Historia Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte -'Strategy and Tactics in the Mytilene Campaign' John Wilson, 1981

7/27/2019 Historia Zeitschrift fr Alte Geschichte -'Strategy and Tactics in the Mytilene Campaign' John Wilson, 1981

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Strategy and Tactics in the Mytilene Campaign

Author(s): John WilsonSource: Historia: Zeitschrift fr Alte Geschichte, Bd. 30, H. 2 (2nd Qtr., 1981), pp. 144-163Published by: Franz Steiner VerlagStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4435753 .

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STRATEGY AND TACTICS IN THE MYTILENE CAMPAIGNThe Mytilene revolt was a very serious business for Athens, as the Athenians

recognised at the time (>tEyaEQyov flyoivTo, Thuc.III.3.1). Some problemsabout the ensuing campaign deserve our attention: the more so since, as I shalltry to show, it was largely owing to good fortune that Athens settled mattersso easily.

1. Athenian and Lesbian NumbersOur first problem concerns the remarkably small numbers of troops whichseem to have been involved on either side. In 5. 1-2 we are told that the

Mytilenians had the support of all Lesbos except for Methymna (that is, ofAntissa, Pyrra, and Eresos: cf. 18.1), and that they marched out against theAthenians in full force (n v68qtci, 5.2). Honours were at least even in theensuing battle, certainly not more on the Athenian side: the Mytilenians aredescribed as oivx 'XEcooovExovTE. They also, with the help of their allies,controlled all the land except that in the immediate vicinity of the Atheniancamps (6.2). Yet the addition of only 1000 hoplites to the Athenian forcescompletely reversed this position, and enabled the Athenians to build a wallround Mytilene apparently without hindrance (18.4ff.).

The problem cannot be solved by any effect that Athens' allies had on thesituation. In 5.1 Thucydides says that the rest of Lesbos as well as theMytilenians (except for Methymna) went to war with Athens, and that theAthenians were supported by the Methymnans, Imbrians,Lemnians and a fewof the other allies. But here he is clearly summarising prospectively the overallresult of the Mytilenian embassy to Athens, not saying that these allies werepresent right from the start; for the Athenians do not send for their own alliesuntil after the first battle (6.1). So the probability is that the Mytilenians toofought this battle on their own; and this is reinforced by 6.2, in which hedescribes the Mytilenian allies, some time after the battle, as :roo-PEjOX1?hjXOTE; i8nj, which implies that they. had only just arrived. The fullmuster of the Mytilenians, then, was opposed in this first battle to whatevertroops the Athenians had on the 40 ships with which they originally came(3.2). After the allies of both sides have arrived,the Athenians are still unableto enjoy any superiority by land. On the contrary, it seems clear that theadvent of forces from the allied cities made the Athenian position worse (6.2);and that means that Mytilene must have gained more troops, or more effectivetroops, from her allies than the Athenians gained from theirs. Worse still, from

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Strategy nd Tactics n the MytileneCampaign 145the Athenian point of view, it appears that by 18.1 (at the very end of thesummer,for the Atheniancounter-measures re taken FQi TrOqhVO6w QOV,18.3) the Mytilenians were supported by mercenaries: so too were theAntissans (18.2).It is certain that the Mytilenians would have done everything possible toavoid the circumvallation, which would have seemed fatal to them (as in fact itwas). Yet we hear of no attempt to interrupt it. We must therefore assume (1)that the numbers of Mytilenian hoplites were small enough for them to haveno serious chance of success once the 1000 Athenians had arrived: (2) that theirmercenaries did not include significant numbers of hoplites: and (3) that theywere not supported in any numbers by hoplites from Antissa, Pyrra andEresos (for such forces would have made the pro-Mytilenian total too high for1000 hoplites to change the whole situation).As to (3) above, it seems likely that there was a deliberate plan on the part ofthe Athenians in conjunction with the Methymnans to keep the Antissanforces, at least, in play: that may apply also to the forces of Eresos, not manymiles from Antissa. The operation of this plan emerges in 18.2; and in 18.3 itspartial failure (the Antissans defeated the Methymnans) made the Atheniansrealise the need to send troops of their own. But at least Methymna'swillingness to fight pinned down some of Mytilene's allies, who would havebeen reluctant to send many troops over the considerable distance to Mytilene(it is over 30 miles, as the crow flies, from Antissa and Eresos) whilstMethymna posed any kind of threat (see Map 1). The Athenians no doubtrelied on this in sending only 1000 men.

METHYMNAANTISSA

E IRo >l'YRRA MYTILENE

LJ W| MILES0 5 10

We may now go back to the probable numbers on either side in the firstbattle. The normal complement of epibatai on 40 Athenian ships would totalonly about 400, and it is hard to believe that the Mytilenians (howevertimorous) could not have defeated such a small force, or that they would haveretreated from it after the battle. Admittedly, the ships were to have been used7thQ FlEko7o6vvojov (3.2), presumably for the hit-and-run attacks on the10



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146 JOHN WILSONPeloponnese which were a common feature of Athenian strategy, and may wellhave contained additional troops. But anything more than a complement of 40epibatai per ship is improbable both for reasons of space and because Athens(since the plague) was short of hoplites. I find it hard to believe in many morethan 30 per ship in the 40 ships, giving a hoplite force of 1200. The increasedforce of 2200 must, as we saw, have been decisively superior, so that theMytilenians cannot have deployed more than about 1500 hoplites at most.That is a strikingly small figure but, so far as I can see, one which we arecompelled to adopt. In fact I suspect the figures were smallerstill: perhaps 800Athenians (20 per ship) and 1000 Mytilenians. But in any case someexplanation is required: Mytilene was surely a bigger city than that, and theMytilenians were (literally) fighting for their lives.The explanation is political. It becomes clear in 27.2ff. that Mytilene was atthis time run by an oligarchy, in which the demos had been denied hopliteequipment (VpktOvo6vTa,27.2). There could have been more Mytilenianhoplites - in fact, many more, since the armed demos was strong enough todisobey the government and the government was powerless to prevent them(27.3 and 28.1) - but the oligarchy did not dare to risk demotic hoplites. Inview of this, there seems to be no reason for objecting to quite small numbers.The 1000 aLTLWT'tTO1J (50.1) who were condemned to death may haverepresented the majority of the upper-middle classes in Mytilene, who were infact the appropriatevictims. We cannot hope to estimate the numbers of thearmed demos accurately: perhaps two or three times as many.We may make some guesses at the political background. Mytilene was not asubject-ally, and there is no reason to assume that the Athenians would have(or even could have)enforced ademocraticregimebefore the time of the revolt -hence we need not suppose that the oligarchs had gained power by a specificcoup. On the other hand, their grip on the situation seems curiously insecure.Clearly they did not trust their fellow-citizens, otherwise they would havearmed them as hoplites and been able to confront the Athenians with a forceperhaps not far short of 5000 hoplites - a force which Athens could not havedefeated with ease, and possibly not at all. Nor were the 1000 or so oligarchseffectively united: if they had been, they could surely have kept the newly-armed demos under discipline and control even though the demos out-numbered them. We know from 2.3 that there was a pro-Athenian group orparty (&vbQEgxtTcv catotv) in Mytilenejustbeforethe revolt; and it seemslikely that the oligarchs, in the years immediately before 428, had become (as itwere) more oligarchical and exclusive, thinning their numbers to include onlythe hard core of committed anti-Athenian revolutionaries. Unless we are toimagine large quantities of spare hoplite equipment, which is extremelyimprobable, we must suppose that the hard-core oligarchs had somehowmanaged to gain control of hoplite equipment which had previously belonged



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Strategy ndTactics n the MytileneCampaign 147to their fellow-citizens. If that did not involve a coup, it involved somethingvery like one.But the demos cannot have been a totally unwilling partner in the revolt.They do not, when properly armed, immediately take the Athenian side(despite Diodotos' remarkin 42.3): they only threaten to do so if they arenotgiven the (real or imagined) food (27.3). Almost certainly the demos mannedthe ships that Lesbos contributed as an ally of Athens, and they may have beenfed up with fighting Athens' battles for her. In 430 (II.56) 50 ships from Chiosand Lesbos take part in an abortive Athenian expedition: if, say, 20 of thesewere Mytilenian, that meant a contribution of not much less than 3500 men.We know there were 10 serving at the time of the revolt (III.3.4) and no doubt,as Gomme says, contributions were ordered every year. The numbers of meninvolved are sufficient to generate some anti-Athenian feeling, but perhapsnota very violent one: the sailors who manned the ships sent against the Atheniansin 4.2 seem not to have had their heart in the business. The demos would,presumably, have gained from a successful revolt and from the synoikesis, ifthe latter gave Mytilene as a whole more power; but probably they dislikedand distrusted the oligarchs as much as the Athenians. On balance - and ofcourse the evidence is tenuous - we may conclude at least that the oligarchs hadto keep a close eye on the demos throughout the revolt: and this helps toaccount for the extreme caution of Mytilenian strategy and tactics -particularly the iovXfav of 6.1, which was a pleasant surprise for theAthenians. Possibly the oligarchs waited until the revolt became overt (so thatthe demos was committed), and then arranged their coup: that, at least, wouldaccount for all the evidence that we have.The only other way in which the problem of numbers may be solved is toregard the MSS numbers as corrupt (often the case in Thucydides); but theyare part of a coherent picture which it would be difficult to alter in anyplausible direction. Thus the numbers condemned to death (50.1) seem tomany scholars too large; but the Athenians could hardly have felt safe inallowing significant numbers of rebellious oligarchs to go free. In Corcyra theAthenians acquiesced in the destruction of at least as many (III.75-85,IV.46-48). Again, if we increase Paches' hoplites to many more than 1000 weovercome the apparentdifficulty of the small numbers on either side; but thatthere were in fact small hoplite-numbers in Mytilene seems clear from thepolitical set-up, that the Lesbian allies did not reinforce Mytilene to any greatextent seems highly probable, and that the Athenians were short of hoplites isnot in dispute.

Some confirmation of this comes from the arrangements made by theAthenians when the revolt was over (50). Here too it seems wrong to questionthe figures in the MSS, since they cohere with the general picture. Somethingover 1000 men were executed, and these must surely be all or nearly all from



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148 JOHN WILSONMytilene itself; for though the text of 35.1 and 50.1 does not absolutelyexclude the possibility that there were other Lesbians, the speakers at Athensin the debate refer uniquely to the Mytilenians, never to rebellious Lesbiansingeneral. In any case Mytilene was clearly the instigator of the revolt, and thevast majorityof attLTWTC'oT; (50.1)musthavecomefromthere.Objections othe large number have usually neglected 35.1, where Paches is preparedto sendto Athens Et TLg4CXXoavc ) 'LTLOgt6OXEL - a pretty loose criterion.Theexecution of 1,000 would then have liquidated the large majority of Mytile-nians of hoplite rank(or above): presumablythose who held most of the land.

The figure of 3,000 allotments is also reasonable (50.2), though we can dono more than guess about this particularmatter. The distribution of low-lyingand fertile land in Lesbos is such that we may plausibly ascribeabout a third ofit to Mytilene and two-thirds to Pyrra, Antissa and Eresos, corresponding tothe 1000 executed Mytilenians (originally holders of 1000 of the 3000allotments) and 2000 from the other cities; excluding, of course, Methymnanland. Mytilene's preeminence in Lesbos was not due to her possession of thebulk of good land, but to her trade in generaland possessions on the mainlandin particular (50.2). If that is anywhere near right, it argues for at least 2000hoplites shared between Pyrra, Antissa and Eresos, as against 1000 fromMytilene. Had hoplite forces from the allied cities combined effectively withthe Mytilenians, Athens' task would have been much more difficult: but theycould not be expected to leave their own cities defenceless.

2. Peloponnesian NumbersHow many fighting troops did Alcidas have with him on his 42 ships?

Characteristically, if not always, Thucydides tells us of any substantialnumbers of hoplite troops on expeditions from the Peloponnese (e. g. forCnemos' expedition, II 80.1: 1000 hoplites); and it would be surprising if heomitted to mention such numbers here. Moreover, the Spartans werecommonly reluctant to commit their own or allied hoplites in dangerousexpeditions by sea. On a priori grounds, then, there were probably not many.At the same time, the fleet and troops were presumably supposed to reinforcethe Lesbians successfully, and might (failing that) have engaged in otheractivities: these aims could hardly have been achieved with ships alone.

Teutiaplos suggested to Alcidas (111.30)that they should attack Mytilene:and this must have at least seemed a plausibleenterprise,however daring, evenwith the advantageof surprise. It would have been less daringif he had thoughtthe Athenian troops to be dispersed or engagedelsewhere in Lesbos, but in facthe took them to be in the city (nO6tv EXO'vTwv,0.2); he still thought that withthe help of some supporters n Mytilene(E'LT5 aQCt1TIv EotV i53JTo'to;?VvouV, 30.3) the thing was possible. That is all the more striking in that the



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Strategy and Tactics in the Mytilene Campaign 149

fleet may have had adequate information about the situation. At Icaros andMykonos they learn of the capture of the city (29.1); they then go to EmbatonfBOVXO6iEVOIO PE$g ibEVaL (29.2),and [tLEVOL TOJcEq ?E3ouXEr?ovto(ibid.).If we take TI o aqE to imply detailed information, we must suppose thatthey knew more or less accurately what the Athenian numbers were: as wehave seen, not far short of 2,000 hoplites, plus allied troops from elsewhere. Inthat case it is hard to see how Teutiaplos' proposal would have been plausibleunless they had available at least 1,000 hoplites. Alternatively, we may translateP3OUXO6pEVOLO Gacfg Ei6?vaL as 'wishing to know for certain' (sc. thatMytilene had in fact been taken, and not accepting outright the informationthey had received at Icaros and Mykonos); and that implies no suchknowledge about Athenian strength. They might, in that case, have believedAthenian numbers to have been much less.

A similar problem is presented by the second option suggested to Alcidas:that he should seize one of the Ionian cities, or Cyme in Aiolia (31.1). Theword used is XaTaXaFiv. To capture a town against the will of resolutecitizens would require a substantial number of troops: but xaTCaXCEEiveednot imply that - it might mean just 'occupy' or 'take over'. The generalgoodwill towards the Spartancause mentioned in 31.1 - that oiU&v' a'xouicsWgacpiXOml- might apply to the city to be first taken over and used as a base, sothat no fighting would be needed: and hence no large number of men.There is even a third uncertainty of the same kind. In 33.3 Paches thought itfortunate (since the Athenians had not managed to intercept the fleet in theopen sea) that the fleet was on its way home to the Peloponnese: the alternativewould have been that the Athenians caught the Peloponnesians on landsomewhere, when they would have built a fortified camp and forced theAthenians to blockade them by land and sea (0TQaT6O7rv t, xTX.).It is notpossible to tell with certainty from the text whether the last part of theseremarks are just Paches' beliefs or represent the true facts: possibly both, buton the first hypothesis we have the option of claiming that the Peloponnesiansdid not in fact dispose of enough troops to put up any serious resistance evenwithin a fortified camp - Paches just thought they did. On the other hand, ifthey represent the true facts (whether or not Paches knew them) we seemobliged to say that there were enough Peloponnesian troops to merit a seriouseffort on the part of the Athenians by way of a blockade - something Pacheswas glad to avoid.

The balance of probability, I think - particularlyin this third passage -, lieswith the idea that the fleet possessed a fairly substantial number of hoplitetroops (and perhaps others as well). The text of 33.3 readsmore naturally thus(Thucydides uses indicatives to describe the necessity of blockade): the take-over of an Ionian city, however potentially friendly, would be very dangerous



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150 JOHN WILSONwithout a fair numberof effective roops; andeven if the fleet did not learndetails of the Atheniannumbersat Embaton, hose numbers ould have beenguessedat. Some figure ike 800 seemsplausible.We mustremember hatthesewere (mostly) alliedships, and not Spartanones: Spartanhoplites were notbeing risked. We do not know the normalcomplementof fightingtroops orepibatai on such ships, but it was almost certainly more than the normalAtheniancomplementof 10-12, since theAthenians eliedon light, swift shipswhich would win by navalmanoeuvre ather hanslogging t out (as at Sybota:1.49.2-3) with fightingtroops. A figure of 20 per ship is plausible,yielding atotal strength of 840. Such a figure makesboth Teutiaplos' uggestions,andAlcidas' cautiousrefusalof them, quitereasonable: noughto make sense ofthe potentialattackon Mytilene, heseizingof an Ioniancity,andthe necessityfor an Athenianblockade,but not enoughto construeAlcidas' ailure o takeup these options as mere cowardice.Afterall, he hadto accountfor himselfback in Sparta:and the accountmust have beenplausibleenough for him tocontinuein commandagainstCorcyra,evenwith the helpof advisers 69.1).

3. The LesbianFleetThe Mytilenian ambassadors to the Peloponnese claim that alliance withMytilene would give the Peloponnesians vatTLxOv yttya (13.7). The claimmust be true: too many Peloponnesians might know the facts for the

Mytilenians to lie.vctVTLxov pEya cannot be pressed too hard, and does not necessarily implythat the Spartan Allianceincluded no states which had a vaUTLxOv (as forinstance Corinth): but it can hardly imply that the Alliance already deployedmany cities in this category. In fact, as we know, not only Corinth but also

Megaracould produce over 40 ships (11.93.2):Ambraciahad contributed 27 tothe battle of Sybota (1.46.1): and however optimistic Spartanhopes may havebeen about the capacity of the alliedstates in general (11.7,VIII.3), the Allianceoften had large numbers operating at once (e. g. 100 against Zacynthos, 11.66,and 77 against Phormio, 11.86). It would be odd if the Mytilenians did notdispose of, say, 40 ships at least: anything much less could hardly count, in thiscontext, as vaiTLxOvREya.Does that number (whatever it is) include the other Lesbian cities? Antissa,Pyrra and Eresos were all either on the sea or possessed of a nearby harbour:their potential contribution may have been considerable. In the above passage,the ambassadors appear to be talking of Mytilene alone, a single city (7o6xtv,13.7): but that might be taken to refer, if somewhat prospectively, to thesynoikesis which would make Lesbos a single city. The other relevantpassageis 11.6: TOE vaTLX'Ov TlIibv vtaQ cX 6v oiiV >t' xct(' ?Vyvo6EVovii V4iV "I&'XX TW7tQOfE'oVoV XTX. About this Gommesays ... . there is



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Strategyand Tactics n the MytileneCampaign 151little point in emphasizing the uniting of the entire Lesbian fleet (Steup). Abetter meaning would be the uniting of all the remaining independentsquadrons (in fact only the Lesbian and Chian), if we may take '[aia to refernot to Mytilene only"' (in the sentences beginning with I.3). If this case is tobe made out at all, it can be strengthened by enlargement. The earliersectionsare, in part, an account of how Athens subjected her originally independentallies in previous years; hence the iEig (andthe #ui v in 11.6) might refer to agreat many more cities than those of Lesbos and Chios. A difficulty with this,however, is that a&XWT then has no very obvious reference: UV4~lV,since theambassadors are talking to the Peloponnesians in general, will include all thestates of the Spartan Alliance, and (since on this view the independent cities ofthe Aegean will be nautically united) who is there left for them to join with?Perhaps the Persians: but this is hardly convincing. On the other hand, if wetake illuiv to refer only to the Lesbian cities, their united fleet might join withsome other independent ally (e. g. Chios). This second interpretationseems, inany case, much more probable: it refers to the attempted synoikesis of Lesbos,which alarmed Athens partly because it would create a large united fleet. Wecannot say in advance that 'there is little point in emphasizing the uniting ofthe entire Lesbian fleet': the contributions of Mytilene's allies, as we have said,might have made a big difference. It also seems likely that the first personplurals in the sentences immediately following this passage (and, I think, inmost of those before) refer uniquely to the Lesbians or Mytilenians, not in pasthistory to the Athenian allies or subjects generally.

The Mytilenians made a poor showing against the 40 Athenian ships (4.2)chiefly because they were unprepared. Ten of their ships were in service withthe Athenian fleet (3.2); and they and their allies had hoped to build moreships before rebelling (2.2). But their main unpreparednesswas the result ofdisunity. Admittedly we can only speculate, but I find it hard to believe that,with help from three allies, they could not have produced a squadron whichhad some chance of coping with the 40 Athenians in battle. Even as it was,etz9a xeOL..xi ctVf avayxaaEvTEg 3TOXE[LEiLVXTXO1)V [LEVTLVCX?MOLlOcVTO (4.2): and that could hardly have seemed serious if they had notdeployed, say, at least 20 ships. On this occasion they were surely testing theAthenians' intentions, to discover whether Athens was in fact willing to fightimmediately: to oppose the 40 Athenians with only a very few ships wouldhardly have been a test at all. The Mytilenians failed to get even minimalreinforcements from their allies: 5 or 10 ships from each might have altered thewhole balance of naval power on the spot.

I A. W. Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides (O.U.P. 1956). Vol. 11, p. 265.



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152 JOHNWILSON4. Athenian encampments

This is one of the few problems that has engaged the attention ofcommentators. It is also one of the many cases in which Thucydides'topography is almost universally, but wrongly, regarded as erroneous. Thedifficulty is that Thucydides seems to be ignorant of the location of Malea,apparentlyplacing it to the north of Mytilene, whereas we seem to know fromStrabo and others2 that it was to the south of the city. The interpretation oflater movements on the part of the Athenians depends on the solution of thisproblem.

The two relevant passages are:(a) Ev TOV(Tw 6& EnO`TEXkOUGLal '; xnv AaxE6a'Lova nQEr(etLTQLrQEL, Xac6VTE; TO TOV 'ANVivcaLwvaUTLx6v, ot 6)QLouv eVV TnMaX?t nQO';OQ?'aV Tij; &6FXcW. (III.4.5).and (b) ... xaLt3TEQLOQ&iLOCEVOLO 7tQO; VOTOVT'u5 6OkEXw 'TE'(LoaVCnQa1T67tEa u' F,XaLxEQwfEVngrt6UE(g, XCatOVS.'t6F'PO'Q[OEZ'7&RCPOTEpOQg01 X[tE'OLVtAOLO)VTO. xai T1g yLv -tkakoMs; ELQyov%XQn0oaLL ov'g MvULk1jV(XLoUq,iS be YnS Tng LE"V'nTg E'XQC'EOUVoTMiTrtXrivaiot CLoi akkOLAEOfhLOLTQooPoEPO otXOTEg616,To&E7tEQLTl uQt6i&Eba ovUn3oXi3 CEiELXov t 'AvaIOtL, va aTtdtaovbe [t6kkov VL'Tv7to kO(WVxCai&yoQa' a (6.1-2).

In (a) above it seems naturalto take Ol Wt)Q[OUVVTf MaXkEtTQ6oOQEav trgnokXw; together, "who were at anchor at Malea on the north side of the city":and this seems to land Thucydides with the topographical error. There are,however, two possible ways of avoiding this conclusion. The first is to rejectthe translation: this is more plausible than has been thought, but entails certainproblems of its own and - a more important point - sheds no new light on, ormakes no better sense of, the military situation in generalandwhat Thucydidestells us about it. The second is to accept the translation but deny that theconclusion follows: and this does, in my judgement, improve our understand-ing of the scene.The first possibility was canvassed by Stahl3, though in an unnecessarilyimplausible form. He takes JtQo; 3oLEav ('septentrionem versus') withanooTEXkouoL 'emittere'): we are to translate along the lines of "They sentout ambassadorsto Spartatoo in a trireme northwards from the city, escapingthe notice of the Athenian fleet which was anchored at Malea" (i. e. to thesouth). Most editors have viewed this harshly, with some justice: Gomme4, forinstance, says that "&AOGTEotXOUolatLE t. A. 7Q.TQL'tEi itQo; Po&v tiT;

2 ibid. p. 258.3 ibid. p. 255.4 ibid.



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StrategyandTactics n the MytileneCampaign 1537t6Xrwg has no good sense: we should want at least kcr6vtrg Tr T. 'Aqva(wvVWVTLXOVtJ6; fOQtaV T.n. ( E'OVTE;) ." Thesuggestionof E'LOvTE;s asimpleerror of syntax: it is not the Mytilenians doing the sending who 'go out', thoughthey may be said to escape notice (kafX0&vTe)n the sending: it is rather theambassadors, which requires the accusative tLOvtTag.Nevertheless, the word-order required by Stahl's interpretation is certainly peculiar.It would however be distinctly less peculiar if we were to take (as Stahlhimself does not) uQ6ogQEav Ti no'rtEw tO mean 'on the north side of thecity': taking it with &MtooTEXXouotut also, indirectly, with kaft0vTeg. TheMytilenians had two harbours, separated by an isthmus: one on the northside, and one on the south. If they wished to escape the Athenians' notice, andif the Athenians were anchored to the south, they would naturally use thenorthern harbour. The sense would be "They sent out ambassadors in atrireme, escaping the Athenians' notice [by doing this] on the north side of thecilty"There is an apparent objection to this (and to Stahl's interpretation) inThucydides' later descriptions of the Athenians nEQLOQLCFtLOaEVOLTO 3QOgVOTOV. For the present interpretationentails that the Athenians were alreadyatanchor south of the city, whereas Thucydides plainly intends some kind ofmove or alteration of position. It is not, as Gomme wrongly says, thatTEEQLOQ>loJa[EVOl means'changing heir station': it meanssimply 'bringingtheir ships to anchor round', just as 3tEQLOQ[tE means 'anchor round'. Butthey could not 'bring their ships to anchor round the south of the city' if theywere there already. However, this may be answered by maintaining that,though the Athenians were indeed to the south of the city, they could not bedescribed as already 'anchored round the area to the south of the city'. Theywere, as Thucydides says, ev T1 Mat4qt: and the cape itself is some 6 milesaway from the city - much further away than their second place of anchoragecould have been.This possibility is not to be lightly discounted; but it is somewhat forced,and fits in badly with what we can induce about the strategic situation (seebelow). A second, and basically simpler, solution is to be preferred. No onefamiliar with the coastline could suppose that they anchored at or near the tipof Malea itself; so the question arises of how much ground the term 'Malea'might reasonably be thought to cover. That it could have covered a good dealmore than the immediate vicinity of the cape is evident (if we need a parallel,what Strabo says about Leucas will serve5); and this makes it at least possiblethat 'Malea' was used to include the whole promontory, which extends somemiles to the north of Mytilene (see maps). It is unsurprising that Strabo andother writers who are primarily interested in sea-distances should refer toMalea always as a cape: that is no argument against the possibility that the term

5 Strabo C. 452 (Leucas named after Cape Leucas).



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154 JOHN WILSONcould also mean the whole promontory.In that case, of course, EVTi~ Mak'Qand tQo; I3oQEav Pj jT6X?Ewrenot inconsistent.The Atheniansmight thenmost plausiblybe placedsome three or four miles north of the city, wherethere is a bay and good anchorage,ncludinga small islandwhich could givethem securityagainstattack romthe land (see Map 2).

2 PAMPH Y L LON

N g I FIRSTATHENIAN ANCHORAGE?

MYTILENE ATHENIANMXYTILEE CAMPSGULP OP SECONDGERAS SECONDATHENIAN

ANCHORAGE

CAPE MALEA

0 1 2 3 4 5 6MILES

Apart from its merits as clearing up the problem, there are two supportingargumentswhich suggest tha this is how Thucydides conceived of Malea. Thefirst is the oddity of ?v in ?V TqiMcaet, if he thinks of Malea simply as a cape:he might at least more naturally have used jTF,( as with TQ'L to XEL?EQLOV(1.30.3) (where he is clear that Cheimerion is a cape or axQa, 1.46.5). Thesecond depends on a proper interpretation of vcnvotact[ov... . Mca4ca.Nearly all editors take this to imply that the base at Malea was somewheredifferent from the two camps: Gomme flirts temporarily with the idea that"Malea is the site of one of the two camps"6,but if Malea identifies no morethan the cape it is far too distant from the town. If our translationproduces atactical situation in which the Athenians occupy two camps (one on either sideof the city) for purposes of blockade, and also a vCV'TCtaiov some 6 milesaway at an inhospitable cape, something is wrong with our translation. Notonly is there no reason in the world why, having command of the sea, theAthenians did not put their ships (and their dayoQ6) where their camps were;they positively needed their ships there in order to carry out the blockade.The vYVowa?fov clause is tacked on, as it were, to the second half of the

Ev... . &e antithesis. If Thucydides had meant "The Mytilenians and allies held6 Gomme, ibid., p. 257.



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StrategyandTactics n the MytileneCampaign 155the rest of the land,whereas he Atheniansonly held(a)a smallareanear heircamps, and (b) Malea",he would have written differently.He might havedelayed the oi 'AhvacoL until the end of the sentence: or he might have putMalea at the beginning, not the end, of its clause: "they held the area round thecamps,andMaleaas avaIGoTWf[toV". Further, s even Gommesees,there sonthis interpretation a problem about what is meant by uCikXov.Much moreprobably the sense is this (I give a loose translation to emphasise the relevantpoints): "As to territory, all the rest of it (on the one hand) was controlled bythe Mytilenians and the other Lesbians who had already come to their help,whereas only a small arearound the camps (on the other hand) was held by theAthenians: it was rather as a place to put their ships and as a market-placethatMalea served them" (sc. rather than anything which they controlled morewidely and could use as a more permanent base). In other words, theOQctTaoTEbt are on, or in, or part of Malea: that is, the whole promontory.We turn now to the meaning of JTEQOQpLoG6[tivoL and to the point of thisoperation. Gomme gives: 'changed their situation and took up position towatch the south side'7. This is a loose translation: the term used for changingone's anchorage is ?tEQoe@w. nFItoQtL4w is found in the middle voice onlyin this passage: and the most natural meaning is surely 'bringing their ships toanchor round', just as (to take two examples reasonably close in generalmeaning) EQL7Tkw means 'sail round', and 7 QLMQtTo7TE6Evo1iat encampround'. Like them, it would be followed by an accusative, not a prepositionalphrase: an accusative governed by the juLm'n the original verb. T6 7rQ6;VOTOVmeans 'the area to the south' (of the city): it is not just, as Gomme's translationimplies, that they are watching the south side of the city, but that they areanchored there.Why did they do this,;andwhy didthey choose to anchor tco;g oLQpv nthe first place? To the former question there are two possible answers:

(a) Not all the ships were brought to the south side: we have to take thesense as "bringing [some of] their ships round to the south side [also]". Thereis some tactical plausibility in this: if the Athenians had camps on both sides ofthe city, they would surely need ships nearto each camp - especially since eachcamp was under fairly heavy pressure from the enemy. One difficulty,however, is that Thucydides does not actually say this, when he easily couldhave done (e. g. the addition of xct( before lo TQo; VOTOV would havesufficed): and there is in any case the more serious objection that if the originalAthenian camp was where we have placed it (in the bay just north of MavrosLophos, which is in fact the only plausible anchorage near Mytilene in anortherly direction), then the Athenians could hardly be said to be anchoredround the north side of the city - the anchorageis too faraway, and not all of it

ibid.



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156 JOHN WILSONeven has a clear view of Mytilene. Hence we cannot interpret ".... anchorround the south side as well".(b) The more plausible answer is thatthe Athenianswantedan anchoragei)close to and with a good view of Mytilene,and (ii) with as good a protectionagainst the weather as was possible under the circumstances.The bayimmediately to the south of the city is the only place that fulfils theseconditions, some protectionbeing givenby the promontoryagainstwinds tothe northand north-west.The Athenians chose for their first anchoragea bay not too far fromMytilene, with an island which might give them additional security: farenough from the city for themnot to be in dangerof a surpriseattackby theMytilenians:and, perhaps, hey may at the beginningof the campaignhavewished to position themselvesbetween Mytilene and her Lesbianallies. (Itwould not then have been too difficult for the Mytilenians o escape theAthenians'noticein sending heirtrireme o Sparta: hey would haveusedthesouth-facingharbour,which was out of sight.)Whenthe Atheniansdetermineon a blockade, his positionwill no longerserve:they need somethingmuchnearer,and move to the bay immediately outh of the city. Thatwill havebeenthe main anchorage,andone of the oQaTOJtEca: the other, on the northsideof the city, will have been used only as a temporarybase, the blockadingtriremes presumably commuting between the two but returningto thesouthernbase for any long periodof rest.Thucydides says that the Atheniansto r TtQTt 0'TC E6c ovU ToXUXOTETXoV:at firstsight rather urprising,or if the Lesbianswere superiorbyland, why did they not challengeAthenianpossessionof this area?Thattheydid not challenge he Athenianoccupationof theircampsis not surprising,because the latter were fortified (ETELXLoav.1). We cannot put it down to anyreluctance f the Mytilenians o leave the securityof theircity walls,sincein18.1 (without, so far as we know, any change n the militarysituation) heymarchout andgo as faras Methymna: eaving, t is to be presumed, noughtroopsto manthe defencesagainstany possibleAthenianattack.The answermust simply be that the Athenianscontrolled (rather than permanentlyoccupiedor possessed) erritorynearenough o theircamps orthemto retreatin safety before any Lesbians attack. The Lesbians could have contested thisarea,but to no purpose:the Athenianswould not have resistedthem, butretreatedo theircamps;andnothingwouldhavebeengainedby theLesbianstryingto occupythose particular reaspermanently. n the to &Earei clauseThucydides mpliessome of these points: the Athenianswere in Malea,butcontrolledonly a smallareaof it - in effect, enough only for anchoragesortheir shippingand a market or theirtroops. Certainly he firstof these, andalmostcertainly he secondalso,would in fact havebeenwithinthe fortifiedarea.



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StrategyandTactics n the MytileneCampaign 1575. Tactics by Land

In 18.1 the Mytilenians time their operation to coincide with the presence ofthe Spartan orces (and perhapsallied forces) at the Isthmus, when the threat toAthens would have been most immediate and obvious: presumably so thatAthens would have been (perhaps then was) deterred from sending reinforce-ments to Lesbos. They strike at Methymna, appreciatingthat the captureof thecity would release the troops of their allies in Antissa, Pyrrha and Eresos:troops which could then reinforce Mytilene. If this move had succeeded, itwould certainly have made a big difference to the strategic position. For on anyaccount the hoplites of Antissa, Pyrra and Eresos must surely have totalledseveral thousand: too many, with the Mytilenians, for Athens to be sure ofdefeating in battle without sending a great many hoplites. This, surely, is whythe Athenians thought it such a serious business. For much the same strategicreasons, as we saw in 1. above, it is likely that the Athenians cooperated withor encouraged the Methymnians in their attack on Antissa immediatelyafterwards (18.2) - that is, in order to keep the Lesbian forces divided. Theattack failed disastrously; but the continued existence of an independentMethymna still tied down the forces of the two allies in the west of Lesbos,Antissa and Eresos.

The strategic position by land (as by sea: see 3. above) depended on thiscrucial factor. Athens could blockade Mytilene by sea without too muchdifficulty. Even if she could not maintain fortified camps on the mainland ofLesbos in the teeth of united Lesbian opposition, there was at least one island(the modern Pamphyllon) close enough (about 4 miles) from the town to serveas a base: and it was there or near there, almost certainly, that the Atheniansfirst encamped (see 4. above). But it is not clearhow much Athens would havegained by this whilst the city could have been supplied by land. Nor wereMytilene's allies overcome: not only Mytilene but also her three allies wereapparently walled cities (xcFxi19cVriUVctVTE;,8.2). Antissa and Eresos were along way distant: Pyrra near the head of a deep gulf, the entrance of whichcould have been defended (it is not more than about two-thirds of a mile wide)by a very few ships. No sudden assault on walled cities, unless assisted bytreachery from inside, would have succeeded: and any Athenian land armywould soon have had to face the combined Lesbians.We do not know the politics of Antissa, Pyrra and Eresos: they may wellhave been oligarchic to have sided against Athens with Mytilene, but it isunlikely that they had such a small proportion of hoplite citizens as Mytilene.It is not absurd to guess at a minimum figure of 3,000 hoplites in all: includingthe Mytilenians, a total force of 4,000 hoplites. The island was large and fertileenough to be self-supporting; nor could the Athenians have blockaded it intoto. Moreover, the Lesbians had the advantage of knowing the terrain, andwere adequately supported by light-armed troops - a serious danger for



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158 JOHNWILSONAthenian hoplites when moving over difficult terrain in an attempt to force abattle. Even an Athenian army of comparable or greater size could not havebeen certain of a quick victory if the Lesbians acted under a centralised andwell-organised command, such as might have been provided by Spartanleadership.That was, of course, a condition unlikely to be met (as in fact it wasnot) in view of the reluctanceof independent cities to combine: but there is noa priori reason why the Athenians should not have anticipated a campaign atleast as difficult, expensive, lengthy and uncertain in its outcome as they hadhad at Potidaia.

6. The SynoikesisBy far the most importantstrategic feature of the campaign,as we have seen,was the possibility of the Lesbian cities acting under a central command; andthis is worth further investigation. In 2.1-2 we are told of the revolt and thepreparations for it. The subject of these sections is not the Mytilenians alone,but Lesbos(or the Lesbians,OP3oXi VTEg in 2.1 standing n apposition o theearlier APoIBo;).They were intending to block their harbour-mouths, buildwalls and ships, and get archers from Pontos. All this, then, applies to the menof Antissa, Pyrra and Eresos. The Athenians, however, first received informa-tion from the men of Tenedos and Methymna, xai actwnv M,TLnVaL'WV, tothe effect that ~UVOtXLOVol T'v A^Eaoov... iL't (2.3). The subject ofeuvoItxlovut might be taken as the Lesbians in general (except for those ofMethymna), as in the previous sections: but in that case it is not easy to makesense of PiLQt:gainst whom was the force used? A possible answer is that theLesbians in question are oligarchic groups which controlled the three alliedcities as well as the oligarchic group which controlled Mytilene: they might beconstrued as using force against the demos in their respective cities. But that ishardly convincing: the natural subject is the Mytilenians, alreadymentioned inthe sentence, who must therefore be exerting force or pressure on the othercities, and who apparently have the power Tmv TE $UVOixrOlV xct TrIV7rUQaoxvnIiv bLa61 EIV (3.1).Yet that interpretationalso faces problems. First, the tense of tVVOLXLlOUGLand the generalcontext both imply that the Mytilenians had not completed theprocess: the Athenians were told that they were forcing (not that they hadforced) a synoikesis. But in 3.1 the process seems to be complete: theambassadors fail to persuade the Mytilenians to break up or dissolve thesynoikesis. Secondly, if the other cities (one or more of them) had to be forcedinto it, why did they continue to support Mytilene during the campaign? Itwould have been open to them to have seceded from the synoikesis as soon asthe Athenians arrived.We have to say, I think, that the Mytilenians had made at least somesuccessful moves towards synoikesis :8 at least to the extent of persuading (by



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Strategy and Tactics in the Mytilene Campaign 159threatof force)other cities to revoltsimultaneouslywith themselves:but thatthey had not completed he business,or achievedany real securityor unityofcommand.Sincethey were hurried ntoactingbefore heywanted o (2.1),thisis not surprising.It will accountnot only for the lack of unity in Lesbianstrategyandtactics(each city still in effectoperatingndependently),butalsofor the remarkablease with whichPachesrecoveredAntissa he simplysenttriremes there and 'acquired' it (7rQoocxEXTouTo,28.3) - and the other twotowns also, which he seems to have no difficulty in 'winningover' (naQ -cTijocTo, 35.1)These walledcities (18.1)could presumablyhave resistedforsome time. Possibly they despaired at the surrender of Mytilene itself; but wemay reasonably suspect that the pressure for rebellion, as well as forsynoikesis, came mostly from Mytilene. It may well also be that theMytilenians had attempted to place the government of these cities in oligarchichands (xaTaCaT6CE[tEvoLTC EV TaLi O6XEColWlTCtL PE,catoTEeQ, 18.1), andthat these political arrangements did not survive the surrender: pro-Atheniandemocratic factions would have come into power, and surrendered their owncities without the need for Athenian force. That did not save them frombecoming subject to Athens and having their land divided along withMytilene's: but the Athenians would have done that in any case.

7. Alcidas' movementsThucydides makes it quite clear that he thought Alcidas not to be a bold ordecisive admiral. He wasted time both round the Peloponnese and on the way

to Delos (29.11):he rejected both Teutiaplos' suggestion and the suggestion thathe should seize a city and stir up revolt in Ionia (31), and after the surrender ofMytilene was chiefly concerned to get back as quickly as possible to thePeloponnese (31.2). His main worry was presumably to avoid interception byany Athenian fleet. But that presents us with problems: why did he move soslowly in places where he was vulnerable to such a fleet - in particular, on theway to Delos and in Ionia?

The ships left at the beginning of the campaigning season of 427 (it is the firstevent mentioned by Thucydides after he has finished those of the previousyear: 25.2-26.1). Since they wasted time round the Peloponnese, they almostcertainly came from Cyllene (a habitual starting-point for naval expeditions,and the point to which the fleet eventually returned, 69.1). The SpartanAlliance seems to have had no great number of ships available on thePeloponnesian coast east of the isthmus of Corinth, since for their earlierattack on Athens the allies arrange to have ships hauled across the isthmusfrom west to east (15.1). Probably, as with the fleets which faced Phormio, theships came partly from the north-western allies - Elis itself, Leucas, perhaps

8 Diodoros, for what he is worth, says that the synoikesis was the chief cause of Athenianintervention (12.55.1).



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160 JOHN WILSONAmbracia, - and partly from the Corinthian Gulf states: for it seems doubtfulwhether the north-western allies alone could easily have produced a total of 40.The collection of such a fleet would have taken time: but it was probablyordered in the summer of 428 (16.3) and had all winter to muster in.

The ships' delay round the Peloponnese must have been due to Alcidas' fearof meeting an Athenian fleet making a periplous in the opposite direction, as ithad done in most previous years: the Spartan Alliance seems to have had noeffective signalling system round the Peloponnese (as there was at Leucas:80.2) on which they could rely to tell them of approachingAthenian fleets. (Itis doubtful whether the Spartans ever had such a system: IV.55 and 56 implythat they had not.) Once having passed Malea, however, there seems noobvious reason why their best policy, to avoid interception, was not to moveas fast as possible. But we must again assume that Alcidas tried to keep one orother secure anchorage within range on his way to Delos: he might, forinstance, have startedby going to Melos (then neutral or pro-Spartan).We mayimagine that they moved jerkily from the vicinity of one defensible harbour orlanding-ground to another, always prepared to put into shore if they saw theAthenians coming. His general route, from the Peloponnese to Delos, Icarosand Mykonos, and thence to Erythraia,shows that he was trying to keep southof the usual route from Athens to Lesbos and the Hellespontine cities, onwhich he may well have thought himself most likely to be identified andintercepted.

All that, whether or not showing undue caution and misapprehension, isintelligible enough. A good deal more mysterious is his failure to return atonce to the Peloponnese either from Icaros and Mykonos, where he first heardof the capture of Mytilene, or from Embaton, where he received clearer orfuller information of it (see 2. above). Thucydides, having just said that hismain idea was to get back to the Peloponnese as quickly as possible, then tellsus without explanation that he TaQE'kEL (32.1 : sc. along the Ionian coastline),put in at Myonnesos, killed prisoners whom he had taken en route (includingat Chios: 32.3), put in at Ephesos, received a deputation of Samians, releasedother prisoners, and finally fled, having been sighted by the Salaminia andParalos around Claros (32.1-33.1). He must have returned via the Patmosregion, where Paches gave up his pursuit (33.3); and we learn later that hisships met a storm off Crete (69.1), whence they returned in dribs and drabs(aoToQa6;g) o the Peloponnese. The even more southerly route is intelligible,to avoid the Athenian pursuit; but what was he doing in Ionia?

The answer must be that he wished to make some kind of showing beforehis return to the Peloponnese. He would not do anything so definitive andrisky as was suggested to him, but was at leastpreparedto make his fleet visibleto some lonian cities, who might have taken the opportunity to rebel. 42 shipscould not be thrown away lightly, particularly since the Alliance wished to



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Strategyand Tactics n the MytileneCampaign 161conduct an expeditionagainst Corcyra (69.1). Had any city done so, it isconceivable that he would have stayed and fortified it againstAthenian attack:possibly his own treatment of the prisoners dissuaded any revolt, or perhapsthe failure of Mytilene had made the cities too reluctant. Even in making thismove he was cautious enough to steer southwards, conveniently for hissoutherly route back home; and as soon as he was sighted, he fled. Thiscaution is easy to criticise; but we must remember that this was the first timethe Spartan Alliance had ventured into the Aegean. The Spartans, after all,claimed to be liberating Greece (e. g. 1.139.3, IV 8.5). The contemporarylonians would not have been so critical and regarded Alcidas as bold ratherthan cowardly: ~k;tt& O"Ub TTqVkXLTTv ELaxovo JroTEAMiqvct(wviftcTkahocngQaToOvtwv vavS; rIEko7ovvfiLWv E; 'IwvWavaQacaktv (32.3).

8. Salaithos,Spartaand the SurrenderSalaithos reached Mytilene via Pyrra: and with the benefit of hindsight we

may think it surprising that the Athenians, having established the blockade ofMytilene, did not spare a ship or two to control the (extremely narrow)entrance to the gulf within which Pyrra lay. But they were short of ships,having to guard against a sudden excursus by the Mytilenian fleet (which mayhave numbered not much fewer than their own) and also against the possibilityof naval help from the Peloponnese; and the blockade of Pyrra would hardlyhave prevented Salaithos' arrival- though the Athenians were now preeminentby land as well as sea, their forces were too few to blockade the whole islandagainst the advent of a single trireme. They concentrated, rightly, on Mytilene;and if they were to blame at all, it was for letting Salaithos through the wall.The Peloponnesians should have acted much earlier: it was not till the end ofthe winter (25.1) that Salaithos was sent, and then only Salaithos. As the laterexample of Gylippos, Gongylos and their associates (VII.2) shows, a great dealcould be achieved without much actual strength: in particular, the Lesbianallies of Mytilene could have been persuaded to help more effectively (cf.VII.1). Corinth and other states, who could easily have spareda few boldly-ledtriremes, were as much to blame as Spartafor the omission. Given the smallnumbers on both sides, even a small body of Peloponnesian hoplites -supported, as they could have been, by the Lesbian allies as well as Mytilene -could have prevented the circumvallation of Mytilene and, indeed, made itvirtually impossible for Athens to prevail by land.

Why did they not try - particularlysince they had been willing earlier in thewar to make attempts on islands which were either neutralor positively hostile(Cephallenia, II.33: Zacynthos, II.66)? Phormio's victories and Cnemos'failure in 429 no doubt lowered their morale in respect of oversea adventures,and the distance to Lesbos was very much greater: yet they were willing to risk



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162 JOHN WILSON40 ships under Alcidas. The answer must be, I think, that both they and theMytilenians believed the most effective measures to consist of a direct attackupon Athens: it is not until these fail that Alcidas' squadron is put underorders (15-16). By that time the campaigning season was coming to an end,and Athens had sent her 1000 hoplites to besiege Mytilene: it is not toosurprising that the Spartan Alliance waited till the following summer beforedoing anything. Nor is it clear that the Mytilenians in their speech, advocatethe forces should be sent to Lesbos. They request, admittedly, that the SpartanAlliance should bt6a taXEWV ,3OEMLaV Wtoc0TCXXELV (13.2); but there followsalmost immediately the suggestion of an attack on Athens which, they think,will do the trick:fiv cVti; v TO iE'QEL 16EaT ti 7TEdi 4[LaMEGP6ikXTETO &OTcE1oV(13.4). The Peloponnesianttackmay in itselfconstitute the Po?ELctav asked for in 13.2; in any case, it is the Mytilenians'only practical suggestion.In the final surrender, the Athenians had remarkably good fortune in morethan one respect. First, although Thucydides says that the food supplies hadrun out (nEkXEkoCLt, 27.1), he gives the events of 27.2-28.1 as the reason whythey were compelled to come to terms (6L& TO6E at the end of 27.1 isprospective). It is clear, in fact, that even Alcidas' caution had put thePeloponnesian fleet within easy distance of Mytilene before it had tocapitulate: the Peloponnesians are at Embaton only seven days after thesurrender(29.2). In any case, the Mytilenians were not yet starving, otherwiseSalaithos' idea of leading them out to fight the Athenians would have beenunrealistic: they could certainly have held out for some days at least, no doubteven weeks.

Secondly, Salaithos was wrong to despair of the fleet so soon, howeverunderstandably: and it was also lucky for the Athenians that there was nocommunication between him and the fleet. If he had realisedhow near it was,he would surely have held on. We are not told of Salaithos' negotiations withthe oligoi and the demos at Mytilene, if indeed there were any: he may haveappreciatedthe dangers of arming the demos, or he may not. But in either casehe seems to have been unable to prevent the ensuing muddle, which he could inprinciple have done either (if there was no food to distribute) by persuadingthe demos that there was no food, or (if there was) by persuadingthe oligoi todistribute it. His performance compares badly with Gylippos': but he mayhave had a less receptive audience.Thirdly, the oligoi were equally incompetent both so far as the food wasconcerned (either in not distributing it or in not being able to make the demosrealise there was none), and in their generalassessment of the situation. Theirown initiative in coming to terms with the Athenians did not save their ownnecks. The demos seem almost as imprudent: in the event, they too nearlyperished, and would certainly have done had not the Athenians had a sudden



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Strategy and Tactics in the Mytilene Campaign 163change of heart, almost too late. Both underestimated potential Athenianwrath at a rebellious ally.Oxford University, John WilsonDepartment of Educational Studies

Selective BibliographyFor the sake of simplicity,I have confinedreferencesn my article almostexclusivelytoGomme'sCommentary, erhaps he best-knownand most readilyavailablework for modernreaders.Gommecontainsmost, though by no meansall, of the other relevant eferences.In considering thersecondary iterature,we haveto face(1) theproblemof its vastamount:

here I havethought t bestto select some 30 of the most important nddirectlyrelevantworks.There s also (2) the fact that most modernscholarshaveconcernedhemselveswiththepolitics,rather hanthe strategyandtactics,of the rebellion: houghof coursethese areinterconnected.Here it may be helpful to say that, for strategyand tactics, early editions of Thucydides(particularly oppoand Classen)arethe mosthelpfulsources,particularlyf combinedwithclosestudy of mapsand terrain.Adcock, F. and D. J. MosleyDiplomacyn AncientGreece London, 1975).Amit,M. Athensand the Sea(Brussels,1965).Andrewes,A. 'TheMytileneDebate' n Phoenix16(1962)64-85.Arnold,T. (edition) Oxford,1847).Bloomfield,S.T. (edition) London, 1842).Bohme, G. (edition,revisedby Widmann)Leipzig,1894).Bradeen,D. W. 'ThePopularity f the AthenianEmpire'n Historia9 (1960)25749.Busolt, G. GriechischeGeschichteGotha, 1893-1904).Classen,J. (edition,revisedby Steup) Berlin,1905).Condis, J. D. Lesbos Athens,1978).Conze, A. Reiseauf der Insel Lesbos Hannover,1865).Ducrey,P. Le traitement esprisonniers e guerredans a Greceantique Paris, 1965).von Fritz, K. GnrechischeeschichtsschreibungBerlin,1967).Georgiades,G. K. NomosLesbou Athens,1931).Gillis, D. 'TheRevolt at Mytilene' n AJP92 (1971) 38-47.Jones,A. H. M. AthenianDemocracyOxford, 1957).Kagan,D. TheArchidamianWar Cornell, 1974).Losada,L. The FifthColumn n the PeloponnesianWar Leiden,1972).Mantzouranes, . P. Oi Qi)TuTE yxaTctaot1 T6)V 'EXkkvov Ti Afoo (Mytilene,1949).To ftnoeto yeoQyLxo61o661ca TTq Afof3ou cTiv &QXcLtct6TaMytilene, 1950).Meiggs,R. TheAthenianEmpire Oxford,1972).Merritt,B. D., H. T. Wade-Gery, nd M. F. McGregor,TheAthenianTributeLists Cambridge,Mass.,1939-53).Muller,C. andTh. FragmentaHistoricorumGraecorumParis,1841-85).Philippson,A. Die Griechischen andschaftenFrankfurt, 950-59).Poppo, E. F. (edition,revisedby Stahl).Quinn,T. J. 'PoliticalGroupsat Lesbos duringthe PeloponnesianWar', n Historia20 (1971)

405-8.de St. Croix,G. E. M. TheOriginsof the PeloponnesianWar London, 1972).Westlake,H. D. 'TheCommonsat Mytilene' n Historna 5 (1976)429-40.Wilson, J. Pylos425 (London,1979).Winnington-Ingram, . P. 'Cleon andDiodotos' in Bull. Inst. Class.Stud.12 (1965) 70-82.I11"'

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Historia Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte -'Strategy and Tactics in the Mytilene Campaign' John Wilson, 1981