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Aufklrung und Abwehr: Thelasting legacy of the Stasiunder Ernst WollweberGary BrucePublished online: 25 Oct 2006.

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Aufklarung und Abwehr: The Lasting Legacyof the Stasi under Ernst Wollweber

GARY BRUCE

The following article traces the development of East Germanys secret

police, the Stasi, during the reign of Ernst Wollweber, the second

Minister of State Security. By examining key Stasi operations during

this period, notably theconcentrated strikes strategy following the

June 1953 revolution, the campaign against Ostburos, and operations

to secure the economy, and by examining Wollwebers major speeches,

it argues that Wollwebers reign was a decisive one for the Stasi

because of the integration of intelligence gathering outside of East

Germany (Aufklarung) with domestic surveillance (Abwehr). Although

this balance shifted toward external duties in Wollwebers landmark

August 1955 speech, Wollweber continued to promote integration of the

two duties, in particular by anchoring the intelligence gathering duties

in the local-level domestic structures of the Stasi.

Those familiar with the East German secret police or, in common parlance,

the Stasi, will know the name Erich Mielke, the leader of East Germanys

intelligence organization from 1957 to 1989 and the name so closely

associated with it that some historians have referred to the Stasi as Mielkes

Enterprise.1 When faced with difficult questions about the Stasi by a reform-

oriented Volkskammer (East German parliament) in 1989, Mielke could only

manage to stammer in response with a bewildered look on his face: But, but

I love you. I love all people!2 The parliamentarians found this hilarious;

some laughed uncontrollably. The name of Wilhelm Zaisser should also be

familiar. Such is the accord give to firsts of most major organizations. In

between Zaisser and Mielke, however, was the intriguing character of Ernst

Wollweber, a leader who was responsible for shaping the agency during the

decisive years 195357. Wollweber oversaw the Stasi as it regrouped

following the shocking revolutionary upheaval of June 1953, before

succumbing to his own poor health and the machinations of East German

leader Walter Ulbricht who pushed Wollweber into retirement.

Intelligence and National Security, Vol.21, No.3, June 2006, pp.364 393ISSN 0268-4527 print 1743-9019 onlineDOI: 10.1080/02684520600750638 2006 Taylor & Francis

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The Wollweber years were crucial ones for the organization, marked in

particular by the development of a security strategy that would dominate the

Stasi long after Wollweber had been retired, namely the unity of Aufklarung

(intelligence gathering) and Abwehr (internal defence). The early develop-

ment of the foreign intelligence vis-a-vis internal duties and, in particular, the

lasting influence of Wollweber on the Stasi should be of concern to

historians. Since the fall of the Wall on that dramatic Thursday in November

1989, former officers of the Stasis Main Intelligence Directorate (Haupt-

verwaltung Aufklarung HVA) have argued that their jobs were no different

from foreign espionage outfits around the globe; they, so the veterans claim,

had little to do with internal repression, and instead set their sights outside of

East Germany.3 The degree to which external and internal operations were

blended, however, has caused some historians to attack this assertion. Peter

Siebenmorgen argues vociferously that the Stasis foreign espionage was

different from other intelligence services because it was seamlessly

integrated with internal repression.4 He believes, for example, that it would

have been impossible for the Stasis foreign espionage to have been as

successful as it was while making up only 6% of the entire complement of

Stasi workers; other branches had to have assisted.5 Anthony Glees has

argued in this journal that the loss of many Stasi foreign intelligence records

in the tumultuous autumn of 1989 is mitigated by the fact that some of these

records were also kept in the offices of the domestic surveillance branches,

since domestic and foreign intelligence affairs were so closely linked.6 In

order to understand the development of this relationship, we must turn our

attention to the turbulent 1950s under Ernst Wollweber. Perhaps the most

investigated event in Wollwebers reign was an August 1955 lengthy speech

which he delivered to leading Stasi officers. The speech launched an intensive

campaign of intelligence gathering in the West, particularly in political and

scientific centres, and marked a major step in the ascendancy of East

Germanys foreign espionage apparatus, the Hauptverwaltung Aufklarung.

This speech, one of the most important in Stasi history, has received such

attention in the literature that the rest of Wollwebers era seems to fade.7

Although there is no question that the speech marked an important

development in Stasi history, it should not overshadow Wollwebers other

contributions to the Stasi. Moreover, the speech itself reveals the continuing

relationship between Aufklarung and Abwehr that had been developing under

Wollweber. The following article traces briefly the development of East

German foreign espionage prior to 1953, the ramifications of the 17 June

uprising, the international context in which the August 1955 speech took

place, and examines the meaning of the speech itself. I have also provided a

long excerpt from the speech which offers outstanding insight into

Wollwebers thought process on the delicate balance between intelligence

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gathering and internal monitoring. In the end, we see in Wollwebers reign

extremely formative years of the Stasi that helped lay the foundation for a

foreign espionage branch that was closely integrated into domestic

surveillance.

EARLY EAST GERMAN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE

On 8 February 1950, the Volkskammer of the new German Democratic

Republic established the Ministry for State Security (Ministerium fur

Staatssicherheit MfS).8 A few weeks later, the Volkskammer appointed

two veterans of the Spanish civil war to head the Ministry. Wilhelm Zaisser

was named Minister for State Security, and Erich Mielke State Secretary.9

Initially, the MfS was a small organization that was little more than an arm

of the Soviet security apparatus in Germany. In 1952, it comprised only

4,000 workers, compared with 9,000 by 1955, 17,500 by 1957 and a

staggering 91,000 by 1989.10 In the 1955 speech quoted below, Wollweber

acknowledged that the original organization was so small that everybody

knew everybody.11 To staff the new Ministry, Zaisser and Mielke turned

not to former Gestapo officers the myth of the Stasi as the red Gestapo

has now been sufficiently exploded12 but reached back into an earlier

era, locating individuals who had worked for the Communist Party of

Germany (KPD) prior to Hindenburgs grudging appointment of Hitler as

Chancellor.13

The fact that KGB officers were in leading positions in the MfS is well

documented. In 1955, Wollweber stated: Eight or five years ago, the

apparatus of the Friends did the majority of the actual operational work of the

Secretariat for State Security.14 The Friends was SED (Socialist Unity

Party) vocabulary for the Soviets. KGB officers (and officers of its forerunner

organizations) were intimately involved in the establishment and running of

the MfS until the mid-1950s when, partly as a result of the Soviet Unions

recognition of GDR sovereignty, the Soviet Union withdrew many of its

KGB advisors, although still maintaining close links.15 Soviet advisors

closely monitored the Stasi during Wollwebers reign.

Of the initial 16 departments (Abteilungen) in the MfS, none was

responsible for foreign espionage as such.16 Several departments conducted

operations in West Germany, but their efforts did not extend to other

countries. Indeed, it is difficult to characterize even these operations as

foreign efforts since they were conducted by Germans within a German

nation whose division had yet to take on the semblance of permanence. MfS

departments which conducted operations in West Germany included

Department V which was responsible for underground opposition and

therefore tended to focus on anti-communist groups in West Berlin such

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as the Fighting Group against Inhumanity,17 Department II which was

responsible for counter-intelligence, and Department VIII which was

responsible for carrying out arrests, including kidnappings in West Berlin.18

Department II, established in December 1951 at both the central level and all

Lander levels was entirely responsible for agent work in West Germany and

therefore has the distinction of being the oldest spy-branch of the GDR.19 The

first six months produced little success in penetrating West German centres

like the Gehlen Organization, the forerunner of the West German Intelligence

Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst BND), a fact that Mielke admitted:

Despite intensive work and a few notable successes, we have not yet

succeeded in penetrating the imperialist spy organizations.20 But by 1954 the

Stasi had successfully infiltrated the Gehlen Org, notably with Gerhard

Prather and Hans-Joachim Geyer, the latter a courier of the Gehlen Org

whom the Stasi had turned.21

East Germany did have a small, more traditional foreign espionage

service (Aussenpolitischer Nachrichtendienst APN), however, housed

originally not in the Ministry for State Security, but in the Foreign Ministry.

There is little information presently available on the origins of East German

foreign espionage, and the destruction of documents which took place in

1989 means that the topic is likely to remain at least a partial mystery.22 The

APN grew out of two sections of the ruling SED, one, under Bruno Haid,

which had been responsible for expanding SED influence in western

Germany, the other had been a branch of the Party responsible for industrial

espionage, headed by Kurt Stoph, brother of Minister President Willi Stoph.

These two branches of the SED had been modest, comprising in total some

100 to 150 people, 20 trucks, and 10 cars.23 Anton Ackermann, a Politburo

candidate and state secretary in the Ministry for External Affairs was

responsible for the APN after its initial founding on 1 September 1951.24

Ackermann subsequently appointed Richard Stahlmann to lead the APN.25 In

a pleasant villa just outside Berlin, the prototype foreign espionage branch

conducted its work as the Institute of Economic Research. Walter Ulbricht

and the Politburo appointed Markus Wolf, the 29-year-old former employee

of the GDR embassy in Moscow, as leader of the APN in December 1952, a

move that Wolf claims in his memoirs was an utter surprise, although he had,

in fact, been informed by Ackermann ahead of time that he would be

assuming the post.26 Richard Stahlmann received somewhat of emeritus

status on Wolfs appointment.27 The activities of the Institute for Economic

Research (the disguised APN), which centred primarily on West Germany,

were short-lived. West Germanys Federal Ministry for the Protection of the

Constitution arrested several members of East Germanys Institute of

Economic Research during the Vulkan affair of 1953, and effectively

brought the Institutes work in West Germany to a halt.28

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JUNE 1953 AND ITS EFFECT ON THE STASI

The event with the greatest effect on the early Stasi began on a blistering hot

afternoon of 16 June 1953, carried over into 17 June and did not peter out

until 24 June. The revolution of June 1953 and the latest literature urges

historians to adopt the term revolution to describe these events29 which

ripped through East Germany and in its wake toppled three-storey posters of

Stalin, murdered party functionaries, and, famously, saw teenagers lob rocks

at Soviet tanks, witnessed surprisingly few altercations with the Stasi.30

Those Stasi who did prove reliable were given 12 extra vacation days and

treated to lavish vacations at Party-run resorts. Although the Stasi was not the

main focus during the revolution, it occupied a central position on the Partys

agenda following it. At the 15th Plenum of the SED Central Committee, held

between 24 and 26 July 1953, Minister of State Security Wilhelm Zaisser and

Rudolf Herrnstadt, the editor of the Party organ Neues Deutschland, were

expelled from the SED for having challenged the leadership of the party.31

The MfS was dissolved as an independent ministry and transferred to the

Ministry of the Interior as the Secretariat for State Security (Staatssekretariat

fur Staatssicherheit SfS), a title that would remain until 24 November 1955.

The Volkskammer appointed Ernst Wollweber, a former state secretary for

ship traffic in the Ministry of Transport who had been simultaneously waging

an underground campaign against the West primarily through the training of

agents for shipping sabotage,32 as Secretary for State Security, a candidate

foisted on East Berlin by Moscow.33 The basic organizational structure of the

MfS remained intact within the Ministry of the Interior, apart from the

notable exception that a new department in the MfS was established for

foreign espionage. APN became Department XV, under the leadership of

Markus Wolf, within the Stasi on 1 September 1953, and would only become

the more familiar Hauptverwaltung Aufklarung (Main Intelligence Directo-

rate) on 1 June 1956.34 (Remarkably, Wolf led this department for the next 30

years. Wolf was, then, head of East German foreign espionage for 34 years of

the 41 years that East Germany had a foreign espionage division.) It would be

very difficult to overstate the importance of the integration of the APN into

the Stasi as Line Department XV. We see here the weaving of Aufklarung and

Abwehr in a way that would be characteristic of Stasi operations from this

point on. These changes were echoed in key directives from the autumn of

1953. In September, the Politburo passed a resolution calling on the Stasi to

conduct an active defence against spies in West Germany and West Berlin as

well as on the territory of the German Democratic Republic. Accordingly,

the Stasi formulated its tasks in an internal directive as the establishment and

maintenance of effective agent centres in equal measure in West Germany,

West Berlin, and in East Germany.35 Department V, under the reliable and

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long-time communist Joseph Gutsche, had its activities ramped up to include

wet (bloody) operations in West Germany such as kidnappings and murder,

one of which was the unsuccessful assassination attempt on the Minister

President of the Saarland in 1955.36

Following closely on the decisions of the SED Central Committees 15th

Plenum, the Stasi expanded internal surveillance of East Germany.37 The

importance of the 15th Plenum in the history of the GDR has received

attention in Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk, Armin Mitter, and Stefan Wolles Der

Tag X: Der 17. Juni 1953, in which the authors argue that the crisis of 1953 led

to the internal founding of the East German state (Innere Staatsgrundung) in

order to prevent future disturbances which would require Soviet assistance and

further undermine the legitimacy of the SED.38 Some measures that the SED

adopted included the creation of interior troops such as factory militias

(Kampfgruppen) and a rapid reaction motorized police unit with over 4,000

men.39 As part of the expanded control apparatus, Wollweber ordered the

creation of information groups within the SfS to collect reports on and

evaluate the situation in wide sections of the East German population.40 It is

also noteworthy that the Politburo established a new Committee for Security

Issues (Sicherheitskommission) on 8 September 1953 to coordinate both

internal and external security of the GDR. (This was the fourth Politburo

Committee (the others dealt with foreign policy, culture, and media) and

should not be confused with the 18 Central Committee Departments.) Quite

apart from the Marxist theory of an aggressive capitalist West, the SED had to

come to terms with the reality of a popular uprising that nearly toppled the

government.41 Among the nine founding members of this Committee were

Walter Ulbricht and the freshly minted head of the Stasi, Ernst Wollweber. In

all, this Committee encompassed more high-ranking SED members than any

other. As Armin Wagner summarizes: In the composition of the Committee

for Security Issues was a political exclusivity like that of no other Committee,

indeed like no other SED instrument whatsoever.42

This focus on internal duties while still integrating the external was

captured in intriguing fashion by Wollweber in August 1953 when he spoke

of the difference between agents (foreign spies) and enemies (domestic

regime opponents) during a closed meeting with his subordinates: We must

eliminate the impression that a person is only then an enemy when he is a

genuine agent, when he belongs to an enemy organization. We must

overcome the view that only agents are of concern to us, and not enemies.43

Wollwebers remarks reflected modified duties of the East German secret

police in the aftermath of 17 June 1953. Following the uprising, East German

state security vastly expanded its internal monitoring duties for enemies,

while conducting an accelerated campaign against western anti-communist

agent organizations.

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Wollwebers reminder to his staff that domestic opponents should also be

kept as a priority was a direct result of how the Stasi had poured significant

resources into fighting western intelligence and quasi-intelligence organiza-

tions in the aftermath of the June revolution. West Germanys intelligence

organization, the Gehlen Organization, and the West German SPDs Eastern

Office (Ostburo) were directly in the Stasis line of sight. After the uprising

Hermann Matern, the head of the Central Party Monitoring Commission

(Zentral Partei Kontrollkommission ZPKK), the Party body that verified

reliability of Party members, citing Ulbricht, stated: We must make the GDR

into a hell for enemy agents. Comrades, that is your primary duty.44

Wollweber agreed, pushing the SfS to rid itself of its defensive mindset and

to turn to concentrated offensive strikes (konzentrierte Schlage) against

enemy organizations.45 These strikes were undertaken by Department II

(counter-espionage), Department V (underground opposition), and Depart-

ment VI (mass organizations and non-Marxist parties), three departments

ostensibly dealing with internal matters, rather than Department XV (foreign

espionage). The campaign against agent centres was a result of several

factors. First, the campaign was an integral component of the Innere

Staatsgrundung. The SfS aimed to justify its importance to the public and

thus increase the publics willingness to work with the SfS in domestic

surveillance by exposing western spy and terrorist activities in East

Germany. Operations against western anti-communist organizations were

accompanied by carefully coordinated propaganda plans.46 Indeed, through-

out 1954 and 1955, Wollweber crisscrossed the GDR, speaking in factories

where he held up the operations against western intelligence agencies and

anti-communist groups as justification for SfS existence, and ultimately for

public support.47 Wollweber and Mielke gave speeches in factories where

Gehlen agents had been arrested in order to expose agent activity and

solidify the bonds between state security workers and the working classes.48

Fighting western organizations was also related to domestic surveillance in

the strictest sense, as the SfS believed that western leaflet propaganda and

infiltrated agents contributed significantly to popular unrest.49 A further

reason for these operations was SfS desire to expose its activities to the

western public and cause conflicts amongst the western allies and between

governments and their publics. Mielke brought out this aspect when

commenting on the success of Operation Feuerwerk (Fireworks) which had

been conducted against the Gehlen Organization, and outlining tasks of the

next campaign, Operation Pfeil (Arrow, August 1954):

The political campaign which was conducted at the same time as

Operation Feuerwerk (October/November 1953) contributed to ensur-

ing peace. We were able to mobilize even capitalist countries like

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France against the Gehlen Organization . . . The goal of Operation Pfeil

is not only to arrest and eliminate agent groups, but through proper

operational measures to reinforce the political effect of the attack, and

to deliver such a blow to the Gehlen spy organization that it becomes

compromised to the point that it might even be dissolved.50

In a clear indication that Stasi external operations lacked unity in these early

years, there were two lead departments for these fundamentally similar

operations. Department II (counterespionage) ran Operations Pfeil (354

arrests) and Feuerwerk (108 arrests), while Department V (internal

opposition) ran Operation Blitz, an operation that led to the arrest of over

500 individuals accused of involvement in the Ostburos and of journalists.51

The Cold War expert of Stasi history, Karl Wilhelm Fricke, was among those

kidnapped to East Germany in Operation Blitz.52 Historians have also

uncovered plans for the kidnapping of both Carola Stern, later a noted

Ulbricht biographer, and Wolfgang Leonhard, a former leading SED member

who fled to West Germany in 1949 and would later pen his famous tract Die

Revolution entlasst ihre Kinder, neither of which were carried out.53 The last

of the kidnappings inspired by the konzentrierte Schlage strategy occurred

shortly before the building of the Wall, when a former SED functionary who

had fled to the West was taken to East Berlin.54 Although there were no doubt

many innocent people arrested in these strikes against West German-based

organizations, the concentrated strikes were by all counts a counter-

espionage success,55 so much so that Wollweber worried about the security of

his position, given the fact that these successes had little to do with his Party

superior Walter Ulbricht.56 Nevertheless, Wollweber continued to appeal for

strikes to unbalance western intelligence agencies: Through strikes . . . no

one in the agent centres should be able to tell who is reliable and who isnt.57

Interestingly, Markus Wolf believed it important not to lose sight of the

ultimate political goals of these operations. He complained: The struggle for

German unity is the central issue. We should not see our work as only in the

area of eliminating agents.58

Following the uprising, the Ostburo of the SPD, too, became a main target

of the SfS in securing the GDR domestically. The stark portrayal of the

SEDs campaign against the SPD and its Ostburo as a witchhunt against the

imaginary menace behind the uprising misses nuances of the campaign,59 and

underplays how taken aback the SED was by the fact that SPD supporters

made known their allegiance to their former party. At several locations in the

GDR on 17 June, workers demanded a reinstatement of the SPD.60 In Gorlitz,

there was even a public founding of the SPD on the main square.61 After the

uprising, Wollweber commented that the Ostburo had had strong social

democratic organizations in factories of the GDR.62

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The most telling evidence on the important role of western targets for the

Innere Staatsgrundung comes from an August 1953 meeting between

Wollweber and the heads of all Bezirk administrations. And for this,

historians need to be versed in the Stasi terms lines and sites. SfS workers

expressed confusion at this meeting as to whether the SfS should work

according to site a penetration of specific installations within East Germany

such as universities or factories in order to monitor for enemy activity or

along certain departmental lines (Linien), which would involve penetrating

western organizations in the West in order to determine what sites they were

targeting for disruption in East Germany. This question, then, was the classic

one of whether the best defence was a good offence. Wollweber felt that the

SfS should work offensively: Do we work according to specific Linien or do

we work according to sites? My opinion is that departments IV and V should

concentrate on centres outside the GDR and expose matters there. In the

future, the main struggle in factories will be played out between us and

representatives of the Ostburo.63 Aufklarung and Abwehr formed here a clear

unity as Wollweber recommended an offensive penetration beyond the

boundaries of East Germany in order to ensure the domestic security of key

social sites.

In its campaign against specific domestic targets required by the Innere

Staatsgrundung, the SfS also undertook operations in West Germany similar

to those prior to 1953. Operation Burger involved a thorough campaign to be

informed about the situation in the non-Marxist parties within East Germany.

The SfS now prepared detailed monthly reports on developments in the non-

Marxist parties.64 Operation Burger also involved penetrating the Ostburo of

the Christlich Demokratische Union (CDU) in West Germany to determine

the location of enemy CDU elements in the GDR.

The Ostburo of the West German Free Democratic Party (FDP), the

western cousin of the East German Liberal Demokratische Partei Deutsch-

lands (LDPD), experienced increased SfS attention following the uprising.

On 13 October 1953, the SfS undertook its first main action against the

Ostburo of the FDP with the kidnapping of Hans Fulda, alias Ludwig. Fulda

was a member of the FDP Ostburo branch in West Berlin and a former LDPD

member who was a strong opponent of the SED. Following his capture, the

FDP Ostburo received warnings from the SfS that more kidnappings were to

follow.65 The FDP noted an increase in the number of SfS agents trying to

penetrate the Ostburo of the FDP in West Berlin.66

Although the impetus for these ramped-up attacks was the 17 June

popular uprising, the porous GermanGerman border and the intense US

interest in the many West Berlin and West Germany-based anti-communist

organizations as proxies in its liberation policy had caused Stasi interest in

this underground theatre of the Cold War since its inception. From 1953 at

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the latest, coinciding with John Foster Dulles appointment as US Foreign

Minister, the US moved from a more cautious Containment Policy to a

more aggressive Liberation Policy, although the extent to which Contain-

ment already contained the seeds of an offensive strategy remains the

subject of historical debate.67 Although the level of integration of the

various groups was never as sophisticated as the Stasi believed, there was a

high level of cooperation. The SPD Ostburo, for example, worked with the

American Radio in the American Sector (RIAS), the CDU Ostburo had

contact with the West German Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichten-

dienst), with the Union of Political Eastern Refugees (Vereinigung

Politischer Ostfluchtlinge), and the Russian emigre organization National

Labour Union (NTS), and the FDP Ostburo had contacts to western secret

services as well as the Investigative Committee of Free Jurists (UfJ) and the

more radical Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit (KgU).68 Of all these

anti-communist groups, the KgU was the one most tightly controlled by the

US, but all of them sought the American designation of Liberation Group

because of the financial support that this would bring.69 As Bernd Stover

has pointed out, these groups were but one of the many tactics employed by

the US under the umbrella of its liberation policy in Eastern Europe, others

of which included massive balloon pamphlet drops (over 1.5 million

between 1954 and 1956 in Czechoslovakia alone), radio broadcasts,

economic aid including care packages,70 and covert operations, including

the botched Albanian attempt and the equally disastrous telephone-tapping

tunnel under East Berlin. The Eisenhower administration, and in particular

C.D. Jackson, the special assistant to Eisenhower for Cold War planning

who worked with the Psychological Strategy Board (and later Operations

Coordinating Board), hoped that these tactics would plant seeds of

dissension that would topple communist regimes by popular revolt, and

thereby avoid US involvement in a war, one of Eisenhowers and Dulles

chief fears.71 When East Germans took to the streets in June 1953, the US

saw a vindication of this strategy, which was reflected in policy papers

NSC 158 of 29 June 1953 and NSC 174 of December 1953 which called

for further use of a cautious Rollback model as the best way to exploit

tensions inside the Eastern Bloc.72 Thus, Wollwebers aggressive strategy

of Aufklarung and Abwehr developed within, and was entirely appropriate

for, a Cold War environment in which the Stasi found itself fighting

opponents based in West Germany who were integral to the American

Liberation Policy. Although it was utter nonsense for the East German

regime to deny publicly the role that the refugee crisis played in the

erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961, there is no doubt that the Stasis fight

against its American-sponsored opponents became much easier once the

Wall sealed the porous border between East and West Berlin.

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AUFKLARUNG AND ABWEHR IN THE PROTECTION

OF THE ECONOMY

Protection against economic disruption and sabotage was a primary motive

behind internal surveillance and penetration of western targets, although it

should be noted that the SfS made little distinction between sabotage and

negligence. In November 1954, Wollweber upgraded Department III which

dealt with economic protection to Main Department III, which had three sub-

departments devoted exclusively to combating economic sabotage.73 In a

perhaps surprising admission of where he saw the enemys priorities (given

that the military tension of the Cold War was very high), Wollweber stated:

The enemys plan is first economic sabotage, second military espionage. Our

defence must be positioned in this regard.74

The SfS believed that economic sabotage was not only conducted by

agents of western secret services, but by GDR workers who had been incited

to act by their contacts in West German industry who, during Hitlers reign,

had managed factories in what would become East Germany. In August 1953,

General Last, head of Department III, complained: We have not taken into

consideration that members of former major conglomerates work in all larger

Peoples Factories [i.e., GDR state-owned factories] . . . In certain factories in

Magdeburg, up to 80% of the clerks are associated with industrial

concerns.75 The SfS therefore drew up plans for the penetration of West

German industry.76 Although acquiring West German technology was also a

motive behind penetration of western industry, the extent to which the SfS

believed West German industry was directly and indirectly involved in

sabotaging the GDRs economic installations should not be underestimated.

In December 1954 General Last informed the SfS in Cottbus, Halle, Leipzig,

and Karl-Marx-Stadt that the SfS was in possession of reports which

indicated that the American secret service intended to disrupt the GDRs coal

industry. He therefore instructed a special task force to penetrate western

industry as a component of SfS protection of the GDRs coal industry.77

Indeed, SfS efforts to combat economic sabotage became centred so

extensively on western targets, Wollweber reminded his subordinates that

in the fight against [economic] disruption, a connection to an enemy centre

does not necessarily have to be present. There are also those who carry out

damaging activities because of their own enemy disposition to the GDR.78

In this campaign as well, internal monitoring and operations in West

Germany were fused. Wollweber outlined these aspects of SfS work in a

November 1954 speech summarizing SfS tasks since the uprising:

We succeeded in securing the Republic, not exclusively through the

organs of state security but certainly with their assistance, so that at the

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moment and in the next while, a repetition of the fascist putsch is not

possible. That was the first task that stood before us following 17 June

and it has been dealt with, at least for the foreseeable future. Second, to

deliver a decisive blow to the enemys agent centres which are geared

for war preparations . . . This task has been partly accomplished through

the strikes against the Gehlen Organization. Third task: To undermine

economic sabotage in the most important sites by liquidating agents

who are engaged in economic espionage.79

Wollweber then explained how best to secure the GDR against internal

opponents:

How will we expose the enemies? That someone comes to us and gives

us a tip is good. To depend on it would be completely wrong. In other

words, we will only be able to uncover enemy activity there where it

takes place and where it is organized. At the sites where [enemy

activity] is conducted, we have the informant who has a certain area

under control . . .; and on the other hand, we have the informant who sits

in the enemy camp and signals us from there.80

We see here, again, the dynamic between line- and site-based approaches

to securing the GDR, which tilts slightly toward line or offensive

penetration, but nevertheless reveals a tight relationship between information

gathering and domestic surveillance.

AUFKLARUNG AND ABWEHR AND WOLLWEBERS

AUGUST 1955 SPEECH

International developments soon thrust East German foreign espionage to the

fore. Following the French parliaments rejection of the European Defence

Community proposal on 30 August 1954, which would have paved the way

for German rearmament within a European framework, Anthony Eden,

Britains Foreign Minister, undertook several visits to the western allies in

order to secure a German defence contribution. These visits culminated in the

Paris treaty of October 1954 which, once ratified by the French parliament in

December (and the Senate on 27 March 1955), allowed for West Germanys

integration into NATO.81

As a result of West Germanys integration into the western alliance, and the

establishment of the Warsaw Pact in May 1955 which effectively solidified

the two-camp reality, the SfS began to accord increased attention to its foreign

espionage department. During an SfS conference of January 1955, Wolf stated

that establishment of an agent network in West Germany was a priority in

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light of the Paris treaty, and Wolf stressed that all departments were to provide

to him any information they had on conflicts in West Germany and between

West Germany and other capitalist countries.82 He also desired information

on the West German SPD and penetration of scientific and technical institutes

in the West.83 It appears that the SfS leadership acquiesced to Wolfs

demands, as Wollweber mentioned during the meeting that a number of

comrades were now being transferred to Main Department XV.84 Ernst

Wollweber indicated at a March 1955 meeting of the secret police of the

Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany, that future work

would focus on information gathering from political centres of the enemy

countries, especially on obtaining documentary proof of secret clauses to the

official treaties, western mobilization plans, and the outfitting of enemy

armies. Apart from these broader orientations, there was also a structural

change to the Stasi in 1955. All 15 of the Bezirk offices of the Stasi were to

establish Aufklarungsabteilungen XV, essentially grass roots offices within

East Germany to assist with foreign espionage.85

The Geneva Summit of July 1955 the first postwar USSoviet summit

stood in contrast to the Cold War tension surrounding the issue of German

rearmament. The Geneva Summit was marked by a spirit of compromise

amongst the Cold War adversaries, and although this spirit did not lead to

concrete agreements, there seemed to be a reduction in tension as a result of

the conference. Eisenhowers parting words at the conference captured the

essence of what came to be known as the Spirit of Geneva: The prospects

of a lasting peace with justice, well-being and broader freedom are brighter.

The dangers of the overwhelming tragedy of modern war are less.86 The new

spirit caused many to believe a solution to the German problem was at hand,

but this hope was soon shattered. On the way home from the conference,

Khrushchev gave a speech in East Berlin in which he cast doubt on German

unity taking place in the near future.87 Two weeks later, the Soviet Union

demonstrated its technological prowess in the military field by exploding

hydrogen bombs. In September, the Soviet Union conferred full sovereignty

on the GDR. As recent scholarship has proven, however, there was good

reason that the Spirit of Geneva did not last long: With the exception of

British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, none of the major participants at

Geneva expected any serious reduction in Cold War tension. Indeed, the

American administration interpreted Soviet interest in disarmament as a sign

of weakness, and hoped that continuing the arms race would quickly bring the

Soviet Union to its knees.88

In the aftermath of the Geneva summit, Ernst Wollweber gave a speech to

leading members of the SfS announcing a shift towards foreign espionage.

The speech provides important insights into the reasons behind this offensive.

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First, the SfS leadership desired information on the possibility of a surprise

attack by the United States. For the SfS leadership, West Germanys

rearmament and integration into the western alliance was a sign of hostility.

Wollweber referred to reconnaissance in the West in order to be forewarned

of a possible attack as the first and most important task. Not only was

Department XV to be expanded by 100 workers,89 but all district level

(Bezirk) SfS administrations were to expend at least 50% of their resources on

reconnaissance in the western camp. It was in this context that Wollweber

uttered the phrase 50% das Gesicht dem Westen zu, literally face turned

50% towards the West. Unfortunately, this phrase poses translation

problems. The tone of it is in the vein of turning ones sights to the West,

but this phrase does not lend itself to incorporating the 50%. The best

translation would be turning our sights to the West with 50% of our

resources. Indeed, reconnaissance in the West could come at the cost of

domestic surveillance in the duties of the Bezirk leaders: If the leader of the

Bezirk administration really dedicates half of his forces to strengthen

information gathering, be it information gathering to expose intentions or

information gathering for defence, if they do this, then obviously they cant

know everything in their Bezirke.

Although the SfS was gravely worried about the possibility of war, it

recognized certain weaknesses in the western camp. The SfS leadership

believed that the western interest in detente expressed at the Geneva

Conference was the result of fear of war in certain capitalist circles.

Specifically, Wollweber believed that many American capitalists no longer

felt secure as a result of developments in long range bombers, and thus that

many of them began to recoil from launching a war. Wollweber talked at

length of the fact that these divisions in the western camp were a result of

new fighting technology, and dwelt on the Soviet Unions development of a

hydrogen bomb. Wollweber believed the fear of war by certain capitalists

would facilitate penetration of western political and military centres: There

must be people in capitalist circles, who, consumed by fear of war, will work

to maintain peace and to avoid a war for special interests of certain capitalist

groups or individual countries. For the SfS, the spirit of Geneva

represented increased possibilities to penetrate western political and military

centres. Although the US leadership did not really consider that Geneva had

been a breakthrough in reducing the chances of war, Wollwebers analysis

that western populations perceived Geneva to be ushering in a new era of

reduced Cold War tensions was accurate.

Wollwebers speech also reveals SfS fear of the political make-up of a

future united Germany. Clearly, there had been discussion in SfS circles

and the broader public about the possibility of German unity at the expense

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of the German Democratic Republic. Wollweber referred to these illusions:

There should be no illusions amongst our [SfS] workers about the nature of

our fight for reunification. There have been these illusions. There have been

these illusions in general. We see this in our daily information reports.

Wollweber emphasized that German unity would not be achieved in this

manner: It is self evident that there is no solution [to the German question]

which would see the German Democratic Republic in any way integrated into

the Federal Republic.

Thus, the SfS leadership expanded its foreign espionage in the West in the

autumn of 1955 due to its belief in the increased likelihood of war as a result

of German rearmament and integration into the western alliance. However,

the SfS leadership also believed that developments in military technology

specifically the Soviet Unions development of an H-bomb and long range

delivery systems had made certain members of western political centres

fearful of launching a war. Wollweber believed that this had led to the Wests

expression at Geneva of an interest in tension reduction, and that the SfS

could exploit those individuals in the West fearful of war to penetrate

political and military centres.

The orientation toward the West must also be seen in the context of

Soviet desires. It is worth remembering that Wollweber was the preferred

choice of the Soviets, and that much of what he did reflected Soviet wishes.

The increased espionage capacity in the West derived largely from Soviet

analyses of the situation, so much so that Walter Ulbricht and Gustav

Robelen, the head of the Central Committee Department on Security Issues,

expressed reservations about such a transfer of resources.90 The Gesicht

dem Westen zu was as much a reflection of Soviet desire for greater

information gathering on the West as it was of East German. One

outstanding and long hidden source on this is Wollwebers draft

memoirs, which he dictated to his wife, Erika Wollweber, in 1964 and which

she gave to Erich Honecker ten years later. After the fall of the Wall in

1989, Erika Wollweber provided the historian Wilfriede Otto with a copy of

the manuscript, which was published for the first time in 1990.91 Wollweber

states clearly that the western orientation was something that both he and the

Soviet advisors in the Stasi saw eye-to-eye on. In his recollections,

Wollweber argues that the impetus for the western orientation related to the

new atomic warfare, whereby the moment of surprise was of the essence.

Wollweber stated this directly: An atomic war will likely be decided on the

first day, and accordingly pushed for appropriate information gathering

to know what the intentions of the western powers were. On Soviet

support for this approach, Wollweber recalled: There was not even the

smallest difference of opinion between me and the Soviet friends on this

analysis.92

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Due to its significance, Wollwebers speech deserves to be quoted at

length:

The Comrade State Secretarys Speech at the [state security]

official meeting of 5 August 195593

. . . The Geneva Conference reveals certain changes and indications of

changes in the behaviour of various imperialist powers. We must ask

ourselves what is behind [these changes] and how we can fulfil our

duties in such a way that world peace will in fact be secured.

World peace depends above all on whether America refrains from

starting a war. Everything else is an aside. What matters therefore is

finally to achieve an agreement, even if not a formal one, between the

two main global powers . . . which will secure world peace.

. . . The Geneva Conference this is of course only the outward

expression reveals a change in the position of certain capitalist circles

towards war. Eisenhowers behaviour is of course not accidental and

naturally not a result of his particular traits, but rather expresses the fear

of war in certain capitalist circles, even among monopoly capitalists.

This is something new and we must take note of it because it has

important consequences.

Monopoly capitalist circles have always been the driving forces

behind war. They calculated matter-of-factly what a war would bring

them. War profits, new sources of raw materials, new sales areas. In

short, new maximum profits were the most important factors for them

and were the driving force behind war.

There still exists today the idea that as long as there is Imperialism,

there will be war. That is absolutely right, but this has to be adjusted

based on the fact that a number of capitalists, including major capitalists,

ask themselves the question: If a new war begins, how will things look

and how will things end up?

In previous wars, capitalists did not personally put their lives in

danger whatsoever. Their private property in the means of production

were not in any danger, even when the given state to which they

belonged lost the war. On the contrary, they were rewarded. But this

has changed because of new battle tactics, new fighting technology.

The fact that hydrogen bombs can be dropped or made to explode by

other means, the fact that atom bombs exist, naturally creates a

different set of conditions for the capitalists. Their production sites are

so much in danger that they have to expect the destruction of their

private property. At least, this is true for certain regions and because

they dont know where [bombs] will fall, they all have to expect [this

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possibility]. The personal life of these capitalists, their own life, the life

of their own relatives is [sic] as much in danger as that of every other

person. This was not the case in other wars. They were well away from

the fire, they were safe. This safety no longer exists for them. As a

result, a number of capitalists wonder if such a war would be worth

it. . . .

Certainly, we cannot count on the monopoly capitalists being

reasonable. . . . But certain capitalist circles ponder how such a war

would be carried out and what the consequences for them would be.

Here they have their doubts, here they recoil, some of them develop a

fear of war. We must take advantage of this fear of war in the interest of

securing peace. . . . [This fear of war] provides us with operational

possibilities, on which I will speak later.

Consequently, there are differences even in high-ranking officer

circles, in the general staffs, regarding the assessment of military

relationships, of the strategic position of individual powers. . . . These

differences . . . amongst general staff officers are naturally a result of

insecurity in bourgeois circles. . . .

The air raid manoeuvres in America demonstrated that, theoretically,

5 million people would die in the first few hours. In America! . . .

This situation forces the capitalists to reflect on what will

happen. . . . There must be people in their circles, who, consumed by

fear of war, will work to maintain peace and to avoid a war for special

interests of certain capitalist groups or individual countries. I stated

previously, the fact is that war is inevitable in the age of Imperialism.

But the difference now is that the peace front against imperialist

policies and imperialist aggression is stronger because, first, it

incorporates significant sections of the working class. . . , second, wide

sections of the bourgeois democratic population have joined this peace

front, third, it is possible for the forces of peace to take advantage of the

fear of war in certain capitalist circles.

Now Comrades, a few comments on developments in fighting

technology . . . Long-range airplanes, fast and high altitude long-range

airplanes that can carry atom and hydrogen bombs have been

developed and continue to be developed. This changes things

fundamentally. Namely, the advantageous geographic position pre-

viously enjoyed by the USA has been overcome through developments

in fighting technology. With the exception of the civil war, the USA has

not had a war on its own territory. Wars in which the USA took part

were always conducted elsewhere, but not in America. America was a

protected country and even when there were airplanes and bombs, such

as in the last war, Hitler who was at war with America was unable

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to bomb American cities or the like. Obviously, the longer the route, the

more fuel is needed, the more fuel, the less bomb payload, therefore the

less the effect, etc. But these were things of the last war, they wont

apply in a future war. These planes which can fly quickly and at high

altitudes over long ranges and which can transport atom bombs and

hydrogen bombs, can reach every corner of America, just like every

other country. People should listen carefully to what Eisenhower said.

Basically he said: America will only get involved in a war if American

interests are directly threatened.

. . . Clearly, because of developments in fighting technology, because

of the whole situation, because of the fact that there are desperate

people, Monopoly Capitalism has not become peaceable. That is

ridiculous . . . I am talking about the fear of war in certain Capitalist

circles. The danger lies in the fact that individuals who have their finger

on the button of the war machinery recognize the situation and will set

the machinery in motion. Therein lies a danger for humanity and this

danger has to be removed by isolating these individuals as much as

possible with help from capitalists consumed by fear of war.

. . . In the age of hydrogen and atom weapons, the element of

surprise, which plays an important role in any war, is of particular

importance. This reality turns out to provide important consequences

for us, on which I will say a few words. What matters is to isolate those

desperate forces and remove from them the possibility of starting a war,

and indeed a war in which America and the Soviet Union would be

drawn in. As at the moment it is only America and the Soviet Union

which possess these new fighting technologies . . .

Now onto the tasks of the instruments of state security which arise

from [this situation].

The first94 means that the element of surprise in a future war is of

utmost importance. For us, this means a strengthening in the field of

information gathering. This is the first [task] and the most important

[task]. I will not speak now about individual operational measures, but

you must understand that to protect us from a surprise attack from the

enemy, it is most important to know who is planning what against

whom and when. This can only be achieved through information

gathering. This is the first [task] and the most important [task].

First, we must strengthen the apparatus of Main Department XV95 by

100 new workers in the course of this year. These 100 new workers are

of absolutely no use if they are not employed properly. What matters is

not strengthening the information gathering apparatus, but rather I see it

as strengthening our position in the enemy centres. I can have a large

branch, without having people in the enemy centres. Therefore we must

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create certain norms and therefore we must say that 75% of the

expansion of the information gathering branch must work in the enemy

camp.

. . . Everything must be used which gives us a possibility of

determining enemy plans and intentions. This must be done through

our strengthened information gathering work. We cannot therefore

have only this branch, information gathering, and think that it will take

care of matters. This means that individual departments must rearrange

their work, for example departments VII and VIII.96 VII has up to now

worked exclusively defensively in its area, but to hell with that. There

are many possibilities in the Volkspolizei to enter into information

gathering work and to extract information. Really? Thousands of

people pass through the hands of the Volkspolizei, a few of whom could

used. VII should not do this, but it should organize in a way that the

possibilities for information gathering are taken advantage of. This also

applies to VIII, especially VIII in the State Secretary for State Security

in connection with interzonal traffic. . . .

Thus I deliberately place the strengthening of information gathering,

not only the strengthening of Department XV but rather all information

gathering, at the centre of all our tasks in the next while, under the

standpoint Fight war . . .

In future, the leaders of the [SfS] Bezirk administrations must spend

at least half their time working on strengthening information gathering

in political centres and strengthening work to penetrate enemy agent

centres in the West. To the Bezirk administrations, I see this clearly:

Leaders of the administrations Turn your sights to the West,

employing 50% of your resources to do so. (50% das Gesicht dem

Westen zu). Not only purely formal information gathering, but also the

penetration of enemy agent centres that which is dealt with on

departmental lines II, V etc.,97 but turned towards the West. Internally,

we must reach the stage where the deputies and leaders of the

departments themselves can deal with the duties. The leaders of

the Bezirk administrations must limit themselves with regard to

internal matters to several main areas of focus, to direction and

control.

Comrades! Let us consider for a moment our development since the

15th Plenum.98 That is now 2 years ago. There was a time and this

was repeated twice99 when we had to employ significant forces to

prevent a major provocative Putsch within the Republic, if not in the

same way, then similar enough to 17 June.100 That means we attached

great importance to internal security. Was this right? Yes, this was

right. Is this still right? I say in part yes, for example for Comrade

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Gartmann especially, for Comrade Last partly and similarly for a

number of comrades.101 But our sights must be set on the enemy

political centres and on the agent centres, and I will personally hold the

heads of the Bezirk administrations responsible.

But on the other hand this means that if, lets say in Floha,102 this or

that occurs and the [leadership of the] state secretariat [for state

security] hears of it and we ask the leader of the responsible Bezirk

administration and he says: Well, I dont know. And someone says to

him: Well, what do you know about your Bezirk? Of course, this has

to stop. Thats obvious. If the leader of the Bezirk administration really

dedicates half of his forces in order to contribute personally to the

strengthening of information gathering, be it information gathering to

expose intentions or information gathering for defence, if they [sic] do

this, then obviously they cant know everything in their Bezirke. But we

have others for that, whose responsibility must be increased.

But of course we will not stop working internally and in order to free

our hands, we are going to have to deliver a couple of strikes. A couple

of concentrated strikes.103 . . .What we strike internally . . . frees us

up . . . externally.

One shouldnt consider the things separate from each other, but

rather see them as connected.

. . . Now Comrades, we must change in particular the attitude towards

West Berlin. It cant go on like this. Nothing should happen in West

Berlin that we do not know about. Second, we must achieve a situation

where every agent in West Berlin must expect that in a short time he

could be with us . . . Third, amongst agents in West Berlin, we must

produce such a psychosis that they believe they are fighting a losing

battle. This is true for members of [West Germanys] apparatus in West

Berlin, of the West Berlin senate, etc.

The Americans will no longer begin a war because of Berlin. This

does not mean that they wont try certain measures. . . .

We must speak with several people and make it clear what the

situation is and that one day the West Berlin issue will be resolved, and

then there will be no way out.

This provides us with operational possibilities. In other words, we

must work on people looking for insurance.

. . . There should be no illusions amongst our [SfS] workers about the

content of our fight for reunification. There have been these illusions.

There have been these illusions in general. We see this in our daily

information reports. . . .

It is self evident that there is no solution [to the German question]

which would see the German Democratic Republic in any way

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integrated into the Federal Republic. To the last man, there should be

no wavering in this direction among our comrades. . . . The German

Democratic Republic is the bastion, the basis in the struggle for the

restoration of a unified Germany on a democratic foundation. A

democratic foundation means that we will also have instruments of

state security there, although the form is not important . . . I think that

Comrade Khrushchev . . . said this very clearly when he announced that

there is no solution at the expense of the GDR.104 I think that is as clear

as it can be expressed diplomatically. There should also be no illusions

amongst us we cant say this outside that the solution is this simple:

We hold free elections and then let the decision be made based on the

outcome of the election. We are democrats, but not idiots. We support

free elections, if at these free elections the working class and its leading

party play a decisive role. And we support free elections, where those

who do not deserve freedom, do not have freedom. . . .

Germany will be reunited as a result of further victories in the fight

against imperialists and reactionary forces. We do not know when this

will be. But on no account should there be wavering on this issue,

especially not amongst [SfS] workers. Because the strengthening of the

states authority [Staatsmacht] . . . in the GDR depends in large part on

increasing the power of the instruments of state security.

. . .We have been successful in creating this powerful instrument. But

now new tasks lie before us. We must now work on preventing war. As a

result we must strengthen information gathering. We must know what is

happening in the Centres in political centres, in military centres, in

scientific-technical centres where new discoveries are being made. We

must know what is happening in the agent centres. We need precise

information, we need documentary material. Special groups must be

established [for this task]. We need the information in time, because if

we receive the information that we need in time, then the element of

surprise is of no use to the enemy. [The element of surprise] is then

eliminated, enormous damage and destruction and many victims

avoided. We therefore fulfil a great task. That is our duty. That is

also the idea to which the comrades at todays conference should be

oriented.

CONCLUSIONS

Wollwebers landmark speech may, at first glance, seem a shocking shift of

resources for a country obsessed with internal security, and which had only

two years previously faced a revolution of such magnitude that the East

German leader Walter Ulbricht cowered in the Soviet headquarters in

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East Berlin and whispered under his breath: Its all over. On closer

examination, the shift outlined in the speech is not a wholesale departure

from the Aufklarung and Abwehr strategy that Wollweber had been fostering

since his arrival at the helm in 1953. To be sure, the targets are more clearly

political-military, and closely related to global geo-strategic Cold War issues;

the fact that Department XV is the lead department is also noteworthy. But

much of the operational activity was housed at the regional (Bezirk) level,

where Department XV branches were established for this purpose. In

addition, Wollweber indicated clearly that Comrade Lasts duties to oversee

protection of industry were to keep his attention focused internally, and he

stated matter-of-factly: Of course, we will not stop working internally. This

foreign espionage offensive in the autumn of 1955 did not mean a complete

abandonment of internal surveillance, contrary to Ulbrichts claims about it

afterward. It did, however, signal an increased role for foreign intelligence

within the East German security structures. It is also worth highlighting that

the autumn 1955 offensive was anchored in the domestic surveillance

structures of the Stasi.

The speech also includes a tantalizing foreshadowing of the Berlin Wall

when, in referring to the thorn that was West Berlin for East German internal

security, Wollweber said: One day the West Berlin situation will be

resolved, and then there will be no way out. It was, of course, in Berlin that

the Aufklarung and Abwehr strategy was at its most visible and it should not

surprise that East German state security was contemplating as early as 1955

the benefits to internal security if western organizations easy access to East

Berlin (and therefore to East Germany) could be cut off. Although the official

SED designation of the Berlin Wall as anti-fascist protective barrier was

ludicrous in light of the haemorrhaging of the East German population, it is

true that the Wall strengthened Stasi Abwehr and allowed the organization to

reallocate resources to Aufklarung.105

The internalexternal dynamic of the East German secret police was

visible in embryonic form already in the pre-1953 period, when the foreign

espionage branch of the Party (the APN) was a small, ineffectual operation,

whereas Departments II and V which dealt with internal matters were much

more involved in operations in West Germany. Following the June 1953

revolution, the relationship between internal and external operations became

even more closely entwined. The APN was integrated into the Stasi as Line

Department XV, the Stasi undertook sweeping concentrated strikes outside

the GDR to secure East Germany internally, and Wollweber outlined a

strategy for his subordinates that required offensive penetration of West

German organizations (a line approach) while maintaining coverage of

important domestic sites like universities (a site approach). Although

Wollwebers strategy to secure the GDR leaned at times toward external

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operations, we must be careful not to conclude that Wollweber was a major

supporter of Department XV. His cautionary words about enemies needing

attention, and not just agents attests to this point. Wollweber, as he makes

clear in his famous August 1955 speech, saw a need for a unity of Aufklarung

and Abwehr to ensure internal stability, even as the Stasi sights were being set

on the West: One shouldnt consider these things as separate from each

other, but rather see them as connected.

What is also worth noting about the Stasi at this point is the genesis of the

Stasis strategy of trying to influence those involved in western policy circles

toward policies that would favour East Germany. Wollweber makes this

explicit in the above speech in his discussion of exploiting the fear in

certain capitalist circles for East German foreign intelligence. The extent to

which the Stasi in later years succeeded in influencing West German politics

is a major debate. Knabe believes that the Stasi did influence major decisions

in West Germany, others that the HVA was informed of the situation in West

Germany, but did not unduly influence it.106

* * *

In winter 1957 at the 30th Plenum of the Central Committee, in part

responding to the crises in Poland and Hungary, Ulbricht brought into

question the role of the Stasi under Wollweber, suggesting that the focus on

external enemy agents had led to neglect of [internal] vigilance. Ulbricht

complained that the Stasi hadnt arrested anyone in a long time and that as a

result opponents had become cheeky.107 Six months later, Ulbricht lashed

out at Wollweber: Wollwebers one-sided strategy of Turning Sights to the

West led to serious neglect of fighting enemy agents on East Germany

territory.108 Much of the UlbrichtWollweber struggle played out in the

powerful Committee for Security Issues which had been established in

response to the 17 June popular uprising, and which had subscribed to the

internalexternal security strategy. Ulbricht enlisted the support of others on

the Committee to oust Wollweber and replace him with Erich Mielke109 by

pointing to Wollwebers ill-advised memorandum to his subordinates that

any information passed on to the party leadership was first to be approved by

Wollweber.110 From 1957 on, the Committee for Security Issues and its

successors would exercise political control of the Stasi. Ulbrichts offensive

against Wollweber and the Stasi would lead to change in the security

apparatus, primarily a shift of resources back toward internal repression and

in the place of the Stasi in the hierarchy of the Communist party.111 The

degree of independence that Wollweber enjoyed however slight would

not be repeated, as Ulbricht instituted Party controls over the Stasi.112

Moreover, Ulbricht was fed up with the unreliable vassal Wollweber and

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was anxious to replace him with someone with whom he was much closer

politically and personally Erich Mielke.113 On 8 October 1957, the

Politburo retired Wollweber as per his wishes and named Erich Mielke

Minister of State Security.

The truth is, Wollweber was a sick man in his last year in power, a matter of

great convenience to Ulbricht. Wollweber had suffered a heart attack at the

end of May 1956 and spent an extended period lying in hospital, a period

during which Walter Ulbricht never visited him. Wollweber dragged himself

into his Stasi office that autumn on a daily basis, regularly ending up in a heap

on the floor after fainting. Wollweber admitted that between November 1956

and June 1957 he was only working at half capacity.114 Following his

pensioning-off, Wollweber claims to have undergone a sensational improve-

ment in his health, which suggests that much of Wollwebers suffering was

due to the stress of his position and his rivalry with Ulbricht. Wollweber died

on 3 May 1967.

The changes in the work methods of the Stasi were brought into effect in

April 1957 at a conference of top Stasi officers, which a leading historian of

the early years of the Stasi has called a decisive chapter in the history of

East German state security.115 At the meeting, Ulbricht delivered a speech

in which he made clear that the Party would have a stronger presence in the

Stasi, and that the Stasi would build up its operations internally in

factories, administrations and would increase the work of the territorial

units of the Stasi the Kreise and the Bezirke.116 Almost immediately, the

Stasi issued order 16/57 which, from the title alone, suggests a shift in Stasi

strategy: On the improvement of operations in factories, ministries and

main administrations, universities, technical colleges and scientific centres

as well as in agricultural centres.117 A certain amount of this shift was

simply Ulbricht attempting to discredit Wollweber, for the Stasi had

not abandoned internal surveillance quite to the extent that Ulbricht

suggested.

Although it appears from his final year in power and from Ulbrichts

pronouncements about him that Wollweber was an incompetent, vacillating,

and ineffectual leader, this was not at all the case. Wollweber laid the

intellectual signposts and the bureaucratic infrastructure for the strategy of

Aufklarung and Abwehr. By the 1980s, this strategy was such a given that

Markus Wolf could send a memorandum to Erich Mielke with the explicit

title: On the Contribution of the HVA to the Guarantee of Internal

Security of the GDR.118 As early as the 1950s, we see that the foreign

espionage branch of the Stasi was so tightly integrated into domestic

surveillance and the regional structures of the Stasi that it was not as

ordinary an intelligence gathering branch as its former officers would have

us believe.

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NOTES

I am grateful for the assistance of Frau Gopel, my assigned case worker at the Stasi Archives, tothe three anonymous reviewers of the article, and to Julie Dixon for comments on earlierdrafts. It also gives me great pleasure to acknowledge the continuing generosity of the SocialSciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and of the German Academic ExchangeService.

1 Jens Gieseke, Mielke-Konzern: Die Geschichte der Stasi (Munich: DVA 2001).2 Hans Georg Lehmann, Deutschland-Chronik 1945 bis 2000 (Bonn: Bundeszentrale furpolitische Bildung 2002) p.379. Mielke is often misquoted as having said Ich liebe euchdoch alle, the erroneous title of the influential book by Armin Mitter and Stefan Wolle.

3 Perhaps the most interesting work on the Stasis foreign espionage since the fall of the Wallis one penned by two former employees, Peter Richter and Klaus Rosler,Wolfs West-Spione.Ein Insider-Report (Berlin, Elefanten Press 1992). For a thorough summary of the literatureon Stasi espionage in the West, see Helmut Muller-Enbergs, Die Erforschung derWestarbeit des MfS in Siegfried Suckut and Jurgen Weber (eds.) Stasi-Akten zwischenPolitik und Zeitgeschichte: Eine Zwischenbilanz (Munich: Olzog 2003).

4 Peter Siebenmorgen, Staatssicherheit der DDR: Der Westen im Fadenkreuz der Stasi(Bonn: Bouvier Verlag 1993).

5 Ibid. p.102.6 Anthony Glees, Debate: The Stasi Files, Intelligence and National Security 19/3 (2004)pp.561562.

7 Georg Herbstritt and Helmut Muller-Enbergs (eds.), Das Gesicht dem Westen zu . . . DDRSpionage gegen die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Bremen: Temmen 2003).

8 On the German security apparatus in the Soviet Occupied Zone, see Norman Naimark, TheRussians in Germany (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1995) chapter 7 Buildingthe East German Police State, pp.353397; Monika Tantzscher, In der Ostzone wird einneuer Apparat aufgebaut: Die Grundung des DDR-Staatssicherheitsdienstes, DeutschlandArchiv 31 (1998) pp.4856; Monika Tantzscher, Die Vorlaufer des Staatssicherheits-dienstes in der Polizei der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone, Jahrbuch fur HistorischeKommunismusforschung 7 (1998) pp.125156.

9 Karl Wilhelm Fricke, Die DDR-Staatssicherheit (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik1989) pp.2425.

10 Clemens Vollnhalls, Das Ministerium fur Staatssicherheit in Hartmut Kaelble, JurgenKocka and Hartmut Zwahr (eds.) Sozialgeschichte der DDR (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta 1994)p.502; Jens Gieseke, Die Hauptamtlichen 1962, Deutschland Archiv 27 (1994) p.940;Gieseke, Die Hauptamtlichen (note 1) pp.8687.

11 Bundesbeauftragter fur die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen DDR(Federal Office for the Files of the State Security Service of the former GDR hereafterBStU), Zentralarchiv (Central Archive hereafter ZA), Sekretariat des Ministers(Secretariat of the Minister hereafter SdM) 1921, p.74. Referat des GenossenStaatssekretars auf der Dienstbesprechung am 5.8.1955 (Comrade State Secretarys speechat the [state security] official meeting of 5 August 1955).

12 Gary Bruce, Resistance with the People: Repression and Resistance in East Germany 19451955 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 2003) p.67. See also Jens Gieseke, Diehauptamtlichen Mitarbeiter der Staatssicherheit (Berlin: Ch. Links 2000) p.75, and RuthBettina Birn and Jens Gieseke, Die Generale der DDR-Staatssicherheit in GuntherHeydemann and Heinrich Oberreuter (eds.) Diktaturen in Deutschland Vergleichsaspekte(Bonn: Bundeszentrale fur politische Bildung 2003) p.223.

13 Siebenmorgen (note 4) p.125.14 Ibid. pp.7475.15 Fricke, Die DDR-Staatssicherheit (note 9) pp.3942.16 Directive on Aktion Sonne from Mielke to the Bezirke leadership, 1 October 1952. BStU,

ZA, GVS 1233/52, #100041. An early West German account, Der Staatssicherheitsdienst

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(Bonn: Bundesministerium fur gesamtdeutsche Fragen 1962) pp.1819 mistakenly claimsthat there were 17.

17 Section 5 of Department V was responsible for western operations (Westarbeit). Interviewwith Dr. R. Turber, former MfS officer in Department V and later Department XX, Berlin, 31May 1995. On the Fighting Group Against Inhumanity, see Kai-Uwe Merz, Kalter Krieg alsantikommunistischer Widerstand: Die KgU 19481959 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag 1987).

18 BStU, ZA, GVS 525/52, #101166. 21 April 1952 letter from Mielke to Gutsche, Minister forState Security in Saxony. For a personal account, see Siegfried Mampel, DerUntergrundkampf des Ministeriums fur Staatssicherheit gegen den UntersuchungsausschussFreiheitlicher Juristen in Berlin (West) (Berlin: Der Berliner LStU 1994).

19 Hubertus Knabe, West-Arbeit des MfS: Das Zusammenspiel vonAufklarung undAbwehr(Berlin: Ch. Links 1999) p.68. Knabe provides an excellent break-down of Department II inthis work. See pp.196201.

20 Ibid. p.70.21 Roger Engelmann, Zur Westarbeit der Staatssicherheit in den funfziger Jahren in

Herbstritt and Muller-Enbergs (eds.) Das Gesicht dem Westen (note 7) p.144.22 Ironically, the order by Wolfgang Schwanitz, the last leader of the MfSs successor, the

Office for National Security (Amt fur Nationale Sicherheit AfNS), on 7 December 1989 tosystematically destroy incriminating material hastened the demise of the secret police.Smoke billowing out of the chimneys of MfS regional offices incited citizens to storm thebuildings and secure the documents. Armin Mitter, Die Aufarbeitung der DDR-Geschichtein Eckhard Jesse and Armin Mitter (eds.), Die Gestaltung der deutschen Einheit (Bonn:Bundeszentrale fur politische Bildung 1992) pp.366, 372. The remaining massivedocumentation has led to a decent output of scholarly work on the Stasi, but has notoverly whet the appetite of historians for other areas of German intelligence history. On thereasons for this, see the useful Wolfgang Krieger, German Intelligence History: A Field inSearch of Scholars, Intelligence and National Security 19/2 (2004) pp.185198. For anintroduction to East German foreign espionage, see David Childs and Richard Popplewell,The Stasi: The East German Intelligence and Security Service (Houndmills: Macmillan1996), and Bodo Wegmann, Entstehung und Vorlaufer des Staatssicherheitsdienstesder DDR (Berlin, 1997), Hefte zur DDR-Geschichte, and Bodo Wegmann, ZwischenNormannenstrae und Camp Nikolaus: die Entstehung deutscher Nachrichtendienste nach1945 (Berlin, DRA 1999).

23 Knabe, West-Arbeit des MfS (note 19) p.62.24 Markus Wolf claims that the founding date was 16 August 1951, but the service records of

leading officers indicate a 1 September 1951 start date. See Knabe, West-Arbeit des MfS(note 19) p.65 n.54.

25 Karl Wilhelm Fricke, Organisation und Tatigkeit der DDR-Nachrichtendienste inWolfgang Krieger and Jurgen Weber (eds.) Spionage fur den Frieden: Nachrichtendienstein Deutschland wahrend des Kalten Krieges (Munich: Olzog 1997) p.215.

26 Peter-Ferdinand Koch, Die feindlichen Bruder: DDR contra BRD (Munich: Scherz 1994)p.225.

27 Siebenmorgen (note 4) p.113.28 See David Dallin, Soviet Espionage (New Haven: Yale University Press 1955)

p.343; Siebenmorgen (note 4) p.91. In his memoirs, Otto John claims that his office,the Federal Agency for the Protection of the Constitution, was not responsible for thearrests, a number of which were erroneous, but that officials from the Federal Courtwere responsible; Otto John, Twice Through the Lines (London: MacMillan 1972)pp.220221.

29 Bruce, Resistance with the People (note 12); Bernd Eisenfeld, Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk andEhrhart Neubert, Die Verdrangte Revolution: Der Platz des 17. Juni 1953 in der deutschenGeschichte (Bremen: Temmen 2004); Rolf Steininger, 17 Juni 1953: Der Anfang vomlangen Ender der DDR (Munich: Olzog 2003). Other important studies on the 17 June 1953uprising are Armin Mitter and Stefan Wolle, Untergang auf Raten (Munich: BertelsmannVerlag, 1993); Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk, Armin Mitter and Stefan Wolle (eds.), Der TagX 17. Juni 1953 (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag 1995); Manfred Hagen, DDR Juni 53

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(Stuttgart: Franz