Einführung in die Theoretische Philosophie: Sprachphilosophie

EINFÜHRUNG IN DIE THEORETISCHE PHILOSOPHIE:

SPRACHPHILOSOPHIE

Nathan [email protected]

KRIPKE’S A PUZZLE

ABOUT BELIEF

THE PLAN1. A Quick Review of Kripke’s Objections to

Descriptivism

2. Kripke’s Positive Storyi. Causal Theory of Referenceii. Rigid Designation & the Meaning of Singular Terms

3. A return to the Naïve Theory & the Six Puzzles

4. Kripke’s new Puzzle about Belief

5. Some conclusions about Singular Terms

3 + 1 DISTINCTIONSThree dimensions upon which statements can

vary:

Semantic – Analytic vs. Synthetic Epistemic – A priori vs. A posteriori Metaphysical – Necessary vs. Contingent

Two roles descriptions can play:

Fixing reference of singular terms Giving meaning of singular terms

DESCRIPTIVISM DETAILEDDescriptivist theory of proper names :

(1)Every name ‘n’ is associated with a description D that x believes is true of n

(2)Speaker x believes that D is satisfied by a unique individual

(3)If y satisfies D, then y is the referent of ‘n’ (4)If nothing satisfies D, ‘n’ doesn’t refer(5)The sentence ‘n is D’ is known a priori by x(6)The sentence ‘n is D’ as uttered by x

expresses a necessary truth

NOTE: SIMPLIFIED FOR PRESENTATION

DESCRIPTIVISM DETAILED(C) D must be chosen in such a way that there is no circularity (i.e. no use of the notion of reference)

CIR: For any theory of proper names T, if T tells us that a name n is associated with a description d that expresses a cluster of properties φ, either:

(i) φ must not include the property being called n,

(ii) φ does include the property being called n but it is possible to eliminate being called n from φ, or

(iii) T is circular

DESCRIPTIVISM DETAILEDIf φ includes the property is called the name ‘n’,

then that theory would amount to telling us that a person P has the property is called the name ‘n’

just in case S is the referent of n

Aristotle is called ‘Aristotle’ iff he’s called ‘Aristotle’

If one was determining the referent of a name like ‘Glunk’ to himself and made the following decision, ‘I shall use the

term ‘Glunk’ to refer to the man that I call ‘Glunk’,’, this would get one nowhere. One had better have some

independent determination of the referent of ‘Glunk’. [Kripke, N&N, p. 295]

MODAL OBJECTION TO (6)…it is a contingent fact that Aristotle ever did any

of the things commonly attributed to him today, any of these great achievements that we so

much admire. [Kripke N&N, p. 296]

i. If a description D gives the semantic content of a proper name n, then the proposition expressed by the sentence ‘if n exists, then n is D’ is necessary

ii. It is possible that n exists and fails to satisfy Diii. Therefore, ‘if n exists, then n is D’ is

contingentiv. Therefore, (6) is false

SEMANTIC OBJECTION TO (3)Does ‘Gödel’ refer to Gödel, or to Schmidt?

i. From (3), if a description D gives the semantic content of a proper name n, then the thing that satisfies D necessarily is the referent of ‘n’

ii. Possibly, an object a satisfies D, but is not the referent of n; instead, object b is the referent of n

iii. Therefore, what satisfies D might not be the referent of ‘n’

iv. Therefore, (3) is false

KNOWLEDGE OBJECTION TO (2), (4), & (5)(5) The sentence ‘n is D’ is known a priori by x

Even if we are competent users of the name, we’re not in a position to know the following a priori If anyone is Gödel, he discovered the incompleteness If anyone discovered incompleteness, he is Gödel

(4) If nothing satisfies D, ‘n’ doesn’t referIt seems possible that the referent of ‘n’ exists despite the fact that there is nothing satisfies D – ‘Gödel’ would still refer to Gödel, even if nobody proved the incompleteness of arithmetic!

KNOWLEDGE OBJECTION TO (2), (4), & (5)(2) Speaker x believes that D is satisfied by a

unique individual

The descriptions people actually associate with proper names simply aren’t specific enough!

F ‘Feynman’ means ‘The famous physicist’

Fails to distinguish Feynman uniquely from Einstein, Gell-Mann, Hawking, etc.


Descriptivism





WHERE FROM HERE?If descriptivism is wrong, two new questions:

Reference: What determines what (if anything) a name refers to? The causal theory of reference

Meaning: What is the meaning of a name? Names are rigid designators

o A reversion to Millianism (i.e. the Naïve theory)?

CAUSAL THEORY OF REFERENCEReference: What determines what (if anything)

a name refers to? It’s in virtue of our connection with other

speakers in the community, going back to the referent himself, that we refer to a certain man

Baptism: how a name first comes to refer to a thing: by ostension – point at it and say ‘I name that

‘n’’ by description – describe it (a la ‘Hesperus’)

The causal chain: after baptism, the name can be transmitted to others via suitable causal links

CAUSAL THEORY OF REFERENCE

An utterance of a proper name ‘n’ refers to x iff

i. the utterance is at the end of a sequence of utterances of ‘n’ the first member of which is an initial baptism of ‘n’ ; and

ii. every other member of which is ‘properly linked’ via a causal chain to the previous member

CAUSAL THEORY OF REFERENCEThis is my friend Harry Adamson

CAUSAL THEORY OF REFERENCE When Harry was born, his parents named him

‘Harry Adamson’. This was a baptism!

They told their friends & family, who came to use ‘Harry’ to refer to Harry in virtue of standing in a causal connection to the initial baptizer's usage

My usage of ‘Harry Adamson’: refers to Harry in virtue of my standing in a appropriate causal connection to previous proper users of ‘Harry’

You usage of ‘Harry Adamson’ refers to Harry because you’re part of the causal chain too!

CAUSAL THEORY OF REFERENCEA Potential Problem Case:

‘Madagascar’ Gareth Evans – The Causal Theory of Reference

Originally used to refer to part of mainland Africa

Marco Polo misunderstood and used the term to refer to an island off the coast of Africa

Was there a new baptism? Can there be unknowing baptisms? Does ‘Madagascar’ refer to Madagascar?

RIGID DESIGNATION

Names are rigid designators – they refer to the same thing in every possible world

Regardless of how different the object might be!

Serena Williams & The Brave Little Toaster

Adam@ & Noah@, ‘Adamwn’& ‘Noahwn’• Chisholm’s ‘Paradox’

NECESSARY A POSTERIORIThe necessary a posteriori

The ancients believed the Morning Star (Phosphorous) and the Evening Star (Hesperus) were distinct stars, though they are the planet Venus.

‘Hesperus is Phosphorous’ is a posteriori Empirical discovery of it’s truth

‘Hesperus is Phosphorous’ is necessary Names are rigid designators which necessarily co-

refer

NECESSARY A POSTERIORIPerhaps Ancients said:

P Possibly, Hesperus is not Phosphorous

S is epistemically possible for y iff y’s evidence doesn’t rule it out

S is metaphysically possible iff S might be the case

PE For all we know, Hesperus is not Phosphorus

True, depends upon available astronomical information

PM Possibly, Hesperus is not Phosphorus False, determined by rigid designation & necessity

of =

CONTINGENT A PRIORIThe contingent a priori

Suppose we fix the reference of ‘meter’ by claiming that 1 meter is the length of stick S at time t0.

It is a priori that S is 1 meter long – ‘1 meter’ is a rigid designator, the reference of which is fixed as the (actual) length of S at t0!

It is contingent that S is 1 meter long – S could have been longer or shorter than it was at t0!


Descriptivism





THE PUZZLES (AGAIN)

(1) Frege’s Puzzle: How can two identity statements differ in cognitive value, if the terms involved refer to the same thing?

(2) Predicational Puzzle: How can two predicational statements differ in cognitive value, if the singular terms involved refer to the same thing?

(3) Substitution Puzzle: How can a = b but ‘S believes that a is F’ not mean the same as ‘S believes that b is F’?

THE PUZZLES (AGAIN)

(4) Empty Names Puzzle: how can ‘a is F’ be meaningful when ‘a’ stands for a non-existing or fictional entity?

(5) Law of Excluded Middle: How can it be that, for any formula ϕ, (ϕ V ϕ)?

(6) Negative Existentials Puzzle: How can ‘a does not exist’ be true?

THE PUZZLESNote that (1) – (3) concern cognitive value

Meanwhile, (4) – (6) concern talk of non-existents

o It was the failure of the Naïve theory to solve the first three puzzles that pushed us towards giving it up

Kripke’s aim in A Puzzle About Belief: Show that the failure to address (1) – (3) isn’t a failure of the Naïve theory. These are puzzles, not objections!


Descriptivism





THE MILLIAN SPIRIT OF NAMING & NECESSITYMill on proper name: A proper name simply refers to its bearer, and has no other linguistic function

Millianism: For all names n and m, if n & m co-designate, then the semantic value of n is identical to the semantic value of m

A consequence: co-referring names are substitutable in all contexts

SUB: For all names n & m , if n & m co-designate, then the proposition expressed by ‘Φn’ = the proposition expressed by ‘Φm’

THE MILLIAN SPIRIT OF NAMING & NECESSITY

Two potential problem cases

(1)Modal Contexts – Necessarily, n is F

(2)Belief Contexts – x believes that n is F

SUB-B: For all names n & m, if n & m co-designate, then sentences of the form ⌜x believes Fn⌝

and ⌜x believes Fm⌝ have the same truth-value

(a)Necessarily, 9

is prime

(b) Necessarily, my favorite #

is prime


SUB-B is false

i. ‘Tom believes Tully denounced Catiline’ – True ii. ‘Tom believes Cicero denounced Catiline’ – False

So it seems clear that co-designative proper names are not interchangeable in belief contexts. It also seems clear that there must be two distinct propositions or contents expressed by ‘Cicero denounced Catiline’ and ‘Tully denounced Catiline’. How else can Tom believe one and deny the other? And the difference in propositions thus expressed can only come from a difference in sense between ‘Tully’ and ‘Cicero’. Such a conclusion agrees with a Fregean theory and seems to be incompatible with a purely Millian view. [Kripke, APB, p. 243]


Supports an argument for Fregean view?

1. Co-designative names are not interchangeable in belief contexts

2. Failure of interchangeability of proper names arises from a difference in the defining description the speaker associates with these names

3. Therefore, different names have different descriptions (i.e. senses) associated with them


Three Problems for ‘Fregean’ ViewI. Community-wide senses or idiolect senses?

a. Former don’t seem fine-grained enoughb. Latter give rise to problems (e.g. we can’t say,

‘Everyone knows that Aristotle was a philosopher’)II. Impoverished senses (the sense of ‘Feynman’ &

‘Gell-man’ are the same for most speakers)III. Mates' puzzle: even synonyms don't seem to be

substitutable in all belief contexts! Whoever believes that doctors are wealthy believes

that physicians are wealthy Whoever believes that doctors are wealthy believes

that doctors are wealthy


FOR Ia: After further thought, however, the Fregean conclusion appears less obvious. Just as people are said to have been unaware at one time of the fact that Hesperus is Phosphorus, so a normal speaker of English apparently may not know that Cicero is Tully, or that Holland is the Netherlands. For he may sincerely assent to ‘Cicero was lazy,’ while

dissenting from ‘Tully was lazy,’ or he may sincerely assent to ‘Holland is a beautiful country,’ while dissenting from ‘The

Netherlands is a beautiful country.’ In the case of ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus,’ it seemed plausible to account for the parallel situation

by supposing that ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ fixed their (rigid) references to a single object in two conventionally different ways, one

as the ‘evening star’ and one as the ‘morning star.’ But what corresponding conventional ‘senses,’ even taking ‘senses’ to be

‘modes of fixing the reference rigidly,’ can plausibly be supposed to exist for ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ (or ‘Holland’ and ‘the Netherlands’)? Are not these just two names (in English) for the same man? Is there any

special conventional, community-wide ‘connotation’ in the one lacking in the other? I am unaware of any. [Kripke, APB]


FOR Ib:

…according to the view we are now entertaining, one cannot say, ‘Some people are unaware that Cicero is Tully.’ For, according to this view, there is no single proposition denoted by the ‘that’ clause, that

the community of normal English speakers expresses by ‘Cicero is Tully.’ Some—for example, those who define both ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’

as ‘the author of De Fato’—use it to express a trivial self-identity. Others use it to express the proposition that the man who satisfied

one description (say, that he denounced Catiline) is one and the same as the man who satisfied another (say, that his speech was

Greek to Cassius). There is no single fact, ‘that Cicero is Tully,’ known by some but not all members of the community.

[Kripke, APB]


Kripke isn’t trying to refute the Fregean account

Rather he is trying to show that problems about belief (and/or belief ascription) arise without invoking a Millian principle of substitution

Upshot: puzzles about belief by themselves can’t be used against the Millian account – they are genuine puzzles, rather than an objection to the Naïve view!

GENERAL PRINCIPLES Assent indicates belief: Jones assents to ‘Cicero

was bald’, so Jones believes that Cicero was bald, he assents to ‘Tully was not bald’, so Jones believes that Tully was not bald.

Disquotation principle (D):If a normal English speaker, on reflection, sincerely

assents to ‘P‘, she believes that P

Note: distinct disquotation principles for each language!

(French) disquotation principle: Si un orateur francais normal, à la reflexion consent sincerement ‘P’, puis elle croit que P

GENERAL PRINCIPLES Failure to assent indicates lack of belief – Jones

fails to assent to ‘Tully was bald’, so it is not the case that Jones believes that Tully was bald

Strengthened disquotation principle (SD)A normal English speaker (who is not reticent) will

be disposed to sincere reflective assent to ‘P’ if and only if she believes that P

GENERAL PRINCIPLES A true sentence remains true when we translate it

into another language

… of course we ordinarily allow ourselves to draw conclusions, stated in English, about the beliefs of speakers of any

language: we infer that Pierre believes that God exists from his sincere reflective assent to ‘Dieu existe.’ [Kripke, APB]

Principle of Translation (T)If a sentence P in language L expresses a truth in L, then any translation of P into any other language L*

also expresses a truth in L*

GENERAL PRINCIPLESD + Millainism entails an absurdity

(i) Jones believes that Tully was bald; &(ii) Jones believes that Tully was not bald.

SD + Millainism entails a contradiction(iii) Jones believes that Tully was bald; &(iv) It is not that case that Jones believes that Tully

was bald.

Kripke is going to derive similar undesirable results without Millianism

CASE 1: PIERRE & LONDONSuppose Pierre is a normal French speaker who lives in France and speaks not a word language except French.

He has heard the famous distant city, London (which he calls ‘Londres’) though he himself has never left France.

On the basis of what he has heard of London, he is inclined to think that it is pretty.

So he assents to the French sentence: ‘Londres est jolie.’

CASE 1: PIERRE & LONDONLater, Pierre moves to a part of London with fairly uneducated inhabitants (Highbury), so he must learn English by direct method, without using any translation

Eventually, he starts to pick up English. In particular, everyone speaks of ‘London’, where they all live.

Pierre's surroundings are unattractive, so he is inclined to assent to the English sentence:

‘London is not pretty.’

CASE 1: PIERRE & LONDON(1)Pierre sincerely assents to 'Londres est jolie'(2)Pierre croit que Londres est jolie. (By French

version of D)(3)'Pierre believes that London is pretty' is a

translation into English of the French sentence in (2)

(4)Pierre believes that London is pretty [by (2), (3), & T]

(5)Pierre sincerely assents to 'London is not pretty'(6)Pierre believes that London is not pretty (By

English version of D)(7)Pierre believes that London is pretty and believes

that London is not pretty [by (4) and (6)]

CASE 1: PIERRE & LONDON1) Pierre sincerely assents to 'Londres est jolie'2) Pierre croit que Londres est jolie. (By French

version of D)3) 'Pierre believes that London is pretty' is a

translation into English of the French sentence in 2)

4) Pierre believes that London is pretty. [by 2), 3), & T]

5) Pierre is not disposed to assent to 'London is pretty'

6) Pierre does not believe that London is pretty. (By English version of SD)

7) Pierre does and does not believe that London is pretty [by 4) and 6)]

CASE 1: PIERRE & LONDONThere are a limited number of possible responses to

this argument:

(a) Reject (3)(b) Reject Disquotation(c) Reject Translation(d) Accept (7), and endorse the argument

The puzzle is that none of the responses look acceptable

CASE 1: PIERRE & LONDONAgainst (d): We can't accept the conclusion, since Pierre is rational – we shouldn't take him to believe something and its negation

[Pierre] lacks information, not logical acumen. He cannot be convicted of inconsistency: to do so is incorrect. [Kripke, APB]

There seems to be some sense in which Pierre's beliefs are inconsistent – they can't both be true. But there's also a sense in which his view of the world is coherent

CASE 1: PIERRE & LONDONAgainst (c): we can't reject T, since the whole point of translation is to preserve meaning – if two sentences mean the same thing, then they're true under the same circumstances.

Quine might dispute this point, but perhaps we can come back to it in the very last week…

CASE 1: PIERRE & LONDONAgainst (b): We could try to reject D, but the principle does seem self-evident. Would we merely restrict it? If so, to what cases?

Suppose we refused to use D to infer from Pierre's assent to 'Londres est jolie' that Pierre believes that London is pretty.

Presumably, we'd then have to think that Pierre used to believe that London is pretty, but changed his mind.

But when did he change his mind?

CASE 1: PIERRE & LONDONAlternatively, we might think that Pierre never believed that London was pretty. But why not? Does what he believes now somehow weirdly depend depends on what happens later in his life?

▪ Suppose on the other hand that we refused to use D to infer from Pierre's assent to 'London is not pretty' that Pierre believes that London is not pretty. Why wasn't he able to acquire this belief? We'd count anyone else in a similar state of mind as believing that London is not pretty. What’s special about this case?

CASE 1: PIERRE & LONDONAgainst (a): We can't reject (3) without implausibly ruling that no sentence containing a name has a translation in any other language.

Furthermore, a similar paradox arises without (3) or T!

This brings us to Case 2: Peter & Paderewski

CASE 2: PETER & PADEREWSKISuppose Peter learns the name ‘Paderewski’ as picking out a famous pianist. This leads Peter to assent to:

‘Paderewski had musical talent’

Later, in a different context, Peter learns of someone called ‘Paderewski’ who was a Polish nationalist leader and Prime Minister. Peter is skeptical of the musical abilities of politicians so, using ‘Paderewski' as a name for the statesman, Peter assents to,

‘Paderewski had no musical talent’

CASE 2: PETER & PADEREWSKIBy two applications of D, it follows that

I. Peter believes that Paderewski had musical talent

II. Peter believes that Paderewski had no musical talent

The Question:Does or doesn't Peter believe that Paderewski had

musical talent?

This all occurs within the same language – so we can get a Puzzle-case without appeal to T or

(3)!


Descriptivism




5. Lessons from the Puzzle

LESSONS FROM THE PUZZLEIt is a mistake to criticize Millianism as follows:

‘Millianism implies SUB, and SUB is wrong. Suppose we have 'S believes that Tully isn't famous'

and 'S believes that Cicero is famous'. Then SUB lets us derive 'S believes that Tully is famous,’’ so we incorrectly attribute contradictory beliefs to a

normal person!

The criticism is mistaken because that result is obtainable without SUB – using just D & T we end

up incorrectly attributing contradictory beliefs!

LESSONS FROM THE PUZZLEFregean Reply:

If Millianism implies SUB and SUB results in paradox, then Millianism is wrong. Why does it

matter if some other principles also result in the same paradox?

Kripke’s Rejoinder:

They aren't just other principles – SUB is just a homophonic application of T. And since T seems

obviously true independent of Millianism, there's no reason to blame the paradox on SUB/Millianism)

LESSONS FROM THE PUZZLE

Kripke doesn't conclude that Millianism is true

But he does conclude that problems about substitution don't favour Fregeanism over Millianism

… [Cases like these] lie in an area where our normal apparatus for the ascription of belief is placed under the greatest strain and may even break down. There is even less warrant at the present time, in the absence of a better understanding of the paradoxes of this paper, for the use of alleged failures of substitutivity in belief contexts to draw any significant theoretical conclusion about proper names. [Kripke, APB]

LESSONS FROM THE PUZZLEIn other words:

the failure to address the Substitution Puzzle isn’t an objection to the Naïve theory’s account of singular terms. Rather, it’s a problem for our account of belief/belief ascriptions – a genuine puzzle to be solved!

Note: It is absolutely crucial to Kripke's conclusion that Fregeanism doesn't provide a plausible way to

deny or restrict D or T. If it did, then Kripke's path to the paradox would be blocked while the path

through SUB would still be clear, leaving Millianism wrecked…

BROADER LESSONS FROM THE PUZZLEWe‘ve spent the last few weeks looking at three

accounts of singular terms:

The Naive Theory: singular terms just refer, they don’t have any other linguistic function

Positives: Simple! Straightforward!

Negatives: Fairs badly with the puzzles given Kripke‘s APB, perhaps the failure to say

something about (1) – (3) isn‘t too bad! Of course, there‘s still (4) – (6)…

BROADER LESSONS FROM THE PUZZLEFrege’s Sense-Based Account: Motivated by the first

three puzzles (in particular, by the puzzle about identity), Frege introduced the notion of sense

Positives: Seems to have a solid answer to (1) – (3)

Something to say about (4) & (6)

Negatives: Problem with (5) [Russell’s objection]Modal, Semantic, & Knowledge

ObjectionsThree problems Kripke mentions in APB

(esp. Mates’ puzzle)

BROADER LESSONS FROM THE PUZZLERussell’s Descriptivism: motivated by a problem

with Frege’s account, Russell tried to reduce singular terms down to definite descriptions

Positives: Solid answers to (1) – (6)!No ‘creepy senses’!

Negatives: Referential uses of definite descriptionsModal, Semantic, & Knowledge

Objections

NEXT WEEKPreliminary Schedule

Week 1 (04.04): Intro to Phil-Lang Week 2 (11.04): NO CLASS Week 3 (18.04): Frege’s On Sense & Reference Week 4 (25.04): More Sense, More Reference Week 5 (02.05): Russell’s Definite Descriptions Week 6 (09.05): NO CLASS Week 7 (16.05): Problems with Definite Descriptions Week 8 (23.05): NO CLASS Week 9 (30.05): Kripke’s Causal Theory of Names Week 10 (06.06): More on the Causal Theory Week 11 (13.06): Grice on Meaning Week 12 (20.06): Austin on Speech Acts Week 13 (27.06): Grice on Logic & Conversation Week 14 (04.04): TBD Week 15 (11.07): Exam

Reference/

Singular Terms

Pragmatics &

Speech Acts

NEXT WEEKShifting topics – moving away from issues dealing

strictly with semantics and instead towards matters about pragmatics

Reading:H. P. Grice’s ‘Meaning’

Also, please bring a pen or pencil next week, as we’ll have a little practice exam…

Documents

Einführung in die Theoretische Philosophie: Sprachphilosophie