OB Paper - Final

8/6/2019 OB Paper - Final

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Squadron Leadership

Running head: CHALLENGE OF LEADERSHIP

The Challenge of Squadron Leadership

Joshua Taylor

Anthony Wright

Gary Herbert

Columbian College of Arts and Sciences

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Introduction

The United States Navy has a proud history of serving our country. Its role is to defend

our coasts and project American power overseas. Since World War II, the primary means of

projecting naval power has been using carrier-based aircraft. While it is easy to fixate on the role

of high-tech weapons in Naval Aviations success, it is truly the Sailors that maintain and fly the

aircraft that add the most value to Naval Aviations product. Even the smartest bomb is useless

if not assembled correctly or if the aircrews are not adequately trained. In managing its people,

Naval Aviation, and the Navy as a whole, does some things better than others. Some

shortcomings in personnel management can be attributed to the limitations of the Navysnecessarily rigid structures and policies. Unquestionably, there is room for personnel

management to improve at all levels. This paper will examine a carrier-based squadron, the

primary organizational unit of Naval Aviation. It will highlight strengths, weaknesses, and

opportunities for improvement in personnel management via an examination of culture,

motivation, and leadership. To place this analysis in context, it will begin with a cursory

description of both the internal structure of a squadron and its environment.

Mission

The missions conducted by squadrons vary, but all require the generation of sorties,

flights by trained aircrew in fully mission capable aircraft. Different stakeholders use these

sorties for different purposes. The officers and enlisted Sailors of a squadron use them as a

metric to judge their efforts. The Operations Department uses the sorties to train aircrew. The

Commanding Officer uses the sorties to support the missions of his multitude superiors.

Ultimately, the United States Government uses sorties to support its foreign policy.

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Structure (See Fig. 1)

While squadron size varies by aircraft type, each has between four and twelve aircraft,

200-240 maintenance and support personnel and 20-30 Naval Aviators and Flight Officers. The

aircrews primary duty is to plan and execute flights. Additionally, they are assigned collateral

duties as managers of the enlisted members of the squadron. The enlisted ranks divide between

Chief Petty Officers, Petty Officers and Airmen (not to be confused with aircrew). There are

roughly 15 Chief Petty Officers, senior supervisors, at the top of the enlisted rank structure. The

chiefs are the repository of institutional knowledge and tradition and provide a buffer between

the officers and enlisted. Petty Officers are technicians of varying experience who earn greater leadership responsibility as they progress through the rank structure. Finally, the Airmen, not to

be confused with aircrew, are the primary source of manual labor as they work to learn their

intended area of expertise. The enlisted personnel in particular are organized in a rigid

hierarchical structure with a typical span of control of 8-14 people. The level of automation is

very low and training requirements typically equate to 10-15% of the total available man-hours.

Attendant to Navy manning policy, during a given year, a squadron can expect to turn over a

quarter to a third of its workforce.

The Commanding Officer (CO) and his Executive Officer (XO) lead the squadron.

Below the front office, the squadron divides into five departments: Operations, Maintenance,

Administration, Tactics, and Safety. Department Heads, the middle managers, lead each

department, which is typically broken down into divisions. Division Officers are junior officers

(JOs) who function as production managers. Finally, some divisions are broken down into

Branches grouped by technical expertise. While Department Heads work with the front office to

guide the squadrons course, Division Officers work with the chiefs to ensure that routine tasks

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go smoothly. The pyramidal rank structure of both the officer and enlisted corps expresses the

scalar principle and unity of command. Finally, the squadron structure displays the exceptions

principle in that Division Officers deal with routine matters thereby freeing the Department

Heads to advise the Commanding Officer.

Navy regulation delineates the structure and staffing of a squadron. The officers cannot,

in the short term, decide how many or of what specialty to hire. The process of firing an

individual is also difficult to control in the short term also. While most aspects of policy and

procedures are outside the control of the officers in a squadron, good leadership can nonetheless

improve squadron performance.

Environment

While outside the realm of organizational behavior, it is important to have an

appreciation for the environment that Sailors live and work in. Squadrons most often operate at

sea. Carrier squadrons spend an average of eight out of eighteen months deployed. Life onboard

an aircraft carrier consists of 12 to 14 hour days, seven days a week, in one of the most

dangerous working environments in the world. Conditions are cramped and often

uncomfortable. Plainly stated, carrier life is hard, particularly for the enlisted. It is in this

challenging environment that the Navy must lead and motivate its Sailors to mission

accomplishment.

The Value and Challenges of Navy Culture

Navy units rely on their strong organizational cultures. The Navy leverages its culture to

get the most out of its people. More than other organizations, the Navy formalizes a great deal of

its culture. The Navy optimizes person-organization fit by carefully selecting recruits based on

their capabilities and potential for integrating into the Navy. For instance, a drug history or

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criminal conviction may disqualify a candidate. The socialization of personnel to Navy culture

begins immediately in boot camp. The Navy indoctrinates loyalty to the Navy in recruits

through the teaching of Navy Core Values: Honor, Courage, and Commitment. The Navy

emphasizes its unique culture for several reasons. First, it seeks to maximize social identity,

teamwork, and selflessness as exemplified in the Navy slogan, Ship, shipmate, self. Second, it

wishes to create a unity of effort and action in every command. Finally, Navy culture encodes its

history, knowledge, and experience.

Throughout their daily lives, artifacts of Navy culture surround Sailors and officers.

There is no way to avoid it. The most obvious artifact is the uniform, a visible symbol of commitment to a common goal. The uniform identifies a Sailor with the Navy, but also their

squadron as the uniform can be customized to a specific squadron. Further, the Navy has its own

language; e.g. head instead of lavatory, ladder instead of staircase, scuttlebutt instead of

drinking fountain, etc. Symbols in the form of the squadron crest and mascot are common.

Ceremonies abound such as the formal Change of Command. These artifacts are the visible

manifestation of the Navys values. The values are built on the assumptions that all Sailors are

patriots who will always choose to do what is right.

The culture of the Navy serves to dampen out variance in perception, convey central

themes, and establish accepted norms of behavior. Beginning in Boot Camp, the Navy instills

Navy Core Values in its people to fill any moral voids or weaknesses in recruits. Later, leaders

can leverage their Sailors character to accomplish squadron missions in the face of adversity.

Ultimately, the Navy uses these principles guide Sailor responses and action when faced with

challenging, but decidedly weak situations (Stroh et al., 2002) in the fog of war.

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Squadron life is rife with strong and weak situations. Standard Operating Procedures and

the Uniform Code of Military Justice mandate uniform, predictable, and expected responses.

There are regulations covering everything from how to order a wrench to how to fly in

formation. The challenge to officers and enlisted is one of knowing the applicable regulation and

complying with it. Thus, the Navy seeks to limit weak situations as much as possible. But, even

in weak situations, the Navy exercises a measure of control. Since the relatively fixed traits of

personality seem most likely to determine behavior in weak situations, the Navy relies on the

imbued Core Values to guide individuals decisions. Weak situations combined with

considerable authority raise the possibility that some superiors may abuse their power, however.To guard against abuse of discretionary power at all levels, the Navy has a myriad of Equal

Opportunity policies.

As in other organizations, Sailors react to the Navys strong culture in several ways.

Overwhelmingly, Sailors conform. For others, the Navy seeks to reinforce its culture by

punishing those who rebel and, perhaps, retraining them through the Corrective Custody Unit

(CCU). The CCU is a month long boot camp-like experience designed to reinforce the Navy

Core Values. There are also certain creative individuals who manage to skirt lesser regulations.

They gain leeway only due to their exceptional job performance. While frustrating to leaders,

these people are often the unorthodox innovators who challenge the status quo and bring change

to the organization.

The Navy and the squadrons strong culture manifest further problems. The workforce of

the Navy is largely homogeneous, not necessarily in appearance, but in belief. Male,

conservative, Republican, and Christian describes the vast majority of Sailors. This

commonality breeds familiarity, but also some degree of groupthink. Additionally, a resistance

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to change dominates Navy culture. The prevailing attitude can be summed up as, This is the

way its always been done. The squadron usually adopts change very slowly and only after

buy-in from the chiefs.

To guard against the negative aspects of the its culture, the Navy must continually

impress upon its leaders the importance of actively seeking and listening to dissenting opinions.

Additionally, leaders must ensure that they and their Sailors comply with regulations regarding

the rights of minorities. Finally, leaders must make every effort to work with subordinates to

develop and implement change. However, one must remember that the squadron is not a

democracy. Mostly, the Navys strong culture is an asset to the squadron. Sailors are trusted tomake the right decisions on their own in weak situations. The underlying values of patriotism

and sacrifice ensure that Sailors will pull together to accomplish the squadrons mission even at

the risk of life and limb.

Sailor Motivation

Working on an aircraft carrier as part of a deployed squadron is difficult at best. Quarters

are cramped and the work is endless. Under these conditions, how does the squadron motivate

Sailors to complete their tasks? The answer is in how the squadron satisfies Sailors internal

needs and how the squadron system rewards them.

Herzbergs Two-Factor Theory (Herzberg in Stroh et al., 2003) provides the most insight

into how the squadron seeks to fulfill its Sailors internal needs. The squadron is very good at

satisfying Sailor hygiene factors. The Sailor has a guaranteed salary and job security as long as

they perform their duties. While the working conditions on an aircraft carrier are inherently

hazardous, the squadron ensures that Sailors receive adequate safety training and equipment to

limit the danger as much as possible. Perhaps because of this risky environment, Sailors form

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unusually strong relationships with their squadron mates, thereby fulfilling their affiliation needs.

The hygiene factors thus fulfilled, the Sailor is not dissatisfied and will do their job acceptably.

Superior job performance, however, is encouraged through the motivators that a squadron

provides.

An obvious motivator is the award of medals to Sailors in recognition of truly

outstanding work. Awards are only superficial though, and leaders recognize that superior

performance is usually the result of subtler forms of motivation. Many Sailors joined the Navy

out of a sense of patriotism and squadron leaders continually emphasize the nobility of service,

thereby providing for the Sailors higher needs. Others joined out of a desire to learn a technicaltrade or as a stepping-stone to college. In these cases, a Sailor generally finds their work in the

squadron satisfying. Growth opportunities are inherent to the squadron system, but have some

serious shortcomings.

The squadron administers biannual, Navy-wide advancement exams. If a Sailor studies

hard and does well, they will pass and be eligible for advancement. Thus, the Navy gives even

the most junior enlisted Sailors an opportunity for self-actualization. Unfortunately, due to

current manning limits, many smart Sailors who pass the tests cannot advance because of caps

placed on the number of Petty Officers at a particular rank in a given specialty. Some Sailors

pass the test multiple times, yet there is no room for them. This leads to frustration and crushes

Sailor instrumentality. It is equally frustrating for the squadron that fully recognizes the value of

the Sailor. Squadrons are allowed to spot promote only two or three Sailors a year through the

Command Advancement Program. Even with this stopgap measure, many deserving Sailors

miss the rewards they deserve. After years of disappointment, many able Sailors leave the Navy.

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While the squadron cannot do much to shorten deployments or make life onboard a

carrier more comfortable, there are certain steps it can take to address some of the issues that

negatively effect Sailor motivation. With the Perform To Serve initiative, the Navy now requires

Airmen and junior Petty Officers in overmanned specialties to either advance, change specialty

or leave the Navy. To remain in the crowded specialty the Bureau of Personnel must grant the

Sailor a waiver. While causing some initial disappointment, the intent is to prevent Sailors from

running into promotion walls later in their careers. At the squadron level, leaders should give

their Sailors more informal positive reinforcement, always the hallmark of strong leadership.

Deck Plate Leadership

The tools available to squadron leaders include reward, coercion, and power. Rewards

include work description and length, freedom to leave the base or ship, and eligibility for follow

on assignments. It is important to note that squadron leaders have limited authority to promote

and none to hire or increase pay. The coercion tools available to officers may appear draconian

to civilians (three days of bread and water is an option at sea), but are strictly governed by the

Uniform Code of Military Justice. The only squadron leader with the authority to fire an

employee is the CO, though all leaders can nominate a candidate. Legitimate power is inherent

in the squadrons rank structure, but expert and referent power are important sources as well.

The biggest challenge for squadron leadership, as in all organizations, is to motivate

Sailors to put forth their best effort. To do this, the best leaders leverage knowledge of their

Sailors needs and align them with squadron mission accomplishment. The idea of attaining

personal goals through superior work performance is central to Expectancy Theory. Without

knowing the Sailors goals, however, it is difficult to motivate the individual. This is why many

squadrons have new personnel write out goals upon check-in and periodically review them

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Squadron Leadership

Unfortunately, reinforcement techniques dominate squadron day-to-day operation due to

its ease and expedience. Punishments for regulations infractions are common, mainly through

Non-Judicial Punishment proceedings, but positive reinforcement is rare. Positive reinforcement

is generally limited to the occasional word of praise or limited personal recognition after

deployment. While a mark of weak leadership, this system prevents the worst behavior but it

also does not promote the best.

To improve squadron congruence, squadrons should increase the number of required

formal counseling sessions from two to four a year. Quarterly counseling will ensure that Sailors

know how they are performing in the eyes of their evaluators and provide the Sailor with agreater chance to change their behavior accordingly. Squadrons should also institute limited

formal feedback from subordinates to allow officers to better align their own actions their

valences. Furthermore, COs should be granted the ability to give cash awards to Sailors for

outstanding service as is the case in the civil service. This would give squadron leadership a

powerful new tool with which to motivate their Sailors.

The Officer/Enlisted Relationship

Officer and enlisted perceptions are fundamentally different. Obvious differences exist

between college-educated, JOs and their 18-year old, high school graduate personnel. To add

complexity to an officers management task, many in the squadron are older with considerably

more time in the service. There are many tools available to assist JOs in managing such a

diverse group, but a fundamental truth of naval leadership is that those who work for you often

live in a very different world. Understanding the subordinates perspective is the key to

successful leadership.

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Construction of differing views may result from orders to work over the weekend. While

not enthusiastic about the COs decision, officers probably recognize its necessity to meet a

squadron mission. A young Sailor, however, may feel that the CO is simply harsh and punishing

the squadron for no reason. After all, the young sailor knows nothing of the Operations

Departments requirements for the next week. Chances are the officers received this information

at a weekly All Officers Meeting. All too often, such information never reaches the lowest

levels. That a substantial portion of the organization does not have the big-picture is a recurring

problem for squadrons. To avoid this situation, officers should make sure to share information

with their subordinates to the greatest extent possible.Certainly, not all officers manage in the same manner. Unfortunately, this produces not

only variance in how divisions, departments, and squadrons function, but also how Sailors

interpret a leaders actions and policies. One concerned leaders tough love becomes anothers

just being tough. The degree of understanding between officers and enlisted may depend on

the amount of time both have served in the squadron. The role of buffering between the officers

and the enlisted belongs to the chief petty officers. The best advice a chief can give an officer is

an appreciation of the enlisted perspective.

Consider that officers have a relatively strong internal locus of control, that is, they are

relatively able to manage events that affect them. Enlisted locus of control, however, is strongly

external. They are subject to the orders of supervisors, senior petty officers, chiefs and officers.

It is common for a sailor to receive conflicting orders from two different individuals to

accomplish tasks simultaneously. For instance, the flight doctor may order a Sailor to report to

Medical for a physical, while the Maintenance Master Chief requires him to man-up an aircraft

for a maintenance check. The conflicting orders place the Sailor in a no-win situation.

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Disobedience will not be tolerated by either leader, but the sailor cannot do both at once. To

prevent this situation, squadrons must stay keenly aware of the multitude demands placed on

their Sailors. Officers must be discouraged from developing the belief that their orders are more

important than anyone elses are. Sailors, in turn, need to communicate to the chain of command

legitimate concerns regarding conflicting orders.

Leaders also have an impact on their Sailors social identity. When leaders seek to

establish a positive social identity in their people, it imprints a military mindset, sense of

belonging, and builds unit espirit de corps . Unfortunately, managers can develop prejudicial

stereotypes. One derogatory term applied to Sailors is TED. TED, an acronym for TypicalEnlisted Dude, lumps all junior enlisted into a category of assumed marginal intelligence,

immaturity, and lack of sophistication. Squadron leadership must stamp out stereotypes of all

kinds. Accepting them in the squadron widens the divide between officers and enlisted and

potentially creates negative self-fulfilling prophecies.

Junior Officer Development Shortcomings

As demonstrated, the Navy stresses leadership at all levels to sustain its competitive

advantage. In theory, the Navy conducts extensive leadership training of senior enlisted

personnel and officers throughout their careers. The Navy Leadership Training Continuum

(NLTC) provides leadership training from Second Class Petty Officers up to COs. According to

the Naval Aviation Schools Command web site, The leadership continuum courses were

designed to familiarize personnel with leadership and management competencies. For enlisted

Sailors, NLTC is their first formal leadership training. Squadrons monitor their petty officers

closely to ensure that they receive this valuable training. Unfortunately, this is not the case in the

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officer corps. JOs often face their first leadership responsibilities with little or no practical

training.

While officers receive leadership training at their accession source (Naval Academy,

NROTC, etc.), the training is mitigated due to the isolation of from enlisted personnel. Further,

aviation officers have up to three years of flight training before they have an opportunity to lead

Sailors. To bolster leadership and managerial knowledge, the Basic Officer Leadership Training

Course (BOLTC) is supposed to provide young officers with guidance on how to manage their

first division. Ironically, this training is offered at either the beginning or middle of flight

training. Many aviators never attend, as squadrons do not make it a priority. As a result, mostJOs assume their first roles as manager/leaders with minimal tools. It is a sink or swim situation.

What little leadership and management guidance JOs receive is through On the Job

Training to use the common euphemism. This informal training is via ongoing case studies in

the squadron. JOs observe Department Heads and COs and note apparently successful and

unsuccessful leadership strategies. Additionally, in one of their most important and difficult

roles, chief petty officers are informally charged with developing their Division Officer. While

seemingly contradictory, this system works in the squadron because referent and expert power do

not follow rank alone, but also experience. Unfortunately, JOs often lack the experience to

integrate situational determinates into their paradigm of leadership. In addition, they are often

heavily biased by personality, typically finding themselves in either outsider or insider groups,

described by the Leadership Member Exchange Model, for reasons they do not understand. All

too often, junior officers learn what not to do through negative experiences rather than through

any positive guidance on how to lead effectively.

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To improve the leadership training of junior officers, squadron COs should make BOLTC

mandatory before junior officers are put into division officer billets. Training should occur after

the entire flight-training syllabus when a JO is on the way to their first operational squadron.

The type-wing, the squadrons macro-organization, should provide the funds for the training at

existing centers or establish a BOLTC course at their home station. Short of that, squadrons

should use their own funds to facilitate junior officer training.

The Nature of Command

Due to a common organizational culture and environment, many COs share traits

conducive to effective leadership. Like all officers, COs are constantly and specificallyevaluated on leadership and integrity throughout their careers. The strenuous selection process

demands drive and a desire to lead. In addition, most enlisted personnel imbue the The Old

Man with referent power as they recognize that the CO sacrificed much to achieve his position.

The most effective CO is transformational and inspirational for reasons beyond the obvious.

Transactional leadership, with its concern for processes, is often wasted effort as squadron

structure and procedures are externally delineated. Additionally, the operations tempo is a

leadership neutralizer during large portions of the year, as it is largely dictated by an externally

developed schedule. This leaves shaping attitudes and motivation as his only real recourse to

transform a squadron. Typically, playing to patriotic instincts, aggressive military heroics, and a

work hard, play hard mentality best aligns the expectations of the mostly young and male

workforce with the squadrons mission.

The squadron task environment is typically unstructured with clear goals (sortie

generation). Subordinates are typically skilled in their tasks with high achievement needs.

Formal authority is extensive and the organizational culture supports participation and is

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achievement oriented. These situational characteristics coupled with a deeper understanding of

the Path-Goal theory of leadership would suggest most successful leaders use either Supportive

or Achievement leadership styles. The Supportive leadership style, in its typical manifestation,

is not compatible with a military culture. Empirical evidence indicates most successful squadron

COs use an Achievement leadership style.

The task of a leader is to strengthen their subordinates expectancy links. Here again the

results are mixed due to externalities. The first expectancy link is routinely very strong. The

Navy tells enlisted personnel from the first day of boot camp that they can accomplish anything

if they work hard and listen to their superiors. In fact, a squadron CO would have to work to break this link. The link between performance and consequence, however, is prone to

externalities with regard to schedule and the inputs required. The CO has some influence on

operations tempo and, therefore, has some marginal affect on the achievability of squadron goals.

Unfortunately, there are not many systemic changes possible to improve CO efficacy. It

is the nature of the squadrons fluid task environment that externalities will always influence

personnel instrumentality. To the maximum extent possible, COs should shape and capitalize on

the squadrons strong culture. By developing a clear squadron mission statement and conveying

a genuine regard for his people, a CO can instill in his squadron a positive belief in the

squadrons mission and their ability to complete it. A squadron without a committed,

enthusiastic Skipper is like a ship without a rudder.

Conclusion

To complete its mission, a squadron relies on its Sailors. These Sailors, imbued with

Navy culture, require well-trained, committed leaders to lead and motivate them. While there

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are significant shortcomings in personnel management practices, it is the combination of

leadership and dedication to duty that makes the United States Navy second to none.

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Figure 1

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OB Paper - Final