Historia Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte -'Kleon's Amphipolitan Campaign; Aims and Results' by Barbara Mitchel, 1991

7/27/2019 Historia Zeitschrift fr Alte Geschichte -'Kleon's Amphipolitan Campaign; Aims and Results' by Barbara Mitchel, 1991

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Kleon's Amphipolitan Campaign: Aims and ResultsAuthor(s): Barbara MitchellSource: Historia: Zeitschrift fr Alte Geschichte, Bd. 40, H. 2 (1991), pp. 170-192Published by: Franz Steiner VerlagStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4436189 .

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KLEON'SAMPHIPOLITANCAMPAIGN:AIMS AND RESULTSKleon is recognisableas a new type of politician n Athenianpubliclife.'Labelled as a 'demagogue'by his contemporaries,he controlled policythroughhis speeches nthe assemblyand, itwill be argued,morecontinuouslythough less openlyby his influenceover thejuries,who were obliged to himfor their rise in dailypay to three obols. Thiswillhavegivenhim a hold overany magistrateswho were subject o the euthynaprocedureat the end of their

term of office, including he strategoi,whoseaccountabilityo the demoswasto become especiallysignificantduringthe long yearsof the Peloponnesianwar. Kleon did not belong to a family with landed wealth and a knownancestry.His familybackgroundwas nouveau-riche,ts wealth was derivedfrom a tanning factory,his father being most probably he Kleainetoswhopaid for the winningchorus n a dithyramb ontest n460/59. Kleon,however,continued to employ the traditionaldynasticmethodof winningand usingphiloi.He probablymarried,about 450, a daughterof Dikaiogenes,son ofMenexenos,a memberof an old and prominent amilyfromhis own deme,Kydathenaion.He laterusedhisson-in-law,Thoudippos, o propose hegreatassessment decree of 425, generally acknowledgedto implementKleon'spolicy of increasingthe tributeof the AthenianEmpireto three times itspre-war-level.2

Unlike hiscontemporaryNikias,probablyalsoa 'newman',butacolleagueof Periklesnthe strategiabeforethewar,he does notappear o haveaimedatthe strategia,which remained n general he prerogative f the olderfamilies,or,if he didaspire o it,he wasunsuccessful.?He wasbornabout470,sincehe

1ForKleon asa new typeof politicianand demagogue, ee J.K. Davies, AthenianPropertiedFamilies no.8674);cf. W.R. Connor,NewMenin AthenianPolitics.2 Thoudippos:Merittand Wade-Gery,AJP57 (1936),392 note36. That he marriedthedaughterof Dikaiogenes Davies op. cit. p. 320) is less certainbut 'a very temptingpossibility'.ContraF. Bourriot Historia31 (1982),404-35)on chronological rounds.Butthe appearance fa 'Menexenos on of Kleon'on the boulein the 370'ssuggestsa closeconnectionbetween hetwo families from Kydathenaion.Bourriotalso doubtswhetherKleon, son of Thoudippos(IsaiosIX c. 370)was Kleon'sgrandson.But n view of the unlikelihoodof theappearance f thetwo uncommon names except througha marriageof Thoudippos o Kleon's daughter, herelationship,whichis chronologically lausible, eems virtually ertain.Foreuthunaprocedureand the courtscf. M. Ostwald,FromPopularSovereigntyo theSovereignty f Law,pp. 201-4.For trialsof generals ee Pritchett,TheGreekState at Wari c. 1.Cf. below pp.186-187.3 Plutarch,Nicias2.2; Eupolisfrg.117K Demoi)saysthat generalsused to be chosen'fromthe great houses'.Cf. Connor, op.cit. p.76 with note 69 and p. 144. In the 430's Kleon ofKydathenaion, n the city tittys of tribe III Pandionis,may have been blockedby strongcandidates romthe same tribewho had Perikles' upport, .g.certainlyHagnon, esscertainlyPhormioand possiblyKallias, onof Kalliades,he proposer f the Kalliasdecreesand generalin the late 430's,who (since there is a fourthcenturyKallias Kalliadou rom Pandionis)can

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Kleon'sAmphipolitanCampaign 171had a daughterof marriageable ge before 425, and was alreadyactive inpoliticsbeforethe deathof Perikles, ince a fragmentof acomedyby Hermip-pos refers o 'fieryKleon'naggingat Perikles or fighting he warwithwordsinstead of resistingthe Peloponnesians n Attikain 431, duringtheir firstinvasionof the Archidamianwar(PlutarchPericles 3). Kleoneitherdid notunderstand he principleof Perikles' ea strategy theneed for Athensto usehernavyagainst he Peloponneseandavoidresistanceby landin Atticasinceshe was inferiorto Spartaand her allies in hoplite warfare)or, if he didunderstand t,disagreedwith it,andwaspoliticallyopposedto Periklesn thefirstyear of the war.Given his age, it is likelythat he was prominent n theyearsbeforethewar,butwe do nothearof him in any military ffice,onlyas acriticof Periclean trategyn 431. Suchcriticismof a general's trategywas tobe characteristic f his later political career. He may also have joined theattackon Perikleswhich led to his deposition from the strategia n 430 andmadepoliticalcapitalout of thewar-weariness nd sufferingof Athensduringthe plague,hopingto replace Penkles as the leading 'prostates ou demo'.4

Kleon does not appear n Thucydides who at 2.21 ignores his partin thecriticismof Periklesn 431),untilthe Mytilenedebateon thefate of the rebels(3.37-48).He is introducedas 'mostviolent' and 'by farthe most persuasivewith the demos at that time' and the debate was concernedwiththe empireand the democraticconstitution,political rather han military opics. How-ever,his influence over the assemblywas not completely effective,since hisproposal to put all the adult male Mytilenaeans o death was overturned nspiteof his forcefulpowersof persuasionby the milderpunishmentproposedby the otherwiseunknownDiodotos.

Eventually,after his involvement n the occupationof Pylos in 425, Kleonwas officiallyelected strategos or 424/3, but this was late in his career,at theequallywellberestored s thegeneralof Pandionis isted n theSamossettlementoathof 439/8.See D. M. Lewis,JHS81(1961),118-9andMeiggs-LewisGHI56line 28.Doublerepresentationof a tribewas of coursepossible,but othercompetentcontenders romtraditionalbackgroundsin the same tribewouldmaketheelectionof a newmanlesslikely.4 In 430 Plutarchib. 35 says Idomeneus gave Kleon'sname as accuserbut Theophrastosnamed Simmias and HeracleidesPonticus Lacratidas.There may have been more than oneaccuser.Thucydidesdoes not mentionany, but he is reticentaboutPerikles'deposition:ETt8'OytpattyC, (2.59.3)and (afterthey had fined him) 6CompOV 8'auOotb toX , 6nEp qtXt61ukXo toutEv, tpaM&yvcTXovxo(2.65.4), mplythat he wasdeposedbutleaveunclearwhenand for how long he remainedout of office. Latertraditionaddedpossiblyunreliabledetails:Plutarch ives 1STas the lowestamountof the fine andSOT sthe highest,according odifferentauthorities.Even 15T s a very largesumand the variation howsthat one or both figuresmustbe invented.The story of the trial andits resultwasevidentlyembroideredn the 4th centuryaccording o politicaltaste,butKleoncouldwell haveexploitedPerikles'unpopularityndthegeneralwarweariness t the time of the plaguebysupporting r participatingn the accusationin thehopethathewould takePerikles'placeasprostatesou demou.Cf.Gomme'scommentaryon Thuc.2.65.3.



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172 BARBARAMITCHELLageof at least fifty.5Kleon'smilitary eputation s moredifficult o assessthanhis political pre-eminence,which was undoubted though not unchallenged,as the Mytilenedebate shows) afterPerikles'death.Thefollowingdiscussionis a re-examination f the variousclaims which have been made for him as amilitarycommander. n the light of this re-assessment,he suggestionwill bemade that Kleon'scareercan be seen as a turning-pointn politicalmethod nthat he initially separatedthe militaryfrom the political role in Athenianpublic life, as was to become common in the fourthcentury;but then heyielded to temptation,and reverted o combiningpoliticswith military om-mandin the traditionalAthenianway. This separation analsobe recognizedin Demosthenes,who was first, foremostand always a general,and to someextentin Nikias, who, though regularly lectedgeneral,was an unsuccessfulcontenderin the assembly; he lost both the Pylos and Sicilian expeditiondebates. Normallyin the fifth centuryhowever,a man prominentn politicswould stillholdthe strategiaf he could, andin the latefifth centuryAlkibia-des, an ambitiousman from a traditional amily, still tried to combine ademagogicwith a military areer.By the fourthcentury, hingshad changedand the two kindsof careerdivergedasprofessionalism raduallyookover nthis as in otherspheres.The lengthand seriousnessof the Archidamianwarhastened this process. It became ever more essential that Athens shouldappoint the best militarycommandersavailable and that the strategia, owhich re-electionwas regularlyallowed, should cease to be treatedas acareer-enhancingfficebecauseof itsbuilt-inpossibilityof continuity hroughre-election.Kleon's career s worthanalysingagainst hisbackground.

Kleon'smilitary alenthas to bejudged by two Atheniancampaignsn theArchidamianwar,thefirst,at Pylos,a successfuloperation, hesecond,whichwillbe analysed n detail,hisattempt o recaptureAmphipolis,a failurewhichled to his death. For both we have the testimonyof Thucydides,which isgenerally agreed to be hostile. Concerning Pylos it is generally acceptedagreementhatthe reinforcementswhichKleontook to supportDemosthenesin the late summer of 425 turnedthe fortunesof the Archidamianwar inAthens' favour.6Athens held hostage the Spartan prisonerscapturedonS AristophanesClouds584-7.See C. W. Fornara,TheAthenianBoardof Generalsfrom01 to404,pp.61-2.6Pylos:Thuc.4.2-23 and 26-41.Mosthistoriansnowaccept he defenceof Kleon'sactions nthe Pylos campaign,cf. A. G. Woodhead, Thucydides'Portraitof Cleon' Mnemosyne V 13(1960),esp. pp. 313-5.Gomme admitted hatThucydideswasbiasedagainstKleon,e.g. Histori-

cal Commentary n Thucydidesol. III 468-9; 478-9; 488-9. Grote'sanalysisof the episode(Historyof Greece . 52, esp. pp. 252-71,newed. 1906)did not find universal upportbutin myview remainsvalid, in particular is methodological omment p. 267). It hashithertobeenthepracticeto look at Kleon only from the testimonyof his opponents, (sc. ThucydidesandAristophanes) hrough whose testimonywe know him.' That Thucydideshas deliberatelyover-emphasizedhe partplayedby chance(tyche)at the expenseof intelligentpre-planningsdifficult odeny,sinceheattributesheAthenian andingat Pylos o the stormwhichchanced o



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Kleon'sAmphipolitanCampaign 173Sphakteria,huspreventingurther nvasionsof Attika,whilethe epiteichismosat Pylos allowed Messenian helots to desert and facilitatedmore effectiveraids on the Peloponnese.ProbablyKleon's reluctance o lead the reinforce-ments himselfwas, as Grotethought,genuine,but eithermisunderstoodormisinterpreted y Thucydides.In any case, he relied on the generalin thefield, Demosthenes. That the enterprisewas pre-plannedand not due to'chance'asThucydideshas it (4.3.1),s suggestedbythe fact thatDemostheneshad Messenians(from Naupaktos) with him (ib. 3.3).Thucydidesexpresslysays (ib.3.2)that thefortification f Pylosen route o Sicilywas Demosthenes'reason for joining the expedition, so it was probablyhis brainchild.Kleoneither knew the aim of Demosthenes from the beginningor he was astuteenough to realise that the investment of Pylos must be made to succeed.Aristophanes' ibethatDemosthenesbaked a cakeatPylosandKleonstoleitaccuseshimof takingall the credit,butthiscould be a comicdistortionof thetruth.7That Kleon knew of the planfromthebeginning s perhapsmorelikelysince Demosthenes could well have needed a politician'ssupport in theassemblywhen he askedfor permission o use his shipsaround he Pelopon-nese (Thuc.4.2.3). Eitherway, he showed strategicgood sense both in hisinsistenceon sendingreinforcements, nd in including roopsof appropriatetype, the archersand peltasts, in addition to the hoplite klerouchsfromLemnosand Imbros Thuc.4.28.4).Thucydides ays Kleonchose Demosthe-nes,by nowin office,ashisassociateat Pylosbecause he knewhe intended olandon Sphakteriaib.29.1-2).Thechoice of Demosthenesat Pyloswouldbeall the morenatural f he hadknownof hisplan fromthebeginning.What heformal mplications f thechoicewere s notclear,butKleonwillhaveneededone of the strategoi o giveorders,notbeing on the boardhimself.carry heirshipsin there,exactlywhereDemostheneswanted.Diodorus however(12.61) ays:'Demosthenesnow led an expeditionagainst Pylos,intendingto fortify this strongholdas athreat o the Peloponnese', mittingthe debatebetween he generalsandthe storm,whichwasthe deciding factorfor Thucydides,who can hardlybe emphasizing ust for its own sake thecontemporaneityf the stormwhichput an end to the generals' rgument soGomme, HCTIII,p.488). He is surelydetractingromthe creditof Demosthenesby choosing o tell the story nthisway,even if the stormwashistorical.Diodorusmay be summarizingThucydides his mainsource)carelesslyhere, but it is temptingto think that there is anothersourceunderlyingDiodoruswhichsimplyattributedhe executionof the plan to Demosthenesandeither omittedthe storm or didnot stress tssignificanceasThucydidesdoes.Thucydidesprobablyunder-esti-matedDemosthenes' ole and the decisivenessof the Pylosepisode n Athens' avourbecause tnecessarily idcredit o Kleonas well,whichhe couldnotallow.7Thuc. 4.29.1;Knights54-7. Aristophanes,who consistentlyattackedKleon,wouldreadilyhavemade ajoke at his expense.Co-operation etween he two men is the mostlikelyscenario.S. Hornbloweraptly describes it as 'an early example of a fourth centuryphenomenon, asoldier-politicianeamworking n harmony, ike the fourth-centuryteam'Charesand Aristo-phon'(7he GreekWorld 79-323B. C p. 133),a parallel o which Mr.G. L.Cawkwelldrewmyattention.Cf. Grote,op.cit.p.267:'Kleon,far fromstealingaway the laurelsof Demosthenes,(asAristophanesepresentsn hiscomedyof the Knights),was the meansof placing hem on hishead,though he at the same timedeservedly hared hem.'



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174 BARBARAMITCHELLThere s,however,greaterdifferenceof opinionconcerningKleon'sattempt

to recoverAmphipolisfor Athensin 422, afterthe year of the armisticeof423/2 had ended. The economic and strategic mportanceof the Strymonvalleyand the colony, foundedby Hagnonin 437, arenot in doubt,but thebackgroundof the longstandingAthenian nterest n the area s worthrecapi-tulating n orderto estimate he damagedone to Athensand her empirebyBrasidas'captureof Amphipolisand, conversely,by the failureof Kleon'sattempt o recapturet.The Strymon ivergaveaccessto a fertilecoastalplain,to the eel fisheriesof lake Kerkinitisand, beyond the Pangaionmountainridge, runningeast and west of Amphipolis,to more fertileplains inland.Silverand gold wereminedin the Mt. Pangaionarea.Timberwas abundantfor shipbuildingand there may well have been shipyardson the Strymonbefore Brasidasbuilt triremes here(Thuc.4.108.1,7).A prosperous olonyoflandowners,Atheniansand locals, would providerevenuesfor Athensfromindirect axeson producesold to traders, nd therewouldhavebeenharbour-dues payableto the nearbyport Eion. Probably n 513 Histiaios,tyrantofMiletos,asked Dariusfor Myrkinoson the Strymon n the territory f theEdonians as a rewardfor saving the Danube bridge for him duringhisScythianexpedition. The advantageshe envisaged at Myrkinos- which,acordingto Herodotusmade Megabazosadvise Darius to removehim toSousa - werean amplesupplyof wood for shipbuildingand oars,silver-mi-nes,and a friendly,numerous ocalpopulation,hencethewherewithalor thebuildingand maintenance f a navy(Hdt.5.23.2).Thracewasalsoa profitablesource of slaves. If the natives were unfriendly,as the local Edoniansonoccasionnotunsurprisingly ere,battlesagainst hemwouldprovidecaptivesto be sold into slavery.In addition,Herodotus ays it was a Thracian ustomto sell their children as slaves (5.6.1).Thracianswould also have providedcavalry, ike the Tokes whose tombstone(datable o 525-490)shows he waskilleddefendingEion. Interestingly, e was fightingfor Paros,showingthatthis island,in the seventhcentury he founderof Thasos,retainedan interestin the Thracianareaat leasttillthe turnof the sixth-fifth enturies.TheAthenian nterest n Thracegoes back at leastto themid-sixthcentury,for Peisistratoshad collectedrevenues rom silverminesin MountPangaionto finance his return to Athens in 547 after his ten-yearexile. Miltiades,married o a ThracianprincessHegesipyle,daughterof kingOloros,had ledan unsuccessfulexpeditionagainstParosafterMarathon.Thegold he hopedto acquirefor Athens(Hdt. 6.132)probablycame fromsome Pariandepen-dency in the Thracianarea,to judge by the above-mentionedombstoneofTokes.At anyrate, t musthave been fromhis fatherand mother hatKimongained his interestin the area. Leadingthe first expeditionof the Delianleague,he recapturedEionfrom the Persians,probably n 476,in spiteof theheroic resistanceand self-sacrificeof Boges, the Persiancommander Hdt.



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Kleon'sAmphipolitanCampaign 1757.107;Thuc.1.98.1;Aischines11(defalsa legatione)34).Eionthereafter eca-me an Athenianbase and emporionThuc.4.102.3).Later,about465, at theheightof Kimon'sinfluence, he Athenianssettled a colony at EnneaHodoi(Nine Ways),just north of Amphipolis,but were defeated by EdoniansatDrabeskos probablySdravik,about 13kms NNE of Amphipolis,rather hanDrama,about 30kms east,nearthe laterPhilippi).Thoughit is unlikelythatall 10,000Athenian colonists were killed the settlementwas subsequentlyabandoned. However, Athenian interestsin gold-miningcontinued in theThasian Peraiaat Skaptesule,where Thucydides'family inheritedmininginterests.His patronymicOloros'showsthathe too was related o the Thra-ciankingOloros whosedaughterHegesipylewasmarried o Miltiades.8

DuringPerikles'politicalascendancy, n 437, the AtheniansreturnedandwithHagnonas oikist foundeda colony at Amphipolison thehigh ground nthe bend of the Strymonbetween Eion and Ennea Hodoi, the most comman-dingand defensibleposition in the area. Bynow, most of the Thracian ownswere underAthenian controland payingtributeto Athens,so Athens hadstrategicreasonsin addition to her long-standing conomic interest or sen-ding out a strongcolony.WhenBrasidas truck n Thrace n 424 Amphipoliswas his mostvaluable prizesince its loss was a blow to the heart of Athens'empireeconomicallyand at the same time undermined he strategicadvan-tageswhichshe had gainedthrough he occupationof Pylos.Itwas thereforesoundstrategy n Kleon'spart o try and recover t, if thiswasfeasible.It mayhave been over-optimistic o try to storm t, considering he naturalstrengthand defencesof the place and the undevelopedstateof siege-warfaren thefifthcentury.However,a siegemight ast longenoughto starve he defendersout, as at Potidaia Thuc.2.70.1),or create he conditionsfor internal tasis tobetray the city, as had happened when an Argilian faction betrayed it toBrasidas n 424 (Thuc.4.103.3-4).The city had a mixed population, with a

8The bestmodernaccountof the historicalgeography f the Strymonvalleysettlements sthatof Benjamin saac,TheGreekSettlementsn Thrace ntiltheMacedonianConquestStudiesof the DutchArchaeologicalocietyVol.X, 1986)pp.1-51. The Mt. Pangaiongold and silvermines:Hdt. 7.112.TheAthenianSophaneswaskilledfightingEdonians n the areaof Datonformines,probably hoselost afterthe Drabeskosdisaster,o be distinguishedromtheSkaptesylegold mine(or'mines'according o Hdt. 6.46) on themainlandoppositeThasos,recoveredn 463after the Thasianrevolt (Hdt.9.75;Thuc. 1.100.2 nd 101.3); f. Isaac, op.cit.pp.27-30. W. M.Leake, (Travels n NorthernGreece1835)vol. III pp.161-4)saysthat in the 16thcentury herewere500-60 furnaces melting ilver andgoldfrompyrites, rom whichasmuch as30,000goldducatsannuallywent as profitto the Turkishgovernment. n 1835silverand leadminesnearNizvorowere stillbeingworkedbutweredueto be abandonedwhenexhausted p. 164).Leakementions the largeandprolificeels netted at the StrymondamaboveAmphipolis p. 183)andwas impressedby the fertility of the well-populatedupper and lower Strymon valleys(pp.200-204).Cf.theearly20thcenturydescription f S.Casson,Macedonia,Thrace ndIllyria,theirrelationswithGreecerom theearliest imesdown othetimeof Philip onofAmyntas1926,repr.1968), . 1.



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176 BARBARAMITCHELLminorityof Athenians(ib. 108). The following discussionis an attempttore-assessKleon'sfailure o recapture hestronghold.

As in the Pylosnarrative, hucydides' ccountof the Amphipoliscampaignis hostile to Kleon: he is an incompetentcommander,his troops have noconfidence n him,he hadno intentionof staying o fightbutfled at once andwas killed while in flight by a Myrcinianpeltast(Thuc.5.10.9).It has beenargued hat not only is this pictureof Kleon's roleunfairbut that, in spite ofhis failure o recaptureAmphipolis,he had manymore successes hanThucy-dides recordsbeforethe finalbattle.In particular, e has been creditedwithrecapturingnot only Torone (on the Sithonianprong of Chalcidice)andGalepsos (on the Thraciancoast, a Thasiancolony in the peraiaof ThasosbeyondAmphipolis,eastof Eion),both of whicharementionedby Thucydi-des, but also the whole of the Sithonianpromontoryand several towns inadditionto Torone.9As well as these Chalcidian owns Kleonhas been heldresponsible or the return o the Athenianallianceof some coastaltowns inBottikewhichdid undoubtedlymakea treatywith Athensfor which we haveepigraphicevidence,eithershortlybeforeorjust after the peace of Nicias.'?

The arguments or the recoveryof both groupsof towns are epigraphic.Theywarrant arefulexaminationbut in my view shouldbe rejected, or thefollowingreasons:

1. The claimsfor conquestsby Kleonin ChalkidikeTthe nference hat Kleon recaptured everalplaces in Chalcidice s basedon the survivalof identicalrecords or six Thracian owns in the AssessmentListsof the Athenianempirefor 425 and for a year, probably422, of which

only three fragmentsand no prescriptsurvive."The six listed in 425 areHerakleion,Singos,Mekyberna,Gale,Trallosand Bormiskos.Of these,Sin-gos, Mekybernaand Gale are assessedat the nominal sum of 10drachmaseach, whereasHeracleionand Bormiskospay 1000dr.each and TrallosIta-lent,which look likenormalrates(thepre-warributeof Mekybernawas also9Argued irstby A. WestandB. D. Meritt,AJA29 (1925),59-69;followedby, amongothers,Meritt,Wade-Gery ndMcGregor,AthenianTributeLists1II,90-1; J. de Romilly,ThucydidesandAthenian mperialism, ng.tr.p. 192,note2. Theirconclusionsweredisputed ffectivelybyP. Roussel, Lacampagnede Cleonen Thrace',Bulletindel'InstitutArcheologiqueulgare 6 =SertaKarazoviana (1950),257-63, and by Gomme, HCT1II,p.636. Butthey were acceptedlaterby A. G.Woodhead n his influentialarticle,op.cit.pp.303-6.W. K.Pritchett,Mnemosyne

26 (1973),376-86, shows how the West-Meritt iew was, for the most part,acceptedwithoutfurtherconsideration f the epigraphic vidence,thoughH. Bengtson,GriechischeGeschichte3(1965),228 note6, assumesthat Rousselhad alreadyrefutedthe theoryof West and Meritt(Pritchett,op.cit.p.376-7).0The Bottic reaty: ee below andnote 18.11IGP 71lines 108-113 from425 assessment ist).The names of the six Thracian ownsarerestored rom the identical ectionof the 422 list, IGP77 lines214.



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Kleon'sAmphipolitanCampaign 1771Talent).The most likely explanationof the nominal sums is that Singos,Mekybemaand Galewereamongthe Chalcidian oastal owns whichThucy-dides says were persuadedby Perdikkas o revolt from Athens in 432 andsynoecizewithOlynthos o makeit a stronghold Thuc.1.58.2).Mekybema, othe northwest of the Sithonianpeninsula,on whichSingosandGale also lie,was at one time, Straboreports, (VII 390 and frg.29) the port of nearbyOlynthos.'2The nominalassessments,uncharacteristicn the year425 whenthe total tributewas trebled,may be due to the presenceof a few Athenianloyalists still residing n these placesor may simplyindicatethatAthensstillclaimed them as tributary llies.

Theassessmentof these smallplacesfor a nominalsum bothin425and422does not prove that they were under the control of Athens in 425, lost toBrasidasn 424and thenrecovered or Athensby Kleon in thelatesummerof422.This inferencewas originallymade by Menttand Westand acceptedinATLiii thoughnot by Gomme, or earlierby Roussel."3t depended on twoassumptions.First, hattheassessmentof 422,on whichpaymentswere madein 421 atthe Dionysia,so after he Peace of Nicias, wasdelayeduntilafter hePanathenaea,delayed in fact until afterpeace had become a certainty,andreflected he mood of the peace witha rateof assessmentwhichwas loweredto somethingmorelike the 'Aristidean'understood o mean'pre-war')evel.Secondly, his viewassumed hat allplacesassessedunder hisdelayedassess-mentactuallypaid theirdue amount of phoros n 421and wereunderAthe-nian control.Thisviewhas now been generallyabandoned, orthe followingreasons:first,the greatassessmentdecree of 425 laid down penalties if anyPanathenaea houldpasswithoutan assessment.As Meiggsand Lewispointout in theircommentary,here is no reasonto thinkthat the nextassessmentwas not in factmade whenit was due, at the Panathenaea f 422. At the timewhen Kleon hadjust takencommand as strategos or 422/1 and was embar-king on a campaign of re-conquest, he assessmentwould not have beenomittedand it would nothavesubstantiallyowered he rate.'4t was,afterall,Kleon who had been principallyresponsible or the high raisein 425.'5The422 assessmentmust undoubtedlyhave been carriedout, and if some rates

12See endnote for the identificationof Sane with Gale and the confusion of Gale with thebetterknown Galepsos.Cf. A. B. West, AJP58 (1937),166-73,whose argumentsfor 'Gale'instead of 'Sane' n the text of the peaceof Nikias (Thuc.5.18.6)still seem convincing,paceGomme'sdoubtsad loc.(HCTIIIpp.672-4).13WestandMeritt,AJA29(1925),pp.64-5; ContraGomme, HCTIII635-6andMoreEssays,112-21, Thucydides nd Kleon, The Second Battleof Amphipolis',es. p. 115note 2, agreeingwith Roussel op.cit.,thoughpointingout the biasof Thucydides'narrativeagainstKleon. Cf.Pritchettop.cit.note 9 above,esp. 383-4.14MeiggsandLewis, GHI69 pp. 225-7; cf. Meiggs,CR(1952),99 in a reviewof ATL II.15Assumingthat the Thoudipposwho proposed he decreewas Kleon'sson-in-lawand wasactingunder his instructions.Cf. note2 above.



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178 BARBARA ITCHELL

were lowered,they will havebeen relaxedonly for pragmatic easons f, forexample,they had been utterlyunrealistic,or, perhaps, n the case of citieswhichhad complainedof excessiveassessmentsunderthe provision orsuchcomplaints n the 425 decree.'6Moreover, he tributequotalistwhichusedtobe assigned o 422/1 is almostcertainly hatof 418/17anditssurviving ntries(for the Hellespont)do not suggestthat even afterthe peace the Athenianslowered he phorossubstantially.n anycase,the fragments f the 422assess-ment,as epigraphists renow mainlyagreed,mustreflect he situationbeforethe Panathenaeaof 422, in Hekatombaion, nd before Kleon'sconquests nthe late summerof thatyear, ust as he was aboutto embarkon the re-con-questof theThracewardegion.Therefore,Mekyberna,GaleandSingoswereassessedbeforeKleon'scampaignand theirassessmentcannothave beentheresultof his activitiesbeforehis attempton Amphipolis.

Secondly, t cannotbe assumedthatall citiesassessed n 422were actuallyunderAtheniancontrolandpaidtheirassessedamountsof tributedutifullyatthe following Dionysia. The assessment ist for 425 was certainly nflated,since it includesboth Melos,whichwasnotevenin the empire,and Olynthosand Spartolos,whichwereboth in revolt.'7But the assessments or Mekyber-na, GaleandSingosare identical nboth lists.Ifthesewerenominal n425,nomore than a statementof Athens' claim to control them, and since theirassessmentsare identicalin 422, they are surelynominalin 422 also. It istherefore mpossibleto infer fromthe 422 list thatall threeplaceshad beenrecoveredby Athensas the authorsof the original heorymaintained. f theirsituationwas the same in both years,and if Athensdid not occupythemin425, thenshe cannothave been occupying hem in 422 either,whetheror nottheywere stillinhabitedby a few Atticizers.

A little moreinformationaboutthe statusof thesetownsat the timeof thepeace can be derivedfrom Thucydides.That Mekybernawas occupiedbyAthensat some timebeforethe winterof 421/0 is indicatedby his statementthatan Atheniangarrisonwas expelledfromthereby the Olynthiansduringthiswinter Thuc.5.39.6).Butthegarrisonwasprobably stablishedhereafterthe peacetreaty, or the followingreason: he clause in the treatyconcerningMekyberna,Sane(sc.Gale)and Singossaysthattheir nhabitantshouldlivein theirown cities,as also the Olynthiansand Acanthians Thuc.5.18.6).Thisis consistentwith theirnominaltributeof 10drachmasand,perhaps,withthepresenceof a few pro-Atheniannhabitants,he samesituationas at the timeof the two assessments.But they are evidentlynot in the same categoryasSkione,Torone and Sermylion, he groupof Thraciancities which Athenspossesses(or,in thecase of Skione, s certain o possessshortly).Thesearethe

16 IG i3 71 lines 21-2; Meigs-Lewis GHI69 lines.17 IG i3 71 line 65, Melioi 15T;line 166, Olynthioi; line 167, Spartolioi.



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Kleon'sAmphipolitanCampaign 179subjectsof a later clause whichallows Athensto make what provisionsshechoosesconcerning hemandany othercities n herpossession(Thuc.5.18.8).If Mekybernahad been occupied before and not afterthe treatyit wouldprobablyhave appeared n the same categoryas Torone,whichwe knowtohave been taken for Athens by Kleon. Skione was admittedlynot yet inAthenianhands, but the fact of her revolt after the armisticeand Kleon'sdecree,passedby the assembly,enacting hatall adult malesshould be puttodeathand the remainingnhabitants old into slavery the same harshprovi-sions as intheoriginaldecreewhich he hadsupportedagainstMytilene)musthave madethe Athenians nsist that Skione shouldappearby anticipationnthe list of places alreadyin their possession.They actuallycarried out theprovisionsof the decreein the summerof 421(Thuc.5.32.1), o it must havefallen soon after hepeacewassigned.The AtheniangarrisonwhichoccupiedMekybernaand was expelled by the Olynthiansduringthe followingwinter(Thuc. 5.39.1)could have been establishedeither before or after the peacetreaty,but since it does not appear with Torone and Sermylion,whereasSkione(eventhoughnot yetrecaptured) oes, it seems much morelikelythatit was occupied by the Atheniansafter the treaty. If it had already beenoccupied,it shouldhave been in the list of placesactually n Athenianhandsand not along with Sane (Gale) and Singos.Furthermore,he provisionthatthe inhabitantsof these three places should live in their own cities is alsoapplied to OlynthosandAkanthos,places certainlynot in Athenianhands atthe time of the peace. It thereforeseems likely that Mekybemawas stillonlyclaimedby Athens and had not yet been occupiedby her at the time of thetreaty,and that the garrisonwas put in as a resultof some action taken soonafterwards, erhapsat thesame timeas the recapture f Skione.There s thenno reason o connecttherecoveryof Mekybernawith Kleon'sexpedition,andthere is no evidence that Sane (Gale)or Singoswere everrecovered.Sermy-lion, also on the Sithonianpeninsula,presumablywas, since it is listed withTorone and Skione in the treaty,but at what time is uncertain. t seems thenthatthe narrative f Thucydidesandthe text of thetreaty upport heinterpre-tation of the epigraphicevidencegiven above, namely, that Kleon was notresponsiblefor the recoveryof any Chalcidic cities in Thraceapart fromTorone andGalepsos.

2. The BotticcitiesIt has alsobeenclaimed hattherecoveryat sometime beforethe peace of anumberof small citiesin the coastalarea of Bottikewas the resultof Cleon'soperations en routefor Amphipolis.18 he cities of the Bottic league had

18The treaty with Bottic coastal towns: IG i3 76; IG il 90; Tod, GHI 68; SEG X 89; Bengtson,



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180 BARBIAR MITCHELLrevolted rom Athens at the same time as Chalcidike n 432 (Thuc.158,1) andhad probablybeen disaffected hroughoutmost of the war. An attemptby anAthenianexpedition n 429 to recoverSpartolos, he leadingcity of the Botticleague, was thwartedby the interventionof a force from Olynthos(Thdc.2.79). The epigraphicevidence for their returnto the Athenian alliance ataround the time of the peace is, however,convincing.The text of the treatybetween Athensand these small towns does not mentionSpartolos,which layinland. It is named in the peace of 421 as one of the six cities still resistingAthens in the north, ncludingOlynthosand Akanthos,which are to be alliesof neitherside.A treatybetweenthe Atheniansand Bottiaeansmade at aboutthe time of thepeace would thereforenot includeSpartolos,which,as head ofthe league, would normallybe expected to head the list. Although it ischronologicallypossible that the returnof the coastalcities to alliance withAthens was due to Kleon's presence n the area,theycould equallywell havebeen recoveredby the successfulexpeditionof Nikiasin423 whichresultedntherecapture f Mende(Thuc.4.124-132).He tookfiftyshipsand would havebeen operatingin the Thermaicgulf opposite the Bottic coastal cities butwould not have threatenedSpartolos nland.That Nikias' successhad reper-cussions is suggested by Perdikkas' eadiness o break off his alliance withSpartaand revertto Athens late in 423 (Thuc.4.132.1).Furthermore,whenKleon arrived n Chalcidike n the summerof 422, he not only summonedPerdikkas,who was already allied with Athens, but was able to summonPolles,king of the OdomantianThracians, o bringmercenarieso Eion(Thuc.5.6.2).These swings n favourof Athensaretoo early o be due to Kleon'sownexpedition and the effect of Nikias' presencelate in 423 may have beenunderestimated.The return of the Bottic cities to Athens, the change inPerdikkas'alliance(albeitfrom personal motives,since his joint expeditionwithBrasidas gainstArrhabaios f Lynkoshadfailed)and theunderstandingwith Pollesmayall owe something o Nikias'success,as well as to local andpersonalrivalries.

It is thereforenot possible o creditKleon withtherecapture f a numberofThraciantowns for Athens other than those Thucydidesrecords,and toexplainthe omissionsas the resultof the bias of his narrative gainstKleon.Thoughbiascanbe detected n the accountof Kleon'smotives,his cowardlyflight and death, and perhaps in the historian'sevident approvalof thehoplites' reasons for mistrustingKleon as a commander, though not, asthings turned out, without reason) it does not seem to be manifestedindeliberate uppressionof factsaboutthecampaign.Butwas Kleonnecessarilyan incompetentgeneral?He capturedTorone,which had servedBrasidasasStaatsvertrdge87;Tod, GHI i 68; ATL , Gazetteers.v. Spartolioi p.550) and s. v. Tripoai(p.556).



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Kleon'sAmphipolitanCampaign 181base in 424 andwasby itspositiona good springboardn the rearof Eionforan attack on Amphipolis,and a dangerousplace to leave in enemy handswhen he moved forward.He had to abandon an attemptto take Stageiros(probablyalongthe coastbeyond Akanthos n the directionof Amphipolis),whichwouldhave been usefulin case of intervention y the Akanthians,butsucceeded n occupyingGalepsos,on the Thracian oastbeyondAmphipolis,whichwouldhave been likewisestrategically dvantageousn caseanyattackcame fromthat directionagainstthe Atheniansduring heirattempton Am-phipolis.Froma strategicpoint of view, the places Thucydidessays Kleontook or attempted o takewereall threeconnectedwiththe mainobjectof hisexpedition, he recapture f Amphipolis.To havedelayedhis attackby besie-ging all the small and unimportantowns on the Sithonianpeninsulawouldhavebeennotonly outof characterwithhishasty emperament, ut,arguably,not soundstrategy.

Thathe aimed at capturingothertowns to the east of Galepsosand evenhad somesuccesstheretoo hasbeen suggested,becauseof the appearanceofTrallos n the422 assessment.Butthisdependson the sameunlikelyassump-tion aboutthis listas theargument bouttheChalcidiccities,namely, hatanycitylistedin it must havepaid,andthereforehavebeenbroughtbackintotheAthenianempire.Moreover,Trailos s now thoughtto be situatednot on thelatersite of Philippibut at Aidonochori,about 111/2 kmswestnorthwest ofAmphipolison the oppositeside of the Strymon,northof Mt.Kerdylion.Theevidence from the numberof Trailos coins found at Aidonochori,wherealmost no other types apart from regal Macedonianissues appear,seemsconclusive.'9 he re-sitingof Trallosalso strengthenshe viewthatKleonwasdirectinghisexpeditionsimply owardsAmphipolisand wasnotaimingattherecoveryof thewholeareaforAthens,atleast notuntilafterhe haddealtwithAmphipolis.It is possible to assess Kleonmorefairlyas a general f it is bornein mindthat thiswas his objective.Hisinadequacyayinthe spherenotof strategybutof tactics.Whatever he precisemovementsandpositions n thebattleoutsideAmphipolis, t is clearthatBrasidaswasable to outmanoeuvrehim.His first,and major,mistakewas to give in to the restlessnessof his troops,who found

19For the location of the site of TraYlos Tragilos), near Aidonochori rather than the laterPhilippi, east of Amphipolis, see Pritchett, op. cit. 380-1. Cf. ATL i Gazetteer s. v.p. 556 (samelocation). It is described as an extensive site near the monastery of St. John Prodromos 3 kmssouth of Aidonochori. Perdrizet had identified it as Trailos in the report of the CongresNumismatique de Paris, 1900, 153-4. The guardian of the site gave him 8 coins, including 1 ofPhilip11,1of Alexanderand 5 of Tragilos.Theyhad been foundin the monastery rounds, owere not acquired through the antiquities trade. No coins of Tragilos or Trailos have appearedanywhere else. D. Hereward (AJA 67 [19631,73-4) reported remains at the site. J. and L. RobertREG 83 (1970), 409-10, (Bulletin tpigraphique no. 377), reviewing Koukouli's excavations of aheroon at the site, summarize the evidence for the identification. Cf. Fig. I p. 191.



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182 BARBARAMITCHELLtheirinactivity rksomeand thoughthim incompetentas a commander om-paredwith Brasidas.In orderto keep themoccupied,he led themout on areconnaissanceexpedition without waiting for the reinforcementswhichmight have enabled him to encircle and retakeAmphipolis,and so gaveBrasidashis chance to make a sortieand catch the Atheniansbefore theycould retire o the safetyof theirbaseon thecoastat Eion.Suchis theoutlineof Thucydides' ccount n 5.6-10,which,however, aisesproblemsof interpre-tation in detail.Whatfollows is a discussionof his narrativen the lightofrecent opographical urveysand discussions.

3. Thucydides'accountof the battleoutsideAmphipolisThucydides'description 5.6-10)of the positionsand movementsof Brasi-

dasand Kleonbeforeandduring he battle s fullof difficultiesand uncertain-ties because, n spiteof its detailedtopographicalnfonnation, t is writtenasthoughthe readerwasas familiarwith theterrainas Thucydideshimselfwas.It has every indicationof being based on an eye-witnesssource,and onehostile to Kleon, probablyone of the hoplitesor their officers.Eye-witnessaccountsof battlesarenotoriouslydifficult o makesense of at any periodandthese chaptersare no exception.Itis,however,methodologically angerousodismiss the account as hopelesslybiasedagainstKleonanduntrustworthyneveryrespectwhenwe haveno othercontemporaryccount.Gomme'scarefulanalysisof thebattle20asto be updatedon somepointsof topographyn thelightof the surveysof Lazaridisduring he 1970's21 ut he demonstratedhatthefactsThucydidesnarrates bout Kleon'sactionsdo notnecessarily onvicthimof cowardice n spiteof the historian's haftsof malice,no doubtderivedfromhis sources.Kleondid not intend to fightbeforereinforcementsrrived(5.7.3-4),so Thucydides' eference o thisat 5.10,9, sincehe had not intendedto fight in the first place' would not alone imply cowardice.It would beconsistentwith a strategicwithdrawal,his originalintentionif it were notfollowed by the loaded ?V50ix;?pci5yov and his death from the Myrcinianpeltast's avelinthrowand contrastedwith the braverearguard ctionof theAthenianhoplitesagainstKlearidasas theyclosedranksand made theirwaybacktowards heiroriginalpositionon the 6Mpo;Thuc.5.10.9). I takethistobe the sameas Hill 133, he X6(pog f id. 5.7.4.)On thisinterpretationKleon's'flight'wasinrealityno morethananattempto disengagehismen andretreatto Eion, following the left wing which had alreadygot away safely. Thepeltast'sjavelin may not have struckhim in the back, as has often beenassumed,but from the side or side front, since the Myrcinianswere with

20 Gomme, HCTIII pp.648-9, takes'the firstgates'of c. 10.6to be the first to AthenianscomingfromEion,hencein the SE.21Seenote23below.



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Kleon'sAmphipolitanCampaign 183Klearidas,who emerged romtheThracian ateandengagedwith the Atheni-an rightafterBrasidasandtherefore urther owardsEion,as I shallattempt oshow. In Diodorus' account of the battle,Kleon is not a coward and thisshould not be disregarded, lthoughthe battle scene is entirelyconventional,both commandersdyingbravely.22tthereforeaddsnothing o ourknowledgeof what actuallyhappened,but may indicatethat an alternative ersion wasavailable o Diodorusin which Kleon was not portrayed s a coward.Evenifsuch a versiondid exist and was given a carelessconventional reatmentbyDiodorus,it does not mean that the details given by Thucydidesabout thebattlehavenecessarilyo be rejectedexceptforthe 'flight'of Kleon, which,asGomme has shown, can be contradicted rom his own earlierstatementofKleon's intention not to fight without reinforcements5.7.3-4). His move-ments have therefore o be regardedas a strategicwithdrawal,which does notimplycowardice.On this point,though perhapsonly on this point, the con-ventionalaccount n Diodorusmay be right.

In spite of its anti-Kleonbias, Thucydides'accountremainsbasic to ourunderstanding f whathappened n thebattle,but it has to be examined n thelight of the topography of Amphipolis and its defences, which have beenre-examinedby Pritchett 1980) in a study based on the excavationsandsurveysof Lazaridis, arriedout in the 1970's,and on his own observations.This archaeological videncewas not of course available o Gomme, whosecommentary ummarizes heviews of earlier cholars,nor to Pritchettwhen hefirst studied Amphipolis (1965).The crucial discovery of Lazaridiswas theremainsof a bridge acrossthe Strymon o the north and of a gate leadingtowards t,both datable o theclassicalperiod.Anothergatewas discovered othe east of thisone,withlargerdimensions,n the NE angleof thewall,also ofthe classicalperiod,this is probably he 'Thracian ate'throughwhich Kleari-das made his attack.The 'first gate' from which Brasidasmade his sortie slikely to be the 'first' or thoseapproaching rom the bridge,on the northsideof Amphipolis,the one Brasidashad crossed in 424, and not a gate in thesouth east, that is to say, the 'first'from the point of view of the AthenianscomingfromEion, as manyhistorians ncludingGomme havethought.23his

22 Diodorus12.74.23 For the topographyof Amphipolis,its walls and gates, see Pritchett,Studiesin AncientGreekTopographyt.1(1965)and the important evisions n pt.III(1980), AmphipolisRestu-died', based on personalobservationand the excavationsand surveysof D. Lazaridis'urveysand excavationsmadeduringthe 1970's.References o the latter are given in H.W. Catling'sannualreportsof archaeology n Greece(AR), in particular 977-78,p. 48; 1978-9,pp.29-30;1979-80,p.43. Cf. Lazaridis,CRAI1977,pp.194-212, LaCite grecqued'Amphipolis';ToErgon1977 (1978), pp. 26-38; PAE (I1paKTE1Ka Tun; 'ApXttokoytKlq 'EtatpEtaq) 1976 (1978),pp.88-98. One of the gates n theNW ledto a bridgecloseto thewall. 1200 reetrunksandpostsfrom its foundationswere found,including 77 wooden piles belonging o the earlierphaseofconstruction, atedby rfpottery o the end of the 5th-beginning f the 4thcent.B.C.'(Catling,AR1979-80,p.43).Thismust be the locationof thebridgeby which Brasidas ntered he city in



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184 BARBARAITCHELLlocation s consistentwiththe identification f the hill (X6(po)to which Kleonadvancedas Hill 133 whicharchaeological inds suggestwas also the site ofEnneaHodoi, where the Athenians irst attempted o found a colony in 465,about 2 km NNW of Amphipolis.The northernaspecttowardsThracewasthe importantone for Athens,sincethe pointof the settlementwas accesstoThraciangold andtimber.

Although t is likely thatthere wereothergatesin the circuitof the Amphi-poliswalls,24 ritchettn hissecondstudyhasarguedconvincinglyhatThucy-dides'accountof the battleand of the Athenianretreatmakesbettersense ifKleon'spositionwas on and aroundHill 133and if Brasidasmadehis sortiefrom the northerngate leading to Lazaridis'northembridge.Brasidashadplacedhimselfwith his forceon Kerdilion,a hill just acrossthe StrymonSWof Amphipolis,from where he could keep an eye on the movementsof theAtheniansat Eion (Thuc.5.6.3).Whenhe saw that Kleonhad led his troopsout, Brasidas ook his force back to join Klearidasand the restof his armyinside Amphipolis,crossingback by the same northernbridge,which forsecuritywould have been the only accessto the town frombeyondthe river.He then instructedKlearidasand his men to preparefor a sortie. Kleonmeanwhilehad observedhis movementsand was also told that a sortiewasimminent by a scout who was far enough forwardto be able to see themovementof the legs of men and animals hrough hegap beneathone of thegates.This wasprobably heThracian atethroughwhichKlearidasmadehisattackas instructedby Brasidas. Ithasbeen identifiedby Lazaridis s a widegate in the NW sector of the walls.) Kleon then went forwardhimself toconfirm hereport tRfXOEV.aCiX5 d?icv- 5.10.3)and immediately rderedthe Atheniansto retreat,with those on the left movingtowards Eion in asoutherlydirection.TheAthenianswerenot,so Brasidas old his men,in anyparticularorder while on reconnaissance 5.9.3) and were demoralizedasmuch by their own &Tcata as by the daringof Brasidaswhen he attackedthemunexpectedlyat a run fromthe 'firstgates'.Thesewereevidentlynotthe'Thraciangates' underwhich they had observedthe readinessof men andhorses,and therefore he attackwas, as Brasidashad planned,all the moreunexpected.

I believethatthe Athenian ataxia'partially xplainsKleon'spuzzlingorder424 (Thuc.4.103.4-5and 108.1) nd be related o thepalisadeandgatefrom whichhe madehissortie o attackKleonin 422 (Thuc.5.10.6).Leake,Travelsn NorthernGreece IIpp. 191,197,found a 300-yardongcauseway-bridgen the same place.Papastavru'slder view(ClioBeiheft24 (1936)was thus provedright,againstthe surmiseof Gomme, who putsthe bridgeon thewesternsidenearthe modernone andthe'firstgate' n the SE towardsEion(HCTIII,648-50).The 'Thraciangate' throughwhich Klearidascame as instructed,was probablyalso in thenorthernsectorof the wall (as its name implies),where Lazaridis dentifiedremainsof aHellenisticgate.24LazaridisCRAI1977p.210f.



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Kleon'sAmphipolitanCampaign 185to the rightwingto swivelround(5.10.4).Theywouldhave been the rearof astraggling olumnafterhis order o retreat,right',centre'and 'left'beingthetermsrelevant o an attackon Amphipolis romthe NE, the directionof theAthenianpositionon the k6(pog,Hill 133.(See sketchmap,p. 191.)As strate-gos, Kleonwouldnaturally e with therightwing,thepositionof mostdangerandglory n a hoplitebattle,and at the rearof his force as it retreated owardsEion.Thinkingmistakenlyhatthere wastime forthe movement o be carriedout, he ordered he right o turn,probably ntending hemto make a quarter-turn to the left.Thischangeof directionwouldhave takenthemfurther romthe NE cornerof the Amphipoliswalls andoverslightlyhighergroundacrossthe low saddleatthe base of Mt.Pangaionandmoredirectly o Eionthanbyfollowing the valley closer to the E walls of Amphipolis.Carryingout theorderwouldhaveensureda moreorderlyretreat, ndthismay have been themainpurposeof it. However,as a resultof obeying t,theyexposedtheirrightsides, now unprotectedby theirneighbours' hields,to the enemy.Thiswas,Thucydidesimplies, Kleon's fault, and led to casualtieson the right(rear)because Kleon did not foresee the effect of his command.25Thucydides'judgementmusthavebeen sharedby the hoplites.Theymaywell havebeenright.Itwas the Athenians nthecentre,on theleft of therightwing,whowerefirstroutedby Brasidas,whose sortiewasfollowedswiftlyby Klearidasfromthe Thraciangate' as instructed(5.9.7 and ib. 10.7). It was thereforetheAthenians n the centrewho wereattacked fromboth sides'by BrasidasandKlearidas.Theright, o thenorth,was thenattackedby Brasidas,whoreceivedhis deathwound in this engagement,unobservedby the Athenians.The leftwing, cut off from the centreand right,escapedto Eion.Those on the rightoffered some resistanceto Klearidasbefore they were overwhelmed,andKleon musthave been with them,since it was one of Klearidas'Myrcinianpeltastswho killed him witha javelin,not 'in flight' as Thucydidessays,butmorelikelyretreating ccording o plan,as arguedabove.

Whetherornot Kleon's nability o gettherightwingoutof dangerwasdueto his ignoranceof the right ype of command, he inexperienceof Kleon as ageneralis undeniable.Thucydides'narrative,hough guilty of bias, reflectswhatmust havebeengenuineunwillingness f hismento be ledby him. As amemberof a familywhich had not traditionally eld the strategiahe had,bygood judgement,succeeded at Pylos, where the experiencedDemostheneswas already n command.Madeover-confidentby this success,his failureatAmphipoliswastheresultof trying o combine,aspoliticianshadtraditionallydone at Athens,the double role of generaland statesman.The two kindsof

25Thucydides'one at c. 7.2,describing he hoplites'mistrustof Kleon'scapacitycomparedwith Brasidas, s consistentwith the hostilereactionof the chorus o Kleon'selectionasgeneralin Aristophanes' Clouds 584-7.



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186 BARBARAMITCHELLcareer were to become gradually more and more separated, the typical 'dem-agogues' or 'rhetores'not usually aspiring o the strategia n the fourthcen-tury.26 he firstsigns of thisdivisionof function,however,arenoticeablen thefifthcenturyandbecome moremarkedwiththealmostcontinuous ightingofthe Peloponnesianwaryears,as the following ndications how.In Aristophanes'Knights164-7, the Sausage-seller s promisedthat as ademagogue he will be able to trampleover the boule and imprisonthegenerals.The courtsandjuries are a familiar arget or Aristophanes, utthereferenceto generalshere must referspecificallyto the euthynaprocedure,which was evidently earedby themduring he Archidamianwar.Demosthe-nes' reluctance o return o Athens afterthe Aetolian disaster s a relevantexample.His returnwas made less dangerousby his subsequentvictoriesatOlpai and Idomene and the threehundredpanoplies he broughtback withhimas spoils.27 urther xamplesarePythodoros,SophoklesandEurymedon,aftertheyhad made the unpopularpeaceof Gelawith Hermokratesn Sicily.On their return o AthensPythodorosand Sophokleswere exiled and Eury-medon fined (Thuc.4.65.3).The mocktrialof the dog Labes for 'stealingaSicilian cheese' in Waspss a parodyof some kind of charge,perhapsem-bezzlement,against Laches,who had been in command in Sicily in 425.Presentationof their accounts formed part of the euthynaprocedureandsometimes led to chargesof embezzlement.The euthynoiwereofficialsap-pointed by the boule and if they and the logistaiwere satisfied with thegenerals'account of their actions and finances nothing furtherhappened.However,if complaints were raised by anyone againstthe generalsat theeuthynaprocedure,they could be broughtfor trial before the appropriatedikasterion.28ere was the opportunity or an accuser,maybean ambitiouspoliticianlike Kleon or the young Alkibiades, o bring charges.This is theobvious ink between Kleon andthedikastswhich is parodied n Waspsnthe

26 For the separationof politicalfrom militaryrolesin the 4th centurysee MogensHansen,'Rhetores nd Strategoi n FourthCenturyAthens',GRBS24 (1983),149-77.27Thuc. 3.114.1(d68E6aTLpCt KA4o5o;); Thuc. 4.4. At the beginning of the Pylos campaignpermissionwas granted o him 6VTr [5trirtq after his returnfrom Akarnania o use his shipsaround he Peloponnese.He was probably eposedafterhis defeat n Aitolia but re-elected fterhis successesat IdomeneandOlpaiandso strategos-electt the beginningof the campaigningseason425/4. When Kleon 'chose'him as his collaborator e was alreadygeneral, 4.29.1)andevidentlyhad not attackedhim for his defeat in Aitolia. Perhaps his was the originof theco-operation etweenDemosthenesand Kleon n the followingyear,cf. p. 173and note7 above.28 Pritchett,TheGreekState at War i c. 1;M. Pierart,LAntiquiteclassique 0 (1971),568-9;Ostwald,op. cit.62-66. I accept Ostwald'sview that the generals were subject to euthynaprocedure n the same wayas other magistrates, ut with variations.The assemblycould actdirectly f necessary, . g. to depose a strategosn mid-term. n such cases (e. g. Perikles n 430,Demosthenesn426)thenormal ime andprocedure or the euthynawouldbe brought orwardif ageneralwas recalled,and would inevitably ead to more seriouscharges.



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Kleon'sAmphipolitanCampaign 187name 'Philokleon'and the mock trial of Labes.29Obviously he chorus,por-trayedas wasps with stings,enjoy condemningthe accused,who would inreality,as in the play,often be generals.

The catalogueof knownaccusationsagainstgeneralsduring he Pelopon-nesianwar is presumablyncomplete,but there areenoughto showthattheywerea featureof political ife. Thelengthandseriousnessof the warwillhavecontributed o the demands of the demosto be satisfied that theirgeneralswere doing theirjob as effectivelyas possibleand euthyna rialsmust havebecome morefrequentduring he Archidamianwar.AmongthosethreatenedwaspresumablyThucydides, or his failure o saveAmphipolis romBrasidasin 424, whichoccasionedhis self-imposedexile.Fearof prosecutionby Kleonis likelyto have contributedo thehistorian's ersonaldislike,detectablenhisnarrativeof the Kleon episodes in spite of his impersonalaccountof theseevents(4.104-7)and his dispassionate eference o his long exile (5.26.5).It ispossiblethat Perikles'deposition rom the strategian 430may havebeen dueto a similaraccusation,and as we have seen, Kleon mayhavehad a hand inthistoo. TheArginusai rialshows how farthe accountability f strategoihadgone by 406 when the assemblytried en bloc and executed six generalsforfailingto pick up shipwrecked rewsafterthe battleof Arginusai.30 his trialwas a substitute or the normal and legal euthynaprocedurewhich wouldhave ended in a trial before the appropriatedikasterion.It is an extremeexampleof the way in whichcontrol overgeneralscould be exercisedby thepoliticiansandXenophon'snarrativeupportedby Diodorus(probablyusingthe Oxyrhynchus istorianhere(who is at least as earlyas Xenophon))revealsclearly he role of the demosand the demagogueKallixenos n the trial.31 heresponsibility or the disasterhad to be saddled on the generals,who tried toshiftit on to Theramenes ndThrasyboulos,heirformercolleagues,who hadbeen presentas trierarchs t the battleand been ordered o pick up thecrews.Thatsuch trialsshould havebecome morefrequent n wartimewas perhapsinevitable o ensure hatgeneralswere bothhonest and competent.

To summarise:As Aristophanes'Knights hould be enough to show, Kle-on's careerbefore Pylos had been closely linked to these trials, in which aprivatecitizen could act as accuser at anytime. This presumably ave ambi-tious politicians like Kleon and Alkibiades their major opportunitiesfor29 Cf. too Knights 55,wherePaphlagon Kleon)calls on the dicasts,his fellow-phrators,hepp&Tope; TpolP6Xou whom he nourishes, to help him against conspirators, implying that hewasresponsibleorthe rise in the dikastikosmisthos hreeobols foreachdayserved.30 Xen. Hell. 1.7.The illegalityconsisted,as Socrates aw (ib. ? IS), in trying the generals enbloc and not individually.The accusationof Erasinidesby Archedemos for embezzlementbeforethe main trialshowsthat the generalswererequired o go throughwhatmust havebeenpartof any normaleuthynaandpresent heir accounts probably o the logistai).Theotherfivepresumably annot havefacedanyfinancialcharges.31Xen. Hell. . 7.8-16 and55;Diod. 15.101-3.



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188 BARBARAMITCHELLpublicaction.32Kleon'sparticipationn the Mytilenedebatemay have beenoccasionedby his membership f thecouncil n the year428/7, but serviceonthe boule was not repeatedmore than once, and was never consecutive.Generally,then, the courts will have providedhim with more continuouspoliticalopportunities.His role, apartpresumably romhopliteservice,wasthatof a rhetor n the assemblyandthe courts.Hencehe is characterized yThucydidesas pithanotatoswhen he is introducedfor the firsttime in theMytilenedebate (Thuc.3.36.6)and again at 4.21.3when he persuades heAtheniansnot to makepeace whenthe Spartansarebesiegedon Sphakteria.He is seen as the patternof a demagoguebothby ThucydidesandAristopha-nes. He does not appearto have aspiredto the strategiauntil after Pylos,whichhadbroughthimunexpectedmilitaryamelatein his career.Thiscouldhave been due to the availability f othercandidates or election as strategoiforhis tribe III Pandionis)nthe440'sand 430's.TheobviouslywellqualifiedPhormioand Hagnon,probablyboth fromPandionis,arelikelyto havehadthe supportof Periklesand would havemadeelectionfor this tribe difficult,especially for a 'new man'. Althoughhe wished to supplant Periklesandinherithis controlof the demos,33Kleon'sambitions ook him in a differentdirectionand his militarycareerbegan only becauseof the turneventshadtaken n the Pylosdebate.The assemblyhadinsistedon sendinghimwiththereinforcementswhenNikiasrefused o go, theaudiencehaving akenhistauntof Nikias andthe generals iterally. n the circumstances,Kleon'sreluctanceto take on the command s understandable uthisswiftrecoveryof confiden-ce and decisiverequest or appropriateorcesonce he had takenon the taskare characteristic f the man. He gained a militaryreputation hroughthePylos campaign argelyby relyingon Demosthenes, he general n the field(Thuc. 4.29.1).His own position at Pylos was unofficial,since he was notelectedgeneralbeforehisdeparture ordid Niciasresignhisgeneralship.Thesuccessof Pyloswas responsible or Kleon'sfirstelectionas general n spring425 forthe year424/3. He mayor maynot havebeen on theboardof 423/2,the yearof the armistice, ince anothermemberof his tribeheld the strategiain this year,dependingon whetheror not therewas a doublerepresentation,

32 Alkibiadess labelledas a youngaccuserof oldermen(assuminghe is the 'sonof Kleinias')in Acharnians 16.33Kleonclaimedthe political nheritanceof Perikles n the Mytilenedebatebyechoinghisphrasesdeliberately Thuc.3.37.2and 40.4, cf. 2.62.3;3.38.1,cf. 2.61.2).The echoes must begenuine,rather han Thucydideannventions, inceThucydidesn Perikles' bituarydissociateshim fromthe demagogueswhosucceededhim (2.65.10-11),o wouldnot haveinventedthem.Forhim, Kleonwasan unworthy mitatorof Perikles n the politicalsphere.CompareAristo-phanesKnights1036-44wherePaphlagon, o the surprise f Demos,claims o be the 'lion'whosucceededPerikles,as a lion in his mother'spropheticdream(Hdt.6.131.2), storyevidentlyknownto Aristophanes.



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Kleon'sAmphipolitanCampaign 189whichof coursedidsometimesoccur.34Whetherornot Kleon wasdropped nthemore pacificclimateof 423,followingBrasidas' uccesses n the northandthe loss of Amphipolis,his election for 422/1 must have depended on thesuccess of his politicalpressure or the renewalof the war and recoveryofAthens'alliesin thenorthrather hanon hismilitary eputation. t wasnaturalthat the Atheniansshouldre-appoinfhim general n recognitionof his suc-cessfulstrategic ndimperialpolicyandexpecthimto succeedas he had doneearlierat Pylos.ThatKleon himselfthoughthis good fortune herewouldberepeatedatAmphipolis s statedbyThucydidesandis psychologically onvin-cing,even thoughthere s irony nThucydides' ommentat5.7.3,standingas itdoesjustbeforeBrasidas' uccessfulsortie.Historically, eneralshave to be judged by success, and not by apology forfailure,however ustified. It is ironicalthat Kleon'sfailureshouldhave beenoccasionedby his attempt o combinea militarycareerwithpolitical eader-ship of the demos in the assemblyand in the courts.Having deviseda newmethod of political ascendancy,he failed because he abandonedit in hisattempt o revert o the traditionaldual role of military eaderand statesman.Thedemagogueswho followed Kleonasprostatai oudemou,with theexcep-tion of Alkibiades,who tried to emulate Periclesand combine both roles,mainlyused politicalmethodsand the courts o the exclusionof the strategia,two notableexamplesbeing Hyperbolosand Kleophon, of whom the latterhada fatherwho hadheldthe strategiaandcould thereforehaveaspired o ithimself.35The divergencebetween the two kinds of career,political andmilitary,becameevenmoremarked nthe fourthcentury. nbecomingpromi-nent in politicswithoutbeing elected general,Kleon had, perhapsthroughforceof circumstancessince it is possiblethathe would not haveshunned heoffi1ce if it had been within his grasp earlier), discovereda new politicalmethod,but,havingsignposted he way, he failed to followit. His failureanddeath at Amphipoliswerethe result.

Endnote:Gale has been convincinglydentifiedas the sameplaceas 'Galepsos',oneof the placesin Sithonia romwhichXerxes'navy pickedup men andships in

34 Kleon'sfirstelection:AristophanesClouds584-7. See C.W. Fornara,TheAthenianBoardof Generalsfrom 01to 404,p.61-2.For doublerepresentationn the strategiaee D. M. Lewis,op.cit.note 3.35 Avoidanceof the strategia yKleophon s particularlyignificant, incehis father,Kleippi-des, was general in 429/8 (Thuc. 3.3.2) and he could presumablyhave emulated him. Thepatronymic s given by an ostrakonon him. See E. Vanderpool,Hesperia21 (1952),114-15;Thomsen,Origin f Ostracism, 6,93and 100.Cf. B.Baldwin,Noteson Cleophon',Acta Classica17 (1974)35-47. His family background hereforewould have not excluded him from thestrategia.Thetradition n the scholiaston Frogs679 that he wasstrategos s probablyunsound.



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190 BARBARA MITCHELL


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Kleon'sAmphipolitanCampaign 191

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192 BARBARAMITCHELL480 (Hdt. 7.122). Herodotus lists them in the order Torone, Galepsos,Sermyle,Mekybemaand Olynthos,apparently onfusingGale with the realGalepsos, theThasiancolony on the Thracian oast beyondAmphipoliseastof Eion capturedby Kleon after Torone(Thuc. 5.6.1).SinceThucydideshadlocal knowledgeof the area throughhis family connectionwith gold miningthereand throughhis own command n 424, he must haveknown where thereal Galepsos was, therefore t is eitherHerodotusor a latercopyistwho has

made the error.PerhapsThucydides'description f Galepsosas T-v OactiOv6intotKiav,hecolony of Thasos, suggeststhat he was awareof a confusionwith Gale. From he appearance f Gale along with Singosand Mekybema nthe 422 assessment list, it is likely that the clause in the Peace of NikiasmentioningMekybema, Sane and Singos (Thuc.5.18.6)should read 'Gale'and not 'Sane',which was perhaps ikewisea copyist'salteration or the lessfamiliar Gale'.Sane, anAndriancolonyon the Acte peninsula,had remainedloyal to Athens,resistingBrasidasalongwith Dion in 424(Thuc.4.109.5), ndhad probablynot rebelled n 432. As A. B. Westconvincinglyargued AJP58(1937),166f.),t does not fit withMekyberna nd Singoseithergeographicallyor politicallyand should be emendedto 'Gale'fromthe 422 assessment ist,paceGomme'sdoubts(HCTIII pp.672-4).I amespeciallygrateful o Mr.G. L.Cawkwell orreadinganearlier ersionof this articleandfor some acuteandhelpfulsuggestions.Hissharpeyesavedme from a numberof errors.Thoseremaining remyown.Dr.JeanDunbabinand Dr. StephenMitchellalso read it andmadeusefulsuggestions eadingtoimprovementsof presentationand clarity.StephenMitchellkindlyassistedwith the maps.St.Anne'sCollege,Oxford BarbaraMitchell

Documents

Historia Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte -'Kleon's Amphipolitan Campaign; Aims and Results' by Barbara Mitchel, 1991