Political Change in Egypt · Political Change in Egypt Juli 2001 5 Problemstellung und Schlußfolgerungen German Introduction Political Change in Egypt The Parliamentary Elections

SWP-StudieStiftung Wissenschaft und PolitikDeutsches Institut für InternationalePolitik und Sicherheit

Gamal Abdelnasser

Political Change in EgyptThe Parliamentary Elections of 2000 andHorizons of Reform

S 19Juli 2001Berlin

Nachweis in öffentlichzugänglichen Datenbankennicht gestattet.Abdruck oder vergleichbareVerwendung von Arbeitender Stiftung Wissenschaftund Politik ist auch in Aus-zügen nur mit vorherigerschriftlicher Genehmigunggestattet.

© Stiftung Wissenschaft undPolitik, 2001

SWPStiftung Wissenschaft undPolitikDeutsches Institut fürInternationale Politik undSicherheit

Ludwigkirchplatz 3−410719 BerlinTelefon +49 30 880 07-0Fax +49 30 880 [email protected]

GestaltungskonzeptGorbach Büro fürGestaltung und RealisierungBuchendorf

Inhalt

Problemstellung und SchlußfolgerungenGerman Introduction 5

Overview 7

The Formation of the New People’s Assembly2000–2005 10Towards the Rule of Law 10Patterns of Elite Choice 10The Quota for Workers and Peasants 12“Party-ism” 13The Ruling Party 14The Opposition Parties 14The Islamic Current 15Genuine Independents 15Emerging Groups 16Women 16Copts 16Businessmen 17Youth 17Absent ... but present groups 18

Horizons of Political Reform 19Short-term Horizon 19The Economic System and The SupremeConstitutional Court as Agent of Change 19Reform of the Political Parties 20The Party Law 20Civil Society Organizations in a Vacuum 21Long-term Horizon: Constitutional Reforms 23Strengthening the Assembly vis-à-vis the Presidency 23Contentious Issues and Common Demands 23

Concluding Reflections 25

Literature 26

SWP-BerlinPolitical Change in Egypt

Juli 2001

5

Problemstellung und SchlußfolgerungenGerman Introduction

Political Change in EgyptThe Parliamentary Elections of 2000 andHorizons of Reform

Warum sollten die ägyptischen Parlamentswahlen desJahres 2000 eine ausführliche Analyse wert sein?Haben Wahlen in Ägypten sich nicht oft genug alsFarce − man denke vor allem an das 94-Prozent-Ergeb-nisse der letzten Präsidentenwahl − und hat das ägyp-tische Parlament sich nicht als Feigenblatt eines letzt-lich autoritären Regimes erwiesen? Ist nicht die ins-gesamt geringe Wahlbeteiligung bei den Parlaments-wahlen ein klares Zeichen dafür, daß auch die ägyp-tische Bevölkerung diesen Wahlen keine Relevanzzumißt?

Die Realität ist auch hier komplizierter. ÄgyptensParlamentswahlen sind anders als die Präsident-schaftswahlen − oder richtiger: Referenden − Aus-druck politischer Pluralität, die auch echte Konkur-renz zwischen Kandidaten und Parteien zuläßt. DieWahlen sind nicht unbedingt sauber, aber Über-raschungen sind möglich. Das hat die deutlicheNiederlage gezeigt, die die regierende Nationaldemo-kratische Partei (NDP) Präsident Mubaraks bei denWahlen des Jahres 2000 erlitten hat − eine unerwar-tete Niederlage, nachdem die Partei doch noch 1995,mit deutlicher Manipulation, mit über 95 Prozent derSitze aus den Wahlen hervorgegangen war.

Die Niederlage eines großen Teils der NDP-Kandi-daten ist wesentlich das Ergebnis der erstmaligenÜberwachung des Wahlvorgangs durch unabhängigeRichter. Die ägyptische Justiz hat im allgemeineneinen guten Ruf. Daß bei den Wahlen des Jahres 2000nun die Wahllokale unter die Aufsicht von Richterngestellt wurden, ist selbst das Ergebnis einer politisch-juristischen Auseinandersetzung um die Art undWeise, wie das Wahlrecht sich materialisiert, an deroppositionelle Politiker, Parlament und Regierung,der Staatspräsident und die Justiz beteiligt waren. ImErgebnis hat diese Auseinandersetzung die rechts-staatlichen Elemente in Ägypten gestärkt.

Darüber hinaus reflektieren die Parlamentswahlen,und reflektiert auch das Feld der Kandidaten undKandidatinnen, die über die Wahlen ihren Anspruchauf aktive Teilnahme am politischen Entscheidungs-prozeß ausgedrückt haben, sozio-politische Verände-rungen in Ägypten, deren mittelfristige Bedeutung

Problemstellung und Schlußfolgerungen

SWP-BerlinPolitical Change in EgyptJuli 2001

6

nicht zu unterschätzen ist, insbesondere die all-mähliche Ablösung einer Generation, die noch durchden Oktober-Krieg (1973) und die ihm folgendenpolitischen Entwicklungen geprägt war, durch eineneue, die vielleicht am ehesten durch die wirtschaft-lichen Liberalisierungsbemühungen der 90er Jahreund die Durchsetzung von Globalisierungselementengeprägt ist.

Im übrigen ist das ägyptische Parlament auch einForum für Auseinandersetzungen um die mittel- undlangfristigen Entwicklungen des politischen Systems.Die Parlamente arabischer Staaten mögen eine Aus-drucksform autoritärer Herrschaft sein − oft margina-lisiert, oft ohne die Kapazität, um strategische Ent-scheidungen wirksam zu steuern, und oftmals auszweifelhaften Wahlen hervorgegangen −, sie sindaber, wie eine jüngere vergleichende Studie belegt(Baaklini / Denoeux / Springborg 1999), gleichzeitigein unerläßliches Element der Transition von autori-tären zu pluralistischen oder gar demokratischenSystemen, die als Arena politischer Auseinander-setzungen friedliche Lösungen von Konfliktenbefördern und darüber selbst zur Herauskristallisie-rung eines demokratischen Ethos gerade der nach-wachsenden politischen Eliten beitragen können. Diesgilt sicherlich auch für Ägypten. Allerdings wird derPluralisierungsprozeß auf parlamentarischer Ebenedurch negative Entwicklungen konterkariert, die dasVerhältnis von Staat und kritischen Nichtregierungs-organisationen betreffen. Die Verurteilung des renom-mierten Soziologen Saad Eddin Ibrahim im Mai 2001zeigt, daß gerade Aktivisten und Organisationen, dieim Menschenrechtsbereich arbeiten, sehr eindeutig inihre Schranken gewiesen werden.

Für deutsche und europäische Politik läßt sich ausder hier vorgelegten Studie von Gamal Abdel Nasser,einem Mitglied des SWP-Forschungsprojekts zumElitenwechsel in der arabischen Welt, vor allem dieKonsequenz ziehen, daß sich die bilateralen Beziehun-gen mit Ägypten und anderen Staaten des Nahen undMittleren Ostens nicht auf die Exekutiven beschrän-ken sollten. Die Parlamente dieser Länder haben eineFunktion, und ihre Mitglieder sind eher als andereSegmente der politischen Eliten an einer weiterenInstitutionalisierung, Pluralisierung und Demokrati-sierung politischer Prozesse interessiert. Die Positionder Parlamente im politischen System dieser Länderwird stärker werden, wenn auch das Ausland sie ernstnimmt.

Volker Perthes

Overview


Juli 2001

7

Overview

During October and November 2000, in the shadow ofa strained regional atmosphere following the onset ofthe al-Aqsa Intifada in the Palestinian Territories andthe call for an extraordinary Arab summit in Cairo,Egypt held its seventh parliamentary elections sincethe introduction of the multi-party system in 1976.These elections were for the first time carried outunder judicial supervision in three consecutive stagesfrom October 18th to November 14th. During the firsttwo rounds respectively nine governorates wereholding elections. In the third round the inhabitantsof Cairo, Giza and six other governorates were goingto the polls. Over 4,000 candidates representingdiverse political currents, among them members ofthe illegal Muslim Brotherhood who participated asindependent individuals, contested 444 parliamentaryseats in 222 constituencies.

The elections resulted in the replacement of morethan two-thirds of the parliamentarians. 329 mem-bers1 of the outgoing parliament lost their seats, and277 members entered parliament for the first time intheir life. The ruling party witnessed unprecedentedlosses whereas the opposition won 13 per cent of theseats. On its vanguard were members of the bannedMuslim Brotherhood who returned to the arena afterten years of absence. Three Christian candidates wereelected. Female candidates kept their percentage ofparliamentary seats.2 Businessmen and small entre-preneurs, representing various spheres of activity,doubled their seats. In compliance with the Nasseristlegacy that at least 50 per cent of the seats have to beoccupied by peasants and workers, the leading tradeunionists as well as the most important peasantunionists also entered the parliament.3 The only topofficials and ministers who stood for election were thehead of the Presidential Court (Zakariya Azmi), theMinister of Agriculture (Yussuf Wali), the StateMinister of Parliamentary Affairs (Kamal ash-Shazli),the State Minister of Military Production (SayyedMashcal), the Minister for Irrigation (Mahmud Abu

1 317 members of the ruling National Democratic Party, 6 depu-ties of 3 opposition parties and 6 independents. The electionresults are taken from the daily press or from Mustafa 2001.2 Seven women made it to the Assembly.3 173 ‘workers’ and 55 ‘peasants’ were elected.

Zeid), the Minister of Housing (Ibrahim Suleiman), andthe Minister of Economy and Foreign Trade (YussufBoutros Ghali), since they enjoy the highest popularityand held some of the most important portfolios.

The new parliament will have to face a number ofthorny issues which have been postponed severaltimes. Generally speaking, they concern theconstruction of a legal base for economic reforms thatallows the liberalization of labor law and landlord-tenant relations. The solution of these pressing issueswill also pave the way to consider the ratification ofthe partnership agreement with the European Union,which was initialled on January 26, 2001, and isexpected to come into effect in the year 2005. More-over, there are other urgent issues related to reform-ing the status of women, regulating the activities ofnon-governmental organizations and to the questionsof freedom of expression and public ethics.

In light of the last elections, this paper will con-centrate on political reform, elite formation andchange in Egypt. Contrary to widely held assumptions(al-Gamal 1999; Kassem 1999; Kienle 2001), one of thebest mechanisms for understanding changes both inEgyptian society and within the political elites areelections.4 Elections in Egypt disclose the patterns ofrepresentation of every social group, in rural as well asurban areas, and reflect the patterns of choosing anelite. This paper thereby assumes that the parliamentis not cut off from society but is an integral part of thesocial body. Even if the different social and religiousgroups are not represented proportionally in anydemocracy, the composition of parliamentary elites isnot disconnected from society and not from changesin society. Furthermore, it is useful to classify the waysin which elites are chosen according to four criteria.

4 Mostly, two approaches are used in order to study therepresentation of society. The macrological approachpresents a classical analysis of election results; the micro-logical approach starts from one village, one electoral districtor one candidate and generalises its conclusions. This paperis part of a broader project which tries to combine both levelsthrough a database collecting the biographical data from 400ministers and governors between 1971 and 2000 as well asfrom candidates of the parliamentary elections in 1990, 1995and 2000 initiated by the author at the CEDEJ in Cairo.

Overview


8

Historical BackgroundAfter the defeat of the Arab armies in the 1948 waragainst Israel and the establishment of the Israelistate, a political elite emerged led by a new gener-ation of young military officers. They came from themiddle classes and adhered to a pan-Arab, nation-alist ideology. In the majority of the Arab countries,this elite displaced the traditional elite. Its legiti-macy was based on two elements: its successful anti-colonial fight and its major reform projects. A socialcontract emerged that found its expression in, e.g.,quota for workers and peasants in parliamentwhich have been preserved until today.

The legitimacy of these nationalist youngofficers began to fade with the failure of the pan-Arab experiment of unification between Syria andEgypt, i.e., the United Arab Republic that lastedfrom 1958 to 1961 only. The deep conflict betweenthe two camps of “progressive” and “reactionary”countries (i.e., the republics and the monarchies inthe region) that was propagated by Nasseristthinking and which culminated in a violent con-frontation between the two camps in the Yemenwar of 1962-67 also added to the demise of theromanticism of pan-Arab nationalism. The nationalmovement suffered its final blow after the defeat inthe 1967 war. By now it had lost its legitimacy inthe eyes of its people once and for all. The result ofthis defeat, especially in the states surroundingIsrael, was a ‘purification’ of the whole militaryelite. This elite change was at that time labeled“replacing the technocrats with bureaucrats”. Inthe end, constitutional legitimacy replaced therevolutionary legitimacy.

Contrary to the period where the Arab worldwitnessed constant changes of regimes, since 1973

the heads of states have stayed in power for a life-time. However, in the last 25 years their legitimacyhas been more and more challenged by Islamistforces. Internal economic difficulties, foreign debtcrises, the opening-up of the economy to thecapitalistic world market, the widening gap betweenoil-producing and non-oil-producing countries andthe effects of structural adjustment programsprovoked major societal contestations, such as thebread riots in Egypt in 1977 and the riots by policeforces in 1986. All of this strengthened the Islamistmovement. Its moderate wing represented the urbanmiddle classes and its extremist wing accommo-dated the urban poor as well as the poor peasants inthe countryside who had profited at first from thenew upward mobility starting in the post-colonialperiod. The conflict between the Islamists and thesecular nationalists dominated the Arab states allthroughout the nineties.

The transformation entered another stage afterthe Second Gulf War with cautious and slow butsolidly. In its aftermath, Egypt’s foreign militarydebt was canceled completely by the United States,half of the civilian debts were rescheduled, the peaceprocess gained speed with the Madrid conference in1991 and the Islamic revolution in Iran lost moreand more of its appeal for other Muslim countries.These circumstances allowed Egypt to enter a phaseof liberalization and privatization. For this phase tocontinue, two reciprocal factors are essential:Regional stability, especially regarding the peaceprocess with Israel, and an increase in economicresources for development. Without these twofactors the optimistic scenario drawn in this paperwill not come into being.

The first is a geographical one; the second is a classcriterion; the third criterion divides the elites accord-ing to their (religious or political) affiliation; and thefourth criterion asks for what could be called “physi-cal identity”, such as age, gender and ethnic origin.Political representation is based on these four closelyinterwoven criteria of choice. In order to recognizechange, the author suggests comparing Egypt’s politi-cal landscape and the composition of its political elitewith the situation ten, twenty or thirty years agorather than with other countries.

The paper relies on three main sources: the imme-diate observation of political changes in Egypt, the

constitutional and legal provisions as well as pressfiles covering the elections5 and various essays andstudies. It is divided into two main sections. The firstpart is dedicated mainly to topics related to the parlia-ment, its formation, composition and changes thatcan be observed, and its position within the state’sstructure. The second part will then concentrate onpolitical reform issues in the short and the long run.However, borders are not always clear-cut as the issuesdiscussed in both of them are closely interwoven.

5 Al-Ahram and al-Ahram Weekly were regularly evaluatedbetween September 2000 and May 2001.

Towards the Rule of Law


Juli 2001

9

The Formation of the New People’s Assembly 2000–2005

Towards the Rule of Law

Until 2000, the general election code, law 63/1956(qanun bi-tanzim mubasharat al-huquq as-siyasiya), hadassigned the supervision of the voting committees toofficials from the governmental administration andthe public sector units. It was always suspected thatthese officials were biased or yielded to directives andpressures from the administration to falsify theelection results by using voting cards of citizens whohad not gone to the polls. After a judgement of theSupreme Constitutional Court in July 2000 stated thatit was unconstitutional to allow persons other thanmembers of the judicial authority to chair the polls,the election code had to be amended. Consequently,the general election committees in the constituenciesand the sub-committees at each polling station werechaired by judges − who do not practice politics − forthe first time in 2000. The Egyptian judiciary is gener-ally acknowledged as an independent and impartialforce.

Anticipating this judgement, the parliament(People’s Assembly) had already initiated a process toamend the election code. But it rejected the idea thatevery single committee had to be chaired by a judgesince about 10,000 members of the judiciary did notsuffice to preside over 42,000 polling stations. TheAssembly’s viewpoint was supported by the Minister ofJustice. When the opposition suggested holding theelection in multiple stages, the ruling party respondedthat this was not feasible from a security as well asadministrative point of view and that it also violatedthe election law which prescribed to hold the elec-tions simultaneously in all constituencies. TheAssembly then concluded what it considered to be acompromise. It retained the former system that judgespreside over the 222 general election committees (onejudge per constituency) and introduced a new require-ment that every judge be assisted by a group of judgeswho would then move among the polling stations onthe election day in order to supervise the 180 sub-committees in every electoral district. The Assemblydeemed this sufficient to secure the safety and impar-tiality of the election process.

Shortly afterwards, however, the Supreme Consti-tutional Court issued its ruling which rendered theamendment made by the Assembly void. The presidentof the republic then practiced his constitutional rightto issue decrees that have the power of a law andcalled the Assembly for an urgent session to adopt thecourt decision. During this session the parliamentapproved by consensus what it had rejected before: tohold the elections in 26 governorates at three con-secutive stages, to reduce the number of pollingstations to about 16,000 (i.e., one third6) and tomobilize about two-thirds of the judges and one-thirdof the prosecutors (i.e., 6,500 altogether) to chairthem. This process shows how elements of rule of lawstart to gain ground.

Patterns of Elite Choice

There are distinctive differences between con-stituencies in Egypt with regard to the percentage ofvoter turn out. The turn-out declines clearly as wemove from the desert constituencies, the governoratesat the border and rural areas (70% in average) towardsthe capitals of the governorates (about 30%) andfinally to major cities like Cairo and Alexandria (about15%). Even within the urban centers, voter turn-outdrops as we move from the poor, informally-built,popular districts to the middle-class constituencies.Voter turn-out is at its lowest in the upper-classdistricts. The higher the level of urbanization andeducation, the lower the voters’ interest and partici-pation. This inverse relation is often said to reflect thenegative attitude of intellectuals towards the politicalprocess in Egypt: the underlying assumption beingthat participation in the vote would not have anyrelevance for political outcomes.

This voting behavior also indicates that politicalparticipation in Egypt is still exercised collectively inmany places. The high turn-out of voters in rural areasreflects the solidarity of the desert tribes, of theextended family, of the guilds, of the employees in

6 This led to some confusion in the end as voters haddifficulties finding their polling station.



10

LegislationThe People’s Assembly is the genuine but not thesole authority in legislation. The president of therepublic shares this power with the Assembly intwo cases: (a) when the Assembly authorizes him,and (b) when the Assembly is inoperative, i.e., whenit is not convened, or when it has been dissolved.

Also, a constitutional amendment made at thebeginning of the 1980s introduced the principle ofsharing the legislative authority between twochambers. Accordingly, the second chamber, theMajlis ash-Shura (Consultative Council)7 was estab-lished but was only given a consultative role in thefollowing cases: (a) proposals for constitutionalamendments and draft laws complementary to theconstitution, (b) the draft of the country’s generalplan for economic and social development, (c) peacetreaties, alliances and all treaties affecting the terri-torial integrity of the state, (d) draft laws referred tothe Assembly by the president, and (e) whatevermatters referred to the Assembly by the presidentthat relate to the general policy of the state and itspolicy regarding Arab or foreign affairs.

Although the president does not exercise hislegislative power extensively, he exercises it con-cerning the most important laws, i.e., those thatmay be described as complementary to the con-stitution and relate to the redistribution of powerbetween the state institutions. The president’s lawconcerning judicial supervision of elections is anideal example. Here the president intervened toresolve what seemed a conflict of power betweenthe state’s institutions when both the parliamentand the government refused the judicial super-vision of elections. After the court ruling the parlia-mentary term had ended, the Assembly was notconvened, and the president issued his decree, notonly as a legislator but also as an arbitratorbetween the state authorities. Then he called theAssembly for an extraordinary session to adopt thedecree. When the president legislates, the Assemblycannot amend the provisions. The Assembly willeither adopt the law as a whole or revoke it.

major industries and of the immigrants from a com-mon region gathered in semi-urban or urban centers.

7 285 members form the Majlis ash-Shura. Two thirds areelected directly and one third is appointed by the presidentfor a period of six years.

Here, decision-making is still a patriarchal process.The head of a tribe, the father, the elder statesmen,the mayor, the employer or the landowner votes forhis subordinates. The law responds to such customs.It allows the voter to choose his or her constituencyaccording to the birthplace, the principal workplaceor the current domicile. Thus, a voter living in thecapital may vote in a constituency in the countrysideor close to his workplace rather than his residence.Correspondingly, the law allows a candidate to run forelection in a constituency other than that in whichhe/she is registered as a voter. Thus, a resident of anurban area may stand for elections in a rural area.Also, an employer, for example, residing in a richdistrict, may be a candidate in a poor popular areawhere his factory or enterprise is located.

This pattern is reinforced by the fact that theconstituencies’ boundaries are not necessarily con-gruent with geographical units. Areas that aregeographically disconnected may be combinedtogether to tailor a homogenous constituency basedon professional, class or sectarian principles or oncommon origin. The electoral district of the Copticcandidate Yussuf Boutros Ghali, for example, is apatchwork out of several districts with a Copticmajority which are not linked geographically.Similarly, the district won by the Minister of MilitaryProduction is located in the south of Cairo andregroups areas with a high percentage of workersfrom the military industry. The third minister whoran in an artificial electoral district is the Minister ofHousing. His constituency was in Fatimid Cairowhere the biggest area of slums is found.

Participation on the basis of a collective patternalso entails that a few individuals vote on behalf oftheir absent relatives. Thus, the head of a pollingstation in the countryside would feel no inhibitions inallowing a handful of persons to vote on behalf ofhundreds of their relatives, even though this is legallyan act of falsification. However, this falsificationillustrates the paradox of customary law versus civillaw in Egypt more than demonstrating a moral orbehavioral value.

Increasingly, over the last few years there have beenindications that this collective voting pattern is beingdismantled. The most apparent indication is the risingnumber of candidates (in 2000 more than double thenumber than in 1990). This testifies to mountingrivalry amongst candidates belonging to the samesocial group and mostly also to the same party as wellas to a fragmentation of the voting blocks. It also

The Quota for Workers and Peasants


Juli 2001

11

shows an increasing social mobility as a result of amore open system of education on the one hand, andan increasing individualism as a result of the inter-nalization of a capitalist rationale on the other. Thesetwo factors help the individual to emerge from thepatriarchal authority of his or her group. More andmore individuals seek autonomous norms on the basisof which they decide themselves for a candidate. Thesenorms are based much more on the efficiency of acandidate than his age, reputation or social position.New norms for participating in elections emerge andcreate a new ruling elite.

Putting the election under judicial supervision ispart of this change. With a judge presiding the pollingstation, voters will no longer be allowed to exerciseanother voter’s right to vote. Consequently, a can-didate can no longer be sure that he will win if heonly convinces a group’s “patriarch” to vote for him.Rather, he will now have to convince the individualgroup members to do so as well. The credibilityemanating from judicial supervision of electionscould thus encourage more active participation ofmarginalized candidates and voters as well as initiatemore competition and diversity.

For this to happen, however, the reform of theelection code can only be a beginning which needs tobe followed by further steps. First of all, there shouldbe uniform criteria for choosing the constituency inwhich a person votes (preferably the domicile) in orderto update the electoral register, which is at presentmisleading in every aspect. The manual registrationmethod should be substituted by an electronicmethod linked with the national identity number − aprogram which is currently under implementation.8

8 The manual registration method is problematic for threemain reasons. First, information circulates via non-computer-ized channels. Second, several agencies are involved in theprocess: lists of those who were born and those who havedied are passed from the Ministry of Health to the Ministry ofInterior who then passes them to the respective policestations where the voters are expected to register. Similarly,the Ministry of Interior is informed by the Ministry forDefense about current draftees and by the Ministry of Laborabout Egyptian migrant workers abroad, both of which arenot entitled to vote. Third, the possibility of registering eitherat one’s place of birth, one’s principal place of work, or one’splace of residence increases the potential of chaos. Thisprocess leaves lots of space for irregularities in the regis-tration and during the actual voting process to occur.

The Quota for Workers and Peasants

The Constitution grants workers and peasants a quotaof at least 50 per cent of the seats in all legislativecouncils, which is a legacy of the Nasserist socialcontract. The law defines these two groups based onthe source and level of income. A peasant is anindividual who earns his main income from agri-culture and does not possess or rent more than 10feddans (about four hectares). A worker is an indi-vidual who earns his income from practicing lower-skill jobs and whose education certificate when hefirst entered a career was below the university level.The law stipulates that a peasant candidate mustreside in the countryside, and that the workercandidate must be a member of one of the tradeunions of the Egyptian Trade Union Federation, whichis the only central trade union organization in thecountry. Any other candidates are grouped in aresidual category called fi’at.9

The voters can choose two candidates in every con-stituency. In vote counting, the quota is then takeninto consideration. This means that in case two fi’atcandidates win the election and the third position istaken by a worker, either the worker will ascend orthe election will be repeated between the two can-didates running under the fi’at category. A party can-not nominate two candidates from the fi’at but it cannominate two workers.

Trade union leaders are the beneficiaries of thissystem even if they have a very high income. Tradi-tionally, one of the two deputy speakers of thePeople’s Assembly is the Head of the Egyptian TradeUnion Federation. Law No. 36/1972, together with thetrade union law, granted members of this elite theprivilege to count as workers and maintain theirparliamentary seat throughout about thirty years. Acandidate who had started as a simple worker, with-out a university degree and with a limited wage, thenlater obtained a university degree and held a mana-gerial position or worked in trade and finally becamea millionaire would continue to qualify as a ‘worker’.The rationale behind this was to reward the old tradeunion elite through this privilege for their acqui-escence to the process of economic transformationduring the last decades and the 1990s in particularand their contribution to managing social stabilityduring these years.

9 214 candidates entered the current parliament repre-senting this category.



12

Only prior to the 2000 elections, the formerPeople’s Assembly started to rectify the ‘fixing’ of theelectoral category to prevent what was called “uncon-stitutional actions”. This reform (Law 13/2000)intended to change the situation so that the electoralcategory would express the candidates’ actual legaland financial status. It therefore could have openedthe door for displacing many of the present tradeunion leaders. However, many candidates wereallowed to stand for election without changing theirelectoral attributes as ‘workers’ or ‘peasants’. Thus theadministrative courts had to consider hundreds ofappeals against the electoral attribute used. But as thejudgements of the Administrative Court do not havethe power to annul the membership of the People’sAssembly after its formation, suspicions aboutwhether the reform project was abided by continueto persist.

Will the present People’s Assembly witness a judge-ment from the Supreme Constitutional Court invali-dating its formation? Since the court took eight yearsto pass its ruling concerning the supervision bymembers of the judiciary over the election com-mittees, it is not likely that this is going to take placeduring the current parliamentary term. This earlierlong judicial process not only allowed the 1990–1995Assembly (whose formation was contested as unconsti-tutional) to complete its term, but also allowed for theformation of the subsequent Assembly (1995–2000) onthe basis of the same outdated principles. Despite theindependent role that the Court has played in the last20 years, it seems that the Supreme ConstitutionalCourt has acted in accordance with what it perceivedas political priorities of the country.10 Interestingly,for instance, the court acted faster than usual to rulethat the election codes on the basis of which therespective parliaments had been elected were uncon-stitutional when in 1983–1987 and 1987–1990 theassemblies had the highest representation of oppo-sition parties and of the Islamist opposition in par-ticular ever.11 The decisions let in both cases to thedissolution of the assemblies.

What could happen during the current term is thatthe Assembly intervenes to reach a redefinition of

10 For a more detailed discussion of the relation between theSupreme Court and politics in Egypt see Abdelnasser 1999.11 Due to the electoral regulations of the time, the Islamistsran as candidates on the lists of other opposition parties.Al-Wafd and the Muslim Brotherhood had 13 per cent of theAssembly’s seats in 1983–1987, and the Islamist alliance had22 per cent of the Assembly’s seats in 1987–1990.

both ‘workers’ and ‘peasants’ and thereby reconstitutepart of its legitimacy. This redefinition should con-form to the rising level of qualification of the laborforce. With the restructuring of technical education, anew spectrum of workers and of peasants with highereducation and income has emerged. A redefinition ofthe ‘worker’ and ‘peasant’ category would heavilyinfluence the composition of the next parliament andreflect a new social contract.

The Assembly and the JudiciaryThe lower courts do not have the power to abrogatethe formation of the Assembly. As soon as theMinistry of Interior announces the election resultsand the deputies take the legal oath, the Assemblybecomes the sole authority to resolve issues relatedto the validity of its membership. Consequently,neither the administrative courts’ rulings nor thoseof the court of appeal on objections to the electionprocedures can automatically invalidate the mem-bership of the deputies. These judgements becomemere reports submitted to the Assembly which mayadopt them and vote to abrogate the membershipby the majority of two-thirds, or disregard themcompletely.

The Assembly’s negative stance concerningrulings against dozens of its members during allthe previous formations had negative effects on itslegitimacy. In 2000 the Assembly regained some ofits credibility due to the judicial supervision of theelectoral process. However, the objections raisedlately concerning the electoral attributes of the can-didates are no less important.

“Party-ism”

Rotation of power between the competing politicalparties is not on the reform agenda in the foreseeablefuture, because this would necessitate the amendmentof the constitution which gives the president alonethe power to form the government irrespective of aparty’s share of seats in the Assembly. It is a govern-ment of the president not of the parties. But in thelight of the election results, several political partiesare expected to play a more important role in politicallife. This will happen by disengaging the ruling partyapparatus from the apparatus of the state and bybroadening the participation and representation ofthe opposition parties in the latter.

“Party-ism”


Juli 2001

13

The Ruling Party

The ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), chairedby the president of the republic, seems to be sufferingfrom a “crisis of abundance”. It is the sole party thathas candidates in all 444 seats. Wherever more partymembers wanted to run for elections, they had topresent themselves as independent candidates. In2000, the party’s candidates won only 38 per cent ofthe parliamentary seats against 47 per cent for theindependents. This was the first time that the “party’sindependent candidates” overran the party’s can-didates. Those “independents” do not owe theirsuccess to the party. One may therefore interpret thisas an indicator of the party’s deteriorating popularity.The voters have punished the party by giving theirvotes to candidates not chosen by the NDP. It is alsopossible to consider the success of the independentsover the party candidates as a sign of the people’sdesire for change, in spite of the party’s announce-ment that it had already changed 40 per cent of itscandidates; or it could have been an endeavor on thepart of the voters to test the credibility of these elec-tions. The observer may even deduce all the abovetogether.

The NDP’s reactions to the election results suggestthat the party must have come to similar conclusions.What was called in the press “a humiliating defeat”and “a party out of touch” was a starting-point for theNDP to replace its second and third-rank functionariesand introduce internal reforms, especially after 10 ofthe party’s local secretaries and eight of its heads ofparliamentary committees had lost their seats. Thesereforms are conducted on two levels. On a verticallevel, local leaders are chosen more and more throughelections on the grassroots level instead of beingappointed by the central leadership. On a horizontallevel, the party’s apparatus is separated from the stateapparatus so that the party will appear as an organi-zation autonomous from the state. Thus it is currentlyunder discussion that officials should no longeracquire party membership automatically by virtue oftheir executive positions. 12 Similarly, the separationof the NDP chairmanship from the presidency of thestate is debated. Before Camp David (1978) whenAnwar Sadat decided to take over the leadership of the

12 Currently whoever would be appointed, for instance,director of an administrative unit, would by mere virtue ofoccupying this position automatically become a member ofthe NDP if he has not been a member earlier.

NDP, the prime minister not the president chaired theArab Socialist Party (the predecessor of the presentNDP). In the context of the tremor caused by Sadat’svisit to Jerusalem, the beginning of the first CampDavid talks and the early signs of the Islamic Revo-lution in Iran, it was decided that the presidenthimself should chair the ruling party.

The Opposition Parties

The opposition parties except the Islamic currentseem to suffer from “scarcity”. Only three of the 14opposition parties stood for election in 2000. But eventhey were unable to put forth candidates all over thecountry even if we add the independents adhering tothe different currents of the opposition.13 The liberalWafd party could only nominate a candidate in 60 percent of the electoral districts and finally won sevenseats. The leftist socialist current, with its two wings,the Tagammu party and the Nasserist Party, had evenmore problems covering the whole country. TheTagammu nominated candidates in 10 per cent of theconstituencies and won six seats in the current parlia-ment. The Nasserist party covered six per cent andwon two seats. Two indicators show their weakposition: First, the total number of their parliamen-tary seats (15) did not increase over three successiveparliamentary terms. Second, they won fewer seatsthan the independent candidates unofficially runningfor the banned Muslim Brotherhood (17 seats).

All the opposition parties suffer from a weakorganizational structure. They lack an effective basisin the governorates and local communities. Theiractivities are limited to their party headquarter officesin Cairo and Alexandria and sometimes do not exceedthe respective press activity. They may be described asparties encapsulated in their newspapers and partyoffices. One could also describe them as “newspaperswith a party”, rather than political parties with anewspaper. Their most effective role lies in high-lighting the necessity to abrogate the state of emer-gency. After the elections, also the opposition calledfor new methods to choose and renew their leader-ship.

13 The independents form over 75 per cent of the candidates.



14

The Islamic Current

During the 1990s, after in the 1980s Egypt hadwitnessed the apex of Islamist influence and itshighest representation in parliamentary councils sofar (five parliamentary seats from 1987 to 1990), thestate launched a comprehensive campaign against thethree wings of the Islamic current: the MuslimBrotherhood, the Labor Party, and the Gama’atIslamiyya. In addition to the military campaignagainst armed Islamist groups and the arrest ofthousands of group members under the emergencylaw, the state hampered the representation of theMuslim Brotherhood in all elected councils (such asthe professional syndicates, the parliament, the tradeunions, the local councils, etc.). The Labor party,known for its Islamic orientation, was subject to con-tinuous security and judicial chases. This culminatedin a decision of the Parties’ Affairs Committee tofreeze the party’s activities and close down its head-quarters before the elections in 2000 in order toprevent it from participating. It seemed that by theend of the 90s some reconciliation between the stateand the radical fundamentalist groups had takenplace as some of their arrested members were releasedand the Gama’at Islamiyya, which is the largestradical group, announced a cease-fire in March 1999.

It was within this framework that the outlawedMuslim Brotherhood returned to participate in the2000 parliamentary elections. The elections took placewhile the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood weretried by a military court in what is known as the“professional-syndicates lawsuit”. Therefore their can-didates ran as independents and originated mostlyfrom the second rank. For the first time the MuslimBrotherhood nominated a woman in order to counteraccusations that they underrate the women’s status.In spite of the chases made by the state security prose-cutor (an extraordinary investigation organ) and thearrest of hundreds of members of the Muslim Brother-hood during the election campaigns, 17 candidateswere elected into the new parliament. They form thelargest opposition block with more seats than all ofthe “legal” opposition parties together. They testifyoverwhelming vitality and represent the most seriousthreat to the ruling party. In case the state of emer-gency is abrogated or the Muslim Brotherhoodbecomes a legal party, it will pose a serious challengeto the political regime and its credibility.

Genuine Independents

Twenty-one parliamentary members have not alignedwith any party, and therefore are referred to here as‘genuine independents’. But observers classify themaccording to their political leanings. Fourteen − in-cluding 10 businessmen − are close to the liberal Wafdparty. Five are close to the Nasserists and two arecloser to the Islamists.

The political chart of the parliament may thus befinally read as follows: the NDP comes in the vanguardwith 388 seats (87%) which includes those NDPmembers that had run as independent candidates,followed by the liberals (22 seats, 5%), the Islamiccurrent (19 seats, 4%) and finally the leftist parties (13seats, 3%).14 Consequently, the opposition has 54 seatsor over 10 per cent, which is constitutionally suf-ficient to demand a motion of no confidence againstthe government or one of its ministers. If theopposition would unite for the first time since theestablishment of the Republic, this would be anunprecedented but possible move.

The Assembly and the GovernmentThe Assembly acts in a supervisory role vis-à-vis thegovernment through a specialized technical agency(al-jihaz al-markazi lil-muhasabat) that politicallybelongs to the Assembly, but does not have theright to topple the government. The presidentsolely has the power to form the government or todissolve it. But the Assembly has the right to make amotion of no confidence against the government orone of its ministers when this is demanded by onetenth of its members. If the motion is adopted bysimple majority in the Assembly, the matter will besubmitted to the president to resolve it. He may dis-solve the government, dismiss the minister or referthe matter to a public referendum. If the result ofthe referendum is in support of the government,the Assembly will be considered dissolved.

14 Two parliamentary seats are still vacant as the electionresults of one district have not yet been published (for back-ground see next page), which is why the percentages givenhere only amount to 99 per cent. The calculations also do notinclude the 10 parliamentarians that are appointed by thepresident.

Emerging Groups


Juli 2001

15

Emerging Groups

Women

The Egyptian constitution has granted women thepolitical rights of candidacy and voting since 1956. Aquota for women’s participation in the People’sAssembly was determined only once. During the 1979–1984 term, women were assigned 35 seats in chosenconstituencies. This was part of a package of lawsaimed at improving the status of women. The packagecarried the name of the former First Lady of Egypt,Gihan Sadat, and was revoked quickly after a courtruling stated that these laws were not constitutional −under pressure from wide opposition in social andpolitical circles reflecting, among others, the growinginfluence of the Islamic current.

In the year 2000, the status of women resurfaced asone of the major topics of the political agenda. Itstarted with the promulgation of Law No. 1/2000 thatamended the personal status law and for the first timegranted women the right to ask for divorce withoutspecified reasons before the court (al-Khul’a).15 Passingthe law underwent serious obstacles after a severeconflict of opinions in elite circles and public opinion.The year ended with the fomation of the NationalCouncil for Women, a high-level organization thatcombines governmental and non-governmentalwomen’s organizations and aims to promote thestatus of women.

Women’s participation in the 2000 elections waslower than expected. About one fourth of the con-testing 96 women were party members. This ratiocorresponds to the frequency of party membershipamong the candidates in general. Although only sevenwomen became members of the parliament and allbelong to the National Democratic Party, the fact thatthey were elected in poor urban and semi-urban areasis meaningful. In spite of the small number of womenin the parliament, the fact that the second DeputySpeaker is a woman from the fi’at is also significant.

The only electoral district in which the legislativeauthority has not published the result so far isAlexandria’s al-Raml district, where the first female

15 However, the woman in exchange has to return the bridalmoney she has received upon marriage to the husband andalso has to renounce some of her legal rights, as e.g. mainte-nance. In practice, this limits the circle of women who canafford a divorce.

candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood was nomi-nated.16 Most observers are sure that this candidate,Gihan al-Halafawi, will win. In this case an Islamistwoman would sit in the Egyptian parliament for thefirst time.17

Copts18

The constitution does not define a quota for Copts inelections. This has been consensus since the adoptionof the first constitution in 1923. The latter was draftedafter the 1919 national revolution whose most impor-tant slogans were “Religion is for god and the home-land is for all” and “The unity of the crescent and thecross”.

In fact, Copts have noticeably withdrawn frompolitical life since the beginning of the religious strifethat started in the mid 1970s and reached its climaxduring the 1980s. Although this discord has notvanished completely, such events have become sparse,occurring only at long intervals during the 1990s.Accordingly, signs of improvement in the Copts’participation in political life during the 1990s can beobserved. The call of the Coptic-orthodox pope thatCoptic physicians shall participate in the elections ofthe physicians’ syndicate played an important role inthis respect. It was followed by their visible partici-pation in the parliamentary elections in 1995. The2000 elections witnessed for the first time in 25 yearsthe election of three out of 74 Coptic candidates.19

This may be an indication that the Copts will return tothe political arena and it may be the beginning of nor-malization between the two religious groups in Egypt.

The liberal Wafd party nominated 12 Copticcandidates. It was followed by the leftist Tagammuparty which nominated four and the National Demo-cratic Party which nominated one Coptic candidate.The three successful Coptic candidates all belong tothe business community. The candidate of the NDP is

16 According to newspaper reports the Muslim Brotherhoodalso tried to nominate a Coptic candidate but this finally didnot happen.17 It is remarkable that the result has not even been pub-lished as by June 2001.18 Following the mainstream discourse in Egypt the termCopt is used here to denote the whole of the Christian popu-lation in Egypt although there also is a minority of adherentsto other Christian confessions. Copts had so far mostly beenappointed directly by the president.19 One-third of the Coptic candidates were party memberswhile the rest were independents.



16

the current Minister of Economy and Foreign Tradecoming from one of the oldest Coptic familiesinvolved in political life, Yussuf Boutros Ghali. Thesecond businessman, Mounir Fakhri Abdelnour, is theGeneral Secretary of the Wafd party. The third, RamyLakah, is one of the most eminent businessmen whoacquired the Egyptian nationality besides his Lebaneseorigin and ran as an independent candidate.

The current reintegration of the Copts in the politi-cal arena is thus given a major impetus by members ofthe business community. But the Copts’ represen-tation in the People’s Assembly had never actuallyceased. The president has the right to appoint 10members to the parliament. Part of them were alwayschosen from among Copts and women. This yearHosni Mubarak appointed four Copts and fourwomen. It has also been a tradition that an appointedCoptic member of the parliament chairs the Commit-tee of Defense and National Security.

Businessmen

During the mid-1980s, about a decade after the firstmeasures of economic liberalization and privatizationhad been introduced, the first generation of big busi-nessmen started to emerge. Another decade later, theyalso began to emerge as political actors as theybecame more and more involved in parliamentarypolitics. Generally speaking, they substituted thosemembers of parliament who had held positions in thepublic sector.

The participation of businessmen in elections oftenraises the issue of the influence of capital on policiesas well as on voters. The donations made during cam-paigning were estimated to have amounted to aboutUS$ 1 billion. This revived a stagnant market, butthose donations were not free from suspected briberyand purchases of parliamentary immunity tocamouflage corruption. Shortly before the electionsand during the preparations for candidacy, a firstinstance criminal court passed a sentence in one ofthe most serious corruption cases that shook businessand political life. About 23 businessmen, includingthree members of the previous parliament and high-ranking officials, were accused of having embezzledabout 11 billion Egyptian Pounds (about US$ 3billion). The sentences gave credibility to the govern-ment’s slogan of “chasing the corrupted regardless oftheir influential positions”.

Businessmen won 25 seats in the 2000 elections.About 50 per cent of them (12 seats) had been runningunder the umbrella of the ruling party, while threehad stood for the liberal Wafd party and 10 asindependents (representing about 40 per cent of allseats won by independents). The Left and the MuslimBrotherhood did not nominate any businessmen torepresent them. Furthermore, 52 small entrepreneurswere also elected.

The double nationality carried by some electedbusinessmen and two ministers was a ground forobjections before the administrative judicial authority(the State Council). A sentence was passed in firstinstance the membership of one parliamentarianshould be revoked because his second nationalityobliged him to waive his original Egyptian nationality.The sentence that was based upon the assumptionthat “double nationality means double loyalty” raisedcontroversy in legal and political circles. It has beenthe first of its kind since the amendment of theNationality Law (by Law No. 26/1975) which allowed toacquire the nationality of another country. Prior tothe said amendment, citizens were forbidden toacquire a second nationality and those who did wereconsidered traitors.

Youth

Several factors led to the emergence of a new gener-ation with higher skills and more pragmatism indecision making. Since the mid-1970s efforts wereexerted to develop education structures and curriculaas well as new criteria for employment. Several sectorsof the domestic and foreign labor markets wereopened during the last 25 years, and the state hasgiven directives since the beginning of the 1990s toestablish a second echelon of leadership in all sectors.Since, there has been a visible rejuvenation of leader-ship in both private business and the public sector.

At the political level, the youth secretariats inaddition to those of women, peasants and workersrepresent the cornerstones of the political parties’structures, especially of the NDP. The most importantissue of the election campaigns was the issue ofunemployed university graduates. Youth secretariatsactively directed programs to train young politicalcadres not only in the parties but also in universities,trade unions, professional syndicates and non-govern-mental organizations. These efforts started to bear

Emerging Groups


Juli 2001

17

fruit during the last elections. Younger and more vitalfaces replaced almost two-thirds of the previousAssembly. Alone 100 out the NDP’s 444 nominatedcandidates were younger than 42 years.20 Thus thewidespread image of a rigid and immobile Egyptianpolitical elite firmly rooted in the apparatus of anauthoritarian state conceals the strong mobility of anew generation striving to be a major player inEgyptian politics.

Absent ... but present groups

Although the law, not the constitution, still deniesmembers of the army, police, intelligence agencies,diplomats and members of the judicial authority theright to vote or stand for election as long as they are inoffice, these groups are conspicuously present. Incampaigning, one frequently finds signs with titlessuch as “Elect Brigadier General...” or “Vote for Coun-selor...” without any reference that these are formertitles. In the 2000 elections, 21 former police officers,six former army officers and three former judgesentered the parliament.

20 There are no statistical data available concerning the ageof the actually elected members of the Assembly.

Horizons of Political Reform


18


The horizons of political reform presented here arelinked with two different time frames. The first isurgent and concerns changes within the framework ofthe present constitution. The second is anticipatedand regards changes of the constitution itself. Theagenda of reform departs from demands of theopposition as voiced at different occasions and iswoven into a reading of what is likely to happen inEgypt’s political arena in the nearer future. Theagenda covers two main fields of action: the statestructure, i.e., the relationship between state andsociety on the one hand, and the state identity, i.e., thesocioeconomic foundation of the regime on the other.

Short-term Horizon

The reform agenda on the short term may be sum-marized as follows: the reform of the economicsystem, structural reform of the political parties,amendment of the law for political parties and the lawregulating NGOs as well as promoting the citizens’participation in elections and civic organizations.These reforms need to accommodate the Islamiccurrent which represents the major challenge to theregime and whose strive for political activity shouldbe accounted for in the party law as well as in the lawregulating civil society activities.

At the political level, the declaration of the state ofemergency with its arsenal of exceptional laws andinstitutions, is an insurmountable obstacle on theroad towards genuine pluralization and democrati-zation. The institutions of the state agree that thecurrent state of emergency is necessary due to theunstable regional circumstances and the cold peacewith Israel.21 Nevertheless the process of pluralizationis going on even under these conditions.

In the short run, the Supreme Constitutional Courtemerges as the most important agent of change. This

21 Correspondingly, the Supreme Court in 1992 ruled thatthe president’s power to declare and renew the state ofemergency is constitutional. Also the NDP-dominated parlia-ment always agrees to a renewal of the state of emergency,despite the resistance of the opposition parties which usuallyvote against the renewal.

is a dialectical process in which the Supreme Courtlegitimizes certain laws that contradict the con-stitution. The Court thus undermines the respectiveconstitutional provisions and thereby creates thenecessity for the construction of new constitutionalnorms.

The Economic System and The SupremeConstitutional Court as Agent of Change

The economic reform issue provides good examples toillustrate this role of the Supreme ConstitutionalCourt. Thus in one of its rulings the Court interpretedthe constitution in favor of privatization. The decisiongranted constitutional legality to governmentmeasures in this direction although they are in clearcontradiction with the constitutional provisions thatprescribe the public sector as the main base for alleconomic development. Another ruling shook theprinciple of fixed contracts in the fields of real-estateleasing and labor law. The contracting system thatprevailed between the owner and the tenant of agri-cultural lands or real estate for commercial orresidency purposes was based on three principles:(a) the state determined a rental value on the basis ofthe real estate tax, (b) the period of lease was infinite,and (c) the lease agreement was inheritable. TheCourt’s judgement abrogated the last principle inorder to ease the way for the liberalization of leasingcontracts. This will affect the positions of many socialgroups on the one hand, and will introduce a differentformula for ownership and possession on the other.

In the same way, the rules that labor contracsbetween the state and its employees were based onbegan to change gradually from the state’s commit-ment to employ any university graduate to employ-ment through contests. Labor law also changed fromresolute regulations that realize job security for theemployee and adopt seniority as a basis for promotion,to more flexible regulations that take efficiency andindividual initiative as a basis for promotion. How-ever, wages and salaries are still restrained. In thiscontext another ruling of the Constitutional Court

Short-term Horizon


Juli 2001

19

stated that it is unconstitutional to fix a maximumlevel for the compensation of the top management inthe public sector companies. Similarly, it ruled that itis against the constitution to deprive an employee ofthe right to receive a pension and salary at the sametime.

Reform of the Political Parties

In order to give an impetus to the structural reform ofthe current political parties, the president of therepublic will have to give up chairing the ruling partyand to restore the situation that existed at the begin-ning of the experiment of pluralism in 1976 when theprime minister, not the president, chaired the rulingparty. It would be a beginning of both separating theparty apparatus from the state apparatus and thewithdrawal from the one-party profile. This reformrequires, as mentioned earlier, horizontal and verticalaction. Horizontally, the party membership should bemade autonomous and should not be gained just byvirtue of certain executive positions. Several stepswere made in this direction. Vertically, the partyleaders should be chosen by elections from thebottom, not imposed by the top. Steps taken in thisdirection have been slow so far. However, there weresigns of intentions to introduce change after theelection in 2000.

The major opposition parties, namely the liberalWafd, the Tagammu’ and the Nasserist are sufferingfrom the same symptoms. Their leadership has notchanged for decades and sometimes the party’s chair-man is even elected for lifetime. Old renownedfamilies or elder-men networks determine the leader-ship. Promotion happens through appointment fromthe top rather than by elections from the bottom.Party meetings are sparse and irregular. Partyactivities are limited to their newspapers and partyheadquarters.

But this is only the surface of a quiet river thathides the apparent agility and vitality of a younggeneration, i.e., those who are between 30 and 42years of age. A look at the second echelon of leader-ship will not miss those young people and new cadreswho have put on their agenda to remedy the afore-mentioned symptoms. The remedy lies in moreinternal democracy, reducing favoritism andrewarding efficiency as well as independent initiative

and finally aiming at installing a team of leadersinstead of resorting to one charismatic leader.

This emergent elite did not come from a vacuum. Itis the output of programs prepared by all parties aswell as other institutions during the 1990s in whatseemed a general approach towards building a secondechelon of leadership. These cadre-building programshave now begun to bear fruit. The election of theleadership of the Wafd last year symbolized thisprocess. After the death of its lifelong leader Fuad SirajEddin who was one of the most eminent politicalleaders before the 1952 revolution, the party’s youngsecond echelon of leadership played a decisive part inthe multi-candidates election. They successfullybacked a middle-aged professor of law against thebrother of the deceased leader who is almost his age.The third candidate was also a descendent of one ofthe oldest families known for their historical supportfor the Wafd party.

Internal reform is necessary as an initial step on theroad towards democratization especially for the rulingparty. No less important is the retreat of the rulingparty from the state and the retreat of the oppositionparties from their newspapers and party headquartersto broaden their bases and “renew their blood”. Thismakes it necessary for the state to relax its tight gripon political action in the universities, trade unionsand NGOs.

The Party Law

One of the most apparent features of the Egyptianparty system is the abundant number of inactiveparties on the one hand, and the limitations andunlawful character of the Islamic parties on the other.The law that regulates the foundation of politicalparties is one of the main reasons for this status quo.The law delegates the power of issuing party licencesand monitoring their political activities to an adminis-trative committee (the Parties Affairs Committee).22

This entitles the committee to freeze a party’sactivities and funds and to close down party head-quarters. Although the parties have the right to chal-lenge the administrative committee’s decisions before

22 The six-member committee is chaired by the Speaker ofthe Shura Council and it comprises the Minister of Justice,the Minister of Interior, the Minister for ParliamentaryAffairs as well as two former judicial consultants chosen bythe president.



20

the administrative judicial authority (the StateCouncil), the council’s decisions are not binding to thecommittee. It can refer the investigation to the PublicSocialist Prosecutor who will undertake action againstthese parties before the exceptional Court of Values.Both institutions belong to the extraordinary judicialsystem and were established in the 1980s.

The committee issued licences for parties that cannow easily be called “parties on paper”. The biggerparties call them “in-vitro parties” because they hadan “unnatural” birth. These parties are 11 out of the15 existing parties. On the other hand the committeewas close-fisted in issuing licences for political move-ments that are indeed present in the political arena.The Nasserist party for example was not able to obtaina licence until 1992, after an administrative courtruling and after the committee refrained from filingaction before the Court of Values.23

Also the al-Wasat party, which observers regard asone attempt of parts of the Muslim Brotherhood toenter the political scene, has been waiting for alicence for more than five years.

In July 2000, the Parties Affairs Committee issued adecree freezing the activities of the Labor party,known for its Islamist tendencies, after it hadlaunched a press campaign against a novel publishedby the Ministry of Culture. The campaign accused thisnovel of being an offense to Islam and incited a violentwave of student protests. The committee’s decision,which is still in force, prevented the Labor party fromnominating its candidates for the elections. Some ofthem stood as independent candidates, similar tomembers of the Muslim Brotherhood that has not yetapplied for obtaining a licence to establish a legalpolitical party. They seem to be satisfied at presentwith testing the intentions through the al-Wasat partyafter the Supreme Constitutional Court in 1992 hadrejected a claim filed by the Brotherhood against itsunconstitutional dissolution in 1954.24

But there are indications that the Muslim Brother-hood is willing to integrate into the party system. Forexample, the movement changed its motto from the1980s, “Islam is the Solution”, to “Reform throughRespect of the Constitution in Text and Spirit” during

23 All parties that successfully applied for a licence so farhad to go through the same process of rejection by the com-mittee in the first place which then was revoked by a rulingof the administrative court.24 The Court saw that the dissolution decision preceded thepromulgation of the constitution that governs the Court(1971).

the 2000 election. In addition, the method of partici-pation and the declarations of the Brotherhood duringthe last elections indicated their desire for recon-ciliation. As a matter of fact, the legal accommodationof the Brotherhood remains a big challenge. In thiscontext, demands to amend the party law is part ofthe agenda to release the administration’s grip ongranting licences for new parties and monitoringexisting ones. A law amendment should also establishnew rules to sift out the idle parties and allow for aspace of action for active underground movementsthat aim to work publicly.

Will it be possible to return to the rules that werein force at the beginning of the multi-party system?According to these rules, any party seeking a licencehad to receive the approval of at least 20 members ofparliament. This was the case with the Wafd party andthe Labor party. Or, will the whole subject be leftentirely in the hands to the judiciary, as was the casewith the Nasserist party that was only establishedafter a court ruling? Or, will new rules be sought?Whatever the case might be, what is needed is to liftthe trusteeship of the administrative committee. TheSupreme Constitutional Court may play a decisive rolehere again as it did when in the early 1990s itabolished the condition that a party has to approvethe peace agreement with Israel.

Civil Society Organizations in a Vacuum

The Egyptian field of non-governmental activities com-prises three categories: In addition to hundreds ofnon-governmental organizations (NGOs) acting insocial and religious care under the financial andadministrative auspices of the government, twoparallel categories of organizations emerged duringthe 1990s. One of them is a semi-formal group oforganizations acting in social fields such as mother-hood, childhood, the family and woman under thepatronage of the First Lady. They rely on their owninitiatives for financing their activities, especiallyfundraising in the Egyptian business community. Thelast, most autonomous category includes dozens oforganizations that were established successively sincethe end of the 1990s, works outside the official legalframe that has been set up for NGOs and embraceshundreds of activists. In order to avoid strict financialand administrative supervision by the government,these organizations do not register under law No. 32/

Short-term Horizon


Juli 2001

21

1964 but as civil companies. They are involved insocial, political and trade union activities and arefinanced from abroad. Most human rights organiza-tions and research institutes fall into this category.Their foreign funding amounts to about 10 per cent ofthe total foreign grants to the private sector, i.e.,totalling US$ 30 million (Ibrahim 2000).

In order to unite these different organizationalvarieties of NGOs under a common umbrella, a jointcommittee combining representatives from thegovernment and from these organizations was formedfor consultation and negotiation on a draft law. Whenthe new law governing NGOs was issued on May 17th,1999, it caused a split between these organizationsand inside each of them. Supporters found that it waspossible to work within the limits set by the new law,while the opponents held the opinion that the lawwould impose governmental trusteeship over NGOsand that they would have to subject to the govern-ment’s financial and administrative supervision. Theyalso saw that the law’s provision stating that NGOsshould not be involved in activities allocated forpolitical parties and trade unions would allow for awide range of interpretations and put the NGOs underdirect threat. However, this law was enforced for a fewmonths only because the Supreme ConstitutionalCourt then ruled it unconstitutional. The decision wasbased on procedural grounds. The court consideredthat the law should have been submitted to the Majlisash-Shura prior to its adoption and issuance. TheNGOs are now acting in a vacuum.

The relationship between the government andNGOs working in the fields of research and humanrights has in general not been very good. It was domi-nated by mutual mistrust, and security as well asjudicial actions were taken against some of theirleaders occasionally during the last years. In 2000,tensions have increased and the situation has becomeeven more polarized. Some of the NGOs working insocial care started to cooperate more and more withother semi-formal organizations under the umbrellaof the National Councils for women, child- andmotherhood. Other NGOs faced mounting pressureconcerning their research, human rights activities andfinancing. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Chairman of the IbnKhaldun Center for Development Studies, 25 was

25 The Ibn Khaldun Center’s main concerns have alwaysbeen to promote democracy and civil society groups. In thiscontext, the Center addressed sensitive issues as the status ofCopts and monitored the 1995 parliamentary elections. Thecharges ranged from accepting funding from the EU without

detained in July 2000 and tried before the SupremeState Security Court later that year. As a professor atthe American University in Cairo, and an inter-nationally renowned sociologist, his case has attractedinternational attention.

Allegations and counter-allegations in the NGOfield have always been connected with two principalissues: (a) foreign funding and monitoring, and(b) limits of action with regard to issues of nationalconcern. A law that deals with these two points isneeded urgently in order to finally regulate and unifythe legal bases for the action of all civil society organi-zations in Egypt. The emergence of a draft law willdepend to a large extent on negotiations betweenthree parties: the government, the donor communityand the NGOs.

Several thousand of NGO cadres have proven theirefficiency during the 1990s. The NGO elite thenprovided the leaders of the newly created semi-formalorganizations. New programs in fields as literacy,micro-credits for the poor, social care for aged orhandicapped people and the promotion of women

permission and mismanagement of funds to forging electionregistration cards and tarnishing Egypt’s image abroad. SaadEddin Ibrahim was sentenced to seven years of hard labor inMay 2001. Four other associates of the Ibn Khaldun Centerwere sentenced to hard labor ranging from four to five years,while the sentences of one year of hard labor for 21 staffmembers of the Center were suspended. The court’sreasoning has not been published as by May 2001 and possi-bilities of appeal are still examined. The judgement provokedcritical reactions both inside and outside Egypt by politicians,newspapers and alike, and the case is being fiercely discussedamong the different political currents in Egypt. The case isalso especially delicate because Saad Eddin Ibrahim posessesthe American citizenship aside the Egyptian one. For moredetailed information on the case see press coverage, e.g.Nadia Abou El-Magd, “Seven Years”, in Al-Ahram Weekly Online24–30 May 2001.In this context, it is important to note the sensitivity ofexternal intervention through statements of condemnationor other measures. Cases like the one of Saad Eddin Ibrahimare very often considered to be internal affairs that reflectinner-Egyptian struggles over values etc. not only by theauthorities, but also and maybe even more so by society.Thus, the very same Egyptian human rights organisationsthat unanimously condemned the ruling against Saad EddinIbrahim, also unanimously boycotted the Committee forReligious Freedoms of the US Congress that visited Egypt inMarch 2001. The Committee had been sent to Egypt toinvestigate the status of Copts in Egypt and then to report tothe Congress who was to decide about the amount of aidgiven to Egypt. The visit was seen as counterproductive ratherthan beneficial for the delicate relations between state andsociety.



22

were launched. The new law should empower theNGOs to take their own financial and administrativedecisions without centralized control. The new lawshould also create possibilities of participation forhuman rights and trade union activists who haveeffectively accumulated valuable experiences ofpolitical engagement in domestic and foreign affairs.Plurality and autonomy are beneficial and are even aprecondition for building confidence between thegovernment and the NGOs, regrouping a diversity ofliberal, Islamic and leftist currents. These NGOs areneeded by the state as much as they are needed bysociety.

Long-term Horizon: Constitutional Reforms

Strengthening the Assembly vis-à-vis the Presidency

Taking an optimistic approach, one can expect thatthe composition of the next parliament (2005–2010) isgoing to change even more substantially. It is likelythat the NDP, for the first time, will not gain a two-thirds majority. This would be a good base for con-stitutional reforms. A two-third majority is necessary,for example, to nominate a candidate for the presi-dency. The next parliament will find on the top of itsagenda the renewal of the president’s term foranother period (2006–2012) and it may determine thenumber of presidency terms which is unlimited sofar.26 Another issue up for reform is the currentsystem for the election of a president which is still byreferendum, i.e., with only one candidate. Instead,there should be direct, multi-candidate elections. Bothissues need the amendment of the constitution. Asidefrom the Assembly, the Majlis as-Shura will have toplay a major role in this respect.

Contentious Issues and Common Demands

Since its amendment at the beginning of the 1980s,the constitution that determines the guiding prin-ciples of the country’s economic order puts moreemphasis on ‘democracy’ than on ‘socialism’. Never-

26 Anwar Sadat changed the previous provision whichlimited the presidency to two successive periods. He justifiedthis amendment, which he did not live long enough tobenefit from, by the need to stabilize the top authorityduring a stage of transformation.

The Parliament and the PresidentAccording to the constitution, the Assemblynominates the president with at least a two-thirdmajority. The presidential candidate then has to beconfirmed in a public referendum. With the samemajority the Assembly may accuse the president ofhigh treason or charge him with any criminal act,delegate the legislative power to him and pass lawswhich the president has rejected and returned tothe Assembly. The president, on the other hand,may dissolve the assembly after this has been con-firmed in a public referendum. He can also refermatters of the country’s supreme interests to areferendum. In practice however, PresidentMubarak, who has been in power since 1981, is notonly the president of the republic but at the sametime chairman of the NDP which has neveroccupied less than 80 per cent of the parliamentaryseats since the introduction of the multipartysystem in 1976.

theless, it took the government and the Left, asrepresented especially in extra-parliamentary insti-tutions like the trade unions, about 10 years to reachan agreement on economic liberalization and privati-zation programs. The motto of the Left changed from“Protecting the public sector” to “Treating the socialimpacts of the economic reform programs”. But newcontentious issues were brought up by the liberals27

who saw that the provisions of the current constitu-tion do not suffice to secure private ownership againstrisks of confiscation and nationalization. They alsoregarded the allocation of 50 per cent of the electedcouncils’ seats for workers and peasants as no longersuitable for a system that moved from what was called“Alliance of the forces of the working people” toliberalization and multi-partism. This, however, isunacceptable for the Left which will defend the exist-ing “socialist” provisions against any attempts toabolish them.

Disagreement between the liberals and the Left isbecoming less sharp over matters concerning publicfreedoms. This includes (a) the right of associationinstead of the present regulations discriminatingagainst associations, societies, unions, trade unionsand parties, and (b) the right of free movement for allindividuals. There is an increasing consensus to

27 In the economic field this includes the members of theMuslim Brotherhood.

Long-term Horizon: Constitutional Reforms


Juli 2001

23

demand that the currently publicized motto of thestate − “State of institutions and supremacy of law” −be implemented. The opposition demands a reform ofthe state structure that would diversify and decentral-ize power in executive and decision-making processesand open the system to bottom-up influence so as totransform the authoritarian presidential regime into asemi-parliamentary one. There are also demands toreduce the legislative authority of the president, togive the majority party a right to say in forming thegovernment, to grant the parliament the right tomake changes to the general budget of the state, andto abolish the president’s authority to appoint theprovincial governors.

Moreover, it is expected that there will be demandsthat the president should not preside over the highercouncils of military organizations (the army and thepolice), and especially not over the Higher Councilof Judicial Authorities. As has been demanded alsoby Egypt’s judges, the role of the Higher Council ofJudicial Authorities should be activated and becharged with the administrative, technical andfinancial supervision of judges of the first instancecourts and the courts of appeal with regard to theirtransfer, promotion and salaries instead of leaving allthese functions in the hands of the Ministry of Justice.

Concluding Reflections


24

Concluding Reflections

Egypt provides an example of a country that is trans-forming from an authoritarian system to a systemwith more liberal features. This transformation istaking place through a gradual process closelyconnected to changes in the regional and inter-national environment. It can be called a process ofpluralization in which the single decision-maker orthe single institution is “de-monopolized”. This break-up leaves multiple institutional units on the hori-zontal level behind. On the vertical level, i.e., withinthe institutions, it will bring the second and third-rank elite up. The Egyptian experience shows that thishappens faster in economic than in political institu-tions. In any case, the pluralization of decision-makinginstitutions brings about competition and negotia-tions on the economic and political resources betweenthe emerging units. This could lead to the creation ofdemocratic values in order to manage the differencesbetween the units. Here the role of the judiciaryemerges to ensure a transition towards the rule of law.

The same phenomenon can be witnessed withinsociety. A transition is taking place from few majorcollective units (like the tribe, the extended family,the guilds) to many smaller social groups who shelterthe individual. This heavily influences decision-making and representation within these groups sinceit is no longer the patriarch alone who takes majordecisions on political or social issues on behalf of hissubordinates. The individual emancipates him- or her-self from the family legacy prescribing education,work, marriage, place of living. Two factors are respon-sible for the mobility of the individual: education andthe spread of capitalist values. In order to raise hisincome, the individual now depends on his ownefforts. This leads to an identity based on one’s ownchoice of work according to norms which are based onindividual initiative and competition. These newnorms are becoming more important than the solidar-ity of the former social unit. Eventually, these peoplewill ask for adequate modes of representation andpolitical participation replacing the traditional mode.

The change of the status of women best reflects theprocess of de-monopolizing the single decision-maker.Traditionally, women have been the core of the

extended family which functioned on the basis ofpatriarchy and at the same time preserved it. With thespread of the nuclear family and as women areincreasingly given individual rights in both public andprivate spheres, the power of patriarchy declines.Thus, women make up for a third of the cast votes inEgypt and more than 20 per cent of the workforce. Theincrease in girls’ education28 liberates girls more andmore from the power of the father. Law 1/2000 gavewomen the right to demand a divorce before the courtwithout specified reason. One and half million womenhave currently filed a case in a family court, that ismore than 10 per cent of all families. Two-thirds ofthem are petitions for divorce.29 Law 1/2000 supportswomen in their own decision-making and lifts themfrom the paternal guardianship. It can be regarded asthe basis for a change of values in society and a newsocial contract.

Especially in urban areas individuals are more andmore independent from primordial groups − a factwhich is paradoxically partly reflected in the low voterturn-out in the cities. In order to integrate people whoidentify and act increasingly as individuals, differentforms of mobilization and participation are needed.The current marginalization of this category of peoplewill in the long run create pressure for reforming thedominant culture of decision-making at all levels ofsocialization, i.e., family, school, university, party,trade union, to enable their participation.

The emergent pluralism visible in state and societyis represented in an emergent new elite sometimesreferred to as “generation of peace” and sometimes asthe “generation of globalisation” or “future”. Thisgeneration has now reached the second and thirdrank positions within the most important state insti-tutions, and to a lesser extent in political parties andtrade unions. The question is to what extent this newelite has found a common political agenda. But in anycase it urgently wants to surface.

28 Analphabetism among women decreased from 71 per centin 1985 to 58.2 per cent in 1998 (UNDP 2000).29 The new law facilitates the proceedings which hadformerly taken ten years on average especially since thewoman had to prove that her husband was either impotent,absent or violent.

Literature


Juli 2001

25

Literature

Abdelnasser, Gamal, “Une lecture politique del’expérience constitutionelle égyptienne,” in: Egypte/Monde Arabe, No. 2, Vol. 2, 1999, pp. 127-142

Abdelnasser, Gamal, “Représentation syndicale ettransition libérale en Egypte. Lecture des électionsde 1996,” in: Egypte/Monde Arabe, No. 33, Vol. 1, 1998,pp. 181–221

Abdelnasser, Gamal, “Les élections de 1995 dans legouvernorat du Caire,” in: Sandrine Gamblin (ed.),Contours et détours du politique en Égypte. Les électionslégislatives de 1995, Paris 1997, pp. 199–228

Baaklini, Abdo/Denoeux, Guilain/Springborg, Robert,Legislative Politics in the Arab World. The Resurgence ofDemocratic Institutions, Boulder/London 1999

CAPMAS (Central Agency of Public Mobilization andStatistics), Mulakhas nataìj al-ta’adad al-’amm lil-sukanwal-iskan wal-munshat (Summary of the results of thegeneral census), Cairo 1996

Dessouki, Ali Eddin Hilal, “L’évolution politique del’Egypte: pluralisme démocratique ou néo-autoritarisme?,” in: Monde Arabe/Maghreb-MashrekNo. 127, 1990, pp. 7–16

Dustur Jumhuriya Misr al-’Arabiya (Constitution of theArab Republic of Egypt), Kairo: al-haià al-’amma li-shuùn al-matabi’al-amiriyya, 1991

al-Gamal, Maisa, an-nukhba as-siyasiyya fi misr (Thepolitical elite in Egypt), Beirut: markaz dirasat al-wahda al-’arabiyya, 1998

Hilal, Ali-ad-Din, at-Tatauwwur ad-dimuqrati fi Misr(Democratic Development in Egypt), Cairo 1986

Hilal, Ali-ad-Din, An-Nizam as-siyasi al-misri (TheEgyptian Political System), Cairo 1988

Hilal, Ali-ad-Din (ed.), Intikhabat Majlis ash-Sha’b (TheParliamentary Elections), Cairo 1990

Ibrahim, Saad Eddin, “Statement before the StateSecurity Prosecutors,” Cairo, July 27, 2000, DAVOInfoService, 1.8.2000

Kassem, May, In the Guise of Democracy. Governance inContemporary Egypt, Reading, Mass. 1999

Kienle, Eberhard, A Grand Delusion: Democracy andEconomic Reform in Egypt, Palgrave 2001

Langoht, Vickie, “Cracks in Egypt’s ElectoralEngineering: The 2000 Vote,” in: MERIP PressInformation Note PIN 39, November 7, 2000

Mustafa, Hala (ed.), Qadaya Barlamaniyya (ParliamentaryAffairs), No. 12, Cairo: al-Ahram Center for Politicaland Strategic Studies, 2000

Mustafa, Hala (ed.), ad-Dimuqratiyya (Democracy), No. 1,Cairo: al-Ahram Center for Political and StrategicStudies, 2001

Sharabi, Hisham, Neopatriarchy. A Theory of DistortedChange in Arab Society, New York 1988

UNDP (United Nations Development Program), HumanDevelopment Report 2000, www.undp.org/hdr2000

Documents

Political Change in Egypt · Political Change in Egypt Juli 2001 5 Problemstellung und Schlußfolgerungen German Introduction Political Change in Egypt The Parliamentary Elections