Universität Greifswald

Mathematisch-Naturwissenschaftliche Fakultät

Umweltwissenschaften

How does the individual’s responsibility compare with

those of industry, government, and the media in the

effort to mitigate the climate crisis?

Bachelor Thesis

7th term 2020/21

Johanna Czichowski

First supervisor:

Prof. Dr. Susanne Stoll-Kleemann

Second supervisor:

M. Sc. Susanne Nicolai

Berlin, 26th of February 2021

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EIDESSTATTLICHE ERKLÄRUNG

Hiermit erkläre ich, dass ich die vorliegende Arbeit selbständig und eigenhändig, sowie ohne

Benutzung anderer als der angegebenen Hilfsmittel angefertigt habe. Die aus fremden Quellen

direkt oder indirekt übernommenen Gedanken sind als solche kenntlich gemacht.

Die Arbeit wurde in gleicher oder ähnlicher Form keiner anderen Prüfungsbehörde vorgelegt

und auch noch nicht veröffentlicht.

Berlin, den 26.02.2021

...........................................................................

Johanna Czichowski

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ABSTRACT

It proves difficult to allocate responsibility for climate change and identify it as an imminent threat since it is a multigenerational, global problem with no direct causation (Peeters et al., 2019), which hinders governmental compensation for damages. Moreover, it thwarts adaptation and mitigation efforts, due to a lack of authoritative oversight committees and because of short-term governments which are re-elected regularly (Bernauer, 2013; Braun & Baatz, 2017), while complex government systems obstruct directly allocating blame to one party (Bache et al., 2015; Mayer, 2016; Okereke & Coventry, 2016; Page & Heyward, 2016; Wilson & Hobolt, 2015). Nevertheless, mitigation and adaptation programs are central governmental duties to protect human rights and to support other, more vulnerable, and less adaptable countries (Bernauer, 2013; Wewerinke-Singh, 2019). Individual moral responsibility for climate change can express itself in personal GHG reductions and more importantly by promoting the collective action of holding institutions accountable. This is based on the argument that people are part of a culpable collective (Banks, 2013; Braun & Baatz, 2017; Hiller, 2013), supported by several other moral principles (Fragnière, 2016; Kyllönen, 2016). Therefore, premising individual responsibility allocations upon a combination of the cause,

benefit and means principle seems to be fairest, thereby acknowledging differing circumstances for each person by considering past actions, current privileges, and monetary resources (Braun & Baatz, 2017). Similarly, (non-)material compensation of governments should be measured by the countries’ financial and technical resources, the benefits current generations enjoy due to past emissions of their country, together with historical responsibility, efforts of mitigation, and vulnerability, which can be summarised by income per capita (Bernauer, 2013; Mayer, 2016). The combination of historical knowledge about the prospective effects of GHG emissions and the unwillingness to adapt technology accordingly, along with lobbying against emission regulations, justify attributing high levels of responsibility to the industry (Frumhoff et al., 2015; Heede, 2017; Hormio, 2017). As media has significant influence on public concern, the perceived credibility of the varying involved parties and the way citizens regard their role and the potential of civil action, it falls to them to provide information about underlying power relations, include marginalised voices, as well as the political opposition, encourage critical thinking, and explain the scientific background (Carvalho, 2010; Happer & Philo, 2016; Lück et al., 2018; Pepermans & Maeseele, 2017; Schäfer, 2015). Yet past and present media coverage has mostly relied on elite authorities (Gibson et al., 2016; Happer & Philo, 2016; Pepermans & Maeseele, 2017; Petersen et al., 2019; Schäfer, 2015; Schäfer & Painter, 2020), has thus contributed to a manipulative reporting system (Maclean, 2019; Schäfer & Painter, 2020) and should hence be held responsible for its journalistic narratives and frames (Lück et al., 2018). However, focussing on intersectionality and climate justice, could enhance self-efficacy and encourage questioning existing socio-political and economic systems (Pepermans & Maeseele, 2018), which need to be reformed to induce lasting change (Cuomo, 2011; Lahikainen, 2018).

IV

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Verantwortung für den anthropogenen Klimawandel zuzuteilen, erweist sich als schwierig, da es sich um ein globales, generationsübergreifendes Problem ohne direkte Kausalität handelt (Peeters et al., 2019). Darüber hinaus werden staatliche Klimawandelanpassungs-, Entschädigungs- und Verminderungsbemühungen aufgrund fehlender Kontrollinstitutionen und zeitlich befristeten Regierungen vereitelt (Bernauer, 2013; Braun & Baatz, 2017), während komplexe Regierungssysteme eine direkte Schuldzuweisung erschweren (Bache et al., 2015; Mayer, 2016; Okereke & Coventry, 2016; Page & Heyward, 2016; Wilson & Hobolt, 2015). Verminderungs- und Anpassungsprogramme sind jedoch zentrale Regierungsaufgaben, die dem Schutz von Menschenrechten dienen, sowie weniger anpassungsfähige Länder unterstützen müssen (Bernauer, 2013; Wewerinke-Singh, 2019). Individuelle moralische Verantwortung für den Klimawandel kann sich in privater Emissionsreduzierung äußern, und indem kollektive Maßnahmen von Institutionen gefordert werden. Dies basiert auf dem Argument, dass Menschen Teil eines schuldhaften Kollektivs sind (Banks, 2013; Braun & Baatz, 2017; Hiller, 2013), sowie weiteren moralische Prinzipien (Fragnière, 2016; Kyllönen, 2016). Daher erscheint es am gerechtesten, Zuweisungen individueller Verantwortung auf die Kombination von Ursache, Nutzen und Mittel zu stützen, unter Beachtung verschiedener persönlicher Umstände, vergangenem Handeln, aktueller Privilegien und finanzieller Mittel (Braun & Baatz, 2017). Ähnlich sollten (im)materielle Entschädigungen von Staaten gemessen werden an deren: finanziellen und technischen Ressourcen; historischer Verantwortung; Vorteilen, die aktuelle Generationen aufgrund vergangener Emissionen ihres Landes genießen; sowie an Verminderungsbemühungen und Vulnerabilität, zusammengefasst unter dem Pro-Kopf-Einkommen (Bernauer, 2013; Mayer, 2016). Eine Kombination aus Wissen über zukünftige Auswirkungen von Treibhausgasen und unzureichendes Anpassen von Technologien, sowie Lobbyarbeit gegen Emissions-vorschriften, rechtfertigen es der Industrie ein hohes Maß an Verantwortung zuzuteilen (Frumhoff et al., 2015; Heede, 2017; Hormio, 2017). Die Medien haben einen erheblichen Einfluss auf den Fokus der Öffentlichkeit, sowie auf die wahrgenommene Glaubwürdigkeit der beteiligten Parteien, die Einschätzung der Bürgerrolle und das Potenzial zivilrechtlicher Maßnahmen. Dementsprechend müssen Medien über zugrunde liegende Machtverhältnisse informieren, kritisches Denken fördern, marginalisierte Stimmen und die politische Opposition repräsentieren, und den wissenschaftlichen Hintergrund erklären (Carvalho, 2010; Happer & Philo, 2016; Lück et al., 2018; Pepermans & Maeseele, 2017; Schäfer, 2015). Vergangene und gegenwärtige Berichterstattung stützt sich jedoch hauptsächlich auf elitäre Institutionen (Gibson et al., 2016; Happer & Philo, 2016; Pepermans & Maeseele, 2017; Petersen et al., 2019; Schäfer, 2015; Schäfer & Painter, 2020), trägt somit zu einem manipulativen System bei (Maclean, 2019; Schäfer & Painter, 2020) und muss daher für journalistische Narrative verantwortlich gemacht werden (Lück et al., 2018). Hingegen kann der Fokus auf Intersektionalität das Hinterfragen aktueller sozio-politischer und wirtschaftlicher Systeme fördern (Pepermans & Maeseele, 2018), die reformiert werden müssen, um eine nachhaltige Veränderung zu bezwecken (Cuomo, 2011; Lahikainen, 2018).

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Eidesstattliche Erklärung ___________________________________________________ II

Abstract ________________________________________________________________ III

Zusammenfassung ________________________________________________________ IV

Table of Contents _________________________________________________________ V

1 Introduction ___________________________________________________________ 1

1.1 Problem definition ................................................................................................ 1

1.1.1 Anthropogenic Climate Change ........................................................... 1

1.1.2 Mitigation responsibility ...................................................................... 2

1.2 Purpose of work & motivation ............................................................................. 2

1.3 Guiding question & structure ............................................................................... 3

2 Method _______________________________________________________________ 4

2.1 Research strategy .................................................................................................. 4

2.2 Selection of sources & search terms ..................................................................... 4

2.3 Strategy for the Analysis ...................................................................................... 5

3 Analysis & Results ______________________________________________________ 6

3.1 Individuals ............................................................................................................ 6

3.1.1 Introduction to Moral Arguments ......................................................... 6

3.1.2 Individual Impact.................................................................................. 7

3.1.3 Collective & Retrospective Responsibility ........................................... 9

3.1.4 Promoting collective action ................................................................ 10

3.1.5 Climate Justice & Intersectionality..................................................... 11

3.1.6 Engagement & Motivation ................................................................. 12

3.1.7 Role of Scientists ................................................................................ 14

3.1.8 Provisional Result ............................................................................... 15

3.2 Industry............................................................................................................... 15

3.2.1 Discreditation of scientific evidence .................................................. 15

3.2.2 Corporate Carbon Disclosure ............................................................. 17

3.2.3 Transforming the Heavy Industry....................................................... 18

3.2.4 Potential of renewable energies .......................................................... 19

3.2.5 North–South Divide ............................................................................ 20

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3.2.6 Lobbyism ............................................................................................ 21

3.2.7 Corporate Responsibility .................................................................... 22

3.2.8 Provisional result ................................................................................ 23

3.3 Government ........................................................................................................ 23

3.3.1 History of Climate Politics ................................................................. 23

3.3.2 Encumbrance to Implementation ........................................................ 25

3.3.3 Compensation, Mitigation & Adaptation ........................................... 26

3.3.4 Lobbyism ............................................................................................ 28

3.3.5 Allocating Responsibility ................................................................... 29

3.3.6 Provisional Result ............................................................................... 31

3.4 Media .................................................................................................................. 31

3.4.1 The role of Media ............................................................................... 31

3.4.2 Journalistic Frames & Narratives ....................................................... 32

3.4.3 Social Media ....................................................................................... 34

3.4.4 Effects of Media representation .......................................................... 35

3.4.5 Climate Journalists ............................................................................. 36

3.4.6 Problems of covering Climate Change ............................................... 37

3.4.7 Provisional Result ............................................................................... 39

4 Discussion ____________________________________________________________ 40

4.1 Limitations ......................................................................................................... 40

4.2 Connection ......................................................................................................... 40

4.3 General Adaptation ............................................................................................ 42

5 Implications __________________________________________________________ 43

5.1 Recommendations .............................................................................................. 43

5.2 Future ................................................................................................................. 45

6 References ____________________________________________________________ 46

6.1 Literature ............................................................................................................ 46

6.2 Internet Sources .................................................................................................. 50

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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 PROBLEM DEFINITION 1.1.1 ANTHROPOGENIC CLIMATE CHANGE Handling the climate crisis has become the most urgent problem of the 21st century, with wildfires and flooding growing more extreme, as well as sea and ground temperatures reaching new heights and causing an uninhabitable environment for millions of people, animals and plants (IPCC, 2014; Hagedorn et al.). The rising temperatures are the result of an increased release of greenhouse gases (GHGs) such as carbon dioxide (𝐶𝑂2) or methane due to human activities like burning fossil fuels and intense animal agriculture. These GHGs reflect the sun rays reaching Earth, ensuring that in its natural state this planet’s average ground temperature lies at +15 °C as opposed to -18 °C when also disregarding the albedo effect. However, the anthropogenically caused GHGs are emitted at such a large rate that they upset the balance between release by animals and capture by trees and algae. Therefore, the GHG concentration in the atmosphere continues to grow, causing an increasing backscatter of sun rays, which results in higher surface temperatures (IPCC, 2014). The average global temperature has already risen by approximately 1 °C in comparison to pre-industrial levels, causing catastrophic effects for aquatic and onshore ecosystems, mainly the loss of many plant and animal species and thereby biodiversity (IPCC, 2014). Additionally, the global North, as well as the political and economic elites of various countries, profit from the past and present exploitation of the planet as a result of desired limitless growth. This happens at the cost of the people least responsible, which currently translates to inhabitants of the global South. According to the Global Climate Risk Index, these citizens suffer the most, due to extreme weather events with little adaptation options (Eckstein et al., 2021), even though they often live the most sustainably, with ecological values and knowledge that do not fit into the system of capitalism (Cuomo, 2011). Moreover, future generations and specifically vulnerable groups of women, children, the poor and BIPoC (Black, Indigenous and People of Colour) are affected disproportionally (Cuomo, 2011), but have the least social power (Lahikainen, 2018). Therefore, anthropogenic climate change is not only a problem of nature science and technological advancement, but also of ethics, sociology, and political science, which should question underlying power relations and the economic systems that caused these structural inequalities (Cuomo, 2011). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) special report of 2018 displays how humans are close to triggering several tipping elements, with the melting of the Arctic’s and Greenland’s ice sheets as the most pressing and undisputed threats. Setting off any of the nine main tipping points could cause a lasting and sometimes irreversible change in the Earth’s ecosystem with disastrous consequences (IPCC, 2018), especially for citizens of the global South (Cuomo, 2011).

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1.1.2 MITIGATION RESPONSIBILITY To mitigate the effects of anthropogenic climate change, the discussion ultimately lands on whose responsibility it is to implement the changes necessary. With the establishment of the Paris Agreement in 2015 it looked like the United Nations (UN) were ready to take on the challenge of enforcing stricter regulations in order to achieve the 2 °C global temperature target (UNFCC). However, since then global policies aiming to protect the environment have been scarce and ineffective (Bernauer, 2013), while the 𝐶𝑂2 concentration in the atmosphere has risen to numbers and is increasing at a rate unprecedented in recorded history (Scripps Institution of Oceanography, Keeling curve). Therefore, one can assume that if society and economy proceed with a business-as-usual mentality, 𝐶𝑂2 emissions will continue to rise, making the adherence to the 2 °C temperature target very unlikely, unless action is taken immediately by all of the parties with influence (IPCC, 2018). While corporations often claim they only produce goods or extract the oil and gas which consumers demand, climate activists state the obligation to enforce and support a more sustainable society lies with governments and industries. They often base their argument on the Carbon Majors Report of 2017, which determined that 100 fossil fuel producers are responsible for more than 70 % of the GHG emissions released since 1988 (Griffin, 2017). However, just because the supplier of unsustainable energy has been identified, this does not necessarily translate to them carrying all the responsibility for it. In this context, a recent study by Oswald et al. (2020) found that energy is used up twenty more times by the wealthiest 10 % of people in comparison to the poorest 10 % and the former are freer in making choices regarding their lifestyle, actively selecting a big car or planes as modes of transportation. Additionally, the authors note that affluent people also tend to hold more influential positions in society, hence possessing the means to implement change on an extensive level (Oswald et al., 2020). This discussion results in the question on how to hold countries and business organisations accountable, while also acknowledging the potential of individual action, with the media as the connection between those sides and the power to make a scientific and structural problem relevant to every citizen.

1.2 PURPOSE OF WORK & MOTIVATION Most analyses about taking on responsibility for the consequences of the climate crisis only focus on one category regarding whose obligation it is to implement sustainability in their respective fields. This approach enables detailed investigations in and studies on various subcategories and groups within those sections. However, it also often neglects how different aspects might influence each other and what kind of system originally facilitated climate change and the resulting inequalities we can observe today. A dissertation by Lauri Lahikainen (2018) partly fills this gap by examining individual responsibility on the assumption that climate change is a social structural issue, hence considering underlying power relations which are required to evolve in order to achieve a holistic transformation of society. Nevertheless, his reasoning revolves around the moral

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accountability of individuals, whereas media, industry and governments as additional systems that are not only made up of separate human beings all acting within their own moral interpretation, are not evaluated in this context. Therefore, this thesis aims to combine the four main themes “individuals, government, industry, and media” in one study, inspecting specific groups and their differing roles in causing and mitigating the climate crisis, as well as studying social and economic structures which these various actors operate in. The direct comparison thus achieves an interdisciplinary view by including politics, science, and sociology, and hopes to capture the varying scientific research over the last ten years on responsibility allocations and summarise conclusions, connections, and suggestions for the future process of moving towards a more sustainable society. During my studies in Environmental Sciences, I discovered that the subjects resonating the most with me, were the ones connecting current scientific discoveries and calculations regarding climate change, with their consequences for and implementation in economy and politics. In conversations with fellow students the question often surfaced, to what extent individual action such as a vegan diet, will have an impact on the reduction of GHGs in comparison to fossil fuel companies. With the emerging movement of Fridays for Future and Extinction Rebellion, the core of this discussions shifted more towards who should be held accountable, keeping in mind the history and (in)action of different governments and industries, at the same time demonstrating the power individuals like Greta Thunberg can hold.

1.3 GUIDING QUESTION & STRUCTURE The first idea on what this thesis should entail included the contrast of the impact of individual action such as reducing animal product consumption in comparison to the power of influential industries. To achieve a holistic view on the issue of important actors in the climate crisis, the institution of governments and media were added to this analysis. Thus, the guiding question quickly assembled to assessing the responsibility of the four main groups in climate change mitigation: individuals, industry, governments, and the media. Those categories also make for a clearly structured scheme, analysing them individually, while addressing various subordinated aspects, before drawing conclusions on how they might affect each other and what measures are required to be taken by each division. Before beginning the analysis my assumptions regarding responsibility allocations are formulated as followed. First, industry and governments should have more pronounced duties to mitigate the effects of climate change as these measures are more effective and active denial or derailing of conversations about GHG regulation add to the debt owed to citizens. Second, individuals should mainly fulfil their obligation to vote so that governments with advanced sustainability programs are able to implement emission reduction measurements. Third, the media must show the catastrophic effects of rising global temperatures for ecosystems and humans on a daily scale to raise alert and action in society, but also present successful measures taken by governments, industry and on an individual level, to enhance engagement.

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2 METHOD

2.1 RESEARCH STRATEGY The approach chosen for this thesis is a systematic literature review to enable a diverse look on the contrasting perspectives in scientific research regarding the topic of responsibility and accountability in the climate crisis within the last ten years. Therefore, the results were summed up in a qualitative way, based on the individual findings of scientists, additionally providing new insights on how to distribute responsibility among all of the involved parties with an inductive argumentation. A first orientation on the subject was done via recent newspaper articles, mainly by independent and impartial papers such as The Guardian, The BBC, The New York Times or Der Spiegel, to establish the four main themes and sketch an outline for each of the subcategories. Different opinions in these articles, portrayed by the various authors and interviewed experts, also helped to survey the arguments for and against different sides regarding responsibility allocations. Most of these articles were based on interviews with scientists, who wrote papers or were part of research teams addressing some aspect of whose obligation it is to fight against climate change. Accordingly, chain-referral sampling (Dudovskiy, 2011) was employed to locate initial papers and reports which the newspapers referred to. This method, sometimes also called snowball sampling (Dudovskiy, 2011), was used additionally during the in-depth search for literature on which the review is based. With the criteria mentioned in the following paragraph an exponential discriminative snowball

sampling was applied, meaning that one paper might lead to several referrals, but only one reference was deemed useful to add to the chosen sources. While studying the abstracts of relevant research, new subtopics emerged such as the specific role one can attribute to scientists when looking at individual responsibility (Getson et al., 2020). New subjects also included sustainable options for the heavy industry (Friedmann et al., 2019), as opposed to the production where consumers have a more direct influence due to their purchase decision. As the topic of media was the least familiar category, several new aspects were added to the rough outline of sub-themes like the focus on how social media affects the perception and awareness of climate change (Anderson, 2017; Mavrodieva, 2019), as well as theories about manipulation (Maclean, 2019; Pepermans & Maeseele, 2018) and whether certain media display results in public action (Feldman et al., 2017; Yang et al., 2020).

2.2 SELECTION OF SOURCES & SEARCH TERMS As a search tool Google Scholar was utilised for finding sources to base the literature review on and with the help of the University Greifswald library license, many of the restricted articles were made accessible. In addition, the databases and publishers employed during the inquiry included Sage Journals, Elsevier, IOPscience and Wiley Online Library. With climate change as a particularly innovative field of research, the main criterion for the selection procedure of sources was the time frame. Only articles written after 2010 were

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chosen, with most of them in 2015 or later, especially regarding the subject of lobbyism and politics in general since those issues experience most changes over time. However, regarding the subject of individual responsibility an analysis on how the opinions about this subject have changed in the past decade might be thought-provoking, which is why the timeframe was not narrowed down as much. The following search terms were used to locate specific articles for the media section of this literature review: media climate change, additionally adding specifications such as international, lobby and social media. Searching for articles related to individuals, the phrase individual responsibility climate change was used and the terms moral and mitigation were added. The expressions for the analysis regarding industry included industry climate change, supplemented by impact, energy, accountability, lobby, and renewable energies. For the search of articles related to the government part, the captions government climate change and corporate social responsibility were worked with including the additions reparations, history,

and politics. Variations of these terms, as well as translations of them in German were employed to ensure an extensive search. Furthermore, most of the sources have been published in reputable journals such as The

British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Journal of Cleaner Production, Taylor

& Francis or Nature, as well as having been printed by editors like Springer. The few unpublished sources, most of them theses or dissertations, were used to gain an overview of what other final papers have already covered and what aspects might be interesting to investigate further, along with considering new developments in more recent research.

2.3 STRATEGY FOR THE ANALYSIS The sources deemed appropriate were firstly sorted into one of the four Excel sheets titled individuals, government, industry, or media. Within those tables the articles were categorised depending on their focus which consisted of the rubrics responsibility, accountability, or role

for all four main classifications. Furthermore, categories were based on the search terms mentioned beforehand, such as international comparison for the media and government subsection, but also complemented by categories like motivation of citizens regarding the analysis about individuals. Part of those additions for the industry examination included impact and food industry together with subjectivity and propaganda in regard to the inquiry about media. Apart from the title and authors of the papers, the sources were evaluated regarding their main statements, prime concepts and their strengths and weaknesses such as being less relevant due to relying on older information. Additionally, limitations resulted from only looking at the situation in one country and their solutions for sustainability issues, with little reproductivity for other parts of the world. However, international comparisons were deemed more valuable for being able to provide thorough interpretations for a global analysis, although they often gave fewer specific ideas regarding suggestions for explicit action.

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Since a qualitative content analysis was chosen as the method of evaluation, the sources for each category were limited to around twenty for each section, depending on which papers gave the most helpful and innovative insights. The quality factor of the analysis has been adhered to since the individual steps of the research have been clearly portrayed, while structured search criteria enabled a comprehensive scope and comparable data, without including outdated or unreliable sources.

3 ANALYSIS & RESULTS

3.1 INDIVIDUALS 3.1.1 INTRODUCTION TO MORAL ARGUMENTS With the introduction of the Carbon Footprint by a campaign led by British Petroleum (BP) in 2005, the focus of the public fell on how individuals should hold themselves accountable for the emissions they caused, hence implying that changes to reduce global GHG emissions ought to be made on a personal level (Crist, The New York Times, Mar. 2020; Doyle, 2011). This stands in controversy with the fact that over two thirds of global 𝐶𝑂2 emissions are released by fossil fuel energy companies (Griffin, 2017) and a change in a few lifestyle choices by a limited group of the population will have little to no impact on mitigating anthropogenic climate change (Hiller, 2013). Nevertheless, based on the no harm principle, citizens bear a personal and collective duty to inhibit negative effects of climate change or at least attempt to limit them (Kyllönen, 2016). Additionally, the aspect of responsibility does not solely rely on the individual effect, but according to Fragnière (2016) also covers the past, by holding people accountable for prior actions, as well as entailing a sense of duty regarding the future. The general discussion about individual obligations therefore distinguishes between the cause principle, where the people emitting the most should be held accountable, the benefit principle meaning the ones gaining the highest profits should carry the burden and the means principle referring to wealthy citizens (Braun & Baatz, 2017). Climate ethicists have been frequently discussing this problem since the 1990s, arguing that virtues make people change their behaviour, for instance, by relying on moral values of citizens, who deem climate change important enough to adapt their way of life (Fragnière, 2016). However, in more recent years the argumentation, summarised by Voget-Kleschin et al. (2019), focussed on if individuals have the duty to reduce their own impact or whether they are only obligated to support institutions aiming to lessen their carbon footprint. Voget-Kleschin et al. further present the debate where one side argues that the impact of individual action is morally irrelevant, hence denying such duty. Yet others suggest that aggregated actions translate to being part of a group causing harm, which can be considered as morally blameworthy regardless of whether the specific consequences can be observed (Kyllönen, 2016; Voget-Kleschin et al., 2019).

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Additionally, the unsustainable actions of one individual might make another person feel vindicated in acting the same way, as group affiliation plays an influential role in human nature (Banks, 2013). Nonetheless, burdening everybody with adapting a completely sustainable lifestyle, also called demandingness objection, cannot be the solution. This leads to the suggestion that instead of impositions on how individuals should implement changes in their lives, our society requires a more defined view of environmental values and higher awareness of sustainability as a virtue to initiate sustainable behaviour (Voget-Kleschin, 2019). Concurrently, the consequences of aggregated individual actions and the resulting duty to mitigate should also not be underestimated.

3.1.2 INDIVIDUAL IMPACT The most common argument against the relevance of individual action and changes in behaviour is that one person’s carbon footprint is inconsequential in the grand scheme of things and therefore not important, also called individual causal inefficacy as mentioned by Avram Hiller (2013). However, as he also counters this is a redundant argumentation, since the total of those actions is the reason for anthropogenic climate change, cultivated by a society which rewards or at least does not restrict unsustainable living choices (Hiller, 2013; Kyllönen, 2016). This becomes obvious when looking at it from a macroscopic point of view, by integrating the effects over an expanded time frame (Braun & Baatz, 2017; Hiller, 2013). Hiller further explains, how humanity is so overwhelmed by the complexity of climate change and its consequences that it is easy to conclude our own actions do not matter. He suggests, focussing on how damages intensify due to certain activities and actively chose to not contribute to those effects. Furthermore, he highlights the importance of implementing changes on a political level and the influence of citizens thereon, by exercising their right to vote (Cuomo, 2011; Hiller, 2013). In addition to that, the value system which our society is based upon came into existence during a time when communities were much smaller and not like our globalised, advanced, and interconnected world of today (Fragnière, 2016). Therefore, our knowledge about everyday causality with an identifiable culprit proves to be challenging to project on the global phenomenon of the climate crisis (Braun & Baatz, 2017). Since the reasons for climate change also stretch over several generations, across the globe and the damage caused is unintentional, it is even more difficult to apply it to a paradigm

moral problem where one person is directly responsible for the harms experienced by another individual (Peeters et al., 2019; Fragnière, 2016). Many therefore argue that we have to revise our current definition of responsibility as a direct causation, in order to adapt it to our reality (Fragnière, 2016). Moreover, according to the British philosopher Derek Parfit, the act of millions of seemingly unimportant and minuscule actions causing considerable damage is called the paradox of

small effects, where people firstly make the mistake of not looking at how these individual activities add up. Secondly, Parfit argues that since our actions do not only have consequences

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for ourselves, but for everyone and everything on this planet, these activities can be seen as morally wrong (quoted in Fragnière, 2016; Hiller, 2013). Another common argument against the power of individual action assumes that if a certain threshold in the climate system is crossed, anything that comes afterwards is irrelevant. However, the IPCC special report of 2018 clearly demonstrates the different circumstances necessary for triggering a tipping point, with some being likely to transpire this century, whereas others heavily depend on our course of action within the next decades. Additionally, tipping points are difficult to calculate, meaning that we cannot precisely determine when our emissions have prompted a lasting change in an ecosystem (IPCC, 2018). As several studies have shown, there is a gap in society between environmental concern and pro-environmental behaviour or policy support, also referred to as the attitude-action gap (Kulin & Sevä, 2019) or motivational gap (Peeters et al., 2019). Regarding this issue, Peeters et al. (2019) present the difference of on the one hand internalism, a concept used in modern philosophy, which states that motivation automatically follows with sincere morals, suggesting that our moral judgment is not equipped to handle the complex, multi-generational issue of climate change. On the other hand, externalism is based on the idea that people understand the problems and consequences of their actions well enough and are still not motivated to adapt their behaviour, therefore separating moral judgement from motivation. Peeters et al. elaborate how although people with sincere moral judgement will be somewhat motivated, this ambition can be suppressed or dominated by other factors such as self-interest, weakness or tenaciousness. Not being able to understand the way our climate system works and interacts, poses another complication in the ability to recognise one’s role and responsibility in the climate crisis. This does not translate into having to educate everyone on the level of climate scientists, but all citizens should be aware of the basic scientific and social consequences that follow due to a certain behaviour (Braun & Baatz, 2017). Putting all the responsibility on governments and international organisations is based on the delegated authority model, where elected politicians are authorised and obligated to act on behalf of the citizens’ interest. However, when dealing with climate change this model has not been working, in part because citizens have failed to make use of their power to elect politicians who support the evolution to a sustainable future. Furthermore, the main issue lies with how people of developed countries are afraid resolute climate politics will burden and demote their current lifestyle. Hence, politicians who focus on improving the national economy with little regard for the environment are at least partly representing the present public opinion (De Smet et al., 2016). Based on this assumption De Smet et al. (2016) deem blaming only governments for their inaction a form of moral disengagement, which enables individuals to justify their unsustainable behaviour and extrude feelings of guilt. By ignoring our role, we become complicit and part of the problem, thus the individual’s responsibility lies in delegating a strong enough mandate to representatives (De Smet et al., 2016). At the same time, citizens who are unsatisfied with their government’s measurement should form new institutions or

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improve existing structures (Banks, 2013). Moreover, while individuals should not have to take over the government’s work, a higher demand for sustainable options like plant-based substitutes or cycle paths, might encourage industry and politics to expand those alternatives. Furthermore, as the changes implemented will have to be executed by citizens, they in part collectively wield the power over societal developments (Peeters et al., 2019).

3.1.3 COLLECTIVE & RETROSPECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY With climate change as a global issue where everyone who causes GHG emissions is, in a cumulative nature, part of the problem, the concept of a collective responsibility has been essential when discussing individual duties. Melany Banks (2013) argues that as a collective problem, the climate crisis requires collective

responsibility to be navigated effectively. Banks allocates everyone to the collective who participates in the emission of GHGs, while individual responsibility is depended on the agent within the collective to connect the consequences to the appropriate causer. She exempts people from this categorisation who have publicly spoken out against and distanced themselves from it, even if they are still contributing to climate change. She does so on the grounds that they are aspiring to limit their participation in the collective action and in most cases are educating their social environment on the problems of collective harm (Banks, 2013). Furthermore, Banks determines moral responsibility by applying the criteria of awareness regarding the consequences certain behaviour entails. Nevertheless, she acknowledges that in modern times the harmful effects of GHGs are almost universally known and an understanding of the complete scientific context is not necessary for each individual. However, this assumption does excuse the behaviour of generations prior to around 1990 when the IPCC published its first report, thereby making information about climate change available to everyone. Being in denial about one’s own harmful contribution does not exempt from being part of the collective, since individual duties also lie in educating oneself about how in the grand scheme of things one’s actions do matter, provided that this information is accessible (Banks, 2013). Therefore, Banks allocates responsibility to everyone who does not openly declare their opposition to a harmful society and economy, while she also recognises that different positions in a system i.e., president, CEO, celebrity, citizen of the global North or of the global South, should implement changes in various ways depending on the power, possibilities, and resources they hold within their community. When looking at collective responsibility, one must also consider the history of climate change, as Europe and the USA each caused one quarter of GHG emissions since the beginning of the industrial revolution around 1751 and while China is now the biggest polluter, its per capita emissions are still much smaller than those of most western countries (Hansen & Sato, 2016). This issue is also referred to as retrospective responsibility (Braun & Baatz, 2017).

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Voget-Kleschin et al. (2019) argue that to be content in the modern world, we depend upon being able to emit our fair-share of GHGs along with considering contextual factors. As one of the co-authors of this paper, García-Portela discusses whether today’s citizens are required to compensate for the damages caused by past generations. She concludes that even though individual obligations are not part of compensatory justice, people should still be held accountable for the atmospheric debt of their state since they also reap the benefits from living in industrialised countries. Nevertheless, the determination of a fair-share is a very complex topic, taking into account living circumstances in different nations and access to more sustainable options like renewable energy, public transport or regional and seasonal food. Fragnière (2016) expands on this, explaining how a finite carbon budget will be difficult to enforce with legally binding consequences. However, if citizens of certain countries have the means and access to reduce their GHG emissions, they should be held accountable to that, especially when looking at luxury emissions, a term coined by Henry Shue (quoted in Fragnière, 2016; Peeters et al., 2015). The complication here lies in where to draw the line between on the one hand, needs that ought to be fulfilled to live a ‘good life’, and on the other hand luxury activities when looking at acts such as eating meat or driving a car to work. This would also mean that citizens of developed countries are universally allowed to produce more emissions, even though these countries have the technology, experts, and financial resources to revolutionise their energy production (Fragnière, 2016). Braun & Baatz (2017) conclude that only a smart and adept combination of the cause, benefit,

and means principle might result in a just distribution of responsibility considering past action, financial resources, and current privileges, while encouraging cumulative activities also constitutes a key duty.

3.1.4 PROMOTING COLLECTIVE ACTION Next to the question of how much responsibility can be put on an individual, an equally if not more important duty is the promotion of collective action, which is generally agreed on as a necessity, but with little specification on how these activities are supposed to look like. The two most common ways to implement collective action are the bottom-up approach, which relies on changes in lifestyles and social norms, whereas the top-down approach is based on institutional action as Fragnière (2016) explains. Although average citizens should not have to develop strategies on how to mitigate climate change, they do have the duty to hold their governments accountable if these fail to act. By staying ‘neutral’ as in politically inactive, one is compliant with the current course of action in politics, which can be seen as immoral (Fragnière, 2016). A special responsibility falls to those who possess a large platform for promoting the concept of sustainable living, causing an amplifying effect and are at liberty to call attention to failings of governments and industry. However, this does not mean that people in less powerful situations are exempt from such duties. With the increasing significance of social media and influencers who are not necessarily classical celebrities, but can still reach a large audience,

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this effect has taken on new dimensions. Moreover, these high-profile positions could also function as a space for including marginalised voices by lending these platforms to people with less influence (Fragnière, 2016). The top-down approach is generally deemed more effective, since without legal bindings, any suggestions for lifestyle changes will only be implemented by a few, and the more influential adjustments regarding transport and energy cannot be made on an individual level. Additionally, these changes, also referred to as secondary means, are more efficient as they lower the level of difficultly for citizens to opt for environmentally friendly alternatives and can be considered fairer because a problem caused by a collective can only be truly solved by a unified approach (Braun & Baatz, 2017; Fragnière, 2016). Nonetheless, without support from the public top-down approaches will likely be inefficient regarding a long-term perspective, as the elected government body of most democracies change in regular time periods of a few years. Since citizens vote for politicians that align with their perspectives, a universal support for measurements mitigating the climate crisis is necessary to raise parties which plan to implement change to influential positions (Wolf and Moser, 2011). Furthermore, as the last 30 years have shown, relying entirely on governmental leaders has not been particularly productive and by choosing an approach which depends on existing power patterns, inequalities will likely be enhanced with marginalised groups suffering the most (Kaijser and Kronsell, 2014; Wolf and Moser, 2011).

3.1.5 CLIMATE JUSTICE & INTERSECTIONALITY In the face of the injustice and unbalanced development regarding emission and energy footprints when distinguishing between the global North and South, climate justice has emerged as an important subcategory for analysing responsibility allocations (Fisher, 2015). While redistribution is one goal climate justice hopes to achieve, it is essential to recognise the work being done by organisations, especially regarding non-governmental (NGO) institutions, in disadvantaged countries. Fisher (2015) argues that by neglecting social movements and local measures, practical implementations are disregarded. He suggests including actors of every scale related to climate justice in policy concepts, to broaden the understanding on how to engage organisations on various levels. The concept of intersectionality emerged within feminist studies and was first used by law professor Kimberlè Crenshaw in 1991, to describe how different forms of inequality can affect and interact with each other, especially when looking at the combined inequalities resulting from gender and race (in Kaijser and Kronsell, 2014; TIME, 2020). By analysing an issue such as climate change with an intersectional approach, different responsibility allocations may emerge, as social constructs are put into historical and political context with regards to past and present power relations (Kaijser and Kronsell, 2014). When looking at the victims and actors of climate change, an intersectional method is necessary to analyse various levels of motivation and engagement groups. Salehi et al. (2015) present several studies, which found that women, people with a University degree and

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younger adults are more likely to adapt their lifestyle and implement mitigation techniques. In a study Salehi et al. conducted in Iran, they found women were more engaged in the issue of climate change, whereas men knew more about it. While women in the global North are more involved in the decision-making process of climate policies, in the global South they often play a key role in sustainable consumption regarding the household (Salehi et al., 2015). Still, climate strategies scarcely suggest adaptation concepts for sectors such as behaviour regarding transportation or consumption where gender and class differences are distinctive (Kaijser and Kronsell, 2014). Effective mitigation and adaptation techniques can only be implemented when the different categorisations society entails, are understood. For example, if adaptation methods regarding transport suggest purchasing a new electric car, this mainly addresses white, middle-class men making them the norm, which neglects the majority of the world population even if only developed countries are targeted (Kaijser and Kronsell, 2014). In addition, taxes on certain plan-based alternatives are often still higher since they are not declared as staples food, hence making them unavailable to low-income households. Moreover, not all regions in every country can always provide affordable seasonal and regional vegetarian options, and not all citizens can afford the technical equipment to store fresh fruits and vegetables (Kendall, 2020). This demonstrates how the modern concept of a sustainable lifestyle is dominantly modelled after the image of white, wealthy citizens of Western countries, thereby rooted in materialistic and economic growth, but a sustainable lifestyle looks different depending on the country, social categories, gender, and race (Kaijser and Kronsell, 2014). Thus, forcing the standards designed for developed countries on the global South and on marginalised groups will likely be impossible to implement and only strengthen existing inequalities. Therefore, marginalised citizens must be part of policy making, while existing power structures should be questioned additionally by asking which social categories and identities are represented, what type of environmental knowledge is prioritised, and how materialistic the image of a ‘good life’ is portrayed, serving as the norm which sustainable practices are often pivoted on (Kaijser and Kronsell, 2014).

3.1.6 ENGAGEMENT & MOTIVATION The implementation of sustainable changes and involvement of individuals on a private as well as collective level, faces several obstacles which are necessary to analyse in order to determine who can be held responsible for their existence. Engagement in this context does not only refer to political action, but also to an individual link to the climate crisis, which can happen on three different levels: through rational argumentation (the mind), by appealing to sympathy and affection (the heart) and lastly via a practical approach (the hands). Addressing only one of those levels will not result in sufficient reactions, as has been shown by research analysing how improving knowledge of climate change does not necessarily motivate audiences since barriers of social and institutional norms are still in place (Wolf & Moser, 2011).

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Furthermore, citizens of varying countries formulate individual opinions and draw different conclusions when being educated on topics such as climate change. This heavily depends on their attitude type, meaning they respond to climate change issues with varying levels of concern, uncertainty, scepticism, or action, which has been proven in cross-national overarching studies as discussed by Wolf & Moser (2011) and Hine et al. (2016). Happer & Philo (2016) conducted a study with various population groups as to their perception of climate change and barriers regarding stimulating action. The obstacle of understanding the complex topic of climate change was a universal finding across all groups. Moreover, the difficulty of determining trustworthiness of digital media was mentioned, especially by young people. While scientists were perceived as the most reliable source of information, the lack of more definite predictions and the uncertainty regarding global trends, evoked feelings of doubt among participants (Happer & Philo, 2016). Politicians were deemed the least trustworthy as they were accused of acting in their own interest, thus neglecting voices of the public and causing feelings of powerlessness (Happer & Philo, 2016), which is a major factor in engaging citizens in political debates (Carvalho, 2010). This was not the case with people having had direct personal experience with decision makers and public meetings, or citizens implementing changes within their communities (Happer & Philo, 2016). Effects on personal lives and living areas were also regarded as productive when stimulating thoughts about climate change. However, translations into a response were often hindered by the perception that individual actions are inconsequential, governments are required to lead the way by implementing more mitigation methods, and lifestyle changes are inconvenient due to structural barriers (Happer & Philo, 2016). Additionally, another important aspect in how audiences react, relates to what their culture has taught them about fairness, the perception of nature and their role in society. Portraying the issue around climate change as a scientific or technological problem limits the group feeling addressed, presuming that all responsibility has to lie with experts of scientific or political fields, whereas integrating the power of the public can enhance feelings of personal responsibility regarding mitigation (Wolf & Moser, 2011). Nevertheless, these findings are not universal as other investigations like an Australian study by Hine et al. (2016) found no strengthening of adaptation intentions when focussing on collective action. They do acknowledge that the difference between mitigation and adaptation methods might be a relevant distinction (Hine et al., 2016). Massage framing is therefore an essential part of motivation, with specific strategies on emission reduction being deemed the most effective to induce engagement. While universal doom often results in disengagement to suppress fear, threats to people’s immediate surroundings like their family, living area or belongings can trigger active behaviour (Hine et al., 2016; Peeters et al., 2019). Yet direct exposure to the effects of raising temperatures such as flooding, do not necessarily translate into a greater concern about mitigation techniques, rather the people affected focus on how to adapt to the new circumstances (Wolf & Moser, 2011).

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To increase motivation and interest in the subject of climate change, visual tools like films can help if they do not communicate too much fear, which people often find manipulative or difficult to process, hence stifling personal engagement (Hine et al., 2016; Wolf & Moser, 2011). Presenting clear, realisable, and locally framed mitigation techniques in a hopeful way, by focussing on the positive outcome if collective measures are taken now, has been proven to be more conducive in raising motivation (Hine et al., 2016). To overcome the motivational gap, Peeters et al. (2019) present two strategies, the first one being to break down the complexity of climate change, thus making it easier to relate to and therefore increasing motivation. Second, they suggest to further educate on the impact of individuals, emphasising the importance and significance everyday choices can have when accumulated over time. They focus on the method of empowerment through self-efficacy to encourage self-management and engagement, as well as clarifying the individual’s role. Since many people still perceive the adaptation of an environmentally friendly lifestyle as expensive it is necessary to highlight that sustainability is rooted in less consumption with higher quality, especially when looking at clothes and electronic devices. Accordingly, people do not have to discard of all their old clothes and replace them with fair fashion, but should reuse and repair the products they already own. Introducing people to a less materialistic lifestyle will not only reduce their emission footprint, but also increase their mental and physical wellbeing by focussing on non-materialistic occupations regarding culture, politics, personal growth, or relationships, leaving people less anxious and more satisfied with life. However, as society and cultural norm can override any attempts of integrating sustainability into one’s life, limitations when changing one’s lifestyle arise from the circumstances the individual is born into (Peeters et al., 2019), with scientists in particularly relevant positions.

3.1.7 ROLE OF SCIENTISTS In past few decades, science was generally viewed as a neutral field and independent from political developments. Yet in more recent years, climate scientists have commenced to clearly position themselves regarding activism for example the Scientists for Future initiative supporting the student movement Fridays for Future by verifying their statements and demands (Hagedorn et al., 2019). Moreover, the current political climate with alternative facts and fake news clearly demonstrates how important professional and qualified experts are to inform the public and counsel governments. In their study, Getson et al. (2020) interviewed climate professionals in the USA on their role in supporting the government in developing climate change mitigation strategies. Since that survey took place from March to the 2nd of June 2017, the United States under the Trump administration announced their decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement just before the end of the study. Accordingly, the scientists expressed their frustration towards the American government and in general agreed that they had a responsibility in spreading information about mitigation techniques to the public.

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Since scientists are becoming more intertwined with politics, either in the role of consultants or by running for office themselves, the image of scientists as a neutral party is changing, and further research on how this integration should be managed is necessary to use the scientific knowledge to its full potential (Getson et al., 2020).

3.1.8 PROVISIONAL RESULT After analysing various perspectives on individual duties, the common ground seems to be that individuals have to take on some moral responsibility for climate change whether by reductions in their own GHG emissions or by mutually holding institutions and fellow citizens accountable. This can be justified by being part of a collective where individual action added up over time, is the reason for harmful consequences of anthropogenic climate change (Banks, 2013; Braun & Baatz, 2017; Hiller, 2013), supported by the morality of the no harm principle (Kyllönen, 2016). However, it proves difficult to identify climate change as an imminent threat because it is a multigenerational, global problem with no direct causation and because our moral judgement can be overridden by other emotions or circumstances in society (Peeters et al., 2019). Framing climate change adaptation in a positive and specific way, while still displaying the urgency of this crisis has been deemed the most effective to motivate audiences (Wolf & Moser, 2011; Hine et al., 2016). Additionally, the various groups of society should be considered when addressing individual responsibility to achieve engagement (Peeters et al., 2019). Top-down approaches have been assumed as the most effective for implementing measures, however, citizens are required to delegate a strong enough mandate to representatives who focus on mitigating the climate crisis (De Smet et al., 2016). The central problem revolves around how the circumstances are different for each individual, making it difficult to formulate a universal recommendation. Basing responsibility allocations on the combination of the cause, benefit and means principle seems to be the most just, considering past actions, current privileges, and financial resources (Braun & Baatz, 2017). As the (fossil fuel) industry is the party facing the highest accusation from individuals and activists’ groups, its role in causing and mitigating the climate crisis will be analysed next.

3.2 INDUSTRY 3.2.1 DISCREDITATION OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE In 2017, the Carbon Majors Report was published, stating that 100 fossil fuel producers are responsible for more than 70 % of the GHG emissions released since 1988, which has been utilised widely to demonstrate the power few industries hold and to question their role in taking on responsibility for the effects of burning fossil fuels (Griffin, 2017). Discussions around the severe consequences of anthropogenic climate change began in the 1950s and commenced being part of scientific papers in the following decades, which led to the establishment of the IPCC in 1988. At the same time, investor-owned fossil fuel companies founded the Global Climate Coalition (GCC) to prevent the establishment of GHG emission limitation policies by lobbying against them, as well as initiating campaigns

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questioning the reputability of the IPCC and the theory of the anthropogenic greenhouse effect (Frumhoff et al., 2015; Schäfer, 2015). This happened, even though the scientists of fossil fuel industries were fully aware of the consequences increasing GHG emissions would entail since the 1970s, yet these companies intentionally failed to disclose the risks to their shareholders and the public (Heede, 2017). After BP acknowledged its shared responsibility for the effects of 𝐶𝑂2 in 1997 and focussed on technological innovations as the solution to this crisis by establishing funding of solar energies, several other companies joined this movement. However, their investments in low-carbon and renewable energies, usually make up only <1 to 2 % of their capital expenditures (Hedde, 2017; Frumhoff et al., 2015; Schäfer, 2015). Nevertheless, even though some companies recognise the influence of human activities, many of the biggest emitters and later also BP denied corporate responsibility, hence refusing to adjust their business model and consider the effects carbon pricing and stricter regulations will have on their industry. Instead, they spent millions on lobbying and ranting against climate protection policies, which among other things led to the failure of the Kyoto protocol and the absence of a cap on emissions in the USA (Frumhoff et al., 2015; Hormio, 2017; Schäfer, 2015). The distribution of false information and discreditation of scientific knowledge has happened not only in relation to climate change, but also with several other areas where these industries were later held legally responsible for their continuous sale of those products, which could function as important references for future accountability allocations (Frumhoff et al., 2015; Jaworska, 2018). These goods include tobacco, lead and asbestos, all once regarded as harmless or even helpful and healing, but turned out to be toxic for the human body and its environment. When these discoveries reached the public, the producers and manufacturers were held responsible, regardless of whether the product was previously legal. In the special case of tobacco, corporations insisted on shifting blame to consumers since they chose to use tobacco, but as society became increasingly aware of the consequences of smoking, public pressure increased. In 1995, the tobacco industry was finally deemed responsible for knowingly distributing false information, which demonstrates the impact society’s outcry and demands can have (Frumhoff et al., 2015; Jaworska, 2018). More recently, producers of meat, soy and palm oil have increasingly been under investigation regarding their manufacturing process and its environmental damage, which are now more strictly regulated with labels declaring ‘fair’ or ‘sustainable’ agriculture, therefore gaining a social license for continuing to sell these products. This concept of corporate social

responsibility has partly been picked up by fossil fuel producers who recognise that they require a social license in order to avoid damages to their image, which in turn could incapacitate their trade on the world market (Favotto & Kollmann, 2019; Frumhoff et al., 2015; Jaworska, 2018). Part of this social responsibility is reflected in the attempt of establishing a corporate carbon disclosure.

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3.2.2 CORPORATE CARBON DISCLOSURE Hahn et al. (2015) reviewed the literature on carbon disclosure and summarised three theoretical perspectives to explain the reasons for the installation of such a framework within the industry. According to them, socio-political theories assume that demands by the public, stakeholders or the government lead to a disclosure of information, thus ascribing it to external pressure. Second, they introduce economics-based theories, which suggest companies adjust their transparency reports to gain benefits on the world market by diminishing asymmetric information, attaining trust and loyalty of customers and investors, as well as appealing to environmental organisations. Lastly, they present the institutional theory, where requirements from organisations or governments result in the corporations’ adaptation of their guidelines (Hahn et al., 2015). Hahn et al. display several researchers who deem voluntary disclosure a successful concept that fulfils stakeholder demands. However, they also acknowledge that while many companies engage in voluntary reports regarding environmental issues, they very rarely disclose in what capacity they contribute to a sustainable future. Instead, they use vague descriptions of environmental sustainability in a noncommittal way, to improve their image and gain competitive economic advantages. Since these reports do not have to fulfil specific requirements, the companies are left to decide what criteria they want to address and to what extend to go into detail, thus mandatory reporting standards have been suggested (Hahn et al., 2015; Jaworska, 2018). Moreover, with voluntary carbon disclosure, the companies can select which guidelines they intend to follow, hence complicating comparisons of carbon achievements and performance since the various guidelines include different sources of emissions (Hahn et al., 2015). When analysing the topics mentioned in environmental reports, most corporations note the gravity of the situation, but few regard this change as an opportunity to transform their business model and adopt new strategies. Furthermore, they prefer using more neutral or abstract scientific expressions such as ‘climate change’ instead of ‘global warming’, the latter of which is perceived as more threatening and immediate. During discussions on climate change and the IPCC, the subjects of energy demand, preservation of jobs and high costs of a transition to low-carbon energies are usually mentioned shortly after and emphasised more strongly. Additionally, statements by the IPCC are frequently paired with words like ‘believe’ or ‘potential’ to assert uncertainty, instead of scientifically proven research. At the same time, fossil fuel industries focus on the importance of individual action to divert responsibility, whereas risks from the climate crisis are mainly projected onto economic dangers rather than describing the catastrophic consequences for citizens (Jaworska, 2018). Maclean (2019) presents another technique of deference through regulatory capture referring to the method of shifting the public eye away from regulatory action to the interests of corporations, mostly by these industries themselves. The most common process entails stating how they are acting in the ‘public’ or ‘national interest’ and are thus difficult to detect, as

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economic benefits are highlighted, while other needs for a flourishing society, like an inhabitable planet, are neglected (Maclean, 2019). However, as Hahn et al. state in their literature review, there exists a discordance regarding the effects of carbon disclosure. These mixed results refer to both the reduction of GHG emissions, as well as gained advantages on the world market by reason of disclosing information. Therefore, the impact of carbon disclosure requires further examination (Hahn et al., 2015), while other areas of the industry are clearly obligated to apply more extreme methods to fulfil their role in taking on responsibility (Friedmann et al., 2019).

3.2.3 TRANSFORMING THE HEAVY INDUSTRY The heavy industry accounts for around 10 % of anthropogenic 𝐶𝑂2 emissions and 42 % of industrial emissions and thus demands transformation to low-carbon alternatives to facilitate achieving global temperature targets. These high percentages result from the combustion of fossil fuels to generate temperatures up to 2000 °C, to enable processing materials like cement, steel, or glass (Friedmann et al., 2019). Trying to decarbonise this industry has been challenging since fossil fuels are the most effective option, possessing the highest energy density, next to nuclear energy, hence having the best heat quality and being relatively cheap. Alternatives such as biomass, hydrogen, or electrical heating all significantly raise manufacturing costs and thus also the product price on the market, which leads to trade disadvantages. Additionally, methods like biomass and electrification implicate high uncertainties regarding their carbon footprint (Friedmann et al., 2019). Carbon capture use and storage (CCUS) might be an option to subtract 𝐶𝑂2 from the facility’s emissions, but entails cost uncertainties, as well as increased efforts for adapting it to these industries, although it would still be easier than switching the supply method (Friedmann et al., 2019). As a substitute for fossil fuels, hydrogen offers the best characteristics regarding heat supply, straightforward adjustment, and costs, which would rise by 10 to 50 %. However, this is based on blue hydrogen, which is generated with natural gas and then decarbonised, whereas green

hydrogen is produced without carbon emissions by electrolysis of water powered by wind, hydro or solar energy, but elevates costs by 200-800 %. These prices would drop considerably if renewable energy costs sank in the future (Friedmann et al., 2019). Furthermore, since industrial markets trade globally, they must be highly competitive with regions where manual labour and energy costs are low and environmental standards underdeveloped. Therefore, further policy regulations of global trade issues are required to be established, enabling the capacity to compete for industries employing low-carbon heat production (Friedmann et al., 2019). At the same time, the possibilities of renewable energies are crucial in determining how industries could have induced shifts to sustainable economies in the past and what they will have to undertake in the present and future.

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3.2.4 POTENTIAL OF RENEWABLE ENERGIES With fossil fuels often described as the backbone of modern society and capitalism, the question arises how transitioning to renewable energies will affect the current economy as most of the program introduced by the Green New Deal aims to maintain or adjust a capitalist system, instead of moving to new socioeconomic structures (McCarthy, 2015). In Germany and Denmark, the renewable energy sector has been growing due to the association of industry and scientific research institutes, but also the participation of regional actors such farmers and households, hence a bottom-up approach. In the UK, investment in renewable energies commenced slower as the technology sector was not as developed or involved, and policy implementation was scarce and focussed mainly on financial efficiency. Yet, with the launch of the state-owned Green Investment Bank in 2010 and increased governmental financing in more costly technology, the UK now has one of the fastest growing renewable energy sectors, especially regarding offshore wind power. Nevertheless, the lack of local involvement and only small rates of experts trained in green energy development hinder a transformation on all levels (Ćetković & Buzogány, 2016). Additionally, it is important to note that the UK heavily relies on nuclear energy as part of its clean energy program and plans continuing to do so in the future. Around 16 % of its energy demand are covered by nuclear technology and the existing power plants retiring by 2030 will be replaced with new ones, investing up to 385 million pounds in this advanced nuclear fund (Energy White Paper, 2020). The renewable energy sector in Eastern Europe has experienced an uneven development over the past decades with sometimes years passing where no further improvement happened due to political instability, little financial means and limited communication between government and society (Ćetković & Buzogány, 2016). Climate scientists have for a long time confirmed that technologically a transition to renewable energies is possible with energy from water, geothermal sources, the sun, and wind providing enough resources at approximately the same costs (IPCC, 2014). These prices are even expected to drop below the ones for fossil fuels since renewable energy deposits are larger and global investments in such technology will reduce costs. Moreover, the trend over the past few decades shows how investment in renewable energies has increased and only slightly lessened shortly after the financial crisis in 2009 (McCarthy, 2015). Nevertheless, transforming the industry will be a tremendous effort since the entire energy infrastructure will have to be reconstructed and as renewable energy is less dense than fossil fuels, it requires remodelling of large landscapes on and offshore (McCarthy, 2015). However, it would also facilitate new investments for firms, as well as create an estimated 2.3 million jobs worldwide, which in turn can positively influence economic growth and lead to improvements in the sectors of education, equality, and health (Owusu & Asumadu-Sarkodie, 2016). Therefore, a capitalist system does not necessarily have to depend upon finite resources, as it has done in the past, it could even enhance a sustainable energy system by large-scale investments in renewable technology and infrastructure (McCarthy, 2015). The cooperation of industrial, governmental, and scientific institutions, as well as a connection to local

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authorities and clear correspondence towards the citizens seems to be essential for a successful transition to renewable energies. Internationally, stronger EU Directives with policy instruments should be established, focussing on the potentials of different member states to achieve a holistic transformation (Ćetković & Buzogány, 2016; Owusu & Asumadu-Sarkodie, 2016). Yet, discussions about suitable construction areas are often dominated by technological and economic requirements that ought to be met, instead of looking at it from a socioecological point of view. The desired regions would most likely be located in countries with low land values, where inhabitants and owners have little influence and power, hence again mostly capitalising on the global South (McCarthy, 2015). Moreover, one should always question a system promising endless economic growth, which in fact only serves a small elite at the cost of the vast majority of people. Instead, more circular and communistic economy approaches should be considered, to remedy existing inequalities that emerged due to exploitation of the global South by corporations of the global North, for which those industries should be held accountable for (Maclean, 2019).

3.2.5 NORTH–SOUTH DIVIDE Nurunnabi (2015) determined that social accountability of companies regarding climate mitigation methods in developing countries like Bangladesh is very low. On the one hand, financial resources are already scarce as workers are often not paid a living wage, which leaves little for sustainability issues. On the other hand, there are no official regulations imposed on the industry, so only the effects of a responsible image as an economic advantage and social legitimacy are contributing to an interest in voluntary regulations and disclosure of information on emissions (Nurunnabi, 2015). A recent international study by Oswald et al. (2020) concerning energy footprints, found that regarding income the lower 50 % of the world population consume less energy, than the top 5 %. Furthermore, they observed how transport is one of the least equal sectors, where switching to renewable and low emission technologies has been proven to be difficult, especially regarding air and private travel. The discrepancies between high- and low-income citizens are intensified by economic growth as the central concept that the modern world bases its society on, which principally benefits high consumption social strata. These inequalities will only aggravate in the future with high-income energy footprints growing larger, whereas the bottom ones will stay small (Oswald et al., 2020). As climate extremes and natural disasters are expected to occur more frequently in the process of climate change, meeting an increasing food demand and water scarcity have been growing concerns in the last decades (IPCC, 2014). Therefore, the food industry should develop climate adaption strategies based on analyses of the food value chain. The most effective way to determine risks and opportunities within the food industry appears to be an analysis of carbon and water footprints of specific food groups. Future research evaluating the consequences of rising temperatures and declining precipitation, as well as the impact of

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climate change on the quality of a product, could provide insights into adaption potentials within the value chain (Ridoutt et al., 2016). Legal action has been taken by Islands and coastal regions against major oil, gas, and coal companies in an attempt to seek compensation. This could enable further claims of holding the fossil fuel industry accountable if these litigations will be successful with some of those suits of law basing their arguments and attribution of guilt on the active lobbying of industries against emission restrictions (Heede, 2017).

3.2.6 LOBBYISM In the USA, many fossil fuel companies continue to be part of influential lobbying groups such as the American Petroleum Institute (API), American Coal Council (ACC) and American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) that spread false information on climate science and hider implementation of GHG regulation policies. This not only allows them to continue with their exploitive methods of extracting gas, oil, and coal from instable environments such as the North Sea or the Artic, but also enables them to justify their utility of previously untouched resources (Frumhoff et al., 2015). While BP has since distanced themselves from ALEC, they continue to fund climate change deniers in the US government or, in ExxonMobil’s case, climate change contrarians in scientific research fields (Frumhoff & Oreskes, 2015, The Guardian). Furthermore, actively engaging in lobbyism against GHG regulations secures these industries an unfair market advantage, which adds to market failure and opposes trends in society for more sustainable, as well as affordable options (Hormio, 2017). Additionally, many fossil fuel energy companies also did not disclose the material risk climate change could have on their production to their shareholder (Frumhoff et al., 2015). A contrasting trend has been that some big fossil fuel companies publicly support GHG emission regulation which Kennard (2017) explains by stating that adapting technologies early on will gain these big companies a competitive advantage over smaller corporations with less financial means. Within the last two decades, companies in western countries have become more open towards disclosing their lobbying activities to meet a growing demand for transparency by society. Yet the content of those declarations is still mostly vaguely phrased, which makes traceability for society or NGO groups challenging and questions the trustworthiness and honesty of such statements. Additionally, very few companies declare their position on policies, defining neither in which capacity they oppose or support certain legislative proposals, nor what their commitments towards climate change and human rights issues entail (Favotto & Kollman, 2019). Nevertheless, public and stakeholder demands should continue as transparency grows, diminishing information asymmetries between the industry and society, as well as encourage policy implementation (Favotto & Kollman, 2019). It is impossible to calculate a definite number of how much money fossil fuel companies have invested in spreading false and misleading information to prolong stricter climate change

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policies as these industries are not obligated to disclose their expenses on politics or the public. However, it is clear that even those millions do not come close to the estimated billions worth of damages that will be caused by storms and sea-level rise to coastal regions over the next decades (Frumhoff & Oreskes, 2015, The Guardian).

3.2.7 CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY All the previous aspects can now be aggregated to determine corporate responsibility which is usually divided in two categories. On the one hand, a social aspect referring to the relationship with society and on the other hand, a moral section that describes the connection to stakeholders, most importantly shareholders. The fundamental problem regarding climate change is that local emissions affect a global community as a result of many separate actions, which makes allocating responsibility difficult (Hormio, 2017). Essential for the determination of corporate moral responsibility is the function of a company in society, which consists of providing specific services or goods that enable activities in society e.g., manufacturing a train to facilitate public transport. For corporations, these two duties are joined by the task to make profit as they interact on competitive markets. However, profit ought not be the top priority, as this would translate to neglecting the industry’s service to society, which represents its primary function (Hormio, 2017). Yet we cannot expect companies to produce completely safe goods or services as this would raise the production cost significantly, making them uncompetitive and unavailable to consumers. Still, corporations also hold a legal responsibility towards most meaningfully their shareholders and employees, and secondary the surrounding communities and their customers, to declare information about the effects of their products and treat them fairly (Hormio, 2017). While businesses cannot be the sole bearer of guilt when it comes to economic and social environments like living wages in other countries, they do actively decide to establish their production in a certain place. The task of creating a legally binding framework for a country such as benefits for sustainable production and heavier taxations of fossil fuel use, falls to governments. Hence, a single company can only act within the politically predefined system and in balance with its economic capabilities and resources. The general tendency, however, shows that policy implementation and legislation often lag behind the current scientific knowledge, development of civil society, as well as consumer demand that induces change. Thus, firms should not simply refute responsibility since policies take time to become legally valid, but also orient themselves towards trends in society (Hormio, 2017). Frumhoff et al. (2015) establish the importance of evaluating industrial responsibility as these corporations with their expertise and technical knowledge were aware of the consequences of their increasing release of GHG after the 1970s (Frumhoff et al., 2015; Hormio, 2017). Furthermore, they could have induced a switch to low-carbon alternatives and investments in research on renewable energies early on, to which they are usually still not aspiring. Instead, the industry often tried and tries to discredit scientific evidence and lobby against policies that would introduce stricter carbon emission regulation (Frumhoff et al., 2015). Therefore, they

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actively encouraged a future that remains dependent on fossil fuels and failed to warn the public of the risks implicated in continuing on that path, even though they have a legal obligation to disclose such information (Frumhoff et al., 2015; Heede, 2017). Additionally, the big industries have the financial and technical means as well as scientific expertise to support the development of sustainable alternatives (Heede, 2017). Hence, they can be attributed with the moral responsibility to compensate for the damages done after they became aware of the effects of increasing GHG emissions, and invest in renewable energies and CCUS technology (Frumhoff et al., 2015).

3.2.8 PROVISIONAL RESULT The combination of knowledge about the effects of GHG emissions in the past and the unwillingness to adapt technology accordingly, together with actively lobbying against stricter carbon regulation, which still gains these corporations financial benefits, all indicate that the industry should be held to high levels of responsibility (Frumhoff et al., 2015; Heede, 2017; Hormio, 2017). Although our current economic system has relied on fossil fuels as its motor for unlimited growth, a capitalist structure could also work with sustainable energies and even improve such a system by large-scale investments in renewable technology and infrastructure (McCarthy, 2015). At the same time, one should question a system which only serves a small elite at the expense of the vast majority of people (Maclean, 2019). To achieve a transition from fossil fuels to renewable energies, industrial, governmental, and scientific institutions are required to cooperate and include local authorities, while clearly communicating with citizens. Furthermore, stronger policy instruments should be established, focussing on the potentials of the different member states, and regulating global trade issues to achieve a holistic transformation and higher competitive capacities for firms that are implementing low-carbon productions (Ćetković & Buzogány, 2016; Friedmann et al., 2019; Owusu & Asumadu-Sarkodie, 2016). Therefore, governments are essential in supporting a shift to sustainable economies, while they additionally will have to be held responsible for their own actions, as explained in the following.

3.3 GOVERNMENT 3.3.1 HISTORY OF CLIMATE POLITICS Developing policies to mitigate the climate crisis has been on the agenda of climate politics since the 1980s, but implementing effective global measures has proven to be more difficult than originally thought (Bernauer, 2013). Initially, climate change was regarded as a technological and economic problem, where science provided the facts and politics distributed responsibilities according to the country’s history and its financial and economic capacities, meaning a top-down approach. Additionally, it was universally agreed upon that as countries evolve and their economies grow, their emissions increase until they reach a peak, and are then able to commence investing in technologies to reduce their pollution. This translated into tasking wealthy countries with establishing mitigation techniques and transferring their technologies to

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developing countries, whereas the latter were provided with room to industrialise and increase their emissions (Gupta, 2016; Okereke & Coventry, 2016). In 1992, a first UN conference regarding climate change was held in Rio de Janeiro, which led to the Unites Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The Kyoto Protocol from 1997 by the parties of the UNFCCC represents a first try at limiting the GHG emissions of the biggest causers, mainly industrial countries (Bernauer, 2013). After years of slow implementation by the global North and growing scepticism in society towards the scientific evidence regarding climate change, it was recognised that we were dealing with a political problem, which must be addressed on all levels of society and requires policies to induce systemic change. This was followed by several Conferences of the Parties (COP) to discuss voluntary, as well as legally binding targets (Gupta, 2016). However, as we have reached the end of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol in 2020, global emissions are continuing to rise. Therefore, the UNFCCC additionally developed the 2015 Paris Agreement with the main goal to keep the global temperature rise during the 21st century below 2 °C, preferably limiting it to 1.5 °C, as passing that threshold will have disastrous consequences for many small islands and African nations. Yet, implementation into politics has been slow and the current measures are not effective enough to reduce emissions (Cuomo, 2011; UNFCCC, 2015). Moreover, the Paris Agreement does not specify any details regarding the methods that should be used for mitigation, like a carbon tax or alternatives to fossil fuels. It also does not define the year when a global peak must be reached, only stating that by 2100 economies should be decarbonised, leaving numerous unspecified targets with no structure as to how these should be accomplished (Okereke & Coventry, 2016). As the Paris Agreement requires all parties to implement ambitious changes and only vaguely describes financial and technological support for developing countries, this could become a problem for the global South, even though they are permitted more time to reach an emission peak. The distribution of accountability according to the nation’s wealth and its historic emissions is referred to as common but differentiated responsibilities (Frumhoff et al., 2015; Hansen & Sato, 2016; Mayer, 2016; Okereke & Coventry, 2016). Now, climate change is recognised as a structural issue with many different paths to manage the problem and a connection to aspects regarding climate justice such as water scarcity, poverty, climate refugees, land use, and housing. This calls for drastic and legally binding changes in our lifestyles and ideologies. Additionally, we need to challenge the global market that is based on growth and linearity, which should develop into a more inclusive and circular system (Gupta, 2016). The most successful global agreement regarding anthropogenic influences on the climate, remains the handling of the ozone layer depletion in the 1980s. Release of the gases responsible for the destruction of ozone, the CFCs (Chlorofluorocarbons), was effectively regulated within ten years of discovering the problem, with the result that the ozone layer has slowly been recovering ever since and is estimated to return to its pre-1980s level by 2070 (Gray & Stein, NASA, Oct. 2019).

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Hence the question remains why other international agreements in climate politics and implementation on a national level have been so slow to advance into action, and who should be held responsible.

3.3.2 ENCUMBRANCE TO IMPLEMENTATION A general difficulty lies in the lack of control mechanisms regarding the collectively agreed upon environmental protection measures in conferences. The singular mandatory obligation is the duty to report about the progression of implementations, but the consequences that follow after violating the determined goals are only to impose unspecified sanctions with no responsible oversight committee. While the existing authorities like COP could be seen in such a role, they are not acknowledged by enough actors to effectively function as such. Furthermore, the different countries would have to be willing to submit part of their national power to an international level, which is most often met with opposition (Braun & Baatz, 2017). Moreover, costly changes are required to be realised now, whereas the benefits will mainly be visible in the long-term, a concept that is difficult to enforce for governments elected for a few years with different political priorities. This obstacle would also remain if an international oversight committee with enough authority was installed (Bernauer, 2013). Therefore, a so-called tying-hands approach (Bernauer, 2013) has been suggested, where the ruling governments establish legally binding climate measures that subsequent politicians cannot modify. However, this would translate into measures that cannot be adapted to future circumstances regarding the climate, economy or politics which may change. Another solution suggests encouraging shifts to more sustainable technologies by large upfront investments that will result in higher demands of those options, as can be observed in the private transportation sector in Scandinavia where electricity or hydrogen fuels cars are subsidised. Nevertheless, this will be difficult to endorse on the entire energy supply sector (Bernauer, 2013). Since participation in climate agreements is voluntary and the goals self-imposed, opting out has so far not resulted in major negative consequences for those countries, as other nations are hesitant to impose sanctions in fear of damaging international economic relations. Stricter enforcement could on the one hand lead to better functioning agreements, on the other hand it could also put off potentially new participating countries (Bernauer, 2013). Blaming other parties or not being willing to implement changes until everybody else does so as well is another common strategy in refusing to assume responsibility, often referred to as the free-rider problem (Bernauer, 2013; Gupta, 2016; Peeters et al., 2019) This happened regarding the USA who have rejected treaties and finally withdrew from the Paris Agreement because they felt the regulations imposed on China and India were disproportionately weak in comparison to those for the United States (Okereke & Coventry, 2016; Peeters et al., 2019). Another complication emerges due to the uncertainty of climate models, which can interpret and prognosticate general trends in the Earth’s climate system for the next decades, but individual years can still be exposed to strong variations, which might confuse citizens and

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politicians who are not aware of the long-term factors in climate modelling (Brauch et al., 2018). Thomas Bernauer (2013) presents the discussion on why the issue with ozone depletion was solved quickly in comparison to other environmental problems. He explains that the dangers were easy to communicate, the benefits resulting from solving it were large for everyone, the costs per capita minimal, and an alternative for the industry was already on hand, meaning that corporations did not inhibit changes as they are largely doing now. The global North, as well as India, China, and Brazil with their large economies are the ones releasing the most GHGs and accordingly will have to invest the most in sustainable changes of their energy sector. At the same time, the developed countries of this group possess the best adaptation methods and their citizens will suffer the least (Bernauer, 2013; Hansen & Sato, 2016). Thus, discussions around compensation have emerged to counterbalance inequalities as well as debates about how to mitigate already occurring effects (Bernauer, 2013).

3.3.3 COMPENSATION, MITIGATION & ADAPTATION As one of the human rights, it is the duty of the state to compensate for losses caused by climate change and to ensure appropriate living conditions for future generations (Wewerinke-Singh, 2019). Furthermore, countries have different histories and shares of releasing emissions, while asymmetric interests within the member states aggravate agreements on universal contracts, which requires compensatory measures (Bernauer, 2013). Transfer payments have been suggested, where countries with high emissions are paid to change their behaviour. However, as wealthy countries are the ones emitting the most, and developing, poorer countries would have to pay, this method does not work in the context of climate change (Bernauer, 2013; Mayer, 2016). Further methods include the Joint

Implementation between members of the Kyoto Protocol and the Clean Development

Mechanism for relations between members and non-members. These mechanisms use emission allowances or credits that countries or companies can trade with, meaning they either sell the excess when they stay under their emission targets or have to acquire extra credits when transgressing their limit. Moreover, countries can fund projects in developing countries aiming to reduce emissions and credit this as their own reduction efforts. This concept again disadvantages countries with less financial means in addition to weakening commitments by industrialised countries as they can simply purchase their share of emissions instead of developing mitigation techniques for their own economies (Bernauer, 2013). Additionally, a study by Aylett (2015) noted that developing countries are reporting a lack of funding as the main barrier for evolving mitigation and adaptation concepts, where local governments are concerned. They also found that while general knowledge of emissions was common worldwide, information on specific local implementation proved to be challenging to acquire (Aylett, 2015).

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As climate agreements of the last two decades often focused on mitigation techniques, the aspect of adaptation was neglected, which is essential for developing countries with low emissions, but highly affected societies. A combination of mitigation and adaptation thus plays a key role in climate justice. Furthermore, compensatory justice must be addressed since adaptations will likely not be enough for some regions. However, compensation for damages will be difficult to put into practice as there is no direct causer and automatic payment every time a natural disaster hits a state will also not be feasible (Mayer, 2016; Okereke & Coventry, 2016; Page & Heyward, 2016). Hence, the concept of loss and damages was introduced by developing countries and integrated into the action plans of the UNFCCC, including the Paris Agreement. They specified three main functions regarding improving knowledge, communication between actors, and financial or technological support. Nonetheless, specific actions and questions around financing remain to be defined and the discussion of the North-South divide about blame and compensation has been ongoing (Page & Heyward, 2016). While losses are defined as being irreversible, damages can be restored, which is crucial to prioritising responses. These can be divided into two categories of on the one hand, means-

based compensation entailing repairment, replacement with an alternative, or financial substitution of an object. On the other hand, ends-based compensation can be a restitution of the conditions necessary for a certain way of life. Since this method is difficult to put into practice, shifting the old way to an equal alternative might be more fruitful, also called displacing compensation. Yet, with many of the caused losses and damages, a sufficient compensation will not be possible e.g., destruction of cultural heritage, loss of life or psychological suffering. Hence, moral repairs as in recognition of fault and public apologies by industrial countries are a crucial part of compensation (Page & Heyward, 2016, Wewerinke-Singh, 2019). Although compensatory justice is essential for acknowledging retrospective responsibility (Braun & Baatz, 2017) and upholding diplomatic international relations, the focus should lie with mitigation and adaption methods to induce a lasting change in the current trends of economy and lifestyles (Page & Heyward, 2016). Therefore, capacity building should be expanded, referring to the capability in which countries can respond to local effects of climate change (Okereke & Coventry, 2016). Moreover, demands for full reparations will likely be met with denial and refusal, thus Mayer (2016) suggests less than full reparations and taking into account the degree of fault, significance, and harm when determining responsibility. Additionally, he states compensation should be measured by the countries’ financial and technical resources (Mayer, 2016). To ascertain the degree of fault regarding the opportunities of governments for facilitating transformation to more sustainable societies and industries, lobbying activities in different countries will have to be examined.

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3.3.4 LOBBYISM As fossil fuel industries engaged in lobbying against climate change mitigation often have close ties to respective politicians, government representatives should be analysed regarding their role in impeding emission policies. Brulle (2018) refers to lobbying as trying to influence the decision-making progress of a member of government which heavily depends on communication and a relationship between the interest group and the decision-maker. He elaborates that modern lobbyism is more focused on influencing the perception of a subject, thus changing the politician’s opinion which makes them more adaptable when representing the interest groups’ position in parliamentarian discussion or the media (Brulle, 2018). Studies on how the economy and other organisations can impair climate policies have been conducted extensively in the USA, where it is amplified by outright climate change denial in the media (Brulle, 2018; Vesa et al., 2020). Between 2000 and 2016, more than $2 billion were invested in climate lobbing within the USA, comprised of over 26 % from power companies, followed by the fossil fuel and the transportation sectors, whereas the renewable energy subdivision only made up 3.8 %. This indicates that while the profits of fossil fuel dependent and renewable energy companies are both subject to climate legislation, the former make up a major part of legislative lobbying. Additionally, when the government is made up of parties who are slow to implement climate protection policies, lobbying declines, which can be observed in the decrease of expenses in lobbying after the Republican Party took control of the House of Representatives from 2011 (Brulle, 2018) until 2019. Vesa et al. (2020) divide the influence on policy implementation into three categories. First the connection between organisations and politics, second direct influence through lobbying which is largely unobserved by the public. Third, they differentiate between corporatist

interest group, where the economy is often part of policy making, and pluralist systems, in which companies compete for collaborations with policy makers. Through a literature analysis and network survey regarding Finland’s policy making, they confirm their hypothesis that corporatist systems can handicap developments of climate mitigation techniques without great media attention, which is mostly the case in Central and Western Europe. The Article 3 of the Code of Conduct for Members of the European Committee forbids a conflict of interest, referring to personal interests that clash with the tasks of the members, while Article 4 imposes a Declaration of Financial Interests (DoFI) (Tansey, 2015). Tansey (2015) examined the side jobs of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) in three different committees regarding the parliament of 2014 to 2019. First, members who next to being part of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, are also paid by banks or investment firms. Second, members of the Industry, Research and Energy Committee, who are on the payroll of big business lobbies or the heavy industry and third, members of the Environment Committee consulting energy companies. These members can declare activities as consultants without giving any details for whom and in what capacity. Tansey therefore suggests updating the Code of Conduct to include information on clients and specific

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functions, instead of the term ‘consultant’ and forbid advising companies which stand in relation to the European Parliament. Moreover, she proposes establishing a concrete list with activities that would be classified as a conflict of interest regarding advisory positions, but also monetary interests in certain companies (Tansey, 2015). Another problem poses the income brackets for MEPs, which consist of four categories, the last one beginning at 10 000 € per month with no upper limit. This translates into more detailed declarations of concrete earnings for the lower brackets and less transparency for high outside revenue, which should be exposed to full disclosure (Tansey, 2015). For all these suggestions to properly work, the Code of Conduct is required to hold more independent investigative power to enable full transparency and accountability (Tansey, 2015). As of the 1st of July 2020 Germany, Portugal and Slovenia hold the presidency of the Council of the EU. The Council has often been criticised as being the most non-transparent institution within the EU, since it is difficult for outsiders to reconstruct internal discussions and the members’ votes in this regard (Cann et al., 2020). While Germany prides itself on progressive environmental policies, its energy sector largely relies on gas, which was added to the green list, thereby declaring it a transition technology during the shift to renewable energy. Moreover, the pipeline project Nord Stream 2 is financed by five European companies from Germany, Finland, the UK, the Netherlands, Austria, and France. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that these countries all tried to avert stricter gas guidelines on national and international levels (Cann et al., 2020). Furthermore, the support of the German car industry where a reduction of 𝐶𝑂2 emissions has not happened since 1990 and industrial agriculture with overfishing and continuous use of glyphosate, lessen the claim of Germany as a pioneer in climate politics (Cann et al., 2020; Michaelowa, 2013). Even countries with the highest mitigation efforts like Sweden, Denmark or Morocco do not reach a score of ‘very high’ on the Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI), which concludes that policymakers should further develop and specify national recovery plans (Burck et al., 2020), thus it is important to determine how to apportion responsibility.

3.3.5 ALLOCATING RESPONSIBILITY The phenomenon of governments avoiding direct responsibility allocations is also referred to as fuzzy governance or fuzzy accountability due to the lack of an organised and transparent system. Therefore, the problem not only lies with holding politicians accountable, but also developing clear control and report mechanisms for the systemic output and internal structures (Bache et al., 2015). There have been several tries to take legal actions against countries and their governments for failing to implement mitigation and adaptation methods as a violation of human rights (Quirico, 2018; Wewerinke-Singh, 2019). For industrial countries, this argument can be elaborated further based on the no harm principle regarding globally caused damages due to their failure in limiting emissions (Kyllönen, 2016; Mayer, 2016; Miron, 2019). The main encumbrance to enforcing these claims poses the oblique link between a country as a direct

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causer of emissions and their specific negative effects on humanity (Miron, 2019; Page & Heyward, 2016; Quirico, 2018; Wewerinke-Singh, 2019). An exception has been a 2015 Dutch court decision which only indirectly referred to human rights violations and instead mainly focussed on the state duty to prevent environmental damage. Crucial to this decision was also the fact that per capita emissions in the Netherlands are very high (Quirico, 2018). During conferences by developed countries from 2011 to 2013, the International Law Commission (ILC) was excluded from discussions on responsibility allocations, thus inhibiting the inclusion of such a duty in the law and only relying on politics to decide. Additionally, even though the concept of loss and damage is mentioned in the Paris Agreement, this does not extend to actual compensation or any accountability that can be allocated (Mayer, 2016). Since the Paris Agreement claims human rights protection and fulfilment for all, one could assume this includes the rights of first, second and third generations. However, as climate policies especially regarding mitigation, are generally not limited to an explicit location, proving violations to human rights regarding water, property, or food can be difficult as these refer to a specific person and their place of life. Attributing responsibility to a country should hence come from a perspective of negligence to ascertain a connection between state action and harmful consequences for citizens (Quirico, 2018). Determining a sustainable environment as an independent human right has been a vexed question as it shifts jurisdiction and accountability from politicians to courts. Yet establishing such a law would deem the environment as worthy of protection, thus adopting an eco-centric approach instead of the current anthropocentric view. Moreover, the right to a sustainable environment would create a direct link between climate change and human rights, therefore enabling holding a country responsible for its GHG emissions. This principle should include an international and intergenerational approach and focus on renewable energy policies as they are crucial to abiding emission targets (Quirico, 2018). In regard to retrospective responsibility (Braun & Baatz, 2017), Mayer (2016) suggests holding countries accountable for their actions after 1992 when the UNFCCC published its knowledge on the consequences anthropogenic GHG release will have on the planet. Nevertheless, finding an exact date after which state responsibility will be regarded as legally binding will also have to be aligned with when a country ratified international human laws (Wewerinke-Singh, 2019). Prior to that, responsibility allocations could be made on the grounds of exploitation of the global South to achieve enrichment of Europe and North America (Mayer, 2016). While industrial states should redeem themselves for their past emissions, it is also unfair to put the brunt of the burden on current and future generations of these countries for aspects they only partly profit from. Therefore, responsibility should be levelled to the benefits current generations enjoy due to excessive GHG emissions of their country and how present efforts of mitigation are implemented. This should also, but not exclusively, include non-material

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compensation like acknowledgement for symbolic meaning or raising public awareness to educate societies on the consequences of their actions (Mayer, 2016).

3.3.6 PROVISIONAL RESULT Implementation on a political level has been slow, despite many international conferences and climate agreements due to a lack of authoritative oversight committees and because of short-term governments which are re-elected every couple of years (Bernauer, 2013; Braun & Baatz, 2017). Furthermore, the members of governments can be subject to lobbyism, which is why concrete lists with activities labelled as a conflict of interest should be established and more independent investigative power must be authorised, to enable full transparency and accountability (Tansey, 2015). With countries’ emissions varying greatly across the world and different histories regarding the causation of GHG, compensation plays a significant role in climate justice and allocating responsibility. However, compensation for damages will be difficult to implement as there is no direct link between causer and victim of the effects of GHG emissions and complex government systems complicate directly allocating blame to one party (Bache et al., 2015; Mayer, 2016; Okereke & Coventry, 2016; Page & Heyward, 2016; Wilson & Hobolt, 2015). Nevertheless, mitigation and adaptation are central duties of governments towards citizens in order to protect their human rights, and towards other countries which suffer more and have less possibilities to adapt compared to the main causers, the industrialised states (Bernauer, 2013; Wewerinke-Singh, 2019). Additionally, compensations should be measured by the countries’ financial and technical resources, the benefits current generations enjoy due to past emission of their country, together with retrospective responsibility (Braun & Baatz, 2017), as well as efforts of mitigation and vulnerability, which can be summarised by income per capita (Bernauer, 2013; Mayer, 2016). This also requires an inclusion of non-material compensation, especially public apologies to acknowledge responsibility (Mayer, 2016). Finally, leaders of countries should be held to a higher level of accountability since by accepting the position of head of state, their politics regulate the form of society and industry, which serves as a base for the citizens’ emissions (Banks, 2013).

3.4 MEDIA 3.4.1 THE ROLE OF MEDIA Shaping the image of the concept of a ‘public’ or ‘national interest’ largely falls to the media, which in turn lays the groundwork for industries or governments to justify their climate change mitigation (in)action (Maclean, 2019). Thus, examining the functions of the media as the connection between citizens, corporations and policymakers is crucial in assessing accountability. Representation of nature and its related issues in media is particularly important since habitants of urban areas often have little to no connection to their natural environment. Therefore, news, films and social media heavily shape their view of the outside world (Braun

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& Baatz, 2017; Lahikainen, 2018). Traditional societies on the other hand, experience a far closer relationship to nature and their role in a large ecosystem, based on their traditional knowledge that has been passed down through generations, which can be a valuable addition to a scientific understanding, particularly regarding the local climate as research in Uganda, Kenya and Australia has shown (Braun & Baatz, 2017). Media reporting on climate change was scarce to moderate from the 1980s until the mid-2000s after which it grew considerably, together with increasing scientific publications (Gibson et al., 2016; Schäfer, 2015). During the early and mid-2010s the coverage of climate change decreased which reflected the trend in political dealings with this issue, however, media coverage rose again and peaked in 2019 (Happer & Philo, 2016; Schäfer & Painter, 2020). Early climate change coverage, focused on the scientific basis, whereas it now mainly revolves around the political, economic, and social challenges (Gibson et al., 2016; Schäfer, 2015). In addition, for most people, mass media such as newspapers, TV, radio, or the internet are the main source of information when it comes to climate change and its political and ethical arguments (Carvalho, 2010; Schäfer, 2015). Moreover, people deem media as more important and trustworthy than the education provided by schools or communication with others (Schäfer, 2015). Thus, it holds the power of influencing concern and the credibility of the involved parties, as well as edifying people on the scientific background. Furthermore, media affects the way citizens perceive their role and the potential of civil action in this crisis, hence being essential in supporting or inhibiting civil movements (Carvalho, 2010). Therefore, it is also the main address for politicians, scientists, and representatives of industry or NGOs, when trying to seek public attention and influencing positions within society (Schäfer, 2015). Consequently, the voices represented in the media will be crucial in shaping the development of policies (Carvalho, 2010). Based on Edward Herman’s and Noam Chomsky’s propaganda model of communication in mass media, democratic states do not require strict control of news flow, but rather limit it to the voices and perspectives of the political and economic elite, while neglecting oppositional opinions and sources (Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Maclean, 2019). Thus, it is particularly necessary to represent different social strata and especially include marginalised groups, to provide all citizens with a place in the political climate and enhance self-efficacy (Carvalho, 2010). Additionally, traditional media often insist on ‘objective’ reporting that disproportionately represents one side in comparison to their actual relevance, as is the case with climate change denialists (Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Maclean, 2019). This example is just one of the obstacles when it comes to journalistic writing on climate change that the media should be held culpable for.

3.4.2 JOURNALISTIC FRAMES & NARRATIVES News stories consist of framing which describes the selection of information and thus interpretive structures, whereas narratives are characterised by entailing a plot with agents and their connection, hence influencing interpretations (Lück et al., 2018).

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Pepermans & Maeseele (2018) divide the presentation of climate change in the media into three categories. First, economisation, which concentrates on technological advancement and economic values, second scientisation focussing on the uncertainty of climate models and definite predictions and third moralisation with GHG emission mitigation as an ethical duty for individuals. These are all methods of depoliticising, referring to the occurrence that different perspectives and choices when determining policies are not made visible, hence inhibiting democratic discussions about underlying societal structures and economic systems that caused the climate crisis in the first place (Pepermans & Maeseele, 2017; 2018). In the early 2000s, news coverage of climate change revolved mostly around discussion of scientific knowledge and the conflict of believers vs. disbelievers (Pepermans & Maeseele, 2018). As anthropogenic climate change became a universally agreed upon phenomenon, this discussion shifted towards allocating responsibility with the global North. Meanwhile, these countries portrayed themselves as the heroes who were willing to discuss changes by attending climate conferences, thereby professing to solve problems. Moreover, especially US media often blamed emerging high polluters like China, Brazil, and India, whereas German coverage also criticised the existing main sources of the USA, Canada, and Australia (Lück et al., 2018; Pepermans & Maeseele, 2018). On the one hand, industrial countries shift responsibility and guilt to other actors rather than their home countries, sometimes just alleging humankind is the villain of the story. Nations of the global South on the other hand, most often assign their own countries the role of victims or heroes, trying to fight the effects of increasing global temperatures, whereas rich states of the global North clearly assume the role of villains in their media coverage (Lück et al., 2018). Meanwhile, the reasons for the North-South divide, historic responsibility and considerations of per capita emissions are rarely mentioned (Pepermans & Maeseele, 2018). After 2010, climate change was often referred to as an irreversible process with generally pessimistic articles as a result of several climate summits that achieved no universal and binding agreements. At the same time, the global temperature target of 2 °C became increasingly popular as a common goal, using a scientific model that should be reached with politics, but neglecting the economic and social changes which would have to be made. Specifically, discussion around the tenets of capitalism and neoliberalism were rarely evoked. However, the emerging topics of climate justice and intersectional approaches include a view on social structures with political and economic models as their framework and base (Pepermans & Maeseele, 2018). In her analysis of climate change coverage in the media, Carvalho (2010) notes that climate justice movements were often portrayed as violent in mainstream media. With the rise of Fridays for Future, criticism of protesters continues, particularly by politicians who disapproved of students skipping school to demonstrate against current climate politics (The

Guardian, Mar. 2019). Moreover, groups like Extinction Rebellion were labelled as ‘extremists’ in British counter-terrorism documents, which was only reversed when this document was discovered by the public (The Guardian, Feb. 2020). At the same time, mainstream media often depicts average citizens as passive and apathetic bystanders in regard

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to climate politics, whereas social media shows higher levels of calls for action of the general public (Carvalho, 2010), but is faced with other issues which this media type needs to account for.

3.4.3 SOCIAL MEDIA The rise of social media platforms like Instagram, Facebook or Twitter facilitated the possibility for everyone to engage in political and societal discussions. Thus, Mavrodieva et al. (2019) define social media as a soft power tool based on Joseph Nye’s concept of influencing people’s behaviour without relying on traditional power relations such as a top-

down approach. Since information can be accessed for free and distribution is incredibly fast, it has become an increasingly political tool used by powerful politicians, as well as normal citizens or NGO institutions. Additionally, the organisation of events such as climate strikes are largely coordinated in and spread through social media (Mavrodieva et al., 2019). At the same time, people state they progressively rely on social media as their main news source and also report they became more involved in a subject after being exposed to it by social media (Mavrodieva et al., 2019). Another advantage are the short and easy, often visual explanations of complex scientific subjects in posts with limited word counts (Anderson, 2017; Mavrodieva et al., 2019). However, this also involves the danger of misinforming or even spreading false information that go mostly unchecked (Mavrodieva et al., 2019). These problems re-emerged during the COVID-19 crisis and the US election of 2020 where social media platforms for the first time tried to disclose the uncertainty of information, declared tweets of former US president Donald Trump as factually wrong or even blocked comments and profiles (Isaac & Conger, The New York Times, Jan. 2021). Events such as Leonardo DiCaprio’s Academy Awards speech about the urgency of climate change, and films like The Day After Tomorrow (2004), An Inconvenient Truth (2007) or Before the Flood (2016) all caused major rises in searches related to climate change, ranging from an increase of around 40% to 5000% that surpassed media attention of official climate change events such as IPCC reports or COPs. Opinion leaders like popular actors or influencers with millions of followers can reach a large audience and hence might generate global discussions, while films with emotional messages that explain scientific knowledge with visuals and on a more basic level can amplify identification and trigger higher responses from people (Mavrodieva et al., 2019). Additionally, media coverage has been shown to increase legislative activity on climate change policies and especially social media could function as a tool to hold politicians and non-state actors accountable for their actions (Anderson, 2017; Mavrodieva et al., 2019). However, a common problem of social media lies in the fact that their algorithms are based on personalisation, meaning they tend to show consumers the same focus on a limited number of subjects, hence reinforcing people’s opinions and intensifying polarisation (Anderson, 2017; Happer & Philo, 2016; Mavrodieva et al., 2019; Pepermans & Maeseele, 2017).

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Therefore, social media can affect societal trends and encourage action around climate change, but could also lead to increased polarisation by keeping people in spheres subscribed to the same views (Anderson, 2017). Nevertheless, the influence of social as well as mainstream media is difficult to foresee and control as the elicited reactions heavily depend on cultural and socio-economic circumstances of the audience (Mavrodieva et al., 2019), as detailed in the following.

3.4.4 EFFECTS OF MEDIA REPRESENTATION In the past, media is shown to have had the power of influencing public behaviour on issues such as AIDS, smoking and cancer, but this is often not the case with climate change (Happer & Philo, 2016). Studies have shown that general awareness and knowledge of the average citizens regarding climate change, grows with increasing media representation (Schäfer, 2015). However, despite consistently high levels of concern, this does not translate into a high priority issue or environmental behaviour, the previously mentioned attitude-action gap. (Happer & Philo, 2016; Kulin & Sevä, 2019). Additionally, opinions and research activities on climate change are highly dependent on political ideologies and cultural affiliation. At the same time, people are searching for evidence supporting their existing views, which has the potential of resisting media in a positive way regarding manipulation, but could also prove possibly dangerous in light of new knowledge (Happer & Philo, 2016). Nonetheless, in modern communication studies individuals are no longer perceived as blank and passive recipients of propaganda, yet media still has the power to considerably shape the content which people discuss and can thus influence societal trends (Barkemeyer et al., 2017; Carvalho, 2010; Happer & Philo, 2016). Wilson & Hobolt (2015) determined that more negative media tone causes higher correct responsibility allocations across Europe, whereas behavioural changes are less explored, especially regarding lifestyle changes (Schäfer, 2015). Nevertheless, a study with US citizens by Feldman et al. (2017) in 2011, found that climate change activism, meaning the support of and participation in mitigation policies, as a result of hostile media coverage is dependent upon political ideologies. Hostile in this context refers to the effect that citizens feel media coverage of a topic is one-sided and does not represent their opinion. For liberals, this phenomenon led to an increase in activism, whereas for conservatives it had inhibiting effects. Feldman et al. explain this behaviour with the eagerness of citizens to declare their position in order to oppose the biased media reports and invest energy in evoking change. Moreover, they also found that especially for conservatives, hostile media perception can indirectly lessen activism as internal political efficacy is reduced referring to the competence citizens feel they possess when trying to understand and discuss political processes. Yet high external efficacy, meaning the trust in the governments’ honesty and belief in them acting in the publics’ interest, can compensate for lack of self-assurance. This concept also works the

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other way around with high levels of internal political efficacy compensating for low external

efficacy. Therefore, strengthening faith in the abilities of governments, as well as those of individuals could maintain increased activism and political participation as a result of hostile

media coverage (Feldman et al., 2017). Happer & Philo (2016) suggest making climate change more visible as the source of major global problems such as water scarcity, food crop decline, the resulting refugees, wildfires, floods, extinction of species, and destruction of habitats. Local connections are particularly important for citizens of the global North as they most often do not notice the effects as prominently. Moreover, increasing integration of climate scientists in media coverage, as opposed to politicians, could strengthen trust among citizens (Happer & Philo, 2016). Nonetheless, a complete understanding of the scientific background regarding climate change is not necessary for citizens to cause behavioural changes. This can be predicated upon the phenomenon that people who think of themselves as well-informed, while their factual knowledge is low, referred to as the illusion of knowing, still show higher motivation for collective action. However, for the development of effective measures a correct understanding of climate science is essential. Yet, as the initial push to engage citizens in mitigating the climate crisis, perceived knowledge could still be helpful. Thus, media does not require taking on the task of constantly increasing factual knowledge, but could also rely on the illusion of

knowing, which could still lead to productive effects (Yang et al., 2020) An international study on broadsheet newspapers by Barkemeyer et al. (2017) for the year of 2008, found that neither exposure to the effects of climate change, involvement in climate conferences and the world economy, nor gross domestic product (GDP) per capita can significantly influence media coverage of the climate crisis by a specific country. Extreme weather events are picked up by newspapers, but rarely linked to the global phenomenon of climate change as the root cause of their increased occurrence. Rather, policy making on a national level or unemployment rates as a competing news topic play a significant role in the quantity of broadcasting on climate change (Barkemeyer et al., 2017), while the journalists reporting on it are confronted with inconvenient circumstances that should be subjected to scrutiny and require changes.

3.4.5 CLIMATE JOURNALISTS With the media as the most important source of information regarding climate change for the public, the journalists covering this issue and deciding what to print are highly relevant in determining trends in society (Schäfer, 2015). Additionally, their roles have partly shifted from simply choosing which information and opinions should be printed, to searching for relevant news and adding their assessment. This results in advocacy journalism that encourages readers to scrutinise their responsibility in climate change. Furthermore, in the past years some newspapers like The Guardian or Der Spiegel have commenced adopting the terms ‘climate crisis’ or ‘climate emergency’ instead of ‘global warming’ or ‘climate change’, thus painting a more urgent picture (Schäfer & Painter, 2020).

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Specialists Climate Journalists are largely present in mainstream media of the global North, however, countries such as Brazil or India also show strong environmental reporting, especially around UNFCCC meetings (Schäfer & Painter, 2020). Higher coverage of issues surrounding climate change aligns with associated events such as floods, hurricanes, heat waves, but also political conferences or films regarding that topic, also referred to as the novelty norm (Pepermans & Maeseele, 2017; Schäfer, 2015). Studies on the environmental knowledge of climate journalists showed that their average expertise exceeds that of decision makers and in almost all cases matches the view of the IPCC. While climate journalism in many industrialised countries obtains its information from scientists, in the global South important politicians are deemed more influential (Schäfer, 2015). Alternatively, international experts are an essential source for climate journalists in the developing world. Thus, they all mostly rely on elite authorities in an attempt to maintain factual coverage since the issue of climate change is regarded sceptically by many. Yet this method neglects marginalised voices, as well as the political opposition and local development regarding climate change mitigation and therefore contributes to a manipulative reporting system (Maclean, 2019; Schäfer & Painter, 2020). Interviews with climate journalists in the USA by Gibson et al. (2016) revealed that these reporters struggle with convincing their editors to include coverage on climate change, as audiences find it hard to grasp, which is why they are increasingly focussing on local and regional impacts to encourage engagement with the audience. Moreover, instead of specific divisions on the climate crisis within a newspaper, environmental reporters are often placed in general assignment groups where they have to integrate the topic into other stories (Gibson et al., 2016). Additionally, only having individual journalists as the suggester and supporter of climate change coverage, instead of social processes limits the input to a personal decision as opposed to the holistic approach it should be based on (Pepermans & Maeseele, 2017). When cutting budgets, specialist journalists are often the first ones that are laid off, forcing many climate journalists into freelancing, which they fear will reduce the quality of climate change coverage. Simultaneously, high quality reporting is now shifting to online outlets that only reach a limited audience, hence adding to unbalanced news reporting (Gibson et al., 2016; Maclean, 2019; Schäfer & Painter, 2020). This is less of a problem in many European countries with more public service broadcasting (Schäfer & Painter, 2020). Therefore, Gibson et al. suggest expanding funding via grant programs for freelance environmental journalists who base their coverage on knowledge instead of ideologies, hence encouraging professional journalism which also integrates and engages the public the most with compelling, local, and contextual reports (Gibson et al., 2016). However, fulfilling the duty of enhancing public involvement and explaining underlying factors is difficult when applying standard journalistic norms to reporting on the climate crisis.

3.4.6 PROBLEMS OF COVERING CLIMATE CHANGE News coverage on climate change faces several issues, which the media should be held accountable for, as it possesses significant influential capacities on society.

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Since climate models usually estimate changing circumstances for future decades and as a global phenomenon, finding resonation within the average citizens’ lives and causing an emotional response has been difficult (Brauch et al., 2018; Happer & Philo, 2016; Schäfer, 2015). This is intensified by the fact that the effects of rising global temperatures will mostly be experienced by younger and future generations when looking at the global North. Additionally, the underlying data is based on complex calculations which all contain varying levels of uncertainty, and mitigation methods are highly debated and have elusive consequences for different social strata (Schäfer, 2015). Another problem emerges due to the fact that analyses in climate science often follow a slower and steadier process instead of ground-breaking and dramatic discoveries that are more convenient for journalistic norms, which translates into only episodic coverage (Pepermans & Maeseele, 2017; Schäfer, 2015). These peaks of media attention are mostly aligned with international summits, whereas national conferences receive considerably less media coverage, thereby disconnecting citizens from local measures and problems with higher impacts for them personally, thus diminishing their will to act (Carvalho, 2010). Furthermore, with the growing influence of online and social media, mainstream media are demanded to act within a highly competitive market of newspapers contending for audiences. In addition, they depend on commercials resulting in quantity over quality writing, which leaves little time for in-depth analyses of social issues, hence contributing to media propaganda (Maclean, 2019; Pepermans & Maeseele, 2017; Schäfer, 2015; Schäfer & Painter, 2020). Therefore, slow journalism with a focus on high quality reports of global social developments, instead of only current events can enhance public understanding and participation (Pepermans & Maeseele, 2017). At the same time representing both climate change denialists and advocates of anthropogenic climate change equally, in an attempt to preserve objectivity, lends the fleeting percentage of climate contrarians a platform disproportionate to their numbers also described as the false

balance coverage (Gibson et al., 2016; Happer & Philo, 2016; Pepermans & Maeseele, 2017; Petersen et al., 2019; Schäfer, 2015; Schäfer & Painter, 2020). Climate journalists state that this method of reporting has lessened over the years and now climate change denialists are not treated as a trustworthy alternative side in coverage of the climate crisis (Gibson et al., 2016; Schäfer & Painter, 2020). However, research for the US found that denialists there gained even more media coverage in the last ten years, specifically after the election of Trump as US president (Schäfer & Painter, 2020). In their analysis of English media articles and research publication Petersen et al. (2019), discovered that climate contrarians are represented 49 % more than climate scientists, but when only looking at mainstream media that increased visibility is reduced to 1 %. Therefore, they demonstrate how new media sources might add to misinforming citizens in comparison to professional mainstream media (Petersen et al., 2019). Additionally, the opinions of fossil fuel companies are often still globally represented, justified by arguing at aiming to maintain objectivity and present arguments of both sides,

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even though this branch of industry cannot be regarded as a neutral discussion partner since they have their own financial agenda (Pepermans & Maeseele, 2017). These journalistic norms of personalisation where individual journalists decide which stories to cover, novelty as in event-driven reporting and dramatisation with exaggerated or alarmist presentation, all contribute to a depolitisation of climate change and thus inhibit valuable discussion of underlying norms and value systems, or explaining solutions (Pepermans & Maeseele, 2017). Alternatively, personalisation can also refer to the strategy of emphasising agents as the causer of events and labelling them as victims, villains, or heroes, whereas emotionalisation describes emotional reporting, and fictionalisation includes hypothetical narratives (Lück et al., 2018). As an alternative, there exists a small number of government and reader sponsored newspapers, which actively seek to thematise the North-South divide, particularly representing the voices of the poor to encourage communication between these two parties and hold responsible entities accountable, thus enabling a transition to a sustainable future. These outlets practice advocacy journalism, which focuses on social responsibility. Moreover, instead of staying neutral as the original idea of newspaper suggests, they openly declare support for practices in line with their ideals that are based on facts and transparently explained. Additionally, they highlight the positive developments and measures happening, to motivate readers and discuss the potentials on different levels to show how governments, citizens, and the industry are required to work together in order to achieve fundamental change, also referred to as constructive journalism (Pepermans & Maeseele, 2017). As news is the main source of information on scientific, political, and social developments for citizens, the way it presents the data heavily shapes the publics’ opinion. Therefore, the media cannot stay completely neutral as simply choosing the broadcast program and taking a side in discussions already applies a filter on the events happening. Thus, journalism requires the inclusion of voices from activists, especially of marginalised groups and developing countries, to explain underlying power relations and encourage readers to question the existing socio-political and economic systems (Pepermans & Maeseele, 2017).

3.4.7 PROVISIONAL RESULT As media holds the power of influencing concern, the perceived credibility of the varying involved parties and the way citizens perceive their role and potential that civil action can have in this crisis, it falls to them to provide information on underlying power relations, encourage critical thinking and explain scientific background in a way that causes emotional responses, even though the global concept is difficult to grasp and does not follow standard journalistic norms (Carvalho, 2010; Happer & Philo, 2016; Lück et al., 2018; Pepermans & Maeseele, 2017; Schäfer, 2015). Although there is a proven attitude-action gap between knowledge of climate change and environmental behaviour (Happer & Philo, 2016; Kulin & Sevä, 2019; Schäfer, 2015) hostile

media coverage (Feldman et al., 2017), the illusion of knowing (Yang et al., 2020), as well as social media can affect societal trends and encourage action around climate change, while the

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latter can also lead to increased polarisation through their personalised algorithms (Anderson, 2017). Since media is the main medium for politicians, scientists and representatives of industry or NGOs when trying to seek public attention and influence positions of society (Schäfer, 2015), the voices represented in the media will be crucial in shaping the development of policies (Carvalho, 2010). Yet journalists mostly rely on elite authorities and often represent both climate change denialists and advocates of anthropogenic climate equally, in an attempt to maintain factual coverage and objectivity (Gibson et al., 2016; Happer & Philo, 2016; Pepermans & Maeseele, 2017; Petersen et al., 2019; Schäfer, 2015; Schäfer & Painter, 2020). However, this results in false balance coverage, neglects marginalised voices, as well as the political opposition, local development regarding climate change mitigation and inhibits discussions around the tenets of capitalism and neoliberalism or the reasons for the North-South divide (Carvalho, 2010; Pepermans & Maeseele, 2018). Therefore, past and present media coverage has contributed to a manipulative reporting system (Maclean, 2019; Schäfer & Painter, 2020) and should thus be held responsible for its journalistic narratives and frames (Lück et al., 2018). At the same time, independent financing and focussing on the issues of climate justice and intersectional approaches could create a more holistic understanding of climate change within society, enhance self-efficacy and encourage citizens to question the existing socio-political and economic systems (Pepermans & Maeseele, 2018).

4 DISCUSSION

4.1 LIMITATIONS Due to the limitation of chosen papers and articles for each category, this thesis in its predetermined length cannot cover and analyse every detail regarding different aspects of responsibility allocations for the various groups. The section of historical occurrences in politics and industry was deliberately merely outlined, to present a brief overview of past actions, but afterwards putting the focus on the current situation. Additionally, the subject of climate justice is still fairly new in scientific research and the long-term consequences of mass protests on climate politics and individual adaption methods are yet to be determined and studied in future research.

4.2 CONNECTION After analysing various aspects of problems resulting from the climate crisis and their origin, it is clear that anthropogenic climate change largely derived from augmented consumerism and the demand for exponential growth in a profit driven environment of competitive markets, which rely on exploitation of the planet and its people and is hence a social structural issue (Cuomo, 2011; Lahikainen, 2018). Thus, as Peeters et al. (2019) indicate, everyone who has agency in the issue of climate change should also be held accountable and is required to take action in their respective fields. People

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who undeservedly gained privileged position from past exploitation of resources and people, are now responsible for questioning the social structures that enabled this history (Lahikainen, 2018). Nonetheless, individuals primarily act within their predetermined social environment, which they have little influence on. However, they are still active members of those societies by purchasing food or clothes and working in a system which upholds the social structures and values (Lahikainen, 2018). To change these social structures, governments are required to enforce transformation fostered by citizens, who should continuously express their discontent for a society that enhances unsustainable living and enables other structural injustices, causing unfairly disadvantaged groups regarding climate change adaptation with less social and political power to provoke change (Lahikainen, 2018). Therefore, determining either a top-down or bottom-

up approach as the most effective way does not seem fruitful to me, as these two processes are always interdependent. A more circular view with citizens enabling politicians, who care about sustainability issues, with their vote, governments that subsidise transitioning to a renewable energy system, and a media structure that functions as a control mechanism, appears more logical when aiming to create lasting change. Yet, the privilege to cast a vote that will then be heard is of course only possible in the politically stable democracies of this world and even in those countries, systemic oppression like the mass incarceration in the USA to inhibit primarily BIPoC from voting, show the injustice possible in countries that pride themselves on freedom and individualism (Kendall, 2020). Moreover, people in privileged social positions often regard these as well deserved and deem the social structures as fair, hence encouraging system justification, while not considering how people from different backgrounds might be affected. Additionally, the privileged seldomly insist on structural changes that would translate to them giving up certain advantages in order to balance out conditions for everyone (Lahikainen, 2018). Therefore, marginalised voices are essential in triggering reflection on the status quo (Carvalho, 2010; Fragnière, 2016; Kaijser and Kronsell, 2014). Banks (2013) categorisation of not holding people responsible who publicly speak out against the current exploitive system makes sense when placing them outside of the group consciously causing harm. However, I would argue that declaring one’s aversion to a system and expressing civil disobedience is not a certificate that can be received once and then remains forever valid. Opposing systems of inequality is a lifelong commitment, meaning that those individuals will have to stand up and prove their discontent with society continuously. Moreover, fighting for social justice should also not be regarded as an individual responsibility aiming at gaining a moral high ground, but rather as a way of trying to improve society for all societal groups by critically reflecting on one’s own role in contributing to an unjust system. Therefore, even people that Banks considers outside of the collective responsibility, will have to be held accountable.

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Moral responsibility for individuals should thus focus on challenging social conditions, while also acting within their possibilities in lifestyle changes and exercising their right to vote (Lahikainen, 2018). Furthermore, citizens are more likely to engage in climate change activism when they believe governments will represent and listen to their demands and feel they hold some power regarding the political decision process (Cuomo, 2011; Feldman et al., 2017). Hence, constant pessimism can be regarded as a form of irresponsibility as it inhibits social movements and changing individual behaviour. Moreover, if governments took the issue of climate change as serious as they correctly do with the current pandemic, the likeliness of higher resonance and interest on a societal level would most certainly rise as well. In addition, public support in environmental policies highly correlates with public trust in the government, but as the global North has been slow to implement the changes agreed upon in climate conferences, political trust is decreasing and the North-South divide is amplified further (Gupta, 2016; Kulin & Sevä, 2019). However, high-quality governments referring to impartial, incorrupt, and efficient characteristics, gather more public support for spending on the environment (Cuomo, 2011; Kulin & Sevä, 2019). Media can serve as a tool to hold politicians and industry responsible and explain the implications for different societal classes clearly, so as to avoid negative resonance within low-income classes of society who fear they cannot afford anything with new measures, consequently voting against parties with sustainability as an item on their program. The general misconception that life will become more expensive if society switches to carbon neutral production, predominantly applies to high-income citizens who will have to pay more for their luxury behaviour of for example taking a plane, but they also have the financial means to afford this. People with medium or low income will most likely benefit from a green industry (Götze, Der Spiegel, Dec. 3rd, 2020), which should be emphasised by news reporting on climate politics. Additionally, media needs to analyse and clarify underlying social structures and illustrate the positive effects of individual and governmental action, while creating a holistic image with an intersectional approach by highlighting the voices of marginalised communities to enhance self-efficacy and encourage citizens to question the current organisation (Pepermans & Maeseele, 2018). Individuals thus should act within their structurally pre-set circumstances, while also challenging the specific systems that inhibit them from making more sustainable choices, and demanding change from the political and economic elite (Lahikainen, 2018).

4.3 GENERAL ADAPTATION While industries often delegate responsibility with the argumentation that they are only meeting the demand of the public, many citizens have likely never thought about what exactly powers their electricity. If fossil fuel reliant industries switched to renewable energies, all the people procuring their electricity there, would automatically reduce their carbon footprint,

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without institutions having to convince every single one of them of the moral and environmental rightness of this transformation (Cuomo, 2011). Responsibility for governments can be divided into two subcategories, with functional

responsibility referring to the actual policymaking duties, whereas causal responsibility

describes the power an institution holds concerning the influence on shaping the public’s opinion on assignments of guilt (Wilson & Hobolt, 2015). As to causal responsibility, a study of the European countries regarding the abilities of its citizens to correctly allocate responsibility in a multi-governance system, found that individuals with more political knowledge and centrist or ambivalent perspectives on the EU, living in countries with party polarisation, make more accurate assumptions. Hence, higher levels of politicisation result in more citizens correctly identifying responsible political actors (Wilson & Hobolt, 2015), thereby supporting social control mechanisms. When looking at functional responsibility, governments must keep in mind how climate protection measurements will affect people of different classes, gender, race, age, and capabilities. Thus, they need to develop plans to enable a switch to sustainable lifestyles for everyone, for instance by sponsoring renewable energy productions in order to reduce clean electricity prices. Additionally, policies could include expanding national railway systems, reducing public transfer prices, and offering re-education for people working in sectors like coal mining to enable a smooth transition to sustainable economies without neglecting workers of the fossil fuel industry that would be rendered unemployed. Politics cannot simply increase carbon pricing, while simultaneously doing little about underdeveloped public infrastructure that forces people to travel by car or leaves occupiers living in badly isolated houses with higher electricity costs, even though these are likely citizens with low income as they cannot afford new, pricey, well isolated houses.

5 IMPLICATIONS

5.1 RECOMMENDATIONS Next to the question of moral responsibility, individual behavioural choices can be put into practice immediately once that decision has been made, whereas institutional change takes years if not decades to be implemented (Wynes & Nicholas, 2017). An international study for developed countries by Wynes & Nicholas (2017) found that the four mitigation methods with the highest impact on reducing one’s carbon footprint are adopting a plant-based diet (0.8 tonnes CO2- equivalent (tCO2e) reduction per year), refraining from plane travelling (1.6 tCO2e reduction per roundtrip transatlantic flight), abstaining from car travel (2.4 tCO2e reduction per year) and most profoundly, having one fewer child (decline in 58.6 tCO2e per year). Adolescents whose lifestyle choices will have a large impact on their lifelong emission footprint are an important target group for 𝐶𝑂2 reduction. Yet, as Wynes and Nicholas discovered, textbooks and government documents focused mainly on mitigation techniques with moderate or small impacts like recycling and energy conservation, also called the low-

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hanging fruit (Peeters et al., 2019; Wynes & Nicolas, 2017). Therefore, education on more effective individual footprint reduction, as well as an understanding of the fundamental economic and societal circumstances which led to the climate crisis, should be obligatory teachings in school. Nicolai et al. (in preparation) conducted a study in Germany, where they asked for the willingness of people to continue or adapt more sustainable behaviour in 2021. They found that the largest enthusiasm for implementing environmentally friendly lifestyle changes lay with measures that have been part of public campaigns or on political agendas for the past few years, such as abstaining from using plastic bags for grocery shopping, buying regional food, or switching off electronic devices instead of using the stand-by mode. Adaptation methods like a vegetarian diet or washing clothes with lower temperatures showed only moderate to low willingness of change. The lowest alacrity to transform an unsustainable behaviour was to dispense with using a car for short distances of up to 20 km (Nicolai et al., in preparation). Therefore, next to teaching about methods with higher impact in school, media campaigns should also explain and promote the more potent practices. Moreover, Wynes and Nicholas state that the willingness to implement high impact changes improves when their effectiveness is understood. Despite that, cultural norms still have the power to stifle putting a vegan diet for example into action or avoiding travelling by car when the transport system lacks range (Wynes & Nicholas, 2017). Additionally, prices for public transport, especially short distance services, have risen significantly in Germany over the past 30 years, whereas using a car is cheaper nowadays than it was in the 60s and 70s. To reconcile this disparity, German railway lobby groups have suggested to dispense the train industry from the tax on electricity which would reduce prices for customers (Nefzger, Der Spiegel, Jan. 2021). Tompkins and Eakin (2012) focus on how to increase the motivation of individuals. For altruistic citizens appealing to moral responsibility might work, however, only relying on empathy often is not enough for groups with a more monetary focus. Here, economic incentives such as changes in the market, regulations, or compensation for adopting more sustainable lifestyles might prove more effective. Regardless of that, these methods also come with obstacles as people frequently are not willing to spend public money on individuals when the consequences are for example increased property values. Additionally, the possibility of free-riders makes those options less appealing to many citizens (Tompkins & Eakin, 2012). Centralising rights by involving a third party that manages the implementation, could increase efficiency and lower transaction costs. Privileged groups with enough monetary means can be targeted with voluntary individual action such as carbon-offsetting, which finances damage reparations or development of more environmentally friendly innovations. This method seems to be more effective when a social contract (Tompkins & Eakin, 2012) is involved where approval by the community can function as a reward to motivate. While knowledge and information regarding an adaption of sustainable practices is not enough to motivate all groups, it is essential for developing public trust in actions taken by

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the government by understanding the reasons and impact of regulations or subventions (Tompkins & Eakin, 2012).

5.2 FUTURE Frumhoff et al. (2015) allocate a major part of the responsibility to fossil fuel energy companies as their economic power also results in political influence (Frumhoff et al., 2015; Lahikainen, 2018). They suggest for these firms to publicly announce the consequences their production cause, particularly the shareholders and policymakers should be made aware of the risks. Second, these industries should distance themselves from lobbying groups and third increase their shift to low carbon or preferably renewable energy, which would result in the structural changes necessary for lasting transformation (Frumhoff et al., 2015; Lahikainen, 2018). This view aligns with my initial assumption regarding the duty of governments and industry, whereas my first impulse of media having to show more devastating news coverage might prove counterproductive. Frumhoff et al. also state that pressure from society on industries to take on responsibility, has played a significant role historically and should thus not be underestimated (Frumhoff et al., 2015). Peeters et al. (2019) present three methods to increase moral engagement, the first one suggesting owning up to our personal actions and their consequences by appealing to virtues such as humility and mindfulness. The latter can be seen as especially important, since mindfulness includes analysing oneself and one’s surroundings with an open mind, which is essential to implement meaningful and lasting changes. Second, they highlight the relevance of understanding and recognising moral disengagement in people’s behaviour in order to critically scrutinise and call out other people’s arguments and self-deception. Third, focusing on the rewarding aspect of tacking on the challenge of climate change will improve engagement and self-efficiency (Peeters et al., 2019). Due to the pandemic, the world saw a global reduction in emissions, yet many countries are now lowering fossil fuel prices in order to boost their economies, whereas climate legislation was put on hold or even decreased (Harvey, The Guardian, Nov. 2020). Moreover, according to the Emission Gap Report the temporary decline in emissions will have no positive long-term consequences and efforts will need to be tripled to adhere to the 2 °C target (Götze, Der

Spiegel, Dec. 9th, 2020). At the same time, it was visible how quickly the environment can recover when we give it a chance. This indicates that it is not too late to contain the catastrophic effects of climate change if we are willing to induce structural changes and take on responsibility within our scope of action. Additionally, we need to recognise and question our privileges while continuously demanding of governmental, industrial and NGO institutions to lead the way and develop control mechanisms for their actions.

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6 REFERENCES

6.1 LITERATURE Anderson, A. A. (2017): Effects of Social Media Use on Climate Change Opinion, Knowledge, and Behavior. Climate Science

Aylett, A. (2015): Institutionalizing the urban governance of climate change adaptation: Results of an international survey. Urban Climate 14, pp. 4-16

Bache, I.; Bartle, I.; Flinders, M.; Marsden, G. (2015): Blame Games and Climate Change: Accountability, Multi-Level Governance and Carbon Management. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 17, pp. 64-88

Banks, M. (2013): Individual responsibility for climate change. The Southern Journal of Philosophy 51(1)

Barkemeyer, R.; Figge, F.; Hoepner, A.; Holt, D.; Kraak, J. M.; Yu, P. (2017): Media coverage of climate change: An international comparison. Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space 35(6), pp. 1029-1054

Bernauer, T. (2013): Climate Change Politics. Annual Review of Political Science

Brauch, J.; Fröhlich, K.; Früh, B.; Seybert, H.; Steger, C. (2018): Climate predictions and climate projections. Offenbach am Main (Germany), Deutscher Wetterdienst

Braun, F.; Baatz, C. (2017): Klimaverantwortung. In: Heidbrink, L.; Loh, J. (eds) (2017): Handbuch Verantwortung. Springer Reference Sozialwissenschaften. Wiesbaden (Germany), Springer, pp. 855-886

Brulle, R. J. (2018): The climate lobby: a sectoral analysis of lobbying spending on climate change in the USA, 2000 to 2016. Climate Change 149, pp. 289-303

Burck, J.; Hagen, U.; Bals, C.; Höhne, N.; Nascimento, L. (2020): Climate Change Performance Index – Results 2021: Climate Mitigation Efforts of 57 Countries plus the EU. Covering 90% of the Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions. Germanwatch, NewClimate Institute, Climate Action Network International

Cann, V.; Katzemich, N. (2020): Die deutsche EU-Ratspräsidentschaft – Industrie in der Hauptrolle?. Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO) and LobbyControl e.V.

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