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DOI: 10.1177/0042098009353629

2010 47: 1479 originally published online 8 February 2010Urban Stud

Tuna Kuyucu and Özlem ÜnsalUrban Renewal in Istanbul

rban Transformation' as State-led Property Transfer: An Analysis of Two Cases of

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47(7) 1479–1499, June 2010

0042-0980 Print/1360-063X Online© 2010 Urban Studies Journal Limited

DOI: 10.1177/0042098009353629

Tuna Kuyucu is in the Department of Sociology, Bogaziçi University,Sosyoloji Bölümü Güney Kampüsü

PK. 2 Bebek/Istanbul 34342, Turkey. E-mail: [email protected].Özlem Ünsal is in the Department of Sociology, City University, Northampton Square, London, EC1V0HB, UK. E-mail: [email protected].

‘Urban Transformation’ as State-ledProperty Transfer: An Analysis of TwoCases of Urban Renewal in IstanbulTuna Kuyucu and Özlem Ünsal

[Paper first received, November 2008; in final form, June 2009]

AbstractSince 2001, there has been a radical shift in the governance of urban land andhousing markets in Turkey from a ‘populist’ to a ‘neo-liberal’ mode. Large ‘urbantransformation projects’ (UTPs) are the main mechanisms through which a neo-liberalsystem is instituted in incompletely commodified urban areas. By analysing two UTPsimplemented in an informal housing zone and an inner-city slum in Istanbul, the paperdiscusses the motivations behind, the socioeconomic consequences of and grassrootsresistance movements to the new urban regime. The analysis shows that the UTPspredominantly aim at physical and demographic upgrading of their respective areas

rather than improving the living conditions of existing inhabitants, thus instigating aprocess of property transfer and displacement. It also demonstrates that the property/tenure structure of an area plays the most important role in determining the form andeffectiveness of grassroots movements against the UTPs.

A group of residents, dressed in White as ifattending a funeral ceremony, carried signs

that read “Our neighbourhood is our pride”,“We will resist until we die” and “Basıbüyükwill be a grave for the MHA”.3 Next to them, agroup of women chanted “Fikri! Don’t crossthe line, don’t test our patience”.4 Later on,the spokesperson of the Istanbul neighbour-hood Associations Platform,5 delivered a pressstatement, criticising the transformation

Introduction

On 26 March 2008, about 1000 people fromBasıbüyük, a politically conservative gece-

kondu neighbourhood in the Maltepe district,gathered outside the municipality to protestthe ‘gecekondu transformation project’ imple-mented in their neighbourhood.1 It was thefirst time that this conservative population,who overwhelmingly voted for the rulingJustice and Development Party (JDP), hadparticipated in such a public demonstration.2







1480 TUNA KUYUCU AND ÖZLEM ÜNSAL

projects because “their real aim is displacingpoor working classes from their neighbour-hoods that they formed with so much sweatand labour, and market their living areas to

the rich”. When he finished his speech, theangry crowd rallied through the streets ofMaltepe, chanting slogans as people aroundcast them puzzled looks. When they reachedthe local JDP building, emotions peaked andeveryone shouted, “Basıbüyük belongs to usand it always will”.

Two months after this incident, on 22 May,the mayor of the Beyoglu Municipality, the

Minister of Tourism and Culture and therepresentatives of the GAP ConstructionCompany 6 were strolling along Istiklal Avenuetogether with a group of journalists towardsan art gallery. The mayor and the ministerwould take short rests during the walk, gazeat the art-nouveau buildings lining the avenueand discuss their architecture. When theyreached the gallery, the journalists startedanalysing the architectural drawings and the

model of a project on exhibit. Fifteen minuteslater, the Mayor of Istanbul was to give a pressconference on the Tarlabası Renewal Projectthat aims to renew 278 historical buildings in9 blocks of the Tarlabası neighbourhood. Noteven a kilometre away was the office of theTarlabası Neighbourhood Association7 wherevolunteer lawyers were filing documents totake the project to court. They argued that theproject breaches rules regarding participationand openness as specified in law no. 5366 andviolates the rights of owners and tenants inthe area.8 One lawyer said

These kinds of projects must serve the publicand must be based on good intentions, butthis certainly isn’t the case in what they wantto do with our lives here.

An old lady who had lived her whole life in

Tarlabası told the lawyers that she had justreceived an eviction letter, a day after sheagreed to sell her building to the developer.

What is taking place in Basıbüyük andTarlabası (see Figure 1) signals a radical tran-sition in the governance of urban housingmarkets in Istanbul from a populist to a neo-

liberal mode (Bartu-Candan and Kolluoglu,2008). In this paper, we analyse the motivationsbehind and consequences of this transition toa fully capitalist urban regime by focusing ontwo ‘urban transformation projects’ (UTPs).These large renewal programmes are theprimary mechanisms by which a capitalistlogic is imposed on urban land and housingmarkets, especially in incompletely commodi-

fied informal housing areas and ‘rundown’inner-city neighbourhoods. By redefiningproperty rules and market dynamics, theUTPs achieve two major goals: physical anddemographic ‘upgrading’ of particular locali-ties within the city and the construction ofa neo-liberal regime of governance that nolonger tolerates the legal ambiguities and theincompletely commodified market structurecharacterising these areas.

These radical interventions into urbanspace disproportionately benefit a coalitionof urban developers, credit institutions, localand central state actors and the politically andeconomically stronger inhabitants of theseareas, whose interests lie in the institution-alisation of a neo-liberal urban regime. Yetthis process pushes into the capitalist marketa highly vulnerable population, whose live-lihood depends on populist redistributivemechanisms. Our case studies demonstratethat, in the absence of social policies enforcedby the state and/or other forms of non-statewelfare distribution, the consequences of this‘forced marketisation’ will result in increaseddisplacement and dispossession of the urbanpoor and heightened levels of spatial andsocioeconomic segregation.

In addition to showing the disruptive impacts

of this new regime, our study also illustratesthe myriad tactics, ranging from setting upbarricades to waging legal battles, that the







‘URBAN TRANSFORMATION’ IN ISTANBUL 1481

inhabitants of these neighbourhoods use tocontest the UTPs. Because both cases are stillat the implementation stage, we cannot conclu-sively demonstrate how these contestations willexactly determine the outcomes. However, ourobservations show that, even when the resist-ance movements fail to halt the projects, theystill alter their implementation in importantways. By comparing the movements in thetwo neighbourhoods, we conclude that themost important determinant of the form andstrength of resistance is the existing property/tenure structure in the area. In both neighbour-hoods, the collective resistance movementsgradually evolved into bargaining with projectimplementers for personal gain. Yet, while thisbargaining process has intensified the divisions

among Basıbüyük inhabitants, none of whomis a formal owner,9 a unified front againstthe project is sustained in Tarlabası, which is

a formal/legal settlement. The more fragilenature of resistance in Basıbüyük makes theproject’s implementation easier compared withthe Tarlabası case, where the inhabitants showa greater resilience in defending their propertyrights. These significant differences betweenour cases show that neo-liberal restructuringsare never pre-determined; their implementa-tion and outcomes depend on local dynamicsand power constellations (Leitner et al., 2007;Brenner and Theodore, 2002). Our focuson the micro-level interactions betweenstate authorities, developers and residentscaptures the contested and contingent natureof these processes.

Methodology and Data

Our research is based on fieldwork con-ducted in Basıbüyük and Tarlabası between

Figure 1. Istanbul showing the locations of Basıbüyük and Tarlabası.









October 2007 and November 2008.10 In bothneighbourhoods, we attended numerouscommunity meetings and public demonstra-tions, interviewed the leaders and lawyers of

neighbourhood associations and conductedin-depth interviews with 30 residents fromeach area. Additionally, we interviewedmunicipal officials in Beyoglu and Maltepe,including the deputy mayor of the former andthe director of the zoning department of thelatter municipality; the project co-ordinatorat GAP; and an expert hired by Beyoglumunicipality to act as a mediator between

the residents and GAP. We also interviewedthe presidents of Istanbul Chamber of UrbanPlanners and Chamber of Architects, profes-sional groups highly critical of the UTPs. Tolearn how developers approach the UTPs, weinterviewed the CEO of a real estate invest-ment trust. Finally, we analysed the municipalplans and other documentary material aboutthe projects and surveyed news articles in thenational media about UTPs.

Three factors motivated our case studyselection: First, to provide a comprehensiveanalysis of how low-income housing areasare being ‘neo-liberalised’, we included acase from each of the two types of UTPcurrently implemented in Istanbul. The firsttype is implemented in historical and natural‘protection zones’ (Tarlabası); the other in‘derelict’ and ‘obsolescent’ areas in the restof the city (Basıbüyük). Secondly, to assessthe effects of different tenure structures onthe implementation of the projects and on thepatterns of resistance, we selected Basıbüyük,which is a gecekondu area with no de jure own-ers and Tarlabası, a formal settlement withhigh tenancy rates. The final reason relates tothe timing of these projects: because both arestill at the implementation stage, they provideinvaluable information about how UTPs are

executed, how the authorities negotiate withdifferent stakeholders and how the inhabit-ants respond to the on-going processes.Focusing on completed projects would not

have allowed us to observe on-the-groundnegotiations and conflicts.

UTPs as Neo-liberalMarket-making Tools

The complex relationship between neo-liberalisation and urban transformations hasreceived remarkable attention since the 1980s

(Hackworth, 2007; Moulaert et al., 2003;Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Harvey, 1989;Logan and Molotch, 1987). Mostly focusingon global cities of advanced capitalist states,this literature shows how the imperatives ofcapital in a post-industrial economy generatenew forms of urban segregation and inequal-ity (Sassen, 2001; Knox and Taylor, 1995).As urban space becomes one of the mostprofitable sources of investment and as citiesadopt aggressive place-marketing strategiesto attract capital, it becomes very difficult forthe urban poor to survive in their living spacesdue to increased real estate values. Numerous

case studies demonstrate that these processeslead to widespread displacement and the con-version of such areas into commercial and/orhigh-end residential districts (Blomley, 2004;Nappi-Choulet, 2006; Smith, 2002; Weber,2002). These developments signal a definiteshift from the Keynesian welfare policies ofthe previous era to a neo-liberal regime thatseeks to extend market forces to all domainsof social life (Brenner and Theodore, 2002).This also necessitates a new form of gov-ernance, where local governments assumeentrepreneurial roles directly or throughpartnerships with private actors (Miraftab,2004; Weber, 2002).

Large redevelopment projects have animportant role in this regime shift as theyopen to investment, mostly through directstate action, highly profitable spaces (such as

old industrial zones, waterfronts and inner-city slums) that have not been economicallyfully exploited. As Moulaert et al. argue,‘mega-projects’









have become one of the most visible andubiquitous urban revitalisation strategiespursued by cities in search of economicgrowth and competitiveness, [making them]

the mechanisms par excellence through whichglobalisation becomes urbanised (Moulaert et al., 2003, pp. 2–3).

Existing research on such projects has shownthat they have highly unequal socioeconomicconsequences for different groups: whilegenerating fast returns for investors and localgovernments,11 they also instigate strongdynamics of displacement and dispossession

for disadvantaged communities (Moulaert et al., 2003; Lehrer and Laidley, 2008).These processes have even more dramatic

effects in the comparatively understudiedmegapoles of developing countries, wherelarge tracts of land, inhabited by legally andsocioeconomically vulnerable populationsand regulated by populist market dynamics,are being redefined through radical legal andeconomic reforms. The remaking of market

rules, property relations and zoning regula-tions in such areas triggers an alarming proc-ess of property transfer, whereby the propertyof weaker actors is legally appropriated bycapitalist developers, by local and centralstate agencies and by stronger players withininformal markets, who are able to employtheir economic and political capital to securemajor gains (Roy, 2004; Sajor, 2003; Thirkell,1996). In many megapoles, it is now appro-priate to speak of an urban regime change, where a populist regime is superseded by aneo-liberal one, which no longer toleratesinformal markets and populist strategies ofrent (re)distribution.

As is well documented by the voluminousliterature on Third World urbanisation, it wasthrough populist urban regimes, based on theincomplete commodification of land and the

partial application of property and zoningrules, that these cities expanded geographi-cally and demographically (Fernandez andVarley, 1998; Gilbert and Gugler, 1982). In the

absence of a formal social housing policy, theinformal market became the only mechanismthrough which growing urban populationscould be absorbed. This particular solution

to the ‘housing problem’ was also extensivelyused in Istanbul, where housing provisionto low-income groups relied on legalisingunauthorised land appropriations and inner-city squatting (Senyapılı, 2000; Keyder, 2000;Bugra, 1998; Erder, 1996; Tekeli, 1992; Öncü,1988). The retroactive extension of owner-ship rights to occupiers via several ‘buildingamnesties’ helped to sustain a populist coali-

tion between industrialists in need of cheaplabour, political parties seeking loyalty andlower-class urbanites in search of affordablehousing. In fact, informal land/housing mar-kets had very significant redistributive effectsin Turkey, without which a much higher levelof inequality would have emerged (Basleventand Dayıoglu, 2005). However, their gradualcommercialisation also led to the solidifica-tion of a lucrative, yet hierarchical market

structure, where those with economic and/or social capital enjoy the benefits of popu-list mechanisms while the majority are leftunprotected in quasi-legal markets (Bugra,1998; Isık and Pınarcıoglu, 2002).

What has ended this populist regime ofhousing provision is the emergence of newpowerful actors—i.e. large developers, realestate investment trusts and various stateagencies—whose interests lie in the transi-tion to a fully commodified market in whichexchange-rights prevail over use rights andprivate property rules are strictly enforced.In Istanbul, the serious shortage of service-able land makes those areas that have beenincompletely integrated into capitalist circuitsduring the populist era increasingly moreattractive to these new actors (Keyder, 2000).Gecekondu zones and inner-city slums, in

this context, become prime targets for largeprojects. Since such projects are risky due tobig start-up investments and uncertain futurereturns, private capital usually demands the








involvement of public agencies in order tomitigate risk (Miraftab, 2004).

Gecekondu s and inner-city slums are par-ticularly attractive for urban redevelopment

for two reasons: legal ambiguities in theirproperty regimes and their perceived statusas centres of crime, blight and decay. UTPsenable radical interventions that purportedlyaim to ‘fix’ the socioeconomic problems andformalise the ambiguous property structurein these areas. It is no coincidence that theTurkish prime minister, during a speechdelivered at the Mass Housing Agency in 2006,

referred to UTPs as surgical tools that canremove the “tumours that have surroundedour cities”12 Even though the ability of UTPsto solve social and legal problems is debat-able, their power to eradicate a pre-existingmarket structure and impose a new marketorder is beyond contention. By creatingnew property rules, exchange mechanismsand physical spaces, these projects institutea neo-liberal system in socioeconomically

and legally vulnerable areas. Ironically, whatmade possible the survival of the poor in suchareas—i.e. informal and extra-legal solutionsto housing—becomes the rationale behindthe remaking of these areas.

The Construction of aNeo-liberal Land andHousing Market in Turkey

In Istanbul, the transition to a neo-liberalurban regime started after the 1980 coupd’état , which also marks the beginning of eco-nomic liberalisation in Turkey (Önis, 1991).Under the mayorship of Bedrettin Dalan(1984–89), turning Istanbul into a ‘world city’became the main goal of the newly empow-ered metropolitan municipality, which under-took massive infrastructural investments and

development projects to this end (Keyderand Öncü, 1994; Bezmez, 2008; Ekinci, 1994;Öktem, 2005). ‘Big capital’ rapidly entered thereal estate sector, leading to the proliferation

of high-rise office buildings, mass housingprojects, malls, gated communities, luxuryhotels and new transport networks (Genis,2007; Bartu-Candan and Kolluoglu, 2008;

Öncü, 1988). This ‘global city project’ gainedmomentum after the break-up of the SovietUnion and the fast liberalisation of ex-socialisteconomies (Yükseker, 2007).

Despite rapid economic liberalisation andurban restructuring during the 1980s and1990s, a fully neo-liberal system was notinstituted until 2001, the year in which Turkeywent through its worst economic crisis (Cizre

and Yeldan, 2005). The greatest obstacle posedto institutionalising such a system was thecontinuation of populist mechanisms in land/housing markets. The existence of a dynamicinformal market meant that large tracts ofland with vast potentials of rent, both in gece-kondu areas and inner-city slums, remainedoutside capitalist circuits. Despite the rentpotential, no political party dared to terminatesuch a vibrant channel of vote-seeking and

wealth redistribution. It was the wreckageof a major accumulation crisis—the 2001economic crash—that brought populism to adefinite end. With a series of legal/institutionalreforms, the ruling JDP radically restructuredthe governance of real estate markets inTurkey, with very important consequences forIstanbul’s socioeconomic geography.

The first set of reforms concern the prevail-ing gecekondu policy. With the passage of thenew Criminal Code in 2004 (Law No. 5237),gecekondu construction was made, for thefirst time, a criminal offence to be punishedby five years in prison, clearly showing thegovernment’s ‘zero-tolerance’ approach.Gecekondu demolitions, which had been rarein Istanbul, speeded up afterwards; between2004 and 2008, 11 543 units in Istanbul weredemolished, a record high for any period.13

Then in 2005 the new Municipality Law waspassed (Law No. 5393), authorising districtmunicipalities to implement ‘transformationprojects’ in derelict, obsolescent and unsafe








(due to natural disasters) parts of cities.These projects, which would be executedthrough a partnership with the Mass HousingAdministration, would renew the existing

building stock through a ‘demolish/rebuild’method and transfer the ‘rightful owners’(which excludes tenants) into public housingprojects. Because of their precarious physical,legal and economic status, gecekondu zonesbecame ideal targets of ‘transformation’.

In addition to reforming the gecekondu regime, the JDP also radically restructuredthe MHA, making it the most powerful real

estate developer in the country and the mostinfluential actor in constructing a neo-liberalregime.14 As a result of numerous legal reformspassed between 2002 and 2008,15 the MHAbecame the sole agency to regulate the zon-ing and sale of almost all state-owned urbanland (excluding military land). These reformsauthorised the MHA to construct ‘for-profit’housing on state land either by its own sub-sidiary firms or through public–private part-

nerships, in order to raise revenues for publichousing construction.16 Furthermore, theMHA acquired the power of making planning/zoning revisions in gecekondu transformationzones and the right to expropriate propertyin these areas. With these vast regulatory andfinancial powers, the MHA is accomplishingtwo crucial goals: constructing a formal land/housing market for low-income householdsand privatising valuable state-owned land.17

A third area of reform concerns the regu-lation of ‘historical and natural protectionzones’, which have been insufficiently inte-grated into capitalist markets due to special‘protection laws’ (such as Law No, 2863). Withthe passage of Law No. 5366 in 2005, districtmunicipalities became authorised to imple-ment regeneration projects in ‘derelict’ and‘obsolescent’ areas within protection zones.18

Similar to other cities, historical ‘inner-city’zones in Istanbul experienced rapid down-fall and are mostly inhabited by vulnerablepopulations unable to meet their housing needs

elsewhere. The new law makes it possible torestore existing buildings in these areas, orto demolish-and-rebuild them in accordancewith the general historical characteristics

and development potentials of the area. Theauthority to designate a ‘renewal zone’ restswith municipalities which have the right toimplement the projects through a partnershipwith the MHA or with private developers.

Finally, in 2007, the JDP passed anothercrucial law (Law No, 5582) restructuring thehousing finance sector, which had tradition-ally been weak and insufficiently institution-

alised in Turkey (Gürlesel, 2006; Öncü, 1988).Use of housing credits has been extraordinar-ily low 19 in a country with very high rates ofhomeownership.20 Such an underdevelopedfinancing mechanism is a serious impedimentto a capitalist urban regime.21 The new lawinstitutionalised the ‘mortgage system’, whichis expected to provide a major impetus to thehousing finance sector. Although this is a bigstep towards neo-liberalisation, high inflation

and interest rates exclude most lower-incomecitizens from participating in mortgage mar-kets. Those unable to enter the private creditmarket can, however, obtain housing throughthe MHA, which provides state-subsidisedcredit to lower-income consumers.

In sum, these reforms have laid the founda-tions of a fully formalised and commodifiedurban regime that creates vast opportunitiesfor state agencies, private developers andcredit institutions. By eradicating the earlierredistribution mechanisms, they have fun-damentally altered the populist relation-ship between the legally and economicallyvulnerable urbanites and the state. UTPsare prime instruments in implementingthis new regime, especially in incompletelycommodified gecekondu and inner-city slumareas. The rest of our article focuses on the

implementation of UTPs, demonstrates theirmajor shortcomings and discusses the variousresistance tactics developed by those who aresubject to such interventions.









Mapping Basıbüyük and Tarlabası

A close look at the socioeconomic and physicalgeography of the two neighbourhoods reve-

als their high potential for rent-generation.Basıbüyük, to start with, is a poor working-class neighbourhood situated on a high hill inthe Maltepe district, commanding a spectacu-lar view. Maltepe remained one of the mostimportant industrial zones of Istanbul’s Asianside until the mid 1990s (Tekeli, 1992). Havingattracted a migrant population from centraland north-eastern Turkey since the 1960s, thepopulation of Basıbüyük rose to about 20 000in 2007 (TURKSTAT, 2008). What madeBasıbüyük a suitable settlement for migrantswas the availability of vacant state-owned landand the proximity to factories in the region.Even though the neighbourhood has receivedmunicipal services and infrastructure since the1970s, the inhabitants could not obtain formalland titles and/or building permits, making allbuildings in Basıbüyük illegal.

Two factors have complicated the propertystructure in Basıbüyük. First, most inhabit-ants have actually purchased their lands fromthird parties in the informal market with stateacceptance and/or involvement, which makesthem believe that they should be eligible forformal ownership. Secondly, about half of the990 buildings in the project area have taputahsis documents, obtained in the 1980s withamnesty acts that successive governments hadpassed. These documents confer to gecekondu ‘owners’ a de facto use right, thus provid-ing them with some legality.22 As a result, ahighly ambiguous and confusing propertyregime emerged in Basıbüyük, where half ofthe inhabitants are ‘occupiers’ with no rightswhereas the other half are de facto owners oftheir land, on which they have built illegaldwellings. In addition, an unknown number

of tenants reside in this legally ambiguousarea. This legal complexity is one of themost important legitimating tools used bythe municipality in the implementation of arenewal project in Basıbüyük.

Geographically, Basıbüyük is no longera peripheral settlement. As a result of theexpansion of the city and the transformationof its economy since the 1980s, it has become

a poor gecekondu area located in a thrivingreal estate zone that has been attracting majorinvestments geared towards the upper classes.With significant reserves of unused land, theMaltepe district has been marked as a poten-tial development area in the master plan ofIstanbul, making it a prime site for up-marketresidential projects.23 The district is in closeproximity to Kartal, another old industrial

zone, soon to be turned into a central busi-central busi-ness disctrict (with office buildings, luxu-rious housing, hotels and a marina) by therenowned architect Zaha Hadid. The NarCityand KIPTAS housing blocks, constructedfor upper-middle-class consumer groups; aprivate university and several major trans-port networks are some of the developmentssurrounding Basıbüyük today.

Tarlabası, on the other hand, is like the

missing piece of a jigsaw puzzle in Taksim,the social and cultural hub of Istanbul.Despite the neighbourhood’s proximity tothe Taksim area and its protection by specialzoning regulations since 1993 because ofits 19th century housing stock, it has beenundergoing a rapid process of socioeco-nomic and physical decline. The ‘ghettoisa-tion’ and radical dereliction of Tarlabası aretriggered by two major historical incidents:the deportation of its non-Muslim residentsin 196424 and the demolition of more than300 Levantine buildings for the constructionof today’s Tarlabası Boulevard by Dalan in1986 (Ekinci, 1994; Çeçener, 1995). Cut offfrom the social and economic flow of Taksim,Tarlabası entered a phase of degradation,as socioeconomic downfall also triggeredphysical dereliction. The decline of exchange

values in Tarlabası after the ‘Dalan demoli-tions’ speeded up the ‘slummification’ of thearea which, by the mid 1990s, had become alow-cost living zone for internally displacedKurds,25 undocumented immigrants and various








marginalised groups. The neighbourhood’sdownfall became even more striking as thesurrounding areas like Cihangir, Galata andTalimhane became gentrified and attracted

major investments (Behar and Islam, 2006).26 In the middle of these, Tarlabası has remainedas an inner-city slum, inhabited by disadvan-taged transient populations.

The predominant tenure structure inTarlabası, despite its slum-like characteristics,is de jure ownership. The buildings that usedto be owned by non-Muslims until 1964 weretransferred to a new landlord class under the

auspices of the state after the expulsion ofthese minorities. Rural migrants mostly bene-fited from this process by either purchasingthe buildings from their official care-takers(kayyum) or extralegally appropriating themand becoming legal ‘owners’ retroactively.Following this process of property transfer, alucrative rental market emerged in the area,where the new owners rented out dwellings tolow-income groups, either formally or infor-

mally. According to research conducted in theproject area, 75 per cent of the inhabitantsare tenants, 20 per cent are property ownersand the remaining 5 per cent are occupiers(Kentsel Strateji A.S., 2008).

Based on the 1990 and 2000 national sur-veys, the populations in both neighbourhoodsare ‘significantly below’ the Istanbul aver-age on educational attainment, income, jobsecurity and status of occupation (Güvenç,2005). The majority of Basıbüyük residentsonly finished primary school and there is alsoa sizeable illiterate population.27 In Tarlabası,the illiterate population, which has greatlyincreased since 1990, constitutes an evenlarger percentage.28 Most of the Basıbüyükinhabitants work in the construction and(informal) manufacturing sectors, but therealso exists a growing population working in

low-end service jobs.29

In Tarlabası, how-ever, the majority work in low-end service

jobs, with minimal social security.30 Servicesrepresent the dominant sector in Tarlabasıbecause of its proximity to Taksim, where

the concentration of entertainment centresgenerates low-paid jobs such as waitressing,cleaning or dish washing. A mixture of smallprivately owned businesses such as grocery

stores and textile workshops and marginal jobs such as refuse collection and prostitutionexist alongside the service sector.

Implementation of the Projects

The Basıbüyük and Tarlabası projects rep-resent the two types of UTP currently beingimplemented in Istanbul. Despite theirsimilarities, there are important differencesin their particular goals, implementing actorsand distinct processes. The Basıbüyük UTP isa ‘gecekondu transformation project’, whichis enabled by the new municipality law andimplemented through a partnership betweenthe Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality,Maltepe municipality and the MHA. Acceptedin February 2006, it aims to demolish gece-kondu s on 400 dönüms31 in the neighbour-

hood and transfer the ‘rightful owners’ toapartment blocks built by the MHA withinthe neighbourhood.32 Currently, six of theseblocks are being built, on a 35-hectare sitewhich had been used as a park by the inhabit-ants (see Figure 2).

Each building consists of 50 flats of 80 squaremetres (www.maltepe.bel.tr). ‘Rightful own-ers’, who exclude tenants, are given the optionto ‘purchase’ these flats with state-subsidisedcredit to be paid in 15 years. Because theirexisting homes are illegal, they are offered a‘demolition value’, determined by the Ministryof Public Works and Resettlement, for theirexisting units, rather than the full value ofthe land and the building. In most cases, thedemolition value constitutes one-quarter ofthe value of the new apartments.

Since its acceptance, the project has gener-

ated a strong negative reaction among thepopulation, resulting in the formation of aneighbourhood association to lead the resist-ance. This strong resistance becomes moreinteresting given the fact that Basıbüyük is a








conservative neighbourhood with no traditionof political mobilisation. The municipality,in response to the collective mobilisaiton,started formal negotiations with the associ-ation in May 2008. Currently, bargaining for

a fair price for gecekondu s continues, whilethe construction of the new blocks advances(see Figure 3). The association also initiateda legal battle in October 2008 against theproject, arguing that it violates public inte-rest, principles of urban planning and rulesof democratic governance. In December, theAdministrative Court found the association’sarguments to be valid and ordered the tempo-rary halting of the project. Despite the court

order, the construction continues.The Tarlabası UTP, as distinct from the

Basıbüyük case, is based on Law No. 5366.Following the designation of 278 buildingsin 9 blocks as a renewal zone in February2006, the site was put out to tender by theBeyoglu municipality and a private devel-oper, GAP, took the bid in April 2007 (seeFigures 4 and 5).

The project, designed by nine Turkish ‘stararchitects’, promises to revitalise the areaby turning it into a residential, tourist andcommercial centre.33 In its efforts to protect

the historical significance of the area, theproject preserves the façades of the historicalbuildings. Property owners are offered either42 per cent of their ‘existing’ property afterthe project’s completion, or full monetary

compensation for their property’s currentvalue. The size of apartments to be built rangefrom 35 to 75 square metres, too small for themajority of Tarlabası’s households. Althoughtenants were initially excluded, they havebecome eligible to purchase MHA units builtin Kayabası, 35 km away.

The owners and tenants responded to theproject terms by establishing a neighbour-hood association in March 2008 to defend

their rights. Because Law No. 5366 rests on theprinciples of ‘fair negotiation’ and ‘participa-tion’ of residents in decision-making, officialtalks between GAP and the neighbourhoodassociation started in February 2008. However,the association withdrew from the talks inJuly 2008 as a result of inadequate financialcompensation and lack of transparancy inproject implementation. Demonstrating aremarkable efficiency in mobilisation, theassociation now represents the majority ofresidents in the area and is considering join-ing the Chamber of Architects in their legal

Figure 2. The Basıbüyük construction site on March 2008, before construction started.









fight against the project. GAP, however, hasbeen able to purchase only 20 per cent of thebuildings and is currently unable to pursuenegotiations, which causes serious delays inproject implementation.

Shortcomings of State-led UTPs

There are three major shortcomings in

the implementation of these projects thatraise serious questions about their overalllegitimacy and their consequences. First, noobjective criteria exist in the Municipality

Figure 3. The Basıbüyük construction site, November 2008.

Figure 4. The Tarlabası project: an image taken from the official booklet.

Figure 5. The Tarlabası project area.









Law or in Law No. 5366 to designate areasas ‘transformation zones’, apart from somevague references to ‘blight’, ‘earthquake risk’and ‘obsolesence’. This ambiguity raises seri-

ous doubts about why particular areas arelabelled as such. For example, two municipalofficials that gave us a tour of Basıbüyükconstantly showed us low-quality housingunits in order to prove that this is in fact a‘social and physical blight zone’. When weasked what makes the area ‘blighted’, theyfailed to give any concrete data and referredto the widespread poverty and informality in

the area as indicators of ‘blight’. Similarly, in alecture delivered to a group of foreign plan-ners, the deputy mayor of Maltepe labelledBa¸sıbüyük as a ‘social decay zone’, withoutproviding any proof other than the existenceof informal housing units. In Tarlabası, nega-tive labelling of the population is even morewidespread, as the neighbourhood is home tohighly marginalised populations. Yet, no con-crete data regarding ‘blight’ and ‘decay’ were

provided in the project brochures, in publicspeeches or during the in-depth interviewswe conducted with officials.

The almost complete exclusion of residentsfrom decision-making processes is a secondmajor problem. In both cases, residents havebecome informed of the projects after thefact. Our interviews revealed that their initialsource of information was usually coincidentalencounters with third persons, not publicauthorities. In Basıbüyük, for example, thenews broke when a resident working at themunicipality happened to see some documentsin relation to the protocol signed by the initia-ting actors of the project (Express , 2008/05). InTarlabası, details of the project were unveiledonly after a property owner consulted hislawyer about offers made by the municipalityon the possible transfer of his building to the

municipality. Prior to this, the residents hadonly been briefed by the municipality in 2006about the possible rehabilitation of Tarlabasıwith the use of World Bank credit. Both inBasıbüyük and Tarlabası, time allowed for

legal objections had already expired when thenews reached the residents.

The exclusion of inhabitants from decision-making means that their opinions and needs

had not been considered in the devising of theprojects. In fact, our interviews with officialsreveal that what they view as ‘participation’is the inhabitants’ acceptance of, or objectionto, the projects after their official approval.Whereas the inclusion of residents to projectdevelopment has never even been a matterof discussion in Basıbüyük, GAP relies onthe feasible demands of property owners in

Tarlabası, whom they try to negotiate withindividually. Both situations result from thecomplete lack of models for participation inthe relevant laws. This situation negativelyimpacts the trust relations between residentsand state officials. Lack of information onthe part of inhabitants also contributes tothe spread of rumours reinforcing anxieties.For example, no one in Basıbüyük knowshow the land cleared from gecekondu s will

be developed, which raises fears that luxuryvillas will replace their homes.

Finally, these projects suffer from a total lackof social projects and economic programmesfor the inhabitants, creating a serious risk ofdisplacement, dispossession and geographicalrelocation of poverty. The fact that the twomunicipalities failed to conduct comprehen-sive surveys about the urgent needs of thesevulnerable groups prior to the projects showsthat the projects are not designed to improveinhabitants’ living conditions. When weasked a municipal official from the Maltepemunicipality if such a survey was conductedin Basıbüyük, she said

No, we didn’t, which was a mistake on ourpart. But we’re learning these things as we goalong. Now we have an information bureauopen to everyone; we go to the neighbourhood

frequently to convince people that the projectis good for them ... But, you also should beaware that this is the first project of its sort inTurkey and we didn’t have any examples tolearn from.









Even though the municipalities emphasisethe ‘social’ aspects of the projects in variousforums, there are no concrete programmesdeveloped to improve living conditions of

current residents. When the deputy mayorof Maltepe was asked, during a meeting witha group of foreign planners, what type ofemployment-generating programmes theyhave developed for inhabitants, he answeredby saying that Basıbüyük does not need anysuch programmes because it does not havean employment problem.34 For an hour, heargued why this project should be seen as

a ‘social’ one without mentioning a singleprogramme devised for inhabitants. In thecase of Tarlabası, however, GAP offers acapacity building programme (CBP) thatenvisages the training of residents to workas construction workers in the UTP and tofind employment in service jobs that willbe generated in the area.35 The CBP wasdeveloped by an ‘urban consultancy agency’,which also conducted a detailed survey in

the project area after the acceptance of thegeneral framework of the project. In light ofthese facts, it is clear that public authoritieshave largely failed to formulate social policiesfor the existing populations of these areas.Neither the project in Basıbüyük, nor theCBP in Tarlabası is effective in responding topeople’s fundamental needs like education,health care and employment.

Due to these major shortcomings, we aredeeply concerned that the UTPs will deepenpoverty and instigate major displacement ofexisting populations from their neighbour-hoods (Bartu-Candan and Kolluoglu, 2008).36 In fact, this is a definite outcome for tenantsin both areas, who are mostly excluded fromthe projects. In Tarlabası, where resistancecontinues and certain gains are expected,tenants have already started moving to other

neighbourhoods where they will not face thethreat of ‘transformation’. We also predictthat a substantial percentage of ‘owners’ willalso leave their neighbourhoods once realestate values rise as a result of the projects. In

Basıbüyük, for example, many inhabitants fearthat they will be unable to pay the monthlyinstalments of the new units and afford theformalised household economy. In several

interviews, residents stated that they will selltheir new unit and use the cash to build agecekondu somewhere else.

Question of Resistance:Property and Violence asThreats to Mobilisation

Large redevelopment projects, as we haveargued so far, are highly effective tools inremaking urban real estate markets andrestructuring urban spaces. However, the par-ticular ways in which they transform urbanareas are still determined, to a great extent, bythe existing power constellations, institutionalstructures and market dynamics prevailing inthese areas (Brenner and Theodore, 2002).In other words, localised responses to neo-liberal dynamics leave their imprint on the

outcome of these processes in complex andhighly contingent ways. Even though thissounds like a truism, there are surprisinglyfew empirical studies on how local dynamics,institutions and contestations shape neo-liberalising processes (Leitner et al., 2007).Our detailed analysis of the highly localisedresistance strategies developed by residentsand of bargaining between residents, privatedevelopers and municipal authorities aims tofill in this gap.

One of the most interesting and theore-tically puzzling aspect of the UTPs we haveanalysed is their potential both to instigateand to hamper grassroots resistance. Ourfindings reveal that, in both of our cases, thestrategies municipalities and their public/private partners have used to boost urbanrent and redefine property structures quickly

transformed the strong collective movementsformed against the projects into bargain-ing processes for personal gain. Despite thisgeneral similarity, however, the tactics thatproject executors used had very different








impacts on the movements that emerged inthe two neighbourhoods. In Basıbüyük, anestablished gecekondu neighbourhood withstrong social networks, the implementation

of the UTP generated a swift and powerfulresistance movement, which lost its fervourwith an equally surprising speed. A largenumber of the residents have already agreedto, or are seriously considering accepting,the project terms. In contrast, in Tarlabası, aneighbourhood with relatively lower degreesof solidarity, the resistance movement has notexperienced such a loss of power. Rather, the

association has successfully mobilised almostall residents, including tenants, against theproject. Furthermore, due to the highly effe-ctive tactics that the assocation developed infighting GAP, the company agreed to reviseproject details in significant ways, such asagreeing to provide financial support to disp-laced tenants and providing more space in theproject area for small businesses.

These differences can be explained by the

different property/tenure structure in thetwo neighbourhoods and the level of violenceused by the state in the implementation of theproject. To start with the latter, the strengthwith which Basıbüyük residents initially actedagainst the project spurred a high degree ofviolence by the state. For example, becausethe residents had put up barricades aroundthe construction site, it was only after thedeployment of more than 1000 fully armedriot police that the work machines couldenter the site. The neighbourhood has beenunder ‘police siege’ since then and a 24-hour-presence police force protects the construc-tion site and controls all entry ways into thearea. Since the stationing of the police inthe area, violent confrontations between thepolice and inhabitants have occurred, injuringseveral inhabitants including children.37 Even

though the level of violence and surveillancedecreased after official negotiations with themunicipality began in May, a permanentpolice force remains in Basıbüyük. The open

and frequent use of state violence cripplesmobilisation and generates an unequal bar-gaining structure, one we call ‘bargainingunder the shadow of violence’, which seriously

weakens the position of the residents.In Tarlabası, however, there is no compara-

ble use of state violence, mainly because thisUTP does not involve the clearing of an areafor construction. Unlike Basıbüyük, whereconverting a local park into a construction siteinstigated the conflict, such overt measuresthat might spark off violence are not beingtaken. Moreover, the state–private partner-

ship in Tarlabası (Beyoglu municipality andthe GAP) also acts as an obstacle to the openuse of violence. Since it won the bid, GAP hasengaged in an intensive public relations cam-paign to convince both the residents and thelarger public that the project is implementedin a participatory and democratic fashion.

More important in determining collectivemobilisation is the prevailing property/tenurestructure in these areas. The ambiguous prop-

erty regime that characterises Basıbüyük—where about half of the existing units haveno titles, while the other half have tapu-tahsis documents—creates a very strong impedi-ment to sustained collective resistance againstthe project. In the absence of legal guaranteesto their property, the residents (especiallythose with no documents) have a strongincentive to accept the municipality’s offers.The municipality effectively uses people’slegal vulnerability and tenure insecurity topersuade them to sign the deals. Furthermore,the existing legal complexity also creates deepdivides between those with tapu-tahsis docu-ments and the ‘occupiers’. Because the formergroup has some level of legal security, theyare more eager to resist the project and arebetter equipped to refuse municipal offers.Occupiers, in contrast, are more willing to

partake in the project and recieve an MHAunit, that can be liquidated in the market.

These structural obstacles to sustained mobi-lisation became very apparent after formal








bargaining started between the municipalityand the assocation in May 2008. Since then,the appetite for private gain has weakenedthe collective ‘right-to-housing’-based move-

ment, resulting in more residents agreeingto the project. The movement lost powerespecially after the municipality decided toincrease the ‘demolition price’ for existingdwellings. The bargaining also made the riftbetween occupiers and tapu-tahsis holdersvery apparent. In the several neighbourhoodmeetings we attended since May, the mainpoint of contention concerned the main

beneficiaries of the resistance. The occupiersargue that the resistance strategies, includ-ing a legal battle that was recently won, onlybenefit those with tapu-tahsis documents. Thefollowing dialogue between the association’spresident and an occupier clearly captures thedivide between the two groups

P : We’re fighting for everyone’s benefit, for

everyone living in Basıbüyük.

O : But, you need to understand, I don’t haveany rights, any papers ... Unlike you, I’m just an occupier. I’ve nothing. When MHAcomes to take my home, why would they evenbargain or negotiate with me ... So, I’ll agreeto the project ... My gecekondu now is worthnothing, but if I get one of the MHA flats, I canthen sell it for at least 100 000.

Such rifts, caused by Basıbüyük’s propertystructure, make it easier for the municipalityto convince more residents to accept pro-

ject terms.In Tarlabası, a different tenure structure

exists, making possible a more effectiveresistance. Following the expulsion of non-Muslims from Tarlabası, a massive propertytransfer took place that created a new landlordclass, who became de jure owners of the prop-

erty. Since then, Tarlabası has become a securesource of income for the new landlords andan affordable residential area for low-incometenants. The UTP, which excludes the tenants

and offers to owners only 42 per cent of theirexisting property, generated a strong reactionfrom both groups whose economic interestsnow converged. As one property owner stated

We know that these buildings will cost millionsof dollars once the project is over. Why areproperty owners not given a share from thatvalue and are forced to accept the ridiculousamounts offered? Or why are they beingoffered 35–55-square-metre flats in return fortheir 5–6 storey buildings? ... Isn’t this unfair?

Tenants are also keenly aware that they will bedisplaced as a result of the project, which willsignificantly increase rents in the area.

To turn these negative sentiments into aneffective movement against the UTP, a groupof owners formed an association on February2008. Thanks to the efforts of a particularlyadept community organiser, Erdal Aybek,and three volunteer lawyers, the associationsucceeded in collecting more than 200 lettersof attorney from owners. Accumulation of

these letters still continues, reinforcing therepresentativeness of the association. Equallyimportant, many tenants have also joined themovement, which has strengthened the posi-tion of the association in its negotiations withGAP and conferred upon it more legitimacyamong the public. The following words of onetenant, a transvestite sex worker who has livedin her apartment for eight years, is commonamong others

I’m confident that my landlord and theassociation will defend my cause togetherwith theirs. He keeps me up-to-date withwhat’s happening and we discuss the matterfrequently. We share the same perspective:they should get what they deserve and soshould I.

It is also common for tenants to attend

meetings organised by GAP on the side oftheir landlords.

The first significant result of this mobilisationwas the inclusion of the association in the








official talks between the municipality andGAP as a third party in March 2008. The legalguarantee that a formal title gives to ownersmakes them stronger in the bargainings with

GAP and the municipality, compared withthe informal occupants of Basıbüyük. Forexample, after GAP pledged to make somerevisions to project terms as a result of thenegotiations, the association found theserevisions insufficient and left the bargainingtable. Following the termination of talks,the association effectively prevented indi-vidual negotiations between residents and

the representatives of the other side, a proc-ess that seriously weakened the movementin Basıbüyük. By blocking the signing of thedeals, the association has so far succeededin suspending the project. Furthermore, asa result of this resistance, GAP has agreedto provide temporary financial assistance totenants who choose to purchase MHA unitsin Kayabası.

Despite the association’s success so far in

defending the rights of all residents, we sus-pect that the coalition between owners andtenants is a fragile one, likely to dissolve ifowners can secure more gains. In an area withsuch high rates of tenancy and absentee land-lordism, we fear that, as the association winsat the bargaining table, tenants will inevitablybe displaced. This (paradoxical) situation isalso acknowledged by Mr Aybek, who in ourfirst interview strongly emphasised that noone (including tenants) will be forced to leaveTarlabası, but changed this discourse in oneof our subsequent interviews

When we first found out about the project,it was too late to take it to the court. Peoplewere worried that they’d suddenly lose theirproperties that they worked so hard to acquire.Under these circumstances, I mean if they arereally going to kick us out, we’ve no chance

other than fighting until we get what we deserve.

The fact that the association has not yet joined the Chamber of Architects in their

lawsuit against the project also shows that itwants to put as much pressure as possible onthe municipality and GAP in order to securemaximum gains rather than protecting eve-

ryone’s right to housing in the area.To sum up, we argue that the form and

strength of collective mobilisation are sig-nificant variables in shaping how the projectsare implemented and in determining theirsocial and economic consequences. Our casesshow that effective and sustained resistancemovements, especially when joining forceswith supralocal organisations, can challenge

these top–down impositions and bring aboutimportant gains (see also Eckstein, 1990). Yet,as Castells argues, movements for collectiveconsumption goods in low-income com-munities tend to be fragile and short-lived,due to important structural impedimentsto movement-building (Castells, 1983). Theresistance movements we have observed wereparticularly threatened by a lack of movementbuilding experience, state violence and, most

importantly, by the appetite for private gainthat UTPs instigate among certain inhabitants,which intensifies the divisions already existingin these communities. The impact of this ‘col-lective action problem’ is intensified when peo-ple have no legal guarantees to their property,as in Basıbüyük. When residents start pursuingshort-term private interests at the expense oflong-term collective goals, it becomes mucheasier for project executors to take over theirproperty and implement the project.

Conclusion

The mounting infrastructural and socio-economic problems caused by Istanbul’sunplanned and unregulated growth makesradical interventions into the built environ-ment in the form of ‘renewal’ or ‘transfor-

mation’ projects a necessity, especially giventhe major earthquake threat the city faces. Thecurrent UTPs implemented in the city, how-ever, seem unlikely to accomplish their stated








goals—i.e. eradicating poor-quality housing,creating a more sustainable and livable urbanenvironment, and improving the lives of theurban poor. Rather, these radical state-led

interventions into urban space and land/housing markets act as tools for ‘marketing’certain potential rent-zones to stronger actors.They are mostly concerned with the physicaland demographic upgrading and beautifica-tion of their respective areas to increase realestate values, which makes it difficult forcurrent ‘users’ to remain in the area.

As our analysis of two UTPs demonstrates,

the project executors make full use of thelegal, coercive and financial powers of the stateforcefully to transfer property from legally andsocioeconomically vulnerable urbanites tostronger ‘urban entrepreneurs’ like the GAPor the MHA. Therefore, urban renewal poli-cies, as they are currently implemented, arelikely to create widespread dispossession anddisplacement. The unconstrained involvementof the state in this process poses serious ethical

questions. Nothing captures these concernsbetter than the words of one of our informantsfrom the Basıbüyük neighbourhood

Mr Erdogan [the prime minister] was talkingabout starting a visa procedure for those whowant to move to Istanbul. Soon he won’thave to come up with such inventions sincethese UTPs will force people to go back totheir villages.

Because they are not supported by any kindof social or employment-generating pro-grammes, the UTPs are likely to cause gen-trification and population transfer.

Finally, our analysis documents the vari-ous tactics of resistance developed by thosewho are subject to ‘transformation’ in orderto protect their interests against public andprivate agents. As we have shown, these

grassroots movements face numerous chal-lenges for sustained mobilisation such asstate violence, lack of experience, internaldivisions and the divide-and-rule tactics of

project implementers. Despite all theseobstacles, however, they have achieved someimportant gains and have shaped the projectsin critical ways. The most significant gain

was won as we were completing this article.On 15 November 2008, we attended a com-munity meeting in Basıbüyük, the purposeof which was to inform the residents of alegal victory that the association has wonagainst the MHA and the municipality. As aresult of the concerted efforts of the associa-tion’s volunteer lawyer and various NGOs,the 5th Administrative Court of Istanbul

ordered the Basıbüyük UTP to be stoppedbecause “it violates conceptions of publicgood, principles of urban planning and rulesof democratic governance”.38 This is a majorlegal victory that is likely to set a precedent forother projects. In the meantime, in Tarlabası,the metropolitan municipality has initiateda major reassessment of the project, mainlybecause of the association’s uncompromis-ing attitude. In both cases, without the swift

mobilisation of the residents and the creativestrategies used by the associations, the gainswould have been impossible. It is our hopethat these struggles pave the ground forthe implementation of a more democratic,egalitarian and inclusionary ‘urban transfor-mation’ agenda, which would strive for thesocial, economic and political empowermentof inhabitants in addition to physical upgrad-ing and rent-seeking.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank theFoundation for Urban and Regional Studiesfor providing funding for a major part of thisresearch. The authors greatly benefited fromthe valuable criticisms and input of ResatKasaba, Katherine Beckett, Arda Ibikoglu,

Ayfer Bartu-Candan, Biray Kolluoglu andMurat Güvenç. The authors would also liketo thank the three anonymous referees fortheir feedback.









Notes

1. Gecekondu is the Turkish word for squatterhousing. It literally means ‘landed overnight’.

2. The JDP got 72 per cent of the votes inBasıbüyük in the 2004 local elections and 55per cent in the 2007 general elections.

3. MHA, the Mass Housing Administration,is the governmental agency responsible forthe provisioning of public housing. It alsois a central actor in the implementation ofUTPs, as we discuss later in the paper.

4. Fikri Köse is the mayor of Maltepe from theruling JDP.

5. Formed in 2006 with 21 neighbourhood

associations, the platform aims to forma unified front against demolitions anddisplacement caused by UTPs.

6. The GAP Construction Company won thetender for the renewal project in Tarlabasıand is currently implementing it. It is part ofthe Çalık Holding Group, famously knownfor its close ties to the ruling JDP. The son-in-law of the Prime Minister is the CEO ofÇalık Holding.

7. The association was formed in March 2008,in response to the Tarlabası TransformationProject.

8. Law for the Protection of DilapidatedHistorical and Cultural Real Estate throughProtection by Renewal, enacted in 2005. Itconstitutes the legal basis for the renewalproject in Tarlabası.

9. The tenure structure in Basıbüyük is complex.Around half of the inhabitants are‘occupiers’ with no legal claims to their

land, whereas the rest have ‘use-rights’,recognised by the state, that they haveacquired after 1984. We discuss this in moredetail later in the paper.

10. These two case studies are part of ourindividual research projects. One of usresearches the transformation of informalhousing markets under neo-liberalisation.The Basıbüyük case is part of this research,which also focuses on the Ayazma-TepeüstüUTP, implemented in the Küçükçekmecedistrict. The other studies the transformationsin the ‘historical protection zone’ in the pastfive years, focusing closely on the Tarlabasıand Sulukule UTPs.

11. The existing research on the long-termprofitability and sustainability of such mega-projects yields mixed and inconclusive results.Despite this reality, however, they remain

highly popular among ‘growth coalitions’.12. Radikal , 09 April 2006.13. The authors thank Cem Bico for providing

this figure.14. Founded in 1984 to provide affordable

housing and to regulate rapid urbanisation,the MHA played a very important role inIstanbul’s urban expansion during the 1980sand 1990s, mostly through providing creditto housing co-operatives. For a detaileddiscussion, see Burkay (2006).

15. Law No. 4966 (2003), Law No. 5162 (2004),Law No. 5582 (2007) and Law No. 5793(2008).

16. Since 2003, 65 808 239 square metresof land have been transferred to MHAownership, with no cost (Radikal , 27 May2008). Between 2003 and 2008, the MHAconstructed about 340 000 housing units,50,000 of which are in Istanbul, 317 tradecentres and 30 hospitals, in addition tonumerous other structures (www.toki.gov.tr)

17. Private actors in the market have startedto raise serious concerns about this over-powered state agency. The CEO of a REITwhom we interviewed argued that, by domi-nating the sector, MHA is violating free-market principles and hurting the interestsof private firms. When asked why the MHAis so active in the construction sector, ourinterviewee said, off the record, “How many

votes do you think are won with the sale ofthose cheap apartment units?”.

18. See note 7.19. As of 2001, housing credits amounted to

US$800 million, constituting 0.75 per centof GNP (www.tcmb.gov.tr). By 2005, theyincreased to 5 per cent. Just to give somefigures of comparison: in Greece, housingcredits constitute 15 per cent of GNP, in Italy13.3 per cent and in Spain 42 per cent.

20. Some 59 per cent and 57 per cent ofhouseholds own their dwellings in Turkeyand Istanbul respectively. These numbers areinflated due to gecekondu ownership (TurkishStatistics Institute (TURKSTAT), 2000).









21. The primary mechanism of homeowner-ship in Turkey is using one’s own funds,borrowing from friends/relatives or gecekondu construction. Research by TURKSTAT (2004)

shows that 63 per cent of respondents usedtheir own funds, 23 per cent borrowed, 8 percent joined co-operatives and only 3 per centused bank credits to buy housing.

22. According to the zoning law, a tapu tahsis document guarantees a future de jure propertyright, either to the property that they ‘own’occupy’ or to another dwelling built elsewhere.If a gecekondu area receives a formal plan,then the tapu tahsis documents may be turnedinto formal tapus (deeds).

23. The 2008 report of Colliers Internationalfocuses on the vast potential of the area forprivate developers, particularly emphasising‘gecekondu transformation projects’ andunused factory buildings as the strengths ofthis region.

24. In 1964, a large number of Greek nationalsand ethnically Greek citizens of Turkey wereforced to leave the country, in the midst ofa political crisis between Greece and Turkey.See Akar and Demir (1994) for more details.

25. According to the 2000 census, south-easternAnatolians, the majority of whom areKurdish, constitute the the largest group inTarlabası.

26. In Talimhane, a neighbourhood adjacent toTarlabası that became a hotel quarter, thevalue of buildings increased to US$3 000 000(Yeni Safak , 13 August 2007).

27. In Basıbüyük, only 18 per cent of thepopulation completed a stage higher than

primary school and 22 per cent do not evenhold a primary school diploma. Nine percent of the neighbourhood is illiterate, withwomen making up 80 per cent of the illiterate(TURKSTAT, 2000).

28. The inflow of large numbers of internallydisplaced Kurds to Tarlabası, some of whomdo not speak any Turkish, is an importantreason for the high rates of illiteracy in thearea.

29. What is interesting in this category is thepredominance of female workers, whose num-bers substantially increased between 1990and 2000, showing the femininisation oflow-end service jobs.

30. One survey conducted in Tarlabası in 2008reveals that 64 per cent of the residents lacksocial security (Kentsel Strateji, 2008). Wepredict the percentage to be higher than this.

31. Roughly 400 000 square metres. This consti-tutes about half of the neighbourhood.32. The total number of MHA blocks to be built

in the area is unknown. The project will beimplemented in consecutive stages, mean-ing that as gecekondu s are demolished, newbuildings will be constructed on cleared plots.

33. According to the project catalogue, the projectcomprises 52 per cent residential, 12 per centcommercial, 17 per cent tourist and 14 per centoffice buildings.

34. This meeting took place on 7 November 2008.One of the authors acted as an interpreter forthe group.

35. Tarlabası Renewal Project Catalogue, 2008.36. In their research examining another UTP

implemented in Istanbul, Bartu-Candan andKolluoglu extensively document the processesof displacement and the relocation of povertytriggered by UTPs. They show that a substantialamount of those relocated to public housingunits from a poor

gecekondu area are selling

their units due to economic hardship andmoving to more marginalised locations.

37. Birgün , 28 February 2008; Radikal , 02 March2008, 20 March 2008.

38. Case No. 2007/1203.

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Documents

Jahre Sylvana Kuyucuozlem 2010 Urban Transofrmation Two Cases Istanbul