Schriftenreihe zum Wirtschaftsrecht Lateinamerikas ... · tion for daily life and occupies the indispensible position, though civil law and other laws have gained much more significance

VRÜVerfassung und Recht in ÜberseeLaw and poLitics in afRica | asia | Latin ameRica

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Brun-otto Bryde philip Kunig Karl-andreas Hernekamp

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3 201043. JahrgangSeite 289 – 395ISSN 0506-7286

Aus dem Inhalt:

ABHANDLUNGEN Shizhou WangOn Development of Criminal Law in the People‘s Republic of China

Dieter WelzDemocracy and the rule of law in South Africa: Observations on significant legislative and other developments after Polokwane

Andreas BaumerSpäte Sehnsucht nach la madre patria: Formen lateinamerikanischer Migration in Spanien

Kennedy GastornSquatters‘ Rights and the Land Laws in Tanzania

BERICHTE Stefanie DjidonouDer Beitrag der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit zur Sicherung von Grundrechten, Demokratie und Entwicklung. VII. KAS-Völkerrechts-Konferenz, 12./13. November 2009, Heidelberg

Cornelia GlinzThe International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes

Julia SattelbergerDer Europäische Auswärtige Dienst – Chance oder Risiko für die europäische Entwicklungszusammenarbeit?

www.verfassung-und-recht.de3

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Parallelimportregelungen im Patent- und Markenrecht in Lateinamerika

Patricia Bohn

Schriftenreihe zum Wirtschaftsrecht Lateinamerikas

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Parallelimportregelungen im Patent- und Markenrecht in LateinamerikaVon Patricia Bohn2010, Band 17, 394 S., brosch., ca. 89,– €, ISBN 978-3-8329-5762-9Erscheint ca. Oktober 2010

Der Band zeigt auf, dass Parallelimportregelungen im Patent- und Markenrecht in lateinamerika-nischen Integrationsgemeinschaften und Ländern unter Berücksichtigung der spezifischen integra-tions- und wirtschaftspolitischen Interessen dif-ferenziert und vielfach anders zu beurteilen sind als in den Industrienationen.

Das Recht der Verwertungsgesellschaften in LateinamerikaEine Untersuchung der kollektiven Wahrnehmung von Musikrechten in Chile, Argentinien, Kolumbien und Mexiko unter urheberrechtlichen und kartellrechtlichen GesichtspunktenVon Dr. Stefan Alich2010, Band 16, 584 S., brosch., 119,– €, ISBN 978-3-8329-5515-1

Im vorliegenden Werk wird das Recht der latein-amerikanischen Verwertungsgesellschaften erst-mals wissenschaftlich erläutert. Neben allgemei-nen Informationen bietet das Buch eine fundierte Analyse der Systeme in Chile, Argentinien, Kolum-bien und Mexiko.

Das Recht der Verwertungsgesellschaften in Lateinamerika

Stefan Alich

Eine Untersuchung der kollektiven Wahrnehmung von Musikrechten in Chile, Argentinien, Kolumbien und Mexiko unter urheberrechtlichen und kartellrechtlichen Gesichtspunkten


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Inhalt

Abstracts ................................................................................................................................ .289

Abhandlungen / ArticlesShizhou WangOn.Development.of.Criminal.Law.in.the.People‘s.Republic.of.China............................ .292

Dieter WelzDemocracy.and.the.rule.of.law.in.South.Africa:.Observations.on.significant..legislative.and.other.developments.after.Polokwane....................................................... .304

Andreas BaumerSpäte.Sehnsucht.nach la madre patria:.Formen.lateinamerikanischer.Migration.in.Spanien........................................................................................................................................328

Kennedy GastornSquatters‘.Rights.and.the.Land.Laws.in.Tanzania.............................................................. .349

Berichte / ReportsStefanie DjidonouDer.Beitrag.der.Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit.zur.Sicherung.von.Grundrechten,..Demokratie.und.Entwicklung..VII..KAS-Völkerrechts-Konferenz,..12./13..November.2009,.Heidelberg........................................................................................ .366

201043. JahrgangSeite 289 – 395

3Begründet.von.Prof..Dr..Herbert Krüger (†)

Herausgegeben von.Prof..Dr..Brun-Otto Bryde,.Justus-Liebig-Universität.Gießen,.Prof..Dr..Philip Kunig,.Freie.Universität.Berlin,.Dr..Karl-Andreas Hernekamp,.Universität.Hamburg.im.Institut.für.Internationale.Angelegenheiten.der.Universität.Hamburgdurch.die.Hamburger.Gesellschaft.für.Völkerrecht.und.Auswärtige.Politik.e.V...in. Verbindung. mit. den. Regional-Instituten. des. German. Institute. of. Global. and. Aerea-Studies.–.GIGA.–.(Institut.für.Afrika-Studien,.Institut.für.Asien-Studien,.Institut.für.Latein-amerika-Studien,.Institut.für.Nahost-Studien),.alle.Hamburg

Beirat: Prof..Dr..Costa R. Mahalu,.Rom/Dar.es.Salaam,.Prof..Dr..Peter Malanczuk,.Hong-kong,.Prof..Dr..Albrecht v. Gleich,.Hamburg,.sowie.die.Leitungen.der.beteiligten.Hamburger.Regionalinstitute.des.GIGA

Schriftleitung: Dr..Karl-Andreas.Hernekamp, E-mail:[email protected]

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Cornelia GlinzThe.International.Centre.for.Settlement.of.Investment.Disputes................................. .369

Julia SattelbergerDer.Europäische.Auswärtige.Dienst.–.Chance.oder.Risiko.für..die.europäische.Entwicklungszusammenarbeit?............................................................... ..381

Bibliographie / Bibliography ...................................................................................386...

289

ABSTRACTS

On Development of Criminal Law in the People's Republic of China

By Shizhou Wang, Beijing

This paper is trying to illustrate the main achievements of Chinese criminal law and explain the main problems in the development of Chinese criminal law. In historical review, this paper explains the significance of promulgating Chinese Criminal Code of 1979 in ending the revolutionary criminal law, building up a state ruled of law and summarizing the experience of the Planned Economy. With open and reform policy, Chinese criminal legis-lation adopted individual supplementary decision to resolve the problem of stability against further development. The Chinese Criminal Code of 1997 integrated 23 supplementary decisions promulgated between 1979 and 1997 as well as other criminal provisions into a complete and systematical code. In the new development after 1997, Chinese criminal law adopted new legislative methods of criminal amendment and criminal legislative explana-tion instead of supplementary decision according to the Legislation Law of 2000. This paper illustrates the new development and points out the Chinese criminal law is in the tendency of expansion. According to the requirement of human rights protection in the Amendment of Constitution in 2004, Chinese criminal law provides more and more protec-tion for daily life and occupies the indispensible position, though civil law and other laws have gained much more significance in legal life. According to the Author’s opinion, there are two serious problems in Chinese criminal law. One is high guilty line and the other is too many death penalty. The Author argues that Chinese criminal law should lower down the guilty line in order to resolve these problems. By lowering down the guilty line, Chinese society could improve the level of social safety, which would provide a good condition for abolishing death penalty, at least a de facto one. Although the principles of modesty and last method (Subsidiaritätsprinzip und ultima ratio-Prinzip) should be observed, the problem in China is not yet the over-regulated but still the less-regulated. The Author believes that it shall be allright as long as criminal provisions are clearly stipulated, the principle of proportionality is followed and the purpose of a criminal provision is to provide and not to deprive people of freedom. With further devel-opment, Chinese criminal law shall also pay more attention to its accurate stipulation and enforcement of criminal law.

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Democracy and the rule of law in South Africa: Observations on significant legislative

and other developments after Polokwane

By Dieter Welz, Fort Hare / RSA

The 52nd Conference of the African National Congress (ANC) held at Polokwane in December 2007 affirmed the ruling party as the key strategic centre of power in South Africa exercising leadership over state and society in pursuit of the objectives of the National Democratic Revolution. Specific Polokwane resolutions impact on the independ-ence of the courts, law-enforcement agencies and the mass media. Aspects of the measures proposed for urgent implementation or already in place do not suit the requirements of the new Constitution. They either brazenly violate or seek to change these requirements – apparently for no principled reason and not inadvertently. These measures are widely seen as a potential threat to constitutional democracy in South Africa. They are discussed here with reference to the country’s complex political realities and its evolving patterns of con-stitutional development Late Nostalgia for la madre patria: Forms of Latin American Migration in Spain

By Andreas Baumer, Rostock

In the last two decades, Spain has undergone dramatic changes. The classic emigration country converted itself into one of the most important migrant-receiving countries in the European Union. Especially since the mid-nineties of the last century, migration to Spain experienced a massive acceleration, only curbed by the economic crisis starting in 2008. The percentage of citizens from foreign countries among the Spanish population increased from 1.3 percent in 1996 to 12.08 percent in 2009, exceeding the average figure of the traditional immigration countries in Europe. Migrants from Latin America had a big share in this boom. At the turn of the century, Latin Americans, especially from countries of the Andean Region, became the predominant group among the migrant population in Spain – to an extent that led scholars to speak of a “Latin-Americanization” of the migration to the Iberian country. Migration from Latin America to Spain became more dynamic more or less because of the same push- and pull-factors which determined migration processes originating from other regions: Poverty, unemployment and a general lack of perspectives on the one hand, and an apparently insatiable demand for work force in the booming Spanish economy on the other. But beyond that, some aspects rooted in the common history of la madre patria and their former colonies had a heavy influence on the development of these migration flows. A common language, the same religion and some kind of cultural vicinity provided to the Latin Americans some benefits compared to other groups, i.e. to Muslim migrants from Northern Africa. A great majority of the Spanish population prefers Latino migrants to immigrants from other regions.

Abstracts

291

Are migrants from Latin America indeed the “preferred of the 21st century”, as migra-tion scholar Antonio Izquierdo Escribano stated? Are there public policies privileging migration flows out of this area against those from former migrant sending regions? Can we even identify elements of a new hispanidad in the public discourse on migration in Spain? The article focuses on these questions. First, a concise account of the migration pro-cesses to Spain and the migration policies of the Spanish Governments in the past two decades will be given. Then, forms and dynamics of Latin American migration will be explored. Finally, the political, social and juridical framework of Latin American migration to Spain will be analysed and debated. Squatters' Rights and the Land Laws in Tanzania

By Kennedy Gastorn, Dar es Salaam

This paper discusses the position of land law in mainland Tanzania in relation to those who hold land outside the formal legal regime, in particular squatters, also referred to as infor-mal landholders. It traces the concept of squatting and its evolution in the Tanzanian land legal regime. The paper analyses the land tenure position of squatters in the courts of law, the National Land Policy and the new land laws. It discusses the schemes of validation and regularization of interests in land under the Land Act, 1999 as the squatters’ main options to formalize their title to land. The future of squatter’s land rights is also discussed. In this paper Tanzania means Tanzania mainland (Tanganyika) because although Tanzania is a union, land is not among the articles of union and therefore each part of the United Repub-lic of Tanzania (Tanganyika and Zanzibar) retains sovereignty as far as land administration and management are concerned.

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ABHANDLUNGEN / ARTICLES

On Development of Criminal Law in the People’s Republic of China

By Shizhou Wang, Beijing* I. Introduction

Even in the modern legal system, criminal law is still occupying the indispensable position, if we do not say that it is the most important position. In China, this is particularly true. With social and economic development, civil law and other laws have gained much more significance in legal life.

1 However, criminal law has still provided legal protection of the

highest standard for society. The role of criminal law has never been ignored. Criminal law shall be cautiously stipulated and implemented, due to its natures in depriving people’s property, freedom and even life. The principles of modesty (Subsidiarität) and last method (ultima ratio-) shall be seriously observed. How to correctly use criminal protection is an eternal topic not only for criminal law science but also for the legal science at large. If we make a brief review of legal history, people shall agree with the reality of expan-sion of criminal law.

2 On one hand, criminal law provides legal protection for more and

more areas in order to meet the social demands. It no longer limits itself in the traditional legal interests (Rechtsgüter) of life, body and property. Rather, the forefield (Vorfeld) of criminal law protection has been expanded to trust, credit, information, environment, as

* Shizhou Wang, Professor of Law & LL.D. Supervisor in Law School at Peking University, Alexander von Humboldt Research Award (2009), K C Wong’s Research Fellow (2004), Alexan-der von Humboldt Research Fellow (1994-1996), LL.M. at UC Berkeley (1988) & Peking Univer-sity (1985), LL.B. at Peking University (1982). E-mail: [email protected] or [email protected]. The article is based on the "Herbert-Krüger-Gedächtnis-Vorle-sung" held by the author on the annual meeting of the "Arbeitskreis für Überseeische Verfassungs-vergleichung" in Regensburg/Germany, July 02.- 04. 2010.

1 According to China's Efforts and Achievements in Promoting the Rule of Law, the White Paper

published by the Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China on February 28, 2008, there were 229 laws promulgated by the National People’s Congress and its Standing Committee by then, of which, 32 were civil and business law, 54 were economic law, 79 were administrative law, and criminal law had only 1.

2 In China, for example, Emperor Bang Liu of Han Dynasty (in about 207 BC) made his first agree-

ment with the people by only three provisions: any one who kills shall be executed and any one who injures or steals shall be expiated. However, the famous Tang Code promulgated by Emperor Shimin Li of Tang Dynasty (in about 637 AC) has reached 12 Titles with 30 Volumes and 502 articles already. See: The Compilatory Group for History of Chinese Legal History in the Editorial Division of Legal Textbook, Chinese Legal History, Press of the Masses, 1982, pp. 129, 205.

Wang, On Development of Criminal Law in the People’s Republic of China 293

well as to attempt and preparation. On the other hand, the minimum criminal punishment stipulated in a criminal provision keeps lowering down while the areas under the protection of criminal law are moved further into the forefield. This is a world-wide tendency for criminal law development. China is also going in this direction. However, it is a serious question for Chinese academia of criminal law to consider how to avoid a misuse of crimi-nal law and how to keep the protection of criminal law conforming to the requirements of rule of law. In this paper, I would like to illustrate the main achievements of Chinese criminal law and explain the main problems in the development of Chinese criminal law. I would like also very much to welcome any comments and critiques upon the solutions I suggested to the direction of further development of Chinese criminal law. 1. Historical Overview

Current Chinese Criminal Law (hereafter the CCC) was promulgated in 1997. It is a revi-sion of the Chinese Criminal Law of 1979 (hereafter the CCC 1979).

3 In structure and

theoretical basis, both of the codes share many similarities. However, the difference between each code rests not only on the degree of delicacy and comprehensiveness but also on its basic attitude towards the spirits of rule of law, if we can observe them with a view-point of historical development. There are some characteristics worthy to mention on the CCC 1979. Firstly, it began to end the practice of the so-called revolutionary criminal law in China. The most distinct nature of the revolutionary criminal law is its ignorance to the principle of legality. After the People’s Republic was founded in 1949, criminal law in China was mainly composed of three parts. The first part was individual regulations such as those concerning the crimes of counter-revolution and corruption, which were enacted in the beginning of 1950s. The second part was the policy of the ruling party of Chinese Commu-nist Party (hereafter the CCP) and the governmental regulations. The third part was the 22nd draft of the Chinese criminal code.

4 The legislation of the Chinese criminal code actually

began in as early as 1952. In 1957, the National People’s Congress (hereafter the NPC) distributed the 22nd draft to law faculties, governmental organs, people’s courts and pro-curotorates, in order to collect suggestion, comments and criticism for a final bill. However, the process of this legislation was interrupted by the so-called anti-rightists movement and other political unrests until the late of 1970s. But the 22nd draft of the criminal code had been used as the guidance in legal practice since then. The promulgation of the CCC 1979 means an ending of this situation.

3 For the English texts of the Chinese laws mentioned in this paper, please see http://www.

lawinfochina.com/. 4 The text of this 22nd draft can be found in Mingxuan Gao & Bingzhi Zhao (Ed.), General Collec-

tion of the Documents and Materials of the Criminal Legislation in the new People’s Republic of China, Press of China People’s Public Security University, 1998, pp. 252-281.

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Secondly, it was an important step in building up a state of rule of law. The most pain-ful lesson China got from the so-called Cultural Revolution was that a state without law would eventually fall into terrible chaos. The death of the President of the People’s Repub-lic, Mr. Liu Shaoqi, and the exile of the General Secretary of the CCP, Mr. Deng Xiaoping, was good examples. After China survived from the disorder of the Cultural Revolution, it became the common understanding in the Chinese leadership to promulgate laws and to build up a state of rule of law. In the CCC 1979, the most notorious acts rampant during the Cultural Revolution were provided as a crime, such as the so-called “beating, smashing and looting”, which means to assemble a crowd and to cause a person’s injury, disability or death or the public or private property destroyed or taken away. It was proved that the CCC 1979 became one of the key footstones for the Chinese legal system to move towards rule of law. Thirdly, it was the summary of the experience of the Planned Economy. Before 1979, the term of “market” was negatively deemed as a bourgeois or petty bourgeois one. The practice of the Planned Economy had ever been guaranteed by the Constitution until 1993. Under the model of the Planned Economy, the State needs to build up a huge administra-tive system to guarantee the implementation of the state’s plan. This administrative system could suppress the occurrence of crime and petty illegalities. However, the effectiveness of the Planned Economy was at the expenses of economic development and the individual’s initiatives. In the CCC 1979, for example, the crime of the so-called “speculation” in Arti-cles 117 and 118 prohibited, with the maximum punishment of death penalty, trading with-out authorization between two places far away from each other. Almost at the same time when the CCC 1979 was promulgated, great changes took place in China, too. With open and reform policy, economic model and social life changed significantly. The old system was being reformed, however, the new system was still being constructed. As the first criminal code with limited experiences from the Cultural Revolu-tion and the Planned Economy, the CCC 1979 found itself difficult in dealing with social problems. But the newly established legal system need stability and could not start all over again immediately. A new type of criminal legislation was adopted: individual supplemen-tary decision. From 1979 to 1997, there were 23 supplementary decisions adopted.

5 These

23 supplementary decisions revised the CCC 1979 significantly, some of which were necessary and correct but some were problematic. The notable revision could be obviously seen in the Specific Part. The total number of the provisions in the Specific Part was greatly increased. A large amount of new crimes was added into the Specific Part, most of which were economic or business related crimes, such as financial fraud, crimes by violat-ing corporation law, taxation violation (including the crime against the special invoices for

5 There was another decision on exercising criminal jurisdiction over the crimes prescribed in the

international treaties where the People’s Republic of China is a party or has acceded, which was promulgated by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on June 23, 1987. If this Decision was calculated, the number of the Supplementary Decisions shall be 24.


Value-added Tax), but also other crimes such as aircraft hijacking, copyright and trademark violations. Some of existing crimes were revised by enhancing severe degree of punish-ment, unfortunately, even to death penalty. The examples of these types of crime were crimes of seriously endangering public security, smuggling, and corruption (embezzlement and bribery). Revisions in the General Part were also significant. However, some of the revisions were necessary and appreciated while some were problematic, too. The most important revisions were followings: As to the jurisdiction, universal principle was added to the crimes which China should undertake its obligation of jurisdiction according to the international treaties. Retroactivity was even possible for economic crimes in some cases when the accused failed to surrender himself in a required period of time.

6 As to the crimi-

nal subject, unit crime (corporate crime) was now introduced into the criminal law. As to the criminal punishment, aggravating punishment was possible for the cases in which a convicted criminal escaped from the custody and attacked the witness or victim or the person who reported his criminal activity. The regulations for the application of monetary punishment like fine became much more complicated. Revisions on the rules for joint crime and probation were also made. Since some of the principles in the General Part of the CCC 1979 were revised or supplemented, the problems in these newly promulgated decisions could not be ignored, because they were inappropriate and conflicted with other provision. Particularly, the problem of too many provisions with death penalty has been under sharp critique. How-ever, it is fair to say that these newly promulgated decisions provided an urgent protection of criminal law for the Chinese society and supported the proceedings of the reform under-taken in China. In order to resolve problems in the criminal law, a reform was advocated even in the end of 1980s. Theoretical circle began their works even earlier. The legislative revision began in the middle of 1990s and was accomplished with the CCC 1997. The CCC 1997 has great significance in the development of Chinese criminal law. Firstly, the princi-ple of legality was statutorily established finally. Art 3 of the CCC 1997 stipulated that any act deemed by explicit stipulations of law as a crime is to be convicted and given punish-ment by law and any act that no explicit stipulations of law deems a crime is not to be convicted or given punishment. The provision of analogy in the CCC 1979 was deleted. The promulgation of the principle of legality indicated that the Chinese process of rule of law was irreversible. Secondly, the whole Chinese criminal law was completely integrated. Previously, there had been more than 130 provisions in the Chinese economic law, civil law or administrative law, which stipulated that any violation thereof might undertake criminal liability “in comparison with” or “in accordance with” the relevant stipulations of

6 For example, Art. 2 of the Decision Regarding the Severe Punishment of Criminals Who Seriously

Sabotage the Economy in 1982 stipulates: if the offender voluntarily surrenders before May 1, 1982 or if he truthfully confesses all his crimes and brings truthful accusations with respect to the facts of crimes of other criminals before May 1, 1982,, he shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the old law. If the offender refuses to surrender voluntarily, he shall be taken as continuing to commit crimes and shall be dealt with in accordance with this Decision.


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the criminal law.7 All of them were completely integrated into this Criminal Code after

careful consideration. Even the military crimes were included into this Code. Substantively, all of the criminal provisions were systematically arranged into one consecutive body.

8

Supplementary decision is still possible. According to the Chinese Legislature Law of 2000, however, any supplement shall not conflict against the principles of the Code itself any more. Thirdly, the definitions of crimes were much better specified. Some of them were revised, e.g., the so-called crime of counter-revolution was revised as the crime of endan-gering national security (Art. 102 - 113). Some were refined, e.g., the crime of dereliction of duty was increased from 7 articles in the CCC 1979 (Art. 185 ff) to 22 in 1997 (Art. 397 ff) plus many relative ones in other chapters. Some of the articles were abolished. For example, the crime of speculation was originally for violation of the laws and regulations on the control of monetary affairs, foreign exchange, gold and silver, or on the administra-tion of industrial and commercial affairs. Now, it was replaced by the crime of manufac-turing and selling counterfeit goods (Ch. 3) and the crime of disrupting market order (Ch. 6) in the new law. The crime of hooligan, which was used to be a catch-all provision for engaging in affrays with an assembled crowd, creating disturbances, humiliating women in public place, was criticized as unclear and too broad. In the CCC of 1997, it was broken as the crime of affrays with an assembled crowd (Art. 292), the crime of disturbances (Art. 293) and others. Fourthly, there were plenty of new crimes added into the new laws. The increasing numbers in economic crime and in crime against social administration were so many that this Criminal Code had to adopt a new legislative skill, i.e., to create sections under Chapter III Crimes of Undermining the Order of Socialist Market Economy and Chapter VI Crimes of Disrupting the Order of Social Administration. Of these revisions, the most important crimes newly added are the crime of underground society (Art. 294), the terrorist crime (Art. 120 ff), the crime of inciting national enmity or discrimination (Art. 249), money laundering (Art. 191), computer crimes (Art. 285 ff), security fraud (Art. 180 ff), crime against land resource (Art. 228), the crimes against business secrets (Art. 219), the crimes of unlawfully depriving personal freedom in order to get payment of a debt (Art. 238) or to compel people to work (Art. 244), the crime against witness (Art. 307), the crimes against environment and resources (Art. 338 ff), the crimes against the national defence (Art. 368) and more. With the CCC 1997, we can say that China has successfully built up a framework of a modern criminal justice system in the field of substantive criminal law. It is modern

7 See Mr. Hanbin Wang, Vice-President of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Con-

gress, Illumination on the Criminal Code of the People’s Republic of China (Bill of Revision) in the Fifth Session of the Eighth National People’s Congress on March 6, 1997, in The Gazette of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, No. 2, 1997, pp. 219, 220.

8 The 23 Supplementary Decision were also integrated into the Code, part of which was totally

integrated and no longer applicable (as listed in Appendix I of the Code), others were integrated with the part of criminal liability and no the part of administrative punishment (as listed in Appendix II of the Code).


because it recognizes the principle of legality. It is still a framework because there are still many details to be filled in. 2. New Developments

After the CCC 1997, the development of the Chinese criminal law went into a new stage. The CCC 1997 really remains stable. Since then, there was only one decision supplemented to it. That was the Decision on Suppression of Fraudulently Purchasing, Evading and Ille-gally Trafficking Foreign Exchange promulgated in 1998. After this decision, the Chinese legislature abandoned this type of legislative skill and adopted amendments and legislative explanations as its main methods to keep the Code up to date. The adoption of new legisla-tive methods shows the sincere efforts of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, who holds the constitutional privilege to amend and explain the Constitution and laws, to follow the requirements of rule of law. With the social and economic development in China, criminal law needs developing, too. Besides that decision, there were 7 amend-ments and 9 legislative explanations made to the CCC 1997 by April of 2010. A brief introduction to these supplements can be summarized as followings: As to the Decision on Suppression of Fraudulently Purchasing, Evading and Illegally Trafficking Foreign Exchange, the purpose was to improve the protection of foreign exchanges in China. If we can still remember the Asian financial storm in the end of 1990s, this Decision will be highly appreciated. The key point of this Decision was to create a new type of crime, i.e., fraudulently purchasing foreign exchange. In addition, the prohibition for the state-owned company was expanded to all kinds of company and institute to deposit foreign exchange abroad without authorization or to illegally transfer foreign exchange abroad. The managements related to foreign exchange such as Customs and foreign exchange administration were also under the cover of criminal law now. The First Amend-ment to the CCC was promulgated in 1999 with the purpose to strengthen the protection of the order of market economy. New criminalization was made to protect document of account such as financial invoices, books and reports, etc.. The bankruptcy of the state-owned company was under supervision of criminal law now. Punishments for illegally establishing banks, stock or futures exchanges, insurances, and other financial institutes, as well as the inside trading, were increased. Protection of stock and futures exchanges from rigging price or false information was strengthened by detailed definition and severer punishments. Almost at the same time, the first legislative explanation was issued in 2000, clarifying the meaning of “the other persons who perform public service according to law” as a state functionary in Art 93 of the CCL 1997. Accordingly, the personnel working in the rural grassroots organization, such as the member of a village’s committee, should be regarded as state functionaries when they assisted the governments to do the administrative management, such as to relieve the victim from a disaster, to deal with emergency, or to collect taxes, and so on. The Second Amendment was promulgated in August of 2001 with the purpose to strengthen the protection of cultivated land and woodland. Accordingly, the


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illegal land development should be strictly prohibited. Meanwhile, the second legislative explanation was issued in 2001 to unifying the meaning of “land” in the criminal law with the law of land administration, the forest law, the grassland law and other administrative regulations. The Third Amendment was promulgated in December of 2001 in order to strengthen the struggle against terrorist activities. Punishments for organizing, leading and participating in a terror group were significantly enhanced. Financing terrorist activities was incriminalized. The suppression to terror-related crimes such as explosion, poisoning and arson, money laundering or spreading false terrorist information were improved. The crime of poisoning was expanded to producing or trading any kinds of substances of poisonous, radioactive and pathogen of infectious diseases. Somewhat related, the third legislative explanation of April of 2002 clarified the meaning of “the organization in the nature of criminal syndicate” in Art. 294. To be a criminal organization, accordingly, it should be relatively stabilized in organization, rather strong in economic capacity, several times in committing crime and illegal activities, and strongly influential by connivance or shield of a state functionary. In 2002, there were two other legislative explanations. The one in April of 2002 pro-vided the meaning of “for his own use” for the crime of misappropriation in Art 384, which was referred to a State personnel who takes advantage of his office and misappropriates public funds for his own use. Accordingly, any circumstances shall be included, as long as it was the perpetrator who made the decision to provide the public funds for a private use or it was he who attempted to gain personal benefits. The one in August of 2002 provided the meaning of “disobeying judgment or order made by a people’s court with capacity” for the crime of refusing to obey the decision of a court in Art 313. Accordingly, any acts of hiding, transferring, intentionally damaging the property or selling the property in an obvi-ously low price should be covered in the meaning. On December 28 of 2002, the Fourth Amendment was promulgated. The purpose of this Amendment was to strengthen the protection of the order of medical administration and Customs as well as natural resource and labor conditions. Punishments were enhanced in order to protect medical apparatus and instruments, medical hygiene materials. Illegally importing waste materials was now completely prohibited, not matter they were in forms of gas, liquid or solid. Employing people under 16 years old to do hard or dangerous work was incriminalized. Illegally lumbering was under heavier punishment than before. Judicial officials were facing more severe punishment for the misconduct in bending the law for selfish ends or twisting the law for a favour. On the same day, the sixth legislative explana-tion clarified that the crimes of dereliction of duty in Chapter 9 of the CCC 1997 should apply to any person who exercised the authority on behalf of the state, no matter he did so was according to law or upon the trust of a governmental office or because he was per-forming a public service in a governmental office without formally listed as a state func-tionary. The Fifth Amendment was promulgated in 2005 to improve the protection on credit card management and the crime of sabotaging military weapon, equipments, facilities and communication. Accordingly, knowingly possessing or transporting large amount of coun-


terfeited credit card or illegally possessing large amount of other’s credit card would be a crime. Before and around that time, the criminal legislative explanations of 2004 explained the meaning of credit card and included all types of cards issued by a bank or financial institute with the function of paying, transferring, depositing or withdrawing. The explana-tion of 2005 explained the meaning of the invoices to refund the tax for exports or to offset tax money. Another explanation of 2005 stipulated that the provision on protecting cultural relics should apply to the protection on fossils of paleoanthropoids or paleovertebrates of scientific value. The Sixth Amendment was promulgated in 2006. Although this Amend-ment emphasized the protection of financial administrative order and interests of listed company and investor, it provided also several new provisions for social and economic safety. Punishments for violation of safety regulations concerning production, operation, installing safety facility and organizing event of large mass of people were clearly enhanced. Failure to report accident should undertake criminal liability for those who had a duty to do so. The definition of crime for failure to provide report of financial account in an exchange-listed company was improved. False bankruptcy, commercial bribery and breaching faithful duty by senior official of a listed company were newly incriminated. Fraudulently obtaining the guaranty from a bank or a financial institute was added into the category of financial fraud. Provision on rigging price of stock and future exchanges was improved. Breaching trust duty and misappropriating client’s fund in stock and futures market as well as bank and financial institute were incriminated. Crime of money launder-ing was revised to cover all types of predicate offences. Organizing disable persons or those under 14 years old with means of violence or coercion was incriminalized. The punishment for running a gambling house was significantly increased. Criminal liability of intentionally bending or twisting the law was expanded to arbitrator. The Seventh Amendment was promulgated in 2009 in order to strengthen the struggle against corruption and economic crimes and improve the protection of citizen’s rights. Goods and articles prohibited by the state for ex- and importation were all under the protection of anti-smuggling provision. Insider trading was also extended to all undisclosed information obtained by taking the advantage of position. Multi-level marketing and the any commercial activities without authority in banking, futures, insurance and financial settlements were completely incrimi-nalized. Selling or illegally giving out the personal data received in the process of perform-ance or service should undertake criminal liability now. The prohibition of invasion into a computer system was no longer limited to the fields of State affairs, national defense con-struction or sophisticated science and technology, however, the criminal liability need the purpose such as obtaining the data or controlling the system. Organizing minor people to commit administrative violation such as petty stealing, fraud or seizing and so on was incriminalized. The crime of harboring plunder was extended to a unit (legal person), so a unit could commit such a crime now. The criminal liability for the crime of violating the law on the entry and exit of animal and plant quarantine was no longer limited to the fact that actual result of a serious animal or plant epidemic, a danger of such epidemic should be enough. The special symbols of the armed forces such as the number plates of vehicles


300

were better protected with heavier punishment. The people who were not a state function-ary could become the subject of bribery now, if they accepted bribe by using the advantage of that state functionary. This is required by trading in influence in the UN Convention against Corruption. Punishment was increased from 5 to 10 years imprisonment if a state functionary whose property or expenditure obviously enormously exceeded his lawful income failed to explain the sources of his property were legitimate. Very significantly, the crime of taxation would receive a lighter punishment, if the perpetrator had paid the due tax and overdue fine and got an administrative sanction, and the crime of kidnapping would also receive a lighter punishment, if the circumstance was not serious. Generally speaking, the new development of Chinese criminal law after the CCC 1997 can be divided into two stages by 2005, mainly taking the Constitutional Amendment of 2004 on “respect and ensure of human right” as an indicator. The development of Chinese criminal law before 2005 mainly showed the expansion of the definition of the existing crime. The expansion could be seen by terms of conduct. For example, the crime of causing bankruptcy of the state-owned company in Art 168 was no longer only through the practice of favoritism but by now also by abusing power or neglecting duties. It could also be seen by subject. For example, the crime against liquida-tion in Art 162 was expanded from the natural person to legal person. It could still be seen in criminal target. For example, the crime of insider trading in Art 180 was available not only to stock exchange but also to the futures exchange. These expansions provided a better protection of criminal law horizontally, which was necessary for a new country with rapid development of economy. These expansions also refined definitions of crimes in the crimi-nal law, which were also necessary to fulfill the requirement of rule of law. The development of Chinese criminal law after 2005 might be more significant. The topics of each amendment were not as centralized as they were before. However, the pro-tection provided by criminal law got more deeply involved in daily social and economic activities. Very compellingly, many of these requirements of protection of criminal law were raised by people’s representatives of the National People’s Congress. The Seventh Amendment was even published before adoption in order to collect comments, suggestions and critiques from the public. From credit card fraud, military facilities protection, labor safety, safety of financial report and due diligences of senior officials in listed company, safety of banks and financial institutes as well as stock and futures exchanges, to money laundering, gambling house, royalty of arbitrator, computer crime, personal data safety, minor people’s protection, people can be convinced that criminal law in China begins to play its role in an even broader area. Very significantly, people can also see in the Seventh Amendment in 2009 that the Chinese criminal law was for the first time not to enhance punishment, rather, to lower down the minimum punishment for a crime. For the crime of kidnapping in Art 239 and the crime of tax evasion, the amendment provided a lighter punishment for light circumstance. This is also an important indicator that the Chinese criminal law began to move to the forefield of its traditional protection area.


3. Deficit and Solution

Indeed, China has made great achievements in term of substantive criminal law on the way towards rule of law. However, there are still problems. According to my viewpoint, there are two most serious problems in Chinese criminal law. One is high guilty line and the other is too many death penalty. Guilty line, or threshold of criminal liability, is stipulated in both CCC 1979, Art 10, and 1997, Art 13. It says: All acts that endanger the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and security of the state; split the state; subvert the political power of the people's democratic dictatorship and over-throw the socialist system; undermine social and economic order; violate property owned by the state or property collectively owned by the labouring masses; violate citizens' privately owned property; infringe upon citizens' rights of the person, democratic rights and other rights; and other acts that endanger society, are crimes if according to law they should be criminally punished. However, if the circumstances are clearly minor and the harm is not great, they are not to be deemed crimes. Because the stipulation in the last sentence of this provision, the Chinese enforcement authorities have to draw a line to separate the guilty and the innocent. Let’s take the crime of theft for example. In the area of Beijing, this guilty line is 1,000

� (about 100 €). Those

who steal less than 1,000�

shall not be deemed as a crime, rather, only an administrative violation. This structure in Chinese criminal law represents a remnant of the Planned Econ-omy. During that time, it was clever to make use of the administrative machinery to deal with petty violations. The stigma brought by an administrative sanction was by no means less than a criminal sanction. This system worked well in the time of the Planned Econ-omy.

9 However, it began to have problems, when China has moved forward.

First of all, the administrative sanction contains the punishment of depriving people of personal freedom. In the usual case, the administrative sanction might be 20 days detention as maximum. In the most serious cases, the administrative sanction can be education through labour for as long as 3 years with the possibility of one year’s extension. Secondly, the administrative sanction shall be decided by the public security organ above the county level or the committee headed by the public security organ. Thirdly, there is no defense lawyer possible in the administrative proceedings. How-ever, the people can raise an administrative lawsuit against the administrative decision they were inflicted, when they can be able to have a help from a lawyer. This system of administrative sanction has been under sharp critiques from all sides for the natures against modern principles of human rights such as fair trial. The legal basis of this system is also very old. It can be traced back to as early as 1957. The works in drawing such guilty line just like building a China Wall within the justice system and they are never

9 CF. Shizhou Wang, On Present Situation and Problems of Protection of Right of Personality in the

Chinese Criminal Code, in Law Journal of He Bei (He Bei Fa Xue), No. 11, 2006, pp. 24, 51.


302

completed. In those crimes and at those points where the guilty line are not clear, imple-mentation will always have difficulty and problems. This statutory guilty line is also not good for a unified legal system. It not only weakens the efficient protection of criminal law but also restricts the authority of people’s court! As to death penalty, it is a big problem in the Chinese criminal law. The number of the provisions with death penalty was increased from 15 in the CCC 1979 to 44 in 1997. The most important critique upon the CCC 1997 has been too much death penalty. In judicial practice, the real execution has been limited only to the crimes of murder, seriously injury, kidnapping, robbery, and drug trafficking. Besides drug trafficking, the other crimes sub-jected themselves to death penalty normally need the result of losing a life. Drug trafficking as an exception to this “rule” is because of the historical lesson of Opium War in 1840, which got China into her darkest times for about one hundred years until 1949. The “death line” for drug trafficking is stipulated in Art 347 of the CCC 1997: opium of more than 1,000 grams, heroin or methyl aniline of more than 50 grams or other narcotics with a large quantify. The policy China carries out for death penalty is to maintain but strictly restrict death penalty. However, too many death penalties will not only trigger the issues of human rights protection but also have negative influence upon the process of rule of law. There are too many lessons in the Chinese history that misusing death penalty led a dynasty to collapse so soon. And China would not be able to verify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which it signed in 1998, if the execution number is still very high. The efforts in restricting or abolishing death penalty shall be strengthened.

10

Facing these two problems, I advocate that Chinese criminal law shall lower down the guilty line. By lowering down the guilty line, Chinese society could improve the level of social safety, which would provide a good condition for abolishing death penalty, at least a de facto one.

11

My argument is actually following the general tendency of criminal law development in the world: to strengthen the social security by the protection of criminal law and to restrict death penalty to the strictest level, i.e., de facto abolition. I find out that the current Chinese situation on criminal law just has some significant difference with the common under-standing of criminal law in the world. For example, what the international human rights treaties allow is still believed by the Chinese criminal law as not allowed (lower guilty

10

CF. Shizhou Wang, Rethinking of the Death Penalty System in China, in Journal of Peking Uni-versity (Bei Jing Da Xue Xue Bao), Edition of Philosophy and Social Science, Vol. 41, No. 3, 2004, pp. 89, 96.

11 Cf. Shizhou Wang, On Present Situation and Problems of Protection of Right of Personality in the

Chinese Criminal Code, in Law Journal of He Bei (He Bei Fa Xue), No. 11, 2006, pp. 24, 30.


line), and what the Chinese criminal law allows is already provided by the international human rights treaties as not allowed (too many death penalty).

12

Now, the new development of Chinese criminal law has showed a sign of good direc-tion. From the criminal amendments and explanation, we can see that criminal liability covered more areas and got more involved in the daily economic and social life. From the judicial practice, we can see that the Supreme People’s Court has strengthened the control on approving capital sentence and that the execution number keeps going down, although the total number is still a “state secret”. More reforms have been also going on. A system of community correction has been introduced for those who were convicted of light crime. The administrative sanction of depriving person of freedom is considered to be reformed, part of which shall be shifted into criminal law and other will remain in the law without the nature of depriving personal freedom any more. However, there are still disputes within the Chinese law circle. Is this direction against the principles of modesty and last method (Sub-sidiaritätsprinzip und ultima ratio-Prinzip)? Does the Chinese criminal law expand itself too much? My answers to both questions are no! According to my research,

13 the principle

of modesty is a legal principle without binding legal power in all jurisdictions, though it is universally observed by law circles. This principle stresses on a humanistic nature of self-responsibility: the assistance of a state can only be provided when and where an individual person is unable to protect himself in his own power. Accordingly, however, this principle is also a policy principle or a legislative principle. Obviously, the criminal law protection shall be provided according to the needs of the weakest in a society, although the strongest might think it unnecessary! For the question of too much expansion of criminal law, there are two sides to be considered. On one hand, China is a country going from a state without law towards a state rule of law. So, the problem for China is not yet the over-regulated but still the less-regulated. I believe, on the other hand, it shall be alright if criminal provisions are clearly stipulated and if the principle of proportionality is followed. If the Chinese criminal law keeps developing in this direction, the understanding of international human rights will play an important role. Without ending, the Chinese criminal law shall also pay more attention to its accurate stipulation of criminal law. In this direction, the German science of criminal law and other laws is the best resource for China to study. Chinese scholars shall learn more from Germany and Sino-German relations shall be further strengthened.

12

See Shizhou Wang, On Allowability and Non-allowability in the International Human Rights Treaties to National Criminal Law, in: Bingzhi Zhao & Sheng Lang (Ed.), A Harmonious Society and the Construction of the Chinese Modern Criminal Law – Festschrift for 10th Anniversary of the New Chinese Criminal Code, Press of Peking University, 2007, pp. 389-393.

13 See, Shizhou Wang, Concepts of Supplementary Principle and Modest Principle in Criminal Law,

in Law Journal of He Bei (He Bei Fa Xue), No. 10, 2008, pp. 6, 12.

304

Democracy and the rule of law in South Africa: Observations on significant legislative and other developments after Polokwane

By Dieter Welz, Fort Hare / RSA* A. Introduction

For the first time since the mid-90’s more adult South Africans feel that the country is going in the wrong direction (42%) than in the right direction (38%). Satisfaction with the performance of the national government is on a steady decline since the previous election, with a decrease of 5% between November 2007 and November 2008. These are findings of a biannual study conducted by Ipsos Markinor in October and November 2008, released on 13 February 2009. The then President of South Africa in 2008 accordingly stated: ‘I am aware of the fact that many in our society are troubled by a deep sense of unease about where our country will be tomorrow… They are worried about whether we have the capacity to defend the democratic rights and the democratic Constitution which were born of enormous sacrifices.’

1

Policy areas of democracy and political governance, such as maintaining transparency and accountability, fighting corruption in the government, appointing the right people to lead government departments and agencies, attracted performance scores of lower than 50% (red lights). A follow-up survey conducted by Ipsos Markinor in October 2008 was released on 13 March 2009. It measures public confidence in the legal system, the police, parliament, local government, the constitutional court, the mass media and the ANC (as the governing party and the custodian of democracy). Its key findings are compatible with the results of the assessment of government performance. Recent developments in South Africa and the attendant allegations about abuse of state power for political purposes have created a public perception that the principles of the rule of law and the administration of justice are under threat, Parliament’s role has been relegated to rubber-stamping the ruling party’s resolutions and media freedom is in decline.

2 Therefore, it has been argued, ‘South Afri-

cans might well come to the conclusion that there is a deliberate and sustained attack on important institutions involved in upholding the Rule of Law and in protecting the admini-

* Dieter Welz, Professor emeritus of German (Rhodes University), Senior Lecturer in Law (Univer-sity of Fort Hare). E-mail: [email protected] or [email protected].

1 State of the Nation Address of the President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki: Joint Sitting of Parlia-

ment (8 February 2008), available at <http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2008/08020811021001. htm>.

2 Law Society Council Comment on Disbandment of ‘Scorpions’ and Related Events. Press

Release, 21 February 2008.

Welz, Democracy and the rule of law in South Africa 305

stration of justice.’3 The question remains whether such a conclusion is justifiable, and if

so, to what extent. B. Constitutional Amendments and Judicial Independence

I. Threats to Judicial Independence

South Africa is a democratic state, founded on inalienable values, including constitutional democracy and the rule of law as stated in section 1 of the Constitution, 1996. The judicial system is a constituent component of this constitutional democracy. Attempts to undermine the independence or impartiality of the courts threaten the administration of justice and the democratic nature of the state.

4

Sporadic filibustering attacks on individual judges in South Africa by the ruling party and its allies do not pose genuine threats to the independence of the judiciary.

5 The same

applies to attempts to influence individual judges pending judgement in one or more cases.6

Genuine threats are rather found in persistent and deliberate attempts to diminish or regu-late the powers of the judiciary as a whole. These attempts are hidden in resolutions on the Transformation of the Judiciary and the justice bills as highlighted in the debate around these bills. They take many forms. In general, interference in any shape or form with the independence of the judiciary is seen as a recipe for disaster both politically and economi-

3 Ibid.

4 According to the Statement by the Judges of the Constitutional Court, 30 May 2008, available at

<http://www.legalbrief.co.za>. 5 The capacity of political leaders and demagogic politicians to mobilize popular sentiment against

judges is present in any democratic government. But it remains fairly difficult to target judges with any precision. See the unwarranted attacks on the Chief Justice and his deputy. Deputy Chief Justice Dikgang Moseneke was attacked by the ANC National Executive Committee because having said (at his birthday party): ‘It’s not what the ANC wants or what the delegates want; it is about what is good for our people.’ Beyond Polokwane: Safeguarding South Africa’s Judicial Independence. An Internal Bar Association Human Rights Institute Report, 2008, para 3.129 (IBAHRI Report), available at <http://www.ibanet.org>.

The chief justice of the Constitutional Court, Pius Langa, was attacked by ANC president Jacob Zuma who reportedly warned: ‘I think we need to look at it, because I don’t think we should have people who are like God in a democracy.’ Zuma ‘Threat’ to Constitution, Mail&Guardian (17 to 23 April 2009). These attacks fall woefully short of the ‘need to respect for the institutions of the democratic state by members and supporters of our movement’ acknowledged by the Resolution on Transformation of State and Governance: Defending the Democratic State, in: Resolutions: ANC 52nd National Conference, 2007, para 1, available at <http://www.anc.org.za/ ancdocs/history/conf/conference52/resolutions/html>.

6 Judges of the Constitutional Court were allegedly approached by the Judge President of the Cape

High Court, Judge John Hlope, in an improper attempt to influence the court’s pending judgment in four Zuma related matters. They simply complained to the Judicial Service Commission (JSC), the constitutional body appointed to deal with complaints of judicial misconduct. The matter was controversially resolved by the JSC. See Statement by the Judges, note 4, para 1-2.

Verfassung und Recht in Übersee VRÜ 43 (2010) 306

cally.7 However, not every attempt to restrict the powers of the judiciary amounts to an

objectionable intrusion on judicial independence. Whether or not a proposed legislative interference with the judiciary is questionable depends on the form it takes.

8 Other branches of government may legitimately interfere

with the judiciary as a whole by regulating the administration of the courts, their jurisdic-tion and the appointment of judicial officers, even if this requires constitutional amend-ments. But any departure from the existing constitutional guarantees of judicial independ-ence would require cogent justification. In other words, it cannot be or seen to be an unconstitutional, illegal or inappropriate attempt to undermine the independence or impar-tiality of the courts. Whether, for instance, a particular limitation of the judicial role in the appointment of certain judges constitutes objectionable interference depends on whether it is aimed at inducing judges to act partially in politically controversial cases. Partiality means that legally irrelevant factors influence how disputes are settled. It has been persuasively argued that for political interference with judicial independ-ence to occur there has to be ‘a concatenation of power, interest, and will’

9. In this view an

organisation or person is a potential political threat to judicial independence if three condi-tions are satisfied. The entity or individual in question must have (1) reason to get a judge or court to reach a decision on grounds irrelevant in law; (2) sufficient resources – political, social and/or economic to influence or intimidate the judge; and (3) the capacity to form a will or intention to act in a way that interferes with judicial independence.

10 The ruling

party in South Africa demonstrably satisfies all three conditions. 1I. Resolution on the Transformation of the Judiciary

The ANC 52nd National Conference 2007 resolution on the Transformation of the Judiciary notes that previous decisions of National Conferences and the National General Council regarding the transformation of the judiciary ‘have not yet been implemented’ and that their implementation is ‘long overdue’.

11 This is a reference to the shelving of two contentious

7 Submissions to the Portfolio Committee on Justice and Constitutional Development on behalf of

the General Council of the Bar of South Africa, 19 May 2006, p. 22-23 (GCB Submissions). 8 John Ferejohn, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining Judicial Independence,

Southern California Law Review 72 (1999) p. 353, 355. 9 Ferejohn, note 8, p. 370.

10 Ibid.

11 Transformation of the Judiciary, note 5. In his first state of the nation address, the current presi-

dent of South Africa, Jacob Zuma, said he believed in the independence of the judiciary and free-dom of the press, but was unhappy about the lack of transformation of both institutions. Remarks on Judiciary, Media Cause for Concern, The Herald (20 April 2009).


bills in 2006, the Constitution Fourteenth Amendment Bill (CAB) and the Superior Courts Bill (SCB).

12 The implementation of the resolution seems a foregone conclusion.

13

The concern is that these Bills might be reintroduced unchanged in spite of vocal oppo-sition from the judiciary and the legal profession in the recent past which had led to their withdrawal.

14 The Government’s failure to revise aspects of the proposed legislation which

interfere fundamentally with the independence of the courts had been previously noted ‘with grave concern’

15. Increased executive and political involvement in matters of judicial

independence is seen as a move in the wrong direction for this country. III. General Observations on the Bills

The impact of specific provisions of the CAB and the SCB on the independence of the judiciary and its extent has been assessed in several submissions to the Ministry and to Parliament.

16 These submissions reflect the concerns that animate the judicial bills

debate.17

12

IBAHRI Report, note 5, para 3.30. – The text of the bills is available at <http://www.legalbrief. org.za>.

13 According to the new Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development the Bills will be

adopted in 2009. The Face of Legal Change, Mail&Guardian (12-18 June 2009). 14

IBAHRI Report (note 5 above) para 3.30. 15

Legislation Affecting the Judiciary: General Council of the Bar Press Statement, 30 January 2006, available at http://www.lrc.org.za/Docs/Constitution/Public%20Commentary/GCB_Press_Release (TheAdvocateApril2006).pdf>.

16 Legal Resources Centre Comments on the Constitution Fourteenth Amendment Bill, 14 January

2006; Legal Resources Centre Comments on Clause 1 of the Constitution Fourteenth Amendment Bill, 1 February 2006, available at <http/www.lrc.co.za//Focus_Areas/Submissions to Justice. asp>; International Bar Association Comments on the Impact of South Africa’s Constitution Fourteenth Amendment Bill and the Superior Courts Bill, April 2006 (IBAHRI Comments), available at http://www.ibanet.org; GCB Submissions, note 5, available at <http://www.legalbrief. co.za/filegmt_data/files/GCB%20billssubmissions.pdf>; Institute for Democracy in South Africa Submissions: Constitution Fourteenth Amendment Bill 2005, 25 May 2006, available at <http//www.idasa.org.za/> (IDASA Submissions); Maritime Law Association of South Africa Submission on Constitution 14th Amendment Bill and Superior Courts Bill, 27 June 2006; IBAHRI Report, note 5.

17 A. Spilg, Opening Remarks, in: Transcript of the Conference on the Justice Bills, Judicial Inde-

pendence and the Restructuring of the Courts, 17 February 2006, p. 12, 14, available at <http://www.lrc.org.za> (Conference Transcript).-- ‘In discussions stakeholders also expressed their fears that recent provisions in draft legislation tabled before the parliament … could seri-ously threaten the independence and/or delivery of justice in the county. Their concerns relate to the powers given to the executive in the proposed Bills on matters such as the appointment of senior judges, and the management of the budget of the judiciary.’ SA Country Review Report No 5, September 2007 (SA Report), para 199 available at <http://www.aprm.org.za/docs/ SACountryReport5.pdf >.


In the view of legal commentators the independence of the judiciary is adequately protected by current provisions of the Constitution. A departure from the status quo requires cogent justification, but little has been offered. What has been tendered does not survive closer scrutiny. The amendments are not, as claimed, about resolving limited issues concerning the demarcation of governmental functions in line with best international prac-tice. They demonstrably infringe objective standards that protect the judiciary’s role in constitutional democracies.

18

The Bills are not preceded by any detailed policy statement. Their policy objectives therefore have to be identified from the provisions of the Bills, but that has proved to be difficult, if not impossible in most instances. In the absence of any policy document com-mentators therefore must address the apparent effect and potential reach of obscure legisla-tive provisions. This has created the impression that hidden policy objectives are being deliberately shielded from scrutiny. Claims that the Bills promote transformation have been rejected as unfounded.

19

The explanations offered in the memoranda about the objects of the proposed legisla-tion are as obscure as particular provisions of the Bills. The stated object of the CAB is ‘to regulated responsibility in respect of the judicial and administrative functions of all courts’. It seeks to amend the Constitution, but for spurious reasons. The SCB purports ‘to ration-alise the various superior courts and the legislation applicable thereto in order to establish a judicial system suited to the Constitution’. In other words, it is a transitional exercise, but as such seen as a failure.

20

The proposed constitutional amendments tamper with textual provisions in the Consti-tution which protect judicial independence and with structural protections of judicial inde-pendence afforded by the Constitution as a whole. This removes constitutional defences against intrusions by other branches of government and sets up circumstances of institu-tional confrontation. It diminishes the role of the judiciary in upholding the rule of law and protecting constitutional rights and thus, incrementally, subverts the foundations of consti-tutional democracy. For these reasons legal commentators are unable to support key provisions of the CAB and their counterparts in the SCB. Significant findings are set out below.

18

GCB Submissions, note 15, p. 4-8. 19

Ibid. p. 2. 20

GCB Submissions, note 7, p. 60.


IV. Towards Political Control of the Courts

1. ‘Separation of Powers’ between Judiciary and Executive

Clause 1 of the CAB seeks to amend section 165 of Constitution by the introduction of new sub-sections 165(6) and 165(7).

21 It provides for a separation of powers between the execu-

tive and the judiciary, with the responsibility for the judicial functions of the courts the sole preserve of the judiciary and the responsibility for the administrative functions the sole preserve of the relevant minister. This demarcation of powers substantially limits the insti-tutional independence of the judiciary. The rationale for the proposed changes is without merit. The Memorandum on the Objects of the Bill claims that the amendment to section 165 of the Constitution maintains and constitutionally entrenches the Commonwealth model of the separation of powers between the judiciary and the executive. This claim is untenable both in fact and in law.

22 There is no such thing as a Commonwealth model of the separa-

tion of powers that could be maintained or constitutionally entrenched. The doctrine forms part of the Constitution anyway.

23 Commentators are not aware of any Commonwealth

jurisdiction with an independent judiciary that would accept this as an adequate definition of judicial independence.

24

The global trend is toward increasing the authority of the judiciary to administer its own activities even in countries where the judicial administration is assumed by the execu-tive branch, usually the ministry of justice. Furthermore judicial leaders in several com-monwealth countries, most notably Britain and Canada, argue that administrative, policy and budgetary functions should be exercised by the judiciary, not by the executive.

25 The

21

Amendment of section 165 of Constitution ‘1. Section 165 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereinafter referred to

as the Constitution), is amended by the addition of the following subsections: "(6) The Chief Justice is the head of the judicial authority and exercises responsibility over the establishment and monitoring of norms and standards for the exercise of the judicial functions of all courts, other than the adjudication of any matter before a court of law. (7) The Cabinet member responsible for the administration of justice exercises authority over the administration and budget of all courts."’

Clause 15(1) of the SCB complements clause 1 of the CAB: ’15. (1) The Minister exercises authority over the administration and budget of all courts in accordance with section 165(7) of the Constitution.’

22 This rationale has been debunked, politely by the former Chief Justice, unceremoniously by a

former Justice of the Constitutional Court who did not mince his words: ‘Anybody who can talk about a Commonwealth model of the separation of powers is a fool or a scoundrel. There is no such thing as a Commonwealth model of the separation of powers.’ J Kriegler, The Constitutional Importance of Judicial Independence, in: Conference Transcript, note 17, p. 46, 52.

23 GCG Submissions, note 7, p. 12.

24 Ibid. p. 11.

25 Both Spain and Italy created judicial councils in the 1980s to assume from the ministries of

justice the management functions of the judicial system. A number of countries in South America


proposed separation of powers is out of step with international developments. It can be seen as a move in the wrong direction. 2. Central Regulation of the Judiciary

Section 165(6) provides that the Chief Justice will be ‘the head of the judicial authority and exercises responsibility over the establishment and monitoring of norms and standards for the exercise of the judicial functions of all courts, other than the adjudication of any matter before a court of law.’ The concept of ‘the judicial authority’ is a novelty. Its parameters are both obscure and perplexing.

26 Most significantly, its introduction points to a dimin-

ished role for the judiciary. It reflects either a lack of understanding of the judiciary’s role in a constitutional democracy as the third branch of government or, more likely, a deliber-ate attempt to diminish that role. The proposed amendment distinguishes between the judicial function generally and the actual adjudication of cases. Only in decision-making or adjudication are judges afforded independence from outside direction, restraint and potential interference. Otherwise they are to be subordinate to ‘the judicial authority’ and subject to its direction in accordance with as yet unspecified ‘norms and standards’. This reflects a significantly narrower view of judicial independence than that articulated by the Constitutional Court.

27 The performance

of judicial functions will be administered by an official responsible to the Minister.28

The centralisation of these matters in a single office by public servants responsible to the Minister leaves ample scope for political interference with the judicial work. This is even more so, when considered in the light of other proposed amendments to the Constitu-tion regarding judicial appointments. It is deemed fundamentally important that adminis-

followed suit. The French judges association recently adopted resolutions supporting the complete separation of judicial functions from the executive. Only a few European countries, including Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium, have not shown interest in departing from the traditional model.’ Office of Democracy and Governance, Guidance for Promoting Judicial Independence and Impartiality, 2002, p. 158-159. <http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_ governance/publications/pdfs/pnacm007.pdf>.

26 GCG Submissions, note 7, p. 9. The former Justice Kriegler observed: ‘The Chief Justice has

never been responsible for the establishment and monitoring of norms and standards for the exer-cise of the judicial functions of all courts. Courts don’t function like that and whoever wrote this just doesn’t understand how the South African judiciary functions.’ Kriegler, note 22. In Bentha-mite terms, this qualifies as ‘nonsense upon stilts’. See Soza v Alavarez-Machain 542 US 692, 743 (2004).

27 GCB Submissions, note 7, p. 10.

28 SCB sections 11, 12, 13.


trative matters such as listing are operated independently of political influence. Otherwise access to justice runs the risk of political obstruction.

29

Section 165(6) apparently prepares the ground for a centralised administration of all the divisions of the High Court by remote control.

30 The decision-making body is constituted

by the Chief Justice and a forum including in the first instance all heads of courts, all of them selected by the President.

31 The functioning of the courts is therefore more or less

controlled by the executive, either directly or by remote control (through individuals all of whom duly appointed by the political head of the executive). This is seen as a move away from judicial independence towards political control of the courts.

32 This even more so in

the absence of compelling reasons to justify central judicial regulation and centralised administrative control of the courts. 3. Executive control over administration and budget of courts

In terms of the proposed subsection 165(7), the Cabinet member responsible for the administration of justice will control the administration and budget of all courts. Clause 15(1) of the SCB complements clause 1 of the CAB. It provides: ’15. (1) The Minister exercises authority over the administration and budget of all courts in accordance with the new section of the Constitution.’ Currently that is not the case. The Executive is precluded from interfering with the Courts’ control over administrative decisions that directly affect the exercise of the judicial function, whereas the Courts’ budget is fixed directly by an Act of Parliament (under the Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act 47 of 2001).

33 In De Lange v Smuts NO and Others 1998 (3) SA 785 (CC) para 70, the Constitu-

tional Court referred to the ‘administrative functions that bear directly on judicial func-tions’, noting that they were part of the ‘institutional independence’ of the courts as set out in the Canadian case of R v Valente (1985) 24 DLR (4th) 161. Administrative independence is one of the elements of judicial independence. Institutionally this requires structures to protect courts and judicial officers against external interference.

34 The proposed amendments in effect seek to dismantle these structures either

inadvertently or, more likely, deliberately. They are seen as ‘retrograde steps that remove from the courts a level of independence that they even enjoyed under the apartheid state’

35.

No convincing explanation for the amendment of the Constitution has been advanced. Its

29

English Bar Council (note 6 above). 30

GCB Submissions, note 7, p. 17, 18. 31

SCB section 11. 32

GCB Submissions, note 7, p. 19. 33

A. Spilg, Judicial Independence – Impending constitutional crisis?, in: Conference Trasnscripts, note 17, p. 130, 134...

34 GCB Submissions, note 7, p. 6n4.

35 Ibid 21.


perceived purpose is to establish a constitutional justification for unconstitutional provi-sions in the SCB dealing with judicial administration and thus to insulate administrative and budgetary matters affecting the functioning of the courts from judicial challenge.

36 In

other wrods, it is seen as a pre-emptive measure. 4. Executive Control over Key Judicial Appointments

Section 9 of the CAB seeks to amend the manner in which the judges-president and the deputy judges-president of the divisions of the High Court are appointed. Currently they are appointed by the President on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) under section 174 (6) of the Constitution. The new subsection (5) provides that these appoint-ments are to be made, after consulting the Chief Justice and the Cabinet member responsi-ble for the administration of justice, from a list provided by the JSC. The role of the JSC in the appointment process is thereby significantly diminished. At the end of the day the deci-sion would be that of the President alone. The only constraint would be an obligation to consult. The presidential discretion is otherwise unfettered. This also applies to other key judicial appointments. Presently the President appoints the Chief Justice and the Deputy, all the judges of the Constitutional Court and the President of the SCA and the Deputy. Now he would select every senior member of the judiciary. Over and above that, this power of appointment probably extends to the new special divisions of the High Court defined in the SCB. All heads of courts and all deputies, the entire complement of judges in the Constitutional Court and the Special Divisions of the High Court will be appointed by the President. He is therefore to be vested with truly extensive powers of judicial appointment.

37 Enormous

powers of patronage within the judiciary go hand in hand with that. The worldwide trend points in a different direction towards appointing judges on merit and with significant involvement of independent bodies, including the legal community. This proposal is seen as ‘a reversion to the pre-Constitutional era when the State President, acting through the Minister of Justice made all judicial appointments’

38.

The motivation for the proposed amendment and the reason for the diminishment of the role of the JSC remain unclear, with some suggesting that the proposed change is motivated by the transformation agenda of the government of the day.

39 But that remains inconclu-

sive. The shifting of power from the JSC to the executive is widely perceived as a move

36

Ibid 21 and 22. 37

GCB Submissions, note 7, p. 25. 38

Ibid. 39

IBAHRI Report, note 5, para 3.110. – SA Report, note 17, para 198, 211, observes: ‘The chal-lenge to transform the judiciary to be representative of South African demographics could pose a threat to its independence.’ It advises South Africa to ensure that ‘the transformation of the Judi-ciary’ does not ‘jeopardize or undermine the independence of the Judiciary.’


towards a more politicised process for the appointment of heads of court and away from a transparent and accountable selection process that affirms democracy.

40 Such a move is in

conflict with the United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary which require that judicial appointments must be made in a manner that safeguards the independence of the judiciary.’

41

5. Executive Control over Acting Judicial Appointments

Clause 10 of the CAB seeks to amend the constitutional provisions regarding acting appointments. The proposed amendment does away with the concurrence of the Chief Justice for any acting appointments. All that is required is consultation. This disturbs the delicate balance of powers between the judiciary and the executive as endorsed by the Constitutional Court in the First Certification judgement.

42

The proposed amendment limits judicial involvement in the appointment of a broad category of acting judges. This enables the executive to appoint acting judges to leadership positions in the judiciary for improper motives or purposes and not necessarily in the best interests of the administration of justice.

43 The proposed amendment effectively empowers

the Minister to appoint acting judges that could swing the vote in any particular case in favour of the executive or its political allies. A recent politically charged case involving Cape Judge President John Hlope and judges of the Constitutional Court illustrates this point. A complaint of judicial misconduct laid by the Constitutional Court judges against the Cape Judge President with the Judicial Services Commission (JSC) in 2008 was made public by these judges without first affording Hlope an opportunity to be heard.

44 If, for

argument’s sake, the matter had gone to the Constitutional Court, which it has not, all judges

45, including the then Chief Justice Pius Langa and his deputy Dikgang Moseneke,

could have been asked to recuse themselves.46

The Court sits en banc.47

In the circum-stances eight acting appointments would have to be made – unprecedented in legal history.

40

IBAHRI Report, note 17, para 3.114.-- C. Albertyn, Judicial Independence and the Constitution Fourteenth Amendment Bill , SAJHR 22 (2006), p. 126, 140.

41 Principle 10. IBAHRI Report, note 17, para 3.107.

42 Ex parte Chairperson of the National Assembly: In re: Certification of the Constitution of the

Republic of South Africa 1996 (1996) SA 744 para 30. 43

Namely to the position of (a) Deputy Chief Justice, (b) judge of the Constitutional Court, (c) Deputy President of the Supreme Court of Appeal, or (d) Deputy Judge President of a Division of the High Court of South Africa.--The UN Basic Principles applicable here clearly state: ‘Any method of judicial selection shall safeguard against judicial appointments from improper motives.’ IBAHRI Report, note 17, para 3.107.

44 Statement by the Judges of the Constitutional Court, note 4.

45 Hlope to Appeal in ConCourt, The Times (01 April 2009).

46 But that is disputed. Expert rules out Hlope appeal, The Cape Argus (30 October 2008).


6. Jurisdiction Stripping

Clause 7(b) of the CAB seeks to prevent the courts from hearing any matter dealing with the suspension of the commencement of an Act of Parliament or a provincial Act, or making an order suspending it, despite any other provision of the Constitution. The Memo-randum asserts that this provision introduces an ‘important new principle’, but no cogent justification for its introduction is offered. The covert purpose of the amendment apparently is to pre-empt a decision by the Constitutional Court on this issue. In terms of section 172(2)(b) of the Constitution, a court which makes an order of constitutional invalidity may grant a temporary interdict or other temporary relief to a party. Such temporary relief probably includes the interim suspension of an Act in exceptional circumstances.

48 In this view, clause 7(b) of the CAB in effect deprives the courts of the

power ‘to suspend the commencement of an Act of Parliament in the interests of justice’ even where such commencement ‘may involve a gross violation of a right in our Bill of Rights’. The full extent of the threat to constitutional democracy ‘may only become fully appreciated if a government in the future were to introduce legislation to fundamentally amend one of the guaranteed freedoms contained in the Bill if Rights’

49. The proposed

constitutional amendment is therefore seen as an ouster clause of the most pernicious kind and a reversion to old order practices.

50 In other words, it is classified as an instance of

illegitimate jurisdictional regulation or jurisdiction stripping.

47

Section 167 (1) of the Constitution provides: ‘A matter before the Constitutional Court must be heard by at least eight judges.’

48 GCB Press Statement, note 15, and Legal Resources Centre Comments Constitutional Fourteenth

Amendment Bill (14 January 2006), para 3.6, 6.4, 7.4, 7.5., available at <www.lrc.org.za>. The Constitutional Court held that a court could grant interim relief in terms of section 172(2) of the Constitution, but such interim relief could merely suspend the operation of a provision in an Act, pending the constitutional challenge, without suspending the commencement of the Act. However, it is clear from this decision of the Constitutional Court that a court, in very limited and special circumstances, could suspend the commencement of an Act. In the absence of the proposed amendment this might indeed happen. The new principle apparently seeks to prevent that eventu-ality. See President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v United Democratic Movement 2003 (1) SA 472 (CC) para 28.

49 GCB Press Statement, note 15.

50 Mitigating its perniciousness is the fact that the proposed section is so badly drafted that it will

not achieve its objective.’ T. Roux, ‘Thinkpiece' for Seminar on the Constitution Fourteenth Amendment Bill, 2005’, p. 5, available at <www.lrc.org.za.>. There are other indications of bad drafting. In terms of sections 80 and 122 of the Constitution, members of a legislature may apply to the Constitutional Court to have all or part of an Act declared unconstitutional after signature by the President. Clause 7(b) effectively also wipes out sections 80(3) and 122(3) which, in the context of abstract constitutional review, make express provision for an order of suspension by the Constitutional Court. It is not clear whether this is an unintended side-effect. The repeal is brought about indirectly via an amendment to section 172, causing collateral damage to the Constitution.


7. The Impasse between Judiciary and Executive

The judiciary has consistently offered to cooperate with other branches of the government to develop a model of court administration that best reflects the principle of judicial inde-pendence, most recently at the judges’ conference held near Pretoria in July 2009.

51 At that

conference the new Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, Jeff Radebe, pub-licly distanced himself from the controversial attempts to amend the Constitution discussed above. He reportedly said that ‘he had no intention of amending the Constitution and would consult on contentious issues arising from the proposed reform of the judicial system’. He also reassured the judges that there were no hidden agendas.

52

Former President Mbeki has taken the consultative route before. In 2006, he first had the deadline for comment extended and then axed the contentious bills altogether until further notice. This was done in order to slow down the process and ‘engage the judiciary to understand properly’

53 their objections to the draft legislation.

These objections are easy to understand. Their core is essentially this: ‘[A] structure which in fact says that the Executive controls all aspects of the functioning of courts other than the way they decide their cases, is not consistent with judicial independence.’

54 Fail-

ure to properly understand this could mean that a constitutional crisis is a distinct possibil-ity, with far reaching consequences: ‘The other route will lead to a constitutional crisis impacting not only on our judicial system and our constitutional values for all time but also our ability to sustain socio economic objectives.’’

55 The link between sustainable economic

growth and the key objectives of constitutional democracy, including an independent judi-ciary, is the central premise of the NEPAD initiative, supported by South Africa and reaffirmed in the APRM Self-Assessment Report on South Africa of 2007. The Maritime Law Association of South Africa, in similar vein, observes that these bills (CAB and SCB)

See LRC Comments on CAB Clause 7(b), note 48, para 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 with IDASA Submissions (note 16 above) para 2.2.2 (iii-vii) concurring.

51 Judges aim for Judicial Independence, Business Day (6 July 2009). Previously, at the second

judges’ conference since 1994, after nearly half a decade of battles about the nature of the trans-formation process in the courts and charges against President Jacob Zuma. This resolve was reaffirmed by a resolution which states: ‘The judiciary should be empowered to administer courts and its own budget. To this extent the judiciary will work with, and cooperate wit, other branches of government to develop a model of court administration that best reflects the principle of judi-cial independence.’

52 Tension Eases between Courts and Government, Mail&Guardian (10-16 July 2009).

53 Business Day (23 February 2006) (my emphasis). -- Indeed ‘the greatest dangers to liberty lurk in

the insidious encroachment by men [or women for that matter] of zeal, well meaning but without understanding.’ Olmsted v United States 277 US 438, 479 (1928) per Justice Louis Brandeis.

54 A Chaskalson, Background to the Justice Bills, in: Conference Transcript, note 17, p. 44.

55 Spilg, note 39, p. 144 with the GCB Submissions, note 7 , p. 22-23 concurring.


‘have the potential to very seriously damage the administration of justice in South Africa and to undermine its credibility in international commerce’ and that ‘undoubtedly foreign investment and foreign trade would suffer’ as a result.

56

However, the ruling party has firmly resolved that judicial independence refers to ‘the adjudicative function of the courts’ only, not to ‘the administration of the courts, including any allocation of resources, financial management and policy matters relating to the administration of courts – which are to be the ultimate responsibility of the Minister responsible for the administration of justice’.

57

This is not the judicial independence enshrined in the new Constitution and endorsed by the Constitutional Court. It truncates this independence with potentially dire conse-quences for constitutional democracy in South Africa. Addressing a conference of the international Commission of Jurists in Cape Town on 21 July 1998, the late Chief Justice, Ismail Mahomed warned: ‘Subvert that independence and you subvert the very foundations of a constitutional democracy.’

58 A Letter from the then President in ANC Today of 10--16

June 2005 recites this statement with approval.59

The Judges of the Constitutional Court, speaking for all the courts in the country, have meanwhile vowed not to ‘yield to or tolerate unconstitutional, illegal and inappropriate attempts to undermine their independence or impartiality’ which threaten ‘the administration of justice in our country and indeed the democratic nature of the state’.

60

The battle about the nature of judicial independence continues unabated, despite indica-tions of a détente between the judiciary and the government after the recent charm offensive launched by the executive. In the course of these overtures President Zuma reassured the judges that ‘the transformation of the judiciary should be advanced and undertaken without interfering with the principle of judicial independence, that an ‘independent judiciary is one of the cornerstones of any democracy’ and that the executive respected ‘without reservation the principle of judicial independence and the rule of law’. In the view of the judiciary that principle includes the power to administer courts and its own budgets whereas the proposed legislation suggests otherwise. ‘In the end, it is the impasse between the executive and the judiciary over this constitutional amendment that is the democratic problem.’

61

56

Maritime Law Association Submission, note 16. 57

Transformation of the Judiciary, note 5, para 11, 12. 58

I. Mahomed, The Independence of the Judiciary, SALJ 115 (1998), p. 666. 59

Fiat justitia ruat caeclum – Let justice be done through the heavens should fail!, ANC Today (10-16 June 2005).

60 Statement of the Judges, note 4, para 8, 9.

61 Albertyn, note 40, p. 137.


C. Interference with Prosecutorial Independence

I. Enquiry into the National Director of Public Prosecutions

Section 179(4) of the Constitution guarantees prosecutorial independence. It stipulates: ‘National legislation must ensure that the prosecuting authority exercises its functions without fear, favour or prejudice.’

62 Any legislation or executive action inconsistent with it

is therefore subject to constitutional control by the courts. The prosecuting authority is accountable to parliament, while the Minister of Justice exercises final political responsi-bility over the prosecuting authority. It is crucial to note that the Act nowhere provides for ministerial control over the decisions of the NDPP or any Director of Prosecutions (NDP). The appointment of the National Director of Public Prosecution (NDPP) by the President does not compromise the independence of the prosecuting authority.

63

The National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP), Vusi Pikoli, was suspended on 23 September 2007, allegedly for a breakdown of communication between him and the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, Brigitte Mabandla. According to his lawyers ’it was Pikoli’s refusal to let the minister second-guess his decision to prosecute Selebi that prompted her demand for his resignation. When he refused, the president also asked him to resign. When Pikoli refused again, the president signed a letter of suspension that again underscored the centrality of the Selebi matter.’

64 A High Court judgement with

far-reaching political consequences delivered on 12 September 2008 by Judge Chris Nicholson concurs.

65 The court inferentially found ‘that the Selebi warrants were cancelled

by Mr Mpshe [the acting NDPP] after political interference and that Pikoli was suspended because he refused to do so’. In the court’s opinion ‘the suspension was a most ominous move that struck at the core of a crucial State institution’.

66 These findings on matters not

62

The National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998 (NPA Act) gives effect to the provisions of s 179 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996).

63 J. J. Joubert (ed), Criminal Procedure Handbook, 7th ed, 2006, p.47.

64 S Sole, How Ginwala blew it, Mai&7Guardian (12 December 2008) <www.mg.co.za/article/2008-

12-12-how-ginwala-blew-it>. 65

He ruled that the NPA’s charges against ANC president Jacob Zuma were unlawful and found that the State President, Thabo Mbeki, had interfered with the prosecution of Zuma for political rea-sons. Mbeki was recalled on 19 September 2008 by the ANC leadership on the basis of these findings, since squashed on appeal as gratuitous. All charges against Jacob Zuma and others were controversially withdrawn in April 2009 when prima facie evidence of such interference was ten-dered. See Statement by the National Director of Public Prosecutions (6 April 2009) available at<http://www.npa.gov.za>.

66 Zuma v National Director of Public Prosecutions (8652/08) [2008] High Court of South Africa,

NPD para 205 and 207. 66 Ibid. para 91.


in issue or canvassed in that case were set aside on appeal.67

They are relevant here as an obiter dictum. Under section 32(1) of the National Prosecuting Authority Act, 1998 (NPA Act) it is an offence to interfere with, hinder or obstruct the prosecuting authority or any of its members in the performance of their functions. The letter that instructed the DNPP to put on hold the investigation and prosecution of the National Commissioner of Police, Jackie Selebi, was signed by the Minister of Justice, Brigitte Mabandla. According to the Ginwala Report this ‘letter was tantamount to executive interference with the prosecutorial independence of the NPA, which is recognised as a serious offence in the [NPA] Act.’

68

The Ginwala Report concluded that the ‘grounds advanced by Government for the suspension of Adv Pikoli have not been established before the Enquiry’ and recommended that he be restored to the office of NDPP’

69. But that has not happened. The application for

judicial review of Pikoli’s subsequent dismissal persuasively asserts ‘that the decision to fire him was a breach of the constitutional guarantee of the independence of the National Prosecution Authority and the principle of legality’.

70

D. Disbandment of the Directorate of Special Operations

I. Background

Article 36 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption of 2003 (which South Africa ratified on 22 November 2004) provides: ‘Each State Party shall … ensure the exis-tence of a body or bodies or persons specialized in combating corruption through law enforcement. Such body or bodies or persons shall be granted the necessary independence, in accordance with the fundamental legal system of the State Party, to be able to carry out their functions effectively and without undue influence.’ Article 5 of the African Union

67

National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma (573/08) [2009] ZASCA 1 (12 Jan 2009) para 48. The Report of the Enquiry into the Fitness of Advocate V P Pikoli to Hold the Office of National Director of Public Prosecutions (Ginwala Report) equally found that political interfer-ence could not be sustained on the evidence before the Enquiry. Report of Enquiry into NDPP (4 November 2008) para 12. Available at <http://www.iss.co.za/dynamic/administration/file_ manager/file_links/20081208PIKOLIREP.PDF?>.

68 Ginwala Report, note 67, para 12.

69 Ibid. para 13 and Recommendations I.

70 Former DPA boss set to take Motlanthe to court, Business Day (14 February 2009). The Ginwala

Report does not support this view. It observes: The ‘Much of the focus of South African scholars, jurists and media has been on prosecutorial independence. Sufficient attention has not been paid to the requirement of democratic accountability of the prosecuting authority. In focusing only on independence from political interference they have erred in conflating freedom from control with freedom from accountability.’ Ginwala Report, note 67, para 51.However that may be, the con-stitutional guarantee of prosecutorial independence is under the spotlight here, not the account-ability to parliament. The Pikoli matter is about executive interference with the Prosecuting Authority.


Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption of 2003 (which South Africa ratified on 7 December 2005) provides as follows: ‘State Parties undertake to… (3) Establish, maintain and strengthen independent national anti-corruption authorities or agencies.’

71

The Directorate of Special Operations (DSO) was established in terms of section 7(1) of the NPA Act and came into being on 12 January 2001. Its mandate was to deal with all national priority crimes, including police corruption, and to supplement the efforts of other law enforcement agencies in fighting national priority crimes, operating as a specialist unit equipped to deal with increasingly sophisticated levels of criminality and organised crime.

72

On 1 April 2006 the President of South Africa appointed a judicial commission of enquiry into the mandate and location of the DSO, chaired by Judge S V Khampepe. The report of the Commission was handed to the president on 3 February 2006, but only released on 5 May 2008, at the same time when the General Law Amendment Bill and the National Prosecuting Bill – dealing with the disbanding of the DSO or Scorpions--were due to be tabled in Parliament.

73

The National Prosecuting Authority Amendment Bill was published in Government Gazette number 31037 of 8 May 2008, the General Law Amendment Bill in Government Gazette number 31018 of 9 May 2008. According to the explanatory notes released the bills emanate from the decision to relocate the investigative capacity of the DSO in the SAPC. The stated aim of the NPA Amendment Bill is to repeal provisions of the NPA Act, 1998 that deal with the establishment and functioning of the DSO. The General Law Amendment Bill provides for the establishment of a Division in the SAPS, to be known as the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation. These legislative measures give effect to resolutions of the ruling party.

74 The disestablishment of the DSO was a fait accompli in

2009.

71

See Glenister v President of RSA (note 106 above) para 23-27. 72

Khampepe Commission of Inquiry into the Mandate and Location of the Directorate of Special Operations: Final Report (February 2006) para 1 (Khamepe Report) available at < http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id>.

73 A Cabinet statement of 29 June 2006 reveals that Cabinet endorsed the National Security Coun-

cil’s decision to accept, in principle, the recommendations of the Khampepe Commission, including the retention of the DSO within the NPA. A further statement of 7 December 2006 recorded that, at its meeting of the previous day, Cabinet had reviewed progress in implementing the recommendations of the Khampepe Commission,’ Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa (CCT 41/08) [2008] ZACC 19 (22 October 2008) para 12. However, the Minister of Safety and Security, Mr Charles Nqakula, speaking during the debate on the President’s State of the Nation Address in the National Assembly on 12 February 2008, announced: ‘The Scorpions, in the circumstances, will be dissolved and the Organised Crime Unit of the police will be phased out and a new amalgamated unit will be created.’ Ibid para 13. This was in the aftermath of the Polokwane conference in December 2007 and the election of ANC president Jacob Zuma.

74 The ANC resolutions on Peace and Stability, under the heading Single Police Service, state that

the DSO must be dissolved, members of the Scorpions performing policing functions must fall


Yet the judicial commission of inquiry into the mandate and the location of the DSO unequivocally disapproved of such measures. In the light of ‘the totality of the evidence and the law relevant in terms of reference’, it found it ‘inconceivable that the Legislature will see it fit to repeal the provisions of the NPA Act that relate to the activities of the DSO’

75. Both the legal mandate and the location of the DSO were unequivocally endorsed.

In its considered view, the argument (advanced by the ruling party) ‘that the legal mandate of the DSO to investigate and prosecute serious organised crime is unconstitutional within the meaning of section 199(1) of the Constitution is without merit’ and that ‘the rationale for locating the DSO under the NDPP [National Director of Public Prosecutions] and the Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development in 2002 still pertains’.

76 It therefore

recommended that the ‘the DSO should continue to be located within the NPA‘77

. A recent critical analysis of the crime investigative system within the South African criminal justice system arrives at a similar conclusion. It recommends the establishment of a new single prosecution-led investigation agency and the retention of the brand name ‘Scorpions’.

78 The Law Society of South Africa concurs: ‘We firmly believe that South

Africa requires a dedicated and specialised crime-fighting unit such as the DSO.’79

None of these recommendations were institutionalised for apparently no principled reasons. The executive’s decision to introduce the bills has since been challenged in court. But the Con-stitutional Court found it not appropriate for the Court to intervene in the affairs of Parlia-ment in this case.

80

under the SAPS and that the relevant legislative changes be effected as a matter of urgency to give effect to the foregoing resolution’. Single Police Service, Resolutions, note 5, para 8-10.

75 Khampepe Commission of Inquiry into the Mandate and Location of the Directorate of Special

Operations: Final Report (February 2006) para 47.1 (Khamepe Report) available at < http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id>.

76 Ibid. para 47.1.

77 Ibid. para 47.2 and 47.4. The report of the Commission was handed to the president on 3 February

2006, but only released on 5 May 2008, at the same time when the General Law Amendment Bill and the National Prosecuting Bill – dealing with the disbanding of the Scorpions – were due to be tabled in Parliament.

78 M Montesh, A Critical Analysis of the Crime Investigative System within the South African

Criminal Justice System: A Comparative Study, 2007, p. 238, 234. 79

LSC Comment, note 2. 80

‘In conclusion, then, I find that the applicant has not established that it is appropriate for the Court to intervene in the affairs of Parliament in this case. He has not shown that material and irreversi-ble harm will result if the Court does not intervene. In the circumstances, both the application for leave to appeal (in Part A) and the application for direct access (in Part B) must be refused as it is not in the interests of justice for the applications to be granted.’ Glenister case CC (note 73 above) para 57.


II. The Reasons behind the Decision

The reasons behind the decision to disband the DSO have remained shrouded in secrecy right to the end of the decision-making process. Allegedly, they were not even disclosed to the members of the DSO until after the publication of the most recent bills in May 2008 and, inexplicably, to members of Cabinet either until the day when the cabinet approved the bills (30 May 2008).

81 An ulterior motive or purpose can therefore not be ruled out, but

none has been substantiated so far. The DSO in the National Prosecuting Authority was tasked with the investigation of allegations of criminal activities relating to the so-called ‘arms deal’. The involvement of ANC politicians in these activities is well-documented.

82 These investigations had been

abandoned in 2001 for lack of evidence.83

They were resumed in 2007 when damning new evidence surfaced in Germany.

84 Hence there is a reasonable apprehension that allegations

of impropriety and corruption in the arms deals have substance.85

Against this background, both the timing of the resolution to disband the DSO and the decision to give effect to it as a matter of urgency make perfectly sense. Inferentially, the call for the disbandment of the Scorpions was not based solely on what is best for the administration of justice and the investigation of organised crime in South Africa. The applicant in the Glenister case accordingly argued that the President and Cabinet had decided ‘to disestablish the DSO and place its members in a dysfunctional unit (the SAPS) because a number of members of the ANC are (or have been) subject to the unwel-come attentions of the DSO.’

86 This argument is bound to resurface in future litigation

which is on the cards. The court did not rule on its merits, but found it irrelevant in dealing with the purely jurisdictional matter at hand.

81

On 29 April 2008 two members of cabinet and their legal representative, the Director General of the Justice department filed affidavits, in which they flatly ‘denied that any decision whatsoever was taken to disestablish the DSO’. On 30 April 2008 Cabinet approved the Bills aimed at relo-cating the DSO from the NPA to the SAPS. Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa (14386/2008) [2008] High Court of South Africa, TPD (27 May 2008) p. 17.

82 The Arms Deal Virtual Press Office available at < www.armsdeal-vpo.co.za>; D. Welz, Nolle

Prosequi! Corruption in the Political Sphere and the Decision not to Prosecute, Speculum Juris 19 (2005), p. 223, 231.

83 The Joint Investigation Report into the Strategic Defence Procurement Packages of 2001 con-

cluded that ‘up to now no evidence has emerged, to suggest that these activities affected the selection of the successful contractors/bidders, which may render the contracts questionable.’

84 The Public Protector in his letter to Trent on 20 April found: ‘It is therefore for the NPA to decide

whether the allegations made by Der Spiegel warrant any further investigation in South Africa, at this time.’

85 Joint letter from Desmond Tutu and F W de Klerk to President Kgalema Motlante (1 December

2008) < www.armsdeal-vpo.co.za>. 86

Glenister case CC, note 73, para 53.


E. Freedom of the Press and other Media

I. Declining Media Freedom

The trend of declining media freedom in South Africa has been spotted before with atten-dant calls to reverse it before it is too late.

87 In 2006 the ANC seemed to endorse these

sentiments in its National Press Freedom Statement.88

However, a year later the Polokwane Conference resolved that ‘the right to freedom of expression should not be elevated above other equally important rights such as the right to privacy and more important rights and values such as human dignity’

89. It therefore proclaimed ‘the need to balance the right to

freedom of expression, freedom of the media, with the right of equality, to privacy and human dignity for all’

90 and called for external regulation of the media, in effect prepubli-

cation censorship. The stated reason for this resolution is ‘that the current form of self regulation … is not adequate to sufficiently protect the rights of the individual citizen, community and society as a whole’

91. Hence the call for the establishment of a media

appeals tribunal (MAT)92

. However, in the view of stakeholders, self-regulation in the new South Africa has served the media and the public well. In their experience and in principle self-regulation by key stakeholders in the press is better for democracy than regulation by external forces with political agendas: ‘With no State or other external oversight, the media can perform as an independent agency – the ‘Forth Estate’ – alongside executive, legisla-tive and judicial authorities.’

93 The Freedom of Expression Institute (FXI) therefore sug-

gests that this system could be applied in the academic context with equal success. In a National Press Freedom Day statement of 2006 the ANC had called on all South Africans ‘to declare that never again shall the right of our people to free expression be silenced by censorship or intimidation’.

94 However, the Polokwane resolutions no longer

87

In 2006 FXI called on civil society and journalists to unite and ‘reverse’ this trend ‘before it becomes difficult to reverse’ at all, cited ‘the deteriorating state of media freedom at the SABC’ and ‘the recent issue of the SABC seeking an interdict against the Mail and Guardian website publishing its report about allegations that it banned using certain analysts and commentators’. SA must save press freedom, available at <http://www.fxi.org.za>.

88 Statement on Media Freedom Day (18 October 2006), available at <http://www.anc.org.za/

ancdocs/pr/2006/pr1018htlm>. ‘Media Freedom Day…provides an opportunity for all South Africans to declare that never again shall the right of our people to free expression be silenced by censorship or intimidation.’

89 Communications and the Battle of Ideas, Resolutions, note 5, para 125.

90 Ibid para 128.

91 Ibid para 93.

92 Ibid para 126-131.

93 Freedom of Expression Institute Submission on the State of Academic Freedom of Expression in

South Africa to the Council on Higher Education (11 June 2007) para 5 and 7 available at <http:// www.fxi.org.za>.

94 National Press Freedom Statement (2006), note 88.


seem to heed that call. They are about limiting the right to freedom of expression and media freedom, not about acknowledging ‘the important role of the media and freedom of expres-sion as one of the pillars of democracy’

95. Indeed, almost half of ANC supporters agree that

the ANC is a different party in the aftermath of the 52nd National Conference of the African National Congress (ANC) in December 2007.

96 This new ANC might well be perceived as

an external force with political agendas that poses a threat to freedom of the press (and other media) and freedom of expression in general, including academic freedom. II. Speaking to the Media

There is a long line of disciplinary cases in the new South Africa where academics have been disciplined for speaking to the media about the institution in which they work

97, some

of them in terms of Conditions of Service with apartheid-era censorship written all over them.

98 That may come as a surprise in a constitutional democracy with freedom of expres-

sion, including academic freedom, enshrined in its bill of rights. The right to academic

95

As acknowledged by the Southern African Judges Commission at a meeting of Chief Justices from Southern and East Africa held in Windhoek, Namibia, on 11-13 August 2005. The Commis-sion’s stated objects include ‘the promotion of the rule of law, democracy and the independence of the courts in the region’. <http://:www.concourt.gov.za/site/southernafricanjudgescommission. htm>.

96 According to an Ipsos Markinor poll conducted from 3 to 22 October 2008 published in 2009.

97 ‘Recently, the University of KwaZulu/ Natal has been a flashpoint for controversies around aca-

demic freedom, with disciplinary action having been taken against two academics for a number of alleged misconducts, including speaking to the media. A case has also arisen at Fort Hare Univer-sity, involving a law professor who is being disciplined for criticizing the University administra-tion in his lectures, at conferences, in private conversations and in the media. These academics are accused of bringing their respective institutions into disrepute, including by lying to the media, and defaming University managers. A member of the support staff of the Tshwane University of Technology is being charged with the apartheid era offence of immorality, for distributing sexu-ally explicit photographs to some of his friends. A disciplinary case is also being heard at Wits University, where students are being charged for bringing the institution into disrepute for criti-cizing the lack of freedom of expression on campus, in the media.’ J. Duncan, The Rise of the Disciplinary University, Harold Wolpe Memorial Lecture (17 May 2007). FXI Submission to UKWZ Council Committee on Governance and Academic Freedom: Recent cases (19 February 2009), available at <http://www.fxi.org.za>. – See also K. MacGregor, South Africa: Freedoms Gained Now being Lost, World University News (13 January 2008). <http://www. universityworldnews.com/topic.php?topic=SpecialReports&page=3>

98 Academics were charged with misconduct and dismissed in terms of Conditions of Employment

which, inter alia, provide: 'An officer shall be guilty of misconduct and may be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of regulation D4, if he--(a) contravenes a provision of the Act ['the act' means the University of Fort Hare Act, 1965 (Act No 40 of 1996)] and these regulations or fails to comply with any provision thereof with which it is his duty to comply; (f) publicly com-ments on the administration of the University’. A request for an audit of subordinate legislation of this kind has since been referred by the South African Law Reform Commission to the Council of Higher Education with a view of resolving the problem jointly.


freedom, according to the High Court of South Africa, would ‘include an unfettered debate on issues surrounding the autonomy of a university and the roles that managerial and academic staff, respectively, should play in that regard’

99. In terms of the 1997 UNESCO

Recommendations higher education teaching personnel are entitled ‘to express freely their opinion about the institution or system in which they work’

100, without fear of institutional

censorship. According to these standards academic freedom covers teaching and research as well as comments on conditions of service and the administration of the university. Com-ments made by academics that are not directly related to their area of expertise are thus permissible and desirable. A self-regulatory framework to protect academics from external censorship would therefore be appropriate

101 . Extramural comments on matters of public

interest are warranted in the context of a democratic society and seen as essential for its further development.

102 Not necessarily so in the context of a developmental state, how-

ever, as recently argued at a regional forum on government regulation of academic free-dom.

103

99

Chetty v Adesina (33/2007) [2007] High Court of South Africa, ECD (02 November 2007) para 11.

100 FXI Submission to UKWZN, note 97.

101 FXI Submission to CHE, note 93, para 8.

102 This means: ‘All higher-education teaching personnel should have the right to fulfil their func-tions without discrimination of any kind and without fear of repression by the state or any other source. Higher-education teaching personnel can effectively do justice to this principle if the envi-ronment in which they operate is conducive, which requires a democratic atmosphere; hence the challenge for all of developing a democratic society.’ UNESCO Recommendation Concerning the Status of Higher-Education Teaching Personnel (1997) para 27 <http://unescodoc.unesco.org/ images/0011/001102/110220e.pdf#page=32>.

103 ‘Academics had always had an image of the university as being a community of scholars, engaged in teaching, research and knowledge production, with a curriculum that went beyond just voca-tionalism and utility. But in the context of a developmental state, should one not have a develop-mental university that pursued that developmental agenda of the state? This idea might be seen in fundamental contradiction to traditional ideas of the university, where academic freedom was understood as the freedom to do research, to decide who should teach, and who should be admit-ted.’ Council of Higher Education Regional Forum on Government Involvement in, and Regula-tion of, Higher Education, Institutional Autonomy and Academic Freedom (HEIAAF) (22 May 2006) available at <http://www.che.ac.za>.-- The Task Team on Higher Education, in its analysis of academic freedom, has since explored (section 2.3.1) ‘how a renewed concept and practice of academic freedom in higher education can benefit South African society at large... It finds that any such reformulation begins by seeking to counter potential and actual external and internal threats to the academy – state repression and/or interference, over-control by government bureauc-racies and institutional hierarchies, commercial and functional impingements on academic work, and unreformed institutional cultures.’ Report of the Independent Task Team on Higher Educa-tion, Institutional Autonomy and Academic Freedom (HEIAAF): Academic Freedom, Institutional Autonomy and Public Accountability in South African Higher Education (August 2008) available at < http://www.che.ac.za/documents/d000183/CHE_HEIAAF_Report_Aug2008.pdf.


In the context of a developmental state, it was suggested, one should have a developmental university that pursued the developmental agenda of the state, admittedly in fundamental contradiction to the traditional idea of the university with academic freedom as endorsed by UNESCO. The implications of this suggestion for academic freedom as under-stood in South Africa today are ominous. The Orwellian concept of a developmental uni-versity pursuing the agenda of the state may well be seen as a potential threat to academic freedom as we know it even in its violation by censorious measures – not state sponsored as yet.

104

F. Conclusion

In South Africa politics are rooted in the resolutions and election manifestos of the domi-nant party seeking to impose its own ideological vision on the larger society.

105 At the

national conference in Polokwane the ruling party ‘affirmed that the ANC remains the key strategic centre of power, which must exercise leadership over the state and society in pursuit of the objectives of the NDR [National Democratic Revolution]’.

106 Apparently the

new ANC has resolved to intensify ‘its efforts to bring all spheres of state and society under party control’

107. In so doing ‘the structures and collectives of the movement must make

the decisions on the direction our country should take collectively.’108

Clearly, there is nothing wrong with such aspirations in a multi-party democracy whether or not one shares this vision.

109

104

The argument about the crucial importance of freedom for development may have been conven-iently overlooked in this debate. Assessments of the correlation between development and democ-racy corroborate the findings that there is a democracy advantage for well being and prosperity. See Poverty Reduction, Economic Growth and Democratisation in Sub-Saharan Africa, Afro-barometer, Briefing Paper No. 68 (May 2009), available at <http://www.afrobarometer.org>.

105 SA Report, note 17, para 199.--Of course, it would be a mistake to see South African politics exclusively through he lens of democracy, given the limited experience with this form of political regime in this country. It is only one of ten African countries to be rated as ‘free’ and qualifies as a ‘liberal democracy’ with a Democracy Status score of 4.2 (out of 5). R Mattes, Democracy with-out People: Political Institutions and Citizenship in the new South Africa, Afrobarometer Working Papers 82 (November 2007), p. 10. However it is not ranked as a consolidated democracy with a sustained balance between perceived demand and supply of democracy. M Mattes, Neither Con-solidated nor fully Democratic: The Evolution of African Political Regimes, 1999-2008, Afro-barometer Briefing Papers 67 (May 2009), p. 2. The project of democracy building has still a long way to go.

106 Organisational Renewal, para 55, Resolutions, note 5.

107 J Myburgh, ANC Targets Judiciary, Media, Politicsweb (23 January 2008), available at <http://www.policitcsweg.co.za>.

108 Organisational Renewal, para 55, Resolutions, note 5.

109 Prominent ANC defector Saki Macozoma with the benefit of hindsight reportedly said: ‘The idea of a liberation movement that is the sole and authentic political vehicle for the national democratic


However, specific Polokwane resolutions impact on the independence of the courts, law-enforcement agencies and the mass media.

110 This has created a public perception that

‘the new ANC has a driving motive to protect its leader (and other cadres) from investiga-tion and prosecution’

111. In other words, the independence of the judiciary and other

institutions involved in upholding constitutional democracy and the rule of law have become vulnerable to party-political interference. Recent developments in the aftermath of Polokwane arguably suggest7 that there is a deliberate and sustained attack on important institutions involved in upholding the Rule of Law and in protecting the administration of justice, orchestrated by the ruling party and maintained by its cadres ‘deployed’

112 in gov-

ernment or within the institutions targeted. The deliberate ‘capture or co-optation’ of par-liament by the ruling party and the weakening of its oversight role is seen as a significant threat to multi-party democracy.

113

The explanations offered for contentious aspects of the measures proposed or taken are untenable. The two judicial bills have nothing to do with the transformation of the judici-ary. They are transitional measures

114 and as such must suit the requirements of the new

Constitution, which they do not do. The suspension and subsequent dismissal of the NDPP are the result of unwarranted executive interference with prosecutorial independence which is constitutionally guaranteed. The relocation of the DSO is not constitutionally mandated as claimed, but serves another, prima facie ulterior purpose. The proposed external regula-tion of the press limits the constitutional right to freedom of expression and promotes pre-publication censorship. It has nothing to do with balancing the right of privacy with the right of the public to know as claimed. All this does not augur well for constitutional

revolution and the aspirations of the people of SA no longer hold water.’ The Times (28 February 2009).

110 These are the Resolutions on Transformation of the Judiciary, Single Police Service and The Battle of Ideas read together.

111 Myburgh, note 107).--:According to an Ipsos Markinor poll conducted in October 2008, released on 26 February 2009, few South Africans from all walks of life and across the racial spectrum and less than half (41%) of ANC supporters think that Jacob Zuma is innocent of corruption. Merely 47% of eligible voters agree that government is ruling in the interests of all South Africans, 42% that government only thinks about the interests of the members of the ANC, 46% that it is diffi-cult to tell what the interests of the ANC and what the interests of the state are. Merely 47% of eligible voters agree that government is ruling in the interests of all South Africans, 42% that gov-ernment only thinks about the interests of the members of the ANC, 46% that it is difficult to tell what the interests of the ANC and what the interests of the state are.

112 The deployment of cadres ‘to senior positions in government, such as President, Premiers and Mayors’ is a problematic practice, however. Organisational Renewal para 55, Resolutions, note 5. SA Report, note 17, para 212.

113 Ibid. para 212.

114 Albertyn, note 40 , p. 126,


democracy in South Africa. According to the Constitutional Court, ‘there is nothing wrong, in our multi-party democracy, with Cabinet seeking to give effect to the policy of the ruling party’, but ‘Cabinet must observe its constitutional obligations and may not breach the Constitution’.

115 Accordingly there is nothing wrong, in a multi-party democracy, with

deployed cadres seeking to implement party resolutions. But, in so doing, they must observe their constitutional obligations and may not breach textual provisions or structural protections of the Constitution which guarantee the independence of important institutions of multi-party democracy. The complaint is that they have not done that or have not been seen to do it. This is perceived as one the most direct threats to democracy and the rule of law in South Africa since 1994

116. Following the elections in 2009, the Superior Courts

Bill, 2003, was allowed to lapse, paving the way for the introduction of the new, revised Constitution Amendment Bill, 2010, and a new Superior Courts Bill, 2010, into Parlia-ment. Both Bills result from further consultation with, particularly, the Judiciary. The draft Constitution Amendment Bill, 2010, is further being published in the Gazette for public comment in accordance with section 74(5)(a) of the Constitution and, since the Bill is closely linked to the transformation envisaged by the Superior Courts Bill, 2010, the latter draft Bill is simultaneously published for public comment.

117

115

Glenister case CC, note 73, para 54. 116

S. Friedmann, ANC’s Belief in its Divine Right to Rule Warrants our Attention, Business Day (1 July 2009).

117 Memorandum on the Objects of the Constitution Amendment Bill, 2010

328

Späte Sehnsucht nach la madre patria: Formen lateinamerikanischer Migration in Spanien

Von Andreas Baumer, Rostock* Spanien hat in den vergangenen Jahrzehnten einen dramatischen Wandel durchlaufen. Aus dem klassischen Auswanderungsland wurde eines der wichtigsten Zielländer für Migranten in Europa. Insbesondere seit Mitte der neunziger Jahre des letzten Jahrhunderts erfuhren die Migrationsprozesse nach Spanien eine einzigartige Dynamisierung, die erst durch die Wirtschaftskrise seit 2008 abgeschwächt wurde. In nur eineinhalb Jahrzehnten hat sich der Anteil von Ausländern an der spanischen Bevölkerung von 1,37 % (1996) auf 12,08 % (2009) erhöht – und damit den Durchschnittswert der traditionellen Einwanderungsländer Westeuropas überschritten.

1

Einen wesentlichen Anteil an diesem Boom haben Migranten aus den Ländern Latein-amerikas. War das Migrationsgeschehen der neunziger Jahre noch von einer Zuwanderung aus Afrika, vornehmlich aus dem Maghreb, geprägt, kam es um die Jahrhundertwende zu einer Verlagerung der wichtigsten Migrationsströme: Jetzt dominierte eine massenhafte Zuwanderung aus Lateinamerika, insbesondere aus den wirtschaftlich verarmten und poli-tisch instabilen Ländern des Andenraums. Bis zur Mitte des neuen Jahrzehnts, zusätzlich befördert durch die Massenmigration von Argentiniern in Reaktion auf die politische und ökonomische Krise, blieb die Dominanz der lateinamerikanischen Migration ungebrochen – in einer Weise, dass vielfach schon eine „Lateinamerikanisierung der Immigration“

2

konstatiert wurde. Auch wenn dieser Befund inzwischen angesichts massenhafter Zuwande-rung aus den Ländern Mittelosteuropas, insbesondere Rumänien, relativiert werden musste, besteht kein Zweifel daran, dass Lateinamerika neben der EU zur wichtigsten Herkunftsre-gion von Migranten für Spanien geworden ist – und diese Position aller Voraussicht nach auch in Zukunft behalten wird. Mit einem Anteil von 37,70 % an der ausländischen Bevöl-

* Andreas Baumer, Dr. rer. pol.; wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Institut für Politik- und Verwal-tungswissenschaften, Fakultät für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften, Universität Rostock. Email: andreas. [email protected]

1 Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Padrón municipal 1996-2009. http://www.ine.es/jaxi/

menu.do?type=pcaxis&path=/t20/e245/&file=inebase (27.07.2010); eigene Berechnungen. Anteil der Migranten mit ausländischer Staatsangehörigkeit an der spanischen Wohnbevölkerung. Legt man die Zahl aller im Ausland geborenen Einwohner Spaniens zugrunde, kommt man sogar auf einen Anteil von 13,83 %. Vgl. ebd.

2 “Latinoamericanización de la inmigración.” Antonio Izquierdo Escribano, Diego López de Lera,

Raquel Martínez Buján, Los preferidos del siglo XXI: la inmigración latinoamericana en España, Universidad de la Coruña 2003, S. 1. http://esomi.es/uploads/publicaciones/articulos/2003-Izquierdo-Lopez%20y%20Matinez_LOS%20PREFERIDOS.pdf (23.07.2010). Dieses und alle weiteren spanischen Zitate wurden vom Autor ins Deutsche übertragen. Das Original findet sich jeweils in den Fußnoten.

Baumer, Späte Sehnsucht nach la madre patria: Formen lateinamerikanischer Migration in Spanien 329

kerung bilden die Lateinamerikaner gegenwärtig noch vor den EU-Bürgern die größte Zuwanderergruppe in Spanien.

3

Die lateinamerikanische Migration nach Spanien hat sich im Kontext der allgemeinen Migrationsprozesse entwickelt. Wie Migranten aus anderen Weltregionen auch, wurden die latinos angezogen von einer spezifischen Kombination von Pull-Faktoren, von denen der bedeutsamste die, über einen langen Zeitraum ungebrochene, Nachfrage in bestimmten Sektoren des spanischen Arbeitsmarktes war. Dynamisiert wurde die Migrationsbewegung durch Push-Faktoren in den Herkunftsländern, die ebenfalls in ähnlicher Form in anderen Regionen der Welt anzutreffen waren: Wirtschaftliche Krise, politische Instabilität, Per-spektivlosigkeit – „Hunger nach Brot und Horizonten“

4, wie Pilar Ponce für die Migranten

aus Ecuador konstatiert hat – sorgten nicht nur in vielen Ländern Lateinamerikas dafür, dass sich ein signifikanter Teil der Bevölkerung in Bewegung setzte. Darüber hinaus wurde die lateinamerikanische Migration nach Spanien aber von einer Reihe von weiteren Fakto-ren bestimmt, die ihren Ursprung in den vielfältigen Beziehungen zwischen la madre patria und den ehemaligen Kolonien, in der Auswanderungstradition Spaniens, kurz: in der oft bemühten gemeinsamen Geschichte haben. Die lateinamerikanische Migration nimmt also eine Sonderstellung im allgemeinen Migrationsgeschehen Spaniens ein. Lässt sich diese Sonderstellung auf eine Bevorzugung von Migranten aus Lateinamerika zurückführen? Sind die spanischsprachigen, meist katho-lischen Zuwanderer aus Lateinamerika tatsächlich „die Bevorzugten des 21. Jahrhun-derts“?

5 Gab und gibt es eine aktive Politik der spanischen Regierungen, die die Zuwande-

rung aus Lateinamerika gegenüber der aus anderen Regionen fördern soll? Lassen sich hier gar Elemente einer „neuen Hispanidad“

6 identifizieren? Welche Rolle spielt die – ver-

meintliche oder tatsächliche – sprachliche, kulturelle und religiöse Nähe der lateinamerika-nischen Migration zur Aufnahmegesellschaft in den unterschiedlichen Integrationsdiskur-sen in Spanien? Um die genannten Fragen im Kontext der gegenwärtigen lateinamerikanischen Migra-tion in Spanien diskutieren zu können, sollen zunächst die Migrationsprozesse nach Spa-nien und die Entwicklung der Zuwanderungspolitik der letzten zwei Jahrzehnte skizziert werden. Daran anschließend, werden die einzelnen Phasen der Migration aus Lateinamerika umrissen. Im nächsten Teil werden die gegenwärtigen Formen der lateinamerikanischen Migration in Spanien dargestellt. Am Schluss steht die Analyse der rechtlichen, politischen

3 Instituto Nacional de Estadística, (Fn. 1).

4 “Hambre de pan y horizontes.” Pilar Ponce, La Inmigración Ecuatoriana en España: Nuevas

vidas, nuevos problemas, in: Ponce Leiva, Javier (Hrsg.), Migrantes. Problemas y Ayudas, Quito 2005, S. 97.

5 “Los preferidos del siglo XXI.” Izquierdo Escribano et al., (Fn. 2), S. 1.

6 “Nueva hispanidad.“ Ricard Zapata-Barrero, Gestión de la multiculturalidad en España: un

análisis contextual para definir un enfoque europeo de la inmigración. I Seminario Inmigración y Europa. España en la construcción de una política europea de inmigración, Barcelona 2005, S. 87.


und gesellschaftlichen Rahmenbedingungen, unter denen sich dieser unbestreitbare Boom der Zuwanderung aus Lateinamerika innerhalb der letzten zehn Jahre entfalten konnte. A. Einwanderungsland Spanien: Entwicklung und Charakteristika der

Zuwanderung

Spanien war lange Zeit eines der klassischen europäischen Auswanderungsländer. In den Jahren 1882 bis 1990 emigrierten insgesamt über sieben Millionen Spanier. Diese Emigra-tion vollzog sich in mehreren Phasen und war anfangs von der kolonialen Vergangenheit Spaniens bestimmt. In einer ersten Welle im letzten Drittel des 19. Jahrhunderts und dann noch einmal in den zwanziger Jahren des 20. Jahrhunderts wanderten Millionen Spanier in die ehemaligen Kolonien in Lateinamerika und in der Karibik aus. Waren diese Emigra-tionswellen in erster Linie wirtschaftlich bedingt, erlebte Spanien nach dem Bürgerkrieg (1936-1939) eine Massenauswanderung aus politischen Motiven. Zeitweise flohen bis zu einer halben Million Anhänger der spanischen Republik vor dem Terror der Sieger unter General Francisco Franco. Etwa 200.000 dieser Flüchtlinge blieben dauerhaft im Exil. Sie ließen sich größtenteils in Frankreich, aber auch in einigen lateinamerikanischen Staaten, etwa Mexiko oder Argentinien, und in geringerem Maße auch in der Sowjetunion nieder.

7

Eine vierte Emigrationswelle setzte Mitte der fünfziger Jahre ein. Ab diesem Zeitpunkt wanderten spanische Arbeitskräfte in die Industrieländer Nordwesteuropas aus. Hauptmotiv dieser Migration war die bessere wirtschaftliche Situation in den Zielländern. Für viele spanische Arbeitsemigranten dürfte jedoch auch die Flucht vor den repressiven politischen und sozialen Verhältnissen der Franco-Diktatur eine wichtige Rolle gespielt haben. In dieser Phase verließen rund drei Millionen Spanier ihre Heimat. Mit dem Ende der Anwer-bephase in den meisten westeuropäischen Staaten 1973, dem spanischen Demokratisie-rungsprozess ab 1975 und der ab den achtziger Jahren einsetzenden wirtschaftlichen Kon-solidierung Spaniens fand diese letzte Auswanderungswelle ihr Ende. Trotz verstärkter Rückwanderung wies die spanische Migrationsbilanz noch lange Zeit einen negativen Saldo auf. Rund zwei Millionen Spanier leben nach wie vor im Ausland. In den vergangenen Jahrzehnten wurde Spanien zu einem Zielland für Migration. Auch die Zuwanderung nach Spanien lässt sich in mehrere Phasen unterteilen. Mitte der siebziger Jahre des letzten Jahrhunderts kamen neben sonnenhungrigen Pensionären aus Nordwest-europa vor allem Lateinamerikaner, die vor den Militärdiktaturen in ihren Heimatländern flüchteten. In den achtziger Jahren folgten zunehmend Arbeitsmigranten aus Lateinamerika. Die rasante Wirtschaftsentwicklung führte zu einer erhöhten Nachfrage etwa nach Haus-haltspersonal, so dass Spanien als Einwanderungsland gerade für Frauen aus den ehemali-gen Kolonien attraktiv wurde. Diese Migrationsbewegungen wurden dadurch begünstigt, dass bis 1985 Einwanderer aus Lateinamerika, den Philippinen und Äquatorialguinea in Spanien keine Arbeits- und Niederlassungserlaubnis benötigten. Im Zuge des spanischen

7 Vgl. Geneviève Dreyfus-Armand, L'exil des Républicains Espagnoles en France, Paris 1999.


EG-Beitritts musste diese Bevorzugung von Zuwanderern aus den ehemaligen Kolonien eingeschränkt werden – genauso wie die Zuwanderungsbestimmungen insgesamt auf Druck der Europäischen Gemeinschaft sukzessive verschärft wurden.

8

Trotzdem setzte zu Beginn der neunziger Jahre eine massive Zuwanderung von Migranten, vornehmlich aus den Maghrebstaaten, aber auch aus Osteuropa und Asien, ein und verwandelte Spanien innerhalb von wenigen Jahren in ein Einwanderungsland. Dabei blieb die Zuwanderung in absoluten Zahlen lange Zeit vergleichsweise gering. 1996 lebten 542.314 Ausländer in Spanien, was einem Anteil von 1,37 %

9 an der Bevölkerung ent-

sprach. 2000 waren es schon 923.879 (2,28 %) Ein regelrechter Boom entwickelte sich in den Jahren nach der Jahrtausendwende: Bis zum Jahr 2003 hatte sich die Zahl der Auslän-der mit 2.664.168 fast verdreifacht (6,24 %). 2009 lebten 5.648.671 Menschen nichtspani-scher Nationalität in dem iberischen Land. Das entspricht einem Bevölkerungsanteil von rund 12,08 %. Innerhalb weniger Jahre hat Spanien damit eine Entwicklung nachvollzogen, die sich in den übrigen Einwanderungsländern Westeuropas über mehrere Dekaden erstreckt hatte. Neben dieser enormen Dynamik zeichnet sich die Migration in Spanien durch eine Reihe von weiteren Merkmalen aus, die sie von vergleichbaren Prozessen in anderen euro-päischen Ländern unterscheiden: • Hoher Anteil von irregulärer Migration: Es gehört zu den Besonderheiten des spanischen Migrationsgeschehens, dass ein großer Teil der Migranten irregulär ins Land gelangte. Der enormen Nachfrage nach billigen Arbeitskräften in Wirtschafszweigen wie der Landwirt-schaft, dem Baugewerbe oder dem Dienstleistungsbereich standen immer restriktivere Einreisbestimmungen gegenüber – mit der Folge, dass die Zahl der irregulären Migranten seit Anfang der neunziger Jahre sprunghaft zunahm. Dieses Phänomen dauerte zumindest bis zur Wirtschaftskrise an. Migranten aus Lateinamerika, insbesondere aus Ecuador und Bolivien, reisen in der Regel legal ein und bleiben dann als overstayer irregulär im Land. Für Migranten aus dem Maghreb und den afrikanischen Staaten südlich der Sahara bleibt meist nur die irreguläre Einreise: Tausende von ihnen warten vor den Grenzzäunen Ceutas und Melillas, den spanischen Exklaven in Marokko, auf eine Möglichkeit, auf spanisches Territorium zu gelangen. Eine weitaus größere Zahl geht das lebensgefährliche Risiko ein, auf dem Seeweg Spaniens Küsten zu erreichen. Nach Angaben von Nichtregierungsorgani-sationen verloren zwischen 1988 und 2000 fast 6.000 Menschen in den Gewässern zwi-schen Marokko und Spanien ihr Leben.

10 Als Reaktion auf die immer effizientere Kontrolle

der Straße von Gibraltar und der spanischen Festlandküste versuchten in den letzten Jahren

8 Andreas Baumer, Chancen und Risiken der spanischen Migrationspolitik, Berlin Risk Brief No.

2. (2008), S. 7-12. 9 Diese und alle weiteren Angaben: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, (Fn. 1); eigene Berechnun-

gen. 10

Andreas Baumer, Spanien. in: Wolfgang Gieler / Dietmar Fricke (Hrsg.), Handbuch europäischer Migrationspolitiken, Münster 2004, S. 179.


immer mehr Migranten, per Boot von der westafrikanischen Küste über den offenen Atlan-tik auf die kanarischen Inseln zu gelangen – eine nochmals gefährlichere Route. Trotzdem stieg die Zahl derer, die dieses hohe Risiko eingehen, lange Zeit beständig. Wurden im Jahr 2000 nach offiziellen Angaben insgesamt 15.195 Migranten bei der illegalen Einreise an Spaniens Küsten festgenommen, waren es 2006 bereits 39.180. Im Jahr 2007 sank die Zahl erstmals wieder auf 18.057.

11 Seit Anfang der neunziger Jahre nahm die Zahl der irregulä-

ren Migranten beständig zu und explodierte förmlich um die Jahrtausendewende. 2003 war rund die Hälfte der Migranten in Spanien ohne regulären Aufenthaltsstatus. 2009 hat sich der Anteil der Irregulären zwar auf ein gutes Fünftel reduziert – umfasst aber noch immer mehr als eine Million Menschen. Trotz einer massenhaften Regularisierung 2005 und einer verschärften Abschiebepolitik bleibt das Phänomen der irregulären Migration also eine zentrale Herausforderung der spanischen Migrationspolitik.

12

• Phasen ethnischer Dominanz: Die Zuwanderung nach Spanien war in ihren verschiedenen Phasen meist von einer bestimmten Migrantengruppe bestimmt. So gelten die neunziger Jahre als das Jahrzehnt der marokkanischen Migration, wenngleich in diesem Zeitraum auch Migranten aus anderen Regionen nach Spanien kamen. Tatsächlich bildeten aber Marokkaner lange Zeit die mit Abstand größte nationale Gruppe unter der zugewanderten Bevölkerung, einen Rang, den sie erstmals 2008 an die Migranten rumänischer Herkunft abgaben.

13 Um die Jahrtausendwende setzte der Boom der Zuwanderung aus Lateinamerika

ein, in den letzten Jahren schließlich gewann die Migration aus den Ländern Mittelosteuro-pas an Bedeutung. Betrachtet man Anteil der unterschiedlichen Herkunftsregionen an der heutigen ausländischen Bevölkerung Spaniens, so wird deutlich, dass der Maghreb und Afrika südlich der Sahara ihre frühere Bedeutung zugunsten Lateinamerikas und Mittelost-europas eingebüßt haben. • Starke geographische Konzentration: Ein weiteres Merkmal der Zuwanderung nach Spa-nien ist die Konzentration der Migranten auf wenige Autonome Gemeinschaften. Diese Konzentration folgt den spezifischen Nachfragestrukturen auf dem Arbeitsmarkt und ist daher bei den verschiedenen Migrantengruppen unterschiedlich ausgeprägt. Während bei-spielsweise marokkanische Migranten oftmals in der arbeitsintensiven Landwirtschaft der südöstlichen Regionen beschäftigt sind, führt etwa die Dominanz von Migrantinnen aus Lateinamerika im Bereich der häuslichen Dienstleistungen zu einer starken Präsenz dieser Gruppe in den Metropolen. Insgesamt lässt sich jedoch festhalten, dass sich der Großteil der Migranten in den Großräumen von Madrid und Barcelona, in den Zentren des Massen-tourismus sowie in den Regionen mit arbeitsintensiver Landwirtschaft sammelt.

14

11

El País, 13.03.2008. 12

Vgl. Baumer, (Fn. 8); Instituto Nacional de Estadística, (Fn. 1). 13

Instituto Nacional de Estadística, (Fn. 1). 14

Vgl. Joaquín Recaño Valverde, Andreu Domingo i Valls, Evolución de la distribución territorial y la movilidad geográfica de la población extranjera en España, in: Eliseo Aja / Joaquín Arango


B. Entwicklung der spanischen Migrationspolitik

Die spanischen Regierungen brauchten lange Zeit, um auf das Phänomen der massenhaften Zuwanderung mit der Formulierung einer eigenständigen Migrationspolitik zu reagieren. Als klassisches Auswanderungsland mit einer im hohen Maße vom Tourismus abhängigen Wirtschaftsstruktur hatte Spanien lange Zeit Interesse an möglichst unbürokratischen Ein-reisebestimmungen. Das änderte sich mit dem Beitritt des Landes zur Europäischen Ge-meinschaft 1986 und zum Schengener Abkommen 1991. Die Zuwanderungs- und Auslän-derpolitik Spaniens wurde fortan bestimmt durch seine politische und geographische Posi-tion an der Südflanke der Europäischen Gemeinschaft. Die Voraussetzung für die Teil-nahme am Schengener Abkommen war die Übernahme des zuvor von den Kernsstaaten erarbeiteten acquis. Spanien führte 1990 die Visumspflicht für Nicht-EU-Bürger ein. Davon ausgenommen blieben nur Staatsangehörige der Länder, die aus den ehemaligen Kolonien in Lateinamerika hervorgegangen waren. Ab 2001 wurden auch diese Sonderre-gelungen sukzessive aufgehoben.

15

Neben der Anpassung (und damit Verschärfung) der einreise- und aufenthaltsrechtli-chen Bestimmungen an die entsprechenden Standards der übrigen Schengen-Staaten be-gann Spanien damit, die Sicherung seiner Grenzen gegen irreguläre Einwanderung voran-zutreiben. Ceuta und Melilla wurden mit Mauern, Stacheldrahtzäunen und Überwachungs-kameras zu regelrechten Festungen ausgebaut. Außerdem wurde ein radar- und infrarotge-stütztes Informationssystem aufgebaut, mit dem die spanischen Küstengewässer überwacht und so Boote mit irregulären Einwanderern schon vor der Landung aufgebracht werden sollen. In den letzten Jahren hat die spanische Regierung den Kampf gegen die irreguläre Migration weiter verstärkt. Neben einer verstärkten Sicherung der Seegrenzen – zeitweise auch mit Unterstützung der europäischen Grenzagentur Frontex – wurden insbesondere Rücknahmeabkommen mit einer Reihe von west- und zentralafrikanischen Transit- und Entsendeländern geschlossen und die Abschiebepolitik drastisch verschärft.

16

Erst unter dem Eindruck der massiven Zuwanderung wurde Ende 1999 ein neues Aus-ländergesetz (ley de extranjería) beschlossen. Dieses Gesetz war nach einer langen Debatte mit den Stimmen der linken und nationalistischen Oppositionsparteien gegen die Stimmen der regierenden konservativen PP (Partido Popular – Volkspartei) verabschiedet worden. Es trat an die Stelle des alten Ausländergesetzes von 1985 und galt als das fortschrittlichste

(Hrsg.), Veinte años de inmigración en España. Perspectivas Jurídica y sociológica [1985-2004], Barcelona 2006, S. 303-338.

15 Axel Kreienbrink, Einwanderungsland Spanien. Migrationspolitik zwischen Europäisierung und

nationalen Interessen, Frankfurt/Main, London 2004, S. 192-205. 16

Ana María López Sala, El control de los flujos migratorios y la gestión política de las fronteras en España, in: Ricard Zapata-Barrero (Hrsg.), Políticas y gobernabilidad de la inmigración en España, Barcelona 2009, S. 31-49.


eines Mitgliedsstaates der Europäischen Union. Neben Erleichterungen für reguläre Zuwanderer beinhaltete es auch einige Rechte für irreguläre Migranten wie etwa Zugang zur Gesundheitsversorgung und zur öffentlichen Schuldbildung sowie Vereinigungs-, Streik- und Demonstrationsrechte.

17 In der Beratungsphase hatte die PP das Gesetzesvorha-

ben noch unterstützt – ihr Rückzug und die Verabschiedung des Gesetzes gegen die Stim-men der Regierung markierten das Ende des Parteienkonsenses in der spanischen Zuwande-rungspolitik. Nach Wahlen im März 2000 verfügte die konservative Regierung von José María Aznar erstmals über eine absolute Mehrheit im Parlament und kündigte die Verschärfung des gerade erst in Kraft getretenen Gesetzes an. Durch die Rücknahme verschiedener Rechte für Irreguläre sollte die angebliche „Sogwirkung“ des Gesetzes beseitigt werden. Die Reform der ley de extranjería führte zu einer breiten Debatte in der spanischen Öffentlich-keit, an der sich Parteien, Gewerkschaften und verschiedene NGOs, darunter auch Selbst-organisationen von Migranten, beteiligten. Dazu kamen zahlreiche Protestaktionen wie Kirchenbesetzungen durch irreguläre, von Abschiebung bedrohte Migranten. Unter diesem hohen öffentlichen Druck musste sich die Regierung kompromissbereit zeigen. Zwar wurde die Reform des Ausländergesetzes mit vielen umstrittenen Punkten verabschiedet. So sind im reformierten Gesetzeswerk Rechte wie Vereinigungs-, Streik- und Demonstrationsrechte nun an den regulären Aufenthaltsstatus gebunden. Der Anspruch der Irregulären auf Gesundheitsversorgung und Schulbildung blieb – im Unterschied zu fast allen anderen europäischen Ländern – jedoch erhalten. Voraussetzung für die Inanspruchnahme dieser öffentlichen Leistungen ist die Einschreibung in das kommunale Melderegister (padrón municipal). Dies ist auch für Irreguläre gefahrlos möglich; ein Abgleich dieser Daten mit den normalen Ausländerregistern findet nicht statt.

18

Der Wahlsieg der sozialistischen PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español – Spani-sche Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei) von José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero im Jahr 2004 fiel mit dem Höhepunkt des beispiellosen Migrationsbooms nach Spanien zusammen. Die sozialis-tische Regierung unternahm den Versuch, mittels einer umfassenden Neuformulierung der Migrationspolitik auf diese Situation zu reagieren. Der Politikbereich Migration wurde vom Innenministerium ins Ministerium für Arbeit und soziale Angelegenheiten verlagert, was eine Neubewertung symbolisierte: nicht mehr sicherheitspolitische und polizeirechtliche Aspekte der Migration, sondern Fragen der Integration in die Sozialsysteme und in den

17

Vgl. Liliana Suárez-Navaz, Raquel Macià Pareja, Ángela Moreno García, El Estado y las luchas de los sin papeles en España: Una extensión de la ciudadanía?, in: Dies. (Hrsg.), Las luchas de los sin papeles y la extensión de la ciudadanía. Perspectivas críticas desde Europa y Estados Unidos, Madrid 2007, S. 185-213.

18 Dieses Verfahren hat für Politik und Wissenschaft einen interessanten Nebeneffekt: Aus der

Differenz zwischen den vergebenen Aufenthaltsbewilligungen und den im padrón registrierten Ausländern lassen sich relativ genaue Rückschlüsse auf die Zahl der Irregulären ziehen. Vgl. Ma. Isabel Carvajal Gómez, Evolución de las cifras de extranjeros con tarjeta o autorización de residencia en vigor (1992-2004), in: Aja / Arango, (Fn. 14), S. 87. Vgl. auch Fn. 34.


Arbeitsmarkt sollten im Vordergrund stehen.19

Das von der Vorgängerregierung ver-schärfte Ausländergesetz wurde zwar nicht reformiert, jedoch in seinen Ausführungsbe-stimmungen liberalisiert. Schwerpunkt der ersten zwei Regierungsjahre Zapateros war die Auseinandersetzung mit der irregulären Migration. Schon zuvor hatte es in Spanien immer wieder Legalisie-rungsverfahren für so genannte sin papeles („Papierlose“) gegeben; zuletzt erhielten 2000 und 2001 insgesamt rund 460.000 Irreguläre eine Aufenthaltserlaubnis. Im Frühjahr 2005 fand nun die bislang letzte und umfangreichste Regularisierung statt. Rund 577.000 irre-guläre Migranten bekamen Papiere. Neu an diesem Prozess war, dass die Arbeitgeber den Antrag auf Regularisierung zu stellen hatten – und damit ihre bislang illegal Beschäftigten bei der Sozialversicherung anmelden mussten. Dieses Verfahren war ein Schlag gegen die Schattenwirtschaft und brachte Geld in die Sozialkassen. NGOs bemängelten allerdings, dass auf diese Weise die Abhängigkeit der Migranten von ihrem Arbeitgeber noch verstärkt werden würde. Neben der Regularisierung eines großen Teils der schon eingewanderten sin papeles bildete die Abwehr neuer Irregulärer einen weiteren Schwerpunkt der sozialistischen Migrationspolitik. Wie schon die konservative Vorgängerregierung schlossen die Sozialis-ten weitere bilaterale Rücknahmeabkommen mit Herkunfts- und Transitländern, um die möglichst rasche Rückführung irregulärer Migranten zu ermöglichen. 2007 wurden über 92% der bei der Einreise aufgegriffenen Irregulären abgeschoben.

20

Offen bleibt die Frage, wie die sozialistische Regierung künftig mit dem Phänomen der irregulären Migration umgehen wird. Eine erneute Regularisierungskampagne wurde zwar ausgeschlossen, im Gesetz sind jedoch weiterhin individuelle Regularisierungen aufgrund von „Verwurzelung“ (arraigo) in der Gesellschaft vorgesehen. Auch der erfolgreiche Widerstand der spanischen Regierung gegen das Vorhaben, Regularisierungen im 2008 beschlossenen EU-Einwanderungspakt generell auszuschließen, deutet daraufhin, dass sich Zapatero eine solche Möglichkeit zumindest offen lassen will – was angesichts der nach wie vor hohen Zahl von Irregulären auch nachvollziehbar scheint. Im Kampf gegen die irreguläre Migration setzte die sozialistische Regierung auch auf die Schaffung von Möglichkeiten der regulären Zuwanderung. Die spezifische Nachfrage-struktur des spanischen Arbeitsmarktes nach ausländischen Arbeitskräften – also der wich-tigste Pull-Faktor für die irreguläre Zuwanderung – sollte in verschiedenen Politiken zur Förderung von regulärer Migration abgebildet werden. Dazu gehören bilaterale Abkommen über temporäre Migration mit einer Reihe von Entsendeländern, Regelungen für Saisonar-beit, sowie eine mit Unternehmerverbänden und Gewerkschaften abgestimmte Liste von schwer zu besetzenden Stellen, für die gezielt ausländische Arbeitskräfte angeworben

19

Gemma Pinyol i Jiménez, La política de inmigración española como un nuevo instrumento de acción exterior, in: Esther Barbé (Hrsg.), España en Europa 2004-2008, Monografías del Observa-torio de Política Exterior Europa, núm. 4, Barcelona 2008, S. 1.

20 El País, 09.01.2008.


werden können. Allen diesen Maßnahmen gemein ist die Tatsache, dass sie in erster Linie auf die Interessen der spanischen Wirtschaft ausgerichtet sind – dem zentralen Anliegen vieler Migranten nach einer dauerhaften Perspektive des Aufenthalts in Spanien werden sie nicht gerecht.

21 Als Bestandteile einer kohärenten Migrationspolitik sind sie deshalb nur

bedingt tauglich und laufen vielmehr Gefahr, die Fehlentwicklungen des nordwesteuropäi-schen Gastarbeitermodells zu reproduzieren. Neben der Eindämmung der irregulären Zuwanderung und der Schaffung von regulären Zuwanderungsmöglichkeiten bildet die Integration der Migranten eine weitere Säule der sozialistischen Migrationspolitik. Lange Zeit spielte die Frage nach Perspektiven der Integ-ration in der spanischen Diskussion eine untergeordnete Rolle. Erst in den letzten Jahren bemühten sich insbesondere die Autonomen Gemeinschaften um Integrationsmaßnahmen. Ein einheitliches Integrationskonzept ist dabei bislang nicht zu erkennen – die Bandbreite reicht von multikulturalistisch inspirierten Politiken in Katalonien bis zu assimilatorischen Ansätzen im konservativ regierten Valencia, wo Migranten – auf freiwilliger Basis – eine „Integrationsverpflichtung“ eingehen sollen, die unter anderem auch Kurse über Politik, Kultur und Sprache der Aufnahmegesellschaft umfasst.

22 Die Regierung Zapatero brachte

nun den Zentralstaat wieder als Akteur ins Spiel. 2007 wurde ein Integrationsplan für die Jahre bis 2010 beschlossen, der rund 2 Milliarden Euro für Maßnahmen insbesondere in den Bereichen Spracherwerb, Bildung und Arbeit vorsieht.

23 2008 kündigte die sozialisti-

sche Regierung außerdem an, noch in der aktuellen Legislaturperiode ein Gesetz zum kommunalen Wahlrecht für Ausländer aus Staaten außerhalb der EU auf den Weg zu brin-gen. Im Zuge der schweren Wirtschaftskrise, von der Spanien seit dem zweiten Halbjahr 2008 massiv betroffen war, begann sich auch der bislang dezidiert migrationsfreundliche Diskurs der sozialistischen Regierung zu wandeln. Das Ministerium für Arbeit und Immi-gration legte im Frühjahr 2009 ein – weitgehend wirkungsloses – Programm zur Rück-kehrförderung von Migranten auf. Im Dezember 2009 verabschiedete das spanische Parla-ment eine Reform des Ausländergesetzes, die den Familiennachzug beschränkte und einige

21

Vgl. Enrique Bernales Ballesteros, Migración, Derechos Humanos, Migrantes Andinos a España. In: Secretaría General Iberoamericana. Encuentro Iberoamericano sobre Migración y desarrollo. Unidos por las migraciones. Madrid, 18 y 19 de julio de 2006. Madrid 2006, S. 237-245.

22 “Compromiso de integración.“ Comunitat Valenciana, Ley 15/2008, de 5 de diciembre, de inte-

gración de las personas inmigrantes en la Comunitat Valenciana, in: Boletín Oficial del Estado, Núm. 9, (2009), Título II, Del compromiso de integración, S. 3420. Zu Integrationspolitiken in Spanien allgemein vgl: Ruth Ferrero-Turrión, Gemma Pinyol-Jiménez, Immigration and the Construction of Public Philosophy(ies) of Integration in Spain, in: Elspeth Guild, Kees Groenen-dijk, Sergio Carrera (Hrsg.), Illiberal Liberal States, Immigration, Citizenship and Integration in the EU, Farnham, Burlington 2009, S. 337-356.

23 Baumer, (Fn. 8), S. 12.


Maßnahmen gegen irreguläre Migration umfasste.24

Bemerkenswert ist allerdings, dass trotz der tiefen Krise und der extrem angespannten Haushaltslage des spanischen Staates nach wie vor ein Konsens darüber besteht, auch irregulären Migranten grundlegende sozi-ale Rechte wie Gesundheitsversorgung oder Beschulung schulpflichtiger Kinder zu gewäh-ren. Entsprechende Vorstöße einiger Bürgermeister, den Irregulären fortan die Registrie-rung im padrón municipal und damit den Zugang zu diesen öffentlichen Leistungen zu verwehren, wurden nicht nur von der regierenden PSOE und den kleineren Linksparteien, sondern auch von PP-Chef Mariano Rajoy zurückgewiesen.

25

C. Phasen der Migration aus Lateinamerika

Lateinamerika war über lange Zeit hinweg das wichtigste Ziel spanischer Migranten. Insge-samt verließen zwischen 1850 und 1950 rund 3,5 Millionen Spanier ihre Heimat in Rich-tung Lateinamerika. Von der Remigration eines Teils dieser Auswanderer abgesehen, fand eine nennenswerte Wanderungsbewegung in entgegen gesetzter Richtung lange Zeit nicht statt. Das änderte sich erstmals mit der Errichtung der Militärdiktaturen in den Ländern des Cono Sur. Mit einem Mal gewann Spanien als Exilland an Bedeutung. In vielen Fällen mischten sich politische und ökonomische Motive, die Flucht vor politischer Verfolgung stand jedoch für diese Migrantengruppe eindeutig im Vordergrund. Nach den Demokrati-sierungsprozessen in den achtziger Jahren kehrte ein Teil dieser Migranten in ihre Ur-sprungsländer zurück, ein beträchtlicher Teil bleib jedoch in Spanien.

26

Mit den ökonomischen und gesellschaftlichen Veränderungen Spaniens im Verlauf der achtziger Jahre, insbesondere der verstärkten Integration von Frauen in das Erwerbsleben, wuchs die Nachfrage nach ausländischen Arbeitskräften im häuslichen Dienstleistungssek-tor, wo die nun erwerbstätigen Spanierinnen ersetzt werden sollten. Diese Nachfragestruk-tur bildete zusammen mit den damals noch visumsfreien Einreisemöglichkeiten für Ange-hörige ehemaliger Kolonien den Rahmen für eine bedeutsame Zuwanderung von Migran-tinnen aus der Karibik, insbesondere aus der Dominikanischen Republik. Ein rassistischer Mord an einer Dominikanerin 1992 in einem Vorort von Madrid brachte die Präsenz dieser Migrantengruppe ins öffentliche Bewusstsein. Sowohl in der Wahrnehmung wie auch von ihrer Größe her stand die lateinamerikanische Migration jedoch lange Zeit im Schatten der Zuwanderung aus dem Maghreb und später aus den Ländern südlich der Sahara. Das änderte sich mit der Jahrtausendwende. Jetzt setzte ein regelrechter Boom der lateinamerikanischen Migration ein – zuerst aus Ecuador, Kolum-bien und Peru, dann, in Folge der Krise, ab 2002 aus Argentinien und schließlich aus Boli-

24

Ley Orgánica 2/2009, de 11 de diciembre, de reforma de la Ley Orgánica 4/2000, de 11 de enero, sobre derechos y libertades de los extranjeros en España y su integración social, in: Boletín Oficial del Estado, Núm. 299 (2009), S. 104986 ff.

25 Vgl. ABC, 22.10.2010.

26 Baumer, (Fn. 10), S. 171.


vien. Die Einreise dieser Migranten erfolgte in den meisten Fällen regulär, zu Irregulären wurden sie erst nach Ablauf der Frist zu Ausreise. Mit der Einführung der Visumspflicht für die wichtigsten Entsendeländer zwischen 2001 und 2003 hat sich der Migrationsstrom aus Lateinamerika etwas abgeschwächt. Insge-samt lässt sich jedoch sagen, dass sich die Arbeitsmigration aus Lateinamerika in den letz-ten Jahren auf einem sehr hohen Niveau stabilisiert hat. Die tiefe Krise, die Spaniens Wirt-schaft seit dem ersten Halbjahr 2008 niederdrückt, hat zwar zu einem drastischen Rückgang der Zuwanderung geführt.

27 Zu einer nennenswerten Remigrationsbewegung ist es trotz der

hohen Ausländerarbeitslosigkeit bislang nicht gekommen. Zumindest die lateinamerikani-schen Migranten sind offensichtlich gekommen, um zu bleiben. D. Gegenwärtige Formen der Migration aus Lateinamerika

Zum 1.1. 2009 verzeichneten die örtlichen Melderegister insgesamt 1.871.239 Migranten mit der Staatsangehörigkeit eines lateinamerikanischen Landes. Die größte nationale Gruppe stellen die Ecuadorianer dar, gefolgt von den Migranten aus Kolumbien, Bolivien, Argentinien und Peru. Nach Rumänen und Marokkanern bilden die Migranten aus Ecuador das größte nationale Kollektiv unter der ausländischen Bevölkerung Spaniens; Lateiname-rika insgesamt ist die wichtigste Herkunftsregion für die Migration nach Spanien.

28 Die

Zuwanderung aus Lateinamerika nach Spanien entwickelt sich nach einem ähnlichen Mus-ter wie andere Migrationströme: Am Anfang steht zumeist die reguläre Einreise als Tourist, drei Monate nach der Einreise bzw. nach Ablauf des Visums wird der Migrant zum Irregu-lären. Oder aber der irreguläre Aufenthalt schließt an eines der regulären, befristeten Arbeitsverhältnisse an, für die in den letzten Jahren verstärkt temporäre Aufenthalts- und Arbeitsgenehmigungen erteilt wurden. Die Arbeitssuche erfolgt dann meist im informellen Sektor, der bis in die Gegenwart, allen gegenläufigen Politiken zum Trotz, viele Beschäfti-gungschancen für Irreguläre bietet. Ein relativ stabiles Beschäftigungsverhältnis war in der Vergangenheit oftmals die Voraussetzung für eine Partizipation an Regularisierungsprozes-sen, die den bis dahin Irregulären erstmals eine befristete Aufenthalts- und Arbeitsgeneh-migung einbrachten. Nach der ersten Erneuerung dieser Papiere nach einem Jahr setzte normalerweise eine Verfestigung des Aufenthaltsstatus ein. Am Ende dieses Prozesses stand vielfach die unbefristete Aufenthaltsgenehmigung oder die Einbürgerung. Seit 2005 hat es jedoch keine Regularisierungskampagne mehr gegeben – und auch in Zukunft soll keine massenhafte Regularisierung mehr stattfinden. Für die Irregulären, die zu spät kamen

27

Nach einem Bericht der OECD ging der Zustrom von Migranten nach Spanien 2008 im Vergleich zum Vorjahr um 43 % zurück – so stark wie in keinem anderen OECD-Land. Die große Mehrheit der im Land lebenden Migranten scheint dagegen entschlossen, zu bleiben, obgleich diese Gruppe überproportional stark von der zunehmenden Arbeitslosigkeit betroffen ist. Programme der spanischen Regierung zur Rückkehrförderung stießen auf nur geringe Resonanz. Vgl. El País, 12.07.2010.

28 Instituto Nacional de Estadística, (Fn. 1).


oder aus anderen Gründen nicht an der letzten Regularisierung 2005 teilnehmen konnten, bedeutet dies, dass sie kaum Chancen auf eine Regularisierung ihrer Situation haben.

29

Oftmals ist die Migration Teil einer „Familienstrategie“30

und beginnt mit der Auswan-derung eines Familienmitglieds. Gerade im Fall der Migranten aus den Ländern des Anden-raums sind das in vielen Fällen Frauen, die erst nach einer Etablierungsphase ihre Partner, später auch Kinder und weitere Familienangehörige nachholen. Pilar Ponce hat für den Fall der ecuadorianischen Migration beschrieben, dass im Normalfall die Frau als erste migriert, nach einem Jahr der Mann und nach zwei weiteren Kinder und evtl. auch Großeltern nach-kommen.

31 Diese Migrationen finden meist noch unter Bedingungen der Irregularität statt.

Bis vor wenigen Jahren konnte allerdings auf eine Regularisierung zu einem späteren Zeit-punkt gehofft werden – eine Perspektive, die sich für die Protagonisten der jüngsten Ein-wanderungswellen, insbesondere der aus Bolivien, wohl nicht mehr bietet. Migranten lateinamerikanischer Herkunft sind in ihrem Verhältnis zur spanischen Aufnahmegesellschaft gegenüber anderen Migrantengruppen im Vorteil. Mit Ausnahme der relativ kleinen Gruppe der Brasilianer und einiger indígenas sind alle Migranten aus dieser Region spanischsprachig. Die gemeinsame Sprache erleichtert nicht nur die Integration in Arbeitswelt und Alltagsleben, sondern symbolisiert eine kulturelle Nähe, die zu einer erhöhten Akzeptanz in der Mehrheitsgesellschaft beiträgt – zumindest dort, wo das castel-lano noch als die gemeinsame Sprache akzeptiert ist. Eine vergleichbare, wenn auch längst nicht gleich bedeutende Rolle kommt der Religion zu. In Umfragen liegen Migranten aus Lateinamerika stets vor anderen Migrantenkollektiven, sowohl was die Häufigkeit des „täglichen Umgangs“ wie auch die „kulturelle Sympathie“

32 angeht.

Jenseits dieses kulturellen Kapitals der Sprache und der Religion, das den meisten latinos zur Verfügung steht, unterscheiden sich die einzelnen Gruppen der lateinamerikani-schen Migranten stark in ihrer jeweiligen sozialen und ökonomischen Situation. Neben Herkunft, Bildungshintergrund, Ausbildung, Dauer des Aufenthalts und anderen individu-ellen Faktoren ist es vor allem der Aufenthaltsstatus, der die soziale Situation determiniert. Der Umstand, ob ein Migrant die spanische Staatsbürgerschaft erlangt hat, über eine Auf-enthaltsgenehmigung verfügt oder gar keine Papiere hat, sich also irregulär im Land befin-det, entscheidet maßgeblich über Zugang zu und Qualität von Arbeit, Wohnung, staatlichen Leistungen, Partizipationsmöglichkeiten, sozialer Anerkennung etc.

33 Und hier sind die

Unterschiede zwischen den einzelnen Migrantenkollektiven aus Lateinamerika enorm.

29

Emilio José Gómez Ciriano, Andrés Tornos Cubillo, Colectivo Ioé, Ecuatorianos en España. Una aproximación sociológica, Madrid 2007, S. 92-93.

30 “Estrategia familiar.” Ponce, (Fn. 4), S. 99.

31 Ebd., S. 101.

32 “Trato cotidiano”, “simpatía cultural.” Izquierdo Escribano et al., (Fn. 2), S. 19.

33 Javier de Lucas, Igualdad jurídica e inclusión política: por el empowerment de los migrantes, in:

Secretaría General Iberoamericana, (Fn. 21), S. 248.


Ingesamt stellt die irreguläre Migration nach wie vor die wohl größte Herausforderung für die Migrationspolitik der spanischen Regierung dar. Trotz der bislang umfassendsten Regularisierungskampagne im Jahr 2005, der in den letzten Jahren erweiterten Möglich-keiten der regulären Zuwanderung und dem verschärften Vorgehen gegen irreguläre Migranten geht die Zahl der sin papeles nur langsam zurück. Zum Jahreswechsel 2008/ 2009 betrug die Differenz zwischen der im padrón municipal registrierten Ausländern und der Zahl der Ausländer mit Aufenthaltsgenehmigungen

34 1.175.172, das entspricht einem

Anteil von rund 20,80 % irregulärer Migranten an der gesamten ausländischen Wohnbe-völkerung. 2007 waren es noch 1.497.746 (33,14 %). Der Anteil der sin papeles an den Migranten aus Lateinamerika ist dabei überproportional hoch: 2007 betrug er 34,15 %, im Jahre 2008 32,04 %. 2009 verfügten noch immer 537.353 lateinamerikanische Migranten über keine Aufenthaltsgenehmigung. Das entspricht einem Anteil von 28,72 %. Dieser hohe Anteil verteilt sich sehr ungleich auf die verschiedenen lateinamerikanischen Natio-nalitäten, die auch bei den übrigen aufenthaltsrechtlichen Varianten (Staatsangehörigkeit oder Aufenthaltsgenehmigung) deutliche Unterschiede aufweisen.

35

Die beste Voraussetzung für soziale und ökonomische Integration von Migranten stellt auch in Spanien die Einbürgerung dar. Wie weiter unten noch ausgeführt werden wird, sind lateinamerikanische Migranten im Allgemeinen und direkte Nachfahren spanischer Aus-wanderer im Besonderen bei der Erlangung der Staatsbürgerschaft bevorzugt. Dementspre-chend viele der in Argentinien geborenen Migranten (33,79 %) sind spanische Staatsbür-ger, einen Status, den Angehörige der indigen geprägten Andenstaaten seltener erreichen. 25,39 % der Peruaner, 17,41 % der Kolumbianer, 14,57 % der Ecuadorianer und lediglich 2,58 % der Bolivianer haben die spanische Staatsbürgerschaft erlangt.

36

Ganz anders stellt sich die Situation bei der Gruppe der lateinamerikanischen Migran-ten mit einem regulären Aufenthaltsstatus dar. Hier sind es die Migrantenkollektive, die vor (Dominikaner) oder zu Beginn des großen Booms (Ecuadorianer, Peruaner, Kolumbianer)

34

Der Stichtag für die Zahlen des padrón municipal ist der 1.1.2009, der für die Angaben über Aufenthaltsgenehmigungen für Ausländer im Anuario Estadístico 2008 der 31.12. 2008. Vgl. Instituto Nacional de Estadística, (Fn. 1); Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración, Secretaria de Estado de Inmigración y Emigración, Anuario Estadístico del año 2008, http://extranjeros. mtin.es/es/InformacionEstadistica/Anuarios/Anuario2008.html (27.07.2010); eigene Berechnun-gen. Alle folgenden Angaben beziehen sich auf das jeweilige Jahr des padrón municipal und die Angaben zum 31.12. des Vorjahrs aus der entsprechenden Ausgabe des Anuario Estadístico und auf eigene Berechnungen. Die Zahlen im padrón municipal gelten als leicht überhöht, da bei-spielsweise Wegzüge nicht registriert werden. Umgekehrt finden sich Aufenthaltsgenehmigungen, die sich gerade im Verlängerungsprozess befinden, nicht in der Statistik des Ministerio de Tra-bajo e Inmigración wieder. Darüber hinaus melden sich nicht alle Irregulären im padrón an. Trotz dieser Probleme führt diese Methode der Berechnung, auch nach Ansicht der meisten spanischen Migrationsforscher, zu einer relativ präzisen Annäherung an die tatsächliche Zahl der irregulären Migranten. Vgl. Carvajal Gómez, (Fn. 18), S. 88.

35 Instituto Nacional de Estadística, (Fn. 1); eigene Berechnungen.

36 Alle Angaben zum 01.01.2009. Vgl. Instituto Nacional de Estadística, (Fn. 1).


nach Spanien kamen, die ihre aufenthaltsrechtliche Situation, oftmals unter Ausnutzung der verschiedenen Regularisierungen, inzwischen in großer Mehrheit konsolidieren konnten. Nahezu alle Migranten aus Ecuador

37, 92,75 % der Kolumbianer, 93,15 % der Peruaner

und 93,35 % der Zuwanderer aus der Dominikanischen Republik verfügen über eine Auf-enthaltsgenehmigung. Den später gekommen Migranten bleib der Weg in den in den regu-lären Aufenthalt mehrheitlich verwehrt. Nur 38,23 % der Bolivianer verfügen über eine Aufenthaltsgenehmigung, fast zwei Drittel der Angehörigen dieses Kollektivs sind irregulär im Land. Unter den argentinischen Migranten verfügen 49,74 % über eine Aufenthaltser-laubnis. Die Gruppe der argentinischen Migranten zeichnet sich also durch eine hohe Ein-bürgerungsrate einerseits und einen hohen Anteil an Irregulären anderseits aus. Bei der argentinischen Migration nach Spanien handelt es sich mehrheitlich um relativ gut ausge-bildete, junge Angehörige der urbanen Mittelschichten, die das Land massenhaft in den Jahren 2002 und 2003 verließen.

38 Für die Mehrheit war die Migration eine direkte Reak-

tion auf die Folgen der Krise und stellte nicht notwendigerweise eine Entscheidung für eine längerfristige Auswanderung dar. Der, zumindest anfangs, temporäre Charakter der Migra-tion und die relativ problemlose Integration in den spanischen Arbeitsmarkt dürften wohl mit dafür verantwortlich sein, dass für viele argentinische Migranten die Regularisierung ihres Aufenthalts keine Priorität hatte. In der prekärsten Situation befindet sich ohne Zweifel das Kollektiv der bolivianischen Migranten. Der größte Teil der rund 230.000 registrierten Bolivianer kam erst in den letz-ten Jahren nach Spanien. Bis 2003 hatten sich lediglich 28.128 im padrón municipal angemeldet, 2005 waren es erst 96.367. Die wenigsten Bolivianer hatten also die Möglich-keit, von der letzten großen Regularisierung 2005 zu profitieren. 2009 befanden sich 61,77 % der Migranten aus Bolivien irregulär im Land. Sie haben kaum eine Chance, ihre Situation zu regularisieren. Als mehrheitlich gering qualifizierte Arbeiter sind sie besonders von den Folgen der Wirtschaftskrise, insbesondere in der Bauwirtschaft, betroffen. Der Verlust der Arbeit stellt für die Angehörigen dieser Migrantengruppe nicht nur ein existen-tielles Problem des Überlebens ohne ökonomische Ressourcen dar, sondern macht auch die letzte Hoffnung zunichte, über ein stabiles, wenn auch informelles, Arbeitsverhältnis in der Zukunft von einem weiteren Regularisierungsprozess oder einer individuellen Regularisie-

37

Tatsächlich sind in der Statistik des Ministeriums für Arbeit und Immigration zum Stichtag 31.12.2008 mehr ecuadorianische Migranten mit Aufenthaltsgenehmigung verzeichnet als im padrón municipal vom 1.1.2009 registriert sind, so dass sich rechnerisch ein Prozentsatz von 102,98 ergibt, was auf die weiter oben schon angemerkte Ungenauigkeit dieser beiden Statistiken zurückzuführen ist. Ein Jahr zuvor verfügten 96,01 % der gemeldeten Ecuadorianer über eine Aufenthaltsgenehmigung. Es ist also davon auszugehen, dass zwischenzeitlich nahezu alle Migranten aus diesem Land ihre aufenthaltsrechtliche Situation regularisieren konnten. Alle Angaben: Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración, Secretaria de Estado de Inmigración y Emigra-ción, (Fn. 34); Instituto Nacional de Estadística, (Fn. 1); eigene Berechnungen.

38 Alejandro Goldberg, Tú, sudaca. Las dimensiones histórico-geográficas, sociopolíticas y cultura-

les alrededor del significado de ser inmigrante (y argentino) en España, Buenos Aires 2007, S. 40.


rung aufgrund von „Verwurzelung“ profitieren zu können. Bolivianische Migranten sind also vom Syndrom der Konsequenzen von Irregularität in hohem Maße betroffen, das sich am besten mit dem Begriff der „Verletzlichkeit“

39 beschreiben lässt.

Betrachtet man im Kontrast die Gruppe der ecuadorianischen Migranten, wird beson-ders deutlich, welche Konsequenzen der Zeitpunkt der Migration für die Integrationsper-spektiven des jeweiligen Kollektivs hatte. Die Push-Faktoren waren für die gesamte andi-nisch geprägte Migration die gleichen: Armut, politische und gesellschaftliche Instabilität, Unsicherheit, Perspektivlosigkeit.

40 Vergleichbar sind auch die sozialstrukturelle Zusam-

mensetzung der Migrantenkollektive – mehrheitlich gering qualifiziert, ein hoher Anteil an indigenen Bevölkerungsgruppen, große Bedeutung der weiblichen Migration – genauso wie der Prozess der Integration in den Arbeitsmarkt. Trotzdem befindet sich die Mehrheit der ecuadorianischen Migranten in einer grundlegend verschiedenen Situation.

41 Fast 15 Pro-

zent der Ecuadorianer in Spanien verfügen inzwischen über die spanische Staatsbürger-schaft. Fast alle übrigen Migranten aus Ecuador haben einen stabilen Aufenthaltsstatus – zumeist mit Aufenthaltsgenehmigungen von mehr als einem Jahr. Sie kamen mehrheitlich in den Jahren 2000 bis 2001 nach Spanien und konnten von den jüngsten Regularisie-rungsprozessen profitieren. Und nur eine kleine Minderheit von Ecuadorianern befindet sich in der Irregularität – entweder, weil sie auch die letzte Regularisierung verpasst haben, oder weil sie aufgrund von Arbeitslosigkeit ihre Aufenthaltserlaubnis verloren haben.

42

Diese prekären Bedingungen, von denen inzwischen nur noch eine Minderheit der Ecuado-rianer betroffen ist, stellen dagegen für die große Mehrheit der bolivianischen Migranten nach wie vor den Regelfall dar. Nicht von ungefähr protestierte Boliviens Präsident Evo Morales besonders scharf gegen die neue Rückführungsrichtlinie

43, die Ministerrat und

Parlament der EU im Frühsommer 2008 beschlossen haben. Ein härteres Vorgehen gegen irreguläre Migranten in Spanien und anderen Ländern der EU würde seine Landsleute in besonderem Maße betreffen. Angesichts der tiefen Konjunkturkrise der spanischen Wirtschaft seit 2008 bleibt aller-dings abzuwarten, wie sich die Situation der Migranten mit einem regulären Aufenthalts-status entwickelt. Befristete Aufenthaltsgenehmigungen sind zumeist an ein Beschäfti-gungsverhältnis gebunden – dauerhafte Arbeitslosigkeit kann also auch zu einer Gefähr-dung des Aufenthaltsstatus führen. Die Integration der Migranten aus Lateinamerika in den spanischen Arbeitsmarkt weist einige Charakteristika auf, die sie von anderen Migrantengruppen unterscheiden. Im Jahr

39

“Vulnerabilidad.” De Lucas, (Fn. 33) S. 245. 40

Bernales Ballesteros, (Fn. 21), S. 240. 41

Gómez Ciriano et al., (Fn. 29), S. 92. 42

Ebd. 43

Morales bezeichnete das Regelwerk, das unter anderem eine Abschiebehaft für Irreguläre von bis zu 18 Monaten vorsieht, als eine „Richtlinie der Schande“ („directiva de la vergüenza“). Vgl. http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/international/newsid_7445000/7445052.stm (28.07.2010).


200844

waren 74,67 % der sozialversicherungspflichtig Beschäftigten im regulären Sozial-versicherungssystem (Régimen General de la Seguridad Social) angemeldet. 5,29 % fielen unter das System für den Agrarbereich (Régimen Especial Agrario), 15,48 % waren in dem System für Beschäftigte in privaten Haushalten registriert. (Régimen Especial de Emplea-dos del Hogar) Zum Vergleich: Von den marokkanischen Beschäftigten waren im gleichen Jahr nur 57,82 % im regulären, jedoch 34,48 % im System für den Agrarbereich angemel-det. Sozialversicherungspflichtige Jobs in Haushalten machten bei dieser Gruppe nur 1,23 % der Beschäftigungsverhältnisse aus. Betrachtet man die Verteilung in den Beschäf-tigungssektoren, die dem regulären Sozialversicherungssystem zugeordnet sind, werden die Unterschiede noch deutlicher. 75,45 % der Lateinamerikaner waren im Dienstleistungs-sektor beschäftigt, gegenüber 55,74 % der marokkanischen Migranten. Diese waren dage-gen zu 28,03 % im Baugewerbe angemeldet, von den Lateinamerikanern waren es 15,19 %. Unter den einzelnen nationalen Kollektiven der lateinamerikanischen Migranten ist eben-falls eine Spezifizierung zu konstatieren. Bolivianer und Ecuadorianer sind überproportio-nal in der Landwirtschaft und in der Bauwirtschaft vertreten, während die große Mehrheit der Argentinier ihr Auskommen im Dienstleistungssektor gefunden hat. E. Los inmigrantes preferidos? Politik, Recht und öffentliche Meinung

Migrationsprozesse sind stets das Ergebnis eines Zusammenspiels aus Push- und Pullfakto-ren, also den Umständen, die im Herkunftsland und im Zielland auf die Migrationsent-scheidung einwirken. Zu den Pull-Faktoren gehören konjunkturelle Faktoren, etwa die Nachfragesituation in bestimmten Segmenten des Arbeitsmarktes, genauso wie strukturelle Faktoren, beispielsweise einreise- und aufenthaltsrechtliche Bestimmungen. Aspekte wie gemeinsame Sprache, Religion, kulturelle Nähe etc. können ebenfalls eine wichtige Rolle spielen, insbesondere dann, wenn sie die Migrationspolitik des Aufnahmelandes beeinflus-sen.

45

Im Folgenden sollen nun diejenigen Faktoren untersucht werden, die Migration aus Lateinamerika nach Spanien gegenüber der aus anderen Regionen begünstigen. Daran wird sich die Diskussion der Frage anschließen, ob tatsächlich von einer Politik der Bevorzu-gung gesprochen werden kann und welche Rolle dabei das Bewusstsein einer gemeinsamen Geschichte oder Konzepte wie das der Hispanidad spielen.

44

Alle Angaben zum 31.12.2008. Vgl. Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración, Secretaria de Estado de Inmigración y Emigración, (Fn. 34).

45 Vgl. Friedrich Heckmann, Dominique Schnapper, Introduction, in: Dies. (Hrsg.), The Integration

of Immigrants in European Societies. National Differences and Trends of Convergence, Stuttgart 2003, S. 9-14.


I. Rechtliche Rahmenbedingungen

Lateinamerikanische Migranten haben gegenüber Zuwanderern aus anderen Regionen verschiedene rechtliche Vorteile: • Abkommen über doppelte Staatsangehörigkeit: Im Rahmen der franquistischen Außen-politik gegenüber Lateinamerika wurden solche Abkommen mit einer Reihe von Staaten geschlossen (mit Argentinien im Jahr 1969, Bolivien 1961, Chile 1958, Costa Rica 1964, Ecuador 1964, Guatemala 1961, Honduras 1966, Paraguay 1959, Peru 1959, Dominikani-sche Republik 1968, mit Kolumbien erst 1979). Die Entscheidung für eine Einbürgung in Spanien fällt für Migranten aus diesen Ländern leichter, da die alte Staatsbürgerschaft nicht aufgegeben werden muss.

46

• Präferentieller Zugang zur spanischen Staatsbürgerschaft. Lateinamerikaner haben allge-mein vereinfachten Zugang zur spanischen Staatsbürgerschaft. Kinder von Spaniern kön-nen die Staatsbürgerschaft sofort beantragen, das gleiche gilt seit 2003 auch für die direkten Nachfahren von lateinamerikanischen Bürgern, die früher die spanische Staatsbürgerschaft besessen haben (españoles de orígen).

47 Nachfahren in der zweiten Generation können die

Einbürgerung schon nach einem Jahr Aufenthalt in Spanien beantragen (españoles de residencia). Lateinamerikaner ohne spanische Vorfahren können nach zwei Jahren regulä-rem Aufenthalt in Spanien eingebürgert werden. Alle übrigen Migranten müssen vor der Einbürgerung mindestens zehn Jahre regulär in Spanien gelebt haben. Hier wird die „klare ethnische Grundausrichtung“

48 des spanischen Staatsbürgerschaftsrechts deutlich. Auch die

Statistik zeigt, dass Lateinamerikaner einen überproportionalen Anteil an der Zahl der Einbürgerungen haben. 2006 entfielen 82,52 % aller Einbürgerungen auf dieses Kollektiv, für den Zeitraum 1991-2001, also noch vor dem Boom der lateinamerikanischen Zuwande-rung, waren es 59 % aller konzedierten Einbürgerungen.

49

• Visumsfreiheit: Auch nach der Angleichung der Einreisebestimmungen an die der übrigen Schengen-Staat benötigten Angehörige lateinamerikanischer Staaten kein Visum, um nach Spanien einzureisen. Diese Regelung wurde erst in den Jahren 2001 bis 2003, also in der Hochphase des Migrationsbooms, für die wichtigsten Herkunftsländer (Kolumbien, Kuba, Ecuador, Peru und Dominikanische Republik) ausgesetzt.

46

Federación Iberoamericana de Ombudsman, I. Informe sobre Derechos humanos. Migraciones, Madrid 2003, S. 150.

47 Vgl. Andreu Domingo, Tras la retórica de la hispanidad: la migración latinoamericana en España

entre la complementariedad y la exclusión, in: Papers de demografia, Nº. 254 (2005). 48

Axel Kreienbrink, Länderprofil Spanien, Focus Migration Nr. 6, August 2008, S. 7. http://www. focus-migration.de/typo3_upload/groups/3/focus_Migration_Publikationen/Laenderprofile/LP_ 06_Spanien-08.pdf (23.07.2010).

49 Domingo, (Fn. 47), S. 4.


II. Politische Rahmenbedingungen

Die Zuwanderungspolitik der spanischen Regierungen hat in den vergangenen Jahren versucht, dem Phänomen der massenhaften irregulären Migration über rein polizeiliche Maßnahmen hinaus mit zwei Ansätzen zu begegnen. Zum einen erhielten irreguläre Migranten in regelmäßigen Abständen die Gelegenheit, ihre aufenthaltsrechtliche Situation zu regularisieren. Zum anderen wurden die Möglichkeiten einer regulären Arbeitsmigration ausgeweitet. Von beiden Politiken konnten lateinamerikanische Migranten überproportio-nal profitieren. In den beiden großen Regularisierungsprozessen, die die konservative Regierung von José María Aznar in den Jahren 2000 und 2001 organisierte, wurden 58,7 % der Antrags-steller anerkannt – unter den Lateinamerikanern betrug diese Quote 76,7 %.

50 Auch von

der bislang größten Maßnahme dieser Art, die von der sozialistischen Regierung 2005 unter der programmatischen Bezeichnung „Prozess der Normalisierung des Status ausländischer Arbeiter“

51 durchgeführt wurde, konnten die irregulären Arbeitsmigranten aus Lateiname-

rika besonders profitieren. Auch in der Frage des regulären Zugangs auf den spanischen Arbeitsmarkt befinden sich die Migranten aus Lateinamerika in einer relativ guten Position: 2001 beschloss die spanische Regierung das Programm GRECO

52, das u.a. als Grundlage für eine Reihe von

bilateralen Abkommen über Arbeitsmigration mit Ländern dienen sollte, die nach politi-schen, ökonomischen und kulturellen Motiven ausgewählt wurden. Die ersten Abkommen wurden 2001 mit Ecuador, Kolumbien und Marokko geschlossen (letzteres jedoch auf-grund der politischen Spannungen erst 2005 ratifiziert). Es folgten weitere Verträge mit der Dominikanischen Republik (2002), Polen, Rumänien und Bulgarien (2003). Mit der signi-fikanten Ausnahme des Abkommens mit Marokko, das auf dessen damaligen Status als wichtigstes Herkunftsland zurückgeht, war der Versuch der konservativen Regierung unverkennbar, mit diesen Abkommen Migrationsströme nach einem Konzept der „kultu-rellen Nähe“

53 zu leiten. Die direkte Wirksamkeit dieser Abkommen war begrenzt. Zwi-

schen 2001 und 2005 wurden beispielsweise nur rund 2000 ecuadorianische Arbeits-migranten im Rahmen des bilateralen Abkommens vermittelt. Im Rahmen des Abkommens

50

Izquierdo Escribano et al., (Fn. 2), S. 19. 51

“Proceso de normalización documental de trabajadores extranjeros.“ Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales, Secretaría de Estado de Inmigración y Emigración. Boletín estadístico de extranjería e inmigración, Número 7, Enero 2006, S. 3. http://extranjeros.mtin.es/es/ InformacionEstadistica/Boletines/Archivos/Boletin-Num-07-Web.pdf (27.07.2010)

52 “Programa Global de Regularización y Coordinación de Extranjería y de Inmigración.” Kreien-

brink, (Fn. 15), S. 436-444. 53

“Proximidad cultural.” Axel Kreienbrink, Inmigración e integración social de los inmigrantes en España entre consenso y enfrentamiento político, in: Walther L Bernecker / Günther Maihold (Hrsg.), España: del consenso a la polarización. Cambios en la democracia española, Madrid, Frankfurt 2007, S. 259.


zwischen Kolumbien und Spanien erhielten im gleichen Zeitraum 16.000 Kolumbianer eine befristete Arbeitserlaubnis.

54 Allerdings kommen auch die übrigen Instrumente zur Steue-

rung der Arbeitsmigration – jährliche Kontingente für bestimmte Beschäftigungen, Saison-arbeit – vornehmlich den Ländern zugute, mit denen ein solches bilaterales Abkommen besteht.

55

III. Öffentliche Meinung

Verschiedene Autoren56

haben darauf hingewiesen, dass Umfragen immer wieder die Prä-ferenz eines großen Teils der spanischen Bevölkerung für Migranten aus Lateinamerika gegenüber Zuwanderern aus anderen Weltregionen ergeben haben: „Sie werden von den Unternehmern und den Politikern, von den Einwohner der Stadtviertel, den katholischen Organisationen und von den Lehrern in den Schulen bevorzugt.“

57 Dabei stellen die ge-

meinsame Sprache und die in der kollektiven Vorstellung der Aufnahmegesellschaft weit verbreitete Idee der kulturellen Nähe die wichtigsten Faktoren für diese positive Wahrneh-mung der lateinamerikanischen Migration dar. Gleichzeitig wurde eine verstärkte Zuwande-rung aus Lateinamerika auch vielfach als eine Möglichkeit wahrgenommen, die Abhängig-keit von marokkanischer Arbeitskraft in bestimmten Wirtschaftszweigen zu verringern und damit letztendlich auch dem „kulturellen Zusammenstoß mit einer anderen Religion“

58 aus

dem Weg zu gehen. Die positive Bezugnahme auf die lateinamerikanische Migration und die Betonung der sprachlichen und kulturellen Nähe ging stets einher mit einem impliziten Ressentiment gegenüber Migranten aus anderen Regionen.

59 Auf der politischen Ebene

wurde diese gesellschaftliche Präferenz gegenüber lateinamerikanischen Migranten in einen Diskurs integriert, der „eine klare Bevorzugung für die Migranten aus dieser Region im Namen der historischen und sprachlichen Gemeinschaft, wie sie in der hispanidad verkör-pert wird“

60, einschloss.

Der Verweis auf das Konzept der hispanidad findet sich im offiziellen Diskurs der Regierung normalerweise zwar nicht, gleichwohl wird das Thema der lateinamerikanischen Migration stets in den Kontext der Iberoamerikanischen Staatengemeinschaft gestellt, mithin also der demokratisch recycelten Version der hispanidad. Unter dem Titel „Vereint

54

Günther Müssig, Acuerdos y Programas de Migración Temporal, in: Secretaría General Ibero-americana, (Fn. 21), S. 370.

55 Marta Rodríguez Tarduchi, Acuerdos y Programas de Migración Temporal, in: ebd., S. 389.

56 Domingo, (Fn. 47), Izquierdo Escribano et al., (Fn. 2).

57 “Los prefieren los empresarios y los políticos, los vecinos del barrio, las organizaciones católicas y

los maestros en los colegios.” Izquierdo Escribano et al., (Fn. 2), S. 3. 58

“Choque cultural con otra religión.” Ebd. 59

Domingo, (Fn. 47), S. 2. 60

“Una clara preferencia por los migrantes procedentes de ese territorio en nombre de la comunidad histórica y lingüística que supone la hispanidad.” Ebd., S. 19.


durch Migration: Iberoamerikanische Konferenz über Migration und Entwicklung“61

fand im Sommer 2006 ein großes Symposium zu diesem Thema in Madrid statt. Ein Jahr zuvor hatte die Konferenz der iberoamerikanischen Staats- und Regierungschefs auf ihrem Gip-feltreffen in Salamanca dem iberoamerikanischen Generalsekretariat das Mandat für die Vorbereitung einer solchen Konferenz erteilt. Marta Rodríguez Tarduchi, zu diesem Zeit-punkt Generaldirektorin für Immigration im damaligen Ministerium für Arbeit und soziale Angelegenheiten

62, hat auf dieser Bezugsrahmen der spanischen Migrationspolitik gegen-

über Lateinamerika umrissen:63

Diese historischen Überlegungen, die im Kontext der iberoamerikanischen Gemeinschaft ange-stellt werden, müssen an die Solidarität und die Gastfreundschaft vieler Länder Lateinamerikas erinnern, die vor noch nicht allzu langer Zeit viele Tausend wirtschaftliche und politische Migranten aus Spanien großzügig empfangen haben, die vor einer feindlichen Gegenwart flohen und in Amerika Unterstützung und Chancen vorfanden. Die notwendige Bestimmtheit der Politik und die Verpflichtung, die Migrationströme kontrolliert und geordneten zu verwalten, dürfen in Bezug auf die iberoamerikanische Gemeinschaft nicht dazu führen, dass wir diese gemeinsame Geschichte vergessen, die Bindungen zwischen beiden Küsten des Atlantiks geschaffen hat, wel-che die konkreten historischen Konjunkturen, die die einzelnen Gesellschaften durchlaufen, trans-zendieren.

Beide Elemente dieser Stellungnahme – die spanische Emigration nach Lateinamerika und die alles überwölbende gemeinsame Geschichte – bilden den Rahmen, in dem sich die spanische Migrationspolitik gegenüber Lateinamerika entwickelt hat. Die Lateinamerikani-sierung der Migration nach Spanien hat hier ihre Wurzeln. F. Fazit

Die Migration aus Lateinamerika gleicht in Form und Verlauf in vielerlei Hinsicht den Zuwanderungen aus anderen Regionen nach Spanien. Die Kombination von Push-Fakto-ren, die in den Herkunftsländern große Gruppen von Menschen zur Migration getrieben hat, ist in vielen Fällen eine ähnliche. Das gilt auch für eine Reihe von Pull-Faktoren, allen

61

“Unidos por las migraciones. Encuentro Iberoamericano sobre Migración y desarrollo.” Vgl. Fn. 22.

62 Inzwischen hat sich Denomination geändert: die neue Bezeichnung lautet „Ministerium für Arbeit

und Immigration“ (Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración). 63

“Esta reflexión histórica, formulada en el contexto de la comunidad iberoamericana, no puede dejar de evocar la solidaridad y la hospitalidad de tantos países de América Latina que, no hace tantos años, recibieron con generosidad la inmigración económica y el exilio político de miles y miles de españoles que huían de una realidad hostil y dramática y encontraron en América solidaridad y oportunidades. El rigor en la determinación de las políticas y el imperativo de gestionar controlada y ordenadamente los flujos migratorios no pueden, cuando hablamos de la comunidad iberoamericana hacernos olvidar esta historia común que establece entre ambas orillas del Atlántico vínculos que trascienden las coyunturas históricas concretas por las que atraviesen unas y otras sociedades.” Rodríguez Tarduchi, (Fn. 55), S. 385.


voran die lange Zeit ungebremste Nachfrage in bestimmten Segmenten des spanischen Arbeitsmarktes. Die lateinamerikanische Migration wurde darüber hinaus durch rechtliche, politische und gesellschaftliche Rahmenbedingungen spezifisch gefördert, die den regelrechten Boom um die Jahrtausendwende erst ermöglichten. Strukturelle Faktoren wie günstige Einreise- und Aufenthaltsbestimmungen, aber auch die gemeinsame Sprache und die relativ hohe Akzeptanz in der Aufnahmegesellschaft erwiesen sich als mächtige Sogfaktoren, die inner-halb weniger Jahre zu einer massenhaften Zuwanderung aus Lateinamerika führten. Spä-testens ab der Jahrtausendwende wurde diese Dynamik durch eine aktive Politik der Regie-rung noch verstärkt: Die Unterzeichnung von bilateralen Abkommen mit den wichtigsten Entsendeländern, die Änderung des Staatsbürgerschaftsrechts 2003 und die Bevorzugung von Lateinamerikanern in den verschiedenen Regularisierungsprozessen spricht dafür, dass die Migranten aus Lateinamerika tatsächlich als die „preferidos del siglo XXI“

64 betrachtet

wurden – wenn auch nicht als die einzigen, wie die ebenfalls geförderte Zuwanderung von Migranten aus Mittelosteuropa belegt. Dabei ist hervorzuheben, dass die Regierung mit ihrer Politik die Präferenz von großen Teilen der Gesellschaft für eine Zuwanderung aus Lateinamerika aufgegriffen und verstärkt hat. Für die klare Vorliebe, die die Spanier nach allen Umfragen den Migranten aus Lateinamerika gegenüber denen aus anderen Regionen entgegen bringen, dürfte das Bewusstsein der gemeinsamen Geschichte oder gar eine Wert-schätzung der hispanidad nur eine untergeordnete Rolle spielen. Vielmehr sind es die gemeinsame Sprache und die kulturelle Nähe auf der einen und ein mehr oder minder bewusstes Ressentiment gegenüber den Marokkanern und noch allgemeiner gegenüber der erinnerungsmächtigen Figur des moro auf der anderen Seite, die diese Präferenz konstituie-ren. Für die Lateinamerikaner bedeutet ihr kulturelles Kapital einen wesentlichen Vorteil bei der Integration in die Aufnahmegesellschaft. Dabei sollte aber nicht vergessen werden, dass die relativ reibungslose Absorption der Migranten in den spanischen Arbeitsmarkt die ungleich wichtigere Integrationsvoraussetzung war – sollte diese im Kontext der wirt-schaftlichen Krise wegfallen, könnte sich auch das relative Wohlwollen der spanischen Gesellschaft gegenüber den latinos rasch verflüchtigen. Das Bewusstsein der gemeinsamen Geschichte mag historische Konjunkturen überdauern. Die durch Sprache und Kultur geförderte Akzeptanz der Aufnahmegesellschaft für eine bestimmte Migrantengemeinde könnte dagegen empfindlich auf wirtschaftliche Konjunkturen reagieren.

64

Izquierdo Escribano et al., (Fn. 2), S. 1.

349

Squatters' Rights and the Land Laws in Tanzania

By Kennedy Gastorn, Dar es Salaam* 1. Land Tenure Regime in Tanzania

Tanzania has a pluralist legal regime. Two set of laws exist governing land tenure in the country, namely statutory and customary laws. Statutory laws are those contained in the Land Act, 1999, while the framework of customary law is now under the Village Land Act, 1999.

1 Two sets of tenure derived from the above structure are the ‘granted right of occu-

pancy’ under the Land Act, 1999, and ‘customary right of occupancy’ under the Village Land Act, 1999. The two sets of tenure are combined together as a ‘right of occupancy’.

2

The right of occupancy system traces its root back to the British colonial regime. After the defeat of Germany in the World War I, and in accordance with Article 119 of the Ver-sailles Treaty of 1919,

3 Germany was forced to surrender all her foreign possessions

including the colony of German East Africa.4 Tanganyika (then the larger part of German

East Africa) was put under British rule as a mandate, and later a trust territory, under the supervision of the League of Nations. British rule proceeded to install a new land tenure regime that best suited its needs. In 1920 and 1922 parts of English common law were declared to be applicable in the territory.

5 The concept of squatting, together with other

English and common law doctrines thus entered the country. In 1923 British rule enacted

* Kennedy Gastorn, LL.B (Hons), LL.M (Dar), Dr. jur. (Bayreuth) teaches in the Department of Public Law at the Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam. He is also the Associate Dean (Administration and Public Affairs) of the Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam, and the Coordinator of the Tanzanian-German Centre for Postgraduate Studies in Law at the Faculty of Law University of Dar es Salaam in cooperation with the University of Bayreuth. His research interests include the areas of land law and family law. E-mail: [email protected]

1 The two laws were enacted in 1999 but came into force with effect from 1st May 2001 via Govern-

ment Notices No. 485 and 486 of 2000. 2 On these distinctions also see Ulrike Wanitzek, Land Law and Legal Pluralism in Tanzania:

Security of Customary land Tenure?, in: Jakob Rösel, et al (eds.), The Reorganisation or the End of Constitutional Liberties?, Köln 2005, pp. 188-192.

3 Signed on June 28th, 1919 at Versailles.

4 More on land laws in German East Africa see Harald Sippel, Aspects of Colonial Land Law in

German East Africa: Germany East Africa Company, Crown Land Ordinance, European Planta-tions and Reserved Areas for Africans, in: Robert Debusmann, et al (eds.) Land Law and Land Ownership in Africa Case Studies from Colonial and contemporary Cameroon and Tanzania, Bayreuth 1996, pp. 3-38.

5 Order in Council 1920 and Reception Clause [Land (Law of Property and Conveyancing) Ordi-

nance No. 2 of 1923, Cap 114]


the Land Ordinance specifically to deal with land in the territory.6 The ordinance intro-

duced the right of occupancy system. Essentially this is a system where the radical title on land remains in the state but people are granted rights to use and occupy land for a certain period of time under certain conditions. These rights are called ‘granted rights of occu-pancy’. At the enactment of the ordinance the assumption was that the indigenous people had no ownership over land. Communal or group-based ownership of land was unknown to British rule.

7 The Land Ordinance declared all land whether occupied or unoccupied as

public lands vested in His Majesty, the King of England,8 giving the state a free hand to

control and alienate indigenous lands, unencumbered by any legal obligations.9 The mean-

ing of the right of occupancy was conveniently enlarged in 1928 to include customary tenure as a deemed right of occupancy

10 as an outcome of the criticisms of the Permanent

Mandates Commission of the League of Nations that customary land rights of indigenous people had been left out in the Ordinance. Right of occupancy tenure still exists today.

11

2. Squatters under Common and English Law

A squatter has been defined as one who settles on the lands of others, including public land, without any legal authority.

12 Squatting is therefore an act of occupying land, not necessar-

ily unused land, without any tenurial rights over the land. It is assumed to be the oldest mode of tenure in the world. A squatter acquires title to land through adverse possession and that is why adverse possession is also called ‘squatters’ rights’. Possession is important under English law because the fact of possession of land entitles a person to retain the land against anyone in the world except someone who has

6 Ordinance No. 3 of 1923. More on the Land Ordiance also see Roland E. Richter, Land Law in

Tanganyika since the British Military Occupation and under the British Mandate of the League of Nations, 1916-1946, in: Robert Debusmann, et al (eds.) Land Law and Land Ownership in Africa Case Studies from Colonial and contemporary Cameroon and Tanzania, Bayreuth 1996, pp 39-80; Kennedy Gastorn, The Impact of Tanzania’s New Land Laws on the Customary Land Rights of Pastoralists A case Study of the Simanjiro and Bariadi Districts, Zurich 2008, pp. 27-32.

7 Kwame Akuffo, The Conception of Land Ownership in African Customary Law and its Implica-

tions for Development, African Journal of International and Comparative Law, 17 (2009), p. 66. 8 Sections 2, 3 and 4 of the Land Ordinance, Cap 113.

9 Issa Shivji, Not Yet Democracy: Reforming Land Tenure in Tanzania, Dar es Salaam 1998, p. 2.

10 Land (Amendment) Ordinance No. 7 of 1928.

11 More on conflicts between granted and deemed (customary) right of occupancy see Fauz Twaib,

The Dilemma of the Customary Landholder. The Conflict between Customary and Statutory Rights of Occupancy in Tanzania, in: Robert Debusmann, et al (eds.) Land Law and Land Owner-ship in Africa Case Studies from Colonial and contemporary Cameroon and Tanzania, Bayreuth 1996, pp. 81-112.

12 http://www.lectlaw.com/def2/s172.htm (accessed in July 2009)

Gastorn, Squatters' Rights and the Land Laws in Tanzania 351

superior title.13

That is why the law puts a period of limitation upon which the holder of better title may recover or bring an action for recovery of land.

14 After that period, a squat-

ter has the right to remain in possession, having acquired a good possessory title, and old title becomes obsolete and its claim stale.

15 Apart from the factual possession, which is

normally demonstrated by a degree of exclusive physical control,16

a squatter must prove the requisite intention to possess the land to the exclusion of all others, including the owner with the paper title (animus possidendi).

17

Following the enactment of the Land Registration Act 2002, distinction has been made between registered and unregistered land as far as adverse possession is concerned.

18 In

order for a squatter to obtain title to registered land, the squatter may, after being in adverse possession for ten years, apply to the land registry to be registered as owner. The land registry must then respond by sending a notice to the registered proprietor and others with registered interests in land informing them that an application has been made by the squat-ter. They are given 65 working days in which to object to registration of the squatter as proprietor, and generally, only if there are no objections, the squatter will be registered as having title to the land at this stage. It has been argued that these provisions are an emas-culation of adverse possession in relation to registered land, signalling the end of adverse possession as a threat to the security of registered title, save in cases where the registered owner genuinely has no use for the land and does not wish to keep it. The system of regis-tered land moves from title by registration to registration of title.

19

It needs to be noted that the law of limitation was unknown to common law.20

Many rationales exist behind the law of limitation. It is in the public interest that a person who has been in undisputed possession be able to manage the land as its owner. Established and peaceable possession is therefore protected by law instead of law assisting the agitation of old claims. ‘Long dormant claims have often more cruelty than justice in them’,

21 and those

who ‘go to sleep upon their claims should not be assisted by the courts in recovering their

13

J. G. Riddal, Land Law, London 1997, p. 468. 14

12 years, according to the Limitation Act 1980, Land Registration Act 1925 and Land Registra-tion Act 2002.

15 Joy Harcup, Green and Henderson: Land Law, London 1995, p. 207.

16 Charles Harpum, et.al., The Law of Real Property, London 2000, p. 1308.

17 Harcup, note 15, p. 216.

18 Charles Harpum, et al., The Law of Real Property, London 2008, pp. 1411 – 1414; Lorna Fox

O’Mahony, et al., Taxonomies of Squatting: Unlawful Occupation in a New Legal Order, The Modern Law Review, 71 (2008), pp. 878-911.

19 O’Mahony, note 18, p. 891.

20 Harpum, note 18, p. 1409.

21 Court v. Cross (1825) 3 Bing. 329, in: Harpum, note 18, p. 1409.


property (a duty of stewardship)’.22

It is also important that a civil litigation should have an end. Moreover, since possession is the basis of unregistered title, limitation facilitates the investigation of title to unregistered land. On the other hand, some people do have a strong moral stance on the immorality of squatting. It is argued that since the basis of adverse possession is wrongful possession, legitimizing it is tantamount to sanctioning theft of land, it is not logical that illegal possession can prevail over legitimate ownership (de facto v. de jure).

23 Limitation needs to be distinguished from prescription. The latter rests on the

presumption of right and not a wrongful possession which is the basis of limitation. Also prescription is primarily a common law doctrine by which a certain incorporeal rights such as easements are acquired over land of others.

24

3. Evolution of the Concept of Squatting in Tanzania

Colonial laws and policies brought the concept of squatters to Tanzania. Likewise, colonial legal practice and colonial activities created a class of people occupying land without title to land. The majority of Africans who lived in towns during colonial time were squatters. The colonial government removed Africans from certain sections of towns and placed strict conditions on them for remaining in town.

25 Even some richer Africans who could afford to

acquire, and build on, urban plots, preferred to build outside the towns where they were free of the tough and peculiar township building and health regulations under which Afri-cans were allowed to settle in towns.

26 In British colonial days it was also the practice that

upon the extension of city or town boundaries, urban lands ceased to be subject to native law and custom upon payment of compensation to the former holders who were affected by the order. Those who remained within the urban boundaries came to be called squatters.

27

Interestingly, the law of limitation was not applicable to the government because squatters could be evicted at the will of the government at any time. As it was held in Muhena Bin Said v. Registrar of Titles

28, the doctrine of long possession, which is the basis of adverse

possession, was a creature alien to native law. Therefore squatters in the Tanzanian context differed in certain aspects from his or her counterpart under the English law. Squatters were also created through land alienation. Colonial government acquired huge chunks of fertile land occupied by indigenous people and caused them to search for

22

Streatford J. in R B Policies at Lloyd’s v. Butler [1950] 1 KB 76. Also see E. H. Burn, Land Law: Cases and Materials, London 1986, p. 162.

23 O’Mahony, note 18, p. 982.

24 Harpum, note 18, pp. 1410-1411.

25 More on colonial urban policy in Tanzania see Andrew Burton, African Underclass Urbanisation,

Crime and Colonial Order in Dar es Salaam, Dar es Salaam 2005. 26

East Africa Royal Commission 1953-1955 Report, Cmd 9475, Chapter 19, paras 60-64. 27

Roden William James, Land Tenure and Policy in Tanzania, Dar es Salaam 1971, p. 100. 28

(1948) 16 EACA 399.


alternative land for grazing and cultivation. The absence of paper title reduced customary landholders to no better than squatters. It has to be remembered that the 1923 Land Ordi-nance disowned indigenous people of their land by declaring all land as public land under the control and subject to the disposition of the Governor, and no title to the occupation and use of any such lands shall be valid without the consent of the Governor. Even the amendment of the Land Ordinance which recognised customary title as deemed right of occupancy was only declaratory,

29 which in itself could not safeguard the customary rights

of the indigenous people.30

Occupation of land under customary law was legally construed by courts as permissive in the nature of licences.

31 James argues, nevertheless, that techni-

cally Africans occupying public lands were in lawful occupation of such lands under deemed rights of occupancy, provided they occupy and use such lands in accordance with African law and customs.

32

An artificial shortage of land by dispossessing and denying natives their land rights, not only made them squatters on public land but was also used deliberately to ensure the avail-ability of labour to the colonial plantations. The Land Ordinance provided a legal frame-work for plantation agriculture in Tanzania.

33 Without land, people had nothing but their

labour to be sold for a wage in the plantations. This also happened in many other jurisdic-tions. In Kenya, for instance, by the alienation of land of indigenous people, inhabitants were turned into squatters. Yet the colonial government proceeded to prohibit natives from settling on any land held by Europeans unless bona fide employed by the owner. The rea-son being that ‘the Europeans settlers who have invested their fortunes in the country at the invitation of the British government cannot be blamed for demanding native labour. Put in the same situation, the twelve apostles would not have acted otherwise’.

34 Therefore the

demand for labour could only be satisfied through squatterdom rather than wage labour. Tanganyika independence in 1961 did not greatly change the position of customary landholders. Several colonial practices survived independence, and in land laws the big change was the substitution of the word “Governor” for “President” wherever it appeared.

35

It was for instance still assumed that native law and customs were only applicable in rural areas but not in urban centres where land could not be acquired other than by grants of

29

Land (Amendment) Ordinance No. 7 of 1928. 30

Shivji, note 9, p. 3. 31

Gamaliel Mgongo Fimbo, Land Law Reforms in Tanzania, Dar es Salaam 2004, p. 4. Also see Muhena Bin Said v. Registrar of Titles (1948) 16 EACA 399; Mtoro Bin Mwamba v. A.G. (1953) TLR 327.

32 James, note 27, p. 100.

33 Fimbo, note 31, p. 3.

34 Thabita Kanogo, Squatters and the Roots of Mau Mau 1905 - 63, Nairobi 1987, p. 35. More on

squatters in Kenya also see Karuti Kanyinga, Re-Distribution from Above The Politics of Land Rights and Squatting in Coastal Kenya, Uppsala 2000.

35 Gamaliel Mgongo Fimbo, Essays in Land Law Tanzania, Dar es Salaam 1992, p. 3.


rights of occupancy. Therefore when an area is given urban status customary law ceases to apply, and the former owner who has become a squatter must apply for a granted right of occupancy.

36 In general the Land Ordinance was not entirely unambiguous on the legality

or illegality of Africans’ rights to town lands.37

Other policies of independent government contributed much to the uncontrolled growth of unplanned settlements within and at the fringes of urban centres. This was partly due to the inherited colonial planning laws that could not easily be availed of by the mass of the population because of their over-ambiti-ously legalistic nature,

38 lack of sufficient surveyed plots, bureaucracy in land administra-

tion procedures, the unregulated land market, population increases in urban centres and the uncontrolled alteration of town master plans.

39 The independent government was indeed

vigilant in preventing squatting activities, only it had no capacity to counter the magnitude of the problem. For instance, nearly two weeks after independence the government warned squatters not to continue erecting houses on public land without title because it was deter-mined not to pay them compensation if the government decided to clear the land for public purposes.

40 It even warned squatters that their presence hindered several national develop-

ment projects, citing Tanga region as an example, which had missed two opportunities for industrial establishment due to squatting.

41 Informal landholding cum squatting continued

to exist. In 2002 the Ministry of Lands made it clear that squatting accompanied by occu-pation constituted 18% of the actions by which people accessed land in urban areas in Tanzania.

42 And in 2003/4 it was estimated that 80% of all residential houses in Dar es

Salaam were in the unplanned settlements.43

In 2007, the Minister for Lands clarified that over 70% of urban Tanzanians live in non-surveyed areas, 25% of the population in the country lived in surveyed areas and the housing deficit in urban areas alone was estimated

36

James, note 27, p. 101. 37

James, note 27, p. 103. 38

Town and Country Planning Ordinance, 1956. See Ibrahim Hamisi Juma, et. al., Tanzania: Peri-Urban Land Insecurity in Dar es Salaam, in: Gordon Woodman, et al (eds.), Local Land Law and Globalization A Comparative Study of Peri-Urban Areas in Benin, Ghana and Tanzania, Muenster 2004, pp. 249-255.

39 James, note 27, pp. 100-105; Twaib, note 11, p. 101. For instance in the Guardian (Tanzania),

December 20, 2007, p. 1, the Minister for Lands confessed as being fed up with avalanche of written proposals from district officials seeking to alter the status of open spaces in the master plans.

40 Tanganyika Standard, December 28, 1961, p. 3; Mwafrika, June 19, 1963, p.1.

41 Tanganyika Standard, May 25, 1963, p.1.

42 Salome Sijaona, Land Issues and the National Development Strategy: The Tanzania Experience,

Dar es Salaam 2002, p.7. 43

Instituto Libertad y Democracia, The State and Property Rights: Tanzania Country Report, Lima 2005.


at 1.2 million units.44

To this end, the usage of term ‘squatters’ in its true sense seemed unwelcome and instead terms like ‘unplanned settlements’ and ‘informal landholders’ were preferred. In rural areas, the land tenure confusion caused by the rural development approach of the villagisation programme in the 1970s left millions of customary landholders uncertain of their tenure.

45 Villagisation was a compulsory scheme of resettling people in villages so

that they could produce on a communal or cooperative basis. The main purpose of the villagisation programme was to speed up rural development through agriculture.

46 The

programme hardly took into account contradictions between the existing land tenure system and the new tenure system to be installed in the villages. It created land tenure confusion and, as has been argued, the resulting mass relocation of people into new villages opened up possibilities of alienation of village land on a scale greater than prevalent even during colonial times.

47 Villagers became informal landholders because their title to land was

uncertain. In the villages in question land was not acquired in accordance with either customary law or statutory tenure.

48

It needs to be noted that the government had earlier on, before the villagisation pro-gramme, already embarked on similar resettlement schemes near cities as a way of fighting unemployment in towns. For instance in 1962, a 3,000 acre resettlement area at Tumbi (Kibaha), 24 miles from the city centre of Dar es Salaam, was created to provide a farming livelihood for 200 unemployed persons. The exercise was carried out on a voluntary basis.

49 The government had even threatened that if people continued to stay in towns

without moving to villages to farm,50

it would have no option but to give foreigners land so that they could produce for the benefit of the nation.

51

44

Hon. John P. Magufuli, M.P. See Daily News (Tanzania), December 20, 2007, p.1; The Guardian (Tanzania), December 20, 2007, p.1.

45 United Republic of Tanzania, Report of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Land Mat-

ters, Vol. I, Land Policy and Land Tenure Structure, Uppsala 1994, chapter IV, para 81. On villa-gisation and land tenure also see Wanitzek, note 2, p. 180.

46 Julius Kambarage Nyerere, Freedom and Unity: Uhuru na Umoja, Dar es Salaam 1967, pp. 176-

187, Julius Kambarage Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism: Uhuru na Ujamaa, Dar es Salaam 1974, pp. 337-366.

47 Shivji, note 9, p. 12.

48 S. 15 Village Land Act has clarified this point that the tenure was customary.

49 Tanganyika Standard, August 23, 1962, p. 4.Also see The Nationalist August 5, 1964, p. 2. Tan-

ganyika Standard, May 10, 1963, p. 1. 50

‘Kupasua Mbuga na Kulima’. 51

Mwafrika, February 7, 1962, p.1.


4. Courts Articulation of the Concept of Squatters in Tanzania

British colonial land tenure structures survived independence. The system continued to apply with minor modifications to suit the needs of the new government. Therefore the concept of squatters remained although not applied as before. Since the concept was used politically against the interests of the natives during colonial days, and therefore resisted by natives, the independent courts had a different approach to it, particularly in relation to African rights on town lands. In Metthuselah Paul Nyagwaswa v. Christopher Mbote Nyirabu

52, one issue was

whether, once an urban area is declared a planning area, existing customary rights become extinct. As noted above, the practice during colonial times was that upon the extension of city or town boundaries, urban lands ceased to be subject to native law and custom upon payment of compensation to the former holders affected by the order. Those who remained within the urban boundaries came to be called squatters. The court resolutely held that:

“…the law in Tanzania on land and land tenure is still developing and certain areas are unclear and would have to await the necessary legislation. At any rate I am not prepared, on the rather inconclusive and tenuous arguments advanced in this appeal, to hold that the right of a holder of a right of occupancy by virtue of native law and custom is extinguished and he thereby becomes a squatter on an area being declared a planning area”.

Since the law was still developing, the court avoided giving a clear verdict on the issue. This might imply that given other conditions, such as compensation being paid, a land-holder may be a squatter. Later, in Mwalimu Omari and Another v. Omari A. Bilali,

53the

court considered the assumptions on squatters in view of the status of customary tenure holders in urban or town areas. The court held that:

“Title under customary law and a granted right of occupancy in an area declared township or minor settlement cannot co-exist. Title to urban land depends on grant. Once an area is declared an urban planning area and land is surveyed and plot demarcated whoever occupies land under customary law has to be quick to apply for right of occupancy. If such person sleeps on such right and the plot is given to another, he becomes a squatter in law and would have to move away; he strictly would not be entitled to anything“.

The court had the advantage of the judgment in the Nyangaswa case above. The court clarified the decision in Nyangaswa’s case as follows:

“What Mustafa J.A. said in Nyangaswa's case is that after an area is declared urban planning area, a squatter or a person holding title under customary law continues to enjoy some rights, e.g. com-pensation but this was not superior to that of a holder of right of occupancy. Squatters have a right of facing authorities for fast registration if they comply with set down rules. If they do not do so and someone is granted the plot, they can only be compensated for unexhausted improvement”.

52

Metthuselah Paul Nyagwaswa v. Christopher Mbote Nyirabu (1985) TLR 103. 53

Mwalimu Omari and Another v. Omari A. Bilali 1990 (TLR) 9.


In this regard, a squatter is as good as a person holding customary tenure in a planning area. Also a customary landholder, once an area is declared a planning area, becomes a squatter with two rights, namely right for compensation for unexhausted improvements, and right to be considered first for new title upon application for the same. In Rashid Makwamba & 1016 others v. Kilombero Sugar Co. Ltd,

54 villagers settled

and occupied a piece of land for a number of years. It was later discovered that the land in question belonged to one legal person under title, although it was unused land. Villagers were sued for trespassing on the land in question. The villagers disputed the claim as they had occupied the land for a long period of time. The court held against the villagers that they were squatters having intruded and trespassed on the land, and had no rights whatso-ever but to vacate the area. At this juncture, a squatter as a person holding land without any tenurial rights over the land needs to be distinguished from a person holding land in a surveyed or planning area by virtue of being the former occupier of the land under custom-ary law. A clear distinction between the two is put by Twaib.

55 According to Twaib, a

person on land without tenurial rights is a squatter per se, not entitled to compensation and his or her occupation is merely permissive, he or she therefore having no right to continue staying on a piece of land after it has been allocated to someone else.

56 But for the previous

holder in customary law, his or her rights remain legally recognized until they are lawfully acquired.

57

5. National Land Policy and Squatters

Tanzania put in place, for the first time, the National Land Policy in 1995 as a policy framework upon which new land laws should be modeled, and all persons exercising powers under, applying or interpreting the laws should have regard to. The National Land Policy provides that;

(a) The existing [squatter] areas will not be cleared, but will be upgraded and provided with facilities for adequate sanitation and other services except for unplanned housing in hazardous

areas.58

(b) Residents in unplanned urban settlements shall have their rights recorded and maintained by

the relevant land allocating authority and that record will be registered.59

54

For example see Rashid Makwamba & 1016 others v. Kilombero Sugar Co. Ltd, Land Case No. 15 of 2003, High Court of Tanzania (Land Division) at Dar es Salaam (unreported).

55 Twaib, note 11, p. 98.

56 Pancras Alexander v. R (1981) TLR 92.

57 Suzan Kakubukubu v. Walwa Joseph Kasubi, High Court of Tanzania at Mwanza, Civil Case No.

13 of 1987 (unreported). 58

National Land Policy, para 6.4.1 (iii & iv) 59

National Land Policy, para 4.2.22.(iii).


(c) The land rights of peri-urban dwellers will be fully recognized and rights of occupancy

issued.60

Also the Human Settlements Policy of 2000 issued by the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development

61 calls for the need to recognize unplanned settlements and provides

strategies for curbing development and regularisation of the same.

The implications of the above policies may be seen from the fact that the squatter or unplanned settlements phenomena in Tanzania revolve also on the role of the government as a provider of basic social services and the people (squatters) as recipients of the services. This has influenced the juridical and policy approaches to the question, as seen above, and the approaches have defied the English myth that ‘squatters are parasitic deviants who steal people’s houses and constitute a threat to everything decent in society’.

62 The government

is determined to grant squatters in unplanned settlements immediate provision of services such as power and water, and is proceeding to take early steps to check the sprawl of unplanned settlements and not to wait until when it is too late to demolish structures. It has recognized that although squatter areas are unplanned, they nevertheless represent assets both in social and financial terms. Responses seemed to require a balancing of two ques-tions: fault on the part of both the squatter and the government (as virtual land owner) and the hardship likely to be occasioned upon each party in the event of alternative legal out-comes. Four factors may be considered in determining the appropriate legal responses to squatter tenurial land rights in Tanzania:

63 the identity of squatters; the type of property in

question; the squatter’s motives; and the conduct of the land owner. In principle, all squatters in Tanzania are people entitled to any vacant public land. All land belongs to the nation. It is vested in the President as a trustee for the benefit of the citizens.

64 In absence of freehold ownership, land is mainly occupied on condition that it is

developed. This means that citizens can not only move and reside wherever they want but also occupy land anywhere provided they use it.

65 That is why, especially after independ-

ence, the majority moved to towns in search of a better life.66

This political and legal envi-ronment regarding citizens’ rights to occupy land encourages people to make good use of all unused land whether in town, peri-urban or rural areas. What makes them squatters is the absence of formal title to land, mainly by non-compliance with the acquisition proce-dures, planning laws, and uncertainty over the application of customary tenure in urban

60

National Land Policy, para 6.3.1. (iii) 61

Now the Ministry of Lands and Human Settlements Development. 62

O’Mahony, note 18, p. 883 63

Based on the current factors considered significant in the UK, see O’Mahony, note 18, p. 882. 64

National Land Policy, para 4.1.1(i); S. 3(1) Land Act. 65

Nyerere, note 46, pp. 53-58. 66

In colonial time, African were removed or prevented from living in towns. See East Africa Royal Commission 1953-1955 Report, Cmd 9475, Chapter 19, para 60-64; Burton, note 25.


areas. The type of property is generally unused public land. As to the motives of squatters, it ranges from lack of alternative, deliberate acquisition of title to simply mistaking urban boundaries and those of neighbouring villages. Village lands are often engulfed by town boundaries or declared planning areas without sufficient notice to the landholders.

67 Villag-

ers, who later become squatters in law, continue holding their land for they have not been given alternative land or their rights are yet to be lawfully extinguished. They are good faith squatters for they bear no fault in relation to their land occupation.

68 The conduct of the

government here leaves a lot to be desired. Inability of land delivery system and poor plan-ning laws promote the sprawl of unplanned settlements in urban and peri-urban areas. In many cases, the government has deliberately or otherwise failed the duty of stewardship bestowed upon it as the virtual land owner (trustee). 6. The Question of Squatters in Law Drafting Stages

The issue of different classes of squatters with different treatment in the eyes of law came out significantly during the drafting process of the new land laws. As noted above, the Ministry of Lands acknowledged that ‘squatting accompanied by occupation’ constitutes 18% of the ways in which people access land in urban areas in Tanzania.

69 Again the

policy is interested in protecting squatters or informal landholders. It was noted with con-cern that unauthorised market transactions for land had existed for several years and must therefore be recognised and not be ignored or the ‘fiction’ maintained that all people who have ‘paid’ for land have no rights and are only squatters, liable to be dispossessed without compensation at any time.

70

It was then suggested, among other things, that the term ‘squatter’ be defined and also the different classes of squatters be included in the land laws.

71

7. Intervention of Land Laws to the Question of Squatters

Land law provides neither definition nor a classification of squatters. It however contains several schemes to enable squatters cum informal landholders to validate or formalize their tenure.

72 This includes schemes for the ‘validation’ and ‘regularisation’ of interests in land.

67

National Land Policy, para 6.2.0. 68

Under English law, unlike in USA, there is no distinction between good faith trespassers and bad faith trespassers.

69 Sijaona, note 42, p. 7.

70 Patrick McAuslan, Clause-By-Clause Commentary, A Draft Bill, Dar es Salaam 1996, para 10.2.

71 McAuslan, note 70, p.118 (Discussion Group III on Dispute Settlements& Miscellaneous Part

XIII-XIV). 72

Part VII Land Act.


(a) Validation of Interests in Land

The validation scheme applies to disposition of a right or interest in land held under customary or informal tenure irrespective of where the land is located.

73 Disposition is

broadly defined to include sale, mortgage, transfer, grant, partition, exchange, lease, assignment, surrender, disclaimer, creation of an easement, or a usufructuary right.

74 Under

the validation scheme a disposition must have been drawn up between parties who should have but did not obtain a grant of approval from the relevant authority, such as the commis-sioner for lands, or have applied for a grant of approval and having been refused nonethe-less proceeded to carry out that disposition.

75 An occupier of land through this disposition

automatically has two rights. First, his or her occupation is deemed lawful for a period of six years from 2001 (a date of commencement of the Land Act, 1999) or any longer period as the Minister for Lands may determine. Secondly, he or she may apply to the commis-sioner for lands for a certificate of validation of that occupation.

76 With the certificate of

validation, the occupier, if the disposition in question was for transfer of right of occu-pancy, is entitled to apply and obtain a right of occupancy for a period of not less than thirty-three years.

77

Non-application for certificate of validation within the prescribed time would render such interest occupied as a deemed licence, valid and irrevocable until the end of the given six years or more as the case may be.

78 A licence holder within this period of time may

apply for a right of occupancy in accordance with ordinary procedures under the Land Act, 1999.

79 If refused, he or she will be entitled to compensation for the value of the unex-

hausted improvements on land.80

In the premises, it is clear that validation of unauthorised land market transactions that were done under the previous legal regime was a deliberate attempt to redress the symptoms that resulted, as Mutakyamilwa puts it, ‘from a malfunc-tioning government land delivery system partly because of corruption coupled with budget

73

S. 53 Land Act. 74

S. 2 Land Act. 75

S. 53(1) (a) and (b) Land Act. 76

S. 53(2) Land Act. An application for a certificate of validation is done on a prescribed form, accompanied by the prescribed fee, and it must be signed by the applicant or his duly appointed representative or agent, and must contain any other information as may be prescribed or which commissioner for lands may require.

77 S. 53(5) Land Act.

78 S. 54(1) Land Act

79 SS. 24 to 52 Land Act.

80 S. 54(3) Land Act. Unexhausted improvements include anything or qualities permanently attached

to the land directly resulting from the expenditure of capital or labour by an occupier or any per-son acting on his behalf and increasing the productivity capacity, the utility, or the sustainability of its environmental quality and include trees, standing crops and growing produce whether of an agricultural or horticultural nature. See S. 2 Land Act.


limitations that impacted on the capacity to adequately deliver land in urban areas, peri-urban areas and areas with high agricultural potential’.

81

The government was also unable to control illegal sub-division, change of use and occupation of the illegally sold and purchased land in the market. Informal land trans-actions were also fuelled by the fact that government land policy did not facilitate the operation of property markets by allowing people to sell undeveloped land to developers.

82

Bare lands were legally considered as of no value but practically marketable. The National Land Policy now recognizes that land has a value.

83 This is a remarkable shift from the

hypocrisy of the past, to use the words of Twaib, which had even refused to recognize the reality of the land market that has existed for a long time in the country.

84 To this end, the

new land laws through the validation process seek to address this reality by attempting to ‘legalise’ what was ‘illegal’ under the hitherto legal regime, ostensibly to avail tenure secu-rity to ‘squatters cum informal landholders’ as victims of previous land delivery system failure. Indeed, this is a compromise package by the government in its limited capacity to deliver land to citizens and its failure to control the occupation and development of land obtained outside of the established legal framework.

85 The difference between people who

obtain land from outside the established legal framework and squatters is hard to find. (b) Regularization of Interests in Land

Regularisation is a scheme of determining the interests in land which exist in the large unauthorised settlements in and around the urban areas by recording them and allocating tenure security to the occupiers and users of land in those areas. The Land Act categorically provides that the purpose of the regularisation scheme is to facilitate the recording, adjudi-cation, classification and registration of the occupation and use of land by informal land-holders in a given area.

86 The Tanzanian regularisation scheme is designed to apply within

the boundaries of any urban authority or any land in a peri-urban area whether that land is within the boundaries of a village or not.

87 Only the Minister for Lands, suo motto or at the

request of an urban authority or village council, has the power to determine and declare a scheme of regularisation over a particular area. Before declaration, the minister is required first to direct the commissioner for lands to prepare or cause a draft of the scheme to be

81

Fidelis Mutakyamilwa, Harmonisation of Land Markets Development with Tenure Security under the Land Act, 1999 and the Village Land Act, 1999, Dar es Salaam 2005, pp. 174-5.

82 National Land Policy, para 4.2.17.

83 National Land Policy, para 4.1.1 (b).

84 Fauz Twaib, Land Law and the Growth of human Settlement in Tanzania A Research Report,

Recht in Afrika (2000), p. 84. 85

Mutakyamilwa, note 81, p. 176. 86

S. 57(1) Land Act. 87

S. 56 Land Act.


prepared.88

The minister is also responsible for the implementation of the scheme but he may delegate the responsibility to the commissioner or village council depending on where the scheme takes place.

89 According to section 57 of the Land Act

90, the criteria to be taken

into account in determining whether to declare a scheme of regularisation in any area are the following:

(a) whether the area is used substantially for habitation in dwellings of their own construction or dwelling places adapted from buildings abandoned by their former occupiers by persons holding at the will or sufferance of a person having title to the land or as a trespassers;

(b) whether a substantial number of persons living in the area appear to have no apparent lawful title to their use and occupation of land notwithstanding that they have paid for or are paying for the land they are occupying and are managing the land in accordance with rules generally recognised within the area;

(c) whether the land, although part of an urban local authority is occupied under customary land law, where that customary land law is the law of one group of people living in the area;

(d) whether the area is a substantially built-up area;

(e) whether the area has been or is likely to be declared to be a planning area under the Town and Country Planning Act;

(f) whether the area has a substantial number of persons who have lived there for a substantial period of time so that the area is a well established, and settled area from a social point of view;

(g) whether there is evidence that despite the lack of any security of tenure for the persons living in the area, a considerable number of such persons appear to be investing in their houses and businesses and attempting to improve the area through their own initiatives;

(h) whether a substantial number of people and community-based organisations within the area indicate that they wish to participate in a scheme of regularisation; and

(i) such other criteria as may be prescribed or which the Minister considers relevant.

The Land Act provides also that a scheme of regularisation may contain all or any of the following matters:

91

(a) arrangements for the survey, adjudication and recording of the interests in land claimed by those persons occupying land in the regularisation area;

(b) arrangements for the readjustment of the boundaries of plots of land;

(c) arrangements, within the framework of the rights in land provided for under paragraphs (a) and (b) for the better planning and layout of the land, including the pooling, sharing and redistribution of rights in land;

(d) arrangements for the involvement of the local authorities having jurisdiction in the regularisa-tion area in the implementation of the scheme;

88

S. 58 Land Act. 89

S. 60(2) Land Act. 90

S. 57(2) Land Act. 91

S. 60(1) Land Act.


(e) arrangements for the involvement of the people whose land is the subject of the scheme of regularisation in the implementation of the scheme;

(f) arrangements for the assessment and payment of any compensation that may become payable as a result of the implementation of the scheme; and

(g) a budget for the scheme.

At the end of the regularization scheme residents in the area will be issued with rights of occupancy as a formal title to land (tenure). To this end, clearly the idea of regularization is in harmony with the spirit of the National Land Policy of accommodating informal land-holders who are on land without title. Long-standing use of land is the most important thing in this regard. Despite the fact that there are few models of legal regimes for the operation of the regularisation process within Africa, land regularisation is mandated as an appropri-ate policy for dealing with the land and housing problems of the urban poor by the Habitat Agenda.

92 No wonder Fimbo argues that the Tanzanian scheme of regularization is about

squatter upgrading intended to protect members of the petty bourgeoisie93

who have bought vast tracts of land in suburbs and villages on the fringes of urban areas such as the Mlala-kuwa, Makongo, Msewe and Kimara areas of Dar es Salaam City.

94

8. The Future of Squatters’ Land Rights in Tanzania

Squatters have remedial measures (via validation and regularisation of their interests in land) to change their status by formalizing their land tenure. In future it is important that people should avoid living in insecurity by following the required procedures of acquiring and holding land. This presupposes that the government as a land service provider will have done its part. In this regard, the government too has a key role to play in avoiding the future growth of squatters’ areas. As the National Land Policy provides,

95 the government should:

(a) timely plan all the potential areas for urban development in the periphery of all towns,

(b) design special areas for low income housing with simplified building regulations and afford-able level of services,

92

Adopted at the UN HABITAT Summit at Istanbul City in 1996. See Patrick McAuslan, Com-ments About Angolan Land Law Draft, 2003, p. 9. Also available at http://www.dwangola.org/ dwWEB/english/pdf/cedoc_pdf/Angola%20Land%20Law%20-%20of%20the%20Republic%20 of%20Angola%20Patrick%20Mc.pdf.

93 Analytical term describing a social stratum in possession of state power in a post-colonial state; it

includes the national leadership, intellectuals, higher civil servants, higher military and police officers as well as prosperous traders. It is allied to the international bourgeoisie but subordinate to it. See Fimbo, note 31, p. xii.

94 Gamaliel Mgongo Fimbo, State and Property Rights in Tanzania, Dar es Salaam 2005, pp.17, 27;

Fimbo, note 31, p. 37. 95

National Land Policy, para 6.4.1.


(c) make land services readily available, and

(d) upgrade all existing squatter areas and provide them with tenure security and basic social services.

9. Conclusion

Because of its nature, it cannot constitute good public policy to simply protect squatters. As held in Mwalimu Omari and Another v. Omari A. Bilali

96 squatters in the eyes of law

cannot equate themselves to any person holding a title under right of occupancy even where the squatter occupies land under customary law. On the other hand, due to the uncontrolled growth of unplanned settlements in the country, squatting has, albeit de facto, been accepted as a way of accessing land in urban and peri-urban areas. Nearly all houses in urban areas, including those of decision makers, lie in unplanned areas. Hence it is neither practical nor just to call all these people on land without title squatters, let alone attempt to remove these hundreds of thousands of squatters from within or the fringes of cities. That is why, arguably, the new land laws refrain from not only defining but also men-tioning the word ‘squatters’.

97 This is despite the fact that squatting accompanied by occu-

pation constitutes 18% of the ways in which people access land in urban areas in Tanza-nia.

98 The land laws significantly accommodate squatters by recognizing that they are there

to stay and wish to make positive contribution to their country, towns, society and them-selves. Accordingly, it supports them by giving them tenure security through schemes of validation and regularisation of interests in land. This is likely to encourage them to invest in their lands as developers, not squatters, and to remain good citizens. They need to be tolerated for want of a practical alternative. Squatters protected by land law are those who have settled on public land other than reserved and hazardous land which has no existing private right or protected interest. This includes those who have acquired land through unauthorized property market transactions. The spirit of the land laws is to recognize, clarify and secure in law any form of informal tenure including the existing long standing use and occupation of land for people who are without apparent lawful title to their use or occupation of land.

99 This is even more justified

in a country like Tanzania where land is public property belonging to all citizens with the President as a trustee, where only 25% live on surveyed land, the urban housing deficit stands at 1.2 million units and over 70% of urban dwellers live in unsurveyed areas.

100

96

Mwalimu Omari and Another v. Omari A. Bilali (1990) TLR 9. 97

Even trespassers are seldom mentioned in sections 57(2)(a) and 151(3) Land Act as well as 24(5) and 57(3)(b) Village Land Act.

98 Sijaona, note 31, p. 7.

99 S. 3(1) (b) Land Act.

100 Hon. John P. Magufuli, M.P. Daily News (Tanzania), December 20, 2007, p.1; The Guardian (Tanzania), December 20, 2007, p.1.


The challenge then to land administrators is how to swiftly regularize existing unplanned areas; plan ahead of development; make land services like plot surveying and building permits less costly, less bureaucratic and readily available; take early steps to check the further sprawl of unplanned settlements; and not to wait until it is too late, which would compel them to resort to squatter upgrading schemes which are relatively expensive and difficult to manage.

366

BERICHTE / REPORTS

Der Beitrag der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit zur Sicherung von Grundrechten, Demokratie und Entwicklung. VII. KAS–Völkerrechtskonferenz, 12./13. November 2009, Heidelberg

Von Stefanie Djidonou, Gießen*

Anlässlich des 60. Geburtstages des Grundgesetzes hatte die VII. völkerrechtliche Fach-tagung der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung und des Max-Planck-Instituts für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht die internationale Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit zum Thema. Die Fachkonferenz wollte Funktion und Funktionsweise der Verfassungsgerichts-barkeit insbesondere im Hinblick auf die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit in den verschiede-nen Teilen der Welt näher beleuchten, Herausforderungen identifizieren und positive Entwicklungen fokussieren. Nach dem Einführungsvortrag von Bundesverfassungsrichter Prof. Udo Di Fabio zum 60-jährigen Bestehen des Grundgesetzes trugen sodann Experten aus dem Ausland zwölf Länder- und vier Regionalberichte vor.

I. Bedeutung und Wirkung der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in Afrika

Zunächst berichtete Prof. Ahmed Sadek El-Kosheri von der Situation in Ägypten. Sie stehe derzeit an einem Scheideweg. Nach der „goldenen Ära“ der 60er und 70er Jahre, in der das Verfassungsgericht dreimal Wahlen annulliert habe mit der Folge von Neuwahlen, konnte es während der letzten drei Jahrzehnte angesichts der politischen Entwicklung keine ent-scheidende Rolle spielen. Der Referent schloss mit lediglich der Hoffnung auf eine positive Wende. Prof. Florence Simbiri-Jaoko (Kenia) erläuterte den derzeitigen Prozess der Ver-fassungsbildung in Kenia und unterstrich insbesondere die problematische politische Aus-richtung der Richterwahl. Sodann ging Prof. Francois Venter auf die Rechtssprechung des südafrikanischen Verfassungsgerichts zu den sozialen Grundrechten ein. Er erläuterte die umfangreiche Gleichheitsrechtssprechung und stellte die südafrikanische Besonderheit dar, dass das Verfassungsgericht eine unfaire Diskriminierung als Verletzung der Menschen-würde interpretiere. Zum Abschluss dieser Sitzung berichtete Prof. Charles Manga Fom-

bad aus Botswana über die Sub-Sahara-Region. Er gab einen Überblick über die im südli-chen Afrika verbreiteten Grundmodelle von Verfassungsstaatlichkeit. Neben einer äußerst

* Stefanie Djidonou, Assessorin und Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin am Lehrstuhl Öffentliches Recht I und Wissenschaft von der Politik, Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen. E-Mail: [email protected] .de.

Djidonou, VII. KAS–Völkerrechtskonferenz 367

positiven Bilanz zur Entwicklung der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in Südafrika bezeichnete Prof. Fombad auch die Entwicklungen in Benin als erfolgsversprechend.

II. Bedeutung und Wirkung der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in Lateinamerika

Beginnend mit Bolivien berichtete Dr. Eduardo Rodriguez Veltzé über die neue, im Januar 2009 in Kraft getretene Verfassung mit etlichen Neuerungen, darunter auch das neue Ver-fassungsgericht. Die Einführung einer zweiten Präsidentschaftsamtszeit in Bolivien wertete er zwar als demokratisch legitimiert, jedoch insgesamt als Rückschritt. Prof. Manuel José

Cepeda Espinosa, Kolumbien, widmete sich, wie zuvor der südafrikanische Berichterstat-ter, der Rechtssprechung des Verfassungsgerichts zu sozialen Grundrechten. Das Verfas-sungsgericht gebe der Regierung Anweisungen; dabei setze es Fristen, zwar nicht für kon-krete Erfolge, wohl aber für die Erarbeitung von Lösungsansätzen. Der letzte Länderbericht Lateinamerikas bezog sich auf Brasilien. Dr. Joaquim B. Barbosa Gomes erläuterte das brasilianische Modell einer diffusen Verfassungsrechtsprechung ohne Verfassungsgericht. Hier finde die Verfassungsmäßigkeitsprüfung von Staatsakten vor der ordentlichen Ge-richtsbarkeit statt. Ein Individualbeschwerderecht bestehe nicht, lediglich eine abstrakte Normenkontrolle. Abschließend erstattete Prof. Néstor Sagüés aus Argentinien den Regio-nalbericht Lateinamerika. Er erläuterte die vorherrschenden Verfassungsmodelle und stellte die Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in ausgewählten Staaten gegenüber.

III. Bedeutung und Wirkung der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in Asien

Prof. Manoj Kumar Sinha berichtete, dass auch in Indien die Verfassungsmäßigkeitskon-trolle in der Zuständigkeit der ordentlichen Gerichte liege. Dem Einzelnen stehe jedoch im Wege der Individualbeschwerde ein direkter Zugang zum Obersten Gericht zu. Im übrigen finde seit dem Beginn der 1990er Jahre keine politische Richterwahl mehr statt. Die Wahl obliege nunmehr einem Richterkollegium. Prof. Dong-Heub Lee referierte zu Korea. Er arbeitete die Kompetenzähnlichkeiten zwischen koreanischem und deutschem (Bundes-) Verfassungsgericht heraus und schloss sein Referat mit der Feststellung, Koreas Verfas-sungsgericht sei nach 21 Jahren seines Bestehens verwurzelt, anerkannt und beachtet. Prof. Suchit Bunbongkarn, ging auf das Verhältnis zwischen konstitutioneller Monarchie und Verfassungsgericht in Thailand ein, wo auch Nichtjuristen Mitglieder des Verfassungsge-richts sein können. Prof. Kevin Y.L. Tan aus Singapur betonte in seinem Regionalbericht zu Asien die Schwierigkeit, asiatische Verfassungsmodelle „zusammenzufassen“, gliederte deshalb in Ost-, Süd-, und Südost-asiatische Staaten. Gegenübergestellt wurden die jeweils vorherrschenden Rechtssysteme mit ihren unterschiedlichen Verfassungsgerichts-Modellen und deren unterschiedlichem Gewicht, nicht nur im Hinblick auf Ansehen und Einkommen der Verfassungsrichter.

Verfassung und Recht in Übersee VRÜ 43 (2010)368

IV. Bedeutung und Wirkung der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in Mittel-, Ost- und

Südosteuropa

Herr Mato Tadic berichtete, dass in Bosnien und Herzegowina nach wie vor die 1995 im Friedensabkommen von Dayton vereinbarte Verfassung noch immer nicht offiziell in die Landessprachen übersetzt worden sei. Das Verfassungsgericht, bestehend aus zwei serbi-schen, vier bosnischen und drei internationalen Richtern, sei jedoch anerkannt und arbeite effizient. Dr. Matthias Hartwig vom MPI referierte über Russland, wo das Verfassungsge-richt trotz Gleichschaltung anderer Institutionen nach wie vor agiere. Der politischen Situ-ation entsprechend erfolge die Nachbesetzung der Verfassungsrichter ausschließlich poli-tisch motiviert. Komme es zu Sondervoten, dürften diese erst Monate nach Urteilsveröf-fentlichung publiziert werden. Im Länderbericht zu Ungarn ging Prof. András Patyi sowohlauf die historischen Quellen der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in Ungarn als auch auf aktuelle Rechtssprechungsfälle des Verfassungsgerichts ein, dessen 11 Mitglieder vom Parlament gewählt werden. Prof. Woijciech Sadursky ging in seinem Regionalbericht zu Südosteuropa auf die Akzeptanz der Verfassungsgerichte in der Bevölkerung ein, übte jedoch auch Kritik an der Rhetorik der Verfassungsgerichte. Abschließend zog Dr. Rainer Grote mit Blick auf zahlreiche „neue“ Demokratien eine insgesamt positive Bilanz der Bedeutung der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit für die Entwick-lung und Stabilisierung demokratischer Strukturen. Gestützt auf etliche Beispiele aus allen Teilen der Welt betonte er den Wert internationaler Zusammenarbeit auch auf diesem Gebiet.

369

The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes

Funnekotter and Others v. Republic of Zimbabwe, Case No. Arb/05/6 – a test case for commercial farmers in Zimbabwe or: how ICSID can fill the gap in the protection of human rights violated by a lawless state like Zimbabwe By Cornelia Glinz, Heidelberg*

A. Introduction

The case Funnekotter and Others versus the Republic of Zimbabwe, which was decided on the 22nd April 2009 by an ICSID Tribunal deals with the claims of 13 Dutch farmers who were displaced from their farmland in Zimbabwe without compensation during Zimbabwe’s notorious land reform programme.

1 In question was the alleged breach of the Bilateral

Investment Treaty concluded between the Netherlands and Zimbabwe2. The Tribunal

declared the Republic of Zimbabwe in breach of international law and bilateral treaty pro-tections. It ordered Zimbabwe to pay damages of 8 Million Euros plus interest, amounting to approximately 16 Million Euros in total. It can be considered a land mark decision, since it is a major success for victims of land seizures in Zimbabwe. Moreover, the award is the first one that gives meaningful financial relief to the commercial farmers for their losses. However, it was not the first time that farmers who lost their land in similar ways in Zimbabwe sought redress before an international adjudicator. Already in 2007 a case was brought before the Tribunal of the South African Development Community (SADC), the so called SADC Tribunal. In this case, known as the Campbell-case, a judgment was delivered on the 28th November 2008.

3 There, the regional Tribunal dealt with the expropriations of

79 farms by the Republic of Zimbabwe. In its judgment, it set an example by stating that

* Cornelia Glinz, Ass. iur., Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, Heidelberg. E-mail: [email protected]

1 [Hereinafter Funnekotter]; the case is printed in: International Legal Materials, 48 (2009), p. 764

ff., with a brief annotation by Ben Love, p. 760 ff. 2 Agreement on encouragement and reciprocal protection of investments between the Republic of

Zimbabwe and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 11.12.1996 (signed), 01.05.1998 (entered into force).

3 Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd et al v. The Republic of Zimbabwe, SADC (T) Case No. 02/2007. On

this judgment, see Oliver C. Ruppel, The Southern African Development Community (SADC) and its Tribunal: Reflexions on a Regional Economic Communities’ Potential Impact on Human Rights Protection, Verfassung und Recht in Übersee, 42 (2009), p. 182 ff.; Gino J. Naldi, Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd et al v The Republic of Zimbabwe: Zimbabwe’s Land Reform Programme Held in Breach of the SADC Treaty, Journal of African Law 53 (2009), p. 305 ff. The judgment is printed in: International legal materials 48 (2009), p. 534 ff.


370

the land reform programme was in breach of the SADC Treaty4 and of the commitment of

its Member States to human rights and the rule of law. However the judgment proved to be meaningless to the Claimants in practice, since Zimbabwe refrained from fulfilling its obligations under the judgment. Thus, the two cases provide an interesting comparison of how, firstly, a regional Tribunal and an international arbitration Tribunal deal with human rights violations and secondly, of the enforcement mechanisms of the two regimes. B. Background

First of all, to give a background to the case, it has to be seen in the context of the history and legal development of Zimbabwe’s land reform programme.

5 In 1992, the Zimbabwean

government passed the Land Acquisition Act, which authorised compulsory acquisition of land for agricultural resettlement purposes. Under its Article 5, the first step for such an acquisition was the issuance of a preliminary notice which deprived the owner of the right to dispose of the land. In a second step, an acquisition of land order could be issued according to Article 8. Although a provision of the Act provided for the payment of fair compensation, in practice, no or at least no adequate compensation was granted. In 2000, the government then proposed a new Constitution which provided for the acquisition of land without compensation. This proposal was defeated in a referendum in February 2000. That defeat immediately resulted in violent invasions of commercial farms, led by so called war veterans who fought in the 1970s War of Liberation. They were encouraged and sup-ported by the Zimbabwean government and the police did not intervene. Only two months after the defeat of the proposed Constitution, a constitutional amendment was finally adopted which abolished the duty to pay compensation. By contrast, expropriated farmers were referred to the United Kingdom as former colonial power to request compensation from them.

6 An amendment of the Land Acquisition Act followed which stated that “com-

pensation shall only be payable for any improvements on or to the land” (Section 29C). Subsequently, an accelerated Land Reform and Resettlement Plan, known as “Fast Track Programme” was started. To protect the illegal occupiers of the farms, the Parliament of Zimbabwe enacted the Rural Land Occupiers (Protection from Eviction) Act in June 2001. Under this Act, occupiers of rural land were protected against eviction. Finally, in 2005, the Zimbabwean Constitution was again amended. Through this amendment the remaining safeguards contained in the Land Acquisition Act were revoked and vast areas of agricul-tural land were directly transferred to the state.

7

4 The Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, 32 I.L.M. 120 (1993), 17.08.1992

(signed), 13.09.1993 (entered into force), amended by SADC Treaty-amendment (2001), 14 Member States (checked 28.05.2010).

5 Funnekotter, para 21 ff.

6 Section 16A (1) (c), Amendment No. 2, 2000.

7 Section 16B, Amendment No. 17, 2005.

Glinz, The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 371

C. The award

I. The facts

First steps in the case were taken in 2003, when 13 Dutch farmers turned to ICSID and requested arbitration against the Republic of Zimbabwe. The request for arbitration was registered by the Center in April 2005.

8 After the Parties failed to agree on the composition

of the Tribunal, in 2006 the former President of the ICJ Gilbert Guillaume was appointed as the presiding arbitrator.

9 An oral hearing of the Parties was held over three days in Paris in

October 2007. The thirteen Claimants, all of them of Dutch nationality, had directly or indirectly owned large commercial farms in Zimbabwe. All of them have been dispossessed of their farmland sometime between 2001 and 2003. Most of them have been forcibly evicted through violent land invasions by war veterans. Additionally, in the majority of cases, the Zimbabwean authorities also issued orders under Section 8 of the Land Acquisition Act to deprive the Claimants of their property. However, none of them received any compensation. The Commercial Farmers’ Union had challenged the occupation of the farms before the Zimbabwean Courts. In 2000 the Supreme Court found that acquisition of farms without compensation under the Fast Track Programme was unconstitutional and the farm invasions were unlawful. In the following year, the composition of the Supreme Court was changed. In a subsequent decision the Court decided contrarily. It held that the land reform programme was constitutional and found that there was no breach of the rule of law concerning the actions taken on the farms. In 2005 the amendment to the Zimbabwean Constitution finally formalised the expropriation of the Claimant’s farms. Most relevant to the facts of the case is the existence of the Bilateral Investment Treaty between the Netherlands and Zimbabwe

10, concluded in 1996 (hereinafter BIT). As to the main

submissions of the Parties: the Claimants requested the Tribunal to declare Zimbabwe responsible for its unlawful action and to order Zimbabwe to compensate them for all the damages suffered, plus interest and costs. They based their claims on the BIT and alleged that the Zimbabwean government violated the Treaty’s provisions on expropriation, on fair and equitable treatment, and on full protection and security. Zimbabwe admitted that the Claimants did not receive any compensation as required by the BIT. II. The decision

In its decision, the Tribunal dealt with three main aspects: firstly, with the alleged breaches of the BIT; secondly, with the evaluation of the damages; and finally with interest and costs.

8 Article 36 ICSID Convention.

9 Article 38 ICSID Convention.

10 See above, note 2.


372

1. The obligations under the BIT

Concerning the first point, the Tribunal considered the question of whether Zimbabwe violated its obligation to pay just compensation under Article 6 of the BIT. Although Zim-babwe had admitted that no compensation was paid, it tried to justify its actions. It raised the defense that a state of necessity or emergency existed which relieved it of its obligations under the BIT. The policy of land redistribution was necessary to rectify the unjust land ownership patterns remaining from colonial times. In this respect it invoked Article 7 of the BIT, as well as Zimbabwean domestic law and customary international law. The Tribunal stated that ultimately international law, not the domestic law of Zimbabwe, would deter-mine whether the Respondent can rely on an emergency defense in the dispute. As the BIT doesn’t release Contracting Parties from their obligation to pay just compensation in cases of national emergency, the question had to be answered exclusively under international law. The Tribunal admitted the state of necessity as an argument recognised by customary inter-national law.

11 However, it can be invoked only under certain strictly defined conditions.

According to the Tribunal, Zimbabwe raised the state of necessity only to justify the mea-sures of expropriation. Nonetheless, it had not shown why the alleged state of necessity would have prevented it from paying compensation. As a consequence, the Tribunal con-cluded that Zimbabwe breached its obligation under Article 6 of the BIT to pay just com-pensation to the Claimants. Therefore, with regard to the other alleged violations of the BIT, the Tribunal stated that it was not necessary to consider them. Consequently, the sole task left for the Tribunal was to fix the damages due to the Claimants. 2. The evaluation of the damages

As to the evaluation of the damages the first question to decide was whether there is a difference between a lawful and an unlawful expropriation. In this respect the Respondent argued that the damages must be calculated as specified in the relevant Article of the BIT (Article 6 [c]). The Claimants objected that the BIT only provided the standard of compen-sation for lawful expropriation. By contrast, compensation due in case of unlawful expro-priation must be calculated according to customary international law.

12 Although the Tribu-

nal acknowledged the distinction between lawful and unlawful expropriation in interna-tional law, it stated that the distinction was only relevant in two cases:

13 first, when award-

11 According to the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice in the case Gabčíkovo-Nagy-

maros (Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project [Hungary v. Slovakia], 1997 ICJ 7 [Judgment of Sept. 25]).

12 To underline this argument the Claimants referred to relevant jurisprudence of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Chorzów Factory case (Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów [Germany v. Poland] 1928 PCIJ [ser. A] No. 17 [Judgment of Sept. 13]).

13 The Tribunal based this differentiation on a quotation of the decision by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal in the Phillips Petroleum case (Philipps Petroleum Co. Iran v. Iran, Partial Award, Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib., No. 425-39-2 [June 28, 1989]).


ing restitution; second, when the value of the property has increased between the date of expropriation and the later date of the decision awarding compensation. The Tribunal found that neither of the two options was an issue here, so that the differentiation between lawful and unlawful expropriation was irrelevant to the case. A further question arose concerning the date of evaluation of the damages and on the method to be applied for such an evalua-tion. On the first point, the Tribunal determined that the property must be evaluated at the date of dispossession. In this regard, the Tribunal referred to both general international law and the relevant provision of the BIT. As the exact dates of dispossession were in dispute, the Tribunal had to determine the various dates concerning the different farms. The main difficulty in this respect was how to deal with the invasions on the farms by the war vete-rans and if Zimbabwe could be held responsible for those events. The Tribunal found a way to come up with a solution without answering the latter question. It distinguished between two cases: at first, there was the majority of cases in which the farms were confiscated through expropriation orders under Section 8 of the Land Acquisition Act. Although most of the farmers had previously been forced to abandon their farms due to invasions, the Claimants agreed to fix the date of the evaluation of damages at the date of the relevant governmental orders. That’s why, according to the Tribunal it was not necessary to decide on the impact of those invasions. Thus it retained the date of issuance of the expropriation orders as the relevant date. However there was a second group of three cases in which no expropriation orders had been issued. The Tribunal decided that these farms were seized under the Rural Land Occupiers Act of 2001

14 which protected illegal occupiers from

eviction. As the war veterans who occupied those three estates in 2001 were “protected occupiers” under the Act (Article 3 [2]), the Claimants were unable to recover the posses-sion of their land. According to the Tribunal, this fell within the responsibility of the Respondent. The relevant date for the evaluation of damages was thus the date of entry into force of the Rural Land Occupiers Act.

15 After elaborating on the date of evaluation, the

Tribunal had then to decide on the method of evaluation. The Tribunal sided with the Claimants that compensation must represent the “genuine value” of the investment, which corresponds to the fair market value. This result could be equally drawn from Article 6 of the BIT or general international law. Further, the Tribunal rejected Zimbabwe’s argument that the calculation of the damages should take into account the initial amount of the investment, the date of the investment and its past profits. The Respondent also submitted that discounting from the market value must be made in case of large scale nationalisations. The Tribunal objected that under general international law as well as under the Investment Treaty the value of the investment has to be calculated independently of the origin and past success of the investments, as well as of the number and aim of the expropriations carried out. In the next paragraph the Tribunal elaborated in detail on the evaluation of damages.

14

See above, at B. 15

The Act entered into force on June 5, 2001.


374

The amounts suggested by Zimbabwe’s experts were rejected as obviously too low. The Tribunal also criticised the Claimant’s valuation method for not fully considering Zim-babwe’s economic situation in the relevant years and arrived at a lower figure of 7.2 Mil-lion Euros for all the farms. In a separate calculation the Tribunal also considered the value of the movable assets left on the farms. Finally the Tribunal agreed with the Claimants that they must obtain reparation for the disturbance resulting from the taking over of their farms, for the necessity for them to start a new life in another country and the tangible expenses related to that. It evaluated the damages suffered in this respect for each Claimant at 20 000 Euros. Furthermore, in the hearing, the Claimants had requested for the first time moral damages, additionally and distinct from the disturbance claim, evaluated at 100 000 Euro for each Claimant. The Court stated that those claims were inadmissible because of the very late stage of the submission. However, it mentioned that the moral damages claim would partially overlap with the damages already compensated by the disturbance indem-nity. The Tribunal ordered the Respondent to pay the compensation within a period of three months. 3. Interest and costs

In its final section, the Tribunal dealt with interest and costs. With respect to interest, the Tribunal granted a 10% rate compounded bi-annually. Regarding costs, the Tribunal referred firstly to the general practice in international arbitration that the successful party under an award should recover its legal costs. However, the Tribunal decided differently, taking into account the situation in Zimbabwe in 2001 and 2002. Thus, the Tribunal exer-cised its discretion

16 that the costs for representation before the Tribunal will remain with

the Parties. Only the costs for the Tribunal and ICSID were imposed on the Respondent. D. Subsequent events

I. Enforcement

After presenting the decision, the crucial questions remaining are: what has happened subsequently and did Zimbabwe finally pay the amounts due to the farmers? The deflating answer is that to date, the Claimants have not been successful in obtaining any payment from the Republic of Zimbabwe and corresponding attempts to pursue diplomatic channels through the Dutch Embassy in Harare failed.

17 Thus, to realise the Claimant’s rights under

the award, an aspect of the ICSID Convention becomes important: an ICSID award is binding and enforceable in each Contracting State as if it was a final judgment of a national

16

Article 61 (2) ICSID Convention. 17

Luke Eric Peterson, Zimbabwe not paying ICSID award, Investment Arbitration Reporter, 07.05.2010.


court in that State.18

In particular, it means that Zimbabwean assets can be seized in any of the Contracting States to the ICSID Convention of which there are more than 140. Thus, immediately after the award was rendered the Claimants announced that if Zimbabwe didn’t pay they would start enforcement proceedings.

19 However, the crucial impediment

that the Claimants face in attempting to enforce the award in jurisdictions outside of Zim-babwe is related to the identification of property belonging to the cash-strapped govern-ment.

20 Subsequently, to set an example, the Claimants finally filed a Petition to confirm

the arbitration award with a United States District Court on the 24th September 2009.21

Zimbabwe for its part failed to respond to the Petition. On February 1st, a judgment was rendered in favour of the Petitioners. Using the Euro/U.S. Dollar exchange rate on the day of the judgment, the Petitioners were awarded 11,5 Million U.S. Dollars for the damages. Additionally, the Court granted the amount of 13,5 Million U.S. Dollars for interest, due as of the day of the judgment, plus 232 500 U.S. Dollars for the ICSID fees. In contrast to the decision of the ICSID Tribunal, the Court awarded attorney’s fees and costs associated with this proceeding to the Petitioners. Thus the total of the judgment amounted to over 25 Million U.S. Dollars. With every day of non payment, the interest continues to accrue in the future pursuant to the arbitration award and as expressly confirmed by the District Court. Hence the judgment can be considered as a further success for the farmers on the way to realising their rights. II. Upcoming claims

Another interesting point is the significance of the decision to other foreign nationals who also lost their farms in Zimbabwe. In this respect the case was meant to be a test case.

22

Following the decision, one of the counsel for the Claimants announced that his law firm

18

Article 53, 54 ICSID Convention. 19

Peta Thornycroft, Zimbabwean assets face seizure after tribunal rules for farmers, Telegraph, 27.04.2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/zimbabwe/ 5232452/Zimbabwe-assets-face-seizure-after-tribunal-rules-for-farmers.html (all references to a webpage are checked on 28.05.2010).

20 The English “Telegraph” suggested for example that passenger jets of Air Zimbabwe which land

at London’s Gatwick airport could be confiscated: note 19. 21

Funnekotter et al v. Republic of Zimbabwe, New York Southern District Court, Case No. 1:09-cv-8168-CM, Petition to confirm arbitration, filed Sept. 24, 2009. The petition was based on 22 U.S.C. § 1650a. In approaching specifically this Court, the Petitioners could follow the example of a case which was brought before the same Court earlier in the year also with the request to confirm an ICSID award (see page p. 2 of the Petition).

22 Luke Eric Peterson, An update on moral damages in investment treaty arbitration, Kluwer Arbi-

tration Blog, 07.05.2009, http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2009/05/07/an-update-on-moral-damages-in-investment-treaty-arbitration/.


376

was in the process of organising additional claims for some 50 European nationals.23

Zim-babwe concluded Bilateral Investment Treaties with several countries in Europe, like Ger-many, France and Sweden.

24 An interesting issue in an upcoming claim will be the question

of whether moral damages can be requested, as this matter was left open in the present case due to the late submission.

25

E. In comparison: the judgment of the SADC Tribunal

I. The judgment

As already mentioned in the introductory section, the present case has to be seen in the context of the earlier judgment by the SADC Tribunal in the Campbell-case. In this first judgment by the newly established regional Tribunal,

26 it took the opportunity to establish

itself as a forum providing relief for human rights violations. Primarily set up to resolve disputes arising from closer economic and political union within the community,

27 the

court established that the principles and objectives of the SADC Treaty - which comprise the respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law (Article 4) - are not just vague declarations but that the Member States are bound by them and they are reviewable by the Tribunal. Thereby, it provided for an avenue of redress for farmers of many different nationalities

28 who suffered human rights violations during the Zimbabwean land reform

programme. In its judgment the Tribunal held that the Republic of Zimbabwe was in breach of its obligations under Article 4 of the SADC Treaty. According to the Tribunal, the Respondent had violated essential elements of the rule of law in denying access to court to the Applicants. Additionally, the land reform programme was found to be racially discrimi-natory and thus in breach of the obligations under Article 6 of the SADC Treaty, which comprises a non-discrimination clause. Finally the Respondent had violated international law by refusing the payment of compensation. Therefore, the court ordered the Respondent firstly, to take all necessary measures to protect the ownership of the lands of the Appli-cants and secondly, to pay fair compensation on or before the 30th June 2009 to the Appli-cants that have already been evicted from their lands.

23

Damon Vis-Dunbar, Tribunal orders compensation in Dutch farmers’ claims against Zimbabwe, Investment Treaty News, 28.04.2009, http://www.investmenttreatynews.org/cms/news/archive/ 2009/04/28/tribunal-orders-compensation-in-dutch-farmers-claims-against-zimbabwe.aspx .

24 Visit the UNCTAD homepage: http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/DocSearch____779.aspx .

25 See above, at C II 2; note 22.

26 The establishment of the Tribunal was already laid down in Article 9 and 16 of the SADC Treaty

but it took 14 years before the Tribunal began its work in 2007. 27

Frans Viljoen, International Human Rights Law in Africa, Oxford 2007, p. 503. 28

As laid down in Article 15 (1) of the SADC Protocol on Tribunal (note 29), the jurisdiction of the Tribunal encompasses “disputes between States, and between natural or legal persons and States” without differentiating on the nationality.


II. The enforcement side

According to Article 16 (5) of the SADC Treaty and Article 24 (3) of the Protocol on Tri-bunal

29, the decisions of the Tribunal are final and binding. However, immediately after the

decision, the Zimbabwean government declared that, despite the judgment, it was not will-ing to stop its land reform programme.

30 One month after the judgment, Mr. Campbell filed

an urgent application to register the Tribunal’s judgment in the Zimbabwean High Court to give it effect in Zimbabwean national law – which was rejected.

31 By contrast to ICSID

awards which immediately have the same status as judgments by a national court,32

the enforcement of judgments by the SADC Tribunal is governed by the national law for the registration and enforcement of foreign judgments.

33 In the following months the violent

invasions on farms continued. In March 2009 it was reported that the violations even increased with special focus on farmers that were amongst the Applicants in the process before the Tribunal.

34 In May 2009 Mr. Campbell and one other farmer filed an urgent

application before the Tribunal, seeking a declaration that the Respondent is in breach and contempt of the Tribunal’s judgment.

35 On the 5th June 2009 the Tribunal agreed that the

Republic of Zimbabwe failed to comply with the judgment of the Tribunal.36

As a conse-quence it referred the issue to the SADC Summit

37 for the latter to take appropriate action

pursuant to Article 32 (5) of the SADC Protocol on Tribunal.38

Despite this judicial pro-gress, the homestead of Mr. Campbell was finally destroyed by fire at the end of August

29

SADC Protocol on Tribunal and Rules of Procedure thereof, 07.08.2000 (adopted), 14.08.2001 (entered into force), amended by Agreement amending the Protocol on Tribunal, 30.10.2002 (adopted).

30 Doro Grebe, Mugabe-Regierung akzeptiert Urteil nicht, Allgemeine Zeitung, 02.12.2008, http://

www.az.com.na/afrika/mugabe-regierung-akzeptiert-urteil-nicht.77410.php . 31

Alex Bell, Outrage as High Court dismisses SADC Land Ruling, 27.01.2010, http://www. zimbabwemetro.com/headline/outrage-as-high-court-dismisses-sadc-land-ruling/ .

32 See above, at D I.

33 Article 32 (1) SADC Protocol on Tribunal.

34 Doro Grebe, “Das schlimmste Wochenende meines Lebens”, Allgemeine Zeitung, 17.03.2009,

http://www.az.com.na/afrika/simbabwe.65972.php . 35

According to Article 32 (4) of the SADC Protocol on Tribunal, may any failure by a State to comply with a decision of the Tribunal be referred to the Tribunal by any party concerned.

36 Campbell and Another v. The Republic of Zimbabwe, SADC (T) Case No. 03/2009.

37 The Summit of Heads of State and Government is the highest decision-making body within SADC

(Article 9 [1], 10 SADC Treaty). 38

According to Article 32 (5), the Tribunal can report the State’s failure to the Summit of Heads of State and Government for the latter to take appropriate action. Subsequently, according to Article 33 of the SADC Treaty, the Summit may impose sanctions for non-compliance on a case-by-case basis.


378

2009.39

Also in August, the Zimbabwean government took a new position concerning the SADC Tribunal. The country’s Justice Minister wrote a letter to the Tribunal whereby the Zimbabwean government withdrew recognition of the Tribunal’s authority.

40 He argued

that the Tribunal was illegal as long as the Protocol on Tribunal was not ratified by at least two-thirds of SADC Member States. What the Justice Minister did not mention was that, in 2001, the SADC Treaty was amended and the SADC Tribunal established as an integral organ of SADC. As a result of this amendment the Articles of the Protocol on Tribunal which had required the two-thirds ratification were repealed. As a consequence, there were high expectations of the SADC Summit which met in Kinshasa in September 2009.

41 How-

ever, despite the referral of the issue to the Summit by the Tribunal, the Summit completely failed to deal with Zimbabwe’s contempt of court and did not address the issue at all. In fact, its final Communiqué called on the international community to lift sanctions against Mugabe and his regime and emphasised the progress that had been made in the country in the political field.

42 Whilst this was celebrated in Zimbabwe’s state media as a triumph for

Mugabe, it was sharply criticised by opposition parties and human rights activist groups all over Southern Africa.

43 No further action in respect of the enforcement of the judgment has

been undertaken so far by SADC. Meanwhile the farmers had initiated several further attempts to register the SADC Tribunal’s judgment before the High Court in Zimbabwe - but without success. Finally, in a decision in January 2010, the High Court rejected the registration, accusing the judgment of contravening Zimbabwe’s Constitution and public policy.

44 The Court stated that it recognised that Zimbabwe is bound in general by the

judgment under international law, but noted that in this case the “greater public good” of the agrarian reform must prevail.

45 As a consequence, Zimbabwe’s Commercial Farmers’

39

Doro Grebe, Bomben auf Mount Carmel explodiert, Allgemeine Zeitung, 14.09.2009, http:// www.az.com.na/afrika/bomben-auf-mount-carmel-explodiert.93061.php .

40 Zimbabwe pulls out of SADC Tribunal, People’s Daily Online, 02.09.2009, http://english.

peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90777/90855/6746705.html . 41

Peta Thornycroft, Upcoming SADC Summit Strains Zimbabwe Inclusive Government, 03.09.20009, http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-09-03-voa34-68807117.html .

42 Communiqué of the 29th Summit of Heads of State and Government of the SADC, held in

Kinshasa from Sept. 8 – 9, 2009. 43

Tichaona Sibanda, Zimbabwe: SADC want “sanctions” against Mugabe and cronies lifted, 09.09.2009, http://allafrica.com/stories/200909090882.html .

44 Gramara (Pvt) Ltd and Another v. The Republic of Zimbabwe et al, HH 169-2009, HC 33/09, X-ref. HC 5483/09 (Jan. 26, 2010); see the statement on the judgment and a summary of the latter by SADC Tribunal Rights Watch: http://www.swradioafrica.com/pages/sadctribunal250110.htm# summary; Fidelis Munyoro, Zimbabwe: High Court rejects land ruling, 27.01.2010, http:// allafrica.com/stories/201001270021.html .

45 Gamara, note 44, p. 19.


Union decided once again to approach the SADC Tribunal on this issue.46

Finally, a new application by the Commercial Farmers’ Unions of Zimbabwe and South Africa was sent to the SADC Tribunal on the 12th February 2010. It is again (like the application of May 2009) an urgent application, seeking a declaration that Zimbabwe is in continued breach and contempt of the Tribunal’s judgment of 2008.

47 The Applicants expect the Tribunal to

refer the issue once more to the SADC Summit which will be held in August this year in Windhoek under Namibian Chairmanship and they hope that the Summit this time might consider sanctions against Zimbabwe or even decide to suspend it from SADC.

48 More

recently, a major success concerning enforcement resulted through a confirmation of the SADC judgment by the South African judiciary. The North Gauteng High Court in Pretoria had ordered in November 2009, that the judgment has to be respected by the South African government. A further case was filed on 12th January with the same Court in order to seize Zimbabwean assets hold in South Africa. Subsequently, the Gauteng Court came up with a land mark decision in February 2010

49 and ordered that the SADC Tribunal rulings

50 in the

Campbell-case are declared to be registered, recognised and enforceable by the High Court of South Africa pursuant to Article 32 of the SADC Protocol on Tribunal. As a result, ownership documents of a Cape Town house belonging to the Zimbabwean government have already been handed over.

51

F. Conclusion

Firstly, the ICSID award covers some interesting issues concerning investment law, espe-cially with respect to the details of the calculation of damages. Furthermore, it is remark-able to observe the influence of investment law on the conditions of land reform pro-grammes, which are relevant to most states with a colonial history; this influence exists at least in so far as foreign nationals are concerned. However, by far the most significant is the fact that the case involves human rights violations and deals with actions of a state 46

Alex Bell, Farmers to challenge High Court dismissal of SADC land ruling, 09.02.2010, http://www.swradioafrica.com/news090210/farmers090210.htm .

47 Brigitte Weidlich, Zimbabwe: SADC Tribunal forgot Zimbabwe Farmers’ Case, The Namibian,

25.03.2010, http://allafrica.com/stories/201003260550.html , which reported the Tribunal initially forgot to register the application.

48 Note 47; SADC Tribunal: Namibia’s President In Limbo Over Zimbabwe Rulings, 03.02.2010,

http://investigativezim.com/2010/02/03/tribunal-rulings-namibian-president-in-limbo-over-zimbabwe/ .

49 Fick and Others v. Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe, Case No. 77881/2009, (Febr. 25,

2010). 50

The judgment of 28th of November 2008 and the ruling of 5th June 2009. 51

Nyasha Nyaungwa, Zimbabwean government could lose more assets in SADC, Namibia Economist, 23. 04.2010, http://www.economist.com.na/index.php?option=com_content&view= article&id=21423:zimbabwean-government-could-lose-more-assets-in-sadc&catid=576:speak-your-mind&Itemid=61 .


380

which is not based on the rule of law. Here, the international courts fill the gap which is left at national level: as no independent judiciary existed anymore in Zimbabwe the farmers could not expect protection before the national courts. Therefore they attempted to seek redress before different international Tribunals like the SADC Tribunal and ICSID, both not intended to consider human rights issues originally. In this respect the two decisions provide interesting grounds for comparison of how the two Tribunals handle the human rights topic. Whilst the SADC Tribunal refers to human rights standards and the rule of law as laid down in the SADC Treaty, the ICSID Tribunal deals with the case under investment law without expressly referring to human rights. Additionally, it is noteworthy to evaluate the enforcement mechanisms of the two different legal regimes and their effectiveness in influencing a state such as Zimbabwe. The SADC Tribunal for its part has failed on the enforcement side since Zimbabwe has completely ignored the judgment and there is a lack of political will amongst SADC members to impose pressure upon Zimbabwe. However, as the decisions by the South African High Court show the issue is ongoing. Further the new attempt by Zimbabwean farmers to approach the SADC Tribunal may bring progress, and it will be interesting to observe the discussions at the upcoming SADC Summit later in the year. By contrast, independently of the actual outcome in practice, ICSID provides a much more effective regime as the award has the same status as a judgment by a national court of a Contracting State. Therefore it cannot be so easily ignored by the Zimbabwean govern-ment. That might be a reason why Zimbabwe co-operated from the very beginning much better with the ICSID Tribunal than with the SADC one. Here it will be interesting to see how successful the Claimants will be in finding and seizing Zimbabwean assets and if the awaited claim by Zimbabwean farmers of other nationalities can contribute to raising pres-sure on the Zimbabwean government concerning human rights violations through the land reform programme. However, in Zimbabwe forced land takeovers are continuing to date, including land meant to be protected under Bilateral Investment Treaties.

52 Thus unfortunately, the ICSID

award has so far had no general impact on the situation in the country.

52

Alex Bell, Zimbabwe: Country urged to honour Bilateral Investment Pacts, 15.01.2010, http:// allafrica.com/stories/201001150931.html.

381

Der Europäische Auswärtige Dienst – Chance oder Risiko für die europäische Entwicklungszusammenarbeit?

Von Julia Sattelberger, Heidelberg* Die Europäische Union ist die weltweit finanzkräftigste Quelle von Entwicklungshilfegel-dern. Ihre Bedeutung als globaler Akteur auf diesem Politikfeld wird jedoch durch eine komplizierte Struktur von Verantwortlichkeiten und Aufgaben zwischen den Organen der Union geschwächt. Kritik an der derzeitigen europäischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit manifestiert sich im Vorwurf einer ineffizienten Organisation, die sich nachteilig auf die Umsetzung und Durchführung der europäischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit auswirke. Der Vertrag von Lissabon schafft nun jedoch einen neuen primärrechtlichen Rahmen für dieses Politikfeld: Die Implementierung des Vertrages führt zur Restrukturierung und Neuschaffung von Institutionen, was nicht ohne Auswirkungen auf die künftige Steuerung und Durchführung der europäischen Entwicklungspolitik bleiben wird. Eine der institutio-nellen Neuerungen durch den Vertrag ist die Schaffung eines Europäischen Auswärtigen Dienstes (EAD). Die genaue Ausgestaltung des neuen Dienstes lässt der Vertrag offen. Es heißt in Art. Artikel 27 Absatz 3 EUV lediglich, der EAD kooperiere mit den diplomatischen Diensten der Mitgliedsstaaten und setze sich zusammen aus Beamten der einschlägigen Abteilungen des Generalsekretariats des Rates und der Kommission sowie aus abgeordnetem Personal der nationalen diplomatischen Dienste. Die Organisation und die Arbeitsweise des Euro-päischen Auswärtigen Dienstes werde durch einen Beschluss des Rates festgelegt: "Der Rat beschließt auf Vorschlag des Hohen Vertreters nach Anhörung des Europäischen Parla-ments und nach Zustimmung der Kommission." Entsprechend hat die derzeitige Hohe Vertreterin der EU für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, Catherine Ashton, am 25. März dieses Jahres einen Vorschlag zum Aufbau des neuen Europäischen Auswärtigen Dienstes vorgelegt. Bereits einen Tag später einigte sich der Ministerrat auf die künftige Organisa-tion und Arbeitsweise des EADs, doch das Europäische Parlament verkündete direkt sein Missfallen an dem Vorschlag. Am 22. Juni konnte unter der Führung der spanischen Rats-präsidentschaft ein Kompromiss erzielt werden, der schließlich am 8. Juli vom Europäi-schen Parlament angenommen wurde. Im folgenden soll Ashtons Vorschlag auf mögliche Konsequenzen für die Restrukturie-rung der institutionellen Architektur der Europäischen Entwicklungsverwaltung untersucht

* Julia Sattelberger, M.A., Studium der Politikwissenschaf, wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin in der interdisziplinären Forschungsgruppe „Recht und Governance der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit“ am Max Planck Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht in Heidelberg. E-mail: jsattelb @mpil.de


werden. Bedeutet die vorgesehene Umstrukturierung für die europäische Entwicklungs-politik eine Chance oder ein Risiko? I. Europäische Entwicklungspolitik vor Lissabon

Die europäische Entwicklungszusammenarbeit war und ist Teil der außenpolitischen Akti-vitäten der EU. Die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit unterstand vor der Implementierung des Vertrags von Lissabon vollständig der Verantwortung der Kommission. Entwicklungspoli-tische Kompetenzen waren hier zwischen dem Kommissar für Entwicklung und der Kom-missarin für Außenbeziehungen und europäische Nachbarschaftspolitik aufgeteilt. Inner-halb der Kommission waren die Kompetenzen nach geographischer Zuständigkeit aufge-teilt. Entsprechend war die Generaldirektion Entwicklung zuständig für Kooperationen mit den sogenannten AKP-Staaten aus Afrika, der Karibik und des Pazifik. Die Gelder für die Kooperationen mit den AKP-Staaten stammen aus dem Europäischen Entwicklungsfonds. Dieser wird nicht aus dem Budget der EU finanziert, sondern separat von den Mitglieds-staaten gefüllt. Den rechtlichen Rahmen, auf dem die Kooperation der jetzigen EU mit den AKP-Staaten basiert, regelt das Cotonou-Abkommen – dem Nachfolger des Lomé-Abkommens. Dabei handelt es sich um einen Vertrag, der zwischen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, deren Mitgliedsstaaten und den Ländern der AKP-Regionen multilateral ausgehandelt wurde. In der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit ist das die Ausnahme; in der Regel handelt es sich um einseitig vom Geber gesetztes Recht. Die Kooperation mit Ländern in Asien und Lateinamerika, sowie Ländern, die in die Nachbarschaftspolitik der EU integriert waren, koordinierte dagegen die Generaldirektion Außenbeziehungen. Die Gelder für Kooperationen mit den Nicht-AKP-Staaten stammen aus dem EU-Budget. Wichtigstes Finanzierungsinstrument ist hier das Instrument für Ent-wicklungszusammenarbeit (DCI). Den rechtlichen Rahmen regelt hier die sogenannte DCI-Verordnung, im Gegensatz zum Cotonou-Abkommen einseitig von der EG gesetztes Recht. Geplant wird die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit in Form von Programmen in unter-schiedlichen Planungs- bzw. Programmierungs-Schritten. Bis zum Vertrag von Lissabon wurde die Programmierung entsprechend der Länder- Zuständigkeit in den beiden General-direktionen durchgeführt. Entsprechend erfolgten alle Programmierungsschritte in der Kommission. Die Programmierungsverfahren für AKP- und Nicht-AKP-Staaten waren dabei ähnlich strukturiert, allerdings wurden die AKP-Staaten formal deutlich stärker in den Planungsprozess eingebunden als die Nicht-AKP Staaten. Durchgeführt wurde die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit schließlich gemeinsam mit der Durchführungsorganisation EuropeAid. II. Europäische Entwicklungspolitik nach Lissabon

Der Vertrag von Lissabon macht eine strukturelle Reorganisation der europäischen Außen-beziehungen notwendig. Das betrifft namentlich das Amt der Hohen Vertreterin der Euro-

Sattelberger, Der Europäische Auswärtige Dienst 383

päischen Union für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik. Ihre Aufgabe wird es künftig sein, der Außendarstellung der EU ein einheitliches Gesicht zu geben und so die Kohärenz der euro-päischen Außenpolitik zu stärken. Die Hohe Vertreterin ist zugleich Vizepräsidentin der Kommission, Vorsitzende des Rates für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten und Außenbeauftragte des Europäischen Rates. In ihren Zuständigkeitsbereich fallen die früheren Aufgaben des Kommissars für Außenbezie-hungen und des Hohen Vertreters für die Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik. Entsprechend geht zumindest ein Teil des bisherigen Postens des Kommissars für Außenbeziehungen in dem Posten der Hohen Vertreterin auf. Langfristig ist zudem die Verschmelzung der General-direktion Außenbeziehungen in den künftigen Europäischen Auswärtigen Dienst vorgese-hen. Die Bildung des neuen Dienstes erweist sich bisher als schwieriger und zäher Prozess. Letztlich geht es um die Verteilung von Kompetenzen und Einfluss. So wundert es kaum, dass die beteiligten Akteure versuchen, ihre Position möglichst erfolgreich in den Prozess einzubringen. 1. Die mögliche entwicklungspolitische Architektur Europas – drei Perspektiven

Insbesondere in Bezug auf die Frage nach der künftigen Aufteilung von Kompetenzen wird es aus entwicklungspolitischer Perspektive interessant: Konkret geht es hier vor allem um die künftige Kontrolle über finanzielle Instrumente aus den Entwicklungsbudgets. Verein-fachend lassen sich hier zwei grundsätzlich gegenläufige Positionen festhalten: Auf der einen Seite steht die Kommission, die unwillig ist, Verantwortung und Einfluss an den EAD abzutreten, da sie dadurch an Einfluss verlieren würde. Dagegen versuchen einige Mitgliedsstaaten, den EAD mit möglichst vielen Kompetenzen auszustatten. Vor diesem Hintergrund ergeben sich nun drei mögliche Szenarien zur Stellung der Entwicklungsver-waltung durch die Etablierung des EADs. Eine Möglichkeit wäre der Aufbau einer starken entwicklungspolitischen Stimme innerhalb der Kommission. Im Hinblick auf die Verteilung von Kompetenzen zwischen der Kommission und dem EAD sieht dieser Vorschlag die Auflösung der regionalen Aufteilung entwicklungspolitischer Kompetenzen vor. Alle entwicklungsrelevanten Instrumente wür-den in diesem Sinne künftig einheitlich unter dem Dach der Generaldirektion Entwicklung zusammengefasst. Der Europäische Auswärtige Dienst stünde in einem solchen Szenario zwar in engem Kontakt zu den Implementierungsorganisationen, er hätte aber kaum Ein-fluss auf die strategische Planung der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit und keine Kontrolle über entwicklungspolitisch relevante Budgets. Ein gegenläufiges zweites Szenario wäre die Bildung eines starken EAD, der für die gesamte Programmplanung und Überwachung der europäischen EZ sowie die Kontrolle über deren Finanzierungsinstrumente jenseits regionaler Zuständigkeiten verantwortlich wäre. Eine solche Lösung favorisieren die großen Mitgliedsstaaten der EU – allen voran Frankreich – aber auch Akteursgruppen, die Entwicklungspolitik im Sinne eines erweiter-ten Sicherheitsbegriffes als Teil der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik begreifen.


Eine Kompromissversion, die Elemente aus beiden Szenarien enthält, wäre zum einen die Etablierung einer gestärkten Generaldirektion Entwicklung durch die Zusammenfas-sung aller bislang regional aufgeteilten entwicklungspolitischen Zuständigkeiten. Um die Kohärenz innerhalb der Außenbeziehungen der EU zu gewährleisten, sieht ein Kompro-missvorschlag jedoch zum anderen die Einbindung des EAD in die Programmierungsab-läufe der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit vor. Vor diesem Hintergrund lässt sich nun ab-schließend der Vorschlag Ashtons darstellen. 2. Der Vorschlag zum Aufbau eines Europäischen Auswärtigen Dienstes

Insgesamt umfasst Ashtons Vorschlag 12 Artikel. Er beschäftigt sich neben der rechtlichen Natur und dem Arbeitsbereich des EADs auch mit seinen Aufgaben, der Zusammenarbeit mit anderen Organen der EU, seiner Verwaltungsstruktur und personellen Zusammenset-zung. Außerdem widmet sich der Vorschlag der Frage nach dem künftigen Budget des EAD und seinen Kompetenzen innerhalb verschiedener Politikbereiche der europäischen Außenbeziehungen. In Bezug auf die Verteilung von Zuständigkeiten sieht der Vorschlag vor, die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit nicht mehr nach regionaler Zugehörigkeit der Ent-wicklungsländer zu verteilen. Kompetenzen werden stattdessen im Hinblick auf unter-schiedliche Schritte innerhalb der Programmierung verteilt. Die Kontrolle über entwicklungsrelevante Budgets soll nach dem Vorschlag innerhalb der Kommission bleiben. So fällt künftig nicht nur der Europäische Entwicklungsfonds, sondern auch das Instrument für die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit unter den primären Verantwortungsbereich des Kommissars für Entwicklung. Allerdings erhält der EAD die Möglichkeit der Einflussnahme auf die ersten drei Programmierungsschritte für die euro-päische Entwicklungszusammenarbeit und zwar unabhängig von der regionalen Zugehörig-keit der betroffenen Länder. Somit kann der EAD künftig auch über Fragen der langfristi-gen Allokation von Geldern zumindest mitentscheiden – und übt dadurch auch eine ge-wisse Kontrolle aus. Konkret heißt es in Artikel 8 Absatz 3:

“The European External Action Service shall in particular have responsibility for preparing the following Commission decision on the strategic, multi-annual steps within the programming cycle: (i) country allocations to determine the global financial envelope for each region […] (ii) country and regional strategic papers (CSPs/RSPs) [and] (iii) national and regional strategic papers (NIPs/RIPs)“.

Um dieser Aufgabe gerecht zu werden, soll innerhalb des Europäischen Auswärtigen Dienstes eine Referatsstruktur geschaffen werden, die alle Weltregionen innerhalb seiner geographischen Ressorts umfasst und somit die ursprünglich nach geographisch getrennten Aufgabenbereichen agierende Verwaltung ablöst. Die relativ starke Einbindung des EAD in die Programmierung der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit ermöglicht es dem Dienst, künftig wesentlichen Einfluss auf die strategische Ausrichtung der europäischen Entwicklungszu-sammenarbeit zu nehmen. Allerdings bleibt die Programmierung in Bezug auf die Vergabe von Geldern aus dem Europäischen Entwicklungsfonds und die Vergabe von Geldern

Sattelberger, Der Europäische Auswärtige Dienst 385

durch das Development Cooperation Instrument unter der Verantwortung des Kommissars für Entwicklung. In dem Vorschlag heißt es dazu konkret in Artikel 8 Absatz 4:

“With regard to the European Development Fund and the Development Cooperation Instrument, any proposals […] shall be prepared […] under the direct supervision and guidance of the Com-missoner responsible for Development Policy and then jointly submitted with the High Represen-tative for decision by the Commission.”

III. Fazit und Ausblick

Wie ist Ashtons Vorschlag abschließend im Hinblick auf die anfangs gestellte Frage nach dem Potential der Neuerungen für die europäische Entwicklungszusammenarbeit zu be-werten? Insgesamt handelt es sich hier um einen Kompromissvorschlag, der die Entwick-lungspolitik weder vollständig der Kommission noch dem Europäischen Auswärtigen Dienst zuordnet. Durch die Einbindung des Europäischen Auswärtigen Dienstes in die strategische Planung der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit besteht künftig das Potential, eine kohärentere Außendarstellung der EU zu erreichen. Dazu benötigt der EAD jedoch fachliche entwick-lungspolitische Expertise innerhalb seiner Referate. Dies sollte bei der Besetzung von Posten entsprechend berücksichtigt werden. Die institutionellen Umstrukturierungen durch eine weitere Konzentration entwicklungspolitischer Kompetenzen innerhalb der Kommis-sion unter dem Dach der Generaldirektion Entwicklung schaffen die Voraussetzungen für eine künftig effektivere und effizientere Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Die Gefahr einer Instrumentalisierung der Entwicklungspolitik durch außen- oder sicherheitspolitische Interessen besteht kaum, da dem Entwicklungskommissar eine hervor-gehobene Rolle innerhalb der Planung zugesprochen wird. So verbleibt die Kontrolle über die europäische Entwicklungspolitik weiterhin großenteils bei der Kommission. Allerdings bleibt abzuwarten, wie die Führungsrolle der Kommission in der Praxis ausgestaltet werden wird. Aus entwicklungspolitischer Perspektive wäre es wünschenswert, sicherzustellen, dass Gelder aus dem europäischen Entwicklungsbudget ausschließlich zur Armutsbe-kämpfung verwendet werden. Der Vorschlag Ashtons ist somit aus entwicklungspolitischer Perspektive eher eine Chance als ein Risiko. Alles weitere hängt von seiner konkreten Ausgestaltung ab.

386

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Call for Papers

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