSCE, EU and CoE representation by rotation. Special modes of representation for international financial institutions

Three-year moratorium on referenda on seces-sion. Elections for the republican parliaments and the President of the state, as well as for ministers and judges. Constitutional Charter drafted by a commis-sion on the basis of parliamentary conclu-sions, submitted to re-publican and federal parliaments. Amend-ment of the republican constitutions.

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1. the federal units’ need and common interest and/or

2. the elementary functions of internal and external operability,

while the new agreement implicitly sympathises with ‘internal and external operability’as basic criteria. In terms of decision-making too, the spirit of the agreement seems to fa-vour Belgrade’s ‘co-operative’ over Podgorica’s impracticable ‘consensual’ decision-making. As the text, however, contains not a single explicit statement on these issues, un-til the Constitutional Charter offers clarification (‘the modalities for achievement of thesegoals shall be elaborated in parallel with the Constitutional Charter’), any partisan inter-pretation is permitted. Conversely, the range of joint competencies and ministries – de-fence, foreign affairs and internal and international economic relations, as well as humanand minority rights – copies the Montenegrin proposal with the exception of the commonmarket and the convertible currency (Euro).

Table 2 – State and member states: division of competencies

Union and republics Institutions and decision-making

Competencies of the Union

Đukanović Platform (28.12.2000)

Member states as hol-ders of sovereignty, delegating part of their competencies

Competencies of the Union interpreted re-strictively, as a rule performed by bodies of the member states. Equality and consensu-al decision-making

Defence, foreign poli-cy, common market and convertible curren-cy, protection of human and minority rights

Koštunica-Đinđić Platform (10.01.2001)

Autonomy of republics in all functions not re-ferred to federal level, incl. direct co-opera-tion

Functions performed at federal level minimal, defined by (1) the fed-eral units’ need and common interest and/or (2) the elementary functions of internal and external operabili-ty. Co-operation be-tween federal and republican bodies in decision-making and joint functions. Equali-ty of the federal units. Dislocation of some federal institutions to Montenegro

Fully exercised: natio-nal defence, monetary and customs system, transportation, commu-nication, foreign poli-cy. Jointly exercised: protection of basic rights and freedoms (incl. social rights), other basics of eco-nomic system

Serbia and Montene-gro Agreement (14.03.2002)

– –Dislocation of some federal institutions to Montenegro

Defence, foreign poli-cy, internal and inter-national economic relations, protection of human and minority rights

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In the five fields of common policy, the new Agreement clearly combines elementsfrom both positions. As Đukanović demanded, conscripts will not be forced to serve out-side their own republic against their will, but there will be only one federal army (a lessonfrom Bosnia). In line with the choice on international legal personality, foreign and de-fence policy are within the realm of the Union. In internal and international economic re-lations, the actual competencies of the federation are less clear, as the republics are al-lowed to keep their separate economies, currencies and customs services. At this point, theAgreement is almost as blank as the Belgrade platform. The domain of human and minor-ity rights is an open question; neither platform foresaw such a ministry that might eitherbecome a figurehead or a welcome excuse for the federal authorities to interfere in almostany republican legislation and political decision-making.

Table 3 – Common policy fields

Defence and foreign policy

Common market and currency

Economic relations

Đukanović Platform (28.12.2000)

Member state armies, military service in one’s member state. The Su-preme Defence Council (i.e. the three presi-dents) decides by con-sensus. Rotation of the defence and foreign ministers of the member states as defence minis-ter of the Union. For-eign policy of the Union to facilitate integration in Euro-Atlantic organi-sations

Common, externally convertible currency and free flow of goods, capital, people and in-formation. Each mem-ber state has its own central bank and retains the right to have its own monetary system

Single customs area without internal tariffs, harmonisation of customs policies and tariffs

Koštunica-Đinđić Platform (10.01.2001)

Defence by the federa-tion and the federal ar-my. Foreign policy as a federal prerogative with the possibility for the republics to exercise in-ternational economic integration and regional co-operation autono-mously

– –

Serbia and Montene-gro Agreement (14.03.2002)

By the state. The Su-preme Defence Council (i.e. the three presi-dents) decides by con-sensus. Conscripts serve in their own republic, unless they prefer other-wise

Harmonisation in trade and customs policies via EU economic system. Transitional harmonisa-tion takes into account the interests of the mem-ber states. EU monitor-ing and assistance

Republics responsible for free flow of goods, capital, people and serv-ices as well as for func-tioning common market

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In terms of state institutions and decision-making, the Agreement tends to follow themore pragmatic Belgrade approach, based on operability rather than an interpretation ofequality. The impracticable mode of the two republican Ministers of Defence and ForeignAffairs taking turns at the respective nominal position at the federal level has been re-placed by an ‘exchange of roles’ of these two federal Ministers and their respective Depu-ties (i.e. from the other republic). Having a ‘real’ federal Foreign and Defence Ministerstrengthens the federal level and so does the abolition of strict parity between the repub-lics in each federal position: President and Vice-President; each Minister and Deputy.Taking into account the limited competencies of the federal government, the Agreementdoes not foresee a Prime Minister (unlike the Belgrade model) and the supervision of theMinisterial Council will be in the hands of the President (unlike the Podgorica model,there is no mention of a Vice-President). The unicameral parliament, elected by all citi-zens of Serbia and Montenegro, points in the same direction, ignoring demands for a par-allel system of republican parity next to individual democratic rights. The ‘certain positivediscrimination’ for Montenegro, however, requires specification.

Table 4 – State institutions and decision-making

Assembly President, Court Council of Ministers

Đukanović Platform (28.12.2000)

Unicameral – deputies elected on parity basis and within the legisla-tive competence of the member states. Rotation of president and vice-president of the assem-bly

Elected and dismissed by the Assembly with prior agreement of the Assemblies of the mem-ber states. President of Union and President of the Council of Ministers from different member states and represent po-litical majority Federal court

President, Vice-Presi-dent, Ministers of For-eign Affairs, Defence, Finance and Economic Relations. President/Vice-President, Minis-ters/Deputy-Ministers from different member states

Koštunica-Đinđić Platform (10.01.2001)

Bicameral – absolute majority in both cham-bers needed for funda-mental federal decisions. General juris-diction for both cham-bers. Chamber of Republics with equal number of deputies from federal units, elected in republican legislatures. Citizens of the federation elect Chamber of Citizens, mandatory minimum for Montenegro

Elected by the Federal Assembly, alternately from the two republics, dismissed only by rul-ing of Federal Court, nominates senior state officialsFederal court as consti-tutional and regular court

Prime Minister elected alternately from the two republics. The Ministers are accountable to the Prime Minister, who is accountable to the Fed-eral Assembly

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Political elites and strategic realignments

Both in Belgrade and in Podgorica, key political figures that were not directly involved inthe actual negotiations pretended surprise and shock at the results. Most recovered quicklyand began to reposition themselves accordingly. In Montenegro, Đukanović, a politicalsurvivor of some repute, faced a tough political imbroglio. The President tried to explainhis decision to his supporters by underlining that, instead of stopping it, the agreementpostpones but in principle accepts, a referendum on independence. Nevertheless, the Mon-tenegrin government was not expected electorally to survive Đukanovićs surprise move:his coalition partner, the Social Democratic Party (Socijaldemokratska partija, SDP) wasmore radical than the DPS in its drive for independence, but could not equal the LiberalAlliance (Liberalni savez Crne Gore, LSCG), which supported the DPS-SDP minoritygovernment, in its single-minded drive for statehood. SDP leader Ranko Krivokapić im-mediately demanded the annulment of the agreement and an immediate referendum. TheDPS offer to the liberals to join the government coalition seemed to be a red herring: in or-der to stay on top of developments, Đukanović had to come to terms with the oppositionalbloc ‘Together for Yugoslavia’, which reacted in more jubilant tones than the ruling par-ties. The first meetings between Đukanović and his SNP opponent Predrag Bulatović dateback to August 2001 when the referendum seemed a forgone conclusion. The Presidentmay be in for some tough negotiations, but representatives of the opposition People’sParty (Narodna Stranka, NS) and of the Socialist People’s Party have cautiously signalledrespect for his ‘stopping at the brink of disaster’ and have even indicated support for theagreement.20 All the party leaders seemed to be waiting for the first indications of the pop-ular mood; and the polls soon indicated that betting on a majority in a referendum on inde-pendence would be risky: support for pro-Yugoslav and pro-independence parties wasequal, with an increasing rate of possible non-voters among independence supporters. 21

In Serbia, Koštunica posed himself as the real winner and tried to sweeten the bitter pillfor his nostalgic supporters by proclaiming ‘the beginning of a new historic unity between

Serbia and Montene-gro Agreement (14.03.2002)

Unicameral – election laws of member states, certain positive discrim-ination for Montenegro. Mechanism against the outvoting of member states

Elected by parliament, proposes and directs Council of MinistersCourt as constitutional and administrative court

Foreign affairs, de-fence, international eco-nomic relations, internal economic relations as well as the protection of human and minority rights. Ministers pro-posed and directed by the President, rotation of Ministers/Deputy Ministers in Foreign Af-fairs and Defence

20 Michael Meyer-Resende: ‘The End of Yugoslavia – the End of Disintegration?’, RFE/RLNewsline, 22.3.2002; Mika Tadić Mijović ‘Montenegro: Đukanović Plots Comeback’,IWPR Balkan Crisis Report, 15.3.2002.

21 Zoran Radulovic: ‘Montenegro: Premier’s Resignation Triggers Political Chaos’, IWPR Bal-kan Crisis Report, 26.4.2002.

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Serbia and Montenegro.’22 The state envisaged in the Agreement would have an improvedpresidential authority: election by the parliament rather than the populace will diminish itspopular legitimacy but the competencies of the post would be more concretely defined.Early elections were bound to become a test for the DOS coalition, for Đinđićs ability tokeep the 18-party coalition united and for Koštunica to reap the fruits of his declining, butstill high, popularity.23 Others, such as Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister Miroljub Labus,or Yugoslav National Bank Governor, Mlađan Dinkić, criticised that a multitude of ques-tions were left unanswered in the Agreement, particularly in the economic field. (Labusreferred to the Agreement as an ‘economic Frankenstein.’) 24 Serb nationalists decryingthe loss of Yugoslavia and Koštunica’s ‘betrayal’ must realise that the Agreement mayhave secured the best possible deal for nationally-minded Serbs, much better than a Yugo-slavia which existing only on paper. Conversely, many Serb leaders had been more thanwilling to let Montenegro go its own way, but most certainly did not want to incur a na-tionalist backlash at home by actually letting it go.

Thus, apart from the clear decision about the name of the new state ‘Serbia and Mon-tenegro,’ most of the contentious issues have been left open, awaiting a constructive nego-tiation process to fill in the gaps. Thus, the Agreement of 14 March is essentially a decla-ration of intent rather than a constitutional blueprint. The Agreement contains some bitterpills for each negotiating party and some partial victories. For a real negotiation process inregional ownership, this may be just the right mixture.

The obligatory verification of the agreement by the Montenegrin and Serbian parlia-ments after early elections (and the eventual ‘submission’ to the federal parliament) indi-cated that the outcome was not a foregone conclusion:25 a mixed commission from thetwo republican parliaments and the federal parliament (which is not recognised by theMontenegrin government!) were tasked with drafting a Constitutional Charter on the basisof parliamentary conclusions. Thereafter, the newly-elected republican parliaments and,eventually, a federal parliament elected by the entire constituency of ‘Serbia and Mon-tenegro’ would pass democratic judgement on the state of a new type, dubbed ‘Solarium’by some sceptics.

Subsequent to the signing of the Agreement, negotiations have been conducted formonths with frequent deadlocks, and it seems quite likely that the Agreement may neverbe implemented in full. A velvet divorce by mutual agreement within the next three yearsmay even be part of Đukanovićs and Đinđićs hidden agendas. Meanwhile, state forma-tion as work in progress may, on the one hand, produce a substantial restructuring of thepolitical landscape and, on the other, create a window of opportunity for real co-operationbased on shared interests.

22 Mika Tadić Mijović, op. cit.23 Željko Cvijanović: ’Serbia: Joint State Deals Blow to Đinđić, IWPR Balkan Crisis Report,

15.3.2002.24 Quoted from Dušan Reljić: ‘Serbien und Montenegro einigen sich über zukünftige staatliche

Gemeinschaft’, SWP-Brennpunkte (2002); RFE/RL Newsline, 20.3.2002.25 Bernhard Küppers: ‘Jugoslawiens Scheintod’, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 15.3.2002, p. 4.

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Open questions and hidden caveats

Like any good political deal, the Serbia-Montenegro Agreement leaves a number of ques-tions unanswered. The first crucial hiatus concerns its hybrid character between federationand confederation: implicitly, ‘Serbia and Montenegro’ is, effectively, a continuation ofthe 1992 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) since it is not a re-federalisation after adeclaration of independence, as envisaged by the Đukanović platform. At the same time,however, the need for the Constitutional Charter to be passed by the parliaments of themember states after elections (and only ‘submitted’ to the federal parliament), indicates aninstitutional break with the (recent) past. Evidently, the negotiating parties have decidedto tackle the political status issue first and leave open the contentious economic issues.Pressed for time, the EU seems to have accepted a looser form of union than envisaged inearlier blueprints.

The envisaged ‘loose union of a new type’ would enable a clearer institutional relation-ship between Serbia and the federal level, a precondition for rationalisation and the elimi-nation of the costly overlaps between the Yugoslav and the Serbian administrations: anumber of FRY institutions not foreseen for the new Union could be re-designated as in-stitutions of the Serbian Republic (e.g. the National Bank). The main structural problem tobe resolved, however, concerns the equality of two essentially unequal republics. Mon-tenegro will have its veto in the Supreme Defence Council and in the federal parliament,as well as its share of international representation. As long as there is a strategic consen-sus, the idea of a Montenegrin representing eight million inhabitants of Serbia and a fewhundred thousand Montenegrins in international organisations may even be bearable. Innegotiations with international financial institutions, however, conflicting interests mayeasily destroy the credibility of the new union, both externally and internally, while imple-menting the Agreement’s ‘special modes of representation for international financial insti-tutions’ will be a challenge. The same applies to the weighting of Montenegro’s demo-cratic representation in the federal decision-making bodies: how to design a system whichboth prevents Serbia from outvoting its junior partner on each and every issue whilst pre-venting Montenegro from applying its veto to get a disproportionate say in common po-licy-making?

The main deficit of the agreement – in that respect more similar to the Ko štunica/Đinđićplatform than to Đukanovićs – concerns the economic integration of the two memberstates. The Serbian prime minister had noted during the negotiations that he cared more foreconomic than for political integration, but each member of the new state will retain, for thetime being, its own economic, financial and customs systems and Montenegro its Euro cur-rency, much along the lines recommended in the ICG/CEPS letter to Solana. 26 Montenegromay also keep its lower tariffs and a customs regime between the two republics. Con-versely, access for Montenegrins to Serbian institutions of higher education, medical careand other state services beyond the reach of a mini-state like Montenegro is likely to be-come an issue for negotiations. Economic separation has many disadvantages, but the cur-rent asymmetries do not allow for significant re-integration. Economic separation, how-ever, is not so much a setback but rather an acceptance of current realities.

26 ICG/CEPS media release: ‘EU Pressure’.

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The federal Deputy Prime Minister, Miroljub Labus, criticised the lack of clarity interms of timetables and economic matters, noting that one year would be a reasonabletimeframe for the re-integration of markets. His one-year deadline refers to the expectedduration of the negotiations for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement between thenew state and the European Union, the first step towards full EU membership in 10-15years.27 EU mediators and the negotiating parties both gave priority to breaking the spellof the (political) status question, hoping that new synergies and the economic momentumreleased by the integrative Stabilisation and Association Process towards full EU mem-bership will make up for the evident disadvantages of economic separation. 28 The EU’spromise to support and monitor intermediate bilateral harmonisation in the economicfield, and eventual harmonisation under the aegis of the European common market, bothindicate that the expectation is that economic policies will be more rational and controlla-ble than the emotional and intractable status question. Economic re-integration could takeplace gradually as Serbia catches up and as EU integration becomes a closer prospect.

The aftermath of the AgreementThe procedure envisaged by the Agreements ‘Proceeding points for the restructuring ofrelations between Serbia and Montenegro’ was rather elaborate and, needless to say, vio-lated the relevant clauses in the respective Constitutions. Firstly, the Parliaments of Serbia(10 April 2002), Montenegro (10 April 2002) and Yugoslavia (31 May 2002) all ratifiedthe Agreement itself rather quickly and without much ado. Originally, it was foreseen thatthe Constitutional Charter – to be hammered out by a tripartite parliamentary commission– would be passed in June and new federal elections set for autumn. 29 Eventually, the dif-ferences between the two delegations from Belgrade, on the one hand, and the delegationfrom Podgorica, on the other, proved hard to overcome. The committee declared itself un-able to produce a draft Constitutional Charter by mid-August 2002. In an effort to breakthe deadlock, the Serbian and Montenegrin governments opened parallel negotiations andpassed a unified proposal for a Charter (written by the DOS presidium). The proposal en-visaged 22 elected representatives from Montenegro and 59 from Serbia (a ratio of 1 to2.1) The proposal left unanswered only the question of the election system for the federalparliament.30 Serbia and the Montenegrin opposition preferred to have the federal MPselected directly (thus enhancing their legitimacy), whereas the Montenegrin governmentinsisted on having the MPs merely delegated by the respective national parliaments. Ow-ing to this one single, but admittedly thorny, issue, the finalisation of the constitutionalprocess was postponed until the end of 2002. Inevitably, the duration of the negotiationscreated more and more specific demands and objections from all sides. The failure of thethird round of the Serbian presidential elections in December 2002 resulted in yet anotherpostponement of the finalisation of the Charter.

Ironically, all three parties – Podgorica, Belgrade and Brussels – had their troubles inthe aftermath of the signing of the Agreement on 14 March, albeit that these were differ-

27 Balkans Weekly, 15.3.2002.28 Reljić, op. cit.29 Meyer-Resende, op. cit.30 Zoran B. Nikolić: ‘Serbia and Montenegro Postpone Adoption of New Federal Constitu-

tion’, Balkan Times, 24.9.2002.

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ent than had been predicted by many observers. In Belgrade, the Agreement generallyfailed to stir public and political emotions: the ongoing conflict between Ko štunica andĐinđić outshining the whole issue of statehood. Both competitors, moreover, were fullyaware that neither could afford to take on the EU in an issue directly linked to the per-spective of EU membership, EU assistance and admission to the Council of Europe. Atough position on ICTY co-operation might enhance a politician’s popularity; a trade-offbetween the details of the Union with Montenegro and tangible EU assistance certainlywould not. Nevertheless, Đinđić may be more under pressure to wrap up the Constitu-tional Charter, thus gaining international standing, to compensate for his lack of domes-tic popularity. Thus, he made additional concessions to Nebojsa Ćović and other propo-nents of a more unified state, even after Belgrade and Podgorica had agreed on a draftcharter on 26 August 2002.31 Ćović insisted, for instance, on having ‘Kosovo and Meto-hija’ mentioned in the text – a populist gesture without relevance to the Montenegrins –whereas Foreign Minister Goran Svilanović argued that Kosovo was not an issue for thefederation, only for Serbia. Yet, Kosovo and Vojvodina did have the status of constitu-tive elements in the old Yugoslavia. Politicians from Vojvodina and, in particular,Sandžak suggested that minority protection legislation should be made a federal preroga-tive, but this was, however, rejected by Podgorica.32 The unresolved relations betweenfederal, national and regional authorities also caused interference as Đinđić had a bilat-eral Serbian-Montenegrin commission hammer out the draft, whereas Ko štunica pro-tested against the exclusion of the federal authorities and Justice Minister Vladan Bati ćsuggested a startling new option – a Serbian referendum on independence prior to thecreation of the new union with Montenegro.33

Predictably, in Podgorica the pro-independence government of Filip Vujanovi ć fellin April, as the Liberal Alliance and the SDP withdrew their support. More surprisingly,Đukanovićs DPS fared reasonably well in the local elections in May 2002: apparently,the electorate preferred a well-managed, gradual divorce without the radical breaks andpolitical confrontation that might be detrimental to economic and social relations be-tween the two states.34 Thus, Parliament accepted the Belgrade Agreement in combina-tion with a possible referendum on independence in March 2005. 35 Even more surpris-ingly, no polarisation or even escalation occurred over the independence issue. On thecontrary, after months of squabbling, the pro-independence Liberal Alliance joinedforces at the local level with the pro-Yugoslav bloc against Đukanović and enforcedearly parliamentary elections in October 2002 at the republican level. 36 The electoratehad consistently given unemployment and other socio-economic issues a much higherpriority in opinion polls than the independence issue, but politicians were now also

31 Deutsche Welle Monitor, 29.8.2002 & 3.9.2002; Nenad Stefanović: ‘Serbie-Monténégro:Entertien avec Nebojša Ćović, Le Courrier des Balkans, 17.4.2002.

32 BETA, 29.8.& 2.9.2002. 33 Deutsche Welle Monitor, 21.8.2002.34 Mika Tadić-Mijović: Đukanović Confounds Pollsters’, IWPR Balkan Crisis Report,

17.5.2002. 35 Montenegro Today, 27.5.2002.36 Neđeljko Rudović: ‘Montenegro: Liberal Switch Heralds Early Elections’, IWPR Balkan

Crisis Report, 28.6.2002.

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demonstrating that there were other stakes involved in Montenegrin politicking than in-dependence. That Đukanović had to present the Belgrade Agreement as a kind of com-monwealth of independent states, whereas the pro-Yugoslav opposition had to demon-strate that, essentially, Yugoslavia continued to exist, made the debate in Podgoricaextremely difficult. And, to top it all, those who were in the opposition in Podgoricaheld only a minute majority in the national parliament and were the only representativesof the country in the federal parliament.

Conversely, in Brussels the Agreement triggered controversy between the High Repre-sentative responsible for crisis management and the Commissioner responsible for signingthe Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the new state. The Belgrade Agreementfocused on the political issues, essentially leaving economic questions unanswered andbanking on the leverage of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement:

Harmonisation of the economic systems of the member states with the EU economic systemshall overcome the existing differences, primarily in the spheres of trade and customs poli-cies. In both regards, economic reforms that have already been carried out in the memberstates shall be taken into full account, while solutions that would provide for the quickest in-tegration into the European Union shall be accepted. Transitional solutions in harmonisingtrade and customs policies should take into account the interests of the member states. TheEuropean Union shall assist in the accomplishment of these objectives and monitor theprocess on a regular basis. The modalities for the achievement of these objectives shall beelaborated in parallel with the Constitutional Charter. If one of the member states believesthat the other does not live up to the commitments under this Agreement concerning the op-eration of a common market and the harmonisation of trade and customs policies, it shall re-serve the right to raise the matter with the EU in the context of the Stabilisation and Associ-ation Process with the view to the adoption of appropriate measures.

Thus, Patten’s negotiators made it clear to the quarrelling politicians in Belgrade andPodgorica that too loose a federation would not do in seeking qualification for the firststep towards EU membership, i.e. a feasibility study on a Stabilisation and AssociationAgreement. Otherwise, it would be impossible to apply EU conditionality and assistanceto two completely different states in an empty shell of a union without political and eco-nomic authority. It would have been paradoxical indeed to have a loose federation joinwith regional and, later, European integration without achieving the same level of integra-tion bilaterally. Joint customs systems, a single market and unified tariffs are absolute pre-requisites. Thus, the draft Constitutional Charter of August envisioned the creation of aSerbian-Montenegrin single market and the harmonisation of the economies and customsregimes within two years. The admission criteria for a Stabilisation and AssociationAgreement define minimum levels of economic union and harmonisation. 37

Solana’s ‘robust mediation’, moreover, treads a thin line between too little intervention,thus allowing politicking local leaders to deadlock the negotiations, and too much inter-vention, provoking truculence on the part of the national authorities. Thus, some Belgradepoliticians have vociferously reiterated that no such advice was needed. Nevertheless, thesuggestions of the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission shaped the draft charter sub-

37 Ines Sabalić: ‘Montenegro: Brussels’ U-Turn on New State’, IWPR Balkan Crisis Report,12.7.2002.

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stantially.38 Thinly-veiled threats that delays caused by elections in Serbia and Montene-gro might affect the Stabilisation and Association Process or admission to the Council ofEurope have been to no avail in accelerating the process. 39

Consequences for regional stability?Many in Serbia, nostalgic for the days of Tito, will regret the loss of the name ‘Yugoslavia’and the ideal of the multi-ethnic state it once implied. For many in Serbia and beyond, afterthe experiences of the past ten years, Yugoslavia had come to stand only for Serbian ethno-nationalism and ethnic cleansing. Conversely, after the extradition of Milošević, droppingthe name ‘Yugoslavia’ is a second reassuring symbol for many in the region, a farewell tothe era of ethnic conflict and human tragedy. Whatever may be its quality as a functioningstate, the new name should be listed on the credit side of the balance sheet for ‘Serbia andMontenegro.’ Dropping the name ‘Yugoslavia,’ moreover, may give a new dimension andimpetus to the on-going debate on Serb national identity and the Serbian state.

The pivotal regional question relates to the consequences for the final status of Kosovo(and other potential status questions in the region, e.g. Republika Srpska and the Alba-nians in Macedonia). The main reason why the EU had strongly objected to the idea ofMontenegrin independence ever since Đukanović took office, despite the confirmation ofthe 1991/1992 Badinter Commission that Montenegro did have the right to self-determi-nation, was concern for precedent followed by yet another round of state fragmentation ina region traditionally suffering from too many projects in state- and nation-building. Mon-tenegro under the rule of DPS and SDP has been, however, largely characterised by acivic state with harmonious relations between the Montenegrin majority, Bosniak-Mus-lims, Albanians and the smaller minorities.40

Therefore, Kosovo’s status has been the main obstacle to Montenegrin independence,although political leaders in Podgorica and Priština have never tired of denying any suchnexus. Indeed, Kosovar politicians will never abandon their aspirations for independence,no matter what kind of constitutional acrobatics the Montenegrins perform. 41 Any imme-diate backlash in Kosovo of a Montenegrin referendum on independence seemed unlikelybut, both in Brussels and in the region, the Agreement has been applauded as an end to theBalkan trend of never-ending state fragmentation in a Europe characterised by integrationand the transfer of sovereign rights to intergovernmental organisations. 42

The International Crisis Group was not the first to raise the question as to what conse-quences the dissolution of the third Yugoslavia would have for the guarantee of its ‘sover-eignty and territorial integrity’ as contained in Resolution 1244 – all the more so as thisResolution referred to Kosovo as part of Yugoslavia, not of Serbia. 43 As of now, the ensu-

38 Gergana Noutcheva: ‘Negotiating a Viable State Union of Serbia and Montenegro,’ CEPSCommentary, August 2002. See also www.venice.coe.int.

39 Glas Javnosti, 19 & 25.9.2002.40 Tim Judah: ‘Montenegro’s Quest for Independence’, BBC News, 28.12.2000; Bieber, op.

cit. See also the chapter by František Šístek and Bohdana Dimitrovová on National minori-ties in Montenegro after the break-up of Yugoslavia, this volume.

41 Rüb, op. cit.42 Ljiljana Renke: ‘Ein steiniger Weg’, Deutsche Welle Monitor, 27.8.2002.43 UNSC Resolution 1244 (1999), adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting on 10

June 1999.

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ing debate between specialists in international and constitutional law has only academicrelevancy. ‘Serbia and Montenegro’ becomes the successor state of the defunct FRY andthe 14 March Agreement includes an explicit safeguard against possible disintegration af-ter three years:

If Montenegro withdraws from the state union, international documents related to FRY,U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 in particular, shall relate to and fully apply on Ser-bia as its successor.

Thus, this weaving fault in Resolution 1244 has been repaired and, strictly speaking,only the unlikely case of Serbia’s secession would unhinge it. The suggestion that theResolution is violated and that Serb sovereignty over Kosovo has been thereby re-intro-duced seems far-fetched: The UN Resolution could not deny Kosovo being a province ofthe Serbian republic under the Yugoslav Constitution and, albeit theoretically, Serbiamight uphold the defunct ‘shell’ of the FRY even after Montenegro’s secession if only be-cause of Kosovo.44

Nevertheless, in three years (at the latest), the triangular dilemma of Belgrade-Podgor-ica-Priština will come to a head again: in quick succession, the term of office of the Koso-var government, the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kos-ovo and the Serbian-Montenegrin moratorium on referenda will end. Three years,however, is a long time. What the Agreement brokered by Solana may achieve is gainingtime rather than playing for time. The new ‘union of states’ erases the delusion of the de-funct FRY that had become a danger in itself and offers a basic framework for new trilat-eral and regional arrangements. Even if the new state would be only a transitional solu-tion, ending the constitutional confusion and political deadlock, it would still be a historicachievement in the Balkan region – on a long and arduous road full of protracted negotia-tions and political detours.

44 Matthias Rüb: ‘Folgen der Einigung von Belgrad’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,16.3.2002, p. 6.

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Appendix 1 – Proceeding Points for the Restructuring of Relations be-tween Serbia and Montenegro1

Belgrade 15.03.2002

Agreement on Principles. The Agreement on Principles of relations betweenSerbia and Montenegro within the state union shall be signed by participants in thetalks: the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Deputy FederalPrime Minister, the President of the Republic of Montenegro, the Serbian andMontenegrin Premiers and, as a witness, the EU High Representative for CommonForeign and Security Policy. The document shall be submitted for debate to theParliaments of member states and the Federal Parliament.Constitutional Charter. On the basis of opinions put forward in parliamentarydebates, that is, parliamentary conclusions, a constitutional commission, whosemembers shall be delegated by the Parliaments of the Federal Republic of Yugo-slavia (FRY), Serbia and Montenegro, shall draft the Constitutional Charter, thehighest legal act of the state union of Serbia and Montenegro. The text of this actshall be adopted by the republican parliaments first, and than submitted to theFederal Parliament. Such procedure would reaffirm the elements of Serbian andMontenegrin statehood, stemming from the present-day factual situation and thehistoric rights of the two member states.Provision on Reconsideration. Upon the expiry of a three-year period, themember states shall be entitled to institute proceedings for a change of the statestatus, that is, withdrawal from the state union. If Montenegro withdraws from thestate union, international documents related to FRY, U.N. Security Council Reso-lution 1244 in particular, shall relate to and fully apply on Serbia as its successor.A member state that uses this right shall not inherit the right to international andlegal status, and all debatable issues shall be regulated specifically between thestate successor and the newly established state. If in a referendum process bothmember states declare themselves in favour of a change of the state status (inde-pendence), all debatable issues shall be resolved in succession proceedings, as wasdone in the case of former Yugoslavia. The Laws on Referendum shall be adoptedby the member states, taking full account of internationally recognised democraticstandards.The name of the state: Serbia and Montenegro.Institutions of Serbia and Montenegro: the Parliament, the President, theCouncil of Ministers and the Court.Parliament: A unicameral parliament providing certain positive discriminationfor Montenegrin representatives. The Laws on the Election of Representatives tothe Parliament of Serbia and Montenegro shall be adopted by the member states,in compliance with the principles defined by the Constitutional Charter. Mecha-nisms to protect against the outvoting of member states shall be provided for.

1 The web site of the FRY government, available at: www.gov.yu.

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President of Serbia and Montenegro: The President, elected by the Parliamentof Serbia and Montenegro, shall propose the composition of the Council of Minis-ters and direct its work.Council of Ministers: The Council of Ministers shall be composed of five de-partments: foreign affairs; defence; international economic relations; internal eco-nomic relations; and protection of human and minority rights. The competences ofthe ministries shall be defined in detail subsequently.The Court of Serbia and Montenegro: The Court shall have a constitutionalcourt and administrative court functions, and shall deal with harmonisation ofcourt practice. The administrative court function shall be exercised in relation tothe administrative acts of the ministries of the Council of Ministers. The Courtshall take legal views and give opinions related to the harmonisation of court prac-tice. The Court is not an appellate court and has an equal number of judges fromthe member states.The Army: The Army of Serbia and Montenegro shall be under the command ofthe Supreme Defence Council, composed of three presidents. The Supreme De-fence Council shall make decisions by consensus. Conscripts shall serve the armyon the territory of their respective member states, with the possibility of servingon the territory of the other member state, if they wish so.Elections and Appointments: Upon the promulgation of the ConstitutionalCharter under the specified procedure, elections shall take place, the Parliament ofSerbia and Montenegro shall be constituted, the President of Serbia and Montene-gro shall be elected, as well as members of the Council of Ministers and judges ofthe Court of Serbia and Montenegro. It shall also be possible to provide for rota-tion during a term in office. (In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry ofDefence, the minister and his/her deputy from different member states shall taketurns when one half of the term in office has expired). In representing the memberstates in international organisations (UN, OSCE, EU and the Council of Europe),parity shall be provided for through rotation, whereas special models for represen-tation shall be defined for international financial organisations. In diplomatic andconsular representative offices of Serbia and Montenegro abroad, special agree-ment shall be made on proportionate representation of the member states. TheConstitutional Charter shall be submitted to the Parliaments for deliberation by theend of June 2002 at the latest.Dislocation of federal institutions. Some federal institutions can be headquar-tered in Podgorica.Constitutional reconstruction of the member states. Within the activitiesaimed at the promulgation of the Constitutional Charter of Serbia and Montene-gro, the member states shall amend their respective constitutions in compliancewith the Constitutional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro or promulgate new con-stitutions by the end of 2002 at the latest.Economic sphere. The level of economic reforms reached in Serbia and Mon-tenegro shall be a proceeding point for regulating mutual economic relations. The

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member states shall be responsible for the unhindered operation of a commonmarket, including the free flow of people, goods, services and capital. Harmonisa-tion of the economic systems of the member states with the EU economic systemshall overcome the existing differences, primarily in the spheres of trade and cus-toms policies. In both regards, economic reforms that have already been carriedout in the member states shall be taken into full account, while solutions thatwould provide for the quickest integration into the European Union shall be ac-cepted. Transitional solutions in harmonising trade and customs policies shouldtake into account the interests of the member states. The European Union shall as-sist in the accomplishment of these objectives and monitor the process on a regu-lar basis. The modalities for the achievement of these objectives shall be elabo-rated in parallel with the Constitutional Charter. If one of the member statesbelieves that the other does not live up to the commitments under this agreementconcerning the operation of a common market and the harmonisation of trade andcustoms policies, it shall reserve the right to raise the matter with the EU in thecontext of the Stabilisation and Association Process with the view to the adoptionof appropriate measures. The EU shall guarantee that, if other conditions and cri-teria for the Stabilisation and Association Process are fulfilled, the agreed princi-ples of constitutional organisation shall not be an obstacle to a rapid conclusion ofan Agreement on Association and Stabilisation.President of the Federal Republic Yugoslavia Vojislav Koštunica Deputy Federal Prime Minister Miroljub Labus President of the Republic of Montenegro Milo Đukanović Premier of the Republic of Serbia Zoran Đinđić Premier of the Republic of Montenegro Filip VujanovićWitnessed by EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy JavierSolana

Belgrade, March 14 2002

Appendix 1

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Srđa Pavlović

Who are Montenegrins? Statehood, identity, and civic society

IntroductionThe last decade of the 20th century was a time of significant political, ideological and de-mographic changes in Eastern and ‘Central’ Europe.1 We witnessed the collapse of theformer Soviet Union and the disappearance of the Berlin Wall, as well as the rise of eth-nic, local and regional aspirations that re-introduced the issues of nationality and national-ism to the European political scene. The over-optimistic prediction that the era of nation-alism and nation states was approaching its final phase proved to be premature indiscounting the nature and vitality of those concepts. Today, nationality and nationalismappear to be the most universal legitimate values in contemporary political life.

This chapter will elaborate on the historical continuity and some of the contemporarymanifestations of the problems facing Montenegro in its struggle to re-negotiate its posi-tion in the region and to preserve distinct notions of national and cultural identity amongits peoples. The primary objective of the chapter is to highlight the issue of identity con-struction in Montenegro over time. It should be kept in mind that the concept of identityand the process of identity construction are ever-changing phenomena. Accordingly, it isneither possible nor advisable to speak of identity in terms of finality, but rather in termsof an ongoing process of accommodation, adjustment and re-definition.

For scholars interested in Montenegro’s past, writing about its history means probingthrough layers of mythologised yester-years and trying to shed more light on the questionof the origins of Montenegrins. When was Montenegro first mentioned and in what sense?Was the Montenegrin state only a ‘peripheral extension of Serbia’ or was it an independ-ent and recognisable entity?2 Who are Montenegrins? Are they Serbs populating the areaknown as Montenegro, thus adopting the toponym as their ethnic name? Are they a SouthSlavic people with their own distinct identity, incorporating certain elements of the pre-Slavic inhabitants of the Balkan Peninsula? Are they an integral part of a broader Serbianethnic framework (‘the best of the Serbs’) that ended up isolated from the nation’s nucleusdue to an unfortunate historical circumstance? Is it possible to talk about the identities ofpeoples living in present-day Montenegro independent of an all-inclusive Serbian para-digm and outside the canonised binary opposition of Serb versus Montenegrin identity?

1 For more detailed discussions on the nature of the concept of ‘Central Europe’ from the Balkanperspective see Maria Todorova: Imagining the Balkans (New York: Oxford University Press,1997), pp. 140-160; Tomislav Z. Longinović: Borderline Culture: The Politics of Identity inFour Twentieth Century Slavic Novels (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1993); K.E.Fleming: ‘Orientalism, the Balkans and Balkan Historiography,’ American Historical ReviewVol. 105 No. 4 (October 2000), pp. 1218-1233. Also see Perry Anderson: ‘A Ripple of the Polo-naise’, London Review of Books, November 1999. For some of my own thoughts on the subject,see Srđa Pavlović: ‘Kako Sačuvati Staru Damu Evropu’, Matica No. 7-8 (Autumn/Winter2001), pp. 29-48, and Srđa Pavlović: Iza Ogledala (Podgorica: CID, 2001), pp. 53-80.

2 Christopher Boehm: Montenegrin Social Organisation and Values: Political Ethnography ofa Refugee Area Tribal Adaptation (New York: AMS Press, 1983), p. 9.

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All of the available historical sources do not provide a clear answer to these questions.The initial contact and, later, the mixing and intermarrying of Slavs with the indigenouspopulation of the Balkans has blurred the lines and prevented a clear-cut ethnic distinc-tion. From the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century onwards, it is possible to makea distinction between Montenegrins and Serbs in terms of their independent political his-tories, as well as their tradition, customs, moral codes and the elements that best define thesocial cultures of their respective societies. The issue of the contested identity of Mon-tenegrins represents the starting point in every debate that evolves around the question ofpolitical relations between Montenegro and Serbia. From the Serbian perspective, Mon-tenegrins were and still are ethnic Serbs living in Montenegro and their state is regarded asproof of the continuity of Serb presence in the region from the medieval times to present.

Methodological dilemma: tribal or national consciousness?The case for the state’s independence and sovereignty might be easier to argue, but resolv-ing the issue of identity/identities in the Montenegro of the period is a daunting task. 3 Ex-amining this aspect of Montenegrin history should begin by addressing the issue of the na-tional awareness of its population in the past. This is an important point of departurebecause it deals with the issues of ‘ancestral land’ and ‘temporal continuity’, and with theapplication of modern analytical categories such as nation and national identity to periodsprior to the emergence of these concepts. Did the 17th and 18th century Montenegrin tribesthink of themselves in national terms and were they aware of the existence of such a levelof identification?

Even though Montenegrin history and tradition provide numerous examples of identifica-tion with Serbs, it would be safe to argue that such identification was of a general, non na-tion-specific nature and had more to do with the notion of shared religious beliefs than withethnic/national awareness among the Montenegrin tribes of the period. However, manyscholars are quick to include Montenegrins with Serbs and to point out that the region was,for centuries, a refuge for the remnants of a defeated Serb nation. 4 This inclusion is rational-ised by invoking the shared language and religious beliefs of Montenegrins and Serbs, andelevating the importance of certain common features of their respective traditional cultures. 5

Others maintain that Montenegrins could and should call themselves a nation because they

3 On the development of Montenegrin statehood, see Šerbo Rastoder’s Short review of thehistory of Montenegro, this volume.

4 ‘From the tenth to the twentieth century, the Zeta area preserved a nucleus of Serbian cultureand nationalism at a time when Serbia was overrun by Bulgars or Ottomans.’ Boehm: Mon-tenegrin Social Organisation, p. 9. Barbara Jelavich wrote about Montenegro as ‘the secondSerbian state’, in Jelavich: History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries,Vol. 1. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 247. Also see R. W. SetonWatson: The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans, (New York: Howard Fertig, 1966), p. 31 andAdrian Hastings: The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 128, 142.

5 The argument about shared religious beliefs represents a contested territory because ‘Ortho-doxy alone can not for any length of time paper over other factors of division … Mon-tenegrin Orthodoxy has resisted, and still resists, incorporation within a Serb church.’Hastings: op. cit., p. 142.

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have a different political history and because one could make a strong case for the long-standing existence of an apparent horizontal identification among Montenegrins. 6

It appears that both approaches are coloured by opposing political views which supportprojecting the concept of national consciousness back in time in order to establish histori-cal continuity for the presence of a particular nation in the region. Such methodology ra-tionalises the concept of a lost ‘ancestral land’ that has to be reclaimed. In modern times,the urge to repossess the ‘cradle’ of one’s civilisation from an unwanted ‘other’ has oftenresulted in significant demographic changes and forced population movements. Further-more, projecting a modern concept back in time does not seem entirely appropriate be-cause it is difficult to apply the logic of national belonging/awareness to periods beforesuch concepts existed.7 However, with the advent of an ideology of national awakening inMontenegro during the last decades of the 19th century, the character, intensity and mo-tives for the region's conflicts acquired a specific and new framework. 8 Only with theemergence of a political project that called for nation-building and national homogenisa-tion did the peoples in the region begin confronting each other in relation to their respec-tive ethnic and religious prerogatives (Christians against the ‘Turks’ (Muslims); Serbsagainst Croats, or Serbs against Albanians, and vice versa). Prior to that, the various in-habitants of the Balkans fought each other for many reasons and on behalf of many em-pires, but the elements of ethnic/national animosity did not play a significant role (if anyat all) in those confrontations. 9

Montenegrin society at the time (17th and 18th century) was characterised by occasionaland voluntary co-operation at the inter-tribal level. However, these temporary allianceshad little to do with the modern concept of national identity but, rather, limited themselvesto military aims, primarily fencing off Ottoman forces. There can be no question about theprimacy of tribal autonomy in Old Montenegro and Brda over the powers of the centralauthority in Cetinje.10 Furthermore, almost all the Montenegrin tribes (with the exceptionof those from Katunska Nahija) assisted at one time or another the neighbouring Ottoman

6 Jozo Tomašević: Peasants, Politics and Economic Change in Yugoslavia (Palo Alto: Stan-ford University Press, 1955), p. 126 (footnote).

7 With regard to the timeframe of the emergence of nation-states and the concept of national-ism, I am more inclined to follow the so-called ‘modernist view’, advocated by scholars suchas Eric Hobsbawm, John Breuilly, Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson than the viewsexpressed by Adrian Hastings.

8 Ivo J. Lederer: ‘Nationalism and the Yugoslavs’, in Peter F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer (eds.):Nationalism in Eastern Europe (Seattle & London: University of Washington Press, 1969),pp. 399-403.

9 Noel Malcolm: Kosovo: A Short History (London: Macmillan, 1998), Introduction, pp.xxviii-xxx. For an interesting analysis of the position of Catholic Albanians in Montenegroat the end of the nineteenth century, see: Šerbo Rastoder; Janusovo lice istorije: odabraničlanci i rasprave, (Podgorica: Vijesti, 2000), pp. 105-125.

10 ‘Montenegro was divided into two parts – Montenegro and the Brda. The first was old Mon-tenegro with some additions on the Herzegovinian side; the second, the mountain mass thatborders on Albania.’ Mary Edith Durham: Some Tribal Origins, Laws and Customs of theBalkans (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1928), p. 34. Brda is the name of the tribal land tothe north and north-east of so-called Old Montenegro. The region of Brda encompassedtribes such as Bjelopavlići, Piperi, Kuči, Vasojevići and others.

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forces against other tribes from the area.11 In the Montenegro of the 17th and 18th century,it was the tribe and not the state/central authority that nearly exclusively provided themechanisms of horizontal identification for individuals. The central authority played avery limited role in this process since it was the tribe that always acted as safe harbour forthe individual and constructed, and maintained the social poetics of the time.12 With thisin mind, it would be safe to conclude that the Montenegrin tribesmen of the 17 th and 18th

centuries valued their tribal allegiance highly and were much more aware of their belong-ing to a particular tribe than they were of thinking of themselves in terms of a nationalidentity. New national demarcation lines within Montenegro and in respect to its neigh-bours came into existence only with the advent of the idea of national awakening and na-tional homogenisation on a more general level.

Politics of identity: from Serbhood to Yugoslavism and backThe Montenegro of Prince (later King) Nikola I Petrović Njegoš (ruler from 1860 until1918) was characterised by a trend in the modernisation of the country and the strengthen-ing of its central authority, as well as the development of a much-needed infrastructure in-cluding roads, elementary and secondary schools, a postal service, banking and telephoneservices. These first steps in the development of the Montenegrin economy and the re-structuring of the state apparatus produced some negative consequences. At the time whenPrince Nikola was working on strengthening the central authority and elevating his ownrole in the country's affairs, some tribal leaders felt increasingly marginalised and sawtheir authority diminished. Nikola's departure from the traditional way of conducting poli-tics (consulting with the tribal leaders) was seen as not only the abandonment of the ‘oldways’ but also as the first step in dissolving the traditional values of Montenegrin soci-ety.13 On 19 December 1905, the Constitutional Assembly, known as NikoljdanskaSkupština (the St. Nicholas Day Assembly), proclaimed the first Montenegrin Constitu-tion. According to the new law of the land, Montenegro was a constitutional but not a par-liamentary monarchy, since the Prince retained the ultimate say in matters of the state andin the decision-making process.14 What followed were a series of short-term political alli-

11 Mary Edith Durham, op. cit., p. 82. Nahija (Nahiya) was the smallest administrative unit inthe Ottoman state. Katunska Nahija was the core of Old Montenegro. See Jelavich, op. cit.,Vol. 1 p. 57.

12 Svetlana Boym views social poetics as the basis for cultural identity and as ‘cultural inti-macy that provides a glue in everyday life… Such identity involves everyday games of hide-and-seek that only ‘natives’ play, unwritten rules of behavior, jokes understood from half aword, a sense of complicity. State propaganda and official national memory build on thiscultural intimacy, but there is also a discrepancy and tension between the two.’ SvetlanaBoym: The Future of Nostalgia (New York: Basic Books, 2001), pp. 42-43. Also seeMichael Herzfeld, Cultural Intimacy: Social Poetics in the Nation-State (New York:Routledge, 1997), pp. 13-14.

13 Ivo Banac: The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics (Ithaca: CornellUniversity Press, 1984), p. 276.

14 The first Montenegrin Constitution was drafted jointly by Prince Nikola and his legal adviserand journalist from Belgrade, Stevan Ćurčić. It greatly resembled the Serbian Constitutionof 1869. Jagoš Jovanović: Istorija Crne Gore, 2nd ed. (Cetinje: Izdavački Centar Cetinje &CID, 1995), pp. 337-38.

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ances, a succession of more or less inefficient governments and the development of seri-ous political rivalry in Montenegro.15

After fifty years of rule, Nikola decided in 1910 to proclaim Montenegro a Kingdom.The coronation represented an effort to strengthen Nikola’s political position at home inaddition to being an effort to internationalise the question of Montenegro’s desired territo-rial expansion at the expense of the Ottoman state. For supporters of his decision, the cor-onation was a continuation of the tradition of Montenegrin independence and an importantstep forward in the process of the complete ‘renewal’ of the ancient Kingdom of Zetafrom 1077. In emphasising his attachment to the Serbian nation, King Nikola I pointed outthe importance of Montenegrin independence and sovereignty, effectively dividing Mon-tenegro into two hostile political camps. Those opposing his policies argued that the coro-nation was nothing more than the act of a power-hungry despot. The new kingdom never-theless proved to be a brief accomplishment because, at the end of World War I,Montenegro lost its independence and sovereignty, and found itself first as part of Serbiaand then, later, of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. 16

During this period, the contested nature of Montenegrin identity came to the politicalforefront and constituted a stumbling block in relations between Serbia and Montenegro.The issue of identities and loyalties gained prominence due to a number of factors, geog-raphy and politics being among the most important. The process of constructing the newgeographical boundaries of Montenegro had a profound impact on how interchanges tookplace between local populations and the state authority concerned, and how the localsadapted to these new frontiers.17 The significant change in the country’s size, which, inturn, was closely related to the economic state of affairs at the local level, affected themechanisms of political and national identification (at the individual level and at that ofthe group). Different groups and individuals living in Montenegro at the time had veryspecific regional and local interests which could not easily be reduced to a universalised‘national’ character or political unit, while the frontiers delineated by the European pow-ers and by the educational and economic reforms, which had been thought to have solidi-fied post-Ottoman identities, proved to be confusing at best. 18 Moreover, the differentgroups within a given tribe (family, clan/familija, bratstvo) in Montenegro had very spe-cific interests which did not always correspond with the interests of the tribe as a whole.These conflicting needs and aspirations at the micro level had rendered the process of na-tional homogenisation in Montenegro even more difficult and had, furthermore, under-mined the cohesiveness of the entire undertaking. The general perception of this process

15 See Jovan Đonović: Ustavne i političke borbe u Crnoj Gori 1905-1910 (Beograd: K.J.Mihailović, 1939).

16 Jovan R. Bojović: Podgorička skupština 1918: dokumenta (Gornji Milanovac: Dečjenovine, 1989).

17 During the reign of Prince (later king) Nikola I Petrović, Montenegro quadrupled its terri-tory. As Ivo Banac points out, after the Balkan wars and for the first time ‘Montenegrinsruled not only over a large body of hostile Muslims, many of them Albanians, but also overhighland tribes with a tradition of strong ties to Serbia.’ Banac, op. cit., p. 275.

18 This adaptation was particularly difficult for non-Christians and non-Slavs living inareas bordering Old Montenegro, some of which were later incorporated into the Mon-tenegrin state.

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in Montenegro goes along the lines of monocausal explanations of the phenomena of eth-nic/national identity which are undergoing continuous modification but, in spite of the ro-manticism of national histories and the persistence of many nationalists, the process offorging a new Montenegrin identity was anything but a smooth ride. Indeed, remnants ofthat old tribal loyalty can still be detected today among the citizens of Montenegro. Manyof them display a significantly high level of attachment and loyalty to their regional, localand tribal identities. In most cases, the first level of identification is either the region/na-hiya (Katunjanin, Crmničanin, Lješnjanin, Bjelopavlić, Cuca, Bjelica, Malisor, Bokelj),or the tribe whose geographic boundaries and name usually correspond with the region(Vasojevići tribe, Drobnjak tribe, etc.).19 Only then, and only in terms of a more generallevel of identification, which is, at present, heavily coloured by the ideologies of the day,does one come across national categories such as Montenegrin, Serb, Serb from Montene-gro, Albanian, Muslim or Croat.

Political conflict during the first decades of the twentieth century also contributed to theformation of national identity. A growing parliamentary opposition characterised theMontenegrin political landscape of the period. The parliament became the arena for a bit-ter confrontation between the representatives of the so-called 'people’s movement' andthose representing the government and Prince/King Nikola I. The main political partieswere the People’s Party (Narodna Stranka), better known as Klubaši (their leader wasŠako Petrović), and the True People’s Party (Prava Narodna Stranka), known as Pravaši(led by Lazar Mijušković). Supporters of the People’s Party not only opposed the policiesof Prince (later King) Nikola I, but were also passionate advocates of the unification ofMontenegro with Serbia. Most of them regarded Montenegro as a Serb state and Mon-tenegrins as ethnic Serbs. Consequently, the majority of party members and supportersidentified themselves as ethnic Serbs. The opposing political group consisted of membersof the True People’s Party who supported Nikola’s policies and the concept of Mon-tenegrin independence and sovereignty. However, no political group in the Montenegro ofthe time represented a uniform entity, particularly when it came to the issue of identity.The demand of the Pravaši for independence was heavily influenced by the politics of thetime and most of its members did not dispute the perceived ethnic/national identity be-tween Montenegrins and Serbs; they considered themselves to be Serbs from Montenegro.Prince Nikola was one of the principle advocates of such identity politics. 20 However,there were also those among the Pravaši who not only advocated Montenegrin independ-ence but thought of themselves as distinctively Montenegrin.

From the turn of the twentieth century onwards, relations between Montenegro and Ser-bia were conditioned by the intensity of the dynastic struggle for prestige among the SouthSlavs, i.e. between the Montenegrin dynasty of Petrović-Njegoš and the Serbian dynasties

19 Katunjanin is a person from the Katunska Nahiya.20 Ivo Banac pointed out: ‘The tradition of Montenegrin self-centeredness did not, however,

prevent reciprocity with the Serbians, though on the basis of a veritable worship of Montene-gro. On the contrary, the Serb tradition percolated down to the consciousness of most ordi-nary herdsmen by a system of mnemonic devices by which the church continuallyadmonished the Montenegrins to remember the glories of the Nemanjić state. Time andagain, Montenegrin rulers took the lead in attempting to restore the medieval Serbianempire.’ Banac, op. cit., p. 247.

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of Obrenović and Karađorđević. All three dynasties presented themselves as the rightfulclaimants of the ancient crown of Stefan Dušan, the medieval Serbian ruler. From as earlyas the 1870s, developments clearly indicate the main line of confrontation between Cet-inje and Belgrade: namely, the struggle for power between these dynasties and the ten-dency of the Serbian dynasties (especially the Karađorđević) to dominate the region andto project Serbia as the South Slav version of Piedmont. 21 This conflict was multi-facetedand incorporated the struggle for various contested territories, issues of dynastic prestige,and different nationalist visions of the future of the region, as well as the efforts of theelites to exercise absolute control over political life in the Balkans. 22 Identity politics inMontenegro played a significant role in this process, which began in earnest in the earlydecades of the twentieth century and which has continued with varying intensity and inmany forms until the present day.

Following the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918, the strug-gle in Montenegro between those in favour of the union and those opposed becamestronger. Many politicians and military leaders in Montenegro, as well as the exiled kingand his government, were of the opinion that the decision of unconditional unification withSerbia should have been made by the legally-elected Montenegrin Parliament and in adher-ence to the Montenegrin Constitution of 1905. They argued that any union with neighbour-ing South Slav states should be based on the principles of equality and respect for Mon-tenegrin sovereignty. In the event of union, they maintained, Montenegro could and shouldplay a constitutive role, rather than a secondary one. The exiled king and his governmentargued that, in the future Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Montenegro should be one of its consti-tuent elements and not just a province of Serbia. The advocates of such political views were

21 ‘The comparison between Serbia and Piedmont regularly pressed in these years was funda-mentally flawed because Piedmont was far too provincial a part of Italy to dominate andalienate the rest of a once united country. Serbia, on the other hand, was a country alreadygripped by an obsessive nationalism, basically of a Germanic sort, bent on the ‘ethnic cleans-ing’ of a ‘Greater Serbia’ long before the 1990s. Ethnic cleansing had been written into Serbnationalism from the early nineteenth century.’ Hastings, op. cit., p. 143. Domination of theunwanted ‘other’ and the eventual ‘cleansing’ of desired territory have been common fea-tures in every case of expansionist nationalism throughout the world, and the case of Serbiashould be seen as the rule rather than the exception. Even though my own views on this mat-ter differ somewhat from those of Hastings, I trust that his assessment of the nature of Ser-bian nationalism carries certain validity to it. Also see Mirko Grmek, Marc Gjidana andNeven Šimac: Le Nettoyage Ethnique: Documents Historiques sur une Ideologie Serbe(Paris: Fayard, 1993); in spite of its one-sided approach to the issue of nationalisms in Yugo-slavia, this volume provides essential documentation covering both the nineteenth and thetwentieth century.

22 ‘Serbia wants to liberate and unite the Yugoslavs and does not want to drown in the sea ofsome kind of Yugoslavia. Serbia does not want to drown in Yugoslavia, but to have Yugo-slavia drown in her.’ Letter by the Serbian Prime Minister, Nikola Pa šić, to Jovan M.Jovanović-Pižon in London, 15 October 1918. Quoted from Dragovan Šepić: Italija,saveznici i Jugoslavensko pitanje, 1914 -1918 (Zagreb, 1970), p. 358. Also see Đorđe Đ.Stanković: Nikola Pašić i Jugoslovensko pitanje, Vols. 1-2 (Beograd: BIGZ, 1985), andCharles Jelavich: ‘Nikola Pašić: Greater Serbia or Yugoslavia?’ Journal of Central Euro-pean Affairs, Vol. 11 (July 1951).

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referred to at the time as ‘Greens’ (zelenaši). The other group of politicians and scholarsadvocated the unionist approach, interpreting the act of unification as the natural progres-sion of a process that had acquired popular support through the years. Hence, the ‘Whites’(bjelaši) based their argument on the assumption that Montenegrins and Serbs were but onepeople. The result of this political shift was that those Montenegrins who supported theGreens were seen as advocates of a separate Montenegrin identity, while the supporters ofthe Whites ascribed to the theory that Montenegrins had a Serb ethnic origin. These con-flicting points of view and the assumption of ethnic and national 'oneness' between Mon-tenegrins and Serbs proved to be the crucial point of conflict between the opposing ideolo-gies in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, as well as in the Socialist FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), created at the end of World War II. 23

The confrontation between Greens and Whites reached a new level during the SecondWorld War. After the capitulation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1941, the Italians oc-cupied Montenegro and were initially supported by the Greens, whose power base was inthe southern and central parts of Old Montenegro. After the initial stage of collaborationwith the occupying force, the Greens, together with partisan/communist forces, managedto defeat the Italians and liberate (for a short period of time) almost the entire territory ofMontenegro. The Whites, on the other hand, predominated in the region of Brda andnorthern Montenegro (bordering Serbia) and their political and military allegiance was tothe Serbian nationalist forces (Četnici or Chetniks) which were led by Nikola Bojović,Pavle Djurišić and Dragoslav-Draža Mihailović.24 As Christopher Boehm has pointedout, this geo-political differentiation portrays Old Montenegro as ‘separatist,’ while theother two regions favoured merger with a Serb-dominated state. 25

Socialist Yugoslavia inherited the unresolved issues of an incomplete process of na-tional definition and unification among its constituent elements. The appearance of unityand tolerance in the former SFRY had primarily a representational character and was lack-ing in substance, it also had strong overtones of the communist ideological umbrella. 26

The communist authorities claimed that South Slavs and other nations living in the region

23 Referring to the process of state and nation-building among the South Slavs and the viabilityof the Yugoslav state created in 1918, Adrian Hastings concludes that: ‘It is a case study ofhow not to construct a nation from a mix of closely-related ethnicities and proto-nations.Inter-war Yugoslavia was constructed as a Greater Serbia just as the heirs of Karadžić andGarašanin were determined it should be. Serbia was the only part which entered it as alreadypolitically independent.’ Hastings, op. cit., pp. 142-143. Also see Ljubodrag Dimić: Kulturnapolitika Kraljevine Jugoslavije, 1918-1941, 3 Vols. (Beograd: Stubovi kulture, 1996-1997).

24 Valuable documents related to this period of Montenegrin history are available in VladoMarković and Radoje Pajović: Saradnja Ćetnika sa okupatorom u Crnoj Gori: dokumenti1941-1945 (Podgorica & Cetinje: Republički Odbor SUBNOR-a Crne Gore, 1996).

25 It would seem that the Greens sided with Italy in hope that the post-war settlement mightresult in the renewal of an independent and sovereign Montenegro. Robert Lee Wolf rightlynoted that the Greens rebelled against the Italian occupation when it became clear that Italy’sintentions were to turn Montenegro into a puppet state. See Robert Lee Wolf: The Balkans inOur Time (Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press, 1956), pp. 214-215.

26 For an interesting analysis of the relations between the communist authorities and peasants,see Melisa Bokovoy: Peasants and Communists: Politics and Ideology in the YugoslavCountryside 1941-1953 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998).

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had united on a solid foundation only because of their political guidance and had done sounder the communist ideological premises of brotherhood and unity. The rhetoric of suchclaims consisted of a curious mix of negative references to the past and a rather enthusias-tic and positive prognosis for the future. National aspirations as a mode of cognition andperception of reality were characterised as negative and backwards, as aspirations thatwould jeopardise the further progress of society.

During the early 1950s, however, the communist rhetoric of a necessary change in soci-ety was intended to convey a message of hope and to have a soothing effect on the collec-tive psyche. Above all, it was intended to grant more credibility to the efforts of the com-munist authorities in their alleged pursuit of a more just and humane society. Communistleaders attempted to create Yugoslav supranationality (Yugoslavism/ Jugoslovenstvo). Thenew elite hoped such an achievement would make obsolete the nationalist claims of localoligarchies.27 In the process of creating Yugoslav supranationality in the 1950s through tothe mid-1960s, the communist authorities attempted to structure society so that it func-tioned according to the principle of unity in diversity. The six Yugoslav republics hadbeen perceived as somewhat distinct but they remained constitutive elements of a largerand politically unified structure. Such unity in diversity served the purpose of sidelining,at least temporarily, the issue of nationalism in the former Yugoslavia. 28 The unsuccessfulattempts of the communist elite to achieve supranational harmony in SFRY included sup-pressing the regional voices which were calling for the recognition of the national specifi-cities of Serbs, Croats, Montenegrins, Macedonians and the other nations living in the re-gion. It also meant using the ideological paradigm to marginalise the elements of nationaldistinctiveness, culture and tradition of all of the constitutive nations. This suppressionand marginalisation was accomplished by positioning local and regional representationsof national and cultural distinctiveness at the level of harmless folklore, popular festivitieswith strong ideological overtones and exotic museum exhibits. Parallel to that, the com-munists managed to silence, at least temporarily, local and regional hegemonic and chau-vinistic nationalist claims.

27 In the sixties, Hugh Seton-Watson wrote: ‘In Yugoslavia the official doctrine was Yugoslavnationalism. This was supposed to comprise, and to transform into a higher quality, thenationalism of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. But in practice it was interpreted as Serbiannationalism writ large.’ Hugh Seton-Watson: Nationalism – Old and New (Sydney: SydneyUniversity Press, 1965), p. 16. For a detailed account of a famous 1961 debate on the natureof Yugoslavism between the Slovenian philosopher Dušan Pirjevec and the Serbian writerand communist dignitary Dobrica Ćosić, see Andrey Helfant: Serb Intellectuals and theNational Question, 1961-1991, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (Cambridge, Ma: HarvardUniversity, 1998).

28 For a more comprehensive account, see Denison Russinow: ‘Nationalities Policy and theNational Question’, in Pedro Ramet (ed.): Yugoslavia in the 1980s (Boulder, Co: Westview,1985). Miron Rezun has also pointed out that Tito believed the final result of the party’sefforts to be the establishment of one true nation (Miron Razun: Europe and the War in theBalkans: Toward a New Yugoslav Identity (Westport, Co: Praeger, 1995), p. 106. Also seeMilovan Đilas: Tito: The Story from Inside (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980),p. 134; Paul Shop: Communism and the Yugoslav National Question (New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1968), pp. 119-198.

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Identity issues in Montenegro were covered with the blanket of ideological uniform-ity while their manifestations were diverted into various cultural and social stereo-types.29 It should be noted, however, that the expressions of Montenegrin identity per sewere viewed as the manifestation of a retrograde ideology and that, in spite of the rhet-oric of brotherhood and unity, it was generally assumed that Montenegrins and Serbswere but one nation.30 The absence of voices arguing in favour of Montenegrin nationaland cultural distinctiveness on the public scene could be taken as proof of the above-mentioned general consensus on this issue. There was indeed some room for manoeuvreregarding the expression of identities other than Montenegrin, but such room was verylimited. Ideological pressure along the lines of the adoption of the communist-promotedconcept of Yugoslav supranationality was not eagerly embraced by everyone in Mon-tenegro.This idyllic image of a country where everyone was equal was somewhat tar-nished by the decision of many Albanians living in Montenegro to change their lastnames in order to fit into the prescribed mould. From the late 1960s through to the late1980s, many Catholic Albanians from Montenegro added the Slav suffix ić to their lastnames and some even Slavicised their first names. This Slavicisation trend turned Alba-nian last names of Arapaj into Arapović, Djokaj into Djokić, Ujkaj into Ujkić, Siništajinto Siništović, Nikaj into Nikić and/or Nikočević, Perkaj into Perković, and so forth.Even though one could not easily point out a clear pattern of the state-sponsored modi-fication of identity manifestations in Montenegro, examples of the aforementioned ad-justments among Catholic Albanians could very well indicate the existence of consider-able pressure. It is interesting to note that such a trend could be detected only amongCatholic Albanians living in Montenegro; their fellow Albanians of the Islamic faith didnot engage in the same process.31

Nationalist sentiments were on the rise in many regions of Yugoslavia in the late 1960sand the early 1970s. During this period, an intense campaign was conducted by many Al-banian politicians, university professors and intellectuals living in Kosovo regardinggreater autonomy and the establishment of a bilingual education system in the province.In Montenegro, Serb nationalist forces gained prominence for a short period of time(1970-1973) by publicly denouncing communist ideology and advocating the ideas of the

29 On the public scene in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Montenegrins haveinhabited the realm of epic stereotypes. They have been thought of as intelligent, educated,brave, honest, trustworthy and proud, but also as lazy and power-loving individuals. Publicperception rarely questioned their assumed ethnic, national and cultural closeness/onenesswith Serbs. Such a perception was an integral part of a vocabulary of popular culture, whilethe lack of scholarly works on the subject might indicate that this stereotypical view of Mon-tenegrins was taken for granted.

30 This assumption is visible in the works of Dimitrije Dimo Vujović: Ujedinjenje Crne Gore iSrbije (Titograd: Istorijski Institut NRCG, 1962) and Crnogorski federalisti 1919-1929(Titograd: CANU, 1981), as well as in Dimitrije Vujović: ‘O etnogenezi Crnogoraca imarksističkom odredjenju Nacije’, Praksa (1981).

31 From 1990 onwards, some Catholic Albanians in Montenegro switched back to their originallast names. The author confirmed this trend of reversal to the original last names during hismost recent stay in Montenegro in 2002; the particular cases mentioned in this text appear asthe result of the author’s personal communications with the individuals involved.

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Ćetnik movement.32 In Croatia, the movement known as the Croatian Spring (HrvatskoProljeće or Maspok, 1972) represented the first serious test for the central government inBelgrade and the Yugoslav Communist Party.33 In Serbia, the early 1970s were a time ofthe ideological and political cleansing of the communist elite and of intellectuals at theuniversities in Belgrade and Novi Sad, a process soon to be followed in the other repub-lics.34 The ideological aspect aside, what many activists in these movements had in com-mon were their strong expressions of nationalist sentiment (Serbian, Croatian and Alba-nian), paired with demands for more power for the republics and a more open system ofgovernance. With regard to the issue of national identification, the specificity of the post-World War II Yugoslav case lies partly in its proclaimed separate road to socialism and inthe creation of sophisticated mechanisms of adoption and adaptation in dealing with thenational question. The system allowed and controlled dissent along these lines in order toproject the false impression of its strength and flexibility, as well as its democratic charac-ter. Adopting and adapting nationalist policies became the means of preserving commu-nist power and, ultimately, resulted in the destruction of the country in the last decade ofthe twentieth century.

Back to the future: Montenegrins as the best of all Serbs

The disintegration of Yugoslavia resulted in Montenegro forming together with Serbia theFederal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The issue of the (in)equality between the two re-

32 Among the most vocal advocates of this ideology in Montenegro were several journalistsfrom the Montenegrin daily Pobjeda, such as Jovan Dujović, Janko Vujisić, Luka Gojnićand Vitomir Nikolić, and the newspaper’s Editor-in-Chief, Milo Kralj. Judging by the out-come of the whole affair, and that none of the above-mentioned individuals faced anycharges (some were transferred to new posts in media organisations in Belgrade), it is rea-sonable to conclude that these nationalist-minded journalists enjoyed at least the limited sup-port of the Montenegrin and Serbian political elites. On the other hand, those who arguedagainst the revival of the Ćetnik ideology in Montenegro suffered serious professional andpersonal consequences, ranging from lost employment to having to serve prison terms. Jour-nalists such as Milika Pavlović, Marko Đonović, Velimir Tasić, Đuro Đukić and ZagaVujović lost their jobs or were forced to resign their posts, while Momčilo Jokić served alengthy prison sentence. For a more detailed account of these events, see: ‘Izvještaj Statut-arne Komisije OK na Opštinskoj Konferenciji SK Titograd’, Titogradska Tribina,4.10.1972; ‘Informacija Sekretarijata CK i OKSK Titograd’, Pobjeda, 24.1.1973. Also see:Husein Bašić and Milika Pavlović: Smrt duše/Podrum (Podgorica: Montenegrin P.E.N. Cen-tre & Damad, 1992), pp. 289-309.

33 Its leaders, Savka Dabčević-Kučar and Mika Tripalo were high-ranking communist partyfunctionaries.

34 University professors Zagorka Pešić-Golubović, Ljubomir Tadić, Miladin Životić, NebojšaPopov, Svetozar Stojanović, Mihailo Marković and many other intellectuals (Mihailo Mji-hailov, Miroslav Mandić, Slavko Bogdanović) lost their posts at universities and werebanned from all public engagements. For a more comprehensive account of the politicalcleansing in the Serbia of the period, see: Aleksandar Nenadović and Mirko Tepavac:Sjećanja i Komentari (Beograd: Radio B92, 1998). See also Nebojša Popov: ‘DisidentskaSkrivalica’, Republika (August 2000), and Contra fatum: slučaj grupe profesora filozofskogfakulteta 1968-1988 (Beograd: Mladost, 1989).

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publics of FRY subsequently proved to be a matter of growing concern for many Mon-tenegrins. Occasional exchanges of opposing political arguments and accusations betweenBelgrade and Podgorica over the nature of the common state and its future came close tobreaking point in the late 1990s. In 1997, the Montenegrin leadership publicly distanceditself from the policies of Slobodan Milošević. The debate between Podgorica and Bel-grade greatly resembled that of 1918, when the issue of the unification of Montenegrowith Serbia was a hot political topic.35

Until the early 1990s, conversations about Montenegrin sovereignty, independence andidentity outside the Serb national and cultural paradigm were rare; people usually spokeabout it sotto voce. Those who oppose Montenegrin independence and deny Montene-gro’s right to its own political expression (unitarists) are many and their political credosdiffer on more than one level. However, they all share a common thread: the perception ofMontenegrins as an integral part of a larger Serbian ethnic and national framework. 36

Such a perception is based on a historical narrative that elevates the role of Montenegro inholding together and preserving the construction of the Serbian national mythos. This nar-rative consists of many elements that are interdependent and which display certain proto-scientific characteristics. The traditional culture and history, and the general cultural ma-trix ascribed to Montenegrins, have been analysed almost exclusively within the Serb na-tional paradigm and have been seen as part of a larger, and presumably uniform, Serbianhistorical and cultural corpus. This methodological approach has characterised not onlythe works of many Serbian historians but can also be detected in the works of a number ofwestern analysts of the South Slavic past.37 More often than not, Montenegrins have beenperceived as a rather exotic, albeit useful, element within the Serbian ethnic and historicmatrix. Furthermore, this constructed historical narrative has been rationalised and repre-sented through the Serbian national mythology. In this approach, the historical reality ofrelations between Montenegro and Serbia is reduced to a figure of memory. This collaps-ing of historical reality manifests itself in the form of a Grand Narrative: the myth of Mon-tenegro as the pinnacle of Eastern Orthodoxy; Montenegrins as the best of all Serbs; and

35 On these discussions, see Beáta Huszka’s chapter on ‘The Dispute over Montenegrin Inde-pendence’, this volume.

36 Petar Vlahović, ‘The Serbian Origins of the Montenegrins’, available at: www.njegos.org/vlahovic.html. For an interesting analysis of the duality of Montenegrin character, seeBanac, op. cit., pp. 270-291, and Andrei Simić: ‘Montenegro: Beyond the Myth’, in Con-stantine P. Danopoulos and Kostas Messas (eds.): Crises in the Balkans (London & Colo-rado: Westview Press, 1997), p. 122.

37 See Ferdo Čulinović: Jugoslavija Između dva rata (Zagreb: Izdavački Zavod JANU, 1961);Vladimir Dedijer et al: History of Yugoslavia (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974); MilovanĐilas: Njegoš: Poet, Prince, Bishop (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966); NovicaRakočević: Politički odnosi Crne Gore i Srbije 1903-1918 (Cetinje: Obod, 1981); JohnTreadway: The Falcon and the Eagle: Montenegro and Austria-Hungary, 1908-1914 (WestLafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1983); Jelavich, op. cit; Charles and Barbara Jela-vich: The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804-1920 (Seattle & London: Uni-versity of Washington Press, 1977); Andrew B. Wachtel: Making a Nation, Breaking aNation: Literature and Cultural Policies in Yugoslavia (Stanford: Stanford UniversityPress, 1998).

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the capital Cetinje as Little Zion.38 The history of Montenegro is often presented as thehistory of a remote army camp, whose swordsmen were guarding for posterity the spirit ofthe Eastern Orthodox faith and protecting it from falling under the cold shadow of theCrescent. This insistence upon the religious aspect in such interpretations, as well as thevalidity of the entire argument, is contestable, since Montenegrins have always displayedan unusual attitude towards religion and the Church institutions:

No matter how much a Montenegrin may love his church, he does not like to attend the serv-ice, and lately the church and state authorities are making an effort to ensure that church serv-ices are attended regularly. In earlier times there were those who never entered a church aslong as they lived. … In his absentmindedness, a Montenegrin enters the church with his capon his head. I had an opportunity to see older priests do the same thing. … This is why the re-ligious beliefs of Montenegrins, regardless of how deep they may be, are either not expressedopenly through rituals or are displayed in a very simple and sometimes even crude manner.39

The Montenegrin state was often perceived not to have been a real state but only a his-torical sentiment (heavily coloured by the oral tradition); it was seen as a historical aberra-tion that survived within the specific conditions of the permanent armed struggle againstthe Ottoman invader.40 Those who ascribe to such a view argue that, once the Ottomanstate had dissolved, there was no reason for a Montenegrin state to exist outside the all-in-clusive Serbian national and political frameworks. Following the same argument, somecontemporary Serbian nationalists argue that:

Montenegro had its own state before Serbia did, but Montenegro has always been a Serbianstate – even under Njegoš and the Petrović dynasty. Bavaria, for example, was once theKingdom and is now called the Free Bavarian State, but no one dreams of turning it into anindependent state, let alone of denying it its German national identity.41

Within such a political and ideological equation, the independent Montenegrin statemade sense only as long as it carried forward the torch of an undying spirit of Serbhood.The reference to Montenegrins as the best of all Serbs (still forcefully advocated by expo-

38 Analysing the process of the reduction of historical reality to a figure of memory is one ofthe primary tasks of the historical sub-discipline called Mnemohistory. ‘Unlike historyproper, mnemohistory is concerned not with the past as such, but only with the past as it isremembered. It surveys the story lines of tradition, the webs of intertextuality, the diachroniccontinuities and discontinuities of reading the past… It concentrates exclusively on thoseaspects of significance and relevance which are the product of memory – that is, of arecourse to a past.’ Jan Assmann: Moses the Egyptian: The Memory of Egypt in WesternMonotheism (Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 7-9.

39 Pavel Apolonovich Rovinsky: Etnografija Crne Gore, Vol. 1 (Podgorica: CID, 1998), pp.282-283. Original publication: St. Petersburg, 1897.

40 See Janko Spasojević, Crna Gora i Srbija, (Paris: Informativna Služba Ministarstva Inos-tranih Dela, 1919). Jovan Ćetković, Ujedinjenje Crne Gore i Srbije (Dubrovnik 1940) andOmladinski pokret u Crnoj Gori (Podgorica 1922); Novica Šaulić: Crna Gora (Beograd1924); Pantelija Jovović: Crnogorski političari (Beograd, 1924); Svetozar Tomić: Desetogo-disnjica ujedinjenja Srbije i Crne Gore (Beograd, 1929).

41 Ljubomir Tadić, Member of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences (SANU) in GlasJavnosti, 10-11.2.2001. See also Vlahović, op. cit; and Simić, op. cit., pp. 122-124.

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nents of Serbian expansionist nationalism) is an example of how the ethnic factor is sim-plified and isolated, as well as hypertrophied, in the attempt to prove the ethnic purity ofMontenegrin identity. This might be the deepest epistemological, ideological and politicalmeaning of the thesis that Montenegrins are racially pure or even the purest of Serbs. Theproblem of the multi-layered character of Montenegrin identity has been, in most cases,interpreted as the relationship between the subordinate concept of ‘Montenegrin’, repre-senting the notion of territoriality, and the superordinate concept of ‘Serb’, representingethnic/national belonging. Thus, Montenegrins have been perceived as ethnic Serbs livingin the geographical region known as Montenegro. It could be argued that such a view rep-resents a simplification of the issue of a Montenegrin Serbhood.

Montenegrins preserved the notion of their distinctiveness with regard to other SouthSlavic groups and continuously reaffirmed it through history. The Montenegrin version ofSerbhood differs from its manifestations in other areas of Yugoslavia which are populatedby peoples of the Eastern Orthodox faith. A heroic attitude towards life, the notion of amessianic role in the historical process of the revival of the medieval Serbian empire andthe prolonged armed struggle against the Ottoman invader, as well as the historical conti-nuity of the Montenegrin state, are elements that distinguish the concept of MontenegrinSerbhood from similar concepts in Bosnia, Croatia or Serbia proper. Ultimately, the ideaof Serbhood was understood to be an attribute of belonging to the Eastern Orthodox faith,and to Christianity in general, as well as to the larger South Slavic context. Based on suchan understanding, many Montenegrins incorporated this idea in the building blocks oftheir national individuality. The result of such incorporation is the historical precedent ofthe notion of Montenegrin Serbhood which, because it was understood as the ideology of‘constant struggle’, did not stand in opposition to a distinct character of Montenegrin na-tional identity. It was used as a tool of pragmatic politics in order to achieve the final goal.Montenegrins used the terms Serbs and Serbhood whenever they referred to the SouthSlavic elements which were rallied in an anti-Ottoman coalition and around the ChristianCross. Moreover, it is true that identity construction is a long process of historical/culturalsedimentation and that the final product is perceived as a relatively long-lasting and stablephenomenon. However, it would be a mistake to regard it as static or unchangeable. Iden-tity is a dynamic phenomenon whose manifestations can vary over time – even more so ifsuch an identity is positioned on the periphery of a dominant cultural/political force.

If ‘we are what we remember,’ the truth of memory lies in the identity that it shapes. Thistruth is subject to time so that it changes with every new identity and every new present. Itlies in the story, not as it happened but as it lives on and unfolds in collective memory. 42

With this in mind, it does not seem entirely appropriate either to contest or to deny con-temporary expressions of the national identity of Montenegrins and their distinctiveness inregard to Serbs by invoking that, a century or so ago, many of their ancestors (some rulersfrom the Petrović dynasty included) declared themselves to be Serbs.43 A more productive

42 Assmann, op. cit., p. 14. 43 Many leaders of the Montenegrin Federalist Movement, who were the most ardent advocates

of an independent Montenegro during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, pub-licly declared themselves as ‘the best of Serbs’.

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approach might be to recognise the ongoing re-definition of identity on an individual level(living a private narrative) and to acknowledge this as a process whose contemporarymanifestations should not be mummified within the strict limitations of the conceptualframework set by the national awakening of the nineteenth century. At present, it seemsthat a plurality of the Montenegrin population constructs and lives a narrative (on an indi-vidual level as well as on the level of collective experience) that is somewhat differentfrom this earlier model. On the other hand, defending a distinct Montenegrin identity byvehemently negating its ever-changing nature, while seeking to establish a non-existentabsolute continuity with the early inhabitants of the Balkan Peninsula or with early stateformations in the region, usually produces negative consequences. 44 Both strategies ofdealing with the identity issue in Montenegro (advocating or denying their distinctive-ness) are present in contemporary Montenegro and their prominence might indicate thatmany people are still wrestling with the significance of national identity. On a more gen-eral level, both approaches are based upon seemingly different myths: one about purity,the other about temporal/historical continuity with medieval state formations. Further-more, the long-lasting debate over the identity of Montenegrins could be taken as a clearindication that their identity does have a distinct nature: that the notion of a distinct/sepa-rate Montenegrin identity is constantly being argued against proves the existence of such alevel of identification.

Epic poetry and/or history: the appropriation of MontenegroThat which envelops this multi-layered character of Montenegrin identity and impedes amore complete understanding of Montenegrin history is, among other things, its traditionof epic poetry, the contents of which are open to various and often conflicting interpreta-tions and which represent valuable material for myth-making. To adopt the metaphor ofSlavoj Žižek, one could say that epic poetry in Montenegro, unlike the role it plays inother societies, is the stuff that others’ dreams are made of.45 The political dimension ofMontenegrin identity is best illustrated by numerous and contradictory interpretations ofthe literary achievements of Petar II Petrović Njegoš.46 His legacy serves as a telling ex-ample of how literature, religion and politics in the Balkans can be interwoven in the serv-ice of particular political agendas. His work has been appropriated by both supporters andopponents of a distinct Montenegrin national and cultural identity, while each group hasmanaged to find enough evidence in Njegoš’s literary work to advance their own political

44 An interesting example of this ‘independentist oriented’ methodology is the book by RadosavRotković: Odakle su došli preci Crnogoraca (Podgorica: Matica Crnogorska, 1992).

45 This expression is borrowed from the title of Slavoj Žižek’s lecture: ‘Yugoslavia: The Bur-den of Being the Stuff OTHERS’ Dreams are Made of’, given at the conference Construc-tion, Deconstruction, Reconstruction of South Slavic Architecture, Cornell University, NewYork, 27.3.2001.

46 Metropolitan Petar II Petrović Njegoš, the nineteenth-century ruler of Montenegro, and hispoetic endeavours occupy a central stage in the South Slavic myth-making factory. Njegoš’smagnum opus is his epic poem The Mountain Wreath, written in 1846 in Cetinje and pub-lished in Vienna in 1847. The poem appeared in print in the same year as Vuk StefanovićKaradžić’s translation of the New Testament. P.P. Njegoš: The Mountain Wreath, transl. byVasa D. Mihailović (Belgrade: Serbian Europe Publishing, 1997).

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vision of Montenegro. By the end of the 19th century, the debate about Njegoš’s sense ofnational identity had already developed into a debate about the national and cultural iden-tity of Montenegrins.47

The most famous of his poems, The Mountain Wreath (Gorski Vijenac) is set in 18th

century Montenegro and describes the attempts of Njegoš's ancestor, Metropolitan Danilo,to regulate relations between the region's warring tribes. Njegoš constructed his poemaround a single event that allegedly took place on a particular Christmas Day in the early1700s, during the rule of Metropolitan Danilo: the mass execution of Montenegrins whohad converted to Islam.48 This work of literature is praised and criticised at the same time,and it has been used to support diametrically opposing political views. Many Serbian na-tionalists use it as historical justification of their attempt to keep alive a dream of GreaterSerbia and as the ultimate proof of the Serb identity of Montenegrins:

The Mountain Wreath represents a synthesis in another sense as well. It is based on histori-cal facts, thus it can be called a historical play. It epitomises the spirit of the Serbian peoplekept alive for centuries; indeed, there is no other literary work with which the Serbs identifymore.49

Some Croatian nationalists recognise in Njegoš’s poetry the ultimate statement of theoriental nature of South Slavs living east of the Drina River, thus reinforcing the popular

47 On Njegoš and the appropriation of his work, see: Milan Bogdanović: ‘Vratimo Njegoš aliteraturi’, Srpski Književni Glasnik Vol. 2. No. 16.7 (1925), pp. 577-79. See also Jaša M.Prodanović: ‘Gorski Vijenac kao Vaspitno Delo’, Srpski Književni Glasnik Vol. 2 No. 16.7(1925), pp. 558-62; Nikola Škerović: ‘Njegoš i jugoslovenstvo’, Nova Evropa, Vol. 2.1(1925), pp. 1-8; Ljubomir Durković-Jakšić: Njegoš i Lovćen (Beograd: n.a., 1971); SavićMarković Štedimlija: ‘Sto Godina Narodne Poezije’, Nova Evropa, Vol. 28 Nos. 4-5 (1935),pp. 120-29; Srđa Pavlović: ‘Poetry or the Blueprint for Genocide’, Spaces of IdentityOnLine Vol. 1 No. 1 (January 2001) available at: www.spacesofidentity.net.

48 The dating of the alleged event is a matter of some controversy. The sub-title of The Moun-tain Wreath tells us that the poem deals with a ‘Historical Event from the End of the 17th

Century’ (Historičesko Sobitie pri Svršetky XVII vieka) (P.P. Njegoš: The Mountain Wreath(Vienna 1847), title page). The same dating of the event described in The Mountain Wreathappeared in a number of histories of Montenegro published during the nineteenth century,such as those by Sima Milutinović Sarajlija (Belgrade, 1835) and Dimitrije Milaković(Zadar, 1856). Later studies by Ilarion Ruvarac: Montenegrina 2nd ed. (1899) and LjubomirStojanović: Zapisi II (1903) based their dating of the event on a note allegedly written byMetropolitan Danilo Petrović himself. The note and its commentary by N. Musulin werepublished in Glasnik, XVII (1836). It is worth pointing out that Ruvarac expressed seriousconcerns regarding the genuine character of the note, but his concerns were quickly brushedaside by a number of local historians. The aforementioned authors offered three differentdates for the ‘Christmas Day Massacre’ (1702, 1704 and 1707), while The Mountain Wreathpositioned the event in the late seventeenth century. It is interesting to note that, in his earlierworks, Njegoš dated the event as 1702. In his poem Ogledalo Srpsko, Njegoš wrote aboutthe event and positioned it ‘around the year 1702’. See: P.P. Njegoš: Ogledalo Srpsko(1845). A notable exception is Konstantin Jiriček, who, in his Naučni Slovnik, stated that theevent described in The Mountain Wreath never took place.

49 Njegoš’s translator Vasa D. Mihailović, in his Introduction to the 1997 edition of The Moun-tain Wreath. See footnote 51.

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notion of a stereotypical other.50 Islamic radicals view The Mountain Wreath as a manualfor ethnic cleansing and fratricidal murder, as a text whose ideas were brought back to lifeduring the most recent nationalistic dance macabre in the former Yugoslavia.51 Mon-tenegrin independentists largely shy away from any interpretation of Njego š’s poetry andonly on occasion discuss its literary and linguistic merits. 52 The myth of the slaying of in-fidels in early eighteenth-century Montenegro is a recurring theme in almost all analysesof the region’s history and the mentality of its people. Its usage as the ultimate explanationfor the recent historical developments in the region is apparent and particularly troubling.Apart from being a material mistake, the employment of this theme serves the purpose offurther restraining Montenegro within the confines of the notions of the so-called ‘ancienthatred’, ‘irrationalism’ and ‘barbarism’.

In spite of the openness of this work to various interpretations (or precisely because ofit), one should not forget that what one is reading is a work of literature. Naturally, litera-ture should be approached as a source and a litmus test for evaluating a particular histori-cal period. But its exclusive usage as the primary and sole determining element in theprocess of historical evaluation across time is a questionable methodological approach.53

More than anything else, The Mountain Wreath is the tale of a long-gone heroic tribal so-ciety that was poeticised in order to depict the state of affairs in Njego š’s Montenegro.From such a point of analytical departure, this work of literature can be approached as anadditional source for assessing the conditions within a particular time frame in Mon-tenegrin history, i.e. Njegoš’s time: the first half of the 19th century. The long-gone Mon-tenegro that Njegoš wrote about had little in common with the Montenegro of his time andhas nothing in common with contemporary Montenegro. However, The Mountain Wreathdoes speak volumes about the political, social, cultural and economic conditions in Mon-tenegro during the early 19th century and about Njegoš’s efforts to advocate the ideas ofpan-Slavism and unification.54

Available sources point out that Njegoš did not base his poem on a historical event.However, he realised the potential significance of a reshaped myth and through licenciapoetica actualised its meanings. The myth of the slaying of converts, as an act of cleansingand the indication of a fresh start, meshed nicely with Njegoš’s efforts to turn Montenegrointo a modern state. 55 The Mountain Wreath represents an important literary achievement,

50 Branimir Anžulović: Heavenly Serbia: From Myth to Genocide (New York: New York Uni-versity Press, 1999), pp. 61-67.

51 ibid., pp. 61-76. See also Ivo Žanić: Prevarena povijest: guslarska estrada, kult hajduka i ratu Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini 1990-1995. godine (Zagreb: Duriex, 1998), pp. 271-303.

52 See Božena Jelušić: ‘Otvoreni za Njegoša’, Matica Vol. 2 No. 6 (Summer 2001).53 ibid., pp. 97-106.54 See Njegoš’s letter written on 2 May 1848 to the Serbian Minister of the Interior, Ilija

Garašanin, the author of Načertanije. P.P. Njegoš: Izabrana pisma (Beograd: Prosveta,1967), p. 166. See also Njegoš to Josip Jelačić, letter written in Cetinje on December 20,1848, ibid. pp. 173-174.

55 See Istorija Crne Gore, Vol. 3 No. 1 (Titograd, 1975). See also Slobodan Tomović: Komen-tar Gorskog Vijenca (Ljubljana, Beograd & Nikšić: Partizanska knjiga Univerzitetska rijeć& Izdavačko publicistička djelatnost, 1986), pp.146-147; Vojislav P. Nikčević: ‘IstragePoturica Nije ni Bilo’, Ovđe No. 189 (1985), pp. 8-10; and Cetinjski Ljetopis (Cetinje:Fototipsko Izdanje Centralne Biblioteke NR Crne Gore, 1962).

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and it should be analysed as a drama that confronts and challenges the concepts of thoughtand action, morality and righteousness, religion and human nature, and not as the poeti-cised version of a historical event and an ultimate expression of Serb identity. It is a poetictale written by a man who continuously deconstructs and questions the very world he livesin. Moreover, the character of Njegoš’s work is far from one-dimensional and cannot, ingood conscience, be viewed exclusively as national literature because it deals with issuesmuch broader than the narrow margins of Montenegrin political and cultural space. Fur-thermore, The Mountain Wreath should not be read outside the context of the time of itsinception, nor from the perspective of one book. As Danilo Kiš has pointed out: ‘Manybooks are not dangerous, but one book is.’56

Bearing in mind the distinct character of Montenegro's traditional culture, and the specifi-cities of its historical, political and economic, as well as its cultural, development, one is in-trigued by the persistent appropriation of Montenegrins by the Serbs and wonders about thereasons for this claim to ownership. New interpretations of these issues, which came to lightin recent scholarly literature in Montenegro, and in support of the claim of Montenegrin cul-tural, linguistic and national distinctiveness, indicate the primacy of politics as a discourse indecoding the history of the region and in assessing the nature of relations between Mon-tenegrins and Serbs.57 The inclusion of Montenegrins in the Serbian national mythos can beidentified as a way to establish and preserve the imagined historical/temporal and culturalcontinuity of the Serbian nation throughout the centuries of Ottoman rule in the region.

For some 400 years, Serbia proper was ruled by the Ottoman Empire. All aspects of lifein the region were subject to regulations and laws imposed by the invader. On the otherhand, Montenegro existed during this same period as a relatively independent entity thatdisplayed a measurable temporal continuity of its own political and historical being. Withthe advent of the ideology of national homogenisation among Serbs, it became necessaryto establish Serbian historical and cultural continuity in the area that was, within the na-tional paradigm, perceived as an integral part of the Serbian medieval state. One of theways to accomplish this task was the appropriation of Montenegro. This appropriationhappened on many levels and included the positioning of Montenegrins within the Serbianmythos as a symbol of the undying spirit of Serbhood. Only then was the Serbian histori-cal narrative able to bridge the gap of some four centuries during Ottoman rule and estab-lish the temporal continuity needed for the process of national awakening.

The politics of identity – the identity of politicsAt present, the differences between those opposed to Montenegro's independence andsovereignty have to do with the modalities for rationalising and justifying the inclusion ofMontenegro and its population into a Serbian ethnic and political, as well as economic and

56 Danilo Kiš: Grobnica za Borisa Davidoviča (Sarajevo: Veselin Masleša, 1990), p. 117.57 See Senka Babović: ‘Kulturna Politika u Zetskoj Banovini’, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation

(Podgorica: University of Montenegro, 1997). See also Vojislav Nikčević: O PostankuEtnonima Dukljani, Zećani, Crnogorci (Podgorica, 1987); V. Nikčević: Crnogorski jezik(Cetinje, 1993); V. Nikčević: Pravopis Crnogorskog jezika (Podgorica: Montenegrin PENCentre, 1997); Dragoje Živković: Istorija Crnogorskog naroda, (Cetinje, 1989); Šerbo Ras-toder: Skrivana strana istorije: Crnogorska buna i odmetnički pokret 1918 – 1929. Doku-menti, Vols. 1-4 (Bar: Nidamentym Montenegro, 1997).

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cultural, framework. Opponents of an independent and sovereign Montenegro havesought to discredit the concept in two ways: either they identify the discourse of independ-ence with the old dynastic aspirations of the last Montenegrin King, Nikola I Petrović, orthey associate it ideologically with the communist regime.58 Dobrica Ćosić, the well-known Serbian writer and, briefly, President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, statedin a recent conversation with Timothy Garton Ash that ‘Montenegrin-ness (Montenegrin-ity?) was the invention of the Stalinist national policy.’59 On the other side of the politicaldivide, advocates of Montenegrin independence repeatedly invoke the alleged continuityof statehood from the time of the medieval Balšić and Vojislavljević dynasties.60

These competing claims and the emotionally charged rhetoric of their current advocateshave managed to polarise (politically and ideologically, as well as in terms of identityconstruction) the population of Montenegro. Regardless of what the available statisticaldata might suggest, it remains so that the people of Montenegro are bitterly divided overthe issue of Montenegro's independence and the referendum as an acceptable modus ofachieving it.61 This division is primarily of a political nature and the identity issue isclosely connected with political/party affiliation. Unlike their parliamentary predecessorsfrom the turn of the century, modern political parties in Montenegro appear more uniformwhen it comes to identity politics. The majority of the supporters of the Socialist People’sParty (Socijalistička Narodna Partija, SNP), the People’s Party (Narodna Stranka, NS)and the Serbian People’s Party (Srpska Narodna Stranka, SNS) take pride in their Serbianidentity and advocate a unitary national state.62 Supporters of the Liberal Alliance of

58 See Srđa Pavlović: ‘The Podgorica Assembly in 1918: Notes on the Yugoslav Historiogra-phy (1919-1970) about the Unification of Montenegro and Serbia’, Canadian SlavonicPapers Vol. 41 No. 2 (June 1999), pp. 157-176.

59 Timothy Garton Ash: ‘The Last Revolution’, The New York Review of Books 16.11.2000.See also Slavenko Terzić: ‘Ideološki Koreni Crnogorske Nacije i Crnogorskog Separa-tizma’, available at www.njegos.org/idkor.html.

60 Rotković, op. cit.61 At the traditional tribal gathering in Vasojevici (northern Montenegro) on St. Peter’s Day (12

July) 1994, prominent individuals from Vasojevici decided that their region would join Serbiaif Montenegro was to secede from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. See Zoran Marković:‘Zapad će Platiti Odštetu Srbiji’, Duga 17.9.1994. For results and analysis of numerous opin-ion polls regarding the future of the Montenegrin state, its referendum on independence andthe political affiliation of its citizens, see: Centre for Democracy and Human Rights(CEDEM): Parliamentary Elections in Montenegro. Opinion Poll, 27 March – 3 April 2001,Podgorica, 2001; Vladimir Goati: Izbori u SRJ od 1990 do 1998: volja gradjana ili izbornamanipulacija (Beograd: CeSID, 1999); International Crisis Group: Montenegro: In theShadow of the Volcano, Podgorica/Brussels/Washington, 21.3.2000, p. 11; Zoran Radulović:‘Crnogorsko Javno Mnjenje na Prekretnici’, AIM, 26.9.1999; European Stability Initiative:‘Politics, Interests and the Future of Yugoslavia: An Agenda for Dialogue’, 26.11.2001;National Democratic Institute: 22 April Parlamentarni Izbori. Ključni Zaključi, Podgorica,March 2001. NDI conducted this opinion poll between 15 and 19 March 2001. It is interestingto note that the majority of those in favour of independence were between the ages of 18 and30, and were mostly students. Also, almost all of the interviewees preferring independencedefined themselves as either Montenegrins or Albanians, or Muslims, not Serbs.

62 That some members of the SNP advocate a strong federal state instead of a unitary nationalstate should not be taken as a sign of their insecurity in the prerogatives of their Serbian iden-tity but rather as a manifestation of their political pragmatism.

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Montenegro (Liberalni Savez Crne Gore, LSCG) identify themselves as Montenegrinsand argue for independence and sovereignty. The strongest political party in Montenegro,the Democratic Party of Socialists (Demokratska Partija Socijalista, DPS) is a less uni-form political body when it comes to identity politics. Some of its members and support-ers express strong attachment to Montenegrin identity while others think of it as a moreregional/territorial type of identification. It would seem that, for DPS leaders and mem-bers, political pragmatism plays a significant role in the matter onational identification. 63

Its coalition partner, the Social Democratic Party (Socijal-Demokratska Partija, SDP) isgenerally considered to represent those who wish to see the development of an independ-ent and sovereign state in Montenegro and the introduction of elements of civic society. 64

The modern condition: identity, cultural concepts and civic societyResponsibility for the ferocity and depth of contemporary political and ideological divi-sion in Montenegro is born equally by all parties in this debate. To date, the unitarists haveachieved their primary objective of marginalising efforts to establish the mechanisms andmodalities of a civic society in Montenegro. These might be some of the reasons why asignificant percentage of the population in Montenegro is not sure about the nature of theearlier promised referendum on independence.65 Many wonder if such a referendumwould represent an attempt to sever all links with Serbia and to establish a legal frame-work that would restrict or deny any expression of attachment (on a personal and a collec-tive level) to Serbian ethnos, culture and tradition.

The solution to the current political and ideological stalemate between Montenegro andSerbia depends on the dynamics of both domestic and international political processes andon strengthening the local economy. However, it should be kept in mind that such statelyprerogatives cannot be achieved solely through the formation of short-term political alli-ances or by the rhetoric of desired inclusion in the so-called European and transatlantic in-tegration processes. What is being sidelined is the role that culture plays in this process.Montenegro's writers, artists, musicians and actors contribute through their artistic en-deavours to finding an optimal solution to the current crisis much more that they are givencredit for.66 The activities of the Montenegrin PEN Centre and the continuing work on the

63 Milo Đukanović stated in 2001 that: ‘Neither can we have anyone closer to us than Serbia is,nor can Serbia have anyone closer to her than Montenegro is.’ Milo Đukanović: ‘Referen-dum je Neminovan. Dogovaraćemo se o Datumu i Uslovima’, Pobjeda 23.7.2001, p. 1.

64 For more on this issue, see the chapter ‘The Dispute over Montenegrin Independence’ byBeáta Huszka, this volume.

65 Even though Art. 3 of the Belgrade Agreement allows for the possibility of a referendum(defining it as a ‘right’ and not as an ‘obligation’), it seems unlikely that such an act will takeplace in Montenegro. However, the leaders of the DPS and signatories of the Agreement(President Đukanović and Prime Minister Vujanović) were quick to reassure the generalpublic that the referendum had not been forgotten but that it would take place under less hos-tile political conditions and if ‘we come to the conclusion that such a move would best servethe interests of Montenegro’s citizens.’ PCNEN, 16.3.2002. See also Milka Tadić-Mijovićand Draško Đuranović: ‘Srećna Nova 1992?’ [especially the section ‘PredsjednikovaRijeć’], Monitor 22.3.2002, pp. 10-15.

66 Aleš Debeljak: ‘Varieties of National Experience: Resistance and Accommodation in Con-temporary Slovenian Identity’, Spaces of Identity Vol. 1 No. 1 (January 2001), available atwww.spacesofidentity.net.

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Montenegrin Encyclopaedia, as well as the contribution of scholarly journals such asAlmanah and Matica, the magazines Gest and Montenegrin Mobil Art, and the publishingactivities of CID and Conteco – to mention just a few – will have a greater long-term im-pact on the process of cultural identification and self-identification than any economi-cally-minded effort of the elite.67

Some independentists (though a small minority) would point out that what we see inMontenegro is not the final stage of the process of forming and defining the national iden-tity of Montenegrins according to the late 19th century model, but the need for protectingand re-emphasising a long-existing and well-rounded notion of identity in a new environ-ment.68 Indeed, it is necessary to seek modalities for expressing, and manoeuvring spacefor accommodating the different national and cultural identities within present-day Mon-tenegro. The specificity of these identities in Montenegro makes this process even moreimportant. When assessing the content of cultural concepts in the republics of the formerYugoslavia, and their internal dynamics, one could broadly characterise these as particulartypes of multi-culturalism. Such a categorisation could be applied to all regions in theformer Yugoslavia, with the possible exception of Montenegro. Multi-culturalism presup-poses the parallel existence of two or more different cultural frameworks within one re-gion, but does not necessarily include any process of interaction. It is the process of inter-culturalism that is represented by and expressed through constant interaction between var-ious cultural concepts. The historical, political and cultural matrix of Montenegro is theresult of multi-layered borrowings that were, and still are, among the central features ofMontenegrin society. What set Montenegro apart from other republics of the former Yu-goslavia are the presence and high visibility of various and different cultural patterns upon

67 The aforementioned journals, publishing houses and magazines are slowly reintroducingpreviously marginalised aspects of the Montenegrin cultural scene and emphasise its inter-cultural character. Conteco and CID have embarked upon significant publishing undertak-ings in order to present previously unavailable documents, historical and literary analysesand other material relevant to Montenegrin history, culture, and society. Magazines such asGest and Montenegrin Mobil Art are venues for the presentation of contemporary theatrical,literary and artistic trends in Montenegro. The editorial policy of the journal Matica isclearly tailored towards a reaffirmation of Montenegrin identity, but also pays close attentionto various other aspects of identity construction in the region and devotes significant space tovarious discussions on many aspects of civic society. These efforts are aimed at informingthe reading public in Montenegro and abroad about various aspects of life, scholarship andart in Montenegro, and serve as vehicles for internationalising its cultural space. However, itshould be noted that these efforts in introducing concepts such as civic society and the inter-culturality of the Montenegrin space, and the departure from the traditional and mytholo-gised perception of reality, are in their initial stages and are, to a certain extent, driven by thefear of marginalisation by Serbs as a dominant neighbouring group.

68 See: Ivan Čolović: ‘Est Natio in Nobis’, Matica Vol. 1 No. 3 (Autumn 2000), pp. 43-53;Srđa Pavlović: ‘Gđe je kuća’, Matica Vol. 1 No. 3 (Autumn 2000), pp. 73-78; Dragan K.Vukčević: ‘Crnogorska raskrsnica’, Matica Vol. 2 No. 7-8 (Autumn/Winter 2001), pp. 7-19;Mato Jelušić: ‘U traganju za civilnim društvom’, Matica Vol. 3 No. 9-10 (Spring/Summer2002), pp. 79-99; Šerbo Rastoder: ‘Crna Gora multietnička država: sadržaj, stvarnost, iluz-ija, parola?’ Almanah No. 13-14 (2000), pp. 11-21; Esad Kočan: ‘Bošnjaci u Crnoj Gori:identitet i integracija’, Almanah No. 13-14 (2000), pp. 29-37.

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which its tradition and history grew and developed, as well as the existence of space pro-vided for the expression of difference.

However, problems arise when seeking practical ways to revitalise the values of Mon-tenegrin national and cultural identity. At that point, some independentists often resort tocanonising the constitutive elements (real or imagined) of such an identity which, in turn,might manifest itself as representations of a somewhat distorted and totalising collectivememory. Such distortion might be the result of a traumatic experience, but the memory ofdefeats from the past (either political or ideological) should not be used as justification forcontemporary canonisations. The harshness and one-dimensional character of their approachare similar to the 19th century movement of national awakening, albeit from a different per-spective: the position as victim. Despite efforts to gloss over this identity via a post-modern-ist discourse (as is the case in present-day Montenegro), it still mirrors the same old model.Insisting on the rhetoric of Montenegrin identity, Montenegrin culture and a Montenegrinethnic framework could be misunderstood by many as an attempt to distance ‘Mon-tenegrins’ from a stereotypical non-Montenegrin other, or as an initial phase in the politicalprocess of creating and marginalising new second class citizens in Montenegro. 69

In the case of Montenegro, one could follow a gradual separation between content (cul-tural identities and cultural politics) and form (the political rhetoric of cohabitation, multi-culturalism and co-operation in the region) and the marginalisation of the former by thelatter. The lack of attention to cultural content and the failure to acknowledge the relation-ship between the cultural identity of a nation and its state-institutional forms usually re-sults in a questioning of both the identity and the viability of the state formation. Regard-less of what might really be the case in Montenegro, the negative effects of the so-called‘active waiting’ on the part of those in power promote a sense of confusion and insecurity,as well as frailty and the lack of a clear vision of Montenegro's future. An independent,sovereign and internationally recognised Montenegro can neither be achieved nor can itsurvive as an acceptable modus vivendi for all its citizens without prior redefinition andqualitative assessment, and a strengthening of its cultural cornerstones. Bearing this inmind, it seems necessary to redefine cultural politics in Montenegro.

The transparency of cultural politics can only be attained by means of a clearly deline-ated notion of identity: a notion whose elements cannot be easily deconstructed in theprocess of cultural exchange. Even though one can easily recognise the specificity of thenational and cultural identity of Montenegrins, emphasising this specificity seems neces-sary. Naturally, the crucial aspect of the whole process is finding a good measure of thingsand establishing a necessary balance. Otherwise, one enters the realm of provincial xeno-phobia and ethnic exclusivism. One has to be conscious that the Montenegrin cultural her-itage and its contemporary manifestations are also the product of a creative effort of indi-vidual intellectuals and groups that could not be positioned within the Montenegrin ethnicframework. Cultural borrowings are a common occurrence in many cultures and there isnothing wrong with them as long as their purpose is to interact with and learn about oth-ers, rather than simply to adopt or create a carbon copy of the outside model. The ability to

69 Examples of such attempts could be found on the pages of the Crnogorski Književni List(Montenegrin Literary Journal) published in Podgorica. Particularly striking examples of aone-dimensional approach to Montenegrin identity (from a radical independentist point ofview) are articles written by the journal’s Editor-in-Chief, Jevrem Brković.

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accept outside influences and filter them through the mechanisms of one's own artistic andcreative sensibility is a sign of a well-rounded sense of identity and represents a qualita-tive departure from the rigid boundaries of one's ethnic mental landscape. An insistenceon prioritising and canonising ethnic criteria inevitably produces a backlash since it con-structs others (outsiders). These others are seen as foreign, unwanted and de-humanised.Finally, when representatives of a particular national group feel insecure about their ownidentity, others are viewed as enemies. As Robert Musil pointed out, ethnic biases are usu-ally nothing more than manifestations of one's self-hatred and the products of an innerconflict that is projected on a convenient victim.70

The political arena in Montenegro today is characterised by emotional outbursts whichobscure the real issue at stake: the modern condition (political, social, economic and cul-tural). This calls for the introduction of a new discourse to assess and present the idea ofMontenegrin independence and sovereignty: the discourse of civic society. Creative inter-action between two or more different segments of broader/different cultural frameworkscould best be achieved if the concept of ethnic identity is separated from that of civic iden-tity. This separation should occur on the semantic level as well as on that of political andcultural activity. Such differentiation has to be initiated and maintained in public dis-course in the Montenegrin state and should carry in itself the possibility and the right of anindividual or a group to choose their own civic identity while not severing all ties with theoriginal ethnic group.71

Despite the ‘multi-cultural’ rhetoric, it seems that a suitable climate for accepting andimplementing this differentiation in Montenegro is still in the making and that the notionof the Montenegrin state is conditioned more by the ethnic principle rather than by that ofthe civic identity of its population. This regression to the absolutism of the pure usuallyproduces various forms of cultural isolation which, in turn, feeds on the remnants of eth-nic mimicry and rejects everything that does not come from within one's own ethnic cir-cle. Instead of representing itself as a living and mobile experience, it is reduced to staticself-representation. In the absence of a political agency able and ready to establish themechanisms of a democratic civic society which is detached from the restrictive conceptof a mythologised past, cultural identities and self-representations become imposed andinternalised.72 Imposed processes and representations – the construction of stereotypes –could turn into mechanisms for controlling numerically smaller ethno-cultural groups (orcould be perceived as such). This is the point at which the problem changes its characterand becomes political. Many people in Montenegro perceive the long-promised referen-dum on independence as an imposition and as an attempt to force each individual to de-clare his or her own ethnic identity, instead of a way to create an optimal legal frameworkfor the process of defining civic identity in Montenegro. Explaining to the electorate thatthe modus vivendi called an independent and sovereign Montenegro is needed in order ‘tohelp us be, and not to simply have’ might reduce some tension within society.73

70 Robert Musil: The Man Without Qualities, Vol. 1 (New York: First Vintage InternationalEdition, 1996), p. 461.

71 Debeljak, op. cit.72 William Anselmi and Kosta Gouliamos: Elusive Margins: Consuming Media, Ethnicity and

Culture (Toronto, Buffalo, Lancaster: Guernica, 1998), p. 15.73 Debeljak, op. cit.

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The prioritisation of culture and cultural politics in the process of creating the condi-tions that will nourish elements of civic identity in Montenegro and establishing the mech-anisms through which a civic society could function are also important in view of the rel-atively recent political/personnel changes in Serbia. Even though these changes aremainly of a representational character, they should be seen as an improvement. Namely,getting rid of Milošević lessened the likelihood of Montenegro being ‘pacified’ throughmilitary action, but it did not entirely remove the threat of the marginalisation and redefi-nition of the Montenegrin political and cultural space by Serbia. Recent political eventsand the ongoing debate over the structure of the future union between Serbia and Mon-tenegro indicate that, once again, the issue of the modalities for achieving political goals(independent Montenegro versus unitary state) is the main stumbling block. It could besaid that the political model that is being imposed upon Montenegro by Brussels (politicaland economic union with Serbia), paired with the persistent imposition of Serbian culturalpatterns by Belgrade, constitutes a new version of an aggressive Serbian expansionism,which, time and again, is gaining international support. But this cosmetic improvementdoes not modify the aggressive nature of such expansionism. In the context of a post-mod-ern model of domination, the pen has become more effective and dangerous than thesword. Overcoming such challenges presupposes a restructuring of Montenegro's econ-omy and its political system. But such a process must include the revitalisation of the con-temporary and multi-layered corpus of cultural activities in Montenegro, as well as thepreservation of its traditional cultural values.

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Šerbo Rastoder

A short review of the history of Montenegro

Introduction: the nameThe oldest reference to the name Montenegro stems from a Papal epistle in Latin, from 9November 1053, where the term Monte nigro is used to denote an area or region within thestate of Duklja, or the Kingdom of Slavs.1 In Cyrillic sources, Montenegro was mentionedfor the first time in 1276, meaning ‘black mount’ or ‘black hills’. According to legend, theprevious forestland of today's Montenegro, when seen from the sea or Lake Skadar, lookedlike a chain of ‘black hills’ or ‘black mounts (forests)’.2 Whatever the case, all west Euro-pean languages embraced the term Montenegro as the name of the country and state ofMontenegro that has now been a historical subject for more than ten centuries, and where themajority of the population consists of Montenegrins, a people described, especially by 18 th

and 19th century authors writing about their travels to the Balkans, as bold warriors of un-usual height and handsomeness and exceptional moral and knightly convictions.

This chapter will trace the political and social developments of Montenegro from theearly Slav times in the 9th century to the end of World War Two. The focus will thus lie onthe interaction between the episodes of independence, or autonomy, of Montenegro andoutside rule, be it by the Ottoman Empire, Venice, the Habsburg Monarchy, Yugoslaviaor Italy.

The emergence of Montenegrin statehood: ZetaNo records exist of the first centuries of Slavic presence in this region. Some scarce his-torical sources3 mention merely the archon Petar as the first ruler of Duklja in the 9th cen-tury. Moreover, there is a complete lack of data on the conversion of the Slavic populationon the territory of Duklja to Christianity and, although there is no doubt that the influenceof Rome was prevalent, the impact of Byzantium was not insignificant, particularly in theperiod of Basil I in the second half of the 9th century. Outlines of a state organisation inthis region originated during the period of turmoil that swept over the Balkan Peninsulatowards the end of the ninth and the beginning of the tenth century.

Apart from Petar, who was mentioned by the earliest sources, further records relate toDuke Vladimir (997-1016), whose throne was in Skadar, from where he withdrew to thesurrounding area after the 997 capture of Drač (Duressi) by the Macedonian EmperorSamuilo who, shortly afterwards, not only conquered Duklja, but imprisoned Vladimir aswell. Vladimir returned to Duklja before long, following his marriage to Samuilo’s daugh-ter Kosara, and was tricked into death by his brother-in-law, Emperor Vladislav. Later,

1 Translated from the original by Ivana Prazić. Vojislav D. Nikčević (ed.): Miscellanea Slavo-rum, Dokumenti o Slovenima, Pars prima (Cetinje: Državni arhiv Crne Gore, 2002), p. 46.

2 See ‘Crna Gora i Crnogorci’, Vol. 2 & 3, 2nd Edition Enciklopedije Jugoslavije (Podgorica:DOB, 1999), p. 1.

3 In recent years, a voluminous publication on the historical origins and the early period of Mon-tenegro was published, see Vojislav D. Nikčević: Monumenta Montegrina, I-X (Podgorica:Istorijski institut Crne Gore, 2001-2002).

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Vladimir was canonised.4 Duke Vladimir’s state stretched from Drač in Albania to theNeretva River, and comprised within its borders the areas of Duklja, Zahumlje and Travu-nija. His court was in Bar.

The founder of the first Montenegrin dynasty, the Vojislavljević Dynasty – which isclaimed to have had as many as 28 kings by Pop Dukljanin in his work The Kingdom ofSlavs in the second half of the twelfth century – was Stefan Vojislav (1016-1043), whosemilitary superiority over the Byzantine Empire, which he defeated, gained Duklja its stateindependence, acknowledged by Byzantium itself. His supremacy was recognised byneighbouring Raška, Hum and Bosnia. Vojislav was succeeded by his son Mihailo, towhom the Byzantine Empire acknowledged sovereignty in internal matters of the state aslong as he, in turn, symbolically recognised the supremacy of the Byzantine Emperor.

Duke Mihailo’s state – referred to more frequently in Byzantine sources as Zeta – in-cluded in its territorial extension the region stretching from Ston and the hinterland of Du-brovnik to the area surrounding around Drač to the south. Duke Mihailo located his courtsin Kotor and Prapratna (a site between Bar and Ulcinj), and it is suspected that his statecontained a number of other coastal cities as well. It was during the period of his rule thatthe schism between the Pope and the Patriarchate in Constantinople took place in 1054,whereupon Mihailo, after fighting Byzantium and sending help to the rebels in Macedoniain 1072, succeeded in raising his state to the status of kingdom. In a letter dated at the be-ginning of 1077, Pope Gregory VII addresses him as rex Sclavorum (the king of theSlavs), although it remains unknown whether his royal title was bestowed upon him thatsame year or somewhat earlier. Be that as it may, the state of King Mihailo Vojislavljevi ćgained international recognition, just as it expanded territorially and became an imposingmilitary force in the region.

In the spiritual sense, the population of his country was under the jurisdiction of theEpiscopate of Dubrovnik which, in turn, was subordinated to Split and, eventually, toRome. Mihailo’s request to gain spiritual, as well as secular, independence was accom-plished in the period of reign of his heir Bodin (1082-1101), who was married to Jakvinta,a Norman.

The Macedonians proclaimed Bodin to be emperor in Prizren, as a gesture of gratitudefor the help he had provided them in the uprising of Đorđe Vojteh against the ByzantineEmpire. During the conquest of Drač by the Normans, Macedonia, Epirus and Thessaly,Bodin conquered Raška, turning it into a Zetan province, after which he took over Bosniaas well. In January 1089, he managed to ensure that the Episcopate of Bar was promotedto the rank of arch-episcopate (archbishopric) by the Pope, thus acquiring the favours ofthe religious chiefs in his state.5

After King Bodin’s death, the country started to weaken and shrink. Ra ška, Bosnia andHum separated from Duklja (Zeta), while disputes over the throne kept weakening the in-ner unity of the country. Bodin’s successor was his brother Dobroslav, who was dethronedby Vukan, the Great Župan (head of a tribal state) of Raška, who first enthroned Kočoparonly to replace him with Vladimir (1102-1114). Bodin’s wife Jakvinta managed to en-

4 Šćepanović: Kratka istorija Crne Gore, pp. 29-30; ‘Crna Gora i Crnogorci’, pp. 142-146.5 The bishoprics of Duklja, Bar, Kotor, Ulcinj, Svač, Skadar, Drivast, Pilot, Serbia, Bosnia

and Travunia were subordinated to the Bar Archbishopric.

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throne her son Đorđije (1114-1118) in order to suppress temporarily the supporters ofRaška and to provoke the intervention of Byzantium, as a result of which Grube ša was en-throned for a short time (1118-1125) before being replaced once again by Đorđije (1125-1131) and then by Gradihna (1131-1142), who succeeded in reclaiming Travunia andplacing it under his control. These long-lasting inner clashes ruined and desolated thecountry. Gradihna’s son and heir became a vassal to Byzantium, thus bringing Zeta andTravunia under his rule. The political anarchy that had ensued in Zeta after Bodin’s deathhad as its final consequence the loss of independence, these territories being conquered byNemanja, Raška’s Great Župan, in 1189 and annexed to Raška.

Thus ended the 173-year-long period of existence of the independent state of Duklja(Zeta) during which a state, a church and a culture dominated by western influence hadbeen created.6 From 1189 to 1360, Zeta became a part of the Nemanjić state, within whichit would retain certain autonomy. After the conquest of Duklja with its coastal area (‘TheKingdom of Dioclitia and Dalmatia’), Stefan Nemanja did not alter its independent organi-sation. Vukan, his eldest son, was appointed regent and he also enjoyed the title of the Kingof ‘Duklja and Dalmatia’, the title taken on from his predecessors, the kings of Duklja. Sig-nificant religious changes in this area began in 1219 when Sava (St. Sava), Stefan Ne-manja’s son, established the orthodox Zeta Episcopate in Prevlaka (near Tivat). Subse-quently, the orthodox Episcopates of Prevlaka and Ston would spread Orthodoxy as far asthe coastal areas of Zeta, where the Catholic religion had previously been predominant, al-though the Serbian feudal landowners would support the Archbishopric of Bar during itslong dispute with the Archbishopric of Dubrovnik on the issue of precedence. 7 The coastaltowns not only kept the autonomy won from the previous rulers under the Nemanji ć Dy-nasty, but also succeeded in broadening it widely. Internal autonomy was arranged by mu-nicipal statutes (Kotor acquired one in 1301, Bar in 1330 and Budva somewhat later) andthus the coastal towns developed into commercial centres and mediators in the exchange ofgoods with the hinterland, where certain towns (e.g. Kotor) had their colonies. 8

At that time, apart from feudal landowners, tenants and sharecroppers, there were alsocattle breeders, Vlachs and Albanians, allowed to move freely throughout Zeta on condi-tion of paying the usual taxes. During that period, Orthodox monasteries from the innerparts of Serbia and from Zeta and its coastal areas also started obtaining properties, whilethe system of pronias, i.e. giving land properties to warriors or officials without the rightof transfer to third persons, spread relatively early. The pronias were cultivated by land-less peasants and a pronia could be inherited by a son on condition that he assumed hisfather’s duties.9

6 On this period of Montenegrin history, see Istorija Crne Gore, Vol. 1 (Titograd, 1970);Nikčević: Monumenta Montenegrina; Šćepanović: Kratka istorija Crne Gore, pp. 28-38;‘Crna Gora i Crnogorci’, pp. 143-149; Dragoslav Srejović et al: Istorija srpskog naroda, Vol. I(Beograd: Srpska književna zadruga, 1981), pp. 109-124, 141-155, 174-175 and 180-196.

7 See Istorija Crne Gore No. 2, Vol. 1 (Titograd, 1970), pp. 15-28.8 ibid. pp. 28-46; ‘Crna Gora i Crnogorci’, pp. 149-154; Šćepanović: Kratka istorija Crne

Gore, pp. 45-57.9 Istorija Crne Gore, No. 2, Vol. 1 (Titograd, 1970), pp. 83-93; Šćepanović: Kratka istorija

Crne Gore, p. 57.

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The beginnings of Montenegro: between Venice and the Ottoman Empire

After 1360, Zeta gained independence under the Balšić Dynasty (1360-1421). The founderof the Balšić Dynasty, Đurađ I Balšić, together with his heirs Balša II and Đurađ IIStracimirović, were at constant war with their neighbours, i.e. Albanians, Serbians, Bosniansand the Zeta dynasties, as well as with some other feudal lords. This weakened significantlythe economic basis of the country, which was already, from the end of the 14 th century, be-ing endangered by the Ottomans.

In the battle of Saursko polje, in the vicinity of Berate, Balša II was killed although hisheir, Đurađ II Stracimirović (1385-1403), managed to retain the conquered territories innorthern Albania, i.e. the towns of Skadar and Drivast with Lješ. Ulcinj became the capi-tal city of Đurađ II and his court. The Balšić Dynasty minted their own coins and issueddocuments to the citizens of Dubrovnik regarding freedom of movement and commerce.Exposed to an Ottoman attack towards the end of the 14 th century, Đurađ II was forced togive up Skadar, Drivast and Sveti Srđ on the Bojana River and to approach Venice, theruling force on the Adriatic coast. In 1395, he managed to reconquer some of these, onlyto concede them to Venice, which took advantage of the internal clashes in Zeta. Venicethen took over a number of other coastal towns (Drivast, Ulcinj, Bar) on the death of Bal šaIII (1403-1421), the last ruler of the Balšić Dynasty. The rest of his territories were inhe-rited by his uncle, the Serbian despot Stefan Lazarević.10

Meanwhile, a family of feudal lords by the name of Crnojević ascended so high as to be-come the third Montenegrin dynasty in a row (1421-1496). Their ascendance was closely re-lated to Stefanica (Stefan) Crnojević who, after the collapse of the state of the Serbian despot(1439), reclaimed certain parts around upper Zeta. It was during the period of his rule thatthe concept of Zeta was being replaced by a new territorial and political notion – Montene-gro. At the same time, some important social changes took place in this area, resulting in thedisappearance of feudal Zeta and the emergence of patriarchal Montenegro. Balancing onthe one hand between Venice and the Ottoman Empire, which was forcefully penetrating theBalkan Peninsula, and local feudal states on the other, the Crnojević Dynasty attempted tomaintain the independence of their country. Stefan sought protection from the Republic ofVenice by means of the establishment of a vassal relationship, although his heir Ivan (1465-1490) later led futile battles against it in the attempt to win complete independence. Ivanfought on the side of Venice against the Ottoman Empire but in 1471 he was forced to recog-nise the supreme rule of the sultan and to pay a tax of 700 ducats. Thus, during the rule ofIvan Crnojević, Montenegro became a two-fold vassal

Even so, the Ottoman Empire continued attacking the Crnojević Dynasty because of itsclose ties with Venice, eventually seizing Podgorica (1474) and Skadar (1479), in thismanner confining the state of the Crnojević Dynasty to the narrow region around MountLovćen. Retreating before the Ottoman Empire, Ivan Crnojević moved the state capitaland the Metropolitan’s residence from Žabljak (Lake Skadar) firstly to Obod and then toCetinje, which was to become the historic capital of Montenegro in the centuries aheadand which was where he first built a court and monastery.

10 On Balša see Istorija Crne Gore, No. 2 Vol. 1 (Titograd, 1970), pp. 3-121; ‘Crna Gora iCrnogorci’, pp. 152-155; Šćepanović: Kratka istorija Crne Gore, pp. 58-80.

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His son and heir Đurađ (1490-1496) acquired a printing press in 1493 in Venice, onlya few years after it had been invented by Johan Gutenberg. The press constituted the firstprinting shop in the South Slav region and was where the first books in Cyrillic on the en-tire Balkan peninsula were printed. Starting from 1494, the Oktoih, the Book of Psalmsand the Prayer Book, among others, were printed – an issue that represented the ultimateaspect of religious defence and Montenegrin freedom. In this state printing shop, five reli-gious books were printed in the Cyrillic alphabet, displaying an unusual degree of techni-cal perfection and possessing high artistic beauty. Makarije, a monk, worked on theirprinting with seven assistants.

The Crnojević Dynasty was making constant attempts to persuade Catholic countries tofight against the Ottoman Empire and, when High Porte found out about one such attemptby Đurđe Crnojević, who had established connections with the French King Charles VIIwho, in turn, seized the Kingdom of Naples in 1495 and started planning an uprisingagainst the Ottoman Empire with the help of the Albanian rulers from southern Italy, hewas ordered to come to the court in Constantinople immediately or face leaving Montene-gro within the next three days. Đurađ decided to escape the country with his family andleft for Venice. Thus, the year of his departure (1496) is considered as the year of the finalfall of Montenegro under the reign of the Ottomans.

The duration of the rule of the Crnojević dynasty is restricted to a few decades but thememory of it persisted throughout centuries. It became a legend, with its members beingseen as the free rulers of Montenegro – an understandable phenomenon which character-ises all national dynasties prior to the loss of their respective states and independence. 11

During the Balšić and the Crnojević dynasties, cultural life was under the mixed swayof influences from both east and south. The Byzantine tradition of creating, copying andtranslating literary works was interwoven with the strong influence of Italy, especially af-ter the Fall of Constantinople (1453), when Zeta was experiencing a special kind of Ren-aissance. This relates particularly to the towns in the coastal area, where the Italian Ren-aissance left visible traces. For instance, Andrija Paltašić, originating from Kotor, printedreligious books and some Latin classical authors, such as Cicero, Ovid and Virgil, in Ven-ice between 1477 and 1493.

Montenegro under Ottoman ruleAfter the final fall under Ottoman rule (1496), Montenegro was adjoined to the countriesof the Ottoman Empire as a separate region under the supervision of the bey of Skadar andSandžak, in whose name a subaša (sub-pasha) governed Montenegro. The first Ottomanrecords of 1497 indicate that the country was subjected to the usual taxes, while the hillstations had an obligation to pay the filurija, a duty which demanded each household payone gold coin. Fifty three muselems, or chiefs of the rural self-governing communities,dominant among whom were the domicile chiefs, were tax-exempt. The seat of the

11 A broad range of literature exists on Montenegro at the time of Crnojević. Just a few are asfollows: Istorija Crne Gore, No. 2 Vol. 2 (Titograd, 1970), pp. 277-348; ‘Crna Gora iCrnogorci’, pp. 156-160; Šćepanović: Kratka istorija Crne Gore, pp. 90-107; ‘Pet vjekovaOktoiha’, Prve štampane ćirilične knjige na Slovenskom jugu, Radovi sa međunarodnognaučnog skupa, Cetinje 24-2.juna 1994 (Podgorica, 1994); Zbornik povodom pola mileni-juma crnogorskog štamparstva (Cetinje: Matica Crnogorska, 1995).

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kadija12 was Podgorica, while that of the subaša was Žabljak (Lake Skadar) from 1499-1511. Later on, this would also be the seat of Crnojević, the Montenegrin Sandžak Beyand the converted Muslim son of Đurđe Crnojević, who had died in Anatolia. This waswhere the sultan provided him with an estate after he had secretly returned to Montenegro,before his departure for Constantinople.

From the very beginning of Ottoman rule,13 there was a resistance to introducing haračand other taxes, and especially to serving the Ottoman army outside the borders of Mon-tenegro. During those periods, when the surrounding regions would be turned into a war-zone, such as during the war between Venice and the Ottoman Empire (1499-1502), theimpending resistance would turn into an open riot. This was exactly what happened in1502, during the above-mentioned war, although it was brutally crushed. The resistance ofthe people (in 1505, 1517 and 1519) forced the court in Constantinople to separate Mon-tenegro into a special Sandžak, governed by the already-mentioned son of Ivan Crnojević,Skender Bey. It was during this period that Montenegro’s usual financial obligations wereabolished. Furthermore, the filurija, corresponding to 55 akčas, was imposed on the entirepopulation and was supposed to be paid by each house, although the abuse of the authori-ties continued to cause constant riots.

After Skender Bey’s death (in 1530), Montenegro was adjoined to the Sandžakat ofSkadar and gained the status of vilajet – that is, a province of the sultan where his rule didnot rely on Muslims. The land was still exempt from the spahi-timar14 system. The proc-ess of forming cifliks15 began in the mid-16th century, when the local landowners (agas)started seizing certain monastery estates and hunting grounds in the lower parts of Mon-tenegro. All of this, coupled with the conversion of the population to Islam, resulted in theretreat of considerable parts of the population to the mountain areas. Hence, the number ofinhabitants in these areas increased. The territory of Montenegro at this time consisted offour nahijas16: the Katun; the Riječka; the Lješanska and Crmnička; and the Pobori, theMaine and Brajići. For a period of time, it also included the Grbalj nahija as well. The1523 census reveals that Montenegro had 3 151 households and properties. 17

Starting from 1566, Montenegro was governed by Dukađinski Bey, who was followedby Sandžak Bey of Herzegovina, who ruled for a short time (1576). Towards the end ofthe 16th century, there were signs of certain attempts once more to separate Montenegrointo a special Sandžak. During this period, in some parts of Montenegro administrativedistricts, known as knežine, had already been formed and had taken the form of tribal or-ganisations. A similar process had spread over all the regions of the so-called Mon-tenegrin Hills and parts of Herzegovina Sandžak and, thus, in the coming period, tribally-organised society was the most significant organisational structure in this area, both in thesocial and the political life of its population. Over time, the organisation of a tribal societywas formed, led by the Opštecrnogorski (All-Montenegrin) and the Montenegrin Assem-

12 A Moslem judge, kadi.13 ‘Crna Gora i Crnogorci’, p. 160; Živko Andrijašević: Kratka istorija Crne Gore 1496-1918

(Bar: Conteco, 2000), pp. 11-13; Šćepanović: Kratka istorija Crne Gore, pp. 109-116.14 An income awarded to Ottoman soldiers in the form of land given in the form of fief.15 Private land estates.16 Ottoman territorial sub-unit below Sandjaks.17 Andrijašević: Kratka istorija Crne Gore, p. 13.

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bly of tribal chiefs (a form of folk assembly) with a Metropolitan – the vladika (bishop) –presiding over them. The vladikas were religious chiefs picked directly at the Assemblysessions from various tribes. In the period between 1499 and 1697, their position was nota hereditary one.

On the other hand, rebellious and belligerent Montenegrins demonstrated their resistanceto Ottoman rule through constant confrontation. After the Ottoman Empire attempted to col-lect payment for harač by force, and following its defeat at Lješkopolje in 1603, the sultanpractically acknowledged the autonomy of Montenegro, naming a resident duke as the spa-hija and chief of Montenegro. The filurija, up to then collected by the imperial haračars18

with the help of the dukes and under the surveillance of the Sandžak Bey, was now replacedwith danak,19 collected by the dukes themselves led by the spahija. An imperial edict con-firmed the privileges and authorised Montenegrins to prevent any Ottoman representativefrom entering Montenegro without their approval, with the exception of those sent by thesultan himself. Moreover, Montenegrins were exempted from the obligation of going to waroutside the borders of Montenegro – except where the sultan had sent for them – althoughthe compulsion remained both to work in the sultan’s salterns in Grbalj and to organise theirdefence. Under the custody of the Sandžak Bey and the Montenegrin kadija, who lived out-side the territory of Montenegro, only a broad supervision of Montenegro was implemented.The de facto acknowledgement of autonomy strengthened the role of the Montenegrin Met-ropolitans in Cetinje and the native spahijas, who represented Montenegro before the Otto-man and the Venetian authorities. Traditional law continued to be the basis for resolving in-ternal disputes, while no decisions of importance for the entire country could be madewithout the agreement of the Opštecrnogorski Assembly.

Tribes in MontenegroDuring Ottoman rule, tribal organisation spread all over the territory of today’s Monte-negro with the exception of Boka Kotorska, where organisation was limited to the Pa štro-vići and Krivošija tribes. The tribes were mainly formed during the late 15 th and first halfof the 16th century, taking the form of territorial organisations of self-governed and localsocial communities within a geographical and economic framework. A tribe is a commu-nity consisting of several clans, possessing territory, institutions, common property and anidentical economic foundation of social life, as well as tradition and awareness of thecommunity. A patriarchal organisation of life would be formed within tribes, differingmuch from one which characterises non-tribal organisations. Within the historical nucleusof Old Montenegro (the area around Mount Lovćen), 21 tribes were created and, in thearea of the so-called Montenegrin Hills, another seven, although the number of tribes va-ries as some have since disappeared and others dispersed.

The Montenegrin Assembly was an organ shared by all tribes and, as such, it was incharge of solving inter-tribal disputes and establishing peace with neighbouring tribes andwith regions belonging to the Ottoman Empire. The decisions of the Montenegrin Assemblyhad a moral obligation only since it did not possess any kind of executive organs of compul-sion. The Assembly was open just to adult Montenegrin men. Most often, only one member

18 Tax collectors.19 Tribute.

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of a household – usually the chief – was sent to the Assembly sessions, but there were caseswhen several houses would send one representative on behalf of them all. There are recordsthat some sessions of the Assembly managed to gather as many as 2 000 participants, whichturned them into real national parliaments. It was at the Assembly sessions that Monte-negro’s Metropolitans were elected, the territorial court established and various issues con-cerning foreign affairs and relations with the surrounding countries and, later on, Russia, re-solved. It is thought that these Assemblies were the continuance of medieval gatherings,although the records show that they appeared as a permanent all-tribal institution only at thebeginning of the 17th century. The Opštecrnogorski Assembly had to ratify all the other as-semblies and the agreements made by the chiefs; there were few cases of disobedience ofAssembly decisions. An Assembly session was usually convened by the Metropolitan, mostoften in one of the monasteries around Cetinje. Over time, the Metropolitan became the mostimportant figure in both the religious and the political life of Montenegrins. 20

The Metropolitan’s residence in Cetinje became the spiritual centre for Orthodox Monte-negrins and, as a religious institution and a spiritual location, it gathered round itself theMontenegrin tribes and directed their feelings regarding Ottoman rule. Between 1496 and1697, there were 18 vladikas originating from various Montenegrin tribes.

Montenegro between Ottoman rule and independenceFrom the 18th century onwards, the neighbouring Sandžak Beys started to jeopardise theprivileges that the Montenegrins had attained within the Ottoman Empire. Defending thoseprivileges, the Montenegrins increased their resistance and looked for allies in the surround-ing Christian countries. During the war over Crete (1645-1669) between the Ottoman Em-pire and Venice, the Montenegrins actively participated on the side of Venice and, in 1648,decided to overthrow Ottoman supremacy and to request protection from Venice. 21 How-ever, the authorities in Venice did not consider the moment to be ripe. On the other hand,though, they actively worked on enticing the Christian population in the Balkans to rise upagainst the Ottoman Empire. Several joint military actions of Venetians and Montenegrins,such as attacks on Bar and Risan (the one on Risan was successful), resulted in punitivecampaigns against the Montenegrin tribes. This in turn resulted in mass migrations of Mon-tenegrins to regions stretching from Boka Kotorska to Istria. Meanwhile, the process of con-version into Islam and ciflik intensified greatly, especially in the plains.

Similar developments ensued during the Morean War (1684-1699), when the Mon-tenegrins, once again, fought on the side of Venice.22 The Sandžak Bey of Skadar, Sulej-

20 On Montenegro during Ottoman rule see Andrijašević: Kratka istorija Crne Gore, pp. 11-43;Šćepanović: Kratka istorija Crne Gore, pp. 109-122; ‘Crna Gora i Crnogorci’, p. 160-162; Brani-slav Đurđev: Turska vlast u Crnoj Gori u XVI i XVII veku (Sarajevo, 1953); Branislav Đurđev:Dva deftera Crne Gore iz vremena Skendred bega Crnojevića, Vol. I (Sarajevo, 1968).

21 For more on Montenegro’s role in the war over Crete, see Gligor Stanojević: Jugoslovenske zem-lje u mletačko turskim ratovima XVI – XVIII veka (Beograd: Prosveta, 1970); Andrijašević:Kratka istorija Crne Gore, pp. 46-49; Šćepanović: Kratka istorija Crne Gore, pp. 126-130.

22 On Montenegro and the battle of Morea, see J. Tomić: Crna Gora za vrijeme Morejskog rata(1684-1699) (Beograd, 1907); Gligor Stanojević: Borba crnogorskih, brdskih i hercegovačkihplemena protiv turske vlasti (XVI-XVIII) (Beograd, 1976), pp. 176-217; Andrijašević: Kratkaistorija Crne Gore, pp. 45-46; Šćepanović: Kratka istorija Crne Gore, pp. 126-130.

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man Pasha Bušatlija, led a military campaign against Montenegro and, at the battle atVrtijeljca, in the close vicinity of Cetinje (1685), defeated the Montenegrin forces and con-quered Cetinje. Venetian influence was suppressed for a while, until 1687, when Monte-negrins actively participated in an attack on Herceg-Novi and, once again, the consequencewas a new Ottoman campaign against Montenegro. Earlier, Sulejman Pasha unsuccessfullyattacked the Kuči Tribe, at which point Montenegrins, at a session of the Assembly (1688),came to an agreement to organise a general uprising. Until 1692, the Montenegrins enjoyedmilitary successes in the war against the Ottoman Empire, only to be defeated by SulejmanPasha once again in the Autumn of the same year, when he managed to conquer Cetinje.However, in the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699), the Ottoman Empire lost vast parts of its terri-tory. This affected the situation in Montenegro in a positive way. The degree of independ-ence of certain tribes from Ottoman rule increased and, in some parts of Montenegro, Otto-man rule was almost unnoticeable.

At that time, Danilo (1696-1735) became the new vladika.23 He is considered to be thefounder of the fourth Montenegrin dynasty, the Petrović Dynasty, which governed Montene-gro until the loss of independence in 1918. Vladika Danilo Šćepčević Petrović became Met-ropolitan in the period after the Cetinje Monastery had been destroyed and ravaged by theSkadar Pasha Sulejman (1692). During his reign, some significant changes took place inMontenegro which had long-term consequences for the fortune of the state. Namely, untilthe beginning of the 18th century, Montenegrins had mainly relied on the help of the Vene-tians in wars against the Ottoman Empire. However, staring from 1711, vladika Danilo es-tablished connections with Russia, the country that would become Montenegro’s protectorand which would provide Montenegro with support in the following centuries. Over time, acharacteristic cult of Russia would evolve in Montenegro,24 while the establishment of Mon-tenegro-Russian political ties would result in a considerable increase in Montenegro’s self-confidence and a bolder attitude regarding the Ottoman authorities.

Attacks on the surrounding Ottoman fortifications resulted in massive punitive militarycampaigns against Montenegro. In one such campaign in 1712, the Ottoman army, led byAhmed Pasha, managed to recapture Cetinje, although it had been previously defeated in abattle at Carev Laz, which the people of Montenegro traditionally cherish as their greatvictory. The Cetinje Monastery was once again demolished and many houses were burntdown, while some of the Montenegrin tribes were forced to declare their loyalty to theOttoman Empire. However, Montenegro was not appeased and, in a new attack in thesummer of 1714, the forces of the Bosnian vizier Numan Pasha Ćuprilić, counting some30 000 soldiers, performed gruesome repressions in which thousands of people werekilled, houses burned to ashes and the country devastated. Vladika Danilo first took refugein Boka and, shortly afterwards, went to Russia to seek help. 25 He requested that the Rus-

23 See Gligor Stanojević: Crna Gora u vrijeme vladike Danila (Beograd, 1955); Andrijašević:Kratka istorija Crne Gore, pp. 55-65; ‘Crna Gora i Crnogorci’, p. 164; Šćepanović: Kratkaistorija Crne Gore, pp. 135-139.

24 Istorija Crne Gore, No. 3 Vol. I (Titograd, 1975), pp. 325-373; Živko Andrijašević: ‘Stva-ranje kulta Rusije u Crnoj Gori u XVIII vijeku’, Slovenski glasnik No. 1 (1996), pp. 19-37.

25 See J. Tomić: ‘Pohod Numan-paše Ćuprilića na Crnu Goru 1714. godine’, Glas SA, No. 147(1932); J. Tomić: Pitanje Careva Laza (Beograd, 1933); Andrija šević: Kratka istorija CrneGore, pp. 55-65; Šćepanović: Kratka istorija Crne Gore, pp. 135-139.

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sian government take Montenegro under its protection and financially help the Monte-negrin victims.

The Russian czar Peter the Great bestowed financial help for the victims on vladikaDanilo and secured a constant amount of money for the Cetinje Monastery. From that mo-ment until the beginning of the 20th century, the Russian subventions played an importantrole in the Montenegrin economy. Even so, this pro-Russian orientation of vladika Daniloencountered strong opposition in Venice and amongst the majority of Montenegrin chiefswho were in favour of the idea of collaboration with the Venetian Republic. A group ofsuch chiefs went to Venice in 1717, with a proposal to put Montenegro under the protec-tion of the Republic of Venice on the condition that it kept its internal autonomy and theindependence of its Church. The proposal was accepted by the Venetians, who establishedthe post of governor, which mostly pertained to the Radonjić family from Njeguše, in1717. The post was abolished in 1830.26 Nevertheless, vladika Danilo still played theleading role in the country and, since he accepted the aforementioned contract, was recog-nised as having the right of supreme religious jurisdiction over the Orthodox population.

The general status of Montenegro did not change significantly. The Ottoman Empirestill saw it as its territory although its reign in Montenegro was fictional. Co-operation be-tween Montenegro and Venice came to an end, with Montenegro starting to seek help andsupport from both Russia and Austria. As the originator of the idea of Montenegrin inde-pendence, vladika Danilo managed to unite the surrounding tribes in their common fightagainst the Ottoman Empire, while the Cetinje residence of the metropolitans became apowerful spiritual and political centre of the state. Vladika Danilo also established the firstorgans of authority beyond tribal ones by forming the Twelve Member Court in 1713, abody which was in charge of resolving inter-tribal disputes and other important issues.

Vladika Danilo’s heir was vladika Sava Petrović (1735-1781), who actively participatedin the Russian and Austrian wars against the Ottoman Empire. On a journey to Russia, hereceived the acknowledgement of the autocephaly of the Montenegrin-Coastal Metropoli-tan Diocese by the Saint Russian Synod, while the Russian Empress Elisabeth gave him aconsiderable amount of financial aid for the Cetinje Monastery and the Montenegrin peo-ple.27 Vladika Vasilije Petrović Njegoš (1735-1781) ruled as koadjutor (assistant) togetherwith his uncle Sava, managing to impose himself as the leading and inviolable figure in thepolitical life of Montenegro. However, the principle of primogeniture in the inheritance ofpower was not valid in Montenegro since vladikas did not have posterity, and their title wasinherited by a member of a side branch of the Petrović family tree.

Vasilije dreamed of organising a Balkan Uprising in which Montenegro would play aleading role. He was the first figure to come up with a plan recognising the territories thatwould go to Montenegro. Interestingly enough, the territory he marked as Montenegro’sin the mid-18th century is almost identical with the territory of today’s Montenegro. Bea-ring this goal in mind, he went to Russia in 1752 and remained there for the following twoyears, raising various issues concerning Montenegro-Russian ties and effectuating theidea of the migration of Montenegrins to Russia. He published The History of Montenegro

26 Šćepanović: Kratka istorija Crne Gore, pp. 135-139.27 Andrijašević: Kratka istorija Crne Gore, p. 66.

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(1754) in Russia and, thus, is considered to be the originator of the modern Montenegrinhistoriography.

Vladika Vasilije passed away in St. Petersburg (1766) and Montenegro was left withouta dominant figure on its political scene28 and internal crisis resulted from the associatedincrease in tribal anarchy and disunity. Under such circumstances, a foreigner by the nameof Šćepan Mali (Stephen the Small) appeared in Montenegro in September 1766, intro-ducing himself as a herbalist. He then started to present himself as the Russian czar PeterIII who had been dethroned and who was believed to have escaped from Russia. Partly outof its special respect for Russia and, partly, because of a certain physical likeness with thedethroned Russian emperor, the Montenegrins took his story for granted and, at a sessionof the Assembly in 1767, he was proclaimed ruler of Montenegro.

The news of the arrival of the ‘Russian Emperor’ in Montenegro awakened suspicionsin neighbouring countries and in Russia. Venice decided to poison Šćepan Mali whileRussia sent the Counsellor of the Russian Embassy in Vienna to remove the usurper fromMontenegro. The court in Istanbul, on the other hand, believed that Šćepan Mali had beenbrought to Montenegro by the Russians. Towards the end of 1768, Montenegro was at-tacked by 50 000 soldiers moving in from three directions. Due to the war between Russiaand the Ottoman Empire, the operations were stopped and, in 1769, Duke Dolgorukovcame to Montenegro bringing a proclamation from Empress Catherine inviting the Slavicpeople to overthrow Ottoman rule. Dolgorukov attested that Šćepan Mali was a fraud andthat he should be arrested. Nevertheless, since Šćepan Mali enjoyed undivided support inthe country, Dolgorukov’s attempt was a failure. Thereafter, he was allowed to stay andgovern the country on the condition that he vowed loyalty to Russia and to the RussianCourt. Eventually, Šćepan Mali was murdered in 1773 by his own servant, of Greek ori-gin, who had been talked into it by the pasha of Skadar.

The beginnings of statehood in MontenegroThis controversial personality left behind important marks on the history of Montenegro.By means of applying sanctions, until that moment unheard of in this region, he intro-duced peace and order to Montenegro. A division of 10 to 50 men was formed and used tofight against blood vengeance, kidnapping and obstinacy. He formed a court (in 1771) thatconsisted of twenty of the most esteemed Montenegrin tribal chiefs, which resolved inter-tribal disputes. The following year, he also created the first executive organs of the centraladministration, a squadron of 80 men-in-arms. The reign of Šćepan Mali is therefore con-sidered to be an important factor in accelerating the process of creating the state of Mon-tenegro.29

28 On the rule of Vasilije, see Gligor Stanojević: Mitropolit Vasilije Petrović i njegovo doba(1740-1766) (Beograd: Istorijski institut/Narodna knjiga, 1978); Istorija Crne Gore, No. 3,Vol. I , pp. 298-365; ‘Crna Gora i Crnogorci’, pp. 164-165; Andrijašević: Kratka istorijaCrne Gore, pp. 69-71; Šćepanović: Kratka istorija Crne Gore, pp. 139-145.

29 On Montenegro during the era of Šćepan Mali, see Istorija Crne Gore, No. 3, Vol. I,pp. 373-390; Gligor Stanojević: Šćepan Mali (Beograd, 1957); ‘Crna Gora i Crnogorci’,pp. 165-166; Šćepanović: Kratka istorija Crne Gore, pp. 147-153; Andrijašević: Kratkaistorija Crne Gore, pp. 77-79.

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In the same sense, the reign of Petar I Petrović Njegoš (1784-1830) was of particularimportance. He was proclaimed vladika shortly after the interim rule of Arsenije Pla-menac (1781-1784), the nephew of Sava, the previous vladika. Petar I is regarded as thegreatest historical figure in Montenegro. At the very beginning of his rule, he came intoconflict with the governor, who was especially provoked by his intention to subdue theCetinje Metropolitan and to place Montenegro under Austrian protection. The opening ofhis reign was also marked by the last Ottoman invasion and the burning down of Cetinje(1785) by Mahmut Pasha Bušatlija of Skadar, a renegade Ottoman lord who frequentlyendangered Montenegro.

In organising the country’s defence against such attacks, Petar I convened a meetingbetween the tribal chiefs and the all-Montenegrin Assembly in July 1796, where an impor-tant decision (later on known as the Stega (fastening)) was made. This obliged all chiefs tovow to lead their tribes and nahijas in the fight against aggressors and to maintain peacebetween their tribes. Creating inner unity in this way, the Montenegrins achieved twogreat victories over the Ottoman Empire, the first being the battle at Martini ći in July 1796and the second the battle at Krusi in September of the same year. These were the firstgreat Montenegrin victories in the 18th century, achieved by means of their own powers,all of which helped them restore self-confidence and enthusiasm and which gained themthe reputation throughout Europe of being bold warriors.

After these victories, Montenegro’s territory extended and encompassed the neighbour-ing tribes of Piperi and Bjelopavlići, and Montenegro, de facto, became an independentcountry. Two years later (1798), at an assembly in Stanjevići Monastery, the GeneralMontenegrin and Hill Code was issued. This comprised 16 articles which were supple-mented by another 17 signed at the Assembly of 1803 in Cetinje. This Code provided a le-gal basis that strengthened the state of Montenegro since it regulated all issues in variousdomains, such as criminal and private law, as well as the law concerning domestic rela-tions. Court procedure was also standardised. At the 1798 Assembly session of tribalchiefs in Stanjevići, the Montenegrin and Hill Governmental Court was also issued, theso-called Kuluk, which had both administrative and legal authority. The National Chan-cellery was also founded in Cetinje, over which the Governmental Court executed its role.This formation of the central authority organs did not pass without the resistance of Mon-tenegrins and some of the tribes. In breaking this resistance and the internal autarchy,vladika Petar I used his moral authority and reputation.30

Towards the end of the 18th century, some significant changes were taking place in theregion surrounding Montenegro. Napoleon Bonaparte destroyed the Venetian Republic in1797, after it had controlled the coastal area of today’s Montenegro for several centuries.

30 On Montenegro during the rule of Petar I, see Dušan Vuksan: Petar I i njegovo doba (Cetinje,1951); Gligor Stanojević: Crna Gora pred stvaranje države (Beograd, 1962); Đoko Pejović:Crna Gora u doba Petra I i Petra II (Beograd: Narodna knjiga, 1981); Branko Pavićević:Petar I Petrović Njegoš (Podgorica: Perganmena, 1997); Branko Pavićević and Radoslav Ras-popović (eds.): ‘Crnogorski zakonici’, Pravni izvori i politički akti od značaja za istorijudržavnosti Crne Gore I – V (Podgorica: Istorijski institut Crne Gore, 1998); Branko Pavićevićand Radoslav Raspopović (eds.): Stega, Jubilarno izdanje (Podgorica, 1996); Istorija CrneGore, No. 3 Vol. I, pp. 419-465; ‘Crna Gora i Crnogorci’, pp. 166-169; Šćepanović: Kratkaistorija Crne Gore, pp. 153-160; Andrijašević: Kratka istorija Crne Gore, pp. 83-91.

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Soon after the fall of the Republic of Venice, Petar I attempted to conquer its territories inthe coastal area. He led a successful war against Napoleon’s army in Boka (1806-1813)and, At the assembly session in 1813, at which representatives from both Montenegro andBoka participated, it was decided that these territories would unify. An interim govern-ment was also formed in order to implement this decision. However, at the Congress ofVienna in 1814, the Great Powers decided – with Russia’s support – that Boka should goto Austria. In this manner, Montenegro gained another mighty neighbour on its southernborders – Austria – and turned a fresh page in Montenegro-Austrian relations. 31

Petar I, a rarely talented ruler, cleric, military leader, lawmaker, thinker, diplomat, vi-sionary and writer, elaborated in his plans the idea of a Slav-Serbian Empire within theframework of the medieval Kingdom of Slavs. During his reign, Montenegro’s territorydoubled from some 1 500 square km to approx. 3 000 square km. He was highly esteemedby his people and one of the most educated Montenegrin vladikas, being fluent in severallanguages. He was also the author of the Brief History of Montenegro and of a number ofepic poems motivated by various events from the history of Montenegro. He was espe-cially remembered by several hundreds of epistles written to various Montenegrin tribesand which, apart from the historical, also have great literary value. Four years after hisdeath, Petar I was canonised.

Petar I was succeeded by Rade Tomov Petrović. At the assembly of Montenegrin tribalchiefs in October 1830, the will of Petar I was confirmed and Rade Tomov Petrovi ć, after hehad entered a monastic order, was given the monastic name Petar II. As the vladika of Mon-tenegro, Petar II Petrović Njegoš (1830-1851) continued to build the organs of the centraladministrative authority. The Montenegrin and Hill Governmental Court established by hispredecessor and uncle, Petar I, was modified into the Montenegrin and Hill Governing Se-nate and it played the role of the supreme legal and administrative organ of authority. He es-tablished the Gvardija, as the executive organ of authority, as well as the institution of per-janik, which functioned as the personal security of the vladika and which formed anincipient police authority in the country. In 1837, he divided the country into kapetanije,which were governed by captains elected by the vladika. The posts of senators, captains,members of the Gvardija and perjaniks were paid from the state budget. By means of creat-ing the executive organs of authority, the premises for the introduction of a system of taxa-tion were also established. This was introduced for the first time in 1833, with payments be-ginning in 1834, not without resistance, although this was energetically crushed.

Even at that time, Montenegro was surrounded by the Ottoman Empire on three sides,so relations with this neighbour were the prior concern of all its rulers – all the more sosince Montenegro behaved as a free country, displaying a permanent ambition to adjoinsurrounding conquered areas to its own territory. Thus, frequent disputes and clashes en-sued, with the majority being resolved on battlefields. The first diplomatic efforts at re-solving disputes were recorded in 1842, when an agreement was signed in Dubrovnik be-tween Montenegro and the Pašaluk of Herzegovina, followed by another, signed in Kotorin 1843. The importance of these agreements lay, primarily, in that they evidenced Mon-tenegro being treated by the Ottoman authorities as an independent country. On the other

31 See Ujedinjenje Crne Gore i Boke 1813-1814, Vol. I-II (Podgorica: Istorijski institut CrneGore/Državni arhiv Crne Gore/Istorijski arhiv Kotor, 1998).

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hand, the pashas of Skadar managed to deprive Montenegro of two important localitiesand fortifications on Lake Skadar (Vranjina and Lesendro), which caused great damage tothe country since, as a result, fishery and trade were constantly disturbed. In 1841, duringthe reign of Petar II, the problems of the borders with Austria were resolved as well, sinceit was then that the last protocol was signed, after two Montenegrin monasteries on Aus-trian territory (Maine and Stanjevići) had been sold to Austria. In a few journeys he madeto Russia, Petar II managed to obtain considerable Russian financial assistance for Mon-tenegro, while he also maintained permanent relations with Serbia under the rule of theObrenović Dynasty, as well as with Serbs from Vojvodina, the Croatian Ban Jela čić and anumber of other political figures from the surrounding areas.

In 1834, Petar II established the first primary school in Montenegro. The same year, aprinting shop started work in Cetinje and, in 1835, the almanac Grlica, the first Mon-tenegrin magazine, was printed. In this period, the first buildings for the needs of govern-mental institutions were built in Cetinje (the Biljarda in 1838). Additionally, Petar IIPetrović Njegoš is regarded as the greatest name in Montenegrin literature. According tomany, he is the most magnificent of the South Slavic poets and is considered to be amongthe best at the European level. His works – The Mountain Wreath, The Ray of the Micro-cosm and The False Tsar Stephen the Small – are regarded as classical works in Monte-negrin and South Slavic literature.32

Petar II was inherited by Knjaz (Prince) Danilo (1851-1860), the first secular ruler ofMontenegro after Đurđe Stanojević (1490-1496). Prince Danilo was bestowed with thattitle in 1852 with the agreement of Russia, whereupon Montenegro was declaredknjaževina, or principality.33 By separating the secular from the religious authority, thepremises for constructing the modern state of Montenegro were created.

The decline of Ottoman influenceThe initiatives of Prince Danilo regarding the country’s foreign affairs were directed to-wards obtaining international recognition of the independence of the Montenegrin state.Prince Danilo sent a Memorandum to the participants in the Paris Conference (1856), inwhich he requested that the state independence of Montenegro be recognised internation-ally. He also requested recognition of the country’s territorial expansion towards Herze-govina and Northern Albania, as well as the Adriatic Sea. The Great Forces did not sup-port these requests, so Prince Danilo went to Paris in 1857, where he re-stated his requeststo the French Empire under Napoleon III. The French Empire demanded that Montenegrofirst recognise the supreme reign of the sultan before its requests could be given consider-ation. This turn to France was a conspicuous change in Montenegro’s traditional position

32 The bibliography of Petar II has some thousand entries. Only the sources used here arementioned: Enciklopedija Njegoš, Vol. I (Podgorica: Fondacija Njegoš/CID, 1999); BožinaM. Ivanović: ‘Njegoševa genealogija’, Matica No. 7/8 (2001); Božina M. Ivanović: Antrpo-morfološke osobine Petra II Petrovića Njegoša (Podgorica: CANU, 1995); Pejović: CrnaGora u doba Petra I i Petra II; Miomir Dašić: ‘Petar II Petrović Njegoš u revoluciji 1848. i1849. godine’, Historijski zapisi No. 1-2 (1998); ‘Crna Gora i Crnogorci’, pp. 170-174;Andrijašević: Kratka istorija Crne Gore, pp. 99-107.

33 Branko Pavićević: ‘Danilo I Petrović Njegoš, Knjaz crnogorski i brdski (1851-1860)’,(Beograd: Književene novine, 1990), pp. 35-73.

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in foreign affairs, in contrast to its close ties with Russia, which was considered to beMontenegro’s traditional protector. Prince Danilo refused the demand of the French Em-pire and thus Montenegro, together with Greece, was the only country in the Balkans thatdid not recognise Ottoman rule.34

At the very beginning of his rule, Prince Danilo was faced with the violent attacks ofOmer Pasha Latas on Montenegro (1852/1853), which he managed to ward off successfully.Prince Danilo constantly urged the surrounding tribes in Herzegovina to rise against Otto-man rule and, as a result, the Ottoman organised another military campaign against Monte-negro.35 In the famous battle at Grahovac (1858), the Montenegrins achieved one of themost resounding victories against the Ottoman Empire. After this victory, the Great Powers(Russia, France and Great Britain) insisted on settling the situation between Montenegro andthe Ottoman Empire. At the conference held in Constantinople in 1858, participants fromRussia, Austria, Great Britain, France and Prussia formed a commission with the task of set-ting the borders between Montenegro and the Ottoman Empire regarding the territories to-wards Herzegovina and Skadar Pašaluk. The border was drawn in 1859 while the Protocolon the division of the territories was signed in 1860. In this manner, the state independenceof Montenegro was, effectively, recognised and, after the battle at Grahovac, Montenegro’sterritory increased to reach some 4 400 square km. The military victories of Montenegro re-sulted in its great popularity throughout the Slav world.36

During the reign of Prince Danilo, the development of Montenegro’s governmental insti-tutions continued. In 1853, the registration of all militarily capable men was carried out andthe so-called Krstonosna vojska – the Cross-bearers Army – was formed, together with aGarda of 400 men. The Montenegrin officers were provided with caps embellished with acoat-of-arms (until then, they were indistinguishable from common soldiers), taxes on im-ported goods were introduced and the obligation of general tax payment was enforced.Book-keeping commenced concerning the state’s revenues and expenses, while roads con-necting certain towns were built. Special importance is to be attributed to the issuing of theMontenegrin and Hill Legal Code in 1855, consisting of 95 articles and also known asDanilo’s Legal Code.37 The fight against tribal separatism and the collection of taxes were,sometimes, accompanied by the brutal intervention of the central authority. Prince Daniloalso abolished the All-Montenegrin Assembly, re-organised the court and modernised theentire administrative system. The nine years of his reign were ended in 1860 in Kotor, wherehe was killed by an assassin who was a Montenegrin political immigrant. 38

Modernisation and the road to independencePrince Danilo was succeeded by Nikola (1860-1918), the last ruler of the independentstate of Montenegro. In 1910, he was proclaimed a king and, in his long-lasting reign ofalmost six decades, Montenegro went through a period of great economic, political and

34 See Željko Andrijašević: Crnogorske teme (Podgorica: Istorijski institut Crne Gore, 1998),pp. 41-53.

35 Pavićević: Danilo I Petrović Njegoš, pp. 75-159.36 ibid, pp. 305-372.37 Jovan Bojović: Zakonik knjza Danila (Titograd: Istorijski institut Crne Gore, 1982);

Vladimir Jovićević: Danilov zakonik: snaga države (Podgorica: Oktoih, 1994).38 See Pavićević: Danilo I Petrović Njegoš, pp. 444-448.

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cultural blossoming and transformation, just as it doubled its territory. The first period ofhis reign (1860-1878) was marked by intensive activities in the field of foreign affairs,constant clashes with the surrounding Ottoman pashas, and efforts directed towards theeconomic strengthening of the country and the further development of culture and educa-tion. From the times of Prince Danilo, Montenegro maintained its representatives in Con-stantinople and in Kotor and, starting from 1863, in Skadar as well.

Military training and armaments were the particular focus of attention during this pe-riod. According to the registration of 1870, there were some 17 000 listed soldiers. Thefollowing year, military reform was undertaken, although the tribal division of the soldierswas retained, while the army was restructured into 25 battalions of the people’s army, sixbattalions of the guard and one battery. Army ranks were also introduced. In 1875, some23 000 rifles were purchased and army warehouses were established, while the artillerywas formed as a separate branch of the army.39

The governmental structure of the country remained unchanged until 1879. The countrywas still ruled by the prince, whose powers were unlimited. The Governing Senate stillfunctioned as the central organ of authority – the Government and the High Court. The ba-sic administrative unit was the kapetanije and, until 1868, governmental and legal proper-ties were not divided. The same year, financial reforms were undertaken and the state’sfunds separated from those of the court. In 1874, the Senate, as the central governmentalorgan, was itself reformed; the number of senators was decreased and administrations forinternal affairs, army affairs, finances and the Princely Chancellery for foreign affairs in-troduced. The role of the High Court was performed by the Senate.

Nevertheless, a weak economic basis did not leave much room for a more dynamic eco-nomic development. In the few workshops engaged in sewing national clothing, or in therepair of arms and furniture, it was mostly outside workers who were employed. Tradewas under-developed and the internal market was not united, partly as a result of limitedinfrastructure development and partly due to geographical conditions. The result of thiswas that domestic markets were under the strong influence of the Austrian and the Otto-man markets. Governmental authorities had a monopoly on salt purchase and wheat tra-ding. Export sites for such goods as meat, fish and lumber (Kotor and Skadar) lay outsideMontenegro’s state territory. There were four points for the collection of customs (two ofthem were near the border with Austria and the other two near the frontiers with the Otto-man Empire). Montenegro was still receiving constant Russian subventions for state andchurch purposes, while the first two secondary schools in Montenegro were also finan-cially supported by Russia. Cattle breeding was the dominant branch of the economy.

It was during this period that the first secondary school in Montenegro was opened(1863); only in 1869 did the Cetinje Seminary start working regularly, training teachersand members of the clergy. The ‘Girls’ Institute’ was opened the same year as the secondsecondary school and, in 1875, an agricultural school was opened in Danilovgrad. Thefirst library was founded in Cetinje in 1869. The almanac Orlić was printed in Cetinjefrom 1865-1870 and the first newspaper Crnogorac (The Montenegrin) was introduced in1871. In the same year, the first literary paper Crnogorka (The Montenegrin40), was estab-

39 Pedeset godina na prestolu Crne Gore (Cetinje, 1910), (Photocopy, Podgorica, 1998 ), pp. 73-90.40 Crnogorka is the term for a female Montenegrin.

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lished, as well as the Army Orchestra and a Choral group. In 1873, Glas Crnogorca(Voice of the Montenegrins) also began to appear. The telegraph was launched in 1869and regular postal traffic in 1873. The same year, the first hospital was built in Cetinje,while the first hotel had already been opened since 1864.41

The internal economic strength of the country was objectively incongruent with the im-portance of Montenegro and the role the country was playing in the field of foreign affairsand the liberation wars in the Balkans. Western European travellers visiting Montenegroin this period saw Montenegrins as a sort of Spartan, a people of unusual courageousness,military qualities and of the highest moral standards; the Montenegrins inspired many po-ets, such as Pushkin42 and Tennyson43, for instance. All this prompted an infiltration of aconsciousness of the internal freedom of a never-conquered Montenegro into the mind ofthe Montenegrin people.

Similar to his predecessor, Prince Nikola was, at the very beginning of his reign, facedwith Ottoman revenge attacks because of his active support for the 1862 Uprising inHerzegovina. Ottoman forces attacked Montenegro from various directions and, duringthe so-called Second Attack of Omer Pasha in 1862, they ravaged the country completely.Only on Russian and Austro-Hungarian intervention did the fighting stop. In theseclashes, Ottoman forces lost over 20 000 soldiers while the Montenegrins lost some 2 000men and were left with 4 600 wounded.44

Montenegro continued preparations for organising a broader liberation movement in theBalkans. An alliance with Serbia was formed in 1866 and this was to become the founda-tion of the First Balkan Alliance. Montenegro’s reputation constantly increased amongstthe Christian population in the Balkans, especially after 1868 when Serbia turned towardsthe Austro-Hungarian Empire.

It was in the 1876-1878 war against the Ottoman Empire, which followed the 1875 upris-ing in Herzegovina, that the Montenegrin alliance with Serbia was formed. However, Mon-tenegro’s military success in this war was independent of Serbia’s and Russia’s on-and-offparticipation in it and, after the end of the conflict, its territory was more than doubled. TheTreaty of San Stefano (March 1878) guaranteed independence and considerable territorialextension to Montenegro. However, the intervention of western forces led to the revision ofthe San Stefano Peace Agreement. At the Congress of Berlin held in the same year, the inde-pendence of Montenegro was acknowledged by those countries which had been hitherto un-willing to do so formally, i.e. the Ottoman Empire, and the following cities were given toMontenegro: Nikšić, Spuž, Podgorica, Kolašin, Andrijevica, Žabljak, Bar, Plav and Gu-sinje. The Ottoman Empire showed reluctance in conceding Plav and Gusinje to Montene-gro, so it agreed instead to give up Ulcinj under the pressure of the Great Powers. Ulcinj hadbeen previously conquered by the Ottoman Empire in the 1878 War. 45

41 Andrijašević: Crnogorske teme, pp. 41-43; Pedeset godina na prestolu Crne Gore (Cetinje,1910).

42 Aleksandar Puškin: ‘Crnogorci i Bonaparta’, Državni Kalendar Crne Gore za 1920 (Paris,1920), p. 51.

43 ibid., p. 35; Alfred Tennyson: ‘Montenegro’, in Ballads and Other Poems (London: C.Kegan Paul, 1880).

44 Andrijašević: Kratka istorija Crne Gore, pp. 147-148.45 See Stogodišnjica crnogorsko-turskog rata 1876-1878, Radovi sa naučnog skupa, 27-

28.5.1977 Cetinje (Titograd: CANU, 1978).

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After the successfully-led liberation war (1876–1878), the international recognition ofits independence and considerable territorial expansion, Montenegro entered the phase ofthe building of a modern nation state. By gaining an outlet to the sea and possession of thetowns previously mentioned, the social and economic structure of the country alsochanged and strong efforts towards the integration of the internal market began to bemade. In a period of a little over two decades (1882-1905), a 450km road network wasconstructed and, starting from 1908, it was used for automobile traffic as well. The sameyear, the first railroad from Bar to Virpazar was put into service. Timber, beer and tobaccofactories also opened during this period. Bank investments were being developed and, be-tween 1903 and 1909, state revenues almost tripled. Concessions regarding foreign invest-ments also contributed to the economic growth of Montenegro. From 1880 to 1907, inter-national telegraphy lines were installed and the first radio-telegraphic line in the Balkansstarted working in 1904, connecting Bar and Bari, in Italy. 46

The country was being thoroughly reformed. By 1879, the following institutions had al-ready been established: the Privy Council (Government); the Ministries; and the HighCourt. The Prince, still in possession of all legislative rights, elected a number of membersof the Privy Council. State territory was divided into nahijas – administrative units –while the nahijas were further divided into kapetanije, the basic units of local authority.

In the construction of a legal system, the passing of the General Law on Properties(1888) was very important. The author of this law was the famous lawyer ValtazarBogišić, who codified the traditional law and introduced some principles of the civil lawwhich were already in use in a number of developed European countries. 47

After the Congress of Berlin, Montenegro was no longer a country consisting only ofOrthodox citizens; within its boundaries, Islamic and Catholic populations also existed.Their religious rights were fully respected. The Muslim population had its religiousleader, the Montenegrin mufti, and the Islamic community in Montenegro, founded in1878, was the oldest community of its kind both in the Balkans and in an Orthodox coun-try.48 Montenegro was also the first Orthodox country to sign a concord with the Vatican(1886), regulating the limits of the religious jurisdiction of the Bar Archbishopric andconfirming its privileges.49 The Orthodox Church was also reorganised and, in 1878, theZahumsko-raška Episcopate was established. Starting from 1893, priests were ordered towear the mantija, the priest’s cloak, and, from 1900, not only priestly taxes were intro-duced but priests also started receiving a regular salary. The Orthodox Church in Mon-tenegro was independent and run by the Metropolitan of Cetinje. 50

46 See Pedeset godina na prestolu Crne Gore, Cetinje 1910; Branislav Marović: ‘Nikola I iekonomski razvoj države – planovi i ostvarenja ‘, CANU No. 21 (1998), pp. 557-575.

47 Milisav Čizmović: ‘Značaj OIZ –a u velikom djelu kralja Nikole’, CANU No. 21 (1998),pp. 687-698.

48 Šerbo Rastoder: ‘Vjerska politika kralja Nikole 1878-1912 (odnos prema Muslimanima)’,CANU No. 21 (1998), pp. 575-597; Šerbo Rastoder: Istorijsko – metodološki okviristraživanja novije istorije crkve (vjerskih zajednica) u Crnoj Gori (1878-1945), Istorijskanauka i nastava istorije u savremenim uslovima 14 (Podgorica: CANU, 1994), pp. 199-243.

49 Konkordat Između Crne Gore i Vatikana 1886. godine s posebnim osvrtom na položaj Alba-naca katolika, Krishterimi nder shqiptare (Shkoder, 2000), pp. 250-268; Šerbo Rastoder:Janusovo lice istorije (Podgorica: Vijesti, 2000), pp. 105-126.

50 Andrijašević: Kratka istorija Crne Gore, pp. 171-172.

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The first gymnasium was opened in 1880 in Cetinje, followed in 1907 in Podgorica andin 1913 in Nikšić, Pljevlje, Peć and Berane; while another agricultural school was openedin 1893 in Podgorica. The number of primary schools increased steadily and, in 1904,their number was estimated to be some 104. During this period, a number of papers andmagazines were being published.51

International recognition gave the right to Montenegro to have diplomatic representa-tives. Not long after 1878, diplomatic relations (including diplomatic representatives)were established with Russia and France and, in 1879, with Great Britain, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Italy and the Ottoman Empire, and in 1881 with Greece, 1897 withSerbia and Bulgaria, 1905 with the USA and 1906 with Germany. All these countries hadtheir diplomatic envoys in Cetinje.

Until 1905, Montenegro was the only European country, apart from Russia and the Ot-toman Empire, which did not have a constitution. This was proclaimed in October 1905,and the first parliamentary elections for the National Parliament were held in 1906. Withinthe elected parliament, the first political parties were founded, the first in 1907 under thename of Klubaška stranka (the Club Party) followed by Prava narodna stranka (the RealNational Party), which was faithful to the Montenegrin court. Of these two parties, onlyKlubaška stranka had a political programme, arguing for stronger ties with Serbia andSerbs living under foreign rule, as well as good relations with Russia. Incidentally, thefirst decade of the 20th century was characterised by the radicalisation of internal politicalclashes in Montenegro and, in 1907 and 1909, a number of political trials, coupled withconspiracies and assassination attempts against Montenegro’s king Nikola (following Ser-bian examples), took place.52

In 1910, Montenegro became a kingdom and King Nikola was proclaimed king. At thattime, Montenegro had some 300 000 inhabitants, 80 per cent of whom lived in villages.The country was divided into ten counties but not one Montenegrin town had more than10 000 inhabitants.

The Balkan Wars and World War OneThe 1878-1912 period was the longest period of continual peace over the previous few cen-turies. It was only in 1912 that the issue of the final expulsion of the Ottoman Empire fromthe Balkans was once more made acute. Montenegro, Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria had al-ready formed an alliance and, according to mutual agreement, then declared war on the Otto-man Empire. In the First Balkan War (1912), Montenegro liberated the northern and north-eastern parts of today’s Montenegro and expanded over the entire territory of Metohija. Italso conquered Skadar in 1913, but had to leave the town under the pressure of the GreatPowers. In this war, Montenegro lost almost 3 000 soldiers (2 000 alone in the battles forSkadar) and had over 6 500 wounded. In the Second Balkan War of 1913, Montenegrofought on the side of Serbia against Bulgaria with a regiment of 13 000 soldiers. 53

51 Djoko Pejović: Razvitak prosvjete i kulture u Crnoj Gori 1852-1916 (Cetinje: Istorijski insti-tut, 1971), pp. 115-138.

52 J. Jovanović: Istorija Crne Gore (Podgorica: CID, 1998), pp. 336-370; ‘Crna Gora iCrnogorci’, pp. 178-179; Andrijašević: Kratka istorija Crne Gore, pp. 173-176.

53 Mitar Đurišić: ‘Kralj Nikola u Prvom balkanskom ratu’, CANU No. 21 (1998), pp. 157-169;Borislav Ratković, Mitar Đurišić and Savo Skoko: Srbija i Crna Gora u balkanskim ratovima1912-1913 (Beograd: BIGZ, 1972), pp. 171-228; Jovanović: Istorija Crne Gore, pp. 390-399.

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After these wars, Montenegro’s territory expanded significantly. The region surround-ing Lake Skadar, Podgorica, part of Metohija (reaching Bijeli Drim) and parts of Novo-pazarski Sandžak were adjoined to its territory. It also gained the following towns: BijeloPolje, Mojkovac, Berane, Pljevlje, Rožaje, Gusinje, Plav, Djakovica and Peć. Montenegrostretched over 14 443 square km and had some 450 000 inhabitants.

However, Montenegro was completely unprepared for the outbreak of World War I. Inthe crisis of July 1914, provoked by the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevoand the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia, Montenegro offered Serbia its uncondi-tional support. The very same day the Austro-Hungarian Empire declared war on Serbia(July 28 1914), King Nikola issued a decree of mobilisation and, by August 6 th, Monte-negro had delivered an official declaration of war on the Austro-Hungarian Empire, igno-ring the Austro-Hungarian initiative and the promises of territorial concessions (i.e. Ska-dar) which had been made in the attempt to persuade Montenegro to remain neutral in theconflict. Montenegro managed to mobilise some 47 000 soldiers, armed with old-fashioned weapons. Back-up reserves were to be found only among Montenegrins work-ing abroad who, hearing of the war, had headed for their homeland and, thus, the numberof soldiers increased to 50 000.

The army of Montenegro occupied a wide front. The most numerable military groupingwas disposed towards the Herzegovina front and Lovćen, and then in the region of Pljev-lje in order to co-operate with the Serbian army, while, for the purpose of guarding thefrontiers with Albania, the Starosrbljanski squadron was formed. Despite being unpre-pared for war, the army of Montenegro resisted on a front almost 500 km long for 18months, demonstrating in that way impressive persistence and bravery. Montenegro’s mi-litary aims, justified on the basis of ethnicity and history, were directed towards expansionto the region around Lake Skadar, Boka Kotorska, Herzegovina and a part of Bosnia.

Military operations began on 7 August 1914 and they were focused on the protection ofthe frontiers with the Austro-Hungarian Empire. By mid-August, the Montenegrin defenceshad been breached at Pljevlje, which was taken by the Austro-Hungarian army, while theMontenegrin army captured Budva. The victory of the Serbian army at Cer relaxed thedefence of Montenegro’s frontiers since the Austro-Hungarian army then retreated fromSandžak and Pljevlje was liberated. According to an earlier plan, units gathered from otherfronts were concentrated in the Pljevlje and Gorane region in order to make a breakthrough,with Sarajevo as the final goal. Almost half of the total number of Montenegrin soldiers wasengaged in these operations and they had the support of the newly-formed army of Sandžak,commanded by general Janko Vukotić. After the Montenegrin army had crossed the DrinaRiver in the middle of September 1914 and had entered the regions of Romanija and Kalino-vik, it suffered a defeat at Glasinac in the second half of October and, thereafter, withdrew tothe right bank of the Drina. During the months of October, November and December, battleswere fought on the Herzegovina front and around Višegrad and, thus, from the beginning of1915 until the great offensive of the Austro-Hungarian army in the October, the front in thisregion was stable and calm.

At that time, Montenegro then organised a military operation against the will of its Al-lies and without their knowledge. Namely, given that the Albanians, enticed by the Aus-tro-Hungarian Empire and by Bulgaria, were jeopardising the Montenegrin border anddisturbing traffic on the Bojana River, King Nikola order a squadron to capture Skadar,

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which was achieved in June 1915. This was the second time in the previous three yearsthat the town had been captured, against the will of the Great Forces. In order to expresshis disagreement with this action, the Serbian general Boža Janković, chief of headquar-ters, left Montenegro and was succeeded by Colonel Petar Pešić. The intervention of Rus-sia put an end to this affair and the Allies issued a collective note stating that they did notrecognise the conquest of Skadar. Later, the Montenegrin action was proved right since itwas exactly through Skadar, controlled by the Montenegrins, that the Serbian army wouldmake its retreat on its way to the Adriatic coast.

The great Austro-Hungarian offensive against Serbia began in October 1915 and wassuccessful in pushing the Serbian army towards the south, thus carrying the battles toMontenegro. The attacks of the Austro-Hungarian army started around Vi šegrad and, asthe Serbian army retreated, the Montenegrin army was forced to expand its front in orderto provide cover.

The main attack of the Austro-Hungarian army was directed towards Lov ćen, whichwas defended by sparse units, given that the major part of the Montenegrin army was con-centrated in the north in the area between the mouth of the Piva River and Čakor. On 8January, the Austro-Hungarian army initiated a powerful artillery attack on positions atLovćen and on 13 January they entered an undefended Cetinje. The Court, the Govern-ment and the Supreme Command moved to Podgorica. Berane had already been captured(on 10 January) and the front at Grahovo breached, thus leaving the army of Montenegroin a hopeless situation. The southern part, from Lake Skadar to the coast, remained com-pletely unprotected and was thus under constant threat of siege.

Under such circumstances, the Government of Montenegro decided to sue for peace on 10January, while the Austro-Hungarian army demanded unconditional surrender. Followingthe orders of the Serbian Government, Serbian soldiers withdrew from Montenegro while theheadquarters commander of the Supreme Command, Petar Pešić, left Montenegro on 17 Jan-uary. Two days later, King Nikola also left the country having appointed General Janko Vu-kotić as chief of the Supreme Command. In the situation of general chaos and confusion thatengulfed Montenegro, those ministers who remained in the country, in agreement with Vu-kotić and Marko, the son of the King, decided to disband the army. In this way, the Monte-negrin army was not able to withdraw, as the Serbian one did, except for a small number ofvolunteers from Boka and Herzegovina. On 25 January, the Regulation of Capitulation was,finally, signed. Montenegro’s surrender was due to the poor strategic disposition of itstroops, for which the greatest responsibility is borne by the chief of the headquarters ofMontenegro’s Supreme Command, the Serbian colonel Petar Pešić, together with KingNikola, who had entrusted him with this task in the first place.

From mid-1916, a spontaneous and organised komitski movement of self-organisedguerrilla fighters emerged against the occupational forces. The beginnings of these eventsare also linked to General Radomir Vešović who, in conspiracy with other Montenegrinofficers, was preparing an uprising. In order to prevent this, the occupying forces decidedto intern those officers as well as other distinguished figures who were considered to rep-resent a potential threat to Austro-Hungarian rule. One such attempt at the arrest of Gen-eral Vešović ended in him taking refuge in woods, after he had killed one officer. This in-cident was followed by even greater repression and the mass imprisonment in camps ofsome 9 500 intellectuals and officers.

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The end of the war was closing in, but the number of komitski groups was steadily in-creasing. This additionally tied down a large number of occupation forces in Montenegro.In 1918, for instance, some 800 active komits operated in Montenegro while, by the end ofthe war, their number had multiplied several times over. In the August of the same year,there were some 40 000 to 45 000 members of the occupying forces out of whom some27 000 were active fighters. Such a concentration of occupying forces was maintained no-where else during World War One.

Leaving Montenegro in January 1916, together with other members of the royal family,the government and the majority of ministers and deputies, King Nikola found himself inexile, without an army or financial means and his reputation in the eyes of his alliesgreatly ruined. Through Skadar and Italy they reached France where, in Neuilly, nearParis, a court, government and governmental administration were established on the basisof subventions provided by Great Britain and France. By then, the issue of Montenegro’sfuture and its possible unification with Serbia had broadly been discussed. Russia wassupporting the idea of uniting Montenegro with Serbia under the Karađorđević Dynasty,implying the creation of a Greater Serbian state in the Balkans, as a means of backing itspolicies in the region. Consequently, in 1916 it abolished its subventions to Montenegroand rejected the possibility of King Nikola’s asylum in Russia. Such an attitude encour-aged the Serbian Prime Minister, Nikola Pašić; moreover, King Nikola and the circlesaround him were not enjoying the unconditional support of the other Allies, i.e. France,Great Britain and Italy.

The developments on the Thessaloniki front impelled the Montenegrin komits to inten-sify their activities. In some regions, armed uprisings broke out and these efforts led to therapid liberation of Montenegro. It was only during the battle for the liberation of Podgo-rica that a few units of the Second Yugoslav Regiment joined the komits. The armedclashes in Montenegro ended on November 11 1918. More than 5 000 enemy soldierswere captured by the komits and the rebels in the struggle for liberation; these were extra-dited to the Serbian army upon their arrival in Montenegro.

Montenegro lost about 20 000 soldiers in this war, amounting to some 10 per cent of itspopulation (bearing in mind its borders before the Balkan Wars), or 40 per cent of the totalnumber of its regular soldiers. Approximately 15 000 people went through the camps inAustria, Hungary and Albania. Montenegro also suffered enormous material damage andlosses estimated to be around the sum of 723 million Francs, which was demanded in thewar reparation request submitted to the Paris Peace Conference. 54

54 On Montenegro during World War One, see Novica Rakočević: Crna Gora u prvom svjet-skom ratu 1914-1918 (Podgorica: Unireks, 1997); ‘Crna Gora u prvom svjetskom ratu’,Zbornik radova sa okruglog stola, No. 2 (Podgorica: Istorijskog instituta Crne Gore, 1998);‘Crna Gora i Crnogorci’, pp. 180-183; Andrijašević: Kratka istorija Crne Gore, pp. 201-207; Jovanović: Istorija Crne Gore, pp. 400-431; Dimitrije Vujović: Ujedinjenje Crne Gorei Srbije (Titograd: Istorijski Institut NRCG, 1962); Dimitrije Vujović: Ratna saradnja CrneGore i Francuske 1914-1916 (Podgorica: CANU, 1994); Aleksandar Drašović: Mojkovačkabitka (Beograd: Stručna knjiga, 1991).

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The end of Montenegrin independence and the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and SlovenesOn the demand of Serbia, the Allies refused King Nikola’s request to return to the countryupon the end of the war, using the excuse that his presence would disturb military opera-tions in the Balkans. Instead, the Inter-Allied Commission in Versailles decided that alliedtroops should occupy Montenegro. France guaranteed King Nikola that the occupationwould be executed in the king’s name and that the legal organs of authority would be re-spected. In reality, Montenegro was occupied by a combination of French, English, Ita-lian, American and Serbian troops. A special Allied Headquarters – subordinated to theEastern Army Headquarters in Constantinople – was formed in Kotor and a French ge-neral put in charge. The rest of the allied troops occupied for the most part the coastal areaof Montenegro and Boka while Serbian troops, amounting to more soldiers than all theother allied troops combined, were able to take control of the interior of the country. In thebeginning, the Serbian troops were welcomed warmly everywhere and the self-organisedMontenegrin units which had participated in the liberation of Montenegro were disarmed.

Only formally commanded by the Allies, however, allied troops acted according to thepolitical interests of their respective national governments. Moreover, all of them wouldbecome involved in the internal affairs of Montenegro. Before entering the country, Ser-bian units had managed to obtain from the French military command carte blanche for theunification of Montenegro with Serbia. In contrast, the Italian military units supported theopponents of unconditional unification and the supporters of King Nikola. Montenegrowas first abandoned by the English in April 1919, followed by the French in March 1920and the Italians in June 1920. Serbian troops were, in the meantime, transformed into unitsof the Yugoslav Army and, as a legalised military force, remained in the area. The alliedtroops failed to accomplish the elementary task that brought them to Montenegro in thefirst place – instead of establishing order and peace, they left Montenegro in state of acivil war.55

Shortly after the arrival of Serbian troops in Montenegro, the Central Executive Commit-tee for the unification of Serbia and Montenegro was created. The Committee issued rulesaccording to which were elected deputies for a ‘Grand National Assembly’. The deputieswere elected by chosen intermediaries in public meetings, on an open voting process, themajority of whom were in favour of unconditional unification and in opposition to the Petro-vić Dynasty. In this manner, 165 deputies were elected with a clear programme to abolishthe independence of Montenegro. That the Grand National Assembly convened, on 24 No-vember 1918, in Podgorica and not in Cetinje, the capital of the country, was intended to en-sure victory for unconditional unification since Cetinje and its surrounding areas wereknown to be strongholds of opponents of unification.56 In reality, the entire election process,as well as the convening of the Assembly, was illegitimate and illegal. The MontenegrinGovernment, Parliament and Court, and the Constitution and the laws already existed at thatpoint of time and had been earlier recognised by Serbia. Just as was the case with Serbia,

55 Šerbo Rastoder: ‘Politika svršenog čina’, in Uloga Francuske u nasilnoj aneksiji Crne Gore(Bar: Conteco, 2000), pp. 199-235.

56 Ivo Banac: The National Question in Yugoslavia. Origins, History, Politics (Ithaca/London:Cornell University Press, 1994), pp. 284-285.

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also under occupation, the holder of international legitimacy was the Montenegrin King andthe government-in-exile. Laws could only be passed by the National Parliament of Montene-gro. Nevertheless, a parallel parliament was organised, in contradiction to all the regulationsof legal procedure, and a decision made determining the future of Montenegro. The sessionof the Grand National Assembly in Podgorica lasted until 29 November (according to thenew calendar). On 26 November, this ‘Assembly of Podgorica’, decided:1. ‘that King Nikola I Petrović-Njegoš and his dynasty be dethroned2. that Montenegro and brotherly Serbia be united in one unified state under the

Karađorđević dynasty then, thus united, join the shared Homeland of our three-namedpeople, the Serbs, the Croats and the Slovenes…’57

In spite of the decisions of the Parliament in Podgorica not being acknowledged by anyof the Great Powers, Montenegro ceased to exist as an independent state. 58

Opponents of the unconditional unification of Montenegro with Serbia, dissatisfiedwith the decisions of the Podgorica Parliament, the actions of the organs of authority andthe bjelaške bands (paramilitary units of the supporters of unconditional unification), aswell as with the difficult socio-economic situation, started preparations for an armed up-rising. The preparations intensified after the return of some Montenegrin leaders fromPOW camps who, on their way to Montenegro, had been held up by the Serbian army invarious places (mostly in Sarajevo) until the Podgorica Parliament had concluded its ses-sions. The uprising – planned for 21 December 1918 – was aimed at internationalising theissue of Montenegro in the light of the opening of the Paris Peace Conference.

The uprising’s slogan was ‘For justice, honour and the freedom of Montenegro’. Some4,000 ill-armed rebels took part in it, equipped mostly with their own private light weap-ons. The plan was uncovered and the Command of the Adriatic Troops in Cetinje, to-gether with the National Executive Council, the interim government, started arresting theprominent leaders and initiators in order to prevent the uprising from taking place. Never-theless, on 21 December rebels occupied Cetinje, Rijeka Crnojevića and Virpazar, whiletroops gathered in the area surrounding Nikšić. After the resistance had been crushedaround Virpazar, the organiser, Jovan Plamenac, on the request of King Nikola, left

57 Odruka, Veliki Narodne Skupštine Srpskog Naroda u Crnoj Gori, donjeta na sjednici od 13.novembra 1918. g. u Podgorici. Podgorica, 26.11.1918.

58 On the Podgorica Assembly, see Dimitrije Vujović: Podgorička skupština (Zagreb: Škol-ska knjiga/Stvarnost, 1989); Jovan R. Bojović: Podgorička skupština 1918: dokumenta(Gornji Milanovac: Dečje novine, 1989); Mijat Šuković: Podgorička skupština 1918(Podgorica, 1999); Radoslav Rotković: Velika zavjera protiv Crne Gore, Od Prizrena doVersaja (Podgorica: Nevladina organizacija Crnogorska izdanja/Montenegro Editions,2001); Whitney Warren: Montenegro. The Crime of the Peace Conference (New York:Brentano's, 1922); Miomir Dašić: ‘O dilemi da li je velika narodna skupština u Podgoricibila legalna i legitimna’, in: Ogledi iz istorije Crne Gore (Podgorica: Istorijski institut CrneGore, 2000), pp. 323-337; Šerbo Rastoder: ‘Petrovići – suton jedne dinastije’, Vijesti,19.12.2001, 1-3.1.2002; Dragoljub Živojinović: Crna Gora u borbi za opstanak 1914-1922(Beograd: Vojska, 1996); Dragoljub Živojinović: Italija i Crna Gora 1914-1925, Studija oiznevjerenom savezništvu (Beograd: Službeni list SRJ, 1998); Dragoljub Živojinović:Nevoljni saveznici 1914-1918 (Beograd: Službeni list SRJ, 2000); Dimitrije Vujović: Fran-cuski masoni i jugoslovensko pitanje 1914-1918 (Beograd: Književne novine, 1994).

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Montenegro. In the meantime, the rebels were repelled at Nikšić and prevented from en-tering the city after a day’s fighting, while some of their leaders (Đuro and Marko Petro-vić, Marko Đukanović) were arrested.

The decisive events, however, occurred in the area surrounding Cetinje. The rebels con-veyed their demands from their headquarters in Bajice, signed by Captain Krsto Popovi ćon behalf of the committee of the uprising, to the commander of the Allied occupationforces, the French general Venel, and the Executive Committee on 22 December 1918.The demands insisted that the Podgorica Assembly had broken the country’s Constitutionand acted against the will of the majority of the Montenegrin people. They also suggestedthat there was a general consensus that Montenegro should enter the Yugoslav state on anequal basis with the other provinces and that the final form of that state’s internal structureshould be decided by a constitutional assembly. The abolition of the Podgorica Parlia-ment’s decisions were demanded, along with fresh, free elections for Montenegro, in anearly section of the statement.

Clashes occurred on Christmas Eve, on 14 December 1918.59 The troops that were de-fending Cetinje – composed of Serbian units and supporters of unconditional union – pre-vented the rioters from entering the town. After the battle, General Venel travelled to Cetinjeand conveyed demands to both sides. The rebels were requested to return to their homes andto lay down their weapons. Some did so, but others refused and escaped to Boka Kotorskaand to Bar, from where they were transferred by the Italians to Medova in Albania, where acollective camp for Montenegrins was located. Other rebels fled to the woods and becameoutlaws. In this manner, this poorly-organised uprising was temporarily crushed.

In January 1919, under the influence of the American President, Woodrow Wilson, KingNikola directed a call from exile to his supporters to stay calm, as the Allies had promisedhim that Montenegrins would soon be able to decide on their future in free elections. How-ever, the Allies failed to fulfil the promise and so the rebels continued to lead a guerrilla waragainst the newly-established authorities until 1924. The largest organised military action in-tended to wipe out the rebels took place in winter 1919/20, in which the army, the gendarme-rie and groups of volunteers joined action with some 900 rebels hiding in woods. Of therebels, 22 were killed while 757 were forced to surrender. Nevertheless, smaller groups ofopponents of unification with Serbia, occasionally joined by rebels from Italy, kept the re-sistance going. Trials were held of a large number of rebels, accomplices and supporters al-though a decree issued by King Alexander pardoned the majority of those convicted, exceptfor 59 outlaws who were sentenced to prison terms of a duration between 10 and 20 years.

The clashes between ‘Whites’ (Bjelaši) – the supporters of unconditional unificationwith Serbia – and ‘Greens’ (Zelenaši) – the opponents – resulted in disastrous conse-quences for Montenegro.60 It is estimated that the number of fugitive, imprisoned, con-victed and killed people reached approximately 5 000. A large number of houses wasburned down and considerable material damage ensued. 61

59 According to the Gregorian calendar.60 The term ‘Whites’ and ‘Greens’ derives from the colours of the paper on which the lists of

candidates in the elections to the Grand National Assembly were printed.61 On this, the author has published 1 759 documents of primarily army and police origin. See Šerbo

Rastoder: Skrivana strana istorije, Crnogorska buna i odmetniči pokret 1918-1929, Doku-menti (Bar: Conteco, 1997). On this topic, see also Banac: The National Question, pp. 286-289.

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Montenegro remained an internationally-recognised allied state, with a king and go-vernment in exile, and, in this sense, it had the same status as Serbia and Belgium. Giventhat the decisions of the Podgorica Parliament were not recognised by any of the greatforces, Montenegro’s expectations on the opening of the Paris Peace Conference in Janu-ary 1919 – at which the future of Europe and the world was being decided – were that itwould participate in the same was as other small Allied countries. On the insistence ofFrance, as the conference host and a supporter of the official Serbian line, Montenegrowas granted one delegate at the Conference. However, the manner of election of the dele-gate could not have been decided until the political situation in the country had been re-solved. Thus, an empty chair with the word ‘Montenegro’ was the only sign of Monte-negro’s presence at the sessions of the Conference. In reality, this solution supported the‘accomplished act of unification’. The delegation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats andSlovenes regarded the status of Montenegro to have been settled by the decisions of thePodgorica Parliament and considered Montenegro to be an integral part of Serbia, unitedwith all the remaining parts of the Yugoslav state. On the constant insistence of KingNikola and the government in exile, a delegation from Montenegro – including Jovan Pla-menac, Dr. Anto Gvozdenović and Dr. Pero Šoć – presented the position of official Mon-tenegro to the Supreme Council of the Paris Peace Conference in March 1919. The Allies,however, ultimately did nothing to alter Montenegro’s status, thus tacitly supporting thenewly-formed Yugoslav state. In this sense, France had played a crucial role. Apart fromsending a few Allied missions to Montenegro, the Allies did not respond to the numerousappeals, protests, notes and memoranda sent to the Paris Peace Conference by the govern-ment-in-exile and by various committees for the defence of Montenegrin independencefrom all over Europe and the USA. This had the effect of keeping the issue open until theend of 1920 but, after parliamentary elections in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats andSlovenes, France severed diplomatic ties with Montenegro on 20 December 1920, fol-lowed by the USA in January 1921 and Great Britain. Thus, Montenegro ceased to exist asa subject in international affairs.

Towards the end of World War One and the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croatsand Slovenes, many Montenegrins lived in exile. At Neuilly remained the MontenegrinCourt and King Nikola. Immediately after Jovan Plamenac, the leader of the ChristmasUprising, had arrived in Paris, the King entrusted him with the task of creating a new go-vernment. In February 1919, Plamenac formed a government. Its chief goals were tospread propaganda among the Allies about Montenegro’s demands and the politics of Ser-bia, to work on forming a Montenegrin government-in-exile and to maintain contact withMontenegro in case of possible military action.

After a number of failed attempts by previous governments to form a Montenegrinarmy during the war on the Thessaloniki front, the Plamenac government, with the sup-port of Italy, managed to create an army-in-exile. The core of this army was composed ofinternees from POW camps who had arrived in Italy immediately after the truce had beenestablished. At first, they were gathered in Ferrara, in northern Italy, but, in March 1919,the army of Montenegro was placed in Gaeta, a small town on the Tyrrhenian Sea locatedbetween Rome and Naples. After the failure of the Christmas Uprising, many of the rebelsfled from Montenegro to Medova, in Albania, from where Italian ships transferred themfirst to Brindisi and then to Gaeta, where the ‘Headquarters of the Montenegrin Soldiers in

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Italy’ was formed. The army was formally under the command of the Minister of theArmy within the Montenegrin government-in-exile, Brigadier-General Milutin Vu činić,although it was, in effect, controlled by Italy. Towards the end of April 1919, a conventionwas signed between the government-in-exile and Italy regarding the financial mainte-nance of the Montenegrin forces, whose maximum number was not to surpass 1 500 men.

By early 1921, the Montenegrin army had grown to four battalions and a maximum1 559 soldiers. With the help of Italy, small military formations were transferred to Monte-negro in the attempt to instigate a national uprising. Such attempts failed since, on the onehand, they were met with organised resistance in Montenegro and, on the other, the supportof the Allies, especially Italy, was not comprehensive. Namely, Italy had instrumentalisedthe army in order to put pressure on the newly-formed Yugoslav state as a means of pro-moting its own territorial claims in the northern and central Adriatic. Thus, immediately af-ter the Rapalski Treaty was signed between Italy and the South Slav Kingdom in Novem-ber 1920, resolving controversial matters between the two countries, Italy obliged itself todismiss the Montenegrin Army from Italy. In March 1921, Italy disarmed the MontenegrinArmy and ceased to provide any kind of help from August 1922. The majority of exiledsoldiers returned to Montenegro, but others went to Argentina, the USA or other Europeancountries. The last remains of the Montenegrin Army were dispersed by Mussolini on hisarrival in power.

The biggest blow to Montenegrin émigrés, however, was the death of King Nikola on 1March 1921 in Antibes on the Côte d’Azur in France. After his death and the abdication ofhis successor, Danilo, in favour of the boy king Prince Mihailo, the army was hit by a riotand emigrant circles divided. The power of the crown rested in the hands of QueenMilena, on behalf of Mihailo, and, after she had entered into conflict with Jovan Plamenacin June 1921, she decided to form a new government and appointed the Brigadier-Generalto preside over it. On the death of Queen Milena in March 1923, the remaining Monte-negrin émigrés had already dispersed. At the beginning of 1925, and by agreement withNikola Pašić, Plamenac, the former premier of Montenegro and the leader of the Christ-mas Uprising, returned to the country, at which point the influence of Montenegrin émi-grés on events within Yugoslavia itself came to an end.

Within the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes – renamed the Kingdom of Yugo-slavia in 1929 – Montenegro’s political, economic, cultural and national role was mar-ginal, considering that the Kingdom was centralised and that Montenegro comprised onlytwo per cent of its population. In administrative terms, a part of Montenegro remainedwithin the Zeta Region, which was renamed Zeta Banovina in 1929. 62

World War TwoIn World War Two, Montenegro was occupied by Italian troops which entered the countryon 17 April 1941, the same day the Kingdom of Yugoslavia surrendered. The Italian occu-pation lasted until the capitulation of Italy in 1943, when the Italian troops were replacedby Germans. The Italian occupation included military garrisons and another 130 carabi-nieri, gendarmerie and financial stations. A High Civilian Commissariat was establishedas the highest authority of the occupying forces until the 13 July 1941 uprising, after

62 Šerbo Rastoder: Životna pitanja Crne Gore 1918-1929 (Bar: Kulturni centar Bar, 1996).

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which were introduced a military administration and the post of Military Governor. Mon-tenegro’s territory was partitioned into the region of Boka Kotorska, which was directlyannexed by Fascist Italy as a separate province within the Dalmatian Governorate,whereas the area of Ulcinj, Tuze, Plav, Gusinj and Rožaje was adjoined to so-calledGreater Albania, which was created with the Italian fascist support. 63 The Fascists, withthe support of a part of Montenegro’s Federalist Party, tried to re-establish an independentstate of Montenegro on the territory that remained. The Petrovda Parliament was formedand convened on 12 July 1941, when it acclaimed a Declaration of Independence preparedbeforehand in Rome.64 Despite the backing of a part of the domestic political elite, this at-tempt by the occupying forces would, nevertheless, fail since it was marked the followingday with the beginning of the previously planned uprising.

The uprising, organised by the Communists in collaboration with other anti-fascist forces,began on 13 July 1941, based on the decisions of the Central Committee of the CommunistParty of Yugoslavia (CPY) on 4 July and the Regional Committee of the CPY on 8 July. Theuprising was to centre on guerrilla warfare waged against the occupation forces. However,the resistance developed into a national uprising soon after the first guerrilla actions hadtaken place and, on 13 July 1941, many towns had already been liberated, including Virpa-zar, Ćevo, Mišići, Petrovac and Rijeka Crnojevića, with these being followed in the nextfew days by Andrijevica, Berane, Kolašin, Danilovgrad, Bijelo Polje, Žabljak, Šavnik andGrahovo. In other words, almost the entire territory of Montenegro was freed with the ex-ception of Cetinje, Podgorica, Nikšić and Pljevlje. This uprising is viewed as an exceptionalevent in the historiography of World War Two, considering that it was the first mass upris-ing in occupied Europe. On the other hand, it resulted in a high concentration in Montenegroof fascist troops (100 000) brought in to crush the rebellion. Instead of the one Italian divi-sion that was active during the first part of the occupation, towards the end of 1941 and in1942 the number of divisions of the occupying forces had increased to eight. 65

After defeat in a battle at Pljevlje on 1 December 1941, one part of the Montenegrin parti-sans retreated to eastern Bosnia where they joined the elite partisan brigades, while the otherwithdrew to their domestic regions and continued to organise minor military actions. 66

The first Četnici groups were formed in Montenegro towards the end of November andthe beginning of December 1941, their leader, Draža Mihailović, having already named aČetnik leadership for Montenegro in mid-October. In collaboration with the Italian fas-cists, who supplied them with arms and food, the Četnici organised actions at the end of1941 and at the start of 1942 against the partisans headed by the Communists, terrorisingthe followers of the National Liberation Movement (Narodni oslobodilački pokret, NOP)and their families, a large number of whom ended up in concentration camps in various

63 See Đuro Vujović: Crna Gora u narodnooslobodilačkom ratu 1941-1945 (Podgorica: Isto-rijski institut Crne Gore, 1997), pp. 23-29.

64 Radoje Pajović: Kontrarevolucija u Crnoj Gori, četnički i federalistički pokret 1941-1945(Cetinje/Titograd : Obod/Istorijski institut SRCG, 1977), pp. 44-75.

65 On the uprising of 13 July 1941, see ‘Trinaestojulski ustanak predmet nauke i umetnosti,Radovi sa naučnog skupa, Titograd 11. i 12. jul 1991’, CANU 12 (1992); Vujović: Crna Gorau narodnooslobodilačkom ratu, pp. 34-67; Radoje Pajović, Kontrarevolucija, pp. 75-98.

66 Špiro Lagator, Djuro Batričević, Pljevaljska bitka (Beograd: Književne novine, 1990),pp. 99-242; Vujović, Crna Gora u narodnooslobodilačkom ratu, pp. 74-79.

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regions of Montenegro, Albania and Italy.67 According to their programme of ‘Homoge-nous Serbia’,68 the Četnici carried out massacres of the non-Orthodox population.69 FromAugust 1942 to February 1943, they carried out mass crimes against the Muslim popula-tions of Foča, Bukovica near Pljevlje, and in the districts of Bijelo Polje and Pljevlje. InČajniče and its surrounding area alone, some 8 000 Muslims were killed, including chil-dren, women and the elderly.70 After they had been defeated at the Neretva in Bosnia bythe partisans in March 1943 and Italy had capitulated, the Montenegrin Četnici openlycollaborated with the German occupation troops. Towards the end of the war, retreating inthe footsteps of German troops in an attempt to reach Slovenia, the remaining Četniciwere destroyed by the Ustaše, while partisans captured and killed a large number in exe-cutions organised at Zidani Most in Pohorje, near the Yugoslav-Austrian border. 71

In addition to partisans and Četnici, which were also active elsewhere in Yugoslaviaduring World War Two, a military grouping of Montenegrin nationalists headed by KrstoPopović, one of the leaders of the 1918/1919 rebellion, emerged in Montenegro. Thisgroup supported the idea of re-establishing Montenegro’s sovereignty. They were, prima-rily, situated in the historical core of Montenegro (the Katunska, Riječka and Crmničkanahijas). With the support of the Italian occupiers, this grouping formed alliances withČetnici in fights with the partisans. Not long before the end of the War, the majority of theZelenaši joined the partisans, with the exception of Popović, who was later killed by theCommunists in 1947.72

At the very beginning of the War, the Communists declared that they were fighting for asociety of equal peoples and a state that would be restructured on a federal basis. Accord-ingly, during the July 1941 uprising, they established a network of authorities (National Lib-eration Committees or Narodnooslobodilački odbor) and summoned assemblies with par-ticipants from various political backgrounds. The Ostroška skupština, organised at theOstrog Monastery, elected a National Liberation Committee for Montenegro as the highestinstitution in Montenegro, in parallel with the Executive Council or government. After thesurrender of Italy, an assembly on 15 November 1943 in Kolašin elected a Territorial Anti-Fascist Council (Zemaljsko antifašističko vijeće, ZAVNO) for Montenegro and Boka, andproclaimed a declaration which acknowledged that Montenegro would be an equal federalunit within a future Yugoslav state to be reorganised in conformity with federal principles.This decision was confirmed at the Second Assembly of ZAVNO in Kolašin on 16 February1944, following the Yugoslav-wide Assembly of AVNOJ (National Anti-fascist LiberationCouncil of Yugoslavia), which took place in Jajce on 29-30 November 1943. At an assem-bly in Kolašin on 13 July 1944, ZAVNO developed into the Montenegrin Anti-fascist As-

67 Pajović: Kontrarevolucija, pp. 103-381.68 The project Homogenous Serbia of the Ćetnik ideologist Stevan Moljević was created on 30

June 1941. See Branko Petranović and Momčilo Zečević: Jugoslovenski federalizam, ideje istvarnost (1914-1943), Vol. I, (Beograd: Prosveta, 1987), pp. 673-695.

69 Vladimir Dedijer and Antun Miletić: Genocid nad Muslimanima, 1941-1945: zbornik doku-menata i svjedočenja (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1990).

70 ibid., pp. 161-274, 768-837, 723-731; Prilog u krvi, Pljevlja 1941-1945 (Pljevlja, 1969).71 Branislav Kovačević: Od Vezirovog do Zidanog mosta, Tragična sudbima crnogorskih

Četnika u završnoj fazi rata 1944-1945 (Beograd: Službeni list SRJ, 1993).72 Pajović: Kontrarevolucija, pp. 241-298.

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sembly (Crnogorska antifašistička skupština, CASNO), which was the formal recognitionof the re-establishment of Montenegro’s sovereignty within the Yugoslav Federation.Hence, authority organs were formed at the level of the Republic of Montenegro. 73

Operations for the liberation of Montenegro formed part of the larger operations of theAnti-Fascist Coalition of Yugoslav partisans. During November and December 1944, all thetowns in the coastal and central regions of Montenegro were freed. By January 1945, withthe liberation of Bijelo Polje on 4 January, the entire territory of Montenegro was liberated.

Alongside the war against the occupation armies, a civil war was fought between Čet-nici and partisans over the future state and its social structure. The partisans belonged to aunified movement led by the Communists and headed by Josip Broz Tito, while the Čet-nik movement considered itself to be the legal army of the royal government-in-exile andconsisted mostly of Serbian nationalists acting according to the Serbian national pro-gramme. From 1943 onwards, they lost the support of the western Allies, who recognisedTito’s partisans as the only legitimate allies in the fight against the Axis Powers. 74

The victory of the partisan movement, won on the platform of social and national equa-lity, guaranteed that the attributes of sovereignty would be given back to Montenegrowithin Communist Yugoslavia.

During the 1941-1945 War, 37 000 Montenegrin citizens were killed. Out of thatnumber, some 14 500 soldiers were killed fighting for the partisans, which was more thantwice the Yugoslav average. Others were killed fighting on the side of the Ćetnici andother anti-communist groups. The strength of the partisan movement can be seen from theparticipation of Montenegrins in it: 36 per cent of partisan generals were from Montene-gro even though the population of Montenegro constituted only two per cent of the popu-lation of Yugoslavia. According to official figures, 40 446 Montenegrins were killed ordied in camps; 95 346 people were imprisoned, displaced or taken to camps and another26 144 were permanently disabled. Approximately one-quarter of the population wasmade homeless and a large part of the communications and economic infrastructure wasdemolished. The total demographic loss of Montenegro in this period amounted to some103,800 people, whereas the financial damage of the war was estimated to stand at 43.8billion dinars.75

Montenegro in Communist YugoslaviaA Constitutional Assembly adopted a new Montenegrin Constitution on 31 December1946, sanctioning the legacy of the National Liberation Movement and legitimising the

73 See Zoran Lakić: Narodna vlast u Crnoj Gori 191-1945 (Beograd/Cetinje: Obod/Narodnaknjiga, 1981); Zoran Lakić (ed.): ZAVNO Crne Gore i Boke, zbirka dokumenata (Titograd,1963); Zoran Lakić (ed.): CASNO – Crnogorska antifašistička skupština narodnogoslobođenja, Zbirka dokumenata (Titograd, 1975).

74 See Branko Petranović: Revolucija i kontrarevolucija u Jugoslaviji (1941-1945), Vol. II(Beograd: RAD, 1983), pp. 123-224.

75 See Branislav Marović: Društveno-ekonomski razvoj Crne Gore 1945-1953 (Titograd,1987), pp. 28-30; Branislav Marović: ‘Narodna vlast u Crnoj Gori i rješavanje prvrednihpitanja i njen doprinos pobjedi nad fašizmom 1941-1945’, Drugi svjetski rat-50 godina kas-nije, Radovi sa međunarodnog naučnog skupa, održanog u Podgorici 20-22. septembra1995, Vol. I-II, CANU 18 (1997), pp. 323-337.

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new social and administrative restructuring of the new Yugoslav state. This Constitutionconfirmed the national and administrative particularity of Montenegro within Yugoslavia.

During the period of reconstruction and state-building, there was great enthusiasm andself-sacrifice among the inhabitants of Montenegro for substantially repairing the disas-trous consequences of the war. Nevertheless, the conflict between Yugoslavia and the So-viet Union and its satellites in 1948 threatened to plunge the country into a new crisis. Thetraditional inclination towards Russia and unchanging dogmatism caused many Mon-tenegrins to come out in favour of Stalin. Between 1948 and 1954, some 2 600 personswere arrested and imprisoned within Montenegro.76

Within Socialist Yugoslavia, Montenegro experienced the greatest economic regenera-tion in its entire history. The largest increase in economic efficiency was recorded in theperiod between 1961 and 1970. The share of the industrial sector in the economy in-creased from six to 35 per cent between 1945 and 1990. During this period, the Republic’scommunications infrastructure was built, with the construction of the Belgrade-Bar rail-way (completed in 1976) being the most significant project, while a maritime fleet wasbuilt as well as a number of shipyards. The number of tourists steadily increased – fromsome 5 000 people in 1946 to over one million in 1979. Significant changes in the struc-ture of the population were also recorded at this time. Urbanisation was a particularly im-portant development: the share of city dwellers in the total population increased dramati-cally from 14.2 per cent in 1953 to 58.2 per cent in 1991. The percentage of the populationwho were illiterate decreased constantly, from 56.1 per cent before 1941 to 5.9 per cent in1991. The first college was opened in 1947 and the first university faculty, a faculty ofeconomics, was set up in 1960, while a University with six faculties was founded in 1974.Some other important institutions relating to the cultural life of the Republic were estab-lished in this period: the Historical Institute in 1948; the State Archive in 1951; and theMontenegrin Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1973; as well as agricultural and biomedi-cal institutes, the National Theatre, radio and television stations and numerous newspa-pers and magazines.

ConclusionDuring its millennium-long history (from Duklja to Zeta to Crna Gora), the main featurein Montenegrin historical development was, on the one side, the characteristic influenceof various civilisations and cultures, and, on the other, the quest for its place within theboundaries of those civilisations. Located on the crossroads between east and west, in thecentral part of the Balkan Peninsula, Montenegro has been exposed to the influence ofglobal historical processes. It was within these processes, and depending on the interestsof the Great Powers, that Montenegro has built its particular historical identity, displayinga strong survivalist impulse in its desire for self-preservation.

Within such a historical disparity, developments characteristic of the whole region ofsouth-east Europe which, in the evolution of European history, have played the roles bothof centre and of periphery, have necessarily conditioned the historical formation of thestate of Montenegro.

76 On this, see Ivo Banac: With Stalin against Tito. Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Commu-nism (Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, 1988).

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The economic development of Montenegro

Introduction: the political environmentPopulism marked the Montenegrin political, economic and social scene during the last de-cade of the 20th century. In the late 1980s, the then Montenegrin regime unsuccessfullyattempted, using police repression and worn-out communist phrases, to curb the populistmovement called the ‘anti-bureaucratic revolution’1 that was skilfully managed from Bel-grade. Thus, after several rallies early in 1990, the complete party and state leadership ofthe then Socialist Republic of Montenegro was replaced.2 The management teams of thebiggest and most successful enterprises were also replaced by new personnel in this wave.The ‘anti-bureaucratic revolution’ was a populist, and hence seemingly also a workers’,movement and so the leadership of the then Montenegrin trade union also resigned at thistime.

Thus, Serbian nationalism, incorporating socialism and Četnik ideology, pervadedMontenegro, after having been already successful in Serbia and Vojvodina during thecourse of 1988/89.3 It was a prelude to the imminent break-up of the country, war, and apreviously unthinkable economic and social collapse. In the same way as they had beenmanipulated when they overthrew the former authority, the citizens and workers of Monte-negro were also under manipulation when they demolished the ramparts of Dubrovnik inthe early phase of the war in Croatia in late 1991. They were manipulated, but they didalso participate voluntarily. ‘Self-managers’ became nationalists and the regime had noproblem sending them as cannon fodder to a meaningless war. Impoverished, under-edu-cated labour, without sufficient urban experience and civil tradition, was an ideal basis formanipulation and the recruitment of fascist demolition hordes.

Very few participants in the anti-bureaucratic rallies were clearly aware of what thesewould come to mean in recent Montenegrin history.4 But the price of the ‘anti-bureau-

1 The name ‘anti-bureaucratic revolution’ was given to this movement by its participants who,in this way, wanted to show how the people, i.e. the nation, fought against the ‘bureaucra-tised regime alienated from the people’.

2 Veseljko Koprivica and Branko Vojičić: Prevrat '89 (Podgorica: LSCG,1994).3 After Slobodan Milošević took over the rule of Serbia and assumed control of the Belgrade

media, a campaign of accusations was launched against Montenegrin officials and the policy theywere pursuing. The reason lay in Milošević’s need to secure another sure vote in the Federationfor his project on solving the problem of Kosovo. The campaign from Serbia was organised via thesecret services, media and official authorities. The communist regime in Montenegro could notresist. Voices of dissent were too scarce and low-key. See Vladimir Keković: Vrijeme meteža ‘88/89 (Podgorica: Kulturno prosvjetna zajednica Podgorice, 2002).

4 This was the time of the demolition of the Berlin Wall and the beginning of the transition proc-ess in ex-socialist countries, but the toppling of the then regime in Montenegro was unrelated tothese trends. On the contrary, it was a movement of a nationalist and socialist orientation. Forexample, only one of the 37 speakers at the so-called January Rally (which was a prelude to theresignation of all state and party officials in Montenegro, as well as Montenegro’s representa-tives in the federal bodies) mentioned that a multi-party system should be introduced. He wasbooed. Veseljko Koprivica and Branko Vojičić, op. cit.

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cratic’ revolution had to be paid. It was paid by inflation and isolation from the worldcommunity. The policy of the economic boycott, which started with the boycott of Slove-nian products in Serbia, boomeranged on its initiators. The sanctions of the United Na-tions Security Council against Yugoslavia, established in 1992, lasted exactly 1 253 days. 5

In this regard, one of the most important factors in the difficult economic, social and poli-tical situation in which Montenegro found itself during the 1990s was the massive participa-tion of workers in the nationalist and populist ‘anti-bureaucratic revolution’. This hamperedand, for a long time, postponed inevitable economic and political reforms, reinforced thecommand control of the economy and made possible the insane policy of the regime epito-mised by Slobodan Milošević which, ultimately, hit the population of Serbia and Montene-gro the hardest.

Economic and social degradation

The political collapse of Yugoslavia has, logically, been accompanied by its economicdownfall. The economic, social and overall moral degradation of society started in 1990 atthe time of the break-up of former Yugoslavia. Economic collapse and the impoverish-ment of the population were caused by the loss of the former single Yugoslav market intowhich the economy of Montenegro was very much integrated, 6 the wars in parts of formerYugoslavia and, finally, international isolation. All this was ultimately the result of thecontinuously wrong policy of the authorities in Serbia and Montenegro, i.e. in the FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia.

The proportions of the economic collapse of the economy are evidenced by statisticaldata on the level of social product, which continues to be below 70 per cent of the GDPMontenegro had in 1990 and the highest inflation rate in history which, during 1993,equalled 123,751,836,168,522 per cent.7

If the level of industrial output in Montenegro in 1990 is indexed by 100, its level ofproduction in 2002 is at only 59.9.8 Even in 2001, industrial output in Montenegro was 0.8per cent lower than it had been in 2000 and accounted for 42 per cent of GDP. The follow-ing table presents a clearer review of the drop in GDP and industrial output in Monte-negro.

5 UN Security Council Resolution 757 imposed sanctions on FRY on 30 May 1992. Theywere suspended 1 253 days later by Resolution 1022 on 22 November 1995. According tothe data of the then official institutions in FRY, the country lost over $1 500bn due to thesanctions. Monitor, 14.7.1995.

6 Over 70 per cent of the total trade of Montenegro was conducted with other republics withinthe Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Observing only the level of trade with otherrepublics within the former SFRY, Montenegro had a continuous deficit but, on the whole,since 1982 it had a positive balance in foreign trade amounting to over $100m. On this issue,see Monitor, 8.3.1991 and Monitor, 20.3.1992.

7 Petar Đukić: Iskušenja ekonomske politike: hronologija života pod sankcijama (Belgrade:PS Grmeč, Privredni pregled, 1995).

8 Monet, April 2002.

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Table 1 – Changes in GDP and industrial output9

The volatility of the economic situation in Montenegro is witnessed by data on price in-creases. Inflation in Montenegro in 2001 was as much as 26 per cent while in 2000 itequalled 23 per cent. These are the years when the dinar, resented because of its inflation-ary history, did not operate in Montenegro, with the German mark being used as the na-tional currency instead.

Montenegro is currently facing numerous limitations to the reform processes initiated in1998, resulting partly in its undefined status in the undefined state it holds with Serbia.This political uncertainty and other circumstances have their economic repercussions. Ob-solete technology, which is scarcely capable of being upgraded, and a lack of interestamong foreign investors are additional key economic problems in Montenegro. Monte-negro is experiencing stagnation of industrial output, with great problems of a budget de-ficit, a shortage of electricity, a critically low degree of utilisation of nominal economiccapacities, a high proportion of economic activities taking place in the shadow economy, ahigh unemployment rate and the lowest average wage in the Balkans. Such a situation hasits deep roots that are explained in more detail in the following sections.

Growing unemploymentEconomic and political conditions in Montenegro during the past decade inevitably resultedin a radical reduction in the number of people employed. This can be clearly seen from thefollowing data. In 1989, about 163 000 people were working in Montenegro (while thenumber of the unemployed was about 48 000). In 2002, the number of the employeddropped to just 113 000, while the number of those seeking work rose to over 80 000. Theunemployment rate in Montenegro was 17 per cent in 1989 and now equals 28 per cent. Inthe meantime, the number of pensioners in Montenegro has risen from 59 000 to over81 000. Changes in the official number of the employed and the unemployed in Montenegroduring the last decade of the 20th century are presented in the following table.

1990 = 100 Nominal GDP (in million dinar)

Real GDP Industrial output

1990 1 778 100.0 100.0

1991 3 490 89.2 86.8

1992 270 819 68.2 69.5

1993 NA 43.3 45.9

1994 1 021 44.0 42.1

1995 1 916 50.2 41.1

1996 3 992 64.1 60.4

1997 5 209 68.3 62.6

1998 7 604 67.3 62.9

1999 16 164 58.0 58.1

9 Monet, December 2001.

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Table 2 – Employment in Montenegro10

A special problem for the Montenegrin economy is the rapid decrease in the number ofworkers in the economy and the gradual increase of those whose salaries are financed frompublic revenues. One-third of the workforce in Montenegro now works in public services.As a result, over the past thirteen years the number of jobs in the Montenegrin economic sec-tor has dropped by more than 30 per cent. Before the beginning of the economic reforms, ata time when full employment was fostered, over 130 000 people worked in the Montenegrineconomic sector as opposed to slightly more than 80 000 today. The ratio in several charac-teristic years between those working in the economic sector and in public services can beseen from the following table.

Table 3 – Number of employees in the economy and public services11

Employment declined as the consequence of company bankruptcies (some hundred largerenterprises went bankrupt during this period) and the dismissal of technically redundantworkers. Despite this, about 20 000 workers in the Montenegrin economy are still effec-tively redundant.12 This number actually coincides with the number of employees on so-called involuntary leave, who do not receive their wages regularly. In the early 1990s, aprocess of the ‘determination of technically and economically redundant workers’ was un-

Year Population (total)

No. of employed

No. of unemployed

Unemploy-ment rate (%)

1991 616 632 144 045 58 144 21.6

1992 624 043 134 205 64 632 23.6

1993 631 933 130 901 62 818 22.4

1994 635 287 128 835 58 210 21.8

1995 638 649 125 090 59 045 22.2

1996 642 890 124 264 60 225 21.9

1997 646 740 120 604 63 995 23.5

1998 650 575 117 745 68 373 25.7

1999 654 540 115 349 75 303 27.3

2000 658 530 113 818 83 583 29.3

2001 659 531 114 076 81 561 28.7

10 Republican Statistical Office.

Employment (annual average)

1989 1992 1995 1999 2000

Total 163 351 133 587 125 399 115 328 114 768

Economy 131 543 104 295 93 126 80 423 78 752

Public services 32 808 29 292 32 273 34 905 36 016

11 Montenegro Employment Office.12 Data of the Republican Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare.

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dertaken in all enterprises in Montenegro. This was an attempt to rid enterprises of theburden of surplus labour inherited from the period of self-management and the maintenanceof full employment and thus, through organisational transformation, to prepare for actualownership transformation.

The legal rights of those workers who were to be dismissed under this process were for-mally rather high, but they existed only on paper. They were entitled to one of the follow-ing: retraining or advanced training; the buy-up of missing years for retirement; severancepay amounting to 24 times the average monthly wage; employment with another com-pany; or a loan for self-employment. However, partly due to the lack of programmes andresources, and partly due to workers’ refusal to accept any other option except either thebuy-up of missing years for retirement or severance pay, settlement was delayed. Re-sources for these purposes should have been provided by enterprises but, since they didnot have them, they shifted everything to the government. At that time, the single-partygovernment used these affairs, as with many others, for political purposes. Thus, the re-sources required to deal with the problem of technical and economic redundancy were dis-tributed according to the criteria of political suitability. In consequence, many of thoseworkers declared redundant (political manipulation was frequently obvious in these pro-cesses, even within enterprises) were left jobless, with no other option but to join the armyor to secure their existence in the burgeoning smuggling and shadow economy.

Rising poverty

According to a methodology adopted on a tripartite basis, and defined in the General Col-lective Agreement,13 the minimum wage in Montenegro is determined according to twocentral criteria: the results of economic performance; and workers’ family needs. Theneeds of the average family are determined on the basis of an official statistical market‘basket’, encompassing 65 different food products and then increased by 40 per cent (alsoset down in the methodology) to account for the costs of housing, clothing, footwear,transportation, health, hygiene, education, culture, sports and everything else required fora family. Currently, the minimum wage (which also serves, very importantly, as the basisfor the adjustment of all welfare benefits in the Republic) equals Euro 50, while the aver-age wage in Montenegro is Euro 116.14 According to the data produced by the Confedera-tion of Independent Trade Unions of Montenegro, real wages are now 50 per cent lowerthan they were in 1990. In addition, also according to trade union sources, in May 2002 noless than 30 296 workers had not received their wages for a period longer than threemonths.

Average wage trends during the past few years (converted into German marks) areshown in the following table.

13 The General Collective Agreement was adopted in 1995. Its signatories are the Chamber ofCommerce and Economy of Montenegro, the Government of the Republic of Montenegroand the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions of Montenegro. This Collective Agree-ment is still in force.

14 At the time of the hyperinflation at the end of 1993, the value of average wages dropped toonly DM 5.

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Table 4 – Average wages in Montenegro15

Such a level of average income is insufficient for normal existence. Research studieshave concluded that, in 1996, as much as 28.9 per cent of the population of Yugoslavia,hence including Montenegro, were poor. According to this study, families which were un-able to cover the cost of the statistical market basket with their monthly income were con-sidered to be poor.16 A comparison between 1986 and 1990, when the poverty ratio in thecountry (i.e. the share of the poor of the total population) was 14.1 per cent, reveals the so-cial decline experienced by the population of Serbia and Montenegro during this period.

The situation has not changed much during recent years. According to research by thePodgorica office of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), carried out atthe end of 2000 and the beginning of 2001, the poverty ratio ranges from 25 to 30 percent.17

In consequence of sanctions and hyperinflation, the middle class became almost extinctwhile most of the population became equal in poverty. The first half of the 1990s was char-acterised by a transitional recession in all the former socialist countries and the ruling polit-ical forces in Montenegro (and in Serbia) tried to interpret the growing poverty as the resultof these transitional processes. However, Serbia and Montenegro at that time had not evenbegun the structural reforms required for transition. A plummeting economy and rapid im-poverishment of the population were the result of the destructive war policy of the regime,an inefficient and expensive economy with obsolete technology and an inadequate struc-ture, particularly its ownership structure. Altogether, these were additionally aggravated bythe sanctions. Economic policy based on an inefficient system and command-type manage-ment of the economy caused a long-lasting and profound crisis. The transitional recession,which inevitably occurs in radical changes of the economic system, is yet to be faced byMontenegrin society, which will have to pay further for the price of economic reforms. 18

Year Average wage (DM)

1994 108

1995 126

1996 188

1997 226

1998 194

1999 152

2000 188

2001 211

2002 (Jan) 261

15 Confederation of Independent Trade Unions of Montenegro.16 Analiza sive ekonomije u SR Jugoslaviji sa procenama za 1997. i preporukama za njenu

legalizaciju (Belgrade: Economics Institute, 1998).17 Zaposlenost, tržište rada i životni standard u Crnoj Gori (Podgorica: UNDP, 2002).18 Only in 2002 has the Government of Montenegro prepared a new draft Labour Law and,

with the assistance of foreign experts, started to prepare reforms in the educational, pensionsand health system.

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The shadow economyShadow economies are a common feature in many economies around the world – and par-ticularly in transition countries – but Serbia and Montenegro have experienced an unpre-cedented escalation in the shadow economy. In many respects, it was the main feature oflife and work in Montenegro during the past decade.

The shadow economy implies the performance of economic activity which is parallel orcontrary to relevant legal regulations, as well as lawful unreported production; in otherwords, it is the sum of production activities that are in accordance with national laws andregulations except that data on their volume, value and effects are not voluntarily reportedto the authorities and the competent tax services in order to evade taxation and the liabili-ties arising from labour legislation. The shadow (grey) economy is a term commonly usedin Montenegro, although elsewhere in the world it is usually referred to as the informalsector or the informal economy. Likewise, ‘black labour’ is the term common in the Bal-kans for unprotected labour.19

There are many reasons for the burgeoning of the informal economy in Montenegro.Unlike other transition countries, where the initial transitional shock and absence of ade-quate programmes for social protection caused a ‘spontaneous movement for survival’through economic activity in the informal sector, in Montenegro it was sanctions whichproved particularly conducive to the development of the informal sector. Governmentbodies in FRY, Serbia and Montenegro were forced to transform import and export trans-actions into internally-legalised smuggling. Here, the vibrant shadow economy in Yugo-slavia differs from the situation in transition countries. This process was inevitably ac-companied by the escalation of corruption.20

In such conditions, the plummeting standard of living of the population and the collapseof the regular economy moved a large share of the economically active population into theinformal sector and informal work. The entire authoritarian system of the rule ofMilošević in FRY was very tightly interwoven in the web of corruption and crime, andthus the everyday life of the ordinary population was criminalised accordingly. The politi-cal backdrop for such a process was the creation of collaboration in the criminalisation ofthe system. For the functioning of its new rule, the political and economic elite created aspecific anti-social coalition with impoverished workers, giving them the opportunity forminor ‘thefts’ and income gathering within the informal economy. Yet, there are huge dif-ferences between small-time and big-time smugglers; the former engaged in this to earntheir subsistence, the latter to increase their wealth. The former were the hostages, the lat-ter the owners of the entire system. Some got into the shadow economy to survive, othersmodelled it as organised crime.21

19 The term ‘black labour’ implies work performed for the employer without legal grounding,when the legal grounding is unlawful or when the work performed is prohibited.

20 The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), published by Transparency International, rankssouth-east European countries at the very top of the list of countries which are burdened withcorruption. In 1999, on a list of 99 countries FRY was ranked 90th, Albania 84th and Croatia74th, while Bulgaria, Romania and Macedonia shared 63rd place. See www.transparency.de/document/cpi/index/html.

21 Dragan Đurić: ‘The Shadow Economy: Between Authority and Crime’, South-East EuropeReview for Labour and Social Affairs, Vol. 2 No. 1, April 1999, pp. 59-68.

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In the conditions of the command economy during Milošević’s era, people learnedabout the market and market operation through the shadow economy. However, in parallelwith this, collaboration between government organs and/or individuals within them withthe members of the new business class caused animosity amongst ordinary citizens towardthe private sector and created the predominant attitude that representatives of the newbusiness class were the same as criminals. Žarko Rakčević, deputy of the Social Demo-cratic Party (Socijaldemokratska partija, SDP), pointed out in an address to the Mon-tenegrin parliament22 that these are:

the untaxed suppliers of scarce imported goods, phantom bankers, racketeers, suppliers ofwar, arms traders… who got rich overnight owing to various suspicious and criminal con-nections, money issuing, bribery and corruption. They are the core of the future establish-ment. War was their ambience, their need and an opportunity for social promotion. Wargave them power, and they provided it with material and political support and political le-gitimacy in return.23

Shortcomings in the regular part of the economy and in the official system were offsetby the informal economy, and that has contributed to the creation of the specific anti-so-cial coalition in which all social strata took part. The gap between standards and realitywas too wide. Government organs and the social partners attempted to develop standardsthrough a formalised social dialogue, not realising that ‘life is somewhere else’, to para-phrase Milan Kundera, the famous Czech author.

All this, incorporated into overall social insecurity and uncertainty, considerably af-fected the political processes in Montenegro.

Unprotected labourIn Montenegro, people have become engaged in private business for a variety of reasons.Some did it because they saw in it their entrepreneurial perspective, others sought to usetheir position in the social or public sector, still others because they had no other option.Thus, a very large number of new private enterprises have been created. There are cur-rently about 17 000 enterprises and shops in Montenegro, of which about 12 000 are ac-tive.24 Most of these enterprises – 45 per cent of the total number – engage in trade, 13 percent are in catering and tourism, and 19 per cent are in transport (taxi drivers). Neverthe-less, a large number of new enterprises have not created many new jobs; the number of theunemployed in Montenegro is still very high, as outlined earlier, and thus it represents oneof the gravest economic and social problems, particularly in the northern, less developed,part of Montenegro.

22 Toward the end of 1993, the Assembly of Montenegro refused to debate information on theeconomic and social situation in Montenegro which had been prepared for the parliamentarysession by the Montenegrin trade union and the then opposition SDP. It had been previouslyagreed that this material would be put on the agenda but, on the decision of the ruling party,it was eliminated from the parliamentary procedure. The chair of the SDP Deputy Club wasonly permitted to deliver the address he had prepared as a keynote speech.

23 Monitor, 31.12.1993.24 Active enterprises imply enterprises with recorded activity through a giro account in the last

two months.

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The ratio of unemployed people to the total number of employees in Montenegro is70.3,25 while the situation in the municipalities of Berane (134), Bijelo Polje (125), Moj-kovac (156) and Plav (125) is considerably more difficult. The situation is much better inPodgorica where this ratio is 59.5 and in Nikšić, where it is 79. Official data on thenumber of the unemployed does not, however, reflect the actual situation because manymore workers are economically active through illegal work and the shadow economy.

Estimates of the number of unregistered employed people in Montenegro vary consid-erably. The estimates of the Employment Office of Montenegro, for example, mention afigure of around 64 000 unregistered jobs. According to these estimates, out of 15-20thousand employees who are on involuntary leave more or less continuously, about 4 000are working illegally. In addition, out of over 80 thousand unemployed, around 30 percent have unregistered employment. According to the same source, approximately 10 percent of pensioners, as well as about 25 per cent of some 25 000 refugees are also involvedin unregistered work. This adds up to a total of about 64 000 unregistered jobs.

On the other hand, experts at the Economics Faculty in Podgorica 26 estimate the totalnumber of employees in the informal sector to be as much as 85 000. According to theseestimates, the share of unregistered activities rises to 31 per cent of the total workforce. Inaddition, a UNDP study indicates that the unemployment rate is far lower than the officialone, equalling about 14 per cent, while 25.5 per cent of the active population has unregis-tered income and 18 per cent have a job on the side.27

In 2000, the author of this text conducted a survey on labour law and the social positionof employees in the so-called small private sector. The sample encompassed 700 workersin trade, catering and construction in eight of the larger municipalities in Montenegro. Theresults of the survey indicate that as much as 38.6 per cent of workers in these sectors areworking illicitly, with nearly one in three having been working in this way for more thantwo years. Women are more likely to be employed illegally than are men (35.3% femalerespondents compared to 4.2% of male ones) and predominantly include either veryyoung or very old workers. The largest number of people surveyed came from the smalltrade sector (small private trading shops), which mostly employ women, and so the surveyresults indicate that there is a much larger number of women employed illegally.

In autumn 2001, the government of Montenegro launched a special programme ofmeasures to combat the shadow economy. For the time being, the programme encom-passes the area of money and commodity circulation. It has, however, not yet seriouslyaddressed the problem of unprotected labour.28

The privatisation processPrivatisation is often considered to be one of the most important elements in the transitionprocess. It is obvious that, for Montenegrin economy and society as a whole, the privatisa-tion process has played a very important role during the past few years.

25 Employment Office of Montenegro and the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare.26 Monet, June 2000, p. 8.27 Zaposlenost, tržište rada i životni standard u Crnoj Gori (Podgorica: UNDP, 2002).28 ‘Suzbijanje sive ekonomije: Pucanj u prazno,’ Skener, No. 2, April 2002.

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They may exist within a common state, but Montenegro and Serbia have different viewsof transition, political and democratic reforms, and, hence, of privatisation. Political andsocial consensus about the need for privatisation of social ownership 29 was reached muchearlier in Montenegro than in the other federal unit – Serbia.

However, the privatisation process in Montenegro has not been continuous. The(dis)continuity of it can best be illustrated by the sequence of laws according to which ithas been conducted.

The first steps were taken in 1989 by the Federal government of Prime Minister AnteMarković,30 with the Law on State Capital which served as the basis for the privatisationof 23 enterprises in Montenegro. Then, in February 1992, the Assembly of Montenegroadopted the Law on Ownership and Management Transformation. 31 Thus, Montenegroformally started its privatisation process – the next to last of the former Yugoslav repub-lics, with Serbia being the last to follow suit.32 This law was amended in 1994 at the initi-ative of the Montenegrin trade union. In addition to the acquisition of shares at discount,the amendment enabled the free distribution of up to ten per cent of enterprise capital toemployees. According to this law, social ownership was eliminated in Montenegro anddistributed between the employees of the respective enterprises and state funds.

The result was a phase called ‘managerial transformation’ in Montenegro. In fact, itcontributed to the re-nationalisation of enterprises. All untransformed social propertywithin enterprises – a part of the capital that was not transferred to workers – was trans-ferred to state funds in the proportion of 60 per cent flowing to the Development Fund, 30per cent to the Pensions and Disability Insurance Fund and 10 per cent to the EmploymentFund. Accordingly, state funds appointed most of the members of the boards of directorsof enterprises and, since political power was in the hands of one party, the DemocraticParty of Socialists (DPS), the situation was the same within the state funds. Consequently,the ruling party had a dominant role in the management of the entire economy. In addi-

29 Social ownership is a specific category that existed only in SFRY. Namely, in the period ofself-management socialism, the institute of social ownership was elaborated which, in the opi-nion of the communist ideologues, was to be the first step toward the non-ownership whichshould characterise communism. Enterprises did not own capital but were only entitled tomanage enterprise capital as part of the general social capital. Such capital was not state capi-tal, as it was in other east European countries.

30 Ante Marković was the last federal Prime Minister of SFRY. He is notable for his efforts tointroduce reforms in the country which, of course, failed. When he realised that republicanpolitical oligarchies lacked the political will for co-operation and reform, he founded a poli-tical party at the Yugoslav level, called the Alliance of Pro-Reform Forces of Yugoslavia.This was another failed project. The Alliance participated in the first multi-party parliamen-tary elections in Montenegro, when the League of Communists of Montenegro won by alandslide. Subsequently, Montenegrin pro-European and pro-reform opposition partiesevolved from the Alliance.

31 Službeni list RCG, No. 2/92, 1992.32 In August 1992, Serbia also adopted a Law on Transformation of Social Ownership into

Other Forms of Ownership. However, in August 1994, at the initiative of Đinđić’s Demo-cratic Party, the notorious revaluation was introduced. This actually brought privatisation inSerbia to a standstill and the whole process into a cul-de-sac from which Serbia has started toemerge only after the democratic changes in October 2000.

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tion, the result of this process was a very pronounced role for employee share ownershipin Montenegro. On average, employees own about 25 per cent of capital in Montenegro. 33

The new Law on the Privatisation of the Economy was enacted in mid-1996. 34 It regu-lated the issue of the further actual privatisation of previously-transformed social enter-prises and introduced the model of voucher privatisation for employees in public services,the unemployed and pensioners. This model was planned as a local variant of the modelsof voucher privatisation implemented elsewhere. However, the political blockade (at thattime, UN Security Council sanctions had already been lifted but the so-called ‘outer wallof sanctions’ remained in place) meant that privatisation proceeded very slowly. By 1998,only 95 small and medium-sized enterprises had been privatised in Montenegro, with for-eign capital invested in just five firms. About 9 000 employees worked in privatised enter-prises at the time.

The valuation of the enterprises was largely conducted in 1996 and so that was the priceat which they were sold, subject furthermore to an average discount of around 40 per cent.This trend has continued until today. The shares of some privatised enterprises are cur-rently quoted on the two stock exchanges in Montenegro and their value is, on average,only 30 per cent of the estimated value which served as the basis for mass voucher privati-sation. The value of the enterprises has declined continuously due to the overall economicdegradation as well as to their low levels of current operation. The management of socialand transformed enterprises, through current business operations with newly-founded pri-vate firms in which they had an interest, has actually moved a solid part of capital fromsocial into private enterprises.

As a result of the very slow privatisation – which, in addition, caused a range of every-day concrete problems, resulting from the more or less obvious corruption and failure toimplement the provisions of privatisation agreements (in 1998 alone, 28 privatisationagreements were cancelled due to these reasons) – a further reorganisation of the entireprocess had to be undertaken. A special body – the Privatisation Council – was set up bythe Law on Privatisation of the Economy35 which actually assumed a monopoly over theentire process and, in 1998, the government pompously announced that it would acceler-ate privatisation by introducing vouchers.

However, owing to the increasing conflict with the Milošević regime in Belgrade,NATO bombing and the fear of possible war in Montenegro, the Montenegrin authoritiesstalled the implementation of the actual reforms and mass voucher privatisation endedonly in late 2001. With the modifications and amendments to the Law on Privatisation ofthe Economy,36 all adult citizens of Montenegro (around 450 000 people) were grantedthe right to receive vouchers that they later used to buy shares in enterprises or the privati-sation funds. Capital for the mass voucher privatisation, to a total of DM 2.5bn, was ear-marked out of the portfolio of the Development Fund of the Republic of Montenegro inaddition to the share of state capital.

Shares in 225 enterprises in all were offered to citizens. Not all enterprise capital wasincluded in this form of privatisation. In smaller and less successful firms, the percentage

33 Data of the Development Fund of Montenegro.34 Službeni list RCG, No. 23/96, 1996.35 ibid.36 Službeni list RCG, No. 6/99, 1999.

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of capital allocated for privatisation was higher while in the strategically important ones,of course it was much lower. Vouchers did not have a face value in monetary terms butwere denominated in points. However, one point was equal to the value of one Germanmark which, at the time of the implementation of mass privatisation, had already becomethe official currency in Montenegro. Citizens had the option freely to choose the sharesthey would buy, either by directly purchasing shares in a certain enterprise or shares inone of the six privatisation funds.

In summary, 90 per cent of citizens took their vouchers; 60 per cent of them subse-quently exchanged their vouchers for shares in the privatisation funds and 30 per cent forshares in individual enterprises. Immediately prior to the mass voucher privatisation,about 21 per cent of total social capital in Montenegro had been privatised. 37 Now, afterthe completion of the mass voucher privatisation, around 57 per cent of total social capitalin Montenegro has been privatised. The rundown of the current situation is as follows.Over 95 per cent of citizens in Montenegro have become share owners in enterprises(through various forms of privatisation). Furthermore, 130 companies have been fully pri-vatised, while there are 179 companies with around 80 per cent privatised capital, 27 com-panies which are 51 per cent privatised and 17 of the largest companies in which about 35per cent of capital has been privatised.

One of the most important characteristics of the present situation is the majority owner-ship of employees (through inside shares, on the basis of the former law) and citizens (onthe basis of vouchers invested directly in the enterprise) in as many as 92 companies inMontenegro,38 albeit that these are largely smaller and poorer-performing ones.

The first half of 2002 was characterised by the establishment of new managerial struc-tures in Montenegrin enterprises. This marked a break with the former practice of par-astate and para-political boards of directors, which were viewed by the public as bearingthe main responsibility for poor performance and the high degree of corruption in theMontenegrin economy.

Other privatisation models have also been implemented slowly. The biggest and mostvaluable enterprises have been earmarked for sale through international tender but notmuch progress has been made. In 2001, for example, the offer of the Montenegrin tele-coms operator attracted no foreign buyers. The key capacities of the Montenegrin econ-omy (the aluminium industry, hotel facilities, wood processing and metals processing fac-tories) are still waiting for prospective buyers. According to the privatisation plan for2002, seventeen of the largest enterprises in Montenegro, which account together for morethan 40 per cent of total capital in Montenegro, have been earmarked for privatisation viainternational tender. They include hotel and tourist enterprises Boka in Herceg Novi, Bud-vanska rivijera in Budva and Crna Gora in Podgorica; Duvanski kombinat (tobacco fac-tory), Podgorica; Elektroprivreda Crne Gore (electricity generation and distribution),Nikšić; Gornji Ibar, Rozaje; Jadransko brodogradiliste (shipyard), Bijela; Jugooceanija,Kotor; Jugopetrol, Kotor; Kombinat aluminijuma (aluminium complex), Podgorica; LukaBar (port), Bar; Plantaže, Podgorica; Prekookeanska plovidba, Bar; Telekom Crne Gore,

37 Veselin Vukotić: Osnovna informacija o portfelju za masovnu vaučersku privatizaciju,material prepared for the Privatisation Council, Podgorica, June 2001.

38 Confederation of Independent Trade Unions of Montenegro.

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Podgorica; hotel and tourist enterprise Ulcinjska rivijera, Ulcinj; Željezara (steel mill),Nikšić; and Željezničko-transportno preduzeće (railway), Podgorica.

However, by the summer of 2002, none of these enterprises had been privatised, for rea-sons which lie primarily in the lack of interest amongst foreign investors, as well as in theslow preparation of the necessary tender documentation.

In August 1996, the author of this text conducted a survey among employees in theMontenegrin economy with the aim of gaining a thorough insight into what workers in theeconomy understood by the privatisation of social ownership which had been carried outup until then and what they expected from the continuation of that process. The sampleconsisted of 600 respondents drawn from separately-structured groups of employees inpublic enterprises, transformed social enterprises, privatised enterprises, and enterprisesthat were in private ownership from the outset. The results of this survey are particularlyinteresting because it demonstrates that employee shareholding is very developed in Mon-tenegro.

Employees’ lack of knowledge about the main aspects of the employee stock ownershipplan was conspicuous. An enormous number of respondents (78 per cent) did not knowwhat percentage of capital in the enterprise they work for belonged to the workers, while86 per cent did not know how much the shares in their personal possession were worthand a similar percentage did not know who were the employees’ representatives on thecompany’s board of directors. The degree of employees’ ignorance on these issues was indirect proportion to the level of their education and their earnings in the job. The vast ma-jority of employees in the economy supported the idea of employee shareholding and thatworkers should receive more than a 50 per cent level of ownership of their companies, along-standing trade union policy in Montenegro. This shows that, at the time of the sur-vey, seven years after the end of self-management, the prevalent opinion among workerswas that they had created the social capital with their current labour and that they shouldnow claim the right to its distribution within the privatisation process.

Comparing these results with some earlier surveys shows that the development of theprivatisation process in itself has contributed to a better understanding of it amongst em-ployees in the economy. It has also turned out that employees in those enterprises whichhave progressed further in the privatisation process demonstrate a greater degree of under-standing of its mechanics. Most of the employees in the economy of Montenegro acceptedthe general concept of privatisation, criticising rather the manner of its implementation,although as much as one-third of respondents could justly be called opponents of priva-tisation.

The altogether painstaking, slow and controversial privatisation process in Montenegrohas decisively affected the course of political events in Serbia and Montenegro.

A new stage: pro-reform rhetoricAfter the beginning of the democratisation process in Montenegro, marked by the electionof Milo Đukanović as President of Montenegro at the end of 1997 and this republic’s in-creasingly fierce conflicts with Belgrade, reforms started to be seriously contemplated. Inshort, in order to distance itself as much as possible from the Belgrade regime, the govern-ment started strongly to promote the idea of reforms and thus built for itself a pro-reformimage, although real reform results have been absent.39 Yet, owing to this, considerable

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foreign aid did start to flow into Montenegro. This aid was, in fact, required as the deficitof the Montenegrin budget was ever-increasing. The government did not prevent the flightof business into the informal sector to evade taxation because it was itself involved in in-formal activities which enabled it, during the sanctions and for several years afterwards,regularly to pay salaries in the public sector, to buy up a portion of Montenegro’s foreigndebt40 and, of course, to have slush funds for political propaganda purposes. Thanks to thenew policy (and to international donations), the economic recovery of Montenegro startedin 1997.

The citizens of Montenegro at that time were accustomed to comparing themselves onlywith Serbia, which was collapsing disastrously, thus creating a false optimism and exces-sive self-content in Montenegro over the slow improvements in the republic’s economy. Insuch conditions, a national and political movement aimed at Montenegrin independencecontinuously gained strength. Transitional reforms were missing, with the authorities reit-erating the same excuse: the threat of the possible civil war that Milošević could incite inMontenegro. Discussions about reforms had begun in Montenegro, but it also managed toextricate itself from some of the hardships felt in Serbia. For example, Montenegro sus-tained far less damage from the NATO bombing than Serbia. 41 However, in 1999, Monte-negro created a two-currency system, introducing the German mark in parallel with theYugoslav dinar and, in early 2000, officially proclaimed the mark as the only legal tenderin Montenegro.42 At the time of the introduction of the euro in the European Union, Monte-negro also converted marks into euros so that the euro is now the only official currency.

The central political theme in Montenegro since 1998 has been the issue of independence.Economists generally then agreed that state sovereignty would considerably help the eco-nomic development of Montenegro.43 However, in consequence of the political problemsboth in relations with Serbia and with the very numerous opponents of independence withinMontenegro, the authorities have opted for the concept of so-called functional sovereignty.The idea was, first, to secure economic independence which would, subsequently, producepolitical effects and practically lead all by itself to state independence. This concept, ofcourse, failed to yield the anticipated effects, but it did result in Montenegro’s independencein the monetary sphere, in the customs system and in foreign trade. On the other hand, it pro-duced numerous problems for that part of the economy that inevitably continued to rely on

39 European Stability Initiative: Rhetoric and Reform. A Case Study of Institution Building inMontenegro 1998-2001, Podgorica, Berlin, 1.7.2001.

40 The total debt of Montenegro amounts to $326m. The highest share of this amount is owedto the international financial institutions ($131.9m) and to the London Club ($120.3m). Thedebt to the Paris Club amounts to $46.7m. The biggest creditor among the internationalfinancial organisations is the World Bank, which claims $116.2m. Data taken from Monet,No. 8, April 2002.

41 Independent researchers in Serbia, gathered in Group 17, estimated the direct damage fromthe NATO bombing in Serbia as over $100bn. See Mlađan Dinkić (ed.): Završni račun,Ekonomske posledice NATO bombardovanja: procena štete i sredstava potrebnih zaekonomsku rekonstrukciju Jugoslavije, Belgrade: Stubovi kulture, Grupa 17, 1999).

42 The Yugoslav dinar became proscribed in Montenegro primarily as a result of inflation.According to data from the federal Statistical Office, it devalued as many as 23 times since1952 and, in addition, was six times denominated.

43 See also the chapter by Beáta Huszka on The dispute over independence in this volume.

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co-operation with the Serbian economy. Payments for goods that crossed the border betweenSerbia and Montenegro, for example, had to be effected via third countries. Imports fromSerbia account for 13 per cent of total imports in Montenegro while exports to Serbia re-presented 8 per cent of total exports from Montenegro during 2000. Thus, the degree of co-operation between the Montenegrin economy and Serbia is today lower than that betweenMontenegro and Croatia.44

However, the collapse of the regime of Slobodan Milošević shifted the course of eventsvery swiftly. The international community turned its support toward newly democraticSerbia, while Montenegro started to sustain damage as a result of its uncooperativenesswith the new position of the international community. It turned out that the pro-reformrhetoric was insufficient and that the authorities in Montenegro had not the political willto take the opportunity provided by a climate which was favourable to the launching of ac-tual transitional changes. Owing to a series of radical reform laws and abundant foreignaid, the Serbian economy has been rapidly recovering and has begun to surpass Monte-negro in almost all the parameters of economic development.

Legislative reformsReforms in Montenegro have been carried out unevenly and in an unsynchronised man-ner. Ownership transformation has been completed, but the fundamental laws – the Lawon Enterprises, the Law on Elements of Labour Relations – have long remained the same,inherited from the socialist system and, still worse, from the system of SFRY, a state thatno longer exists. More serious legislative activities in Montenegro have started since1997, following the split in the Democratic Party of Socialists and the democratic streamwhich then prevailed.45 Such a discrepancy in the reform processes has caused enormousproblems for the entire process of transition.

The absence of systemic laws has been, for many years, offset by the continual modifi-cation of and amendments to republic laws. In consequence, an unregulated legal environ-ment and rule by decree have created an atmosphere of overall insecurity and uncertainty,privileging certain parts of the economic structure and fostering corruption and nepotism.Such conditions have had a very adverse effect on the business climate and have reducedthe interest of potential foreign investors for investment in Montenegro. Laws on eco-nomic companies, on insolvency and on employment, and a series of laws in the monetarysphere, were adopted in Montenegro only at the beginning of 2002. The Law on Eco-nomic Companies is a Montenegrin variant of the federal Law on Enterprises under whichthe official name for enterprises (joint stock companies) in Montenegro is now economiccompany, while the Law on Insolvency substituted the former federal Law on Bankruptcyand Liquidation. However, the new Labour Law and laws on the reform of the pensionssystem and on the reform of the health system are still in preparation.

44 Monet, No. 8, April 2002. This information, however, should be taken with a degree of reser-vation because, due to payment transactions with Serbia being unregulated, many enterprisesfrom Montenegro have organised trade with enterprises in Serbia via third countries, mostfrequently Republika Srpska and Croatia. This means that trade with Serbia is shown in theofficial statistics as trade with other countries.

45 Even before that, however, federal laws had no particular importance in Montenegro.

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However, the most striking example of the repeated discontinuity in the economic poli-cies of the authorities in Montenegro concerns its offshore laws.

A shortcut to h(e)avenSearching for an answer to the question of how, after the lifting of sanctions, transitionprocesses could be accelerated and foreign capital attracted, the government of Montene-gro prepared in 1996 a global development project entitled ‘Montenegro – A Free Eco-nomic Zone’.

In co-operation with foreign experts, a special law on foreign companies and individu-als was drafted, along with a separate study on the economic justification of the develop-ment of Montenegro as an international offshore centre.

The project included numerous forms and modalities of arrangements for special busi-ness operations. In addition to offshore firms,46 there exist flagged-out shipping opportu-nities, free warehouses, ports, airports, open zones for tourists, etc. The law, in addition,guaranteed that:

The rights, reliefs, facilities and other benefits stipulated by this law cannot be changed fora period of 15 years’.

The explanation for turning Montenegro into an offshore zone was that it could not pro-pel its economy after the lifting of sanctions without foreign capital, that capital could nolonger be provided by taking out expensive loans and that effort had to be made to createan attractive social and economic environment in which foreign capital would flow intothe republic. Using various business operation systems within this project, Montenegrowas promised by the government that it would become an attractive area for foreign capi-tal which would generate domestic resources and introduce new products, programmes,the transfer of technology, know-how and international standards, and which would en-sure the growth of competitiveness of the local economy and its necessary changes in boththe organisational, managerial and information sense. Of course, all this would also con-tribute to the considerable influx of foreign currency and the employment of a large pro-portion of the local labour force.47

This was, therefore, the Montenegrin way to a ‘tariff and tax heaven’. The project ledimmediately to suspicions in Serbia and at the federal level. The Constitutional Court ofFRY immediately proclaimed the special law unconstitutional, and comments came fromBelgrade which likened Montenegro to Slovenia’s secessionist policy in the late 1980s.The Montenegrin authorities, however, disregarded such comments. Nevertheless, the ul-timate outcome was not particularly successful. By 2002, there were 1 200 offshore com-panies registered in Montenegro, including about 500 offshore banks. This prompted nu-merous comments from international consultants that Montenegro was being used foruncontrolled money laundering through offshore banks.48 Thus, the ‘Cypriot dream’ inMontenegro was short-lived. Seven years later, on 18 June 2002, at the request of the go-

46 These are companies that cannot operate on the territory of the state on which they are regis-tered because they enjoy special customs and tax benefits.

47 Monitor, 7.6.2002, p. 34.48 Monitor, 5.7.2002, p. 30.

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vernment of Montenegro, the Constitutional Court declared that the provision on the dura-tion of the Law was unconstitutional, with the explanation that it had created a monopolis-tic position for foreign banks. Thus, the entire development of offshore business inMontenegro was simply ruled null and void. Bearing in mind that offshore banks havetheir seat only in Montenegro, but that they do not have the right to develop their businessthere, the large number of offshore banks has had virtually no effect either on the econ-omy or the general public.

The problem of the Montenegrin budget deficit

Within the former Yugoslavia, Montenegro was a dependent republic. It received assist-ance from the Fund for the Development of Under-Developed Regions (FADURK), as didKosovo, Macedonia and Bosnia.49 With the creation of the Federal Republic of Yugosla-via, this Fund, of course, ceased to exist, but a part of the population in Montenegro stillretained the general attitude that Serbia ‘fed’ this republic and that it would not be able tosurvive alone. In 1994, however, the government of Montenegro, for the first time, re-ported that it had managed to achieve full self-financing for all government functions, al-though very few people wondered where the money came from when the whole economywas stumbling under the burden of sanctions.

However, after the Montenegrin democratic authorities became co-operative with theinternational community, the channels of non-transparent cash inflow had gradually to beclosed. Almost as a substitute for that, considerable foreign donations started to come toMontenegro. The scope of this aid is sufficiently illustrated by the statistic that, in 1999-2000, Montenegro received the highest aid per capita granted by the US government to aforeign country with the exception only of Israel.50 However, after the toppling of theMilošević regime in Belgrade, this aid was reduced. For 2001, foreign aid (mainly fromthe USA and the European Union) was planned at a level of DM 60m, although less thanhalf this amount was actually disbursed. Consequently, the problem of the budgetary defi-cit has become increasingly apparent. With a series of new tax laws, enacted early in2002, and the programme of the legalisation of the shadow economy, the Montenegringovernment is trying to address this problem. The results are not yet visible but they will,certainly, have a considerable impact on economic flows in Montenegro.

In 2001, public expenditures (the budget, the pensions insurance fund and the health in-surance fund) accounted for two-thirds of Montenegro’s GDP. The budget planned for2002 amounts to over DM 670m, which is 45 per cent more than the plan for the previousyear. When the planned social funds are added to this figure, the share of public revenuesof planned GDP rises to as much as 69 per cent.51 All this threatens the further economicstability of Montenegro.

49 See Sabrina Petra Ramet: Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1991, (Blooming-ton: Indiana University Press, 1992), pp. 150-161.

50 Centre for Democracy and Human Rights: Transition in Montenegro: Legislation, Media andPrivatisation, Report No. 9 (January-March 2001), Podgorica; available at: www.cedem.cg.yu/cedem.htm.

51 Akcija: Osvrt na reforme u Crnoj Gori, unpublished study, Podgorica: February 2002.

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Economic aspects of relations between Montenegro and SerbiaOne of the main problems in the economic development of Montenegro over the past de-cade has been the continuous political and economic conflicts between Montenegro andSerbia. At this point, Montenegro and Serbia have economic sovereignty, with no commu-nication between the federal and republic authorities in Montenegro. Economic relationsbetween Serbia and Montenegro are at a low point.

As mentioned earlier, economists in Montenegro have been almost unanimous in theopinion that state sovereignty would create more opportunity for the economic developmentof Montenegro. These positions are based on a series of arguments that need to be explained.

The most important of these refers to the significant differences between the economicsystems of Montenegro and Serbia which prevent the establishment of equitable relationswithin the federation. The difference in size is so big that there will always be the feelingthat one side is exploiting the other. Montenegro is by far the smallest of the formerYugoslav republics. By all economic parameters, it accounted for between two and threeper cent of the former Yugoslavia. As a result, Yugoslav planners often had the habit ofreducing the entire republic to a so-called statistical error. After the break-up of SocialistYugoslavia in 1992, Montenegro decided, in a very problematic referendum, to continueliving in a new federal state, but now only with Serbia. In the new state, which many inMontenegro experienced as Greater Serbia, although it was called Yugoslavia, the Mon-tenegrin share of the territory, population and gross national product again amounted toonly seven to ten per cent. From the point of the equality of republics within the new fe-deration, this seemed like a story of David and Goliath.

In addition, the economies of Montenegro and Serbia have experienced major changes.These changes entailed different interests, views on further development and, even, differ-ent strategies of economic development. This has meant that the paths of the further de-velopment of the economies of Montenegro and Serbia have been different. Montenegrineconomic policy has focused on developing services, tourism and small and medium-sized enterprises; on the other hand, Serbia predominantly relies on industry, agricultureand transport.

Besides, one should also bear in mind the different level of privatisation in the econ-omy. In Montenegro, every enterprise has at least some element of private capital (about60 per cent of the former public ownership has been privatised); in contrast, privatisationin Serbia is at the very beginning.

Furthermore, the two republics have different customs rates. Montenegro not only haslower customs rates than Serbia but it also has a lesser need to protect its economy withcustoms tariffs: instead, Montenegro has a need to build an open economic system. Over70 per cent of the goods imported by Montenegro are subject to customs rates of underthree per cent. Transferring this authority to a federation would imply the introduction of aprotectionism of which the Montenegrin economy has no need.

It is obvious that there are different interests involved concerning foreign trade policy.Montenegro has almost completely liberalised its foreign trade and over 98 per cent ofgoods, on both the export and the import side, are traded freely. On the other hand, Serbiahas 96 per cent of goods on the export side and 84 per cent on the import side traded undera free trade system.52

52 ‘Ekonomski aspekti neodrživosti federacije’, Monet, No. 8, April 2002.

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The differences are even more obvious in monetary policy. Montenegro has introducedthe euro while Serbia has retained the national currency and the possibility of the issue ofmoney. Returning Montenegro to the dinar, according to Montenegrin economists, 53

would imply the closing of the Montenegrin economy, owing to its high dependence onfluctuations in the dinar exchange rate, and would greatly restrict the freedom of importand export now enjoyed by enterprises and individuals in Montenegro.

The high dependence of the Montenegrin economy on relations with Serbia also nolonger holds true. In the total imports of Montenegro, products from Serbia account for10.6 per cent, with a steadily declining share in recent years. Montenegro has already sub-stituted the import of products from Serbia partly from its own production and partlythrough imports from other countries. In total exports, export to Serbia accounts for 4.4per cent. Montenegro has, gradually, become more integrated at the regional level.

Neither can the cost that Montenegro would incur due to the existence of the federalstate be neglected. The federal budget for 2002 would cost Montenegro Euro 75m-80m.

ConclusionAfter the signing of the Belgrade Agreement in March 2002 on relations between Serbiaand Montenegro, a new phase started on the Montenegrin political scene. The effects ofthe new political instability may not yet be sufficiently visible, but it is evident that theBelgrade Agreement, and the long process of preparations and the enactment of a newconstitutional charter for the common state, will cause further delay in the introduction ofthe necessary reform actions. In addition, the limited timeframe for which a joint state isrequired before one party can secede is further likely to delay the reform process.

Numerous reform laws prepared by the government have already been delayed by thecollapse of the minority government and preparations for early elections which have hadinevitable consequences for the quality of reform in Montenegro. In addition, in the ab-sence of domestic capital, privatisation in Montenegro has had to rely on direct foreign in-vestment; foreign capital is, in consequence of the political instability and risk, unlikely toflow into Montenegro, at least not in the required amounts, for the foreseeable future.

The economy of Montenegro has, for many years, functioned as a hostage of politicsand, in all likelihood, it will continue to bear this burden on its shoulders.

53 Monitor, 8.3.2002.

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National minorities in Montenegro after the break-up of Yugoslavia

IntroductionThe national minorities in Montenegro, except for the Roma, are indigenous populationswhich have traditionally inhabited the regions where they can be found today. For the pur-pose of this chapter, we shall apply the term minority only to the non-Orthodox popula-tions of Montenegro. We shall treat those people who define themselves ethnically asMontenegrins (numbering 380 467; 61.86%), as well as those who declare Serb nationa-lity (some 57 453; 9.34%), as the majority population of the republic (which has a totalpopulation of 615 035).1 Ethnic Montenegrins have been the majority population in allpost-war censuses which sufficiently justifies our approach, while treating those Monte-negrin citizens who identify themselves to be Serbs as a minority in the proper sensewould be absurd for many reasons. In Montenegro, self-identification as a Serb or aMontenegrin is rather a matter of personal choice based on political, cultural and othergrounds. Such an ‘ethnic’ division exists even inside many families. 2 As a formal part ofthe Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as well as a member state of the newly-constitutedUnion of Serbia and Montenegro, the Adriatic republic has been associated in a dual com-mon state with Serbia. When the existence of the joint state is taken into account, there isabsolutely no doubt that Serbs are a constituent nation and cannot be considered a mino-rity in one of its two constituent republics.

Montenegro managed to escape large-scale ethnic and armed conflicts after the dissolu-tion of Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, various factors such as migration and the settlement ofrefugees, as well as some shifts in ethnic identification, have altered the ethnic and demo-graphic structure of Montenegro during the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the warswhich ensued during the 1990s. Unfortunately, these changes have not yet been reflectedin official statistics, because the last general census in Montenegro took place in 1991. 3 Inthis chapter, we had to rely on the limited data available. We have tried to indicate thelikely imprecision of the 1991 census, as well as to acknowledge whenever necessary thatthe numbers have probably changed since the last census was taken.

Religion has been a key factor in the process of national identification in the Balkansand this has also been the case on the territory of the present-day Republic of Montenegro.Therefore, ethnic minorities can also be defined as minorities in religious terms. The ma-

1 Statistički godišnjak Republike Crne Gore 2000 (Podgorica: Republički zavod za statistiku,2000), p. 248.

2 On the ambiguities of Montenegrin identity, see Srđa Pavlović´s chapter in this volume:Who are Montenegrins? Statehood, identity and civic society.

3 The 1991 census, carried out in an atmosphere of nationalist tensions, did not preciselyreflect the real situation and somewhat under-represented the number of minorities. The cen-sus scheduled for 2001 was postponed so that it would not interfere with the preliminary par-liamentary elections. The new parliamentary and presidential elections in 2002 similarlyprevented the census from being carried out.

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jority population has been Christian Orthodox, while Montenegro‘s minorities are Muslim(Bosniaks-Muslims; around two-thirds of Albanians; most Roma); and Catholic (Croats;around one-third of Albanians). Montenegro‘s minorities can also be defined territoriallyto some degree since they are generally concentrated on the periphery of the republic (Al-banians along the border with Albania; most Bosniaks-Muslims along the northern fron-tier with Serbia in the Montenegrin part of the Sandžak region; Croats in the Boka Kotor-ska close to the border with Croatia). Linguistically, Bosniaks-Muslims and Croats speakthe same language as the majority population, even though different appellations for it(Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian, Montenegrin) have been used instead of the previous term,Serbo-Croatian, by different groups and individuals since the break-up of Yugoslavia. TheAlbanians and most Roma differ from the majority population also in linguistic terms, al-though knowledge of the majority language is widespread.

Before the break-up of socialist Yugoslavia, the Titoist categorisation concerning na-tional and ethnic groups was applied in Montenegro. The category of narod (nation) wasapplied to the constitutive South Slavic nations – Croats, Serbs, Slovenes, Macedonians,Montenegrins and Muslims. The term narodnost (before 1963 this was nacionalna man-jina – national minority) designated nationalities which had their matrix state outside Yu-goslavia (Albanians, Hungarians, Italians, Turks etc.). Finally, the category of etničkagrupa (ethnic group) described ‘stateless’ minorities such as Roma and (after 1948 quiteawkwardly) Jews.4

The 1992 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (composed of just two re-publics, Serbia and Montenegro) used the designation of nacionalne manjine (national mi-norities), while the Montenegrin republican Constitution from the same year talked aboutnacionalne i etničke manjine (national and ethnic minorities). The break-up of socialistYugoslavia made the position of Croats and Bosniaks-Muslims particularly problematicsince both groups lost their previously-privileged status of constitutive nations as regardsthe whole federation. A special document on the position of minorities, ratified by allMontenegrin parliamentary parties in September 1997, used the new designation of man-jinski narodi (minority nations), which has been applied to Bosniaks-Muslims, Albaniansand Croats. The primary reason was to underline that the three groups have been autoch-thonous in parts of the territory of Montenegro, distinguishing them from ethnic minori-ties which have resulted from migration (Roma and small groups such as Macedonians,Hungarians and Slovenes).5

The national minorities

Bosniaks-MuslimsIn the 1991 census, 89 614 (14.57%) people declared themselves as belonging to the Mus-lim nationality. Their real number was probably somewhat higher as some of them de-

4 Filip Tesař, ‘Postavení národnostních menšin ve Svazové republice Jugoslávii’, BřetislavDančák and Petr Fiala (eds.): Národnostní politika v postkomunistických zemích (Brno:Masarykova Univerzita, 2000), pp. 269-270.

5 Srdjan Vukadinović, ‘Društvena stvarnost i socijalna prohodnost – manjinski narodi upolitičkom, ekonomskom, kulturnom i obrazovnom životu Crne Gore’, Almanah No. 13-14,2000, pp. 37-38.

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clared that they belonged to the ‘Yugoslav’ nationality. The majority of Montenegro‘sBosniaks-Muslims6 live in the Montenegrin part of the Sandžak region in the north of therepublic. This historical region was divided between Serbia and Montenegro after the Bal-kan wars of 1912-1913, while a substantial number of Bosniaks-Muslims also live in theneighbouring Serbian part of Sandžak. In Montenegro, the largest Bosniak-Muslim popu-lation can be found in the municipality of Bijelo Polje, which is the most important centrein the northern part of Montenegro (22 977, 41.6%). Bosniaks-Muslims form a majority intwo municipalities, Rožaje (19 983, 86.9%) and Plav (11 199, 58.1%). Furthermore, Bos-niaks-Muslims represent a significant share of population in the municipalities of Berane(11 769, 30.3%) and Pljevlja (6 964, 17.6%). A certain part of the Bosniak-Muslim popu-lation also resides in the south of the republic, especially in the municipalities of Podgo-rica (7 622, 5.1%) and Bar (5 136, 13.77%).7

Montenegro‘s Bosniaks-Muslims are indigenous, descendants of that part of the localSlavic population which accepted Islam during the long period of Ottoman rule. 8 The Otto-man administrative, cultural and religious presence in this part of the Balkans was strongerin the lower altitudes and towns than in the mountains. It was in such regions where theprocess of Islamisation succeeded more significantly. The tribes of Old Montenegro and theBrda (literally, Highlands) were not greatly touched by this process and retained the Chris-tian Orthodox faith. These regions gradually developed central rule and an administration in-dependent of the Ottomans, forming therefore the core of the Montenegrin state. Substantialnumbers of Slavic Muslims came under Montenegrin dominance after the territorial expan-sion and international recognition of Montenegro in 1878, while an even greater number ofMuslims resided in the regions absorbed by the monarchy in 1912.

There have been both elements of co-existence and conflict between Montenegrins andBosniaks-Muslims in their turbulent history. During the period of Montenegro‘s indepen-dence, a great number of Bosniaks-Muslims emigrated from the newly absorbed areas,mostly to Turkey. The proportionate number of Bosniaks-Muslims was greatly reduced inmany of the traditional areas of their settlement (Podgorica), while some areas were com-pletely re-populated by people of the Orthodox faith (Nikšić, Kolašin). The massive emigra-tion continued during the first Yugoslavia and, partly, even in the Communist federation. 9

Similar to other areas of the Balkans, occasional excesses, pogroms and anti-Islamic preju-

6 There is an ongoing debate concerning the appropriate appellation for the largest minority inMontenegro. This is described at the end of this section. We have chosen to use the dual termBosniak-Muslim instead of taking sides with either the proponents of the term ‘Bosniak’ orthose who defend the name Muslim.

7 Statistički godišnjak, p. 248. It is generally acknowledged that a number of Slavic Muslimsin the south of Montenegro declare Montenegrin nationality and describe themselves asMontenegrins of Islamic faith (Crnogorac islamske vjeroispovijesti).

8 Ejup Mušović: Muslimani od pada Zete (1499) (Novi Pazar: Muzej Ras, 1997), is the bestshort overview of Bosniak-Muslim history in Montenegro. The journal Almanah, publishedin Podgorica, is also an excellent source on the history, traditions and culture of Montene-gro’s Bosniaks-Muslims.

9 The minority position of Bosniaks-Muslims and the feeling of insecurity were definitely impor-tant reasons in the large-scale migration. The dominant ethnic Montenegrin and Serb population,however, was similarly affected by large-scale economically and socially motivated migrationsthroughout the 19th and 20th centuries (to Serbia, USA, etc.). For more on the Bosniak-Muslimmigrations, see Safet Bandžović: Iseljavanje Muslimana iz Sandžaka (Sarajevo, 1991).

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dices have also negatively affected the co-existence of the Slavic Orthodox and Muslim po-pulations in mixed areas. However, there is also an important tradition of co-existence whichhas served as a powerful intellectual argument for the proponents of ethnic tolerance – bothBosniak-Muslim and Montenegrin – in the past decade. There have been, as also with the re-lations between Montenegrins and Albanians, certain traditions of mutual respect betweenthe two communities, based on shared patriarchal and moral values which persisted muchlonger in Montenegro (and northern Albania) than in other parts of the Balkans. The politicsof the last ruler of independent Montenegro, King Nikola (1860-1918), regarding religiousand ethnic minorities was relatively liberal for the time. His era, far from being ideal, never-theless established some basic precedents for further co-existence. 10

After the incorporation of regions with substantial numbers of Muslims into the Mon-tenegrin state in 1878, an Islamic religious community of Montenegro was founded to or-ganise the religious life of Muslims (mostly Slavic and Albanian). It was the first organi-sation of such a type in a predominantly Christian Balkan country. 11 After the creation ofYugoslavia, Islamic believers in Montenegro were organised by the Islamic community ofYugoslavia, which ceased to function after the dissolution of the federal state at the begin-ning of the 1990s. In 1994, an independent Islamic Community of Montenegro ( Islamskazajednica Crne Gore, IZCG), with a seat in Podgorica, was founded. The religious orga-nisation which covers the entire territory of the republic has been headed by the ethnicallyBosniak-Muslim reis-ul-ulema,12 Idriz Demirović, since it was founded. However, therehas been a controversial competition for religious control of the Montenegrin part of theSandžak region between the IZCG and the mešihat of Sandžak, with its seat in NoviPazar, headed by muftija Muamer Zukorlić. In 1993, the Islamic mešihat of Sandžak wasfounded with the aim of representing Islamic communities from both the Serb and theMontenegrin parts of the historical region. The Islamic mešihat of Sandžak formally be-came a part of the Islamic Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina (IZBH), headed by reis-ul-ulema, Mustafa Cerić, in 1997.13 Through Novi Pazar, religious authority over the Mon-tenegrin part of Sandžak is claimed by the IZBH. Despite that, the IZCG, supported byMontenegro’s government, fully controls religious affairs over the whole territory of therepublic. For all practical purposes, the IZBH exercises its authority only in the northern,Serbian part of Sandžak.14

At the beginning of the 1990s, political developments within the ethnic Bosniak-Mus-lim community in Montenegro somewhat resembled developments in the Serbian part ofSandžak and Bosnia-Herzegovina, although it later followed a more independent path.Similar to Bosnia and the Serbian part of Sandžak, the Party of Democratic Action

10 Živko Andrijašević: ‘Muslimani u crnogorskoj državi, od loajalnosti do patriotizma’, Alma-nah No. 13-14, 2000, pp. 146-147.

11 Bajro Agović: ‘Džamije u Crnoj Gori’ (Podgorica: Almanah, 2001), p. 9.12 Islamic religious terms in this text are given in the form and transcription used in the former

Yugoslavia.13 Harun Crnovršanin and Nuro Sadiković: Sandžak. Porobljena zemlja (Neu Isenburg, 2001),

pp. 721-723.14 Unlike in Montenegro, the IZBH is in practical control of the religious affairs in the Serbian

part of Sandžak despite its authority not being officially recognised by Serbian state authori-ties and the Belgrade muftija Hamdija Jusufspahić.

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(Stranka demokratske akcije, SDA) was founded in Montenegro with the aim of homoge-nising ethnic Muslim voters and representing their interests in that republic. The SDA ofMontenegro, represented by Harun Hadžić, Rasim Šahman, Rifat Vesković and others,gained some support among the Muslims of Sandžak in the first half of the 1990s. In thehistorically and geographically specific municipality of Plav, where a Bosniak-Muslimmajority lives intermingled with Albanians, it was not the ethnically Bosniak SDA but thelocal Party of National Equality (Stranka nacionalne ravnopravnosti) which won the sup-port of Bosniaks-Muslims in the towns of Plav, Gusinje and their vicinity. 15 The SDA par-ticipated in the republican parliamentary elections of 1996 and 1998 without receivingenough support to enter the republican parliament.16

Apart from the small ethnically defined parties, in the first half of the 1990s many Bos-niaks-Muslims supported the Liberal Alliance of Montenegro (Liberalni savez Crne Gore,LSCG), a multi-ethnic independence-oriented opposition party. A part of Bosniak-Mus-lim voters also supported the Social Democratic Party (Socijaldemokratska partija, SDP)of a similar multi-ethnic, pacifist and pro-independence orientation.

The first half of the 1990s, the time of increased Serb nationalism in Montenegro andthe war in neighbouring Bosnia-Herzegovina, was also the period of the most serious inci-dents which affected Bosniaks-Muslims. Apart from various forms of repression by aMontenegrin regime which was firmly allied at the time with that of Slobodan Milo šević,the gravest incidents were caused by the activities of the Serb paramilitary units whichwere also operating in the Serb-controlled part of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Serb parami-litaries which were involved in the ethnic cleansing of Bosniaks-Muslims in Bosnia alsoattempted to reduce the Bosniak-Muslim presence in the regions of Montenegro and Ser-bia which lay adjacent to the Bosnian border. The aim of this strategy was, probably, toprevent any possible connection between Bosniaks-Muslims in Sandžak and those in Bos-nia-Herzegovina.

In August 1992, several hundred members of Serb paramilitary forces, led by MilikaDačević, occupied the Montenegrin town of Pljevlja, overpowered the Montenegrin po-lice, encircled the town with artillery and intimidated the local Muslim population which,justly, feared the danger of physical extermination. The paramilitaries vacated the townonly after the personal intervention of Yugoslav President, Dobrica Ćosić, and the Mon-tenegrin President, Momir Bulatović.17

In February 1993, Serb paramilitary forces ethnically cleansed the rural region of Bu-kovica, north of Pljevlja, of local Bosniaks-Muslims. Several people were killed, somewere kidnapped and taken to Bosnia, while others were forced to flee deeper into Mon-tenegrin territory. The houses of local Bosniaks-Muslims were burned. The expulsion ofsome 800 Bosniaks-Muslims from 30 villages in the Bukovica region, which included

15 Xavier Bougarel: ‘L’islam bosniaque, entre identité culturelle et idéologie politique’, XavierBougarel and Nathalie Clayer (eds.): Le Nouvel Islam balkanique. Les musulmans, acteursdu post-communisme 1990 – 2000 (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 2001), p. 87. Most acti-vists from the Party of National Equality later merged with the Social Democratic Party.

16 See the section on Albanians for information about co-operation between Bosniak-Muslimand Albanian political subjects in the period 1990-1992.

17 Crnovršanin and Sadiković, op. cit., pp. 708-709.

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several murders, constituted the gravest incident against minorities in Montenegro duringthe 1990s. Almost ten years later, the refugees have not yet been able to return home. 18

Several days after the ethnic cleansing of the Bukovica region, on 27 February 1993, 18Bosniaks from Montenegro and Serbia, as well as one ethnic Croat, were kidnapped bySerb paramilitaries and massacred on a regular train travelling from Belgrade to Bar. Thecrime, which took place in Štrpci, a narrow stretch of Serb-controlled Bosnian territorythrough which the line between Montenegro and Serbia passes, received more publicitythan the ethnic cleansing of Bukovica. However, only one of the murderers, Neboj šaRanisavljević, has so far been captured; he was sentenced to 15 years in prison in 2002 bythe municipal court in Bijelo Polje.19

Many incidents were caused by Serb paramilitaries beyond the control of the Montene-grin government, but there were also a few cases of serious harassment of Bosniaks-Mus-lims for which representatives of the official state can be held responsible. At the begin-ning of the war in Bosnia, the Montenegrin leadership entertained cordial relations withthe Bosnian Serb leadership of Radovan Karadžić. In the summer of 1992, following anofficial request of the Bosnian Serb institutions, the Montenegrin police captured dozensof Bosniaks-Muslims from Bosnia in various places in Montenegro, including seaside re-sorts where some of the Bosniaks-Muslims were on holiday or where they were takingrefuge from the Bosnian conflict (many of them had already acquired official refugee sta-tus in Montenegro). These Bosnian nationals were arrested and extradited to the BosnianSerb forces which subsequently slaughtered them.20

The repression of local Bosniak-Muslim representatives culminated in a political trialof SDA activists in 1994. In February 1994, 21 leading SDA representatives in Montene-gro including the party chair, Harun Hadžić, were accused of separatist activities. The po-litical trial, which took place in Bijelo Polje, was closely connected with the similar trialof SDA activists in Novi Pazar, Serbia, who had already been arrested on identicalgrounds in May 1993. Alleged members of the artificially constructed ‘Bijelo Polje group’underwent repeated and brutal torture while in prison. After the Dayton peace agreement,at the beginning of 1996, Montenegrin President Momir Bulatović granted amnesty andfinancial compensation to the Bosniak political prisoners who had spent two years in jail.The government responsible for the staging of the trial thereby acknowledged its purelypolitical nature.21

18 Sead Sadiković: ‘Bukovica, A Stain on Montenegrin Conscience’, AIM, 11.1.2001, availableat: aimpress.org/dyn/trae/archive/data/200101/10121-004-trae-pod.htm; Veseljko Koprivica:‘Bukovica, Seven Years Later’, AIM, 11. 11. 2000, available at: aimpress.org/dyn/trae/archive/data/200011/01117-008-trae-pod.htm. So far, only a single perpetrator of ethnic cleansing hasbeen tried and sentenced (4.5 years in prison for murder).

19 Similar crimes (kidnappings followed by murder, etc.) involving Serb paramilitaries alsotook place in the Serbian part of the Sandžak region.

20 ‘Crna Gora ima pravo da povrati državnost. Amor Mašović, poslanik SDA u ParlamentuBosne i Herzegovine’, Onogošt, 27.4.2001, available at: www.onogost.cg.yu/broj%20164/tekstovi/intervju.htm.

21 Dragoljub Todorović: ‘Nema lustracije dok traju montirani procesi’, Helsinška povelja, No.54-55 (July-August 2002), p. 17.

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Support for ethnically-defined Bosniak-Muslim political parties such as SDA and theirdemands (including territorial autonomy for the Sandžak region) was never as widespreadand unanimous in Montenegro as it was in the Serbian part of Sandžak. On the contrary,the support of multi-ethnic parties which advocated Montenegrin independence became avery important factor in the political life of Bosniaks-Muslims. Together with other fac-tors, it further marginalised the position of the ethnically-defined parties in the second halfof the 1990s. After distancing himself from Slobodan Milošević and Momir Bulatović,Milo Đukanović increasingly focused on Bosniak-Muslim support. Đukanović and hisDemocratic Party of Socialists (Demokratska partija socijalista, DPS) included notions ofmulti-ethnicity, tolerance, pro-western political orientation, economic reform and greaterpolitical autonomy from Belgrade. The party programme – spread massively through thestate-owned media – appealed to the Bosniaks-Muslims, who overwhelmingly voted forĐukanović and the DPS-led coalition in the 1997/1998 presidential and parliamentaryelections as well as in several subsequent elections. Harun Hadžić, SDA chair, had ap-pealed in vain for Bosniaks-Muslims to abstain. Disappointed and marginalised withinSDA, Hadžić left the party to form a new one, the International Democratic Union(Internacijonalna demokratska unija, IDU). The IDU, despite being supported by theSDA of Sulejman Ugljanin, has since remained without any real influence outsideHadžić´s hometown of Rožaje. The SDA, headed next by Rifat Vesković, instead joinedthe DPS-dominated coalition government of Filip Vujanović.22 After Milo Đukanovićand DPS assumed the political platform of ethnic tolerance and embarked on the pro-inde-pendence course in 1997-98, the Liberal Alliance similarly experienced a reduction inBosniak-Muslim votes in favour of the ruling DPS and SDP. 23 Despite their continuedcommitment to a multi-ethnic society, the Liberals have not been able to regain the confi-dence of more significant numbers of Bosniak-Muslim voters. The party‘s political for-tunes in the north of Montenegro have subsequently been minimal. 24

Several smaller ethnic parties representing Bosniaks-Muslims have had marginal influ-ence on the Montenegrin political scene. In addition to low electoral results, these partieshad been plagued by personal conflicts. Thus far, the parties had enjoyed limited electoralsuccess only at the local level in the two municipalities which have a Bosniak-Muslimmajority. In the 2002 local elections, SDA received 13.07% of the votes in Plav, whiletwo coalitions of several smaller parties, the Bosniak Democratic Coalition ( Bošnjačkademokratska koalicija) and the Bosniak-Muslim Democratic Coalition (Bošnjačka-musli-manska demokratska koalicija) won respectively 21.4% and 4.01% of the votes in the mu-nicipality of Rožaje. Even so, there was greater support for multi-ethnic parties even inthese two municipalities. In Plav, DPS and SDP each received more votes than the SDA;while in Rožaje, the DPS overwhelmingly won with 51.18% of the vote while the SDP re-ceived 13.66%.25

22 Bougarel, op. cit., p. 126.23 Unlike LSCG, the original opposition SDP has been closely allied with the DPS since 1997/98,

participating with it in all levels of government.24 Liberal leaders have often complained that the DPS ‘stole their programme’ of multi-ethnic

co-existence.25 Lokalni izbori 2002 – Crna Gora, available at: www.cesid.org/cg2002/rezultati.htm.

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Similarly in the 20 October 2002 parliamentary elections, two ethnic coalitions – theBosniak Democratic Coalition (Bošnjačka demokratska koalicija) of Harun Hadžić andthe Bosniak Coalition (Bošnjačka koalicija) of Kemal Purišić won just 2 480 and 2 173votes respectively. Harun Hadžić blamed the lack of “national consciousness and politicalmaturity” of the Bosniaks-Muslims for the results.26

It is certain that many Bosniaks-Muslims (together with other national minorities) haveseen Milo Đukanović and his administration as a guarantee of ethnic stability and a peacefullife after the war in Bosnia and during the Kosovo conflict and the last years of theMilošević rule.27 Despite the increased political and military pressure on the Montenegringovernment from Belgrade during and after the Kosovo crisis, the Bosniak-Muslim popula-tion felt somewhat safer during this period of serious tension than in the first half of the1990s. The massive presence of Montenegrin police loyal to President Đukanović protectedthe Bosniak-Muslim population from the excesses of the Yugoslav Army and Serb paramil-itaries. In the most peripheral municipality of Rožaje, the Montenegrin police distributedweapons to the local civilian population so that it would not be defenceless in case it was at-tacked by armed formations loyal to Milošević. The Bosniak-Muslim population certainlyappreciated these signs of protection from the republican government, as well as its decisionnot to participate in the Kosovo war and the military conflict with NATO.

However, voices critical of the Montenegrin government have been raised by the mar-ginalised ethnic parties and by Bosniak-Muslim politicians from the Serbian portion ofSandžak, an area where Bosniak-Muslim support for ethnic parties has been almost abso-lute for years. Politicians and intellectuals in Novi Pazar have repeatedly claimed that theMontenegrin government ‘manipulates’ the Bosniak-Muslim minority and that it hasmanaged to repress the ‘authentic’ representation of Bosniaks-Muslims, i.e. the ethni-cally-defined parties. Similarly, Bosniak-Muslim representatives from the Serbian dis-tricts of the Sandžak region, as well as some (though not all) Bosniak-Muslim ethnic par-ties from Montenegro, have been concerned that the majority of Montenegrin Bosniaks-Muslims support the idea of Montenegrin independence. If this project was realised, itwould further confirm the division of the historical Sandžak region. The Novi Pazar elitetherefore, somewhat paradoxically, supports the position of Belgrade on the question ofMontenegrin independence. Charges of the ‘manipulation’ of Montenegrin Bosniaks-Muslims by independence-minded political subjects have often been raised. Despite that,Bosniaks-Muslims living in Montenegro, as well as other minorities, have overwhel-mingly supported the restoration of Montenegro‘s independent statehood and have de-monstrated this with their electoral preferences and the engagement of their elites infavour of this idea, as well as in public opinion polls.28

It is clear that Montenegrin political representation has not been favourable to the estab-lishment of ethnically-defined parties of the Bosniak-Muslim minority. It has consistentlyavoided both the designation ‘Bosniak’ for the Bosniak-Muslim minority as well as no-

26 Sanapress, 24.10.2002.27 Veselin Pavićević: ‘Muslimani u Crnoj Gori u svjetlu etničkih i socijalnih distanci prema

istraživanjima CEDEM-a’, Almanah No. 13-14, 2000, p. 129.28 Pavićević, “Muslimani u Crnoj Gori”, p. 129, 131. According to the CEDEM statistics ana-

lysed by Pavićević, only 2.3 % of Bosniaks-Muslims favoured the preservation of the federalstate in 2000.

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tions of the Sandžak region, which is usually referred to as ’the north’.29 Many criticalvoices, from within as well as from outside Montenegro, also point to Bosniaks-Muslimscontinuing to be gravely under-represented in most sectors of public life despite officialcommitment to ‘multi-culturalism’ and ‘multi-ethnic tolerance’. In the last several years,however, Bosniaks-Muslims have been represented in the Montenegrin government byseveral ministers and other government officials of lesser rank. There have been severalBosniak-Muslim deputies in the Montenegrin parliament and Rifat Rastoder (SDP) hasserved as vice-chair of the chamber. Bosniaks-Muslims have been numerous in the policeforces although they are under-represented amongst officer grades. There have also beenBosniaks-Muslims appointed to the judiciary (being members of DPS or the SDP).Despite these visible achievements, Bosniaks-Muslims are still under-represented at alllevels of state institutions as well as in public services, local administration, etc. 30

The fundamental discord concerning Bosniak-Muslim political representation and po-litical preferences is quite clear and has a wider significance for the whole region. Oneside believes that the only adequate representation of a national minority is through ethni-cally-defined parties and their representatives. If a national minority does not demonstratepolitical allegiance to its ‘own’ ethnic parties, something must be wrong. It is probablymanipulated and harassed by the majority, or morally and nationally corrupt, or else it iscollectively ‘unconscious’. When the outside forms of oppression cease and the minoritybecomes conscious of itself, the natural state of affairs will return – it will support the eth-nic parties. In contrast, the other side maintains that ethnically-defined parties only serveto petrify nationalist prejudices and lead to ‘ghettoisation’ and the isolation of the respec-tive national communities. The right solution is the integration of national minoritieswithin the multi-ethnic parties on the basis of their general political programme ratherthan the ethnic (or ‘tribal’) agenda. Neither solution automatically guarantees that the in-terest of the minority group will be satisfied, since too much depends on the position ofthe majority or the dominant political subjects and personalities.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, Bosniak-Muslim intellectuals in Montenegro havebeen involved in debates concerning the appellation of their nation. These debates havebeen incited by the similar debates originating in Sarajevo at the beginning of the war inBosnia and Herzegovina. Similarly to Montenegrins and Macedonians, the developmentof the modern national consciousness of Bosniaks-Muslims was fully achieved only in the20th century. Under Communist Yugoslavia, the existence of their separate ethnic identitywas recognised by the state. The Serbo-Croatian speaking inhabitants of Bosnia-Herze-govina, Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo who adhered to the Islamic faith were calledMuslims (Muslimani – the capital ‘M’ distinguishes them as an ethnic category, as op-posed to the term muslimani which identifies the adherents of the Islamic religion in ge-neral). In 1993, Bosnian Muslim intellectuals proposed the term Bosniak ( Bošnjak) asmore fitting than Muslim, citing two main reasons. A designation based purely on the tra-ditional religion was not seen as fitting in modern society since many members of the

29 The notion of “the north” also includes other areas which did not form a part of the historicalSandžak of Novi Pazar (Kolašin, Žabljak, Mojkovac etc.). In Serbia, the notion of Sandžakhas been repressed more systematically. The region is archaically referred to as Raška afterthe medieval Serbian kingdom which flourished in the area before the Ottoman conquest.

30 Vukadinović, op. cit. p. 43.

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Muslim nation can, at the same time, be atheist or religiously indifferent. Secondly, thename ‘Bosniak’ used to be the traditional and widely-used term in the more distant past,although it was scarcely used during the 20th century. The relationship between the term‘Bosniak’ and the land of Bosnia as the ‘mother country’ (matična država) of all Bos-niaks (therefore, including those living in Sandžak and elsewhere outside the boundariesof Bosnia) is also evident.

In Montenegro, the debate has been particularly lively. One part of the Bosniak-Muslimelite fully accepted the new term. The acceptance of ‘Bosniak’ was demonstrated by thefounding of a national cultural organisation (modelled after similar organisations whichhave existed in Slavic countries since the 19th century), Matica Bošnjaka Crne Gore,31

headed by Hamdija Šarkinović. However, one part of the intellectual elite did not acceptthe designation, arguing that ‘Bosniak’ was an artificial term in the service of political in-strumentalisation and the dominance of Sarajevo-based nationalists over Sand žak. In ad-dition, no-one may have attempted to deny the affinity between the Slavic Muslims ofMontenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina, but the opponents of the term ‘Bosniak’ have ar-gued that there are, indeed, many differences between both groups and the countries theyinhabit. Moreover, they also expressed fears that the use of the term ‘Bosniak’ would un-dermine the autochthonous status of the minority in Montenegro which would then beconsidered merely as a diaspora of Bosniaks from Bosnia and be treated accordingly bythe state authorities. Supporters of the term ‘Muslim’ have centred around Matica musli-manska Crne Gore, represented by Avdul Kurpejović.32

It seems that ‘Bosniak’ has been slowly prevailing in Montenegro within the Bosniak-Muslim community itself, similarly to Bosnia and the Serbian part of Sandžak, while themajority society and, especially, the government has been more reluctant to accept the term.However, the sometimes heated debates about the name itself do not in any case signify theconstruction of two or more different ethnic groups. There is no doubt that the national con-sciousness of the group as such remains united. Most representatives of Bosniaks-Muslimshave so far been using both terms at the same time (Bošnjaci-Muslimani or Muslimani-Bošnjaci) in order not to offend any of the factions. The problem of the name will probablybe resolved by natural preferences in the long run rather than by arbitrary decisions such asthe consensus of the intellectual elite or state intervention and codification.

Many Bosniaks-Muslims have greatly contributed to the democratisation of Monte-negro and the development of a more tolerant society in recent years. The activities ofmost Bosniak-Muslim intellectuals have not been confined to a narrow ethnic audience.There has been a great deal of co-operation between Bosniak-Muslim and Montenegrinintellectuals in the framework of different independent institutions and media which havesupported the ideas of open society, democratic reforms and ethnic tolerance since the be-ginning of the 1990s. Ethnic Bosniaks-Muslims from different segments of public life,such as writer Husein Bašić, historian Šerbo Rastoder, journalist Esad Kočan and manyothers, have been respected by the Montenegrin majority as some of Montenegro‘s mosteminent intellectuals of the last decade. Membership of the Almanah Association, which

31 Matica literally translates to Queen Bee or river current. 32 For a more detailed analysis of the debate, see Bohdana Dimitrovová: ‘Bosniak or Muslim?

Dilemma of One Nation with Two Names’, Southeast European Politics, Vol. 2 No. 2(October 2001), pp. 94-108, available at: www.seep.ceu.hu/issue22/dimitrovova.pdf

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focuses on the preservation and study of the Bosniak-Muslim heritage in Montenegro, issimilarly composed of personalities with diverse ethnic backgrounds. The journal Alma-nah, published twice a year by the Association, has been one of the best periodicals focus-ing on minority issues in Eastern Europe. Most of these positive intellectual develop-ments, which have shown that integration of minorities, multi-culturalism and ethnictolerance are possible in the Balkans, have been achieved without the active participation,financial aid or even sign of interest from the government or the state institutions.

AlbaniansMontenegro‘s Albanians reside along the republican borders with Albania and Kosovo. Ac-cording to the 1991 census, there were 40 415 (6.57%) Albanians living in Montenegro. Asin the case of other minorities, this number is probably somewhat under-estimated. Most Al-banians reside in the southernmost coastal municipality of Ulcinj (17 469, 72.19%) while asmaller number of Albanians can also be found in the neighbouring littoral municipality ofBar (4 619, 12.38%). Most Albanians living by the Adriatic are adherents of the Islamicfaith while a smaller proportion belongs to the Roman Catholic Church. In the Podgoricamunicipality, 12 777 (7.73%) people have declared Albanian nationality. A certain numberof Albanians resides in the city of Podgorica itself; the majority lives in the town of Tuzi andits vicinity in the south of the Podgorica municipality, in a region known as Malesia. A largenumber of the Albanians living in Malesia is Catholic, Tuzi being their most important cen-tre, but Muslim Albanians can also be found in the area. Another area of Albanian settlementis the municipality of Plav (4 032, 20.89%), which is surrounded by Albanian and Kosovoborders. In Plav, Muslim Albanians live alongside the Bosniaks-Muslims who form the ma-jority in the municipality. Finally, some Albanians (900, 3.91%) can also be found in thesimilarly Bosniak-Muslim dominated municipality of Rožaje.33

Similarly to Bosniaks-Muslims, the regions with an Albanian presence were incorpo-rated into Montenegro in two successive waves, in 1878/80 and after the Balkan wars of1912-13. The Albanians generally resented the inclusion of their ethnic space into theMontenegrin state, which could be carried out only after breaking the considerable resist-ance of the local Albanian population (especially in the case of Plav and Gusinje, whichmanaged to avoid inclusion into Montenegro in 1878 and were incorporated only after theBalkan wars). The Albanian population which fell under Montenegrin dominance resem-bled Montenegrins in many aspects of tribal structure, moral code and patriarchal valueswhich were almost identical in the case of both Montenegrin and north Albanian tribes.However, Albanians also stood apart because of their distinct language. It is indeed theAlbanian language which, together with historical reminiscences, forms the key elementof the Albanian national consciousness which is shared by the various Albanian commu-nities living in the western Balkans. The same is true for the religiously, culturally and ge-ographically diverse Albanian communities in Montenegro which, nevertheless, share Al-banian national consciousness despite the many differences.

A larger part of Montenegro’s Albanians is of Islamic faith. The Islamic Community ofMontenegro (Bashkësia islame në Mal të Zi) organises the religious life of all Muslims inthe republic, including Albanians. The smaller part of the Albanian community (around

33 Statistički godišnjak, p. 248.

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one-third) is adherents of the Catholic Church (especially members of the Malisori tribesaround the town of Tuzi, the Shestani/Šestani tribe on the banks of Lake Skadar and someAlbanians in the Bar and Ulcinj municipalities). Ecclesiastically, these believers are orga-nised within the Archbishopric of Bar. The territory of the Archbishopric of Bar coversthe whole territory of Montenegro with the exception of the Bay of Kotor, which is a partof the Archbishopric of Split. The Archbishopric of Bar gathers primarily Albanian-speaking Catholics as well as some Slavic-speaking ones – altogether around 20 000 be-lievers. The Archbishopric of Bar is an ancient and respectable institution which has en-joyed the status of Archbishopric since 1089.34 The current Archbishop, Zef Gashi, is anethnic Albanian.

Within the first months of political pluralism in Montenegro, in September 1990, thefirst ethnic Albanian party, the Democratic League in Montenegro (Lidhja demokratike nëMal të Zi; Demokratski savez Albanaca u Crnoj Gori, LDMZ) was founded to protect theinterests of ethnic Albanians at a time of rising Serb nationalism and ethnic tensions. Inthe first parliamentary elections, held in December 1990, the party joined forces with theBosniak-Muslim SDA and the Party of National Equality under the name of DemocraticCoalition (Demokratska koalicija). This coalition of ethnic minorities won 10.1 per centof the votes and twelve mandates in the parliament. Similar co-operation between ethnicAlbanian and Bosniak-Muslim parties, however, did not occur in subsequent periodswhen the ethnic parties of both minorities participated independently in the elections. 35

The coastal town of Ulcinj has been the centre of LDMZ political activities. The partyhas either controlled or else participated decisively in the local government of the Ulcinjmunicipality since 1991. In 1996, a second ethnically Albanian party, the DemocraticUnion of Albanians (Unioni demokratik i Shqiptarëve, UDSH; Demokratska unija Alba-naca, DUA) was founded.36 The LDMZ party chairman Mehmet Bardhi and the UDSHleader Ferhat Dinosha have represented their parties in the republican parliament. Bothparties have raised very similar demands on behalf of Montenegro’s Albanians. In 2000, athird Albanian ethnic party, the Party of Democratic Prosperity of Montenegro ( Partia eprosperitet demokratik në Mal të Zi, PPD; Partija demokratskog prosperiteta Crne Gore,PDP) was founded by Osman Rexha, a former mayor of Ulcinj. The Party of DemocraticProsperity, however, gathers less supporters than the first two political parties and has, sofar, only played a marginal role.

Unlike other minorities in Montenegro, Albanians have benefited from special treatmentwhich has ensured the participation of Albanian deputies in the Montenegrin parliament. Be-fore the early parliamentary elections of 1998, a new law codified the creation of a specialsingle electoral district composed of the most compact, predominantly ethnic Albanian areas(the municipality of Ulcinj and the Albanian-inhabited parts of the Podgorica and Bar mu-nicipalities). The law guaranteed that five of the total number of 78 deputies in the Montene-grin parliament would be elected from this Albanian electoral district. In the 1998 elections,

34 Šerbo Rastoder: Janusovo lice istorije (Podgorica: Vijesti, 2000), p. 126.35 Veselin Pavićević: Izborni sistem u Crnoj Gori (Belgrade: CeSID, 2002), available at:

www.cesid.org/pdf/Izborni_sistem.pdf36 Jovan Nikolaidis: ‘Multiculturalism in Montenegro and the City of Ulcinj’, in Nenad Dimi-

trijević (ed.): Managing Multiethnic Communities in the Countries of the Former Yugoslavia(LGI: Budapest, 2000), pp. 447-458; available at http://lgi.osi.hu/publications/2000/26/30.PDF

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UDSH and LDMZ each won one mandate in the new district while the multi-ethnic coalition‘For Better Life’ (DPS, SDP and the People‘s Party, Narodna stranka, NS) won the remain-ing three mandates.37 The situation remained almost unchanged after the October 2002 par-liamentary election. The coalition of all the three Albanian parties won 8 498 votes and twodeputies. Before the elections in October 2002, the number of mandates provided by the Al-banian electoral district was reduced, with the consensus of all parliamentary parties and theapproval of the international community, to four.

Ethnic Albanian voters have shown more preference for minority parties than Bosniaks-Muslims. However, even the Albanians have, so far, favoured multi-ethnic parties overethnic ones. It is estimated that there are around 32 000 voters of Albanian nationality inMontenegro.38 In the April 2001 early parliamentary elections, the three ethnic Albanianparties won roughly one-third of the minority votes (UDSH 4 232; LDMZ 3 570; PDP1 572) while most of the remaining two-thirds of Albanian voters decided to cast theirvotes in favour of the DPS-SDP coalition.39 Ethnic Albanian politicians can be found inthe ranks of Montenegrin parliamentary parties which have an independent, multi-ethnicorientation (DPS, SDP, LSCG). The grievances of Albanian ethnic parties have been sim-ilar to those which attempt to represent Bosniaks-Muslims. Their representatives believethat minority interests cannot be defended through multi-ethnic parties and regard the par-ticipation of ethnic Albanians in these parties as a pretence, or personal mistake. UDSHand LDMZ (each represented by one deputy in the republican parliament – in both casesthe party chairs, Ferhat Dinosha and Mehmet Bardhi) have often been close to the posi-tions of the DPS and SDP in the parliament. Despite a good level of communication andco-operation, the ethnic parties continue to view the DPS and SDP with a degree of mis-trust and suspicion.

Albanians in Montenegro have not been physically harassed since the break-up of Yu-goslavia. The only exception was the massacre of several villagers in the rural communityof Kaludjerski Laz, near Rožaje, during an incursion of Yugoslav Army units from Ko-sovo in April 1999. The Kosovo conflict and its aftermath was probably the most difficultperiod for Montenegro’s Albanians. In 1998 and 1999, Montenegro accepted tens of thou-sands of refugees from Kosovo. Before the entry of NATO forces to the province, theoverwhelming majority of these refugees were Albanians. Most of them found refuge inethnic Albanian areas of Montenegro, usually in private houses. Montenegrin Albanians,as well as other citizens, demonstrated great solidarity with the refugees. Nevertheless, theAlbanian minority in Montenegro also became the target of nationalist propaganda in thelast years of Miloševićs rule. This tendency continued – and even further escalated – afterhis fall, especially in 2001 during the ethnic conflict in Macedonia. Certain Serbian andMontenegrin media, as well as some foreign outlets, repeatedly indicated that Montenegrowas endangered by a similar ethnic conflict, with the Albanian minority represented as athreat to Montenegro’s stability and territorial integrity. Anti-Albanian propaganda wasfrequently raised by the pro-Belgrade parties which had programmes based on Serb na-tionalist ideology (the coalition Together for Yugoslavia, Zajedno za Jugoslaviju and its

37 Pavićević, op. cit.38 Veseljko Koprivica: ‘Specijalni status po finskom modelu’, AIM, 12.2.1999, available at:

www.aimpress.org/dyn/pubs/archive/data/199902/90212-003-pubs-pod.htm39 CeSID & CEMI: Montenegro Election 2001, available at www.cesid.org/cg2001.

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components: the Socialist People‘s Party, Socijalistička narodna partija, SNP; the Peo-ple‘s Party, Narodna stranka, NS; and the Serbian People‘s Party, Srpska narodnastranka, SNS).40 In fact, the political demands of Albanian politicians in Montenegro havebeen consistently moderate and there has been no evidence of any armed or terrorist acti-vities. The accusations have, rather, been a part of a strategy for discrediting the Montene-grin independence project. Representing minorities as a threat to territorial integrity andstability, as well as limiting the rights of minorities to decide on fundamental questionssuch as independence, have been an important part of such nationalist propaganda, notjust in the Montenegrin case.41

The position of the Albanian minority and the degree of co-operation and integrationwith the majority society has been far greater than in the case of Albanian minorities inKosovo before 1999, or in Macedonia or southern Serbia. Montenegrin Albanians havenot attempted to organise referendums on territorial autonomy or independence, they havenot boycotted republican elections and there have been no attempts at armed rebellion orsigns of terrorist activities. Albanians in Montenegro have been concerned by the dramaticdevelopments concerning Kosovo Albanians and, to a much lesser degree, the Albanianminority in Macedonia. Some family and individual ties exist between Montenegrin andKosovo Albanians due to the recent history of life in the Yugoslav state. However, politi-cal relations between both communities are practically non-existent. Montenegrin Albani-ans had historically close family and economic ties with the Albanians of northern Alba-nia (Shkodër/Skadar region), although these were drastically reduced by the severedrelations between Yugoslavia and Albania after 1948. Subsequent to the change in politi-cal orientation of the Montenegrin ruling elite in 1997-98, the government has, likewise,demonstrated an increased degree of co-operation and dialogue.

Albanians have a satisfactory number of elementary schools as well as several highschools with instruction in their native language. There are local radio stations in Alba-nian-inhabited municipalities, in addition to state TV and radio which regularly broadcastsprogrammes in Albanian. Apart from the guaranteed mandates in parliament, Albanianshave been represented by one minister and two lower-ranking government officials since1998. In 2002, an Albanian language weekly, Koha Jone, was founded and has been fi-nanced by the Montenegrin parliament. The absolute majority of Montenegro’s Albaniansare perfectly fluent in Serbo-Croatian, which facilitates their increased integration into themajority society.42 A great part of ethnic Albanian grievances and aspirations can besolved by the decentralisation of state administration, which would grant more compe-tence and responsibilities to the municipalities.

Despite the many positive signs, the position of Albanians in Montenegro is still farfrom satisfactory. Albanians are gravely under-represented in all sectors of public life (le-gal institutions, police forces, education sector, etc.). Ethnic Albanian politicians and in-tellectuals often point out that Albanians, who represent over six per cent of Montenegro‘spopulation, form only 0.03-0.05 per cent of the employees of all state structures com-

40 Prior to the October 2002 parliamentary election, the coalition changed its name to Zajednoza promjene (Together for changes).

41 Florian Bieber: ‘The Instrumentalisation of Minorities in the Montenegrin Dispute overIndependence’, ECMI Brief 8 (March 2002).

42 Knowledge of Albanian among members of the ethnic majority is very rare.

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bined.43 Apart from that, the educational sector has, likewise, been of concern to Albanianrepresentatives in Montenegro, especially the limited room accorded to Albanian nationalhistory and culture. Albanian representatives had already proposed in 1992 a Memoran-dum on the Special Status of Albanians, which included many elements of positive dis-crimination; however, the document was ignored by the state authorities of the time. Dur-ing 2001-02, Albanian representatives reached consensus concerning their key demands.These have included: providing the town of Tuzi with municipality status; opening an Al-banian-language pedagogical faculty at the University of Podgorica; opening a secondborder crossing with Albania in the Ulcinj area; recognition of university diplomas issuedin Tiranë, Priština and Tetovo; establishing a maternity hospital in Ulcinj; and installingethnic Albanians to the positions of chief of police and head judge in Ulcinj. 44 Goals forthe more distant future which have not been seriously discussed so far include, especially,the establishment of a second chamber of the Montenegrin parliament which would repre-sent the republic‘s national communities.

It seems that most of the demands of the Albanian representatives can realistically befulfilled by the government in the forthcoming period,45 while some Albanian demandshave clashed with the political stance of the most important Montenegrin parties and willcertainly continue to do so. This concerns, in particular, the status of municipality for thetown of Tuzi. Technically, the town and its vicinity have sufficient population, while theyalso form the cohesive unit necessary to the meeting of the criteria for a municipality.However, politics in Montenegro has been largely dictated by party interests. The interestsof the most influential parties dictate the structure of the political system in Montenegroand any changes to it. In the case of Tuzi, it is largely the electoral mathematics which arecurrently favourable to the DPS, rather than the fear of another local Albanian-dominatedgovernment, which has kept the town within the Podgorica municipality until now. Thepolitical preferences of voters in Podgorica have been more or less evenly divided bet-ween the DPS and the pro-Yugoslav forces led by the SNP. The several thousand Alba-nian voters in the south of the Podgorica municipality have been voting for the DPS inconsiderable numbers, thus helping the party to preserve its dominance in the administra-tive capital and the most important of Montenegrin cities. If Tuzi formed a separate mu-nicipality, the sudden lack of Albanian votes could certainly weaken the position of theDPS in the Podgorica local government. This seems to be the main reason why it mighttake some time to fulfil the most consistently repeated Albanian demand.

CroatsCroats are autochthonous inhabitants of the northern part of the Montenegrin littoral. Inthe 1991 official census, 6 244 persons declared themselves as having Croat nationalityand Croats thus form just one per cent of the republic‘s population. The highest concen-tration of Croats was to be found in the three municipalities of the Bay of Kotor (BokaKotorska): Tivat (2 640, 23.16%); Kotor (1 620, 7.23%); and Herceg Novi (636, 2.3%).

43 ‘Albanians in Montenegro’, in: Human Rights and Transition. Serbia 2001 (Belgrade: Hel-sinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, 2002), pp. 283-290.

44 ‘Inter-Ethnic Relations in Montenegro’, Second PER Roundtable: Albanians in Montenegro,October 26-27 2001’, available at: www.per-usa.org/montenegro2nd.doc.

45 The border crossing south of Ulcinj has already been opened.

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Apart from the area of their traditional settlement, the highest number of Croats was regis-tered in Podgorica (608, 0.4%).46 The census took place in the spring of 1991 during thebreak-up of the Yugoslav federation, in an atmosphere of increased anti-Croat propa-ganda. The number of Croats in Montenegro was certainly somewhat higher than thenumber of people who declared Croat nationality, although it did not exceed 10 000.

The historical region of Boka Kotorska where Montenegro‘s Croats primarily reside isa religiously mixed area where both Catholics (mostly in urban settlements) and Orthodox(residing rather in the countryside or at higher altitudes) traditionally lived side-by-side.After centuries of Venetian rule, the Bay of Kotor became part of the Habsburg Empire atthe end of the 18th century and then part of the new Yugoslav state in 1918. Within Aus-tria-Hungary, the region formed a single administrative district. Except for a brief episodeduring the Napoleonic wars, the Bay of Kotor was not controlled by Montenegro, beingintegrated into the newly-constituted Montenegrin republic within Communist Yugosla-via only after World War Two. This distinct history has marked both the landscape andpopulation of the Bay of Kotor.

In the complex process of ethnic identification in this part of Europe during the 19thand 20th centuries, the Catholic population of the Bay of Kotor developed a Croatian na-tional identity while the Orthodox of the area identified themselves as Montenegrins orSerbs. The relative number of Croats/Catholics in the region has decreased in the last onehundred years: at the beginning of the 20th century, Catholics represented a majority in allthe towns of Boka Kotorska except Risan47 but, before the break-up of Yugoslavia in1991, they found themselves in the minority in all urban settlements of the region. Thiscan be explained mostly by increased migration to the coastal region after it was unitedwith the Dinaric hinterland (Old Montenegro, Herzegovina) within the Yugoslav state.

The Catholic Church continues to exercise an important influence on the collectiveidentity and cultural development of the Croat minority. The borders of the former Aus-tro-Hungarian territorial district continue to serve as the administrative boundaries of theKotor bishopric (670 square km and less than 10 000 adherents; current bishop is IlijaJanjić).48 As indicated above, the bishopric is formally a part of the Archbishopric of Splitin the Republic of Croatia and not the Archbishopric of Bar. This division underlines thepredominantly Croatian character of the Catholic Church in the Bay of Kotor. Representa-tives of the Croat minority in Montenegro, as well as those of the Catholic Church inCroatia, continue to support this structure despite the new state borders resulting from thebreak-up of Yugoslavia.

The 1990s were a very difficult period for Croats living in Montenegro. Croats in theBay of Kotor became the target of Serb nationalist propaganda, especially in the first halfof the decade. Croats were frequently labelled as traitors and fifth-columnists whoplanned to join the Montenegrin littoral to ‘Greater Croatia’. Apart from the Belgrade po-

46 Statistički godišnjak, p. 248.47 Josip Pečarić: ‘Croats of Boka Kotorska from 1918 until today’, Southeastern Europe 1918-

1995 International Symposium, Zadar, 28-30.09.95 (Zagreb: Croatian Heritage Foundation& Croatian Information Centre, 1996), available at: www.hic.hr/books/seeurope/009e-pecaric.htm

48 ‘Biti u manjini ne znači biti manje vrijedan. Intervju s Vladimirom Marvučićem’, ZvonikNo. 6 (80) (June 2001), available at: www.tippnet.co.yu/zvonik/801/ZVO3.html.

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litical elite and media, the hysterical anti-Croatian campaign was also orchestrated by theMontenegrin leadership of the time (Momir Bulatović, Milo Đukanović and SvetozarMarović) through the state daily Pobjeda (the only daily in Montenegro before 1997),state TV and radio.49 The atmosphere of fear and lynch law culminated in 1991 withCroatia‘s declaration of independence and the subsequent attack of Montenegrin reser-vists on the Dubrovnik region. There were no cases of ethnic cleansing or organised at-tempts to remove local Croats, but the atmosphere of fear and insecurity forced many ofthem to leave their homes and seek safer conditions abroad. There are no precise data con-cerning this gradual exodus, though credible unofficial estimates claim that probably one-quarter of the total Croat population left the country during the 1990s. It remains to beseen whether the exodus will remain permanent.

Apart from the exodus of many Croats, the Boka Kotorska region experienced a largeinflux of predominantly Serb refugees from Herzegovina and Croatia during the 1990s.This migration significantly altered the ethnic and social structure of the region, especiallyin the municipality of Herceg Novi. However, the position of local Croats in the Bay ofKotor cannot be simply characterised as one of ethnic tension and marginalisation on eth-nic grounds (i.e. Croats versus Serbs/Montenegrins). Some segments of the majority pop-ulation frequently demonstrated support for the harassed Croats. Many Orthodox inhabit-ants of the Boka (typically those who identified themselves ethnically as Montenegrins)and who had longer roots in the region felt similarly threatened by the rise of Serb nation-alism and the influx of refugees and economic settlers in the region. Therefore, the divi-sion felt by many autochthonous inhabitants of the Boka has been rather between the orig-inal inhabitants (the starosjedioci), both Catholic and Orthodox, who usually consideredthemselves to be urban, civilised and ethnically tolerant, as opposed to the new immi-grants (the došljaci), who were regarded as rural, primitive and ethnically intolerant. Thesolidarity and perceived common destiny of the Bokelji (a regional term describing the in-habitants of the Boka Kotorska), regardless of ethnic or religious division, somewhateased the position of the Croats. In addition, the Liberal Alliance of Montenegro and theSocial Democratic Party, both multi-ethnic, anti-war opposition parties committed toMontenegro’s independence, repeatedly protested against the harassment of MontenegrinCroats and the anti-Croatian campaign during the 1990s. Apart from raising domestic andinternational awareness, one of their major achievements was to prevent attempts to con-fiscate the houses of those Croats who had left Montenegro in order to providing perma-nent accommodation for Serb newcomers from the Krajina in 1995. 50

After Milo Đukanović had distanced himself from the regime of Slobodan Milošević,the government‘s attitude toward minorities, including Croats, improved. The gradual im-provement of relations with Croatia was very beneficial for Croats in Montenegro. In1999, the border crossing between Croatia and Montenegro at Debeli Brijeg was re-opened to regular traffic, while a consulate of the Republic of Croatia opened in Kotor.Croats, as well as others in the region, could renew their family and cultural links with

49 Well-documented analyses of the officially-orchestrated anti-Croat campaign, and numerousexamples of xenophobic threats and hate-speech in the daily Pobjeda during 1991, can befound in Živko Andrijašević: Nacrt za ideologiju jedne vlasti (Bar: Conteco, 1999).

50 Marko Vuković: ‘Prevlaka, opozicija, Tivat’, AIM 16.9.1995, available at: www.aimpress.org/dyn/pubs/archive/data/199509/50916-004-pubs-pod.htm.

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Croatia, and especially the neighbouring Dubrovnik region, although much remains to bedone in order fully to normalise relations between Montenegro and Croatia.

Apart from the media propaganda in the first half of the 1990s, Croats in Montenegrohave been practically overlooked by the Montenegrin authorities. There are several cul-tural Croatian associations in Montenegro, such as Napredak (Progress) and Hrvatski dom(Croatian Home) as well as several musical associations (traditional groups of tamburaši).In 2002, a Croat ethnic party, the Croat Civil Association (Hrvatsko gradjansko društvo)was formed. The party is primarily concerned with local politics. It won 4 out of the total32 deputies in the Tivat municipal election in October 2002.

There has been little interest in Croatia in the position of Montenegro‘s Croats, exceptfor some unimportant nationalist circles whose rhetorical interest has been motivated byprimarily domestic concerns. Even during the nationalist rule of President FranjoTuđman, there were no attempts politically to instrumentalise the issue of Croats in theBoka (the southernmost ethnically Croat community), let alone to raise territorial de-mands. Overall, Croats in Montenegro have been a small, half-forgotten and very quietminority since the break-up of Yugoslavia.

RomaSimilarly to other east European countries, it is very difficult to estimate the number ofRoma in Montenegro. According to the official census of 1991, 3 282 people declared aRoma nationality, most of them in Podgorica (1 676) and Nikšić (802).51 This number is,however, a clear under-estimate of the total size of the Roma population. Despite the lackof precise data, it seems certain that the number of Roma living in Montenegro has furtherincreased since the break-up of Yugoslavia. The approximate number of Roma may wellbe over 20 000.52

Both historical and contemporary sources concerning the Roma minority are very lim-ited. A small number of Roma people (around 500) lived within the pre-1878 Montene-grin borders while a greater number resided in the Ottoman areas joined to Montenegroduring the 19th and 20th centuries. The Roma in Old Montenegro were an Orthodox, set-tled population, well integrated into Montenegrin society. The Montenegrins treated thesettled Roma tolerantly, referring to them as Egyptians (Jeđupaci) or majstori/meštari (ar-tisans, crafts people) in order to distinguish them from nomadic Gypsies ( Ciganji) whooccasionally passed through Montenegro.53

The majority of Roma living in Montenegro today are Muslims (Orthodox Roma prob-ably became fully integrated with Montenegrins during the 20th century). The local Romacommunity living in the old centre of Bar (Stari Bar) is a relic of the traditional, settledway of life which was typical for most Montenegrin Roma in the past. 54 However, itseems that the majority of Roma living in Montenegro today have arrived from other areasof the Balkans (mostly from Serbia and Kosovo). The most recent influx of Roma came

51 Statistički godišnjak, p. 249.52 Vukadinović, op cit. p. 40.53 Valtazar Bogišić: ‘Slavenizirani Cigani u Crnoj Gori’, Almanah No. 19-20 (2002), pp. 250-

259.54 Despite the deep tradition and roots, the Roma in Bar mostly identify themselves with Mus-

lims or Montenegrins.

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after the conflict in Kosovo in 1999. Some Roma from Kosovo used Montenegro only as atransitional stop on their exodus to the west, but many have stayed, especially in citiessuch as Podgorica.

Unlike 100 years ago, the Roma in Montenegro today are living on the margin of soci-ety and in dismal conditions. Anti-Roma prejudices and intolerance have been widelypresent in Montenegrin society. The most serious outburst of anti-Roma sentiment was theexpulsion of Roma from the town of Danilovgrad in April 1995. Following a rape of a 14year old girl by allegedly two Roma adolescents, angry crowds demanded the expulsionof all Roma from the town. The Roma fled Danilovgrad in panic and their settlementswere burned down.55 The problems of the Roma – both new refugees/immigrants as wellas those who were living in the republic before the dissolution of Yugoslavia – have beengenerally overlooked in Montenegro, except for occasional articles which mostly pointout the bad social and economic situation of this minority and the visible demonstrationsof their condition, such as increased begging on the streets of Montenegrin towns. The in-fluence of the main minority organisation, the Association of Roma in Montenegro,headed by Izen Gaši, on Roma people has been extremely limited. There are no schools orclasses with Roma language as the language of instruction in Montenegro. Roma continueto be completely overlooked in internal Montenegrin debates about minority issues, al-though their current number is possibly several times higher than indicated by the officialstatistical data. Neither has the position of Montenegro’s Roma received more than limi-ted attention from foreign observers and NGOs.56

OthersSmall numbers of different ethnic groups can be found scattered around Montenegro, es-pecially in the big cities. The absolute majority of these individuals settled in Montenegroin the second half of the 20th century as a result of internal migrations within the pre-1991Yugoslav state. These individuals number usually only several dozens, hundreds at best.According to the 1991 census, only Macedonians numbered slightly over 1 000 people.57

Montenegro’s minorities and the polarised majorityThe co-existence of minorities and the majority society in Montenegro has been consider-ably better than in most parts of former Yugoslavia. This can be attributed to several fac-tors. The relatively satisfactory level of traditional multi-ethnic co-existence prior to thedissolution of Yugoslavia was preserved as Montenegro managed to escape a militaryconflict which would have probably dramatically worsened inter-ethnic relations. Minor-ity representatives have not raised demands regarded by the majority as going too far.From the beginning of the 1990s, there have been multi-ethnic parties which have had acivil orientation and their influence among minorities has further grown in the second halfof the decade as the government started to show signs of greater interest in minority is-

55 Šeki Radončić, “Danilovgrad Left Without Gipsies”, AIM, 25.4.1995.56 The notable exception was humanitarian aid to Roma refugee camps during the Kosovo cri-

sis and its aftermath.57 Statistički godišnjak, p. 248.

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sues. Intellectual elites amongst minorities have actively participated in the process of de-mocratisation alongside the ethnic Montenegrin elites.

During the regime of Slobodan Milošević as well as afterwards, Montenegro has had toface many serious problems which often diverted attention from the position of minorities.In the first half of the 1990s, the Montenegrin government largely followed the officialpolitics of the Belgrade regime and frequently demonstrated intolerance toward minoritiesand political opponents. The position of minorities, as well as individual freedoms, have,however, greatly improved since the mid-1990s. Despite that, minorities continue to beseriously under-represented in most segments of public life in Montenegro. The represen-tation of minorities has often been rather simulated by the appointment to administrativepositions of carefully selected and controllable individuals as representatives of respectiveminorities.58 The limited legitimacy of such appointments has been often highlighted byactivists of ethnic political parties who have themselves not gained sufficient legitimacyin the electoral process.

The Montenegrin political scene has been radically polarised by the division betweensupporters and opponents of Montenegro’s independence. 59 Political subjects which are infavour of continued alliance with Serbia have been ethnically exclusive parties based onSerb nationalist values (SNP, NS, SNS and several smaller political groupings of lesserimportance). The membership and electoral base of the pro-Yugoslav bloc do not includemembers of Montenegro‘s minorities. On the contrary, minorities have been consistentlyattacked and demonised by supporters of alliance with Serbia as a threat to Montenegro‘sterritorial integrity. Montenegro‘s minorities have shown a great degree of loyalty toMontenegro as their homeland and have not threatened it with nationalist and territorialpretensions. In fact, threats that Montenegro could be partitioned (and parts of it joined toSerbia) have in recent years come only from some radical circles of the supporters of afederal state. In Montenegro‘s case, some segments of the majority society have been de-finitely more dangerous to the future stability of the republic and the wider region than theloyal and restrained minorities.

It is indicative that, unlike those supporters of alliance with Serbia, political subjectswhich have an independent orientation have shown a pro-western attitude and have wel-comed minority participation (LSCG, SDP, DPS and a few miniscule parties). Apart fromorganisations based on Serb nationalism, there are some organisations whose ideologicalorientation could indeed be described as Montenegrin nationalist. However, Montenegrinnationalism has traditionally defined itself primarily in terms of opposition to Serbia andpro-Serb forces in Montenegro. Its proponents have had a friendly attitude toward Bos-niaks-Muslims, Albanians, Croats and other Montenegrin minorities. It cannot be deniedthat some latent prejudices and misconceptions concerning minorities continue to prevailamong those who consider themselves ethnically Montenegrin and who support Mon-tenegrin independence while, in the case of pro-Yugoslav political groups, a hostility to

58 Šerbo Rastoder: ‘Multinacionalnost – demokratizacija kao proces (Crnogorsko iskustvo)’,Almanah No. 17-18 (2001), p. 253.

59 Apart from the long-term polarisation of these two platforms, a polarisation between theopponents and supporters of Milo Đukanović has also been important. The informal allianceof Đukanovićs opponents includes both the pro-Yugoslav coalition and independence-minded Liberals.

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minorities and nationalist ideas form a standard part of their political agenda and beliefs.The policy of the EU and the US in supporting the formal preservation of a federal state ofSerbia and Montenegro almost at any cost has strengthened the position of Serb national-ist forces in Montenegro. This will probably have some negative consequences for minor-ities, as well as for political stability and democratisation processes in the republic.

Despite the many obstacles, the problems of national minorities in Montenegro can beresolved more easily than in other parts of the Balkans. The first step would clearly be toincrease the representation of minorities in all segments of public life within the existinginstitutions and structures to a level which would correspond with their share of the popu-lation. Increased attention to the grievances of minorities and the fulfilment of their realis-tic demands (such as those raised by Albanian ethnic parties) could improve the situationstill further. Later, when the basic but most pressing problems have been resolved, othersolutions, such as measures of positive discrimination and the increased constitutional andlegal protection of minority rights, might be discussed in an open and democratic atmos-phere. There have been many encouraging signs in Montenegro‘s treatment of minorities,but domestic political dynamics in the direction of increased minority participation andrights has been quite slow. The balanced and sensitive assistance of foreign mediators, ad-visors and NGOs could certainly speed up this process.

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The authors

Florian Bieber is a senior non-resident research associate of the European Centre forMinority Issues based in Belgrade and an International Policy Fellow with the Open Soci-ety Institute, Budapest. He teaches at the regional Masters programme for Democracy andHuman Rights at the University of Sarajevo and at the Central European University in Bu-dapest, Hungary. He has published articles on nationalism and politics in south-easternEurope in Nationalities Papers, Third World Quarterly, Current History and other jour-nals. He authored Bosnien-Herzegowina und Libanon im Vergleich [Bosnia-Herzegovinaand Lebanon in Comparison] (Sinzheim: Pro Universitate Verlag, 1999) and edited, to-gether with Džemal Sokolović, Reconstructing Multiethnic Societies: The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), and with Židas Daskalovski: Understandingthe War in Kosovo (London: Frank Cass, 2003). He is co-editor of the journal South-EastEuropean Politics and founder and editor of Balkan Academic News.

Bohdana Dimitrovová is a research associate on the Programme on Transfrontier Co-operation in SEE at the international non-governmental organisation EastWest Institute.She is currently conducting research on regional and cross-border cooperation in SEEcountries and the establishment of Euro-regions. She graduated from Charles University,Prague and received an MA in Nationalism Studies from the Central European Universityin Budapest. She has done extensive field and academic research on minorities in Mon-tenegro and completed her Masters thesis on the National Identity of Slav Muslims inMontenegro, which was later published in South-East European Politics.

Dragan Đurić is currently the Head of the Department for International Co-operationof the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions of Montenegro. He graduated in Polit-ical Sciences from the University of Belgrade and worked as a journalist for 15 years. Heis one of the founders of the prominent Montenegrin weekly Monitor. He is also a founderand President of the Montenegrin NGO, the Centre for the Development of IndustrialDemocracy. His research interests lie in the economic and social aspects of the transitionprocess in Montenegro. He has published numerous articles for newspapers and maga-zines, as well as for journals in Yugoslavia and abroad, including the South-East EuropeReview.

Beáta Huszka is a researcher for the Public Foundation for European Comparative Mi-nority Research in Budapest. She graduated in economics and international relations fromthe Budapest University of Economic Sciences in 2001. In 2002, she continued her studiesat the Central European University in Budapest on the Nationalism Studies programme.She is currently conducting research on the Hungarian minority of Vojvodina and on in-ter-ethnic relations in Kosovo.

Wim van Meurs has been a senior research fellow and project co-ordinator for South-Eastern Europe at the Centre for Applied Policy Research since 1997. He received his MA(in 1988) and Ph.D. (in 1993) in Russian and East European studies from Utrecht Univer-sity in the Netherlands. Between 1994 and 1997, he was a researcher and lecturer in tran-

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sition studies, EU enlargement, nationalism and ethnic conflicts in south-eastern Europeand the Baltic Sea region at the Free University and the Humboldt University in Berlin.

Srđa Pavlović is a Montenegrin historian, essayist and literary translator. He special-ises in the nineteenth and twentieth century cultural and political history of the SouthSlavs at the University of Alberta (Canada). He is the editor for Spaces of Identity (Uni-versity of Vienna/Lingnan University/University of Alberta) and was the co-founder andeditor of the Stone Soup literary magazine (London, UK). His books include: IzaOgledala: Eseji o identitetu i politici pripadnosti (Podgorica: CID, 2001); Threshold: AnAnthology of Contemporary Writing in Alberta (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press,1998) and Zapadna Ljuljaska (Novi Pazar: DaMaD, 1997). Pavlović has contributed arti-cles to numerous scholarly journals and magazines, including the Canadian Slavonic Pa-pers, the Journal of Historical Sociology, Spaces of Identity, Kakanien Revisited, South-East European Politics, Matica, Almanah, Ars, Balcanis , and Prism International.

Šerbo Rastoder is an associate professor at the University of Montenegro, Faculty ofPhilosophy at Nikšić and a professor in the South-East European postgraduate studiesprogramme at the Law Faculty of the University of Montenegro. His area of expertise isthe history of Montenegro in the 19th and 20th centuries and the theoretical-methodologi-cal problems of history. He is the author of eight scientific monographs and more thanninety scientific reviews, articles and treatises. He is a full-time member of the DocleanAcademy of Sciences and Arts, and a member of the Managing Board of Matica Crnogor-ska of the Historical Institute of Montenegro. He is also Editor of the journal Almanah.

František Šístek is a Ph.D. student in Anthropology at the Faculty of Humanities,Charles University, Prague. As a political analyst, he has been covering the political situ-ation in Serbia and Montenegro for Europe Analyse, Paris and for various media in theCzech Republic. He graduated from the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, inArea Studies and from the Central European University, Budapest with an MA in His-tory. As a historian, he has focused on Montenegrin history in the 19 th and 20th centuries(national discourse and statehood, modernisation of tribal society, and ethnic and religiousminorities).

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Decline or transformation? Change in industrial conflict and its challenges Lorenzo Bordogna and Gian Primo Cella

Regulation of strikes and the European social model Tiziano Treu

Transnational primary and secondary collective action: an overview of international,European and national legislation Stefan Clauwaert

European-level bargaining in action? Joint texts negotiated by European WorksCouncilsMark Carley

The regulation of conflicts in the German industrial relations system: legal and extra-legal institutions and procedures Eva Kocher

Conflict regulation in the Nordic countries Torgeir Aarvaag Stokke

Collective conflict in the public sector in FranceMarie-Armelle Souriac

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Frank Kressing/Karl Kaser

Aspects of changing identities in a South-East European country

NOMOS Verlagsgesellschaft76520 Baden-Baden

Even after the breakdown of the Communist regime in Albania in the 1990ies, thissmall country of the Balkan peninsula remains one of the least known areas ofEurope. In this volume, a number of authors from the fields of Balkan studies,Anthropology and History examine various aspects of the transition process whichthe country has been dealing with after more than 40 years of complete isolation.The contributions to this volume focuses on the Albanians‘ quest for their ownidentity when facing contradictory influences from East and West – caught betweentradition and modernism, post-Communist adaptation to capitalism and main-tenance of pre-Communist social structures. Among other topics, the role of Islamin the former self-proclaimed ’first atheist state of the world‘, enduring patriarchalpatterns of gender relations, mass migration, the position of ethnic minorities, andstereotype images of Albanians and Albania in the West are highlighted. Thus, thiscompendium offers a wide range of background information to scholars of Balkan-related subjects as well as to the average reader who is interested in history, cultureand religion of south-eastern Europe.

2002, 176 pp., hb., 35,– €, 61,– sFr, ISBN 3-7890-7670-8(Schriften des Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung (ZEI), Vol. 51)

Albania – a country in transition

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