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Leonhard Dobusch Freie Universität Berlin – Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft Telemedicus Sommerkonferenz „Zwei Schritte vorwärts: Die Zukunft des Internetrechts“ 29.-30. August 2015 Regulierung durch Standards Härter als es scheint.

Regulierung durch Standards: Härter als es scheint

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Leonhard Dobusch Freie Universität Berlin – Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft

Telemedicus Sommerkonferenz„Zwei Schritte vorwärts: Die Zukunft des Internetrechts“

29.-30. August 2015

Regulierung durch Standards Härter als es scheint.

Freiwillig!

Effizient!

Unpolitisch!

Wie sich Standards verbreiten…

Quelle: https://xkcd.com/927/, CC-BY-NC 2.5, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.5/

Freiwillig?

Effizient?

Unpolitisch?

Schwache Verbreitung /

mehrere Standards

Hohe Verbreitung/ ein Standard

exklusiv

inklusiv

Standard Diffusion

(1) Standard-

Wettbewerb

Stan

dard

F

orm

atio

n

(2) De-facto Standards

(3) Ko-Existenz

von Standards

(4) Kollektiv- Standards

Schwache Verbreitung /

mehrere Standards

Hohe Verbreitung/ ein Standard

exklusiv

inklusiv

Standard Diffusion

(1) Standard-

Wettbewerb

Stan

dard

F

orm

atio

n

(2) De-facto Standards

(3) Ko-Existenz

von Standards

(4) Kollektiv- Standards

Standard Formation

Standard Diffusion

Input Legitimacy

Output Legitimacy

Adoption rate

Source: Botzem, S./Dobusch L. (2012): Standardization Cycles: A Process Perspective on the Formation and Diffusion of Transnational Standards, Organization Studies, 33 (5-6), 737-762

Zyklen der Standardisierung

Standard-Formierung

Standard-FormierungStandard-Diffusion

Input-Legitimität

Output-Legitimität

Verbreitung

Beispiel: Standardisierungsprojekte im Urheberrecht

(Inter-) Nationales Recht

Private Standards

Legislativer Prozess (z.B.: Internationale Verträge)

Lobbying (z.B.: v. Unternehmen, Verbänden)

Protestmobilisierung (z.B. Anti-ACTA-Proteste)

Standardsetzung (z.B. Lizenzen, Technologien)

Konstruktive Mobilisierung (z.B. die Verbreitung eines Standards fördern)

Arenen transnationaler Regulierung

WIPO, WTO, EU, Nation States

Konsumenten / Nutzer

Legislative Arena

Marktarena

TRIPS, WIPO Copyright Treaties

Musik-, Film-, Softwarefirmen sowie Verlage

Regulierung via technologischer Standardisierung: DRM

Industrieverbände (MPAA, RIAA, ..)

Verwertungsgesellschaften (CISAC, GEMA, SUISA)

Cop

yrig

ht-K

oalit

ion

Regulierung via Standardisierung von Lizenzen: Creative Commons

Free Software Foundation, Creative Commons, WIkimedia

„Open“-Movements (Open Access, Open Data, etc.)

„Fai

r Use

“-K

oalit

ion

Post-TRIPS Implementation

~2001-2008

Copyright-Koalition: DRM-Desaster

Copyright-Koalition: DRM-Desaster

Quelle: http://www.xkcd.com/488/, CC-BY-NC 2.5, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.5/

Musikmarkt

>> Komplett entkoppelt von Nutzungsrealitäten, seit 2007 tot

no compelling benefit for the consumer“

DRM-Mastermind Mark Stefik (2007)

JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR INFORMATION SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY—November 2005 1413

Several of these sites actively condemned piracy. One au-thor noted, “Piracy is wrong. . .” A slogan used on several Websites contrasted those who used DeCSS to view DVDs withpirates, “We’re not their enemy—we’re their customers.”

Data confirm earlier findings that both U.S. and non-U.S.Web sites post DeCSS. Data also show that non-U.S. posters(predominately European) posted DeCSS despite the factthat national law prohibiting DeCSS posting did not exist inmost of the non-U.S. nations in our sample at the time of thestudy.14

Why Do People Post DeCSS?

Another interesting question is why people post DeCSSdespite its technical obsolescence and its legal status. Oneexplanation is that people post DeCSS to protest something.Past authors have defined online protest in terms of its col-lective aim; its public nature; and its political, ethical, or ide-ological motivations (Lievrouw, 2003; Manion & Goodrum,2000; McAughey & Ayers, 2003; Vegh, 2003). While thereis room for argument, we assert that much DeCSS postingfits the definition of protest. DeCSS posting aims for a col-lective goal of either changing law or opposing the enforce-ment of law by corporate interests. Further, because DeCSSis posted on public Web sites, and is often accompanied bythe Web site author’s contact information, posting DeCSS isclearly a public act. Finally, the arguments we identifiedshowed political, ethical, or ideological reasoning in thatthey stated beliefs about how laws ought to be, how actorsought to behave, and what rights, duties, and freedoms DVDand Internet users should enjoy (Blackburn, 1996).

But in considering the political, ethical, or ideologicalnature of these arguments, it is important to note that in manycases, substantial inference was necessary to interpret whatarguments existed. For example, to understand the phrase,“Help 2600 in their struggles against ‘the powers that be’—get the word out” we had to infer that the ‘powers that be’ re-ferred to the parties suing 2600. Not many examples providedgood arguments in a rhetorical or logical sense (i.e., conclu-sions following from carefully crafted premises). And, as de-scribed earlier, most authors included no arguments; for theseauthors, it is impossible to determine the degree to which theirmotives for posting DeCSS were ethical.

Another explanation is that DeCSS posting is merelymalfeasance motivated by piracy interests or thrill-seeking.

But the arguments outlined in the findings draw the malfea-sance explanation for DeCSS posting into doubt—at leastfor Web sites containing arguments.

While many of the sites in our sample contained no argu-ments, and it is thus difficult to ascertain the intentions ofthese posters, we are hesitant to conclude that those Websites necessarily qualify as malfeasance. First, if no-argu-ment DeCSS posters were pirates or crackers, one might ex-pect that they would have presented DeCSS as a piracy orcracking tool. We have observed DeCSS posting in other en-vironments where DeCSS is clearly presented within thecontext of “cracking” (e.g., included in a list of links labeled“Cracks”; Eschenfelder et al., 2005). Yet we found no suchevidence in this data.

Second, it may be that we defined the concept of “argu-ments” too narrowly to capture political intent.

We observed four types of Web sites in our sample:

1. File names only. These Web sites offered file name linksto download the DeCSS code. The label used in the linkwas the name of some form of DeCSS (e.g., “decss.exe”or “css-auth.tar.gz”). No argument is used.

2. Links with annotations. These Web sites similarly offeredlinks to download DeCSS, but included with some shortexplanatory comments (e.g., “decss.exe—download thefamous DeCSS code”). No argument is used.

3. Sentences of text. These Web sites included fragments orincomplete arguments frequently requiring substantialinference.

4. Fully formed arguments. These Web sites included well-formulated arguments with little required interpretation.

In this study, we took as a starting assumption that onlyTypes 3 and 4 constituted “arguments” and Types 1 and 2were “no argument” Web sites. Yet, theorizing from thecommunications and rhetoric fields suggest that Types 1 and2 could also qualify as arguments. That is, even a filename—posted alone—could qualify as an argument whenconsidered in the context of a larger discourse.

Rhetorical analysis argues that contemporary discourseproceeds primarily in “fragments” that rely on a shared con-textual understanding in one or more “public spheres”—ordomains of conversation about public issues generated byopen dialogue—for their meaning (Habermas, 1974;McGee, 1990; Zulick, 1997). For example, interpretation ofa short phrase on a political bumper sticker may require ex-tensive background understanding of the policy under dis-pute and existing arguments protesting or supporting thatpolicy (Bloch, 2000). From this perspective, even the act ofplacing an unannotated link to DeCSS on a Web site canrefer to and evoke arguments against the prohibition on cir-cumvention within a set of people with shared contextualunderstandings.

Further, numerous sites in our data contain cues thatimply the poster envisions herself or himself engaged in alarger public deliberation, even if no argument is stated. Forexample, on one site, the DeCSS link is accompanied by thetext, “At the moment, lots of court cases are running about

FIG. 1. DVD for every OS (operating system).

14Of the other nations appearing in our sample, only Australia(Australia Copyright Act, 2000, § 116A), and the Czech Republic (2000,Article 43) had anti-circumvention laws at the time of the study.

Videomarkt

>> schwache Akzeptanz, weitgehende Umgehung

Proteste gegen Ausschluss von Freier/Open Source Software

„Fair Use“-Koalition: Lizenzstandards

Jurisdiction Ports (p.a. / kum.)

00 1*

12 13

9 8

13

26

35

43

1*

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

year

diff

eren

t jur

isdi

ctio

ns

Newly Porting JurisdictionsPorted Jurisdictions (kum.)

*USA

Wer Blogeinträge oder Präsentationen mit Bildern aus dem Internet illustrieren und keine

Abmahnung riskieren möchte, der findet bei Flickr oder Wikimedia Commons ein reichhaltiges

Angebot an CC-lizenzierten Bildern. Auf beiden Plattformen gibt es aber keine Qualitätskontrolle.

Diese ist wiederum die Stärke kleinerer Anbieter wie 500px oder Wellcome Images, wo sich

besonders hochwertige Bilder unter CC-Lizenzen finden.

FLICKR288.535.409

WIKIMEDIA COMMONS18.984.329

500PX203.560

WELLCOME IMAGES100.000

100.000

11.

000.

000

BILDER

BILDER307.823.298

TEXT30.353.310

1.000.000 VIDEOS7.354.443

AUDIO1.369.445

WIPO, WTO, EU, Nation States

Konsumenten / Nutzer

Legislative Arena

Marktarena

TRIPS, WIPO Copyright Treaties

Musik-, Film-, Softwarefirmen sowie Verlage

Multilaterale and bi-laterale Verträge: ACTA, CETA, TTIP

Industrieverbände (MPAA, RIAA, ..)

Verwertungsgesellschaften (CISAC, GEMA, SUISA)

Cop

yrig

ht-K

oalit

ion

Protestmobilisierung, Piratenparteien

Free Software Foundation, Creative Commons, WIkimedia

„Open“-Movements (Open Access, Open Data, etc.)

„Fai

r Use

“-K

oalit

ion

Post-DRM seit 2008

Zyklen regulatorischer Arenen

Standard Formation

Standard Diffusion

Input Legitimacy

Output Legitimacy

Adoption rate

Legislative Arena

Markt Arena

ermöglicht inspiriert

unterminiert verstärkt

Regulierung durch Standards trotz (oder sogar: wegen) gesetzlicher Regulierung

“Dialektik privater Governance“ (Teubner 1998): Apolitisch vs. Re-politisierung

Konstruktive Mobilisierung erfordert Andocken an Nutzungsrealitäten

Fazit

Kontakt

E-Mail: [email protected] !Twitter: @leonidobusch !Webseiten:wiwiss.fu-berlin.de/dobuschwww.dobusch.net !Blog:www.governancexborders.com