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UNIVERSITÄT DES SAARLANDES FACHRICHTUNG 4.3 – ANGLISTIK, AMERIKANISTIK UND ANGLOPHONE KULTUREN Lehrstuhl für Englische Sprachwissenschaft Univ.-Professor Dr. Neal R. Norrick
Psycholinguistics – lecture script – SS 09
1. Introduction
Psycholinguistics = the study of language and mind
mind versus brain
• mind as understanding, senses, spirit, psyche
• mind as total of cognitive capacities
• myth of the ghost in the machine
language as communication versus language as thought
• thought as silent, internal speech
• language as representation of underlying thought
Psycholinguistics is:
• either - study of underlying language system (in memory)
• or - study of language production & comprehension
reflecting distinction of competence versus performance
Psycholinguistics versus neighbor disciplines:
Sociolinguistics, Neurolinguistics, Cognitive Linguistics
2
2. Biological foundations of speech
2.1 Organs of speech
humans have no specific organs of speech, but we find specialization for speech in
many parts of system
• evolution of human physiology (phylogenesis)
• development of children from birth (ontogenesis)
� result in contemporary adult human speech system
3
• erect posture frees hands to develop fine motor skills
• fine motor skills in tool-making lead to brain development
• brain development enables symbolic representation
• erect posture lowers epiglottis and larynx
• larger mouth and lower tongue expand range of sounds
4
2.2 Nervous system
central versus peripheral
descending, motor versus ascending, sensory
� but both systems function together in complex activity,
so that brain gets feedback on effects
nerve development from birth to two years reflects growth in motor and language skills
newborn baby six-month old
5
fifteen-month old twenty-four-month old
6
� special areas of brain for language skills
organization of perception, language and articulation in the brain:
motor cortex:
7
2.3 Brain Lateralization
specialization of function in left and right hemispheres as part of evolutionary
development in brain
still, corpus callosum connects the two hemispheres
lateralization of language functions in brain:
contralateral organization and handedness
dominance of left-brain in language ability
8
Dichotic Listening:
Dichotic listening tests have shown a right ear advantage in recognizing linguistic
sounds, while non-verbal sounds received through the left ear are processed faster.
3. Linguistics and mental entities
3.1 Words and concepts
word meaning as mental image
words as signs of concepts, labels for concepts
concepts might be figures, images, models etc
concepts include perceptual and functional information
9
Miller & Johnson-Laird's concept:
3.2 Sounds and phonemes
phonemes as psychologically real entities
abstract phoneme /p/
versus positionally variant allophones:
• aspirated [ph] word-initial, as in pill
• preglottalized [√p] word-final, as in lip
• unaspirated [p-] after initial s, as in spill
these allophones are predictable variants
they don't distinguish meanings
ability to distinguish meanings defines phonemes
10
hence: minimal pair test
pill - bill
but experiments show:
• words are recognized faster than phonemes
• we recognize the letter b and the sound /b/
faster in the word bat than in isolation
• words are more salient than phonemes
� suprasegmental features are also psychologically salient
intonation distinguishes statements and questions
Sally's here. versus Sally's here?
stress focuses on any constituent in questions
Sally gave the new car to Judy today?
• can question whether it was Sally (not Suzy),
• whether she gave (not loaned) the car,
• whether it was the new (not the old) car etc
other salient suprasegmentals are volume and speed,
they signal speaker attitudes and emotional states.
11
3.3 Sentences and propositions
sentences as grammatical representations of underlying meaning in the form of (logical)
propositions
propositions in language of thought clarify (logical) relations between words and
sentences, represent entailments, inferences etc
versus
sentences following the rules of some natural language
grammar rules transform underlying meanings into grammatical sentences of natural
language
so a single underlying logical proposition has multiple possible representations in any
given natural language, e.g.
the cat is on the mat, the cat is on top of the mat
the mat is under the cat, the mat is beneath the ca t etc
but where would such a logical language of propositions come from if not from
communication in a natural language?
But if our language of thought is some acquired natural language, then the specific
characteristics of that language determine our patterns of thinking - and this leads to the
Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis.
3.4 Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis
Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis sees language and human cognition as related in non-arbitrary
ways
12
Sapir 1921, 1929, 1949, Whorf 1950, 1956 proposed a relationship between language,
meaning, culture, and personality, generally called the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis
The strong version of the hypothesis says our language determines our perception. We
see the things and processes our language has names for and ignore or cannot see
what our language doesn't name.
The weak version of the hypothesis says our language influences our perception. We
attend to the things and processes our language has names for and tend to ignore or
find it difficult to attend to what our language doesn't name, e.g.
English speakers with only a single word wall find it difficult to understand and
make the distinctions necessary for choosing Wand versus Mauer in German.
German and English speakers group together all kinds of spherical objects with
the single word ball , they would not normally distinguish the objects categorized
in French as ball from those called ballon .
In French, speakers must attend to differences in size and determine whether an
object is inflated or not to categorize it as ball versus ballon .
Also, the grammar of the language we're speaking at any given time (be it our native
language or not) forces us to think in certain ways.
Slobin's ‘thinking for speaking’ notes that any language system enforces certain choices
in grammar and lexis, no matter how our underlying thought patterns work,
e.g. because of the tense/aspect system of English, all the following questions
are relevant in talking about an event:
When did the action take place? present versus past tense
Is it completed? perfective versus simple aspect
Was it an ongoing process or a momentary activity? progressive versus simple aspect
Did it only happen once or does it always happen? progressive versus simple aspect
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In many other languages, these questions are not important for grammar.
But in various languages, the questions below are important for determining
grammatical forms (word order, cases):
• Did I (as speaker) see the event or just hear about it?
• Is this statement a fact or just my opinion?
• What kinds of words are typically subjects? And what kinds objects?
Compare: I like it, mir gefällt es, mi piace
I'm cold, mich friert, mir ist kalt, isch h ann kalt, j'ai froid
If we must always attend to certain distinctions and ignore others, in speaking and
thinking, shouldn't that influence the way we think?
Nevertheless, we manage to translate between languages and to learn other languages,
so apparently our thought patterns can extend and adapt.
We can grasp and learn to use words from other languages, even if they have no
counterpart in our native language, e.g.
Schadenfreude blind date
4. Words in the Mental Lexicon
Mental Lexicon versus dictionary
words accessible via sound, meaning, related words
Mental Lexicon versus encyclopedia
14
Encyclopedia contains all kinds of knowledge, usually unnecessary for normal word use,
e.g. for dog :
• perceptual: four-legged, furry, barking sound etc
• functions: used as pet, for hunting, guarding etc
• behaviors: chases cats, chews bones, is territorial etc
• origins: animal, mammal, bears litters of puppies etc
• history: domesticated early, developed into pet etc
• facts: Suzy has a puppy, Bill's dog chases cars etc
Encyclopedia contains entries for concepts not represented by individual words in
lexicon
e.g. for "aquatic mammals" and "famous scientists" or "favorite bars in town"
assume that lexical entries specify only:
• sound
• morphological irregularities
• syntactic properties
• core meaning for identification
• relations to other words
• perhaps spelling
4.1 Word Association Tests (WATs)
Experiments show:
we recognize concrete words like table
faster than abstract words like trouble
15
table ���� chair faster, more consistent
trouble ���� bad lower, less consistent
we also recognize familiar words and short words faster than unfamiliar and long words
Compare: A traveling salesman arrived in town
An itinerate salesman arrived in town
WATs also show paradigmatic versus syntagmatic relations:
• paradigmatic apple, pear, banana, plum
• syntagmatic apple, red, juicy, eat
in WATs:
• adults respond paradigmatically: pillow ���� bed
• children respond syntagmatically: pillow ���� soft
semantic features (or components) are also psychologically real for speakers
Woman ���� human, adult, female . . .
Man ���� human, adult, male . . .
again kids don't analyze, responding syntagmatically:
Man ���� work instead of woman ���� adult or female
based on response times to questions like:
• Can a canary sing?
• Can a canary fly?
• Does a canary have skin?
16
Collins & Quillan (1989) postulate memory structures:
But other tests show pure frequency of occurrence in discourse counts for more than
response times in WATs
A canary sings/is yellow more frequent
versus
A canary flies/eats less frequent
WATs show faster recognition after associated words:
• we recognize roof faster after house
• than after some unrelated word like apple
17
so Lindsay & Norman (1972) postulate lexical networks:
WATs are a questionable method:
• WATs elicit unnatural verbal behavior
• WATs develop quantitative results, but they're always fuzzy
• WATs are usually limited to nouns, usually concrete but consider, e.g.
colors,fruits, games etc
• WATs are unnecessary, given discourse analysis, especially now with computers
available
4.2 Tip-of-the-Tongue Phenomena
thinking on Tip-of-the-Tongue (TOT) phenomena begins with James (1890)
James speaks of “a gap that is intensively active” in consciousness when we try to recall
a forgotten name.
18
Meringer and Mayer (1895), Fromkin (1973) kept personal catalogues of error types to
gather natural data.
Brown and McNeill (1966) collected intuitions on remembering in diary studies, e.g.
unable to recall the name of the street on which a relative lives,
one of us thought of Congress and Corinth and Concord
and then looked up the address and learned that it was Cornish .
Brown and McNeill also induce TOT states, by reading definitions of uncommon words
to subjects, who then answer questions about their search for the missing word, e.g.
subjects asked to identify the target word sextant based on a dictionary definition
“A navigational instrument used in measuring angular distances, especially the
altitude of sun, moon and stars at sea.”
Burke et al. (1991) write, “When a TOT occurs, a lexical node in a semantic system
becomes activated, giving access to semantic information about the target word, but at
least some phonological information remains inaccessible.”
Subjects in the TOT state often report that a word related to the target comes repeatedly
and involuntarily to mind, yielding ‘blockers’, ‘interlopers’ or ‘persistent alternates’, e.g.
sexton or sextet for sextant
Burke et al. (1991) developed an experimental task, using prompts like those in a trivia
game presented on a computer, where subjects typed responses, e.g.
What is the old name of Taiwan?
target: Formosa foils: Taipei, Canton, Ceylon
The foils often acted as blockers for the target word
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They then asked questions like:
• “How familiar do you think the word is?”
• “How certain are you that you can recall the word?“
• “What is the first letter or group of letters in the word?”
Burke et al. (1991) identify a semantic system or network of nodes connecting concepts
• the concept chastity is connected with “is a virtue,” “take a vow of” etc
• the concept baker with “bake bread” “get up early” “sell cakes” “knead dough” etc
Compare scripts of Schank and Abelson (1977), cognitive models of Lakoff (1987):
• Cognitive model for chastity would identify prototypes for the virtue like saints,
and distinguish characteristics like “is a virtue” from linguistic constructions in
which the word chastity occurs such as “take a vow of chastity.”
• Cognitive model for baker would identify prototypes for profession like the owner
of the bakery at the foot of the hill.
Burke et al. (1991) say one word may prime, i.e. facilitate recognition of, another word,
the activation of nurse facilitates activation of doctor because priming spreads and
summates via these many shared connections.
Cognitive processes recoded in diary studies and lab experiments differ from TOT
searches in real conversation, e.g.
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1 Helen: in Hammond, north Hammond. Junior Toy Company.
2 they used to make toys, little tricycles and scooters and everything.
3 David: and where was it?
4 Helen: I don't remember the street.
5 Hoffman?
6 No.
7 it was a little beyond right here, you know,
8 it wasn't right in north Hammond.
9 it was around that street that turns into Illinois,
10 there when you go to the cemetery.
11 here's a tavern on one side and a VFW on one side.
12 forget the street.
13 David: Gosselin?
14 Helen: Could be, I don't know.
15 I don't know,
16 but that's where Junior Toy was in the low corner there.
Helen expresses her forgetfulness at line 4 with “I don’t remember the street.”
She takes a guess at the name in line 5, but immediately rejects the guess in line 6.
She begins an extended description of the area in terms of landmarks in lines 7-11.
She concludes, “I forget the street” at line 12,
but David offers a guess of his own, since he’s familiar with the local neighborhood.
21
Helen expects help with name or at least assurance that David can identify the place.
Storytellers often name landmarks and major streets, not phonetically similar words.
Note references to cemetery (l. 10), tavern and VFW (l.. 11)
Description “in the low corner” implies that the teller can visualize the scene.
So why not search corpora for natural instances of TOT?
4.3 Discourse, frames, prototypes
Cognitive linguists look at discourse contexts where words occur,
e.g. if, for an item like roof,
The house needs a new roof
Then "house has a roof" is part of discourse frame
Consider also frame effects:
We saw an old house.
The roof was in need of repair.
Consider typical collocations and metaphors:
• she has no roof over her head for 'no house'
• we're finally under one roof for 'in the same house'
22
Moreover, Rosch and her co-workers have shown:
• some properties are more salient than others
• some members of a category are more typical
it may be impossible to define certain words without exemplification,
e.g.: colors, fruits, games etc
• instead of: "a fruit is the edible part of a plant etc"
• we find: "a fruit is like an apple, a peach or a banana"
� word meanings and categories are generally not defined by features or propositions,
but by prototypes
Testing for prototypes
A. Ask subjects to identify the most typical bird:
B. Ask subjects for typical statements about birds, e.g.
A bird was singing outside my window
A bird flew down and caught a worm etc
23
C. Then substitute different bird names into the statements and ask how well they fit:
A robin/eagle/chicken was singing outside my window
A robin/eagle/chicken flew down and caught a worm
D. Test for speed of verification of identity statements
A robin/eagle/chicken/penguin/bat is a bird
Prototype Effects:
prototype: A trout is a typical fish
marginal: A tadpole is a kind of a fish
non-member: Their daughter is a regular fish
Note: real members don't fit here:
*This trout is a regular fish
Prototypical verb meanings extend:
• The kid runs around the house
• The pavement runs around the house
• The rainwater runs down the spout
• The Mississippi runs from Minnesota to the Gulf
• Peter climbed a ladder
• The plane climbed to 30,000 feet
• The ivy climbed the fence
• The temperature climbed to 30° C
• Judy climbed down into the well
24
5. First Language Acquisition
Natural acquisition with no special learning necessary
critical period resulting from a combination of factors:
• development of connections between nerve cells
• myelination of nerve cells
• lateralization of brain functions
• dominance of left hemisphere
• corresponding development of motor skills
• general cognitive stages of development (Piaget)
5.1 Developmental sketch
Age
(months)
Language General
9 babbling crawling
10 first words standing up,
recurrent, maintained: claps hands,
(ba)nana(na) for holds spoon
'banana, food, mama'
11 5-10 recurrent words first steps,
fulfills requests like: recognizes pictures
bring me the blue ball in books
show me the big red dog
25
12 5 distinct vowels starts walking
5 distinct consonants
13 recognizable words running,
daddy nein ball allgone climbing furniture
14 imitations: horse, train simple puzzles,
reduplications: choochoo turns book pages
byebye taktak ‘clock’
16 recognizes own name points to himself:
20+ words
Where's Nicky?
18 vocabulary explosion climbs stairs
2-word units: ducky allgone without rail
Nicky haben
20 3-word units: Nicky cookie haben hangs on monkey bars,
also: haben Nicky cookie points to eyes, nose,
mouth
22 verb + particle: lock up / deck zu dramatic play,
4-word units: stuffed animals, dolls
Mami Auto fahren kau ft
Inni gute Nacht sagen
26
24 verb endings: Inni spuckt bisschen kicks soccer ball,
statement: Nicky auch essen plays hide-n-seek,
question: Nicky auch essen, ja? draws details:
command: Nicky auch essen ears, tails, wheels
word-formation: cutter ‘knife’
auskleben ’tear apart’ umwärts
26 participles: draws objectively
Mami ist weggegingt identifiable figures,
das ist runtergefallt recognizes colors
comparison:
Pferdchen ein kleineres
Mond grösser als Daddy
Monologues/stories:
Mami kommt darein, tic-tac
Danke, Post schickt Daddy
27 future orientation: sings melodies
Let's build a castle
I'll put it in
28 recursive structures: counts to 5
Ich weiss nicht, wen recognizes letters:
der Deckel verloren hat N, C, O
questions with when, how
27
30 conditionals:
Ich suche, ob ich den Hasen finde
Timmy ist traurig, wenn das
Osterhäschen hier schläft
plans:
I want to read a book about a story
32
first real narrative:
builds Legos,
It was a wooden lamby
and it was on the floor in a barn
draws people beside
tree and house with
and they took it home chimney and windows
and they washed it
and it wasn't ugly
34 reports on TV program: learns to pedal trike
Plötzlich kamen zwei Krokodile und
haben das Kälbchen ge'essen
reports on activities:
I'm pretending this is a castle
explains actions:
I break it that I can make it new
predicts:
It's gonna be real beautiful, you're
gonna love it
28
36 months:
Phonetics:
• voiced th: initial okay in the this etc
• medial v in other
• voiceless th : initial s in sing
• final f in both
• vocalizes final l and r
• mispronunciations: amimals, cimamon, pasketti
Morphology:
• double plurals: mens, feets, mices
• double preterites: sawed, stooded
• regularized preterites: goed, sitted
• reverse word-formations: popcorner, mowgrasser
Syntax:
• negation: I see it not, That doll sits not right
• questions: What it did? What the lady said?
• counting: 1 2 3 4 5 6 20 14 fiveteen 16
Mean Length of Utterance (MLU) as standard measure of first language development as
opposed to age
29
5.2 Natural order of acquisition:
5.2.1 "Why mama and papa?"
Jakobson's order for phoneme acquisition
• in babbling, children produce all kinds of sounds and sound combinations; many
children produce imitations after babbling
• but around age 2, children narrow their sound repertory and begin to produce
sounds of their language in fixed order
order reflects an attempt to create the clearest possible set of distinctions at any given
point, within the given physiological limits
• this order of acquisition also reveals parallels between different languages
• most salient distinction is between Vowels (V) and Consonants (C)
Vowels are characteristically open and resonant:
• the prototypical V is a
Consonants are characteristically closed and obstruent:
• stops are prototypical Cs
• the prototypical stop is p
the prototypical syllable is CV: maximizing the C-V distinction, a child's first syllable
should be pa
• given children's tendency to reduplication, a child's first real word should be papa
30
the first division within the class of Cs is that between oral and nasal; the nasal
counterpart of bilabial p is m
• maximizing the p-m distinction and reduplicating, the child's second word should be
mama (actually initial nasals often appear first, because of the association with sucking;
and mama is often first word recorded, because of the centrality of mother for the child)
major divisions within the class of Vs are those between front and back, high and low,
spread and open; the vowel most distinct from a along all these parameters is i
• again maximizing the a-i distinction (and reduplicating), the child's next words
should be pipi and mimi
extending the pattern of Vs, always seeking to maximize distinctness, the child should
move to a triplet:
a
u i
after the Cs p and m , the child usually acquires t , then the third voiceless stop k and so
on:
p m t k
� child moves on to ever larger patterns with increasing numbers of distinctive features
only when child controls the individual consonants can they occur together in 2-
consonant clusters:
31
• then word-initial clusters like pl- and st- precede final clusters like -lp and -st
• later come initial 3-consonant clusters like spr- and str-
• and then word-final 3-consonant clusters like -rst and -sks
of course, kids don't learn sounds in isolation, but only in words and syntactic structures
5.2.2 Order of acquisition for syntax
at first, kids produce:
• one-word utterances with holistic meaning
• two-word utterances with no fixed word order
• three-word utterances without inflections
• prepositions or other markers
then they begin to acquire syntax
Brown's (1973) order of acquisition for syntax:
1. present progressive girl playing
2. prepositions ball in water
3. plural toys, dishes
4. irregular past tense went, told
5. possessive Ann's toys
6. articles a dog, the dog
32
order of acquisition as reflecting general learning strategies and stages of development
(Piaget) or as evidence of innate language acquisition device (Chomsky)
5.3 Piaget
language as product of intelligence, not behaviorist learning
rational origin of language presupposes fixed nucleus,
i.e. structures common to all human languages
like subject-predicate, hierarchical organization
but no specific language-learning device (despite Chomsky)
Piaget assumes child language development reflects species development; no
innateness assumption is necessary, given sensorimotor intelligence in human
development
language as a special case of general symbolic behavior
• developmentally, each stage prepares for the next,
• but each new stage requires a reorganization
7. regular past tense jumped, hugged, wanted
8. regular 3rd person she goes, talks, watches
9. irregular 3rd person she does, has
10. auxiliary be:I am, you are, she is
11. contracted auxiliary I'm, you're, she's
33
e.g. infant recognizes caregiver as separate from continuum
caregiver as recurrent/stable entity
self as separate
self as entity like caregiver
e.g. kid recognizes human sound separate from continuum
language sound as separate from babbling
discrete word as separate from continuum
discrete word as recurrent/stable entity
word + word as unit
hierarchy within word + word unit etc
Piagetian stages in general cognitive development
1. Sensory-motor stage (birth to 2 years)
• child notices objects as separate from self and permanent
• manipulates objects as chief contact with environment
2. Preoperational thought
2a. Stage of symbolic thought (age 2-4)
• symbolic play, pretending and language acquisition
• child recognizes social nature of language.
34
2b. Stage of intuitive thought (age 4-7)
• child begins to think in language, but thinking is still egocentric and centered on
one relationship at a time.
3. Stage of concrete operations (age 7-11)
• child can vary two or more relationships independently
• solves conservation problem by compensation
4. Stage of formal operations (age 11-15)
hypothesis formation and testing. rational consideration of the form of an argument, e.g.
All three-legged snakes are purple.
I am hiding a three-legged snake.
What color is it?
35
5.4 Innateness Debate
Chomsky (1986: 150) writes:
What we "know innately" are the principles of the various subsystems [phonology,
syntax, thematic structure etc] of So [the initial state of the child's mind] and the manner
of their interaction, and the parameters associated with these principles. What we learn
are the values of the parameters and the elements of the periphery (along with the
lexicon to which similar considerations apply).
That is: we "know innately" as part of Universal Grammar (UG) that sentences will have
noun phrases and verb phrases in some order, but we have to learn the order.
Chomsky argues children must know innately what they can not learn by observation.
Poverty of Stimulus Argument (POS)
Some patterns in language are unlearnable from positive evidence alone
(due to the hierarchical nature of languages)
You are happy.
Are you happy?
possible rules:
1. the first auxiliary verb in the sentence moves to the front
2. the main auxiliary verb in the sentence moves to the front
but compare:
• The girl who is on the bus is happy.
• *Is the girl who __ on the bus is happy?
• Is the girl who is on the bus __ happy?
Children don't see sentences like this enough to decide which rule works
but nobody ever chooses the wrong rule
36
Grammaticality judgments:
• Who do you think Mary knows?
• Who do you think that Mary knows?
• Who do you think knows Mary?
• *Who do you think that knows Mary?
Note translations!
We need input to learn the whole vocabulary of our language, including the special
syntactic properties of the vocabulary we learn. We need input to set parameters like
word order, use of cases versus prepositions etc. and we need input for the periphery,
i.e. all the structures and rules characteristic for the particular language we hear.
But if input supplies all this information, shouldn't it supply enough information to learn
the basic principles?
Consider the acquisition of vocabulary:
• Webster’s dictionary: 500,000 words
• Average educated person’s vocabulary: 40,000 words
(and another 40,000 proper names, idioms, sayings)
thus: monolingual speakers acquire about 4,000 words per year or about 10 words
every day to age 20
Even within the Chomskyan scheme, there's debate on whether the principles and
parameters are complete in the newborn child (like the heart) or whether they develop
over time (like the teeth, which slowly grow and appear, then are replaced by an adult
system).
And even if we "know innately" the principles of language, are they separate from or
integrated with other abilities?
37
How the debate developed:
Chomsky develops Poverty of Stimulus Argument
• posits Language Acquisition Device (LAD) and Universal Grammar (UG)
• claims input is flawed and insufficient for acquisition
• input too complicated, contains ungrammatical structures
Child Language researchers counter by showing caregivers using simple, grammatical
sentences as well as repetitions & expansions
Kevin (20 mo's, 21 days) takes puppet
Kevin: Dougall. Dougall, Dougall.
Mother: He's a lovely Dougall, isn't he?
Eileen (24 months, 8 days) points puppet toward television
Eileen: Skippy a telly.
Mother: That's Skippy on the telly.
Chomsky argues competence would require "negative evidence"
as basis for grammaticality judgments--without LAD and UG innate
Al is easy to please - It is easy to please Al
Sue is eager to please - *It is eager to please Su e
Child Language researchers claim kids learn to make grammaticality judgments only
later (in school) & argue that judgments are based on semantic factors
It is eager - unacceptable for nongrammatical reasons
38
Gold proves mathematically that natural languages are unlearnable in principle without
negative evidence (unless LAD and UG are innate)
Child Language researchers show caregivers making corrections, esp. in expansions
(as above) and responses
Billy: Daddy fixit?
Father: Yeah. Daddy'll fix it for you.
Janik (4,8): Mami, ich will mit dich.
Mother: Mit?
Janik: Dir.
Chomsky-ites argue that caregivers are more concerned with truth and appropriateness
of kids' talk than grammaticality
they find language communities where kids receive little if any controlled input or
feedback from caregivers, and they learn language anyway
Child Language researchers went back to study input,
e.g. as a register like foreigner talk
this led to study of interaction and hence to kids developing pragmatic competence,
including interaction between kids
39
We find kids correct each other from ca. 4 1/2 years on:
Nick (4;3): I'm his- I'm a Santa. Who are you?
Coco (2;7): Santa Mrs.
Nick: No, Mrs. Santa.
Come on, let's break the other people's house down.
Coco (3;2): Und sie waren in dem Wald in die Nacht.
Nick (4;10): In der Nacht.
Due to influence of linguistic pragmatics (from philosophy of language: Austin, Searle,
Grice), frame theory and richer theories of learning, Child Language researchers re-
emphasized input, feedback and strategies of learning, especially negative evidence we
find kids not only provide negative evidence, but even engage in metalinguistic talk:
Nick: Daddy, Coco hat gesagt güter. Das kann man nicht sa gen, oder?
Me: Nee, was muss man sagen.
Nick: Coco meint besser.
Coco: Nein, güter.
Nick: Nein, Coco, besser. Du musst besser sagen.
Coco: Lass mich, das ich sage.
Nick: ((lacht)) Jetzt hat Coco wieder Unsinn gesagt.
Nick (5;9): Coco, look at these mouses.
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Coco (4;1): Mice.
Nick: Same thing.
5.5 Slobin's Operating Principles & Universals of A cquisition
Whether parts of language acquisition are innate or not, developing kids seem to follow
specific strategies and their acquisition processes reveal universals
Operating Principles
A. Identify word units.
B. Forms of words may be systematically modified.
C. Pay attention to the ends of words.
D. There are elements which encode relations between words.
Universal 1:
• postposed forms learned before preposed forms
• articles before nouns less salient than noun suffixes
E. Avoid exceptions
Universal 2: Stages of linguistic marking
1. no marking: bird, birdy - singular & plural
2. appropriate marking in limited cases: bird, birdies - plural
3. overgeneralization of marking: mens, sheeps
4. appropriate marking everywhere
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F. Semantic relations should be marked clearly.
Universal 3:
• one-to-one marking is acquired earlier than compound markings.
• unchanging singular articles like French le are acquired faster than
der/den/dem in German
G. Grammatical markers should make semantic sense.
Universal 4:
• if a group of inflections all mark the same relation, the child will tend to use
the single commonest form for all cases
• irregular past tenses reduce to dental suffix -ed
Universal 5:
• semantically consistent grammatical rules are acquired early and without
significant error
• kids don't overextend the progressive to stative verbs, as in *She's
knowing the answer or *I'm liking cookies
6. Second Language Acquisition
6.1 Contrastive Analysis
growing out of work by Fries (1945) and Weinreich (1953) most work on Second
Language Acquisition in the 40's and 50's shared the assumptions of Contrastive
Analysis (Lado 1957)
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Contrastive Analysis based on transfer
• from Native Language (NL) to Target Language (TL)
or First Language (L1) to Second Language (L2)
• shared structures facilitate acquisition
• distinct structures cause problems
• positive transfer when L1 and L2 share structures
e.g. Det Adj N structure in NP in English and German
the mean dog der böse Hund
negative transfer when L1 and L2 have different structures
e.g. Adv V NP in German versus Adv NP V in English
Morgen fahren wir nach Hause Tomorrow we go home
so research in Second Language Acquisition tended to revolve around comparison of
language pairs
Language Acquisition was seen as developing a set of habits to be practiced in
accordance with Behaviorist Theory
but researchers found errors not predictable by language differences,
and the psycholinguistic process of language acquisition can't be described solely in
terms of linguistic products
6.2 Approximative Systems and Interlanguage
In the 1960's, linguists rejected Behaviorism and became interested in mentalistic
theories
evidence was mounting for a third system between L1 and L2
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Nemser (1971) recognized an Approximative System for the learner with features of
both L1 and L2
Selinker (1972) introduced the term Interlanguage for this individual language system
Interlanguages are highly variable, due to:
1. limited cognitive attention, given so much to learn and remember simultaneously
2. learners lack of knowledge of rules
3. simultaneous pull from L1 and L2
4. they represent transitional stages of development
but L2 tends to fossilize at some stage, due to:
1. Negative transfer from L1
e.g. putting temporal Adv before locative Adv
*They went last week to Berlin.
2. Overgeneralization of L2 rules
e.g. extending progressive pattern to stative verbs
*I'm knowing him a long time
3. Simplification of L2 rules
e.g. failure to apply sequence of tenses (or back shift)
*I thought it is a joke
• it's often difficult to tell what causes an error, since these three factors
interact
• the concern with rules and errors makes interlanguages spill over into
error analysis research
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6.3 Error Analysis
concern with interlanguage and errors it contains and their relation gave rise to research
in Error Analysis
1. Researchers first look for idiosyncrasies in learner's production
when a learner says: *I want to know the English
we must first determine the intention behind it:
either correct expression of desire involving knowledge of English people or
incorrect expression of desire involving the English Language
2. Then they try to describe the structure in terms of the grammars of both L1 and L2
*I want to know the English involves an overuse of the definite article from the
point of view of English grammar; does it reflect the grammar of the learner's L1,
where abstract nouns take definite articles?
3. Finally, they seek to explain the structure as interference or the learner's
hypothesis-testing
if the learner uses this sort of construction systematically, it's part of an
interlanguage;
but it may be a single careless mistake or an attempt to test this particular structure as
well
this attempt at explanation can get muddled, due to the unclear distinction
between competence and performance
� Error Analysis ends up as a method of describing data, but not a psycholinguistic
theory of language acquisition
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Error Analysis loses sight of the whole picture of developing competence in L2 by
focusing on errors;
• we could instead equate knowledge of L2 with fluency and understandability
rather than lack of errors
• or we could instead focus on what learners do right and test to see if they do it right
intuitively
6.4 Innateness, Input, Natural Order of Acquisition in L 2
The Innateness Debate from Child Language Research carries over to research in
Second Language Acquisition
Does the Language Acquisition Device (LAD) work for L2 as for L1 ?
If the LAD is at work, there should be a Natural Order of Acquisition in L2 as in L1.
Could L2 learners simply reset the parameters from L1 ?
Dulay & Burt (1973) posit natural order of acquisition in L2 parallel to what Brown (1973)
found for L1
at least learners with the same L1 background go through the same stages in acquiring L2
1. plural -s on nouns: the books
2. progressive -ing on verbs: they driving
3. forms of main verb be: this is London, she was there
4. forms of auxiliary be: she's driving
5. articles a and the : a cat, the dog
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6. irregular past tenses: went, ate, came
7. 3rd person sing pres -s: she waits
8. possessive -s: Sally's truck
Dulay & Burt (1974) found even greater regularity of order if features were ordered into groups
group 1: progressive -ing , plural -s, copula be
group 2: auxiliary be, articles
group 3: irregular past
group 4: regular past, 3rd pers -s, possessive -s
Dulay & Burt use cross-sectional testing, i.e. what percentage of which forms show up
for a group of learners,
while Brown used longitudinal testing, i.e. at what stage do kids control (90% correct)
certain forms
other problems with tests for order of acquisition in L2
• tests based purely on English: what about other languages with lots more
inflection or no inflection?
• tests failed to distinguish variants like a versus an, and degrees of irregularity
e.g. in past tense told, bought, went
• if no firm order of acquisition can be shown, then there's no reason to assume
that acquisition of L2 and L1 are alike
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Even if LAD makes input unimportant in L1 acquisition,
the status of input in L2 remains a problem:
• What kind of input should learners receive?
• Does correcting errors help?
6.5 Krashen's Input Hypothesis and the Monitor Mode l
Language Acquisition versus Language Learning
subconscious acquisition like children's L1 acquisition
• not affected by correction
• not based on formally learned rules
but conscious learning in L2 context changes things
• input is filtered and output is monitored
• conscious learning results in ‘knowing about’
� learning rules only acts as Monitor
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natural order of acquisition in L2 just as in L1
• not based on linguistic complexity
• but Monitor disturbs the natural order
affective filter based on types of motivation
• integrative lowers filter
• instrumental can raise filter
• empathy for L2 group lowers filter
Monitor has its source in Piaget's Formal Operations Stage
• consciously formulates and edits output
• disturbs the natural order of acquisition
Monitor use conditions:
• time
• focus on form (not involved in message)
• must know the rule
“the monitor is not limited to conscious rules,
but conscious learning is limited to the monitor”
Krashen uses Monitor to describe individual differences
� overusers, underusers, optimal users
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Organizer
innate language acquisition faculty (like Chomsky's LAD)
gradually organizes input (without conscious attention) reflected in:
• errors
• transitional constructions
• natural order of acquisition
Input
input understood in context is the primary factor in L2 acquisition
caretaker speech is ideal intake:
1. here & now: immediate environment
2. syntactically simple
3. communication for action in context
Input Hypothesis
We acquire i + 1, the next rule along the natural order, by understanding messages
containing i + 1. a necessary but not sufficient condition for acquisition
i = current level in phonology, morphology, syntax, lexis
learner controls get in constructions like I get mail/you got mail,
and learner can form passives with be like he was stopped by a cop
i + 1 = constructions just beyond current level, e.g. combining the two
hears passive constructions with get like we got stopped by a cop
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Factors
1. delaying speaking L2 helps
2. comprehension precedes production in L2 acquisition
3. comprehension in interaction provides best intake
4. best input contains structures one step beyond current knowledge, i.e. i + 1
critique of Krashen:
1. McLaughlin (1978) denies clear distinction between consciously learned rules of
L2 and unconsciously acquired feel for L2
Krashen's appeal to introspection is unacceptable
2. focus on quality of input loses sight of processing input
• ignores functioning of Organizer
• offers no insight into relation between L1 and L2
• offers no account of bilingual competence
3. comprehensible input as structures one step beyond current knowledge not
operationalizable
• we can't completely characterize either i or i + 1
• this suggests that we learn L2 one rule at a time rather than combinations
of syntax, lexis, phonology
4. The Monitor functions in a more-or-less fashion, not like an on-off switch
� if filters work differentially in input phase, they should apply differentially
in output phase, allowing Monitor use to vary incrementally
Note: Krashen sometimes speaks of an output filter blocking performance of
acquired rules to account for fossilization in L2 acquisition
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5. Krashen's system is circular, components are incestuously related
• if the natural order of acquisition holds, then the Monitor was not working
• if the natural order is disturbed, then the Monitor was working
• but there’s no independent evidence of Monitor etc
6.6 Formulaic Speech
Formulaic speech also violates normal acquisition order
but formulas play a special role in L2 acquisition because they represent structures
beyond current competence
routines like be careful, let's play and you know
patterns like that's ___ and Do you want____?
affect L2 acquisition positively
• perhaps because they facilitate interaction
• perhaps because they develop into syntax
Formulaic Speech remains unanalyzed initially
routines & formulas learned top-down versus bottom-up
may reflect different overall style of acquisition
but in later acquisition, formulas and idioms create extra problems, because they require
memorization item by item
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7. Bilingualism
individual bilingualism versus societal bilingualism
Compare: bilingualism versus diglossia (Ferguson)
balanced versus unbalanced bilingualism
dominant, usually first, native language
versus
weaker, second or foreign language (second or foreign language for special purpose)
7.1 Becoming bilingual
• childhood/right-from-the-beginning-on acquisition (during critical period)
• later acquisition (after critical period)
• as second language in second language culture
• as foreign language in first language culture
7.2 Advantages and disadvantages of bilingualism
obviously bilingualism is socially advantageous
nobody questions the value of adults learning foreign language, though kids learn
languages more easily
but psychologists question effects of childhood acquisition of bilingualism
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some tests show that acquiring two languages
• slows progress in both
• slows intellectual development generally
� test group: lower class immigrant children where the home language enjoyed no
prestige
other tests show that acquiring two languages
• has no effect on progress in either
• can improve linguistic creativity
• correlates with higher intelligence
� test group: upper middle class children self-selected for exposure to a second
language
all tests agree that child bilingualism increases linguistic flexibility and creativity in
problem solving
• creativity measures
o how many uses child can name for everyday objects like rubber bands and
tin cans
o how many things a child can list corresponding to an abstract design,
e.g. snake and swan for a wavy line
• bilingual kids recognize arbitrariness in language earlier
asked whether can or hat is more like cap
o bilingual kids age 4-9 more likely to say hat
o monolingual kids more likely to say can
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7.3 Do bilinguals have split personalities?
if each language comes with a whole set of cultural prototypes and values, then
switching languages should cause a personality switch as well
consider e.g. a Canadian who speaks English only in the insurance company where she
works and French with family and friends and everyone in the village where she lives
French-English bilinguals in the US responded to picture sequences with longer stories
in French than in English, but also with different themes for the same pictures, e.g.
• stress and anxiety in French story
• hard work and achievement in English story
In sentence completion tests, bilinguals also respond differently in their two languages.
responses for Japanese-English bilinguals in the US e.g. were:
When my wishes conflict with my family's . . .
it is a time of great unhappiness (Japanese)
I do what I want (English)
Bilinguals report feeling e.g. more gregarious speaking French and more reserved
speaking English, but no one has tested these feelings systematically so far
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7.4 Two languages in one brain
7.4.1 Types of bilinguals
Weinreich (1953) distinguished three kinds of bilingualism
A. Coordinate: L1 and L2 acquired in separate contexts
• each system is complete in itself
• person functions as monolingual in both communities
B. Compound: L1 and L2 acquired in same context
• the two systems are merged
• person doesn't function as monolingual in either community
• person may experience interference from L1 to L2 and from L2 to L1
C. Subordinate: L2 acquired based on L1
• only one system
• person functions as monolingual only in L1
• person experiences interference only from L1 to L2
Notice that Weinreich’s typology works only at the lexical level, but bilinguals may
experience interference at all levels from phonetics up to semantics.
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7.4.2 Bilingual meaning systems
According to Macnamara (1970):
• subordinate bilinguals function appropriately in L1, but inappropriately L2 ;
• compound bilinguals function inappropriately in both languages;
• though coordinate bilinguals function appropriately in L1 & L2 they must
experience confusion in their internal thought
But this assumes that word meaning and natural language semantics correspond
directly to mental concepts.
By contrast, Paradis (1979, 1985) argues that both language systems are connected to
a conceptual-experiential level of cognition
In fact, the situation is probably a mixture of these two positions:
• WATs and other tests show concrete concepts like tree and table seem to be
shared, as in ‘compound’ diagram B above
• but abstract concepts like freedom and justice are language-specific, as in
‘coordinate’ diagram A above
words identical in meaning and similar in form seem to share a single ‘lexical entry’
die Karotte carrot la carotte
die Adresse address l'adresse
but the systematic semantics of the individual languages may still differ, thus German
has rough synonyms:
Karotte Mohrrübe
Adresse Anschrift
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probably semantic systems overlap with some areas shared and others distinct, e.g.
English ball spheric, bouncy, for play
French balle spheric, bouncy, for play, small
� given French ballon for larger, inflatable spheres, while these features are
irrelevant for English ball
7.4.3 Bilingual phonology and syntax
Extended system hypothesis: phonemes of L2 are processed as allophones of L1 phonemes
Dual system hypothesis: separate phonemic systems for L1 & L2
Tripartite system hypothesis: shared phonemes in one system with separate phonemes
in separate systems
Stop consonants p t k, b d g could be shared in bilingual German-English system
but English fricatives in then and thin, and German fricatives in ich and ach must occur
in separate systems
Similarly:
• syntactic structures of L2 could be processed in accordance with L1 syntax
• L1 & L2 could have separate syntactic systems
• shared structures could be processed the same while separate structures would
require separate processing
e.g. Germ & Engl NPs could be processed similarly with special processing for German
preposed participles like:
das von der Kandidatin gewählte Thema
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7.4.4 Language processing in the bilingual brain
Depending how they're acquired, L1 & L2 may even be lateralized differently in brain:
• L2 lateralized in right hemisphere
• L2 less lateralized than L1
• L1 & L2 both less lateralized than in monolinguals
evidence from aphasia indicates that languages are separately organized in brain, but
not necessary lateralized separately
As Paradis (1979, 1985) shows, bilinguals comes in many types
bilinguals may differ with regard to:
• manner of acquisition (formal, informal)
• mode of acquisition (oral, written)
• method of acquisition (deductive, inductive, analytic, global)
• age of acquisition (during or after critical period)
• stage of acquisition
• degree of proficiency
• frequency and modes of use
• language-specific features of L1 & L2
• sharing features and rules at various levels
on every linguistic level, structures might be shared or separate
e.g. if L1 speaker produces L2 perfectly, except for phonetics, i.e. has lots of interference
from L1 to L2 at the level of phonetics, we could model the situation as follows:
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L1 L2
conceptual level single system
semantics x -- y
syntax x -- y
morphology x -- y
lexis x -- y
phonology x -- y
and if L1 speaker produces phonetically correct L2, but makes lots of interference errors
in grammar and word choice, we could model the situation as follows:
L1 L2
conceptual level single system
semantics x -- y
syntax x -- y
morphology x -- y
lexis x -- y
phonology x -- y
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Of course, some languages may naturally share structures at certain levels:
English-German bilinguals probably have a single set of stop consonants for both
languages, but German speakers need to add the fricatives in then and thin, and
English speakers need to add the fricatives in ich and ach and so on
Paradis presents three models of the bilingual brain:
• In the simplest model (on the left), the concepts of experience run through a set
of pipes and come out as either L1 or L2 (in the model Spanish and English).
• The next model (on the right) ignores the concepts and begins with separate
tanks for the words of L1 & L2; again pipes run down, and one language
spills out.
This second model corresponds to Weinreich’s “coordinate bilingual”;
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• In third model, the concepts of experience
run through pipes representing L1 & L2, they
are assigned appropriate words from either
L1 or L2, and they flow into another set of
pipes, representing the grammar and
phonology, and finally flow out as either L1 or
L2
But, as in Weinreich, there’s no way in these models to account for interference
Since there's interference between the systems, some pipes may be playing a role in
both L1 and L2 systems, and the pipes must be leaky; since we can code-switch and
translate, there must be leakage in both directions
It’s probably necessary to complicate the third model:
The tanks of words from L1 or L2, need valves to turn them on or shut them off,
representing the decision to speak either L1 or L2 and block out the other;
As we saw above, the words must flow into separate sets of pipes, representing the
grammar, morphology and phonology of either L1 or L2 as well; but some pipes serve
both L1 & L2 systems to some extent, to account for interference
At all levels, we must allow leakage to explain how we can code-switch from L1 to L2
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also possible:
comprehension is a single system for L1 & L2,
while production of L1 & L2 remains separate, because:
• comprehension precedes production in acquisition
• comprehension more advanced than production at all stages
• though we can choose not to speak L1 or L2, we can't choose not to comprehend
• production is lost before comprehension in aphasia
• comprehension returns before production in aphasia
again according to Paradis, we can envision:
• single coherent underlying conceptual system
• two cognitively separate systems - with some shared areas in semantics, syntax,
phonology
one system is suppressed due to context, frequency of contact etc
but word/phrase from suppressed system may intrude, especially during word search
there may be differences in processing due to acquisition history, strategies etc
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8. Language comprehension
� means understanding what we hear and read
comprehension as active search for coherence and sense based on expectations arising
from context,
not a passive item-by-item recording and analysis of words in a linear sequence.
meaning and real-world expectations play a more important role than grammar
top-down versus bottom-up processing
Until the age of four, kids interpret a-d the same way; even adults require longer to
respond to c, d:
a. The cat chased the mouse.
b. The mouse was chased by the cat.
c. The mouse chased the cat.
d. The cat was chased by the mouse.
Asked to paraphrase e-g in their own words, subjects ‘normalized’ the sentences 60% of
the time:
e. John dressed and had a bath.
f. John finished and wrote the article on the weekend .
g. Don't print that or I won't sue you.
Asked if they saw any difference between g and their ‘incorrect’ paraphrase h, 53% still
said no
h. If you print that, I'll sue you.
� clearly, the ‘Reality Principle’ guides our comprehension of linguistic structures
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8.1 Comprehension of words
Parallel Distributed Processing (PDP):
separate, simultaneous and parallel processes work to identify words
by pronunciation to recognize homophones lead N and led V pst
by spelling to recognize homographs wind N and wind V
by grammar to recognize smell as noun or verb
while hear can only function as verb
by semantics synonyms like little and small
antonyms like little and big
hyponyms like car versus vehicle etc.
PDP can link word meanings to perceptual and functional paradigms (how a thing looks,
sounds etc, what it's used for) related words and concepts
consider Tip-of-the-tongue (TOT) phenomena
you're trying to recall the word for the belief that life's events are preordained by a deity
you remember that the word begins with p
then that word begins with pre-
and that it ends with -tion
Bathtub Effect: recall is best for beginnings and ends of words, like the head and feet of
a person which are visible though the middle remains submerged in the tub
you recall associated words like:
predilection pretension Presbyterian p reordained
you finally come up with: predestination
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Spreading activation networks: as the search progresses, more words and concepts are
accessed related in various ways,
including schematic knowledge, e.g. the association of Presbyterian and
predestination via 'religion'
8.2 Comprehension of sentences
Chomsky proposed Generative Transformational Grammar (TG) as a model of
Competence, suggesting that psycholinguists should figure out how Performance could
be related to his model
Psycholinguists began to test for transformational complexity
Sentences involving more transformations like PASSIVE, NEGATION, QUESTION
FORMATION etc should be harder to comprehend than sentences involving fewer
transformations
processing time should increase for sentences a-e:
a. Judy called the boy.
b. Judy didn't call the boy.
c. The boy was called by Judy.
d. The boy was not called by Judy.
e. Wasn't the boy called by Judy?
They found that negatives were harder to process than either passives or questions,
even though negation seemed like a simpler transformation
Subjects seemed to have difficulty processing negatives generally.
Consider the difficulty of:
It's not true that Wednesday never comes after a da y that isn't Tuesday.
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Subjects also processed passives more easily than actives, if the passives made more
sense, e.g.
The struggling swimmer rescued the lifeguard.
The struggling swimmer was rescued by the lifeguard .
Apparently, semantics was more important than derivational complexity as predicted by
TG analysis
Garden Pathing is most obvious when we have to backtrack after an unexpected switch,
as in sentence a; the addition of this in sentence b, or a comma, as in sentence c,
eliminates the problem
a. Since Jay always jogs a mile
seems like a short distance to him
b. Since Jay always jogs a mile
this seems like a short distance to him
c. Since Jay always jogs,
a mile seems like a short distance to him
Garden pathing works both syntactically and semantically.
We follow expectations about constructions and meaning.
Garden pathing makes it so difficult to understand sentences which seem complete and
semantically simple, e.g.
The horse raced past the barn fell.
Compare: The horse that was raced past the barn fell.
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Tests revealed other syntactic processing differences.
Right-branching constructions are easy to process:
This is the cat that chased the rat that stole the cheese that lay in the cupboard.
Here each construction is closed before the next is added.
But left-branching constructions are difficult.
The rat the cat chased stole the cheese.
Left-branching requires that the listener keep the first construction open (in short-term
memory) while processing the second. Adding a third makes processing impossible
because of the demands it places on short-term memory
The cheese the rat the cat chased stole lay in the cupboard.
8.3 Comprehension of metaphor
metaphors consist of three parts: tenor, vehicle, ground
tenor vehicle
billboards a re warts on the landscape
ground (tertium comparationis) = 'ugly protrusions on some surface'
Ortony (1975) argues that we comprehend metaphors in the same way we comprehend
explicit comparisons or similes like:
billboards are like warts on the landscape
in both cases, we must find the appropriate ground
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even in literal comparisons such as: dogs are like cats
we must discover a common semantic property like 'pet' as the ground of the comparison
we need only certain aspects of the word meanings
In the metaphors below, different semantic aspects of butcher are dominant:
the pianist is a butcher
the surgeon is a butcher
This suggests that we always access just as much semantic content from the mental
lexicon as we need to comprehend the sentence at hand, not complete encyclopedic
information
Given a metaphoric statement like:
skyscrapers are the giraffes of a city
we identify a ground like 'tall compared to surroundings' as part of comprehension
process. And though the ground is unstated, tests show that it provides as good a cue
for recall as the tenor or vehicle.
Metaphors organize our understanding of the tenor; reversing tenor and vehicle usually
confuses the relation, as in:
warts are billboards on the body
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Tests show that metaphors require longer to comprehend only in isolation
in appropriate contexts, metaphors require no longer than literal statements, as in:
Billboards are really offensive to look at.
They mess up the surrounding area.
Billboards are like warts on the landscape
Within a single sentence, prior context (as in A below) is more effective than subsequent
context (as in B) in triggering metaphoric interpretation:
A. The night was filled with drops of molten silver
B. Drops of molten silver filled the night.
Apparently, understanding metaphors in context is no different from regular
comprehension processes
Familiarity is also a factor in metaphor comprehension
Test subjects respond fastest to familiar metaphors, e.g.
Joe's the top cat around here
Telecommunications are further shrinking the globe
If the vehicle of the metaphor is unfamiliar or has no single salient property, comparison
is difficult and comprehension will be slow, e.g.
Judy's a real platypus at work
Bob's a regular isotope for politics
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Metaphor may even be necessary and go unnoticed when language lacks any other word, e.g.
dead metaphor: face of a clock
moribund metaphor: cut into line
cf. knife through the line
Poetic metaphor involves anomaly, and requires extra processing time
I have measured out my life with coffee spoons
but many metaphors aren't anomalous, e.g. metaphoric proverbs may be both literally
true and consistent:
The early bird catches the worm
Like other metaphors, metaphorical proverbs seem to require no special processing in
appropriate discourse contexts
8.5 Comprehending sentences
Given-New Contract (Clark & Clark 1977):
Listeners expect information in a regular pattern.
Coherent texts generally exhibit a characteristic information flow:
• begin each utterance with given information
• then move on to new information
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e.g. The ballerina captivated a musician during her perf ormance.
The one who the ballerina captivated was the trombo nist.
(with the ballerina as given and the rest of the first sentence as new)
In the second sentence, all the information is given, except the fact that the musician
was a trombonist. Hearing the first sentence reduces processing time for the second.
If the second sentence is altered as below, listeners are confused and processing times
increase.
The ballerina captivated a musician during her perf ormance.
The one who captivated the trombonist was the balle rina.
