Moral maps: Kohlberg's contribution

MORAL MAPS: KOHLBERG’S CONTRIBUTION

Review of Lawrence Kohlberg: Consensus and Controzlersy edited by Sohan Modgil and Celia Modgil. London, U.K.: Falmer Press/and Philadelphia, PA: Taylor &

Francis, 1986.

ANN DOUCETTE-GATES Box 119, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027, U.S.A.

The contributions of Lawrence Kohlberg to the field of psychology are acknowledged as significant even amongst his detractors. While some refer to him as the “father of moral development,” to the students at Theodore Roosevelt High School in the Bronx, New York, where Kohlberg conducted his most recent research on moral judgment and moral atmosphere, it was “Hey, Larry.” His death has left a void not only within the discipline of psychological inquiry, but within the communities of those who knew him personally and in the hearts and minds of the Bronx students. The neutrality I maintained as a researcher on Kohlberg’s Bronx project dissipated as student subjects and I shared the pain and loss of a man one student described as “Larry: an important guy who cared.”

The contributions of this book reveal the intellectual and academic posture of Lawrence Kohlberg, but say little about the man dressed in plaid shirts meandering through the graffitied Roosevelt hallways, addressing students by name, or the man waiting to be recognized by the student ‘chair’ of a “Just Community” meeting. His quiet presence filtered through moments of student disruption creating a calm as students noticed him listening attentively to the discordant discussions. In addition to the intellectual endeavor of theoretical constructs, Lawrence Kohlberg was a participant in moral development, placing himself and his theory in the most difficult of circumstances to be tested. He left a legacy with the students at Roosevelt: The idea that one could achieve, through a sense of community, a sense of justice. His message is not always evidenced by student behavior in the Bronx, but it is solidly contained in the rhetoric of a few students who quell a disruptive community meeting with statements such as “We gotta carry on. Larry, he believed in us.”

In this volume, the intellectual and academic posture of Lawrence Kohlberg is examined from a philosophical and psychological perspective. The breadth of Kohlberg’s contributions to moral understanding is addressed in the editors’ consideration of varied knowledge contents, including the relationship of judgment and action, ego and emotional development, education, social and political reasoning, theological epistemology, and research methodology. The analytical objective of this compendium is achieved by the editors via an oppositional stance of paired contributions, with an opportunity for the contributing authors to read and refute the opposing position. The design of the book does not always take the form of a debate, as many of the contributors find

96 A. Doucette-Gates

“consensus as well as controversy” between their positions relative to specific areas of inquiry. The judgments and opinions of the authors are well substantiated and offer much in the way of constructive critical analysis to the field of moral development.

The following is a brief summary of the contributions. It stands in testimony to the position of Lawrence Kohlberg that his theory is, in a Lakatosian mold, a progressive, spiraling research program, anticipating the generation of new thought (Lakatos, 1978). Kohlberg (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987) describes his theory as a set of “hard core” theoretical assumptions surrounded by a Lakatosian “protective belt” of empirical postulates and methodology, providing new knowledge in a progressive manner. ‘rheoretical reformulation takes place within the protective belt leaving the core theory intact. The range in content of the authors’ contributions in this volume addresses the “protective belt” and supports the claim of a progressive generation of new thought.

MORAL PHILOSOPHY

Issues of philosophy are considered by Robert Carter and Don Locke. Kohlberg’s repeated attempts to avoid the charge of ‘relativist’ are underscored in Carter’s contribution. The latter claims that Kohlberg is more accurately identified as a “constructive relativist” as a result of his current theoretical reformulation and his dialogue with Habermas regarding the “complementarity thesis” which states, “The success of an empirical theory which can only be true or false may function as a check on the normative validity of hypothetically reconstructed moral intuitions” (Habermas, 1983, p. 266). Kohlberg, as Carter infers, negotiates a continuum between objectivity and the extremes of nihilistic skepticism and absolutistic certainty, a position that is not ameliorated through association with Habermas.

Locke begins his critical commentary on Kohlberg’s theory with a tribute to his contribution of a multi-disciplinary approach combining psychological research, philosophical discourse, and educational practice and intervention. He argues that Kohlberg offers no evidence for the universality of cultural moralities concerning the differentiation of form/topic and message/content. Locke centers the remainder of his critique on Kohlberg’s Stage 6. He cites Kohlberg’s misconception of the philosophic definition of universalizability and of the principles of reversibility. Locke maintains that the rightness of a moral claim is specific to a moral perspective.

The issue of relativism is addressed by both authors from different perspectives. Carter disambiguates the definition of relativism anti in doing so demonstrates that his position is similar to that evidenced in Kohlberg’s thinking (see, for example, Kohlberg, 1984, ch. 7). Locke’s critique, based on Kohlberg’s earlier work, is more thoroughly articulated in his paper, “‘I‘he Principle of Equal Interests” (Locke, 198 l), stating that ~noral resolutions are contextualI) relativistic. Locke questions whether moral disc-ourse is justification for the universalizability of a single moral solution. ‘l‘he absence of empirical evidence for Stage 6 leaves this issue unanswered.

Moral maps: Kohlberg’s contribution 97

BETWEEN DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY

Kohlberg’s philosophical and psychological discourse are discussed by Dwight Boyd and Harvey Siegel. Kohlberg’s negotiation of the boundary between philosophy and psychology is the subject of Boyd’s discussion of the difficulty in the relationship of “is” to “ought.” Boyd argues against the reduction from “ought” to “is,” asserting that “ought” claims function as a criticism of existing conditions guiding moral judgment toward increasing adequacy of resolution, Boyd offers a systematic presentation of the plausible interpretations of Kohlberg’s work regarding this issue. The most promising interpretation, he claims, is found in Kohlberg’s shift from an identity thesis claiming similarity between empirical stage development and philosophical preference for more adequate moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 198 l), to the complementarity thesis of Habermas (1983) arguing that although empirical theory may inform and justify normative theory it must still be philosophically grounded.

Siegel argues that justification of the adequacy of moral claims cannot be supported through empirical findings. He uses this argument to validate his belief that educational intervention promoting moral stage development is unjustified. Educational intervention is substantiated in terms of an obligation to help students to become rational persons, independent of research considerations. Siegel is critical of Kohlberg’s use of the formalist meta-ethical criteria of prescriptivity and universalizability. He further states that while psychological study may isolate formal criteria, justification of such must be grounded philosophically.

The discord found in the section contributed by Boyd and Siegel is centered on the issue of complementarity between psychology and moral philosophy. Siegel reduces Kohlberg’s attempt at complementarity to an explanation of moral adequacy through psychological fact which is in opposition to Boyd’s position and is inconsistent with Kohlberg’s latest formulation regarding this issue (Kohlberg, 1984, ch. 3).

PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT

Olivera Petrovich and Peter Tomlinson offer a critical analysis of Kohlberg’s moral theory, focusing on such features as autonomy, the potential for religious relevance, and cognitive structuralism. Petrovich cites the notion of autonomy as the fundamental weakness in the cognitive developmental theory of moral reasoning. She argues for a Kantian perspective (cf., Kant, 1949), stipulating that the use of the term, “autonomy,” requires a more exact operational definition if it is to be applicable to the psychological understanding of moral reasoning. Petrovich acknowledges the prerequisite need for autonomy in moral development, but questions the sufficiency of autonomy as a defining principle for mature moral reasoning. The seventh stage extension of Kohlberg’s theory is seen as an attempt to permeate the limits of the cognitive model of moral development, to generate broader research efforts and to add religious significance to moral development. Petrovich takes the addition of Stage 7 as

98 A. Doucette-(iates

evidence that moral development cannot be explained exclusively by cognitive psychology.

Tomlinson’s contribution critically examines structuralism, phenomenalism (Kohlberg, 1984, ch. 3), and the “under-use” of psychological paradigms within Kohlberg’s developmental approach. He argues that Kohlberg’s study of morality focuses on distributive justice using a “hard” cognitive stage orientation, restricting the significance of his contribution by eliminating much of what could be considered under the inquiry of moral psychology. With regard to phenomenalism, he identifies a tension between Kohlberg’s emphasis on conscious verbal processes and his discussion of “implicit” justice structures. Tomlinson argues for an eclectic psychological approach to moral development, integrating the insights of other paradigms, to yield a comprehensive uncler- standing of individual experience and action.

Both authors acknowledge a skepticism as to the adequacy of a cognitive developmental approach to a full explanation of moral development. The emphasis on the form of moral reasoning, embedded in invarant stage sequences, ignores sociological, political, cultural, and historical contexts of’ liuman response to moral conflict. ‘I’he eclectic approach proposed b) ‘l‘omlinson is more appealing than the addition of yet another stage to the categorical system of moral development theory.

‘I‘HE KELA-I‘IONSHII OF MORAL ,JUDC;h1EN’I‘ Ah’D MORAL ACTION

‘I‘he judg~nentiactiorl relationship is explored in the papers offered by Pete1 Kutnick and Roger Straughan. Kutnick provides a retrospective sunlmation of the theoretical relationship between nloral reasoning and moral betia\,ioi posited by Kohlberg, citing studies that provide empirical support tot- a monotonic relationship between the t\vo. He continues with a survey of criticism of Kohlberg’s work arid a recapitulation of Kohlberg’s present Llnderstanding, inclucling refinemenTs in the stage progression and the addition of substages ‘A’ and ‘B.’ Kutnick finds support for the naturalistsic fallacy (cf., Kohlberg, 19X 1, ch. 4) in the tendency of deontic,jrltlgiiielits to move toward increasing atleq~~ac-y,

making judgment aretaically more substantial. The *;ietliodologic~il emphasis on the use of hypothetical ethical dilemmas

restricts Kohlberg’s contribution, argues Straughan, who ;~cc‘~tses Kohlberg of‘ lack of attention to the complexity of the relationship between judgment and behavior. hloral principles, he argues, ha\,e no motivational power and therefore do not imply a predictability of moral behavior. ‘l‘he inclination of’the individual toward moral principle may be quite dif‘ferent under hypotheCca1 conditions than in the real ‘Seat of’ the moment.”

Kutnick provides the reader with a critical f‘ranlework regarding the relational aspects of rnor~~ljud~~~ll~i~t and action. Straughan continues this line of inquiry in his criticism of’ Kohlberg’s use of hypothetical dilemmas. ~I‘lie gap between competence and performa~lce that Kohlberg admits (Colby X- Kohlberg, i9H’i) has been shown to depend on interpersonal contexts, influenced by copiiig and defensive tendencies as well as in the objective restrictions on freedom experienced by t tie iiitli\%lual (I Iaan, 1078). Such findings certainly confirm


Straughan’s reservations about simplistic connections between reasoning and behavior.

MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND EGO DEVELOPMENT

The implications of Kohlberg’s moral theory for ego development are argued by Robert Kegan and Jane Loevinger. Kegan concludes that, although Kohlberg’s concept of the relationship between ego and moral development is inconsistent and problematic, his theory nonetheless offers the most “original and potentiating contribution to the understanding of the ego since Sigmund Freud’s,” especially in the form of the constructivist concepts of structure and development. Kegan characterizes Kohlberg’s stage theory approvingly as a constructivist account of the evolution of subject-object relations. He argues for a holistic perspective, rather than the traditional Kohlbergian one of differential development of independent domains constrained only by the “necessary but insufficient” relationship (Kohlberg, 1976; Noam, Kohlberg, & Snarey, 1983).

A summary of the genesis of Kohlberg’s work regarding ego development is provided in Loevinger’s contribution. She claims that data supporting changes in Kohlberg’s concept of the ego are not substantial: Kohlberg creates a false impression of precision in his logical and scientific treatment of ego, which she holds to be, in actuality, an intuitive concept. She shares with Kegan a concern regarding differential development of parallel structure domains. Nevertheless, again like Kegan, she concludes that Kohlberg’s work has been revolutionary in the conceptualization of moral development and continues to generate intensive inquiry into the field of ego development.

The authors approach Kohlberg’s theory and ego development from different perspectives. Kegan constructs the implications of Kohlberg’s work for the concept of ego while Loevinger criticizes Kohlberg’s hard-stage interpretation of ego. Rather, she says, structure provides a range of alternatives which within ego development is determined by other factors including subjectivity, freedom, and consciousness (c.f., Loevinger, 1976). These factors are ignored in Kohlberg’s concept of parallel domains and his adherence to the hypothesis of necessary- but-insufficient relationships.

EMOTIONS AND MORAL REASONING

Affective and emotional considerations regarding moral judgment and behavior are presented by Charles Bailey and John Martin Rich. Bailey argues for the Kohlbergian position on the primacy of cognitive judgment in the consideration of behavior and the primacy of affect in regard to the quality of a person’s morality. He outlines the relationship among issues of morality, reason, and justification and distinguishes between reactive and justified behaviors. Emotions may initiate conditions for moral judgment, but they themselves do not serve as judgments, he claims. He argues for “affective commitment” to reason as a motivational component for moral judgment and a possible explanation for individual differences in moral development.

Kohlberg’s approach to emotions as non-rational and cognitively conflicting is seen as problematic by Rich. He distinguishes two differing types of emotions


involved in moral judgment and behavior. In an attempt to relate cognitive development to emotions in the study of morality, he argues for the use of character traits as non-arbitrary “behavioral counterparts” of the principles underlying the conventional and post-conventional levels of Kohlberg’s theory.

The authors disagree about the significance of emotion in moral judgment and action. Bailey takes a Kantian perspective claiming that emotions are ontologically prior to moral judgment and action. Rich’s argument posits the crucial function of emotions in conveying moral worth as well as their ability to assist individuals in grasping moral rules. This perspective, consistent with the constructivist emotional perspective emerging over the past decade (see HarrP, 1986), offers potential for increased understanding of individual differences regarding moral behavior.

MORAL EDUCATION

Educational implications are discussed in the papers presented by John Wilson and Edmund Sullivan. Wilson criticizes developmental psychology for not clearly defining its assertions under the heading of “stages of development.” He contends that Kohlberg demonstrates the stage grouping of responses resulting from moral interviews, rather than accounting for children’s understanding of moral reasoning as a result of educational intervention. The control on

children’s use of moral reasons by the social regime is more salient than their moral understanding, he argues.

Sullivan’s argument is centered in his critique of progressive ideology (Sullivan, 1977). He claims that Kohlberg’s work does not represent a complete moral theory. Intrinsic to Sullivan’s post-progressive approach is the notion that values-such as the assumptions communicated by the “hidden curriculum” with regard to work and success-are unconsciously assimilated and so must be subjected to critical awareness. He argues for educational transformation, claiming that the present educational model offers “mindless conformity” and

does little to encourage the reflective thought that is necessary to achieve post- conventionality in moral thought.

The social context of education is addressed by both authors. Wilson and Sullivan agree on the significance of social influence. Wilson’s argument is weakened by failing to incorporate Kohlberg’s notion of social perspective- taking in his claim for the salience of social “regimes” in shaping the moral understanding of the individual. On the other hand, Sullivan’s argument for an emphasis on the ecological complexity of morality and the qualities of mind needed to achieve post-conventionality is cogent.

EDUCATIONAL INTERVENTION

James Leming and David Gordon provide perspectives on the use of Kohlberg’s theory as an educational intervention. Leming uses a practical approach in his review, detailing the evolution of Kohlberg’s work from an initial emphasis on the stimulation of moral development, through dilemma discussion, to the active “just community” approach. Leming argues that the difficulty in implementing the just community approach-facilitating individual moral


growth by focusing on collective norms-stems from the demands of traditional curriculum. He demonstrates concern for the possible intimidation of students by making them aware of the increasing adequacy of higher stages. He also points to the considerations addressed by school administrators regarding the expense of teacher training, curricular priorities, and methods of evaluating program success apart from moral stage growth.

Gordon argues that Kohlberg’s contribution to moral development is constricted by his notion of the concept of the “hidden curriculum.” In his claim for a pervasive, non-contradictory hidden curriculum, Kohlberg ignores cultural pluralism and the potential for opposition to hegemony (cf., Gramsci, 1971). Gordon stresses that attention must be directed toward the role of school as part of society and to the interrelation of practical concerns with theoretical knowledge.

Leming’s emphasis on the practicality of implementing just community interventions is cogent in light of recent political budget reductions. Gordon’s position regarding cultural pluralism and contradictory “hidden curricula” is particularly relevant to “just community” programs. If the latter deny such problems, they will have failed to recognize the social and cultural realities of students, leaving education idealistically impotent.

SOCIAL REASONING

The application of Kohlberg’s theory and method of intervention regarding social cognition is considered from a positive perspective by joint authors Robert Enright, Daniel Lapsley, and Leanne Olson. They take a Lakatosian perspective in their argument that Kohlberg’s work in moral development is a progressive scientific theory in its anticipation of new facts. They show how Kohlberg was responsible for the generation of new theories in the social-cognitive domain and for the theoretical association of cognitive role-taking (from the work of his colleague Robert Selman, 197 1) with moral development.

The usefulness of the term “social reasoning” is questioned in the contribution of Lea Pearson. She challenges the heuristic significance of the compatible domains outlined by Enright, Lapsley, and Olson. She also examines the appropriateness of a stage theory as an empirical assessment of social and moral reasoning, and considers the issues of social skills training and educational applications.

Support for the vitality of Kohlberg’s paradigm is found in both papers. Pearson’s critique of complementary domains is important since the adequacy of the cognitive-developmental paradigm in the area of morality continues to be questioned (see, for example, Shweder, Turiel, & Much, 1981; Rest, 1986), and the paradigm ignores tacit knowing (Polanyi & Prosch, 1975) and its educational implications (Broudy, 1980).

POLITICS

Ideology and political issues find authors Helen Weinreich-Haste and John Broughton in opposition. Haste gives general approval to Kohberg’s claim that political ideology and morality are associated as indicated by research data,


though the latter are limited. Nevertheless, she surmises that this relationship may be confined to the rhetoric ofdemocracy and the educated middle class. She closes her analysis with support for the “just community” approach, and affirms its potential for significant understanding of the dialogue between individual and society.

Broughton argues against Kohlberg’s reliance on liberal ideology and points out the limitations and distortions inherent within liberalism. He points out that Kohlberg’s theory provides only non-rational criteria for societal order, lacks any concern for history, and disregards the impact of organizational complexity on social control. Kohlberg is further criticized for the reduction of the political to the moral. Broughton concludes with a critique of Kohlberg’s notion of role- taking, suggesting that it elevates impoverished communication and degenerate human relatedness to the order of norms.

Both authors argue against Kohlberg’s unitary perspective with regard to moral reasoning and political thought. Broughton’s position is particularly cogent in its application to progressive educational interventions, such as the “just community” program. The liberal argument predicates economic success on education, presupposing and fostering a meritocratic distribution of opportunity that is insensitive to unequal opportunities for access. As Bowles and Gintis (1976) have demonstrated, societal structures of authority and control are embodied within the social relationships of the school. Liberal ideology obscures such mechanisms for the reproduction of oppression.

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

‘rhe application of Kohlberg’s theory to issues of religious education is the concern of Marion Smith and Brian Gates, both writing from a British perspective, Smith describes moral and religious development as complementary, with progress in the former domain informing development within the latter. She claims that Kohlberg’s work has had a limited impact on religious education due to a widespread reluctance to accept structural-developmental theories in that area.

Gates argues against the factual, formal consicleration given by Smith. He identifies four areas of incompleteness in Kohlberg’s work. Ambiguity is found in the empirical evidence claiming stage invariance and sequence and in the shift from a content-based to criteria-based structure that focuses on the reasoning pattern rather than the concrete response type (Colby 8c Kohlberg, 1987). (Gates further criticizes Kohlberg’s exclusive use of the verbal medium, and points out that societies function with far more than “verbal currency.” In addltlon, C.ates addresses the paradoxical position of Kohlberg’s universal moral model in a pluralistic universe. He suggests that the celebration of values and beliefs observed in English school assemblies may offer a new direction of inquiry for Kohlberg’s colleagues. ‘I‘his proposal woulcl seem to have significant implications for the “just community” orientation.

‘I‘HEORY

The implications of Kohlberg’s work for theological epistemology are the


concerns of Mary Marks Wilcox and Donald Joy. Wilcox considers the social perspective-taking features of Kohlberg’s theory and the correlations found in the longitudinal study done at the Iliff School of Theology (Everding 8c Wilcox, 1975; Wilcox, 1979). She argues for further expansion of the issue of social perspective within Kohlberg’s work and for a consideration of the theological possibilities found in the work of William Perry (Philibert, 1987).

Joy points out as structural faults in the Kohlbergian edifice: the ‘naturalistic fallacy,’ the definition of moral reasoning, and the role of the reasoner as subject, object, or agent. In addition, he offers a synopsis of a variety of critical res P onses by theorists and theologians. Despite his opposition, -Joy maintains that with minimal revisions addressing Kohlberg’s theoretical deficiencies, progress (from a structural development perspective) can be achieved.

Wilcox and Joy argue for revisions of Kohlberg’s theory that are complementary: Wilcox presses for elaboration of social perspective-taking, while Joy calls for historical consideration of the understanding of religion and value.

CROSS-CULTURAL RESEARCH

The necessity of cross-cultural research to establish the universality of a theory is the consideration of authors Carolyn Edwards and Ian Vine. Edwards reviews the cross-cultural literature from the perspectives of method, measurement, and the utility of theory in the explanation of human development. She argues that Kohlberg’s own work has generated additional multi-domain, cross-cultural research.

Vine admits that Kohlberg’s theory has “considerable heuristic value,” but is critical of the tendency toward methodological bias in cross-cultural work on

developmental universals, especially regarding the higher stages. Vine’s argument for a social systems perspective highlights issues of ethical relativism, collectivism, bureaucracy, and power relations.

While Edwards and Vine both respect Kohlberg’s cross-cultural contribution, some disparity between the authors is evidenced in Vine’s argument against Kohlberg’s subordination of social influence as motivation for moral contempla- tion. Though Kohlberg’s interest in moral atmosphere attends to a community orientation, the concept ignores organizational complexity. Kohlberg’s depen- dence on a research methodology that presupposes objective hermeneutic understanding must be “conjoined with analysis of social systems” (McCarthy, 1978, p. 183).

METHODOLOGY

Methodology and research concerns are the areas of contribution for authors James Rest and Charles Evans. Rest summarizes three methodological areas of decision necessary to moral judgment inquiry: data source (hypothetical/reality- based dilemmas, verbal interviews, etc.), coding and indexing of subject responses, and validity.

Evans focuses on the issues of validity and reliability in Kohlberg’s methodology. Reported stage regression, gender issues, and changes in the scoring procedures (elimination of Stage 6, inclusion of Stage 4%) are considered by


Evans as issues of validity. Some studies show low correlation between dilemma forms, requiring speculation as to the effects on the subjects of retesting, dilemma exposure, and incidental learning. The requirement of verbal articulation and the possibility of interviewer or rater bias are seen as particularly problematic.

The cultural, diversity and varying levels of verbal skills-both production and comprehension-among Kohlberg’s own high school subjects (at Theodore Roosevelt High School in the Bronx) illustrate not only Evans’ but also Vine’s methodological concern.

KOHLBEKG’S RESPONSE

The final chapter is devoted to a response from Kohlberg himself. Considerations of personal time and publication deadlines restricted his commentary on the above pieces. He provides a summary of his current theoretical position, as well as a reaction, to the psychological issues raised in the contributions of Rest, Straughan, Bailey, Kegan, Loevinger, Lapsley et al., and Tomlinson. He continues with a review, from a Lakatosian perspective, of the reformulation of his interdisciplinary approach relating philosophic postulates to empirical psychological data. He responds to the positions of Siegel, Carter, and most specifically to Boyd and Locke, substantiating his position \cith reference to the work of Habermas (1983, 1984) and Rawls (1971). His contribution concludes with a reply to Gordon and Leming, regarding education considerations.

Kohlberg’s remarks about his educational intervention are unfortunately lacking in thoroughness. His comments on the success of the Scarsdale Alternative School are made without reference to its affluent middle to upper middle class standing. He fails to address the criticism of his avoiding the significance of organizational complexity in social systems or the questioning of his reliance on liberal progressive ideology. One can only trust that these issues, so germane to educational intervention, are to be dealt with in the forthcoming third volume of his collected works (Kohlberg, in press).

CONC:LUSION

In sum, the efforts of the editors of this volume foster an improved understanding of Kohlberg’s theory through the presentation of analytical and critical perspectives, providing accounts of recent Kohlbergian thought and findings, often substantiated by research studies, and illuminating the limitations of the approach. ‘I‘he oppositional format anticipated by the editors is not fully achieved since the authors frequently address complementary aspects of the various domains of Kohlberg’s work. Each paired contribution is however followed by the author’s response to the “opposing” article, allowing for dialogic refutation or agreement, often incorporating material by the author not addressed in the contribution. ‘l-he interactions are delightful, informative, and often complex-so much so that 1 have not attempted to reflect on them above.

The volume addresses issues that remain um-esolved, left to those who follow in the Kohlberg tradition as well as to those who might expand or challenge his


theoretical construct. Despite the discord among the authors this collection stands in tribute to the life’s work of a major contributor to and shaper of the disciplines of moral development and moral education.

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Moral maps: Kohlberg's contribution