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WISSENSCHAFTLICHER BEIRAT DER BUNDESREGIERUNGGLOBALE UMWELTVERÄNDERUNGEN

Universität Bonn, 2. Juli 2009

Klimawandel: Entwicklung – Sicherheit - Weltwirtschaft

Dirk Messner

German Development InstituteGerman Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU)

www.die-gdi.de

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Human security

Destabilization of countries and regions

New lines of conflicts and tensions globally

Geopolitics of climate change

RadicalTransformation ofthe Earth System

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Main message

Climate change could unite the international community, recognizing climate change as a threat to humankind...

If it fails to do so, climate change will draw ever-deeper lines of division in international relations, triggering distributional conflicts over water, land, the management of migration, compensation payments between the countries mainly responible for climate change and those countries most affected by it`s destructive impacts ....

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Environmental Conflicts (1980–2005): Causes and intensities

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„Old“ environmenatally driven versus climate driven conflicts

• Local• Limited numer of affected

people• Multicausal drivers• Local distributional conflicts

(water, land, forests et al.)

... No challenge for international stability and security

• Local, crossboarder, subregional, global

• Many people affected• Dito• Distributional conflicts (local,

crossborder, subregional)• Overburdened governments,

economies, societies: weak states under climate stress

• Large scale migration• Global tensions: who pays

the bill? Who is responsible?... International security impacts

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A2

B1

2º

EU - Limit?!

Szenarien Klimawandel ... 5° plus Welt: Radikaler Wandel des Erdsystems!

a) Eiszeit – heute, b) Menschheitsexperiment, c) Erdsystem

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Figure SPM.6

Global Warming – regional impacts

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Die CO2-Konzentration steigt

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Reduction of GHG – emissions needed until 2050

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Mitigation as an investment in international stability ... Avoiding unmanageable risks in the global earth system!

Key actors in the furture: OECD, China/ India

Brazil1.6%

Africa4.4%

Middle East8.9%

International navigation0.7%

India10.0%

China39.4%

Other transition econom ies

1.8%

Other developing Asia9.0%

Russia2.6%

OECD Europe4.0%

OECD Pacific1.8%

OECD North Am erica12.8%

Other Latin Am erica2.9%

Projected Em issions

grow th 2004-2030

14 bn t CO 2= 55%

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Dangerous climate change: impacts on societies

Three Perspectives

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First Perspective: „Tipping Points“ in the Earth System – Will societies be able to adopt?

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Collapse of the Amazonian Forest: Radical transformations of eco-systems in very little time

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WISSENSCHAFTLICHER BEIRAT DER BUNDESREGIERUNGGLOBALE UMWELTVERÄNDERUNGEN

Second perspective

Climate change driven conflict constellations

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Conflict constellation 1: Climate-induced

decline in food production-

Conflicts on land

17Droughts in the A1B-Scenario

IPCC, 2007

Ensemble-Projections 2080-2099

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Soil degradation & desertification(intensity and dynamic)

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Min Temp ºCSource: Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences

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Precipitation % ChangeSource: Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences

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Conflict constellation 2: Climate-induced degradation of freshwater resources - conflicts on access to water

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Access to Water (today)

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Processes of desertification towards2041/2070 (Hadley Centre)

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Glaciers: Global Mass Balance

World Glacier Monitoring Service

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Glaciers in the Himalya: Importance for Water Supply ... Many people affected: agriculture/ water

UNEP 2007

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Conflict constellation 3: climate-induced increase in storm and flood desasters- political instability/ economic crisis„New Orleans“

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Messdaten:Hurrikan-Energie korreliert mit Meerestemperatur Beide sind deutlich angestiegen (Emanuel, Nature 2005)

Hurrikan-Energie (PDI)

Meerestemperatur (August-Oktober)

Globale Mitteltemperatur

Atlantik

Huricans

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Hurricanes: intensities and patterns (1960-2006)

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9 cm

88 cm

21 cm

70 cm

Tide Gauges

Sea level Rise

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Bay of Bengal and Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna-Bay

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Conflict constellation 4: environmentally-induced migration

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Climate Change - conflict constellations in world regions

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Climate change as a multiplier of mechanisms that causes instability and conflicts

• Weak governance structures favours conflicts ... Climate change is affecting many fragile states ... and might overburden not yet weak governance systems

• Low income countries ... High probability of violent conflicts: Climate change affects agriculture, water system ... Creates economic problems for LDCs ... Triggering conflict risks

• Spillover risks in conflict regions: climate change causes cross-border challenges (water shortages, migration etc.)

• Climate change aggravates or causes ressource-conflicts: land, water, forests, food etc.

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The third Perspective

Climate change impacts translating into international tensions and conflicts

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Largest per cap ita C O 2 em itters

Highest social and / or agro-economic vulnerabilityLargest per cap ita C O 2 em itters, and highest social and / or agro-economic vulnerability

Areas w ith h ighest eco logical vu lnerability

Highest vulnerability towards clim ate change vs. largest CO 2 em issions (from fossil fuel com bustion and cem ent production, and including land use change, kg C per person and year from 1950 - 2003)

Highest vulnerability vs. largest per capita CO 2 emissions

Highest social and / or agro-economic vulnerabilityLargest per cap ita C O 2 em itters, and highest social and / or agro-economic vulnerabilityAreas w ith h ighest eco logical vu lnerability

Highest vulnerability towards clim ate change vs. largest CO 2 em issions (from fossil fuel com bustion and cem ent production, and including land use change, kg C per person and year from 1950 - 2003)

Largest per cap ita C O 2 em itters

Highest social and / or agro-economic vulnerabilityLargest per cap ita C O 2 em itters, and highest social and / or agro-economic vulnerabilityAreas w ith h ighest eco logical vu lnerability

Highest vulnerability towards clim ate change vs. largest CO 2 em issions (from fossil fuel com bustion and cem ent production, and including land use change, kg C per person and year from 1950 - 2003)

Largest per cap ita C O 2 em itters

Largest per cap ita C O 2 em itters, and highest social and / or agro-economic vulnerability

Areas w ith h ighest eco logical vu lnerability

Highest vulnerability towards clim ate change vs. largest CO 2 em issions (from fossil fuel com bustion and cem ent production, and including land use change, kg C per person and year from 1950 - 2003)

Largest per cap ita C O 2 em itters

Highest social and / or agro-economic vulnerabilityLargest per cap ita C O 2 em itters, and highest social and / or agro-economic vulnerability

Areas w ith h ighest eco logical vu lnerability

Highest vulnerability towards clim ate change vs. largest CO 2 em issions (from fossil fuel com bustion and cem ent production, and including land use change, kg C per person and year from 1950 - 2003)

Largest per cap ita C O 2 em itters

Highest social and / or agro-economic vulnerability

Areas w ith h ighest eco logical vu lnerability

Highest vulnerability towards clim ate change vs. largest CO 2 em issions (from fossil fuel com bustion and cem ent production, and including land use change, kg C per person and year from 1950 - 2003)

Largest per cap ita C O 2 em itters

Highest social and / or agro-economic vulnerabilityLargest per cap ita C O 2 em itters, and highest social and / or agro-economic vulnerability

Highest vulnerability towards clim ate change vs. largest CO 2 em issions (from fossil fuel com bustion and cem ent production, and including land use change, kg C per person and year from 1950 - 2003)

Largest per cap ita C O 2 em itters

Highest social and / or agro-economic vulnerabilityLargest per cap ita C O 2 em itters, and highest social and / or agro-economic vulnerabilityAreas w ith h ighest eco logical vu lnerability

Vulnerabilty towards climate change- New lines of conflict?

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The third perspective 1:Overstreching the capacities of the global

governance system - destabilization• Posible increase in the number of weak and fragile states

• Risks for the global economy (Stern Report)

• Growing distributional conflicts between the main drivers of climate change and the most affected (polluter pays principle; compensations)

• Triggering and intensification of migration

• Climate change undermining basic human rights (access to water, food): the „new human rights debate“ .... Legitimacy problems for the OECD (loosing soft power)

• Limits of classical security policy: Impacts of Tipping Points could be unmanagable

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WISSENSCHAFTLICHER BEIRAT DER BUNDESREGIERUNGGLOBALE UMWELTVERÄNDERUNGEN

How to avoid dangerous climate change?

The transformation towards a low carbon global economy

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Towards 450 ppmv CO2

Convergence level:2 tCO2eq/cap

0

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

1200019

90

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

2060

2070

2080

2090

2100

MtC

O2e

q

India

China

Braz il

Saudi Arabia

USA

EU 25

Japan

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WISSENSCHAFTLICHER BEIRAT DER BUNDESREGIERUNGGLOBALE UMWELTVERÄNDERUNGEN

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Primary Energy – A2r – BL: Business as usual – the 5-6 °C

world

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Primary Energy – B1r – BL: The 3-4 °C world

“Green business as usual”

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Primary Energy – B1r – 450: Die 2 Grad Welt

4) nationale und globale low carbon

roadmaps

5) Lebensstile

Emissio

National und international:

1) Emissionshandel – Preis für THG

2) Innovationspolitik

3) Effizienzstandards (Gebäude, Autos,Geräte)

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Mitigation und Adaptation:neue Anforderungen für Entwicklungspolitik

• Energiekooperation China/ Indien

• Globaler Wälderschutz (Brasilien, Peru, Indonesien, Kongo)

• Kooperationen Richtung low carbon global economy

• Globale Landnutzungssysteme (Ernährung, Bioenergie, GHG-Senken, Biodiversität)

• Länder- und regionenspezifische Anpassungsstrategien

• Verbindung MDGs und Anpassung

• „Anpassung an 3 – 6 Grad Welt“ schwierig

• Finanzierung

Kopenhagen 2009 als Weichenstellung!

48© 2007 Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik

„It is not important to predict the future, but to be prepared for the future.“

Perikles, 493-429 BC

49 Visión: red trans-europeo de electricidad

Vision eines Hochspannungs-Gleichstromnetzes als Rückgrat eines trans-europäischen Stromverbunds und als Ergänzung des konventionellen

Quelle: DLR, Dr: F. Trieb

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El potencial de energías rjfcjvlknovables hasta

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