School of Accounting and Finance | School of Accounting and ...州市海珠区新港西路135 号（510275）；Email：[email protected]。孔祥婷，博士生，中山大学管

131

2013 年 6 月第 15 卷第 2 期

中国会计与财务研究

C h i n a A c c o u n t i n g a n d F i n a n c e R e v i e w

Volume 15, Number 2 – June 2013

会计师事务所发审委身份与 IPO 客户质量-基于寻租假说与声誉假说的实证研究

1

谭劲松孔祥婷易阳2

投稿日：2012 年 5 月 14 日录用日：2013 年 3 月 26 日 © 作者 2013。本文由香港理工大学以开放取用(open access)方式出版。

摘要

本文以会计师事务所合伙人担任 IPO 发审委员为出发点，从寻租假说和声誉假

说两个角度检验事务所的发审委身份如何影响其 IPO 客户质量，以及事务所的规模

如何影响上述关系。通过选择从 2004 年到 2011 年 4 月 30 日所有成功上市的 IPO

公司为样本，以公司 IPO 之前的盈余稳健性和可操纵应计项作为公司会计盈余质量

的代理变量，以公司 IPO 之后的市场超额回报作为公司经济绩效的代理变量，结果

发现，（1）在 IPO 之前，选择发审委事务所的公司盈余稳健性程度更高、正向盈余

管理程度更小；（2）在 IPO 之后，选择发审委事务所的公司市场超额回报更高。进

一步发现，发审委事务所与其他事务所的客户质量差异更多体现在发审委小所的客

户中。这些发现支持了声誉假说。

关键词：发审委事务所、寻租、声誉、IPO、客户质量

中图分类号：F239.6、F830.91

1 感谢国家自然基金项目“董事会的权力结构：影响因素与经济后果”（项目批准号 71272196)和广东省人文社科重点研究基地重大项目“董事会结构、运作与绩效研究”（2012JDXM-0002）的

资助。感谢中山大学郑国坚副教授、郑颖助理教授、郑军博士、简宇寅博士、中央财经大学宋顺

林博士以及华南农业大学陈艳艳博士等给予的意见和建议。感谢两名匿名审稿人和苏黎新编辑认

真细致的审稿，他们的意见对文章的完善起了非常重要的作用。文责作者自负。 2 谭劲松，教授，中山大学管理学院 / 中山大学现代会计与财务研究中心；通讯地址：广东省广

州市海珠区新港西路 135 号（510275）；Email：[email protected]。孔祥婷，博士生，中山大学管

理学院；通讯地址：广东省广州市海珠区新港西路 135 号（510275）；Email：[email protected]。易阳，博士生，中山大学管理学院；通讯地址：广东省广州市海珠区

新港西路 135 号（510275）；Email：[email protected]。

DOI 10.7603/s -01 -000 -

132 谭劲松孔祥婷易阳

一、引言

资本市场不仅是公司筹集资金的重要渠道，同时也是成就一个个亿万富豪的“梦

工厂”。面对巨大的利益诱惑，公司对于 IPO 资源的竞争愈演愈烈。自 1993 年以来，

证监会设立发行审核委员会，作为核准股票发行申请的专职机构，承担着甄别公司

良莠、提升整个资本市场资源配置效率的重要职责和使命。随着发审委制度的改革

和发展，发审委委员的构成逐渐向证监会以外的行业自律组织方向发展。其中，来

自会计师事务所3 的发审委委员比例逐步增加，从 2003 年的 20%升至 2007 年的

36%，2009 年创业板发审委中来自会计师事务所的委员比例更高达 40%。基于这些

事实，本文研究会计师事务所的发审委身份整体上如何影响资本市场 IPO 资源的配

置效率。

作为新兴市场，我国资本市场仍处于各项法制和规范尚不健全的阶段，企业为

成功上市普遍对其财务业绩进行“包装”（Aharony et al., 2000；林舒、魏明海，2000）。

逐步依托于会计师事务所等中介机构的发审委委员构成，将有利于以市场定位和专

业判断甄别拟上市公司的良莠，促进资本市场的资源合理配置。但外界同时担心，

当事务所的合伙人被任命为发审委委员时（以下简称为“发审委事务所”），这一“身

份”也可能会成为事务所寻租的工具，为其自身客户的上市发审过程进行“保驾护

航”，帮助低质量客户进行“公关”，提高低质量客户的通过率（王兵、辛清泉，2009；

李敏才、刘峰，2012；Yang, 2012）。换言之，发审委事务所这种既是“教练员”又当“裁

判员”的特殊身份，在上市资源极度稀缺，而成功上市便可成就“造富神话”的极大利

益诱惑下，拟上市公司有需求、发审委事务所有能力，利用二者的业务关系进行寻

租活动（以下称为“寻租假说”）。胜景山河和绿大地的情况似乎也为这一潜在可能

提供了现实注脚。4

不过，除了可能的寻租活动以外，发审委事务所也有维护声誉、降低诉讼风险

的考虑（以下称为“声誉假说”）。这是因为，（1）较高的声誉可以带来相应的声誉

利得（Klein and Leffler, 1981; Craswell et al., 1995）。事务所的发审委身份无疑为该

事务所区别于同行提供了极佳的辨识品牌，树立了更高的声誉，相应地可以获得更

高的收费溢价。（2）事务所的发审委身份增加了审计失败被发现的可能性和相应的

损失。由于发审委事务所的“明星”身份是公共信息，事务所会受到更多的关注和

监督。如果发审委事务所出现审计失败的事件，市场更有可能会及时发现，对于其

处罚也会更为严厉。如前文提及的参与胜景山河和绿大地 IPO 造假的中审国际会计

师事务所和深圳鹏城会计师事务所，分别受到了证监会的出具警示函和吊销事务所

证券服务业务许可的严厉处罚。（3）发审委事务所的政治联系增加了其对自身声誉

3 本文以下所提到的事务所除特殊指明以外，其他均指会计师事务所。 4 涉嫌财务造假的胜景山河和绿大地 IPO 时的事务所分别是中审国际会计师事务所和深圳鹏城会

计师事务所，而这两个所当时均为发审委事务所。关于这两个公司的详情可参考以下链接：http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/quanshang/thyj/20111201/054710913423.shtml; http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20110406/20299646488.shtml。

会计师事务所发审委身份与 IPO 客户质量 133

的关注。发审委的“头衔”是事务所与发审监管机构建立政治联系的重要渠道，发

审委委员的选择也代表了政府主管部门的声誉。一旦发审委事务所被发现进行寻租

活动，则将极大地影响政府监管机构的公信力，也就必然失去了和监管机构已建立

的政治联系，同时可能会受到政府监管机构的严厉惩罚。此外，发审委事务所也有

能力维护声誉、降低诉讼风险。从发审委事务所与拟上市公司的双向选择过程来看，

高质量拟上市公司为了较高的声誉和发审信息优势选择发审委事务所，低质量拟上

市公司为了获得寻租便利选择发审委事务所，这增加了发审委事务所对公司的可选

范围。同时，出于降低审计客户固有风险的考虑，发审委事务所会选择高质量的客

户，以维护自身的声誉。

综上所述，为了判断事务所的发审委身份整体上如何影响资本市场 IPO 资源的

配置效率，事务所的发审委身份整体上是会沦为寻租的工具，帮助低质量公司上市，

也即支持寻租假说；还是出于维护声誉的考虑整体上维持选择高质量的客户群体，

起到了甄别公司良莠作用，也即支持声誉假说。本文考察发审委事务所与其他事务

所的 IPO 客户质量是否有所区别。通过选择 2004 年到 2011 年 4 月 30 日的所有成

功上市的 IPO 公司为样本，以公司 IPO 之前的盈余稳健性和可操纵应计项作为公司

的会计盈余质量的代理变量，以公司 IPO 之后的市场超额回报作为公司经济绩效的

代理变量，通过回归分析发现，（1）在 IPO 之前，发审委事务所的 IPO 客户比其他

事务所的 IPO 客户的盈余稳健性程度更高、正向盈余管理程度更小；（2）在 IPO 之

后，发审委事务所的 IPO 客户比其他事务所的 IPO 客户的市场超额回报更高。并且

上述检验结果不受未通过审核样本及潜在的内生性问题的影响。进一步还发现，发

审委事务所与其他事务所的客户质量差异更多体现在发审委小所的客户中。这些结

果说明，会计师事务所的发审委身份使得会计师事务所更加重视自身的声誉，维持

了对公司高质量的要求，从整体上起到了甄别公司良莠的作用，支持了声誉假说。

本文可能在以下方面丰富了已有的文献：第一，本文丰富了制度背景如何影响

事务所行为方面的文献。以往相关文献主要关注寻找事务所利用发审委身份进行寻

租活动的证据（王兵、辛清泉，2009；李敏才、刘峰，2012；Yang, 2012）。而本文

与以往文献主要的区别在于，本文通过研究事务所的发审委身份与其 IPO 客户质

量之间的关系，讨论事务所的发审委身份整体上如何影响资本市场 IPO 资源的配置

效率，并发现了事务所出于对“发审委”这一头衔的声誉关注，使得发审委事务所选

择了高质量的公司，降低了自身的审计风险。第二，本文丰富了事务所声誉关注方

面的文献。根据 Klein and Leffler（1981）构建的品牌投资模型预期，一旦事务所拥

有品牌效应，事务所就会主动采取以保证审计质量的方式维护事务所的品牌（Chan

and Wu, 2011），而本文通过对发审委事务所的考察，为此提供了可靠的实证证据。

同时，本文拓展了关于现有发审制度效率的讨论，对于相关的政策制定有一定

启示。通过研究事务所的发审委身份是整体上会成为寻租的工具还是声誉的标志，

本文的结论发现发审委事务所的客户质量整体上较高，一定程度上肯定了中介机构

担任发审委委员对于资本市场 IPO 资源配置效率所起到的作用。


本文的其他部分安排如下：第二部分介绍相关制度背景，回顾以往文献并提出

本文的研究假设；第三部分介绍具体的研究设计；第四部分列示并分析本文主要的

实证结果；第五部分是本文的结论。

二、制度背景、文献回顾与研究假设

2.1 发审委制度的建立与发展

伴随着改革开放的市场化实践，我国逐步建立健全了资本市场各项制度，企业

股票发行制度也经历了从完全行政化到逐步市场化的深度探索。然而，无论是早期

的“审批制”，还是《证券法》颁布后的“核准制”，再到以《证券发行上市保荐制度

暂行办法》出台为标志的“保荐制”，中国证监会发审委始终对于核准股票发行与否

起着至关重要的作用。

从 1993 年起，证监会开始设立发行审核委员会，并根据证监会发行部的预审

意见对于新股发行给予复审意见。1999 年实施的《证券法》第十四条更明确规定，

“国务院证券监督管理机构设发行审核委员会，依法审核股票发行申请”。自此，

发审委被赋予的核准股票发行与否的权力和职能得到了法律的确认。这一段时期，

根据 1999 年 9 月 16 日国务院批准实施的《中国证券监督管理委员会股票发行审核

委员会条例》的第四条规定，发审委由中国证监会的专业人员和所聘请的中国证监

会以外的有关专家以及社会知名人士共 80 人组成。每届任期两年，每个委员连续

任期长不超过三届。然而，这段时期委员的资料和发审委的工作并不公开，这就

不可避免地导致了王小石案5的发生。为了保证股票发行贯彻公开、公平、公正的原

则，证监会对于发审委制度进行了大幅改革，并于 2003 年由国务院批准执行《中

国证券监督管理委员会股票发行审核委员会暂行办法》（以下简称“《暂行办法》”）。

《暂行办法》规定，发审委委员由有关行政机关、行业自律组织、研究机构和高等

院校等推荐，由中国证监会聘任。委员名单予以公开，投票采用记名投票的方式。

发审委委员一届共 25 名，其中中国证监会人员 5 名，证监会以外人员 20 名。委员

任期一年一届，长连任不超过三届。为了适应创业板的监管要求，2009 年 5 月

13 日证监会修改了发审委委员组成的条例，在主板委员不变的情况下，特别增设了

创业板发审委，创业板发审委委员一届共 35 名，其中中国证监会人员 5 名，证监

会以外人员 30 名。

从发审委成立到改革，一个重要的变化是，发审委委员的构成逐步地倾向于由

证监会以外的中介机构人员所组成。其中，来自会计师事务所的委员数量逐步增加。

从 2003 年《暂行办法》开始披露发审委委员名单起，由中注协推荐的会计师事务

所的委员从 5 名（占委员总数 20%）到 2007 年第 9 届发审委增至 9 名（占委员总

数 36%）。2009 年开始成立的创业板发审委中，来自会计师事务所的委员有 14 名（占

5 关于王小石案件的始末可以参考链接：http://media.163.com/special/w/wxs_zqzt_20041122501.html。


委员总数的 40%）。这表明政府对于上市资源的控制和行政干预进一步弱化，发审

过程的市场化程度和公开透明程度得到了进一步的加强。

2.2 相关文献回顾

逐步依托于市场中介机构的发审委委员构成，有利于发审委委员以市场化的定

位和判断来甄别拟上市公司的良莠。但外界同时担心，当事务所的合伙人被任命为

发审委委员时，这一“身份”也可能会成为事务所寻租的工具，为其自身客户的上

市发审过程进行“保驾护航”，帮助低质量客户进行“公关”，提高低质量客户的通

过率（王兵、辛清泉，2009；李敏才、刘峰，2012；Yang, 2012）。

以往相关文献对于事务所是否会利用发审委身份进行寻租活动，进行了有益的

探索。比如王兵、辛清泉（2009）发现，发审委事务所在 IPO 市场中的份额更高，

获得的审计收费也更高；李敏才、刘峰（2012）和 Yang（2012）分别以中小板和所

有拟上市的公司为样本检验拟上市公司选择发审委事务所与否和拟上市公司 IPO 过

会的成功率之间的关系。李敏才、刘峰（2012）发现，公司上市过会的成功率与公

司选择发审委事务所的与否正相关；Yang（2012）发现，这种正相关关系及相应的

市场份额的增加，只有对于排名靠后的事务所成为发审委事务所后才存在，对于排

名靠前的事务所成为发审委事务所，公司选择他们与否和公司上市过会的成功率无

关。

然而，他们的研究可能存在替代性解释。比如，王兵、辛清泉（2009）关于审

计收费的发现，有可能是事务所成为发审委事务所后具有了更高的声誉，因而要求

更高的收费，或是因为面临更大程度的市场监督，潜在的审计风险和损失增大，较

高的收费是作为额外的风险补偿。而这些并不一定是发审委寻租的结果。李敏才、

刘峰（2012）以及 Yang（2012）关于发审委事务所和上市过会成功率之间关系的发

现，有可能是因为发审委事务所在考虑声誉的前提下，维持了对公司高质量的要求，

发审委事务所的客户质量本身较高，因而其上市成功率相对高。

总体上，以往相关文献主要关注寻找事务所利用发审委身份进行寻租活动的证

据。而本文与以往文献主要的区别在于，本文通过研究事务所的发审委身份与其

IPO 客户质量之间的关系，讨论事务所的发审委身份整体上如何影响资本市场 IPO

资源的配置效率。

2.3 理论分析及假设的提出

2.3.1 寻租假说

由于国内 IPO 资源相对稀缺，且具有相当强的行政审批性质，当事务所的合伙

人被任命为发审委委员时，不仅意味着该事务所的中介身份得到了监管部门的肯

定，同时也意味着该事务所被赋予了可以直接参与表决发审议案的重要身份。这种

“教练员”和“裁判员”的双重身份，就会使发审委事务所有可能利用发审委身份

进行寻租，提高自身客户的 IPO 发审通过率（以下称为“寻租假说”）。


首先，发审委事务所有能力帮助低质量客户通过 IPO 发审会。这主要体现在信

息优势和政治联系两方面（Yang, 2012）：一方面，发审委事务所拥有信息优势。通

过参与发审议案的表决，发审委事务所可以了解 IPO 发审过程的全部流程和环节，

熟悉发审过程中常见的问题和监管机构主要关注的缺陷，并可以利用这些信息优势

和自身的专业特长帮助低质量客户识别并改善相关问题和缺陷，从而提高低质量客

户的 IPO 通过率（Yang, 2012）。另一方面，发审委事务所拥有发审政治联系。关于

政治关系的文献指出，由于我国政府对于经济活动的干预能力和程度非常强，企业

就有可能通过建立政治关系，来获得相关部门的政策审批，争取有限的资源（余明

桂、潘红波，2008；罗党论、刘晓龙，2009；余明桂等，2010）。当事务所的合伙

人被任命为发审委委员后，他们就自然地与发审机构建立了政治联系。相对于其他

利益团体，他们对发审机构的游说更为有效、直接，从而有效地提高了低质量客户

的 IPO 通过率。

第二，发审委事务所有动机帮助低质量客户通过 IPO 发审会。国外文献发现事

务所会为了自己或自己的客户对管制者进行游说（Puro, 1984; Roberts et al., 2003;

Thornburg and Roberts, 2008; Lennox and Li, 2012）。通过帮助寻租公司成功上市，发

审委事务所除了获得寻租的直接收入以外，还可以获得寻租公司的未来几年审计服

务准租。同时，帮助客户提高通过率，也有助于赢得更多的客户并收取更高的审计

费用。因此，发审委事务所有动机利用自身的优势，帮助公司进行“公关”（Yang,

2012）。

2.3.2 声誉假说

不过，除了可能的寻租活动以外，事务所也有维护自身声誉的考虑。对事务所

而言，“发审委”这一光环，除了为可能的寻租提供便利，同时也增加了事务所对自

身声誉和诉讼风险的关注。发审委事务所出于获取声誉利得和降低审计风险的考

虑，会主动维护自身的声誉，提高对公司质量的要求，以降低潜在的声誉损失。同

时，更多的客户出于不同的考虑选择发审委事务所，也使发审委事务所有可能选择

更高质量的客户，以维护自身的声誉，降低自身的风险（以下称为“声誉假说”）。

具体来讲：

首先，发审委事务所有维护较高声誉的动机。这是因为，（1）较高的声誉可以

带来相应的声誉利得（Klein and Leffler, 1981; Craswell et al., 1995）。事务所的声誉

和独立性对于事务所的生存和发展至关重要（Simunic and Stein, 1987; Francis and

Wilson, 1988），事务所维护较高的声誉可以获得更高的市场份额和审计溢价。当事

务所的合伙人被任命为发审委委员时，这无疑为发审委事务所区别于同行提供了极

佳的辨识品牌，进而树立了更高的声誉。根据 Klein and Leffler（1981）构建的品牌

投资模型预期，一旦事务所拥有品牌效应，事务所就会主动采取以保证审计质量的

方式维护事务所的品牌（Chan and Wu, 2011）。并且，对品牌的维护会提供区别于

同行的更高质量的认证，进而获得更高的收费溢价（Craswell et al., 1995）。王兵、


辛清泉（2009）和 Yang（2012）等研究发现事务所成为发审委事务所后的审计收费

更高，市场份额增大的证据在一定程度上证明了这一点。（2）事务所的发审委身份

增加了审计失败被发现的可能性和相应的损失。发审委事务所的“明星”身份是公

共信息，事务所会受到更多的关注和监督。Chan and Wu（2011）认为事务所审计上

市公司比非上市公司所受到的市场关注程度更高，所受到的市场法律监管更严格。

这一点对于有发审委委员的事务所尤其适用。当事务所的合伙人被任命为发审委委

员时，该事务所不但拥有审计上市公司的权力，同时还掌握了决定公司能否上市的

表决权。这一既是“教练员”又是“裁判员”的特殊身份，无疑将吸引市场各方更

多的注意力。这就意味着市场及时发现事务所审计失败的可能性更大。同时，由于

受到市场各方更多的关注，发审委事务所所承担的声誉成本更高，其审计失败的影

响也更大。DeAngelo（1981）认为当事务所审计失败时事务所可能会失去其所有的

客户。在中国，尽管事务所面临的审计失败的诉讼风险要低于美国同行（Chan and

Wu, 2011），但中国证监会和财政部对于违规会计师事务所的处罚也相当严厉，如

前文提到的参与胜景山河和绿大地 IPO造假的中审国际会计师事务所和深圳鹏城会

计师事务所，分别受到了证监会的出具警示函和吊销事务所证券服务业务许可的严

厉处罚。因而，在中国的环境下，审计失败的代价也很高昂。王兵、辛清泉（2009）

以及 Yang（2012）发现发审委事务所的 IPO 份额更高，这无疑进一步增大了发审

委事务所审计失败的损失。（3）发审委事务所的政治联系增加了其对自身声誉的

关注。发审委的头衔是事务所与发审监管机构建立政治联系的重要渠道，相应地，

发审委委员的选择也代表了政府主管部门的声誉。一旦发审委事务所被发现进行寻

租活动，将极大地影响政府监管机构的公信力，也就必然失去了和监管机构已建立

的政治联系，同时可能会受到政府监管机构的严厉惩罚。因此，发审委事务所会主

动维护自身的声誉，以维系和监管机构的政治联系。

第二，从审计服务的双向选择的过程来看，发审委的身份增加了发审委事务所

选择高质量客户的可能性。（1）一方面，高质量拟上市公司有对发审委事务所较高

声誉和发审过程信息优势的需求，低质量拟上市公司有对发审委事务所寻租的需

求，这就使得发审委事务所有更多的客户可以选择。（2）另一方面，审计风险取决

于事务所客户的固有风险（Hogan and Wilkins, 2008）。而低质量客户的固有风险要

比其他公司高。当事务所的合伙人被任命为发审委委员时，事务所的品牌效应更强，

事务所维护其声誉的动机更强，事务所会提高对客户的选择标准，减少为低质量客

户提供审计鉴证服务，增加选择高质量客户的可能性，以降低自身的审计风险。

2.3.3 假设的提出

为了判断事务所的发审委身份整体上如何影响资本市场 IPO 资源的配置效率，

事务所的发审委身份整体上是会沦为寻租的工具，帮助低质量公司上市，也即支持

寻租假说；还是出于维护声誉的考虑整体上维护高质量的客户群体，起到了甄别公

司良莠的作用，也即支持声誉假说。本文以 IPO 之前的会计盈余质量和 IPO 之后的


公司绩效作为公司自身质量高低的判断依据，考察发审委事务所与其他事务所的

IPO 客户质量是否有所区别。

具体地，当寻租假说占主导，发审委事务所会为低质量的拟上市公司提供审计

鉴证服务，帮助低质量的客户成功上市；低质量的客户也会有动机去选择发审委事

务所进行游说，以期利用发审委事务所的独特资源，帮助自己成功上市。这就意味

着发审委事务所比其他事务所的 IPO 客户质量低。相似地，当声誉假说占主导，发

审委事务所出于声誉的考虑和潜在审计风险的加大，会拒绝为低质量的拟上市公司

提供审计鉴证服务，或为低质量客户成功上市提供帮助。发审委事务所会维护高质

量的客户群体，以降低自身的审计风险，这就说明发审委事务所的 IPO 客户质量比

其他事务所的 IPO 客户质量高。

由于有两个可能，因此提出以下假设：

假设 1：发审委事务所的 IPO 客户与非发审委事务所的 IPO 客户在 IPO 之前会

计盈余质量不同。

假设 2：发审委事务所的 IPO 客户与非发审委事务所的 IPO 客户在 IPO 之后经

济绩效有所不同。

三、研究设计

3.1 样本选取

我们以 2004 年到 2011 年 4 月 30 日所有成功过会并上市的 IPO 公司作为初始

样本，同时整理了这段期间所有发审委委员的资料。之所以选择从 2004 年开始，

是因为（1）《暂行办法》于 2003 年底正式执行，发审委委员的资料开始予以公开；

（2）同时，2003 年 12 月 28 日证监会批准通过了《证券发行上市保荐制度暂行办

法》，并规定股票发行上市自 2004 年 2 月 1 日起开始实行保荐制，股票发行制度进

一步市场化。选择 2004 年以后的样本，可以避免由于股票发行制度的差异所引起

的发审委的职能和权限不一致的问题，使样本期间内的发审委职能相对更为统一。

样本之所以选择至 2011 年 4 月 30 日成功上市的 IPO 公司样本，是为了使 IPO 公司

至少有一年的股价数据，便于假设 2 的检验，同时可以与 IPO 之前会计盈余质量检

验的样本相对统一。

同时，由于金融行业的会计程序、经营活动及方式和其他行业有很大差别，因

此我们剔除了金融行业的样本，获得 857 个 IPO 公司样本。由于不同实证模型中变

量缺失，各模型中用到的样本数和涉及的 IPO 公司数有所不同。具体 IPO 公司各年

样本及实证模型中的样本分布见表 1。

公司财务报告、公司股票回报和会计师事务所的相关数据来源于 Wind 和

CSMAR 数据库，公司 IPO 申请过会的数据、招股说明书申报稿及发审委委员资料

的信息来自于 Wind 数据库和手工收集整理。对于检验中涉及到事务所合并的情况，


我们将事务所合并前和合并后的所视为同一个所。

表 1 样本分布

Panel A: 成功 IPO 公司样本年度分布

年度 IPO 公司数量

2004 31

2005 14

2006 64

2007 114

2008 77

2009 97

2010 342

2011 年 4 月 30 日止 118

总数 857

Panel B: 各回归模型样本分布

样本分布回归模型

稳健性回归可操纵应计项回归累计超额回报回归

样本时间范围 IPO 前两年 IPO 前两年 IPO 后一年

回归样本数 783 660 724

涉及 IPO 公司数 474 417 724

3.2 实证设计和变量定义

为了检验发审委事务所寻租假说占主导还是声誉假说占主导，如前所述，我们

选择拟上市公司 IPO 之前的会计盈余质量和公司 IPO 之后的经济绩效，作为检验本

文假设的依据。

3.2.1 对于拟上市公司 IPO 前的会计盈余质量

对于拟上市公司 IPO 前的会计盈余质量，我们选择公司 IPO 前两年的稳健性和

可操纵应计项作为代理指标。6

稳健性是会计的重要属性（Basu, 1997；李增泉、卢文斌，2003）。Ball et al.（2003）

认为稳健性能较好地衡量会计盈余质量有几方面原因：第一，通常高管拥有更多关

于公司盈利情况的信息，并且高管有动机推迟确认关于损失的坏消息，及时公布关

于盈利的好消息。而对于缺乏信息的外部市场投资者和契约方而言，如果公司的会

计信息缺乏稳健性的原则，会影响他们对公司业绩的正确判断，进而可能造成重大

6 这里前两年是以 IPO 的前三年数据为初始数据，由于稳健性和可操纵应计项模型设计中需要用

到上一年的数据，所以具体在模型回归中，只包含 IPO 前两年的样本。


的损失。因此，损失的及时确认程度更高，会计盈余质量更高，相对于公司盈利有

关的信息，审计师对于公司损失的信息的认可度也更高。第二，高管可以通过变卖

资产等方式来虚增利润，但并没有动机用相似的方式制造损失，因此损失的及时性

确认可以更为准确的衡量公司的真实经营情况。第三，公司会计盈余质量更稳健，

有助于减少公司过度投资或投资负净现值项目的可能性，从而提高公司的投资效

率。这将有助于外部股权投资者和债券人更好的了解公司的盈利信息和投资规划，

尽可能的保证外部投资人的权益。第四，公司的会计盈余质量越稳健，债权人对公

司的经营情况和财务信息了解就更准确，进而可以降低公司债务违约的风险。因此，

稳健性可以有效地衡量公司的会计盈余质量，进而帮助投资者了解 IPO 公司的真实

情况。

依据 Ball et al.（2003）的理论分析，我们选择用 Ball and Shivakumar（2005）

的模型来估计稳健性。这是因为 Ball and Shivakumar（2005）的模型不需要依赖股

价的信息，这就便于检验 IPO 之前公司的会计盈余质量。

具体的模型选择如下：

titititi

titititi

titititititi

titititititi

titititi

titititi

tititititi

tititititi

BIG10CFODCFO

BIG10CFOBIG10DCFO

BIG10LEVCFODCFOLEVCFO

LEVDCFOLEVSIZECFODCFO

SIZECFOSIZEDCFO

SIZEPORCCFODCFO

PORCCFOPORCDCFOPORC

CFODCFOCFODCFOACCRUAL

,,,,19

,,18,,17

,16,,,15,,14

,,13,12,,,11

,,10,,9

,8,,,7

,,6,,5,4

,,3,2,10,

Effects FixedIndustry

(1)

其中，ACCRUALi,t 是会计应计项，用净利润减去经营现金流量后除以期初总资

产来计算；DCFOi,t 是经营现金流量是否为负的虚拟变量，如果经营现金流量为负则

取 1，否则取 0；CFOi,t 是经营现金流量除以期初总资产；PORCi,t 是发审委事务所

虚拟变量，如果事务所的合伙人是发审委委员则取 1，否则取 0。为了检验假设 1，

也即损失确认的及时性程度，根据模型设计，我们重点考察 DCFOi,t*CFOi,t*PORCi,t

的系数，也即 β7 的正负。如果支持假设声誉假说（寻租假说），那么在 IPO 时，发

审委事务所的 IPO 客户比其他事务所的 IPO 客户的会计盈余稳健性更好（差），损

失确认更及时（不及时），此时 β7 为正（负）。

在模型中与以往文献一致（Goh and Li, 2011），我们还控制了公司的规模 SIZEi,t

以减轻公司规模差异对结果造成的影响，公司的资产负债率 LEVi,t 以控制公司的负

债水平。同时，由于事务所的审计质量是影响会计信息质量以及是否担任发审委事

务所的重要变量，因此，我们还控制了国内十大所的虚拟变量 BIG10i,t 以控制事务

所审计质量对稳健性的影响。本文所有用到的变量详细定义见表 2。


表 2 变量定义及说明

变量名定义及计算方法

1、因变量

ACCRUALi,t 会计应计项；= (净利润 – 经营现金流量) /期初总资产

ACC_DDi,t 根据修正的 DD 模型估计的可操纵应计项；

CARi,1 IPO 后一年经市场校正后的累计超额回报

2、解释变量 PORCi,t

发审委事务所虚拟变量；= 1，则该事务所的合伙人当年为发审委

委员；否则 = 0

CFOi,t 经营现金流量；= 经营现金流量 / 期初总资产

DCFOi,t CFOi,t 是否为负的虚拟变量，= 1，如果 CFOi,t < 0；否则 = 0

SIZEi,t 公司规模；= 公司期末总资产取对数

LEVi,t 公司的资产负债率；= (公司的流动负债 + 长期借款) /期末总资产

WCi,t

营运资本应计项；= (营业利润 + 折旧摊销 + 财务费用 – 经营现

金流量) /期初期末总资产平均数

CFOAi,t 修正 DD 模型的经营现金流量；= 经营现金流量 / 期初期末总资

产平均数

ΔSALESi,t 销售增长；= 营业收入增加额/期初期末总资产平均数

PPEi,t 固定资产；固定资产 / 期初期末总资产平均数

ROAi,t 公司总资产报酬率；= 净利润/期末总资产

Ri,t 月度个股回报率

Rm,t 等权平均计算的考虑现金红利再投资的综合市场月回报率

MBi,t 市帐比（Market-to-Book ratio）；= 公司期末总市值 / 权益账面价

值

SOEi,t 国有企业虚拟变量；= 1，则为国有企业；否则 = 0。 BIG10i,t

前十大事务所虚拟变量；= 1，则公司所选事务所为前十大（按中

注协排名）；否则 = 0。 REG_INDi,t

管制行业虚拟变量；= 1，则公司处于采掘、电力、煤气及水的生

产和供应、房地产或社会服务业；否则为 0 BIGBROKERi,t

前十大券商虚拟变量；= 1，则公司所选券商为前十大（按中国证

券业协会公布排名）；否则为 0

ACCRUAL_ADi,t IPO 当年会计应计项；= (净利润 – 经营现金流量) / 总资产 PAIRPORCi,t

涉及事务所正在担任发审委委员虚拟变量；= 1，则涉及事务所正

在担任发审委委员；= 0，则涉及事务所当年未担任发审委委员

本文选择的第二个会计盈余质量的指标是可操纵性应计项。根据中国证监会

2006 年 5 月 18 日发布的《首次公开发行股票并上市管理办法》的规定，“拟上市

公司的近 3 个会计年度净利润均为正数且累计超过人民币 3000 万元”。同时，

2009 年 3 月 11 日发布的《首次公开发行股票并在创业板管理暂行办法》的规定要

求“拟上市公司近两年连续盈利，近两年净利润累计不少于一千万元，且持续


增长；或者近一年盈利，且净利润不少于五百万元，近一年营业收入不少于五

千万元，近两年营业收入增长率均不低于百分之三十”。这实际上要求拟上市公

司具有较强的盈利能力，因此拟上市公司有很强的动机进行盈余管理以达到上市所

规定的盈利指标的要求（林舒、魏明海，2000；Aharony et al., 2000）。吴联生等（2007）

也发现由于不同的监管标准，上市公司比非上市公司存在更多的盈余管理行为。因

此，我们用可操纵应计项作为盈余管理的衡量指标，这就能较好的反映出拟上市公

司的盈余管理程度和相应的会计盈余质量的高低。

我们与 Gul et al.（2013）一致，选择 McNichols（2002）修正的 Dechow and Dichev

（2002）的模型（以下简称修正的 DD 模型）作为计算可操纵应计项的依据。这是

因为 Jones（1991）和 Kothari et al.（2005）的模型包含了更多的噪音，比如这种模

型认为是盈余管理造成的应计利润，而实际上这些往往是因企业投资增加所引起的

营运资本的增加。同时，在选择 DD 模型的基础上同时采用 McNichols（2002）的

建议加入 Jones 模型的变量可以减少省略变量偏误的可能性。

具体的模型选择如下：

ti

tititititi

PPE

SALESCFOACFOACFOAWC

,4

,41,3,21,10,

(2)

其中，WCi,t 是营运资本应计项；CFOAi,t-1、CFOAi,t 和 CFOAi,t+1 分别是 t-1、t

期和 t+1 期的经营现金流量；ΔSALESi,t是 t-1 期到 t 期营业收入的变化额；PPEi,t为

固定资产。模型所有的变量都经过期初和期末总资产的平均数的校正。

模型根据证监会的行业分类为依据，按行业和年度的组合进行分组，对于每个

行业和年度组合超过 10 个样本的组合估计出一组系数，7 进而得出残差作为可操纵

应计项的估计。

为了检验假设 1，我们将模型估计出的可操纵应计项代入如下方程进行检验。

具体的模型为：

Effects FixedYear

_

,5

,4,3,2,10,

ti

tititititi

BIG10

ROALEVSIZEPORCDDACC (3)

由于计算 ACC_DDi,t 需要用到上一年的数据，所以等式（3）的回归只包括 IPO

前两年的样本。同时，为了检验假设 1，我们重点考察 PORCi,t的系数 β1。此外，与

以往文献一致（如 Gul et al., 2013），我们控制了公司的规模 SIZEi,t 以控制公司规模

所造成的差异，公司的资产负债率 LEVi,t 以控制公司的负债水平，公司的资产收益

率 ROAi,t 以控制公司的盈利水平，事务所的规模虚拟变量 BIG10i,t 以控制事务所的

审计质量和声誉。这里需要说明的是，我们并没有像以往文献一样包含亏损的虚拟

变量，这是因为 IPO 公司之前的业绩不可能出现亏损，否则就不满足 IPO 的要求。

7 把限制放宽为 20 个样本的组合，并不改变模型的主要估计结果。由于篇幅所限，结果未报告在

文章中。


3.2.2 对于拟上市公司 IPO 之后的经济绩效

我们考察 IPO 之后一年的经济绩效来验证假设 2。8 具体的，我们与 Fan et al.

（2007）一样，选择经过市场调整后的累计超额回报作为公司的经济绩效的代理变

量。像 Teoh and Wong（1993）一样，本文选择月度收益率的数据按如下公式计算

公司的市场调整后的累计超额回报：

12

0,1, )1( log

ttm,tii RRCAR (4)

其中，Ri,t 是个股的月度回报率，Rm,t 是等权平均计算的考虑现金红利再投资的

综合市场月回报率。通过计算公司 IPO 之后 12 个月的超额回报率，得到公司经市

场调整后的累计超额回报的数据，并代入如下方程检验假设。

ti

tititi

tititititii

ADACCRUAL

BIGBROKERINDREGBIG10

SOEMBLEVSIZEPORCCAR

,9

,8,7,6

,5,4,3,2,101,

_

_ (5)

与之前相似，在模型中重点考察 PORCi,t 的系数 β1。如果 β1 显著为正（负），则

说明在 IPO 之后，发审委事务所的 IPO 客户比其他事务所的 IPO 客户绩效要好（差），

进而证明发审委事务所的 IPO 客户质量更好（差），进而支持假设声誉假说（寻租

假说）。

同时，与 Fan et al.（2007）一致，我们控制了公司的规模 SIZEi,t 以控制公司规

模所造成的差异；公司的资产负债率 LEVi,t 以控制公司的负债水平；公司的市值/账

面价值的比率 MBi,t 以控制公司的成长性；公司是否为国有企业的虚拟变量 SOEi,t

以控制国有与民营企业之间的差异；所选事务所是否为国内十大事务所的虚拟变量

BIG10i,t 以控制事务所的声誉影响；所在行业是否是管制行业的虚拟变量 REG_INDi,t

以控制行业的差异；所选券商是否为国内十大券商的虚拟变量 BIGBROKERi,t 以控制

券商的影响；应计项 ACCRUAL_ADi,t以控制应计项对未来股票收益的影响。

3.2.3 发审委事务所的内生性问题检验

通过附录发审委事务所名单可以发现，发审委事务所几乎均由大所担任，上述

检验发现的发审委事务所与非发审委事务所的 IPO 客户质量之间的差别，可能并不

是发审委这一“身份”所带来的影响，而是事务所自身其他特征所引起的差异。

为了进一步厘清发审委这一身份对事务所客户质量的影响，同时解决可能存在

的内生性问题，我们选择至今所有担任过发审委委员的事务所（以下简称为“涉及

事务所”）样本，比较涉及事务所在任发审委委员与否和该事务所的 IPO 客户质量

之间的关系，从而检验该事务所在担任发审委委员时 IPO 公司的质量是否比该事务

所不担任发审委委员时 IPO 公司的质量高。这样解决内生性问题的设计至少有三个

8 这里并没有选择更长的时间是为了避免公司换所的影响和其他事件对于公司绩效的影响，时间

越长噪音越大，因而与以往文献一致选择了后一年的累计超额回报。


好处：（1）可以弥补配对样本由于主观标准可操作性的缺陷；（2）可以避免使用

Heckman 两阶段分析所造成的工具变量选取随意性的问题（Francis et al., 2010;

Larcker and Rusticus, 2010）；（3）可以控制包括事务所的排名、执业人数和执业水

平等所有事务所特征的影响，单独考察发审委“头衔”与其 IPO 客户质量之间的关

系，从而消除内生性对结果的影响。具体的，我们构造涉及事务所正在担任发审委

委员的虚拟变量 PAIRPORCi,t，替换模型（1），（3）和（5）中的 PORCi,t 并进行回

归分析。

一个潜在的问题是，涉及事务所的样本是否具有代表性。经过统计发现，涉及

事务所所承担的 IPO 业务共有 686 个，占总数 857 个的 80.0%，因而，选择涉及事

务所的子样本很有代表性。

后，为了避免异常值对回归结果进行干扰，本文对所有连续变量均进行了 1%

和 99%分位数上的缩尾（Winsorize）处理。

四、实证结果

4.1 描述性统计结果

表 3 列示了所有变量的描述性统计结果。在会计盈余质量的回归方程中，平均

28%的 IPO 公司选择了发审委事务所，这些公司的资产收益率平均为 10%，平均 36%

的公司选择国内十大事务所。在累计超额收益的回归方程中，选择发审委事务所的

公司平均为 24%，属于国有企业的公司占 23%，选择的事务所排名为前十大事务所

的比例接近一半为 47%，属于管制行业的公司平均为 8%。

表 3 主要变量的描述性统计

变量名样本数均值标准差

1 分

位数

25 分

位数中值

75 分

位数

99 分

位数

Panel A: 会计盈余质量回归方程变量

ACCRUALi,t 783 0.00 0.11 -0.27 -0.06 -0.01 0.04 0.37

ACC_DDi,t 660 0.00 0.05 -0.11 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.14

PORCi,t 783 0.28 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00

PAIRPORCi,t 603 0.36 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00

CFOi,t 783 0.14 0.12 -0.17 0.07 0.13 0.20 0.52

DCFOi,t 783 0.06 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00

SIZEi,t 783 20.58 1.36 18.57 19.71 20.24 21.10 25.37

LEVi,t 783 0.54 0.15 0.15 0.44 0.56 0.64 0.85

ROAi,t 783 0.10 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.09 0.13 0.31

BIG10i,t 783 0.36 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00


表 3 （续）

Panel B: 累计超额收益回归方程变量

CARi,1 724 -0.24 0.39 -1.17 -0.45 -0.23 0.00 0.73

PORCi,t 724 0.24 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00

PAIRPORCi,t 564 0.31 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00

SIZEi,t 724 21.06 1.10 19.56 20.38 20.84 21.39 25.27

LEVi,t 724 0.26 0.17 0.02 0.12 0.24 0.38 0.75

MBi,t 724 4.54 2.09 1.38 3.12 4.12 5.52 12.76

SOEi,t 724 0.23 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00

BIG10i,t 724 0.47 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00

REG_INDi,t 724 0.08 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00

BIGBROKERi,t 724 0.36 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00

ACCRUAL_ADi,t 724 0.03 0.07 -0.11 -0.01 0.02 0.06 0.25

注：为了防止异常值的影响，本文的主要变量除虚拟变量以外均在 1%和 99%进行了异常值

Winsorize 处理。

表 4 列示了所有变量的相关系数表格。在会计盈余质量的回归变量中，

ACC_DDi,t与 PORCi,t 负相关，不过不显著，这在一定程度上说明发审委事务所的客

户盈余管理程度更低。在累计超额收益的回归变量中，CARi,1与 PORCi,t 显著正相关，

说明发审委事务所的客户 IPO 后一年的经济绩效更高。其他主要变量的相关系数详

见表 4。

图 1 描绘了 IPO 之后三年的公司累计超额回报的趋势图。其中横坐标为 IPO 之

后的月份，连线表示发审委事务所的 IPO 客户 IPO 之后三年的公司累计超额回报，

虚线表示其他事务所的 IPO 客户 IPO 之后三年的公司累计超额回报。从图的趋势上

可以看出，IPO 之后平均所有公司的业绩都有很大程度的下降，但是选择发审委事

务所的公司业绩下降程度要小于选择其他事务所的公司。同时，这种差异在 IPO 之

后第一年内非常明显。这说明，发审委事务所的 IPO 客户业绩要高于其他事务所的

IPO 客户业绩，这一发现支持声誉假说。当然，这里不排除存在另一个可能的原因，

也即是发审委事务所通常是审计质量较高的所，基于 Fan and Wong（2005）的发现，

选择发审委事务所公司的累计超额回报高有可能是市场对于发审委事务所的声誉

给予的一个较低的折价。因此，除了描述性统计结果以外，有必要在控制事务所的

声誉后，进一步证实事务所的发审委身份和客户 IPO 之后业绩的关系。


表 4 主要变量相关系数表格

Panel A: 发审委事务所与会计盈余质量回归方程变量 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

1. ACCRUALi,t 1.000 2. ACC_DDi,t 0.412 1.000 *** 3. PORCi,t -0.031 -0.029 1.000 4. CFOi,t -0.647 0.062 0.017 1.000 *** 5. DCFOi,t 0.482 0.138 -0.041 -0.481 1.000 *** *** *** 6. SIZEi,t -0.056 -0.168 0.039 -0.146 0.117 1.000 *** *** *** 7. LEVi,t -0.052 -0.286 -0.068 -0.332 0.153 0.259 1.000 *** * *** *** *** 8. ROAi,t 0.202 0.537 0.026 0.539 -0.113 -0.315 -0.564 1.000 *** *** *** *** *** *** 9. BIG10i,t -0.077 -0.062 0.101 0.031 0.010 0.246 -0.060 -0.032 1.000 ** *** *** * Panel B: 发审委事务所与累计超额收益回归方程变量

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1. CARi,1 1.000 2. PORCi,t 0.077 1.000 ** 3. SIZEi,t 0.049 0.008 1.000 4. LEVi,t -0.081 -0.094 0.379 1.000 ** ** *** 5. MBi,t 0.065 0.002 -0.131 -0.092 1.000 * *** ** 6. SOEi,t -0.050 0.045 0.416 0.302 -0.060 1.000 *** *** 7. REG_INDi,t 0.075 -0.007 0.291 0.159 0.078 0.279 1.000 ** *** *** ** *** 8. BIG10i,t 0.076 0.123 0.251 -0.073 -0.016 0.015 0.081 1.000 ** *** *** ** ** 9. BIGBROKERi,t 0.061 -0.045 0.286 0.026 0.001 0.118 0.066 0.116 1.000 *** *** * *** 10. ACCRUAL_ADi,t -0.038 -0.040 -0.134 -0.031 0.094 -0.243 -0.102 -0.101 -0.045 1.000 *** ** *** *** ***

注：***、**、*分别表示相关系数的 Pearson 检验在 1%、5%和 10%水平上显著。


-.4

-.3

-.2

-.1

0C

AR

1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35Month

发审委事务所的IPO客户其他事务所的IPO客户

注：图中横坐标为 IPO 之后的月份，连线表示选择发审委事务所的公司 IPO 之后三年的公司累

计超额回报，虚线表示选择其他事务所的公司 IPO 之后三年的公司累计超额回报。

图 1 IPO 后三年累计超额回报趋势图

表 5 列示了 IPO 之前可操纵应计项和 IPO 之后公司累计超额回报的分组均值检

验结果。通过检验可以发现，IPO 之前，发审委事务所的 IPO 客户的带符号的（signed）

可操纵应计项、正向盈余管理程度都比选择其他事务所的公司要小，不过不显著。

而 IPO 之后的公司业绩在 IPO 之后第一年，两组公司有显著差别，并且发审委事务

所的 IPO 客户比其他所的 IPO 客户业绩要好。同时，在业绩为负的子样本中，两组

的差异更显著。这些结果支持了发审委事务所的声誉假说。

4.2 回归结果分析

根据上面的相关论述和实证模型设计，我们详细检验了事务所的发审委身份与

其客户 IPO 之前会计盈余质量和 IPO 之后公司业绩的关系。回归具体结果见下述各

表。9

9 本文所有的回归结果均考察了 VIF 值，发现结果并不存在多重共线性的问题。


表 5 可操纵应计项和累计超额回报均值中值检验

变量名

变量均值比较

（1 为发审委事务所

的 IPO 客户，

0 为其他）

两组均值

T 检验

变量中值比较

（1 为发审委事务所

的 IPO 客户，

0 为其他）

两组中值

Wilcoxon

检验

0 1

(0 组-1 组)

T-value 0 1

Wilcoxon

Z-value

（1）可操纵应计项

ACC_DDi,t

全样本

-0.004

(n=485)

-0.007

(=175)

0.69

-0.006

(n=485)

-0.009

(n=175)

0.22

ACC_DDi,t if

ACC_DDi,t>= 0

0.041

(n=193)

0.033

(n=76)

1.56

0.030

(n=193)

0.025

(n=76)

1.22

ACC_DDi,t if

ACC_DDi,t< 0

-0.034

(n=292)

-0.038

(n=99)

1.16

-0.028

(n=292)

-0.031

(n=99)

1.35

（2）累计超额回报

CARi,1

-0.252

(n=548)

-0.183

(n=176)

-2.08**

-0.242

(n=548)

-0.206

(n=176)

-1.81*

CARi,1< 0

-0.413

(n=416)

-0.338

(n=128)

-2.61***

-0.361

(n=416)

-0.297

(n=128)

-2.03**

注：*、**、***分别表示在 10%、5%、1%水平上显著。

4.2.1 发审委事务所与 IPO 客户的会计稳健性

首先来看 IPO 之前事务所的发审委身份与其客户会计稳健性的关系，结果见表

6。具体的，通过回归模型分析发现，在 IPO 前两年，PORCi,t × DCFOi,t × CFOi,t 的

系数显著为正。根据 Ball and Shivakumar（2005）的模型设计，这说明发审委事务

所的 IPO 客户比其他事务所的 IPO 客户，在 IPO 前两年对于盈余损失确认的更及时，

会计盈余稳健性更高。与之相似的，为了减轻事务所特征的内生性问题的影响，以

涉及事务所的样本回归发现，PAIRPORCi,t × DCFOi,t × CFOi,t的系数也显著为正。综

合这些实证结果说明，发审委事务所的 IPO 客户会计稳健性程度更高，会计盈余质

量更高，这就支持了发审委事务所的声誉假说。其他的控制变量的结果与 Goh and Li

（2011）的结果一致，也即公司的规模越小公司的盈余稳健性程度更高，公司的资

产负债率越高，公司对于盈余损失的信息确认更及时，盈余稳健性程度更高。

这里需要说明的是，在 IPO 前两年的回归中，DCFOi,t × CFOi,t的系数并没有像


表 6 发审委事务所与客户会计稳健性自变量 ACCRUALi,t (1) (2) CFOi,t -1.429*** -1.527*** (-3.84) (-3.46) DCFOi,t 0.039 0.609 (0.17) (1.33) DCFOi,t × CFOi,t 0.390 4.624 (0.15) (0.92) PORCi,t 0.010 (1.02) PORCi,t × CFOi,t -0.103* (-1.95) PORCi,t × DCFOi,t 0.054 (1.41) PORCi,t × DCFOi,t × CFOi,t 0.957** (2.29) PAIRPORCi,t 0.012 (1.17) PAIRPORCi,t × CFOi,t -0.130** (-2.28) PAIRPORCi,t × DCFOi,t 0.064 (1.32) PAIRPORCi,t × DCFOi,t × CFOi,t 1.304* (1.66) SIZEi,t -0.017*** -0.020*** (-4.73) (-4.76) SIZEi,t × CFOi,t 0.079*** 0.094*** (4.23) (4.30) SIZEi,t × DCFOi,t 0.005 -0.023 (0.43) (-0.94) SIZEi,t × DCFOi,t × CFOi,t -0.043 -0.321 (-0.26) (-1.14) LEVi,t 0.016 0.065* (0.52) (1.83) LEVi,t × CFOi,t -1.412*** -1.764*** (-10.18) (-10.33) LEVi,t × DCFOi,t -0.244** -0.238 (-2.06) (-1.46) LEVi,t × DCFOi,t × CFOi,t -0.613 1.294 (-0.34) (0.51) BIG10i,t -0.000 0.001 (-0.02) (0.06) BIG10i,t × CFOi,t -0.063 -0.096* (-1.28) (-1.74) BIG10i,t × DCFOi,t 0.045 0.060 (1.45) (1.55) BIG10i,t × DCFOi,t × CFOi,t 0.591* 0.875* (1.69) (1.68) Constant 0.293*** 0.483*** (3.44) (5.36) 行业 Yes Yes 样本数 783 603 Adjusted-R2 0.643 0.616 F-value 47.964 34.358 p-value (0.000) (0.000) 注：*、**、***分别表示在 10%、5%、1%水平上显著。


预期的显著为正。造成这样的原因主要是因为 IPO前公司的经营现金流量很少为负，

只有 48 个样本为负（占 783 个样本中的 6.1%）。

4.2.2 发审委事务所与 IPO 客户的可操纵性应计项

本文选择的第二个会计信息质量的指标是可操纵性应计项。与之前文章相似

（金智，2010；Lennox and Li, 2012），我们考察了带符号的（Signed）可操纵性应

计项回归，以及按盈余调整的方向分为调高盈余组和调低盈余组的分组回归。通过

表 7 的结果发现，在带符号的可操纵性应计项回归中，PORCi,t 的系数为负，这说明

选择发审委事务所的公司在 IPO 前两年可操纵性应计项更低，相应地盈余管理程度

更低，不过结果不显著。不显著的原因可能是操纵存在正向盈余管理和负向盈余管

理两种，两种影响可能影响整体的结果。根据前面的背景介绍，公司需要达到一定

的盈利条件才能具备 IPO 的资格，这使得公司正向盈余管理的动机更强，而事务所

相对更不认同客户进行向上的盈余调整（Lennox and Li, 2012），因此正向盈余管理

更能体现事务所客户的盈余质量的差别；而负向盈余管理的动机与上市动机并不一

致，因而很难对盈余操纵程度和会计盈余质量加以区分。因此，我们按可操纵性应

计项的正负分为调高盈余组和调低盈余组，同时用截断回归模型（Truncated

regression model）的方法分别对调高盈余组和调低盈余组的样本进行回归，以避免

OLS 回归可能的偏误（Caramanis and Lennox, 2008）。并不意外的，实证结果发现在

正向盈余管理的组 PORCi,t 的系数显著为负，而在负向盈余管理的组 PORCi,t 的系数

为负但不显著。在涉及事务所的样本回归中，也得到了相似的结果，PAIRPORCi,t

的系数在正向盈余管理组中显著为负。这些结果说明，在 IPO 前两年，发审委事务

所的客户，其正向盈余管理程度低，会计盈余质量更好，公司质量更高，进而支持

了发审委事务所的声誉假说。其他控制变量的结果也与之前的文献相符。

4.2.3 发审委事务所与客户 IPO 后一年累计超额回报

后本文考察事务所的发审委身份与其客户 IPO 之后业绩的关系。本文选择

IPO 后一年的 CARi,1 作为公司 IPO 之后的业绩，通过表 8 的结果发现，在全样本的

回归中，PORCi,t 的系数显著为正，这说明选择发审委事务所的公司 IPO 之后一年的

业绩比选择其他事务所的公司业绩要高，验证了声誉假说。同时，从图 1 的趋势可

以发现，IPO 之后的公司业绩整体有下降的趋势，这与 Fan et al.（2007）的结果相

似，因此，我们单独考察了 CARi,1 < 0 的子样本回归。对 CARi,1 < 0 子样本的回归，

同样用截断回归模型（Truncated regression model）的方法进行估计，以避免 OLS

回归可能的偏误（Caramanis and Lennox, 2008）。10 结果与全样本一致，PORCi,t 的

系数显著为正，同样验证了声誉假说。以涉及子样本的回归结果也与之相似，这里

不再赘述。

10 本文所有对正向盈余管理、负向盈余管理以及 CARi,1 < 0 子样本的回归，均采用截断回归模型

（Truncated regression model）的方法进行估计，以下不再重复说明。


表 7 发审委事务所与客户可操纵性应计项

自变量 ACC_DDi,t

全样本

回归

调高

盈余组

调低

盈余组

全样本

回归

调高

盈余组

调低

盈余组

PORCi,t -0.004 -0.009** -0.004

(-1.19) (-2.12) (-1.15)

PAIRPORCi,t -0.005 -0.012*** -0.004

(-1.18) (-2.60) (-1.01)

SIZEi,t -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001

(-0.20) (-0.23) (-0.20) (0.15) (0.25) (-0.35)

LEVi,t 0.012 0.053*** -0.017 0.019 0.047** -0.011

(0.88) (3.24) (-1.42) (1.12) (2.42) (-0.78)

ROAi,t 0.491*** 0.440*** 0.072* 0.518*** 0.451*** 0.088**

(14.24) (12.18) (1.86) (12.68) (10.29) (2.02)

BIG10i,t -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002

(-0.32) (-0.50) (-0.25) (-0.29) (-0.62) (-0.60)

Constant -0.076** -0.032 -0.031 -0.069* -0.045 -0.029

(-2.32) (-1.04) (-1.16) (-1.89) (-1.16) (-0.89)

年度 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

样本数 660 269 391 515 206 309

Adjusted-R2 0.308 - - 0.294 - -

F-value 27.642 - - 20.489 - -

LR-2 - 154.00 21.91 - 114.05 20.57

p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.025) (0.000) (0.000) (0.038) 注：*、**、***分别表示在 10%、5%、1%水平上显著。

4.3 稳健性检验及进一步分析

4.3.1 未通过审核样本的影响

前已述及，本文采用的是比较通过审核并成功上市样本的会计盈余质量和经济

绩效之间的差异，这虽然是为了剔除未通过审核样本的极端情况影响，进而保证公

司质量比较的标准相对统一、公允，但有可能存在样本选择性偏误。为了消除可能

存在的样本选择性偏误，我们通过数据库和手工收集了未通过审核公司的招股说明

书（申报稿），在原有样本的基础上加入了未通过审核的样本，重新回归了模型（1）

和（3），结果发现之前检验的结论均未改变，也就进而说明，是否包括未通过审核

的样本对结果并无影响。限于篇幅，具体的回归结果没有报告。11

11 本文所有没有报告的结果，均可向作者索取。


表 8 发审委事务所与客户 IPO 后一年的累计超额回报

自变量 CARi,1

全样本 CAR<0 子样本全样本 CAR<0 子样本

PORCi,t 0.063* 0.069**

(1.88) (2.40)

PAIRPORCi,t 0.044 0.048*

(1.30) (1.73)

SIZEi,t 0.028* 0.030** 0.025 0.023

(1.68) (2.16) (1.31) (1.51)

LEVi,t -0.184** -0.173** -0.162 -0.170**

(-1.99) (-2.24) (-1.55) (-2.03)

MBi,t 0.011 -0.002 0.013 -0.002

(1.60) (-0.34) (1.62) (-0.29)

SOEi,t -0.088** -0.086*** -0.048 -0.055

(-2.22) (-2.60) (-1.06) (-1.50)

REG_INDi,t 0.109** 0.055 0.053 0.012

(1.97) (1.12) (0.84) (0.23)

BIG10i,t 0.022 0.053** 0.033 0.072***

(0.71) (2.10) (1.02) (2.74)

BIGBROKERi,t 0.036 0.038 0.047 0.048*

(1.15) (1.44) (1.42) (1.78)

ACCRUAL_ADi,t -0.253 0.128 -0.497** -0.020

(-1.14) (0.68) (-2.06) (-0.10)

Constant -0.839** -1.008*** -0.783** -0.870***

(-2.50) (-3.55) (-2.01) (-2.71)

样本数 724 544 564 424

Adjusted-R2 0.024 - 0.015 -

F-value 3.248 - 2.103 -

LR-2 - 36.12 - 27.07

p-value (0.001) (0.000) (0.034) (0.001)

注：*、**、***分别表示在 10%、5%、1%水平上显著。

4.3.2 另一种内生性问题解决办法

除了用涉及事务所的子样本进行检验的方法以外，为了进一步排除内生性问题

的影响，证实是事务所的发审委身份而非事务所的特征对事务所客户质量的影响，

我们还比较了发审委事务所 A 与非发审委事务所 B 在 A 担任委员前一年和卸任后


两年的 IPO 客户质量。12 这样可以在控制事务所特征差异不变的情况下，比较发审

委这一身份对而非事务所特征对 IPO 客户质量的影响。结果发现，不论是在事务所

A 担任发审委委员前一年还是卸任后两年，事务所 A 与事务所 B 的客户质量均没有

显著差异。这就进一步说明发审委事务所与非发审委事务所 IPO 客户质量与事务所

的发审委身份有关，而不受事务所的特征的影响。限于篇幅，具体结果没有报告。

为了保证结果的可靠性，本文还进行了其他一系列稳健性检验。对于模型（2）

本文放松了对行业与年度组合样本大于 10 个的限制，得出的结果并没有变化。同

时，由于第 9 届发审委事务所增加至 9 家，我们划分了 2007 年以前和 2007 年以后

的样本，发现本文的各项结论均没有发生变化。同时，我们还将样本区间扩展至 2011

年底的所有 IPO 公司，本文的主要结论均没有发生变化。我们还将创业板的样本单

独考虑，结果也没有改变。后对于所有模型均进行了异方差和序列自相关以及多

重共线性的检验或修正，文章结论也没有发生变化。限于篇幅，其他稳健性检验的

结果这里没有报告。

4.3.3 事务所规模对发审委事务所与其 IPO 客户质量关系的影响13

Yang（2012）发现发审委事务所对其客户增加收费和提高通过率的情况主要体

现在规模较小的事务所中。与之相似，我们也考察事务所规模对发审委事务所与其

IPO 客户质量关系的影响。

从寻租角度来看，大所拥有更高的声誉和更大的市场份额，发审委的“头衔”

对于大所潜在的寻租收益影响不大，发审委大所通过寻租来赢得客户的动机不强。

同时发审委的头衔增加了大所的关注度，也进而增加了大所寻租的成本，大所因寻

租而引起的声誉损失要更大。因此，如果整体上发审委事务所寻租假说占主导，那

么相较于发审委小所，发审委大所的寻租动机更弱，其对客户选择的标准相对更高

一些，IPO 客户质量更高些。

从声誉关注的角度来看，发审委的头衔增加了事务所的被关注程度，其潜在的

声誉损失更大。对于小所而言，在成为发审委事务所之前，由于没有大所的业务量

大，受关注程度高，因而小所的客户质量要低于大所。但当成为发审委事务所之后，

小所的受关注程度大幅提升，其审计失败被发现的可能性显著增加，加之自身资源

不如大所，因而一旦出现审计失败，发起诉讼的成本更低，被诉讼的可能性更大。

因此，当发审委事务所整体上声誉假说占主导时，发审委事务所客户质量的提高主

要是发审委小所的影响。

为此，我们以可操作应计项和累计超额收益为例，将事务所按规模进行分组回

归。结果见表 9 和 10。可以发现，在小所中，发审委事务所比非发审委事务所的客

户质量更高，而在大所中，发审委与否的差异并不显著，这也就证实上述推断。这

一发现也进而说明，Yang（2012）发现的发审委小所的客户通过率更高结果，可能

12 这里选择卸任后两年，是为了尽可能消除发审委身份所带来的干扰。 13 作者感谢匿名审稿人在此提出的建设性意见。


更多是由于小所的客户质量提升更高，因而通过率更高，而这不一定是小所寻租的

结果。

表 9 事务所规模对发审委事务所与客户质量关系的影响（分组回归）

自变量 ACC_DDi,t

全样本回归调高盈余组调低盈余组

小所大所小所大所小所大所

PORCi,t -0.004 -0.004 -0.010* -0.008 -0.002 -0.006

(-0.86) (-0.74) (-1.87) (-1.22) (-0.46) (-1.13)

SIZEi,t -0.003 0.002 0.000 -0.000 -0.002 0.001

(-1.27) (0.90) (0.09) (-0.09) (-1.17) (0.77)

LEVi,t 0.013 0.015 0.057*** 0.035 -0.025 -0.008

(0.72) (0.67) (2.71) (1.32) (-1.53) (-0.46)

ROAi,t 0.511*** 0.434*** 0.463*** 0.390*** 0.067 0.068

(12.10) (6.96) (11.04) (5.31) (1.20) (1.24)

Constant 0.003 -0.090** -0.047 -0.025 0.015 -0.066*

(0.07) (-2.05) (-0.84) (-0.55) (0.35) (-1.87)

年度 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

样本数 414 246 170 99 244 147

Adjusted-R2 0.362 0.187 - - - -

F-value 24.482 7.280 - - - -

LR-2 - 115.00 41.09 17.52 8.58

p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.064) (0.477)

注：*、**、***分别表示在 10%、5%、1%水平上显著。

五、结论和建议

从证券市场建立以来，证监会发审委就掌握着决定公司能否上市的关键表决

权。而随着发审委制度的改革和发展，依托于会计师事务所等行业自律组织的发审

委委员构成逐渐占据主导地位。事务所的“发审委”这一特殊身份既为可能的寻租

提供了便利，同时也增加了事务所潜在的声誉成本。

为了判断事务所的发审委身份从整体上如何影响资本市场 IPO 资源的配置效

率，本文考察发审委事务所与其他事务所的 IPO 客户质量是否有所区别。通过选择

从 2004 年到 2011 年 4 月 30 日止的所有成功上市的 IPO 公司样本，以公司 IPO 之

前的盈余稳健性和可操纵应计项作为公司会计盈余质量的代理变量，以公司 IPO 之

后的市场超额回报作为公司经济绩效的代理变量，通过实证分析发现，（1）在 IPO


表 10 事务所规模对发审委事务所与客户质量关系的影响（分组回归）

自变量 CARi,1

全样本 CAR < 0 子样本

小所大所小所大所

PORCi,t 0.112** 0.032

(2.55) (0.91)

PAIRPORCi,t 0.114** -0.012

(2.52) (-0.39)

SIZEi,t 0.054** 0.003 0.039 -0.005

(2.33) (0.16) (1.30) (-0.28)

LEVi,t -0.356*** 0.066 -0.383*** 0.073

(-3.37) (0.60) (-3.09) (0.72)

MBi,t 0.009 -0.019** 0.020* -0.029***

(1.04) (-2.06) (1.88) (-3.52)

SOEi,t -0.124*** -0.022 -0.137** 0.042

(-2.74) (-0.47) (-2.38) (0.97)

REG_INDi,t 0.163* 0.009 0.128 -0.017

(1.95) (0.16) (1.19) (-0.32)

BIGBROKERi,t 0.039 0.023 0.071* 0.014

(1.04) (0.66) (1.65) (0.45)

ACCRUAL_ADi,t 0.089 0.134 0.028 -0.058

(0.33) (0.51) (0.09) (-0.25)

Constant -1.520*** -0.361 -1.253** -0.125

(-3.15) (-1.02) (-2.00) (-0.36)

样本数 292 252 198 226

LR-2 33.72 6.64 31.79 15.67

p-value (0.000) (0.576) (0.000) (0.047)

注：*、**、***分别表示在 10%、5%、1%水平上显著。

之前，选择发审委事务所的公司比选择其他事务所的公司的盈余稳健性程度更高、

正向盈余管理程度更小；（2）在 IPO 之后，选择发审委事务所的公司比选择其他事

务所的公司的市场超额回报更高。并且检验结果不受未通过审核样本及潜在内生性

问题的影响。进一步发现，发审委事务所与其他事务所的客户质量差异更多体现在

发审委小所的客户中，并且结果也不受内生性等问题的影响。这些结果说明，会计

师事务所的发审委身份使得会计师事务所增加了对自身声誉的关注，提高了对客户

质量的要求，维护了高质量的客户群体，整体上起到了甄别公司良莠的作用。

不过，关于本文结论和证据的解读，需要特别提醒的是，本文的结果并不直接


否定之前文献关于利用发审委身份进行寻租的证据，同时，本文也没有直接讨论发

审委事务所对声誉的关注足够消除可能的寻租行为。换言之，本文并不是讨论发审

委制度是否存在缺陷，本文的关注点在于讨论中介机构担任发审委委员的制度，整

体上是否有利于资本市场的资源配置。此外，本文的个别检验结果并不十分显著，

所选择的指标不可能穷尽，关于以上问题的探索，仍需未来的研究进一步深入分析。

“Open Access. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons

Attribution License which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any

medium, provided the original author(s) and the source are credited.”

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附录各届发审委委员所涉及的事务所名录及任期

（1）主板委员(25)

涉及事务所

届次任期起任期至数量事务所名单

6 2003/12/24 2004/12/10 5 中和正信;信永中和;安永华明;浙江天健;普华永

道中天

7 2004/12/10 2005/12/31 5 中和正信;天健信德;普华永道中天;信永中和;安

永华明

8 2005/12/31 2007/05/09 5 中和正信;天健信德;普华永道中天;信永中和;安

永华明

9 2007/05/09 2008/04/30 9 浙江东方中汇;深圳鹏城;大信;浙江天健;上海众

华沪银;岳华;利安达信隆;天健华证中洲（北京）;

北京京都

10 2008/04/30 2009/07/11 9 江苏公证;安永华明;中准;亚太中汇;立信;北京兴

华;中磊;中和正信;信永中和

11 2009/07/11 2010/05/04 9 江苏公证;安永华明;中准;亚太中汇;立信;北京兴

华;中磊;中和正信;信永中和

12 2010/05/04 2011/05/26 9 四川华信;五洲松德联合;北京京都天华;立信羊

城;中汇;中勤万信;武汉众环;国富浩华;中审国际

13 2011/05/26 --- 9 北京京都天华;立信大华;中瑞岳华;中汇;普华永

道;中勤万信;国富浩华;信永中和;中审国际

（2）创业板委员(35)

涉及事务所

届次任期起任期至数量事务所名单

1 2009/08/14 2010/08/09 14 大信；江苏天衡；天健光华(北京)；广东正中珠

江；福建华兴；上海众华沪银；广东大华德律；

华普天健高商；开元信德；北京天圆全；浙江天

健东方；亚太(集团)；中兴华；中瑞岳华

2 2010/08/09 2011/08/26 14 大信；江苏天衡；天健光华(北京)；广东正中珠

江；福建华兴；上海众华沪银；广东大华德律；

华普天健高商；开元信德；北京天圆全；浙江天

健东方；亚太(集团)；中兴华；中瑞岳华

3 2011/08/26 --- 14 大信；天健光华(北京)；天职国际；中瑞岳华；

立信；上海众华沪银；北京天圆全；北京兴华；

天健；中天运；亚太(集团)；京都天华；中汇；

中磊

160

2013 年 6 月第 15 卷第 2 期

中国会计与财务研究

C h i n a A c c o u n t i n g a n d F i n a n c e R e v i e w

Volume 15, Number 2 – June 2013

PORC Audit Firms and IPO Client Quality: An Empirical Study of Rent-Seeking and Reputation-Based Explanations1 Jinsong Tan, Xiangting Kong, and Yang Yi2 Received 14th of May 2012 Accepted 26th of March 2013

© The Author(s) 2013. This article is published with open access by The Hong Kong Polytechnic University

Abstract

Based on the event in which the partner of an audit firm is appointed as a member of the

Public Offering Review Committee (PORC), our investigation examines the relationship

between an audit firm’s PORC member status and the quality of its initial public offering

(IPO) clients and how an audit firm’s size influences that relationship from the

perspectives of rent-seeking and reputation-based explanations. Using a sample of all

successfully listed firms from 2004 to 30 April 2011 and using conservatism and

discretionary accruals to represent earnings quality and market-adjusted cumulative

abnormal return to represent corporate economic performance, we find that (1) in the

pre-IPO period, the clients that choose PORC audit firms have a higher level of

conservatism in their earnings and lower income-increasing discretionary accruals than

firms that choose other audit firms; and (2) in the post-IPO period, the clients that choose

1 The authors acknowledge the financial support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No.: 71272196) and the Major Project of Guangdong Humanities and Social Sciences Key Research Foundation (Grant No.: 2012JDXM-0002). We appreciate the helpful suggestions of Prof Guojian Zheng, Prof Ying Zheng, Dr Jun Zheng, and Dr Yuyin Jian from Sun Yat-sen University; Prof Shunlin Song from the Central University of Finance and Economics; and Prof Yanyan Chen from South China Agricultural University. We are grateful to the two anonymous referees and Dr Nancy Su (the executive editor) for their valuable comments. All errors are our own. 2 Jinsong Tan, Professor, Business School, Contemporary Accountancy and Finance Research Center, Sun Yat-sen University, 135 Xingang West Road, Guangzhou, 510275; email: [email protected]. Xiangting Kong, PhD candidate, Business School, Sun Yat-sen University; email: [email protected]. Yang Yi, PhD candidate, Business School, Sun Yat-sen University; email: [email protected].

PORC Audit Firms and IPO Client Quality 161

PORC audit firms have higher market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns.

Furthermore, the difference in quality between PORC audit firms’ clients and other audit

firms’ clients is especially significant in the small PORC audit firms’ clients group. These

findings support the reputation-based explanation.

Keywords: PORC Audit Firm, Rent-Seeking, Reputation, IPO, Client Quality

CLC Codes: F239.6, F830.91

I. Introduction

The capital market is not only an important channel for firms to raise funds but also

a dream place for people to become billionaires. Driven by the lure of a great source of

capital, the competition among firms for initial public offering (IPO) resources is

increasingly intense. In 1993, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) set

up the Public Offering Review Committee (PORC) as the authorised institution for the

examination and approval of stock issuance applications with the important mission of

distinguishing between good and bad companies and enhancing the IPO resource

allocation efficiency of the capital market. As the PORC undergoes reform and

development, more and more PORC members are coming from self-regulatory industrial

organisations outside the CSRC; for example, the proportion of committee members from

audit firms3 in the PORC of the Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) gradually increased

from 20 per cent in 2003 to 36 per cent in 2007 and 40 per cent in 2009. On the basis of

the fact that a partner of an audit firm can be appointed as a member of the PORC, this

study investigates how an audit firm’s PORC status influences the IPO resource

allocation efficiency of the capital market.

As an emerging market, China’s legal and regulatory systems for capital markets are

still imperfect and immature, and so companies generally whitewash their financial

reports in order to get listed (Aharony et al., 2000; Lin et al., 2000). Having shifted from

a bureaucrat-dominated system to a professional-dominated system, the PORC, with

intermediaries such as audit firms, will now be better at screening IPO firms and

allocating IPO resources. Meanwhile, there is concern that an audit firm’s PORC status

might become a rent-seeking instrument to assist its clients to pass the IPO screening

process when one of its partners is appointed as a member of the PORC (hereinafter, “the

PORC audit firm”) (Wang et al., 2009; Li et al., 2012; Yang, 2012). In other words,

making use of their special status, being a coach as well as a referee, PORC audit firms

3 All of the audit firms in this paper are certified public accountant (CPA) firms unless otherwise stated.

162 Tan, Kong, and Yi

are able to engage in rent-seeking activities through their relationships with the PORC

when listing resources are scarce and when demanded by their IPO clients, who are

attracted to the huge benefits received from successful listing (the rent-seeking

hypothesis). The cases of Sheng Jing Shan He (stock code: 002525) and Green-Land

(stock code: 002200) can be regarded as actual examples of this potential hypothesis.4

However, PORC audit firms also have to consider the reputation cost and litigation

risk as well as the possible rent-seeking opportunities (the reputation hypothesis) for the

following reasons. First, a high reputation can bring an audit firm corresponding benefits

(Klein and Leffler, 1981; Craswell et al., 1995). Undoubtedly, PORC status gives an audit

firm an excellent brand name that exceeds that of other firms in the industry as well as a

higher reputation and audit fee premiums. Second, an audit firm’s PORC status increases

the possibility of discovering audit failure and the losses resulting from it because a

PORC audit firm is monitored more intensely due to its well-known status. If a PORC

audit firm is involved in an audit failure, it will soon be found out and punished much

more severely. For example, China Audit International Certified Public Accountants Ltd

(CAICPA) and Shenzhen Pengcheng Certified Public Accountants Co. Ltd (SPCPA) were

respectively involved in the financial frauds of Sheng Jing Shan He and Green-Land:

CAICPA received a warning letter from the CSRC, and SPCPA’s securities business

licence was revoked. Third, the political connections of PORC audit firms make them

more concerned about their reputation. The PORC status of an audit firm is not only an

important channel for building up political connections with the IPO regulatory institution

but also a guarantee given by government authorities. The credibility of the government

will be hurt if a PORC audit firm is found to have engaged in rent-seeking activities, and

the firm will lose its political connections with the IPO regulatory institution and be

severely punished by the government. In addition, PORC audit firms have the ability to

maintain their reputation and reduce their litigation risk. From the perspective of the

two-way selection process between PORC audit firms and IPO firms, the range of options

for PORC audit firms increases because of the preferences of both higher quality and

lower quality IPO firms. Higher quality IPO firms prefer PORC audit firms owing to the

latter’s enhanced reputation and information advantage during the IPO regulatory process,

and lower quality IPO firms prefer PORC audit firms because these audit firms give them

rent-seeking opportunities. Meanwhile, PORC audit firms will choose higher quality

clients to reduce the inherent risks associated with taking on a client in order to maintain

4 China Audit International Certified Public Accountants Ltd (CAICPA) and Shenzhen Pengcheng Certified Public Accountants Co. LTD (SZPCCPA) engaged in the financial frauds of Sheng Jing Shan He and Green-Land and both were PORC audit firms at that time. Details can be found at http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/quanshang/thyj/20111201/054710913423.shtml and http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20110406/20299646488.shtml


their reputation.

In summary, this paper studies the difference in IPO client quality between PORC

audit firms and non-PORC audit firms to investigate how an audit firm’s PORC status

influences the IPO resource allocation efficiency of the capital market by testing whether

the rent-seeking hypothesis (i.e. the PORC status of an audit firm helps its lower quality

IPO clients to increase their probability of passing the IPO regulatory process) or the

reputation hypothesis (i.e. PORC status encourages an audit firm to distinguish between

good and bad clients and finally to choose higher quality IPO clients in order to maintain

its reputation) holds. Using a sample of firms successfully listed between 2004 and 30

April 2011 and conservatism and discretionary accruals to represent earnings quality and

market-adjusted cumulative abnormal return to represent corporate economic

performance, we find that (1) in the pre-IPO period, the clients that choose PORC audit

firms show a higher level of conservatism in their reported earnings and have less

income-increasing discretionary accruals than the firms that choose non-PORC audit

firms; and (2) in the post-IPO period, the clients that choose PORC audit firms have

higher market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns. These findings are consistent after

controlling for cases rejected by the IPO regulatory institution and potential endogeneity

problems. Furthermore, the difference in quality between PORC audit firms’ clients and

non-PORC audit firms’ clients is especially significant in the small PORC audit firms’

clients group. These findings support the reputation hypothesis.

This study makes several contributions to the literature. First, it enriches the

literature on the influence of institutional background on the behaviour of audit firms.

Previous research has focused on the empirical evidence of PORC audit firms’

rent-seeking activities (Wang et al., 2009; Li et al., 2012; Yang, 2012). The principle

difference of this study is that we study the relationship between audit firms’ PORC status

and the quality of their IPO clients in order to investigate how an audit firm’s PORC

status influences the IPO resource allocation efficiency of the capital market, and we find

that PORC status encourages audit firms to choose higher quality IPO clients because

such clients enhance their reputation and lower their audit risk.

Second, this study enriches the literature on the reputation of audit firms. According

to the brand name investment model constructed by Klein and Leffler (1981), audit firms

are motivated to maintain audit quality to protect their brand name once it has been

established (Chan and Wu, 2011), and this study provides empirical evidence for this

model using a unique setting in which audit firms can enhance their brand name

reputation by acquiring PORC status.

This study also extends the discussion on the efficiency of the existing public

offering evaluation system, and our results could help policy setting in the future. By


investigating the effect of audit firms’ PORC status (i.e. whether it is an instrument for

rent-seeking or an indication of higher reputation), this study finds that the quality of

PORC audit firms’ clients is higher than that of non-PORC audit firms. This finding

confirms that PORC members from intermediaries such as audit firms can exert a positive

impact on the IPO resource allocation efficiency of the capital market.

The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section II introduces the institutional

background, reviews the literature, and develops the hypotheses; Section III describes the

research design; Section IV reports the main empirical results; and Section V concludes

the paper.

II. Institutional Background, Literature Review, and Hypothesis Development

2.1 Institutional Background

Following the policy of open-door reform, the Chinese government has gradually

established and improved various institutions of the capital market; as part of this process,

the stock issuance institution, which was initially administration-based, has gradually

been commercialised. The CSRC has played a crucial role in approving IPO applications

during the transformation process of the stock issuance institution from the earliest quota

system to the approval system introduced after the promulgation of Securities Law and

finally to the implementation of the sponsorship system.

In 1993, the CSRC set up the PORC to review IPO applications according to the

preliminary opinions of CSRC officials. Article 14 of the Securities Law promulgated in

1999 stipulates explicitly that the securities regulatory authorities under the State Council

shall establish an issuance evaluation commission to review applications for the issuance

of shares according to the law. Since then, PORC’s stock issuance approval power and

function have been confirmed by law. According to Article 4 of the Public Offering

Review Committee of China Securities Regulatory Commission Ordinance issued by the

State Council on 16 September 1999, the PORC shall comprise of 80 members,

bureaucrats from the CSRC and professionals outside the CSRC, who will hold office for

a term of 2 years and for no more than three terms. However, at that time, information

about PORC members and the commission’s working processes were not known to the

public, and this inevitably led to the case of Wang Xiaoshi.5 To ensure openness, fairness,

and impartiality in the stock issuance system, the CSRC enacted a sweeping reform of the

5 The case of Wang Xiaoshi is described at http://media.163.com/special/w/wxs_zqzt_20041122501.html.


system and the State Council issued the Interim Measures for the Public Offering Review

Committee of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (the “Interim Measures”) in

2003. The Interim Measures stipulates that PORC members shall be recommended by the

relevant administrative organs, self-regulatory industrial organisations, research

institutions, and universities and shall be employed by the CSRC. PORC members are

elected by open ballot, and the final PORC members list is open to the public. The

committee consists of 25 members: 5 from the CSRC and 20 from outside institutions.

Each term of office is 1 year, and each member can hold office for no more than three

terms. To monitor the GEM, the CSRC set up the Public Offering Review Committee of

the Growth Enterprise Market (PORCGEM) on 13 May 2009. The PORCGEM consists

of 35 members, 5 from the CSRC and 30 from outside institutions.

As the PORC has developed, more and more committee members have come from

self-regulatory industrial organisations, and especially from audit firms, rather than from

the CSRC. As shown by the PORC members lists mandated by the Interim Measures

since 2003, the number of committee members from audit firms increased from five in

2003 (20 per cent of the total) to nine in 2007 (36 per cent of the total). There are 14

members from audit firms on the PORCGEM, accounting for 40 per cent of the total

number of members. This shows that the government has reduced its intervention in and

control of IPO resources while strengthening the marketisation and transparency of the

IPO regulatory process.

2.2 Literature Review

Having shifted from a bureaucrat-dominated system to a professional-dominated

system, the PORC, with members from market intermediaries such as audit firms, will be

better equipped to screen IPO firms and allocate IPO resources. However, concern exists

that an audit firm might use its PORC status as an instrument for rent-seeking to assist its

clients to pass the IPO regulatory process when a partner of the audit firm is appointed as

a member of the PORC (Wang et al., 2009; Li et al., 2012; Yang, 2012).

Previous papers have studied whether a PORC firm would use its PORC status to

conduct rent-seeking activities. Wang and Xin (2009) find that PORC audit firms have a

larger share of the IPO market and charge higher IPO audit fees. Li and Liu (2012) and

Yang (2012) test the relation between IPO firms’ choice of PORC audit firms and the

likelihood of passing the IPO regulatory process. Li and Liu (2012) use IPO companies

applying for listing on the Small and Medium Enterprises Board (SMEB) as the sample

and find that IPO firms’ likelihood of passing the IPO regulatory process is positively

correlated with the choice of PORC audit firms. Using the IPO cases examined by the

CSRC between 2002 and 2010, Yang (2012) finds that after their partners are appointed


to the PORC, the IPO audit fees and the IPO market share of audit firms below the top

tier increase significantly and the IPO rejection risk of their clients decreases, whereas no

significant effect is found among top-tier audit firms.

However, there may be alternative explanations for these results. Wang and Xin’s

(2009) findings about IPO audit fees may be due to the fact that the higher IPO audit fees

come from the rent-seeking activities of the PORC audit firms, but it could also be that

the higher reputation resulting from PORC status warrants a higher audit fee or that a

higher audit fee is charged to compensate for the higher risk (i.e. the potential risk of

audit failure and loss increases) involved due to much more intense monitoring from the

market. Meanwhile, the findings of Li and Liu (2012) and Yang (2012) about the relation

between IPO firms’ choice of PORC audit firms and the likelihood of passing the IPO

regulatory process could be interpreted as showing that PORC status encourages audit

firms to choose higher quality IPO clients in order to maintain their reputation and thus

the pass rate is higher among PORC audit firms’ clients.

Overall, previous research has focused on the empirical evidence of PORC audit

firms’ rent-seeking activities, and the main difference of this study is that we study the

relationship between audit firms’ PORC status and the quality of their IPO clients so as to

investigate how an audit firm’s PORC status influences the IPO resource allocation

efficiency of the capital market.

2.3 Hypothesis Development

2.3.1 Rent-Seeking Hypothesis

Owing to the scarcity of IPO resources and the administrative approval system for

IPO regulation, the PORC status of an audit firm represents not only an affirmation from

the CSRC but also an important right to vote on IPO applications. In other words, the

special status of PORC audit firms, being a coach as well as a referee, can enable them to

engage in rent-seeking activities so as to increase the probability of their clients passing

the IPO regulatory process (hereinafter “the rent-seeking hypothesis”).

First, due to their information advantage and political connections, PORC audit

firms have the capacity to help their clients to succeed in the IPO regulatory process

(Yang, 2012). Through its partner’s experience on the PORC, a PORC audit firm gains a

good understanding of the institutional arrangements related to the IPO regulatory process

and will therefore be able to help its clients to be better prepared for IPO applications

(Yang, 2012). In addition, an audit firm can build up political connections with the

regulators when its partner is appointed to the PORC. As shown by the literature on

political connections, firms can use political connections to obtain administrative

approval and win scarce resources in the Chinese market, where the government plays an


active role (Yu and Pan, 2008; Luo and Liu, 2009; Yu et al., 2010). An audit firm with

partners on the PORC has access to key CSRC officials and other PORC members who

determine the outcomes of IPO applications, and thus it is able to lobby more effectively

for favourable regulatory decisions on behalf of its clients.

Second, PORC audit firms have the incentive to help their clients to succeed in the

IPO regulatory process. Evidence from Western research shows that audit firms lobby

regulators for both their own and their clients’ benefit (Puro, 1984; Roberts et al., 2003;

Thornburg and Roberts, 2008; Lennox and Li, 2012). The PORC audit firms that help

their clients to pass the IPO regulatory process can obtain significant benefits – not only

the direct income from IPO rent-seeking activities but also future audit fees after IPO.

Meanwhile, a higher pass rate can enable PORC audit firms to charge higher fees and win

new clients (Yang, 2012). Thus, PORC audit firms have the incentive to help clients build

“connections” using their own advantages.

2.3.2 Reputation Hypothesis

Apart from possible rent-seeking activities, PORC audit firms also have reputation

concerns. PORC status gives an audit firm easy access to rent-seeking, but it also

increases the firm’s concern about the reputation cost and litigation risk, and this makes it

strengthen its requirements regarding the quality of IPO clients. Meanwhile, as more IPO

clients turn to choose PORC audit firms, this gives PORC audit firms chances to choose

higher quality clients so as to maintain their own reputation (hereinafter “the reputation

hypothesis”).

First, PORC audit firms have the incentive to maintain their high reputation for the

following reasons:

(1) A higher reputation brings corresponding benefits to an audit firm (Klein and

Leffler, 1981; Craswell et al., 1995). An audit firm’s reputation and independence are

critical to its survival and growth (Simunic and Stein, 1987; Francis and Wilson, 1988),

and it can get a bigger market share and bigger audit fee premiums through having a good

reputation. Undoubtedly, PORC status gives an audit firm a higher reputation than, and

an excellent brand name that is superior to, their peers. According to the brand name

investment model constructed by Klein and Leffler (1981), audit firms will be motivated

to maintain audit quality to protect their brand name once it has been established (Chan

and Wu, 2011), while building and maintaining a brand name will make audit firms

become industry specialists and enable them to gain audit fee premiums (Craswell et al.,

1995). The empirical evidence of Wang and Xin (2009) and Yang (2012) supports the

above prediction, showing that audit firms gain higher audit fees and a larger market

share after they obtain PORC status.


(2) An audit firm’s PORC status increases the possibility of audit failure being found

and the corresponding losses because a PORC audit firm is monitored more intensely

because of its renowned status in the industry. Audit firms, especially PORC audit firms,

receive more market attention and legal supervision when they audit listed companies

(Chan and Wu, 2011). When a partner of an audit firm is appointed as a PORC member,

the audit firm not only has the power of auditing IPO firms but also a voting right in

deciding which firms go public. The special status of PORC audit firms attracts much

more market attention and raises the probability of audit firms being detected in a timely

manner if they are involved in an audit failure. Meanwhile, PORC firms will bear a

higher reputation cost and a bigger impact from an audit failure because of the market

attention they receive. DeAngelo (1981) shows that audit firms will lose all of their

clients if they fail to report breaches in clients’ accounting reports. Although Chinese

auditors’ level of exposure to litigation risk is less than that of their US counterparts

(Chan and Wu, 2011), the sanctions imposed by Chinese regulators, such as the CSRC

and the Ministry of Finance (MOF), for audit failure can be harsh: for example, both

CAICPA and SPCPA, who were respectively involved in the financial frauds of Sheng

Jing Shan He and Green-Land, were punished; the former received a warning letter from

the CSRC, and the latter had its securities business licence revoked. So in the Chinese

capital market, the costs of audit failure are high. Evidence from Wang and Xin (2009)

and Yang (2012) shows that PORC audit firms have a higher share of the market, which

means that they suffer a greater loss after audit failures.

(3) The political connections of PORC audit firms arouse more concerns about

maintaining their reputation. The PORC status of an audit firm is an important channel

for acquiring political connections with the IPO regulatory institution, and it is also

considered to be a guarantee given by government authorities. If a PORC audit firm is

found to have engaged in rent-seeking activities, the credibility of the government will be

damaged and the firm will thus lose its political connections with the IPO regulatory

institution and be severely punished by the government. So, PORC audit firms will

treasure their reputation in order to keep their connections with the regulators.

Second, PORC status enhances audit firms’ ability to choose higher quality clients:

(1) Higher quality IPO firms prefer PORC audit firms because of the guarantee of their

reputation and their information advantage during the IPO regulatory process, while

lower quality IPO firms prefer PORC audit firms because of the opportunities for

rent-seeking. (2) Audit risk depends on the inherent risk associated with taking on a client

(Hogan and Wilkins, 2008), and the inherent risk of low-quality clients is higher than that

of high-quality clients. So when a partner of an audit firm is appointed as a PORC

member, the audit firm will have a more intense motivation to maintain its brand name’s


reputation. To reduce audit risk, PORC audit firms will raise the selection criteria and

choose higher quality clients in order to maintain their reputation.

2.3.3 Hypothesis Development

Using pre-IPO earnings quality and post-IPO corporate economic performance to

represent the quality of IPO firms, this paper studies the difference in IPO client quality

between PORC audit firms and non-PORC audit firms to investigate how an audit firm’s

PORC status influences the IPO resource allocation efficiency of the capital market by

testing two opposite hypotheses: the rent-seeking hypothesis that PORC status will help

lower quality IPO clients to increase their probability of passing the IPO regulatory

process, and the reputation hypothesis that PORC status will encourage audit firms to

distinguish between the good and the bad companies and finally to choose higher quality

IPO clients in order to maintain their reputation.

Specifically, if the rent-seeking hypothesis dominates, PORC audit firms will choose

low-quality clients and help them to pass the IPO regulatory process, while low-quality

IPO firms will have incentives to choose PORC audit firms and to pass the IPO

regulatory process by making use of the special resources that PORC audit firms have.

This means that the quality of the clients of PORC audit firms will be lower than that of

the clients of non-PORC audit firms. However, if the reputation hypothesis dominates,

PORC audit firms, concerned about their reputation and the potential audit risk, will

refuse to audit low-quality IPO firms and will not help them to pass the IPO regulatory

process, and so they will choose high-quality IPO clients to reduce the audit risk. This

means that the quality of the clients of PORC audit firms will be higher than that of the

clients of non-PORC audit firms.

Formally, the following two hypotheses are tested:

Hypothesis 1: The pre-IPO earnings quality of IPO clients of PORC audit

firms is different from that of IPO clients of non-PORC audit

firms.

Hypothesis 2: The post-IPO economic performance of IPO clients of PORC

audit firms is different from that of IPO clients of non-PORC

audit firms.

III. Research Design

3.1 Sample

This paper focuses on a sample of successfully listed firms from 2004 to 30 April


2011 and collects background information on all PORC members during this period. The

research period begins in 2004 because the State Council issued the Interim Measures on

28 December 2003. The Interim Measures stipulates that background material on PORC

members must be open to the public. Moreover, the sponsorship system came into effect

in 2004. Therefore, this paper focuses on IPO cases since 2004 to avoid the problems

caused by the different functions of the PORC under the different issuance approval

mechanisms. The research period ends on 30 April 2011 because this study needs the

share price data for at least 1 year to test Hypothesis 1.

Meanwhile, we exclude financial companies on account of their particular

accounting process and operating activities, which is fairly different from other industries.

Finally, we obtain 857 IPO firm observations. However, the observations used in the

models are different because some variables have missing data in different models. Table

1 displays the distribution of the sample.

Table 1 Sample Distribution

Panel A: Distribution of successfully listed firms by year

Year Number of IPO firms

2004 31

2005 14

2006 64

2007 114

2008 77

2009 97

2010 342

Up to 30 April 2011 118

Total 857

Panel B: Sample distribution by model

Sample Distribution Regression Models

Conservatism

Model

Accruals

Model

Cumulative

Abnormal

Return Model

Time Range

2 years

before IPO

2 years

after IPO

1 year

after IPO

Number of Obs 783 660 724

Number of firms 474 417 724


The financial report data, stock return data, and audit firm data are sourced from the

Wind and CSMAR databases. Firms’ IPO applications, the drafts of prospectuses, and the

background information on PORC members are sourced from the Wind database and

collected by hand. We treat merged audit firms before and after the merger as the same

firm.

3.2 Model and Definition

To test whether the rent-seeking or the reputation hypothesis dominates, this study

uses pre-IPO earnings quality and post-IPO economic performance to represent the

quality of IPO firms.

3.2.1 Pre-IPO earnings quality

This study uses accounting conservatism and discretionary accruals 2 years before

IPO to measure firms’ pre-IPO earnings quality.6

Conservatism is an important accounting principle (Basu, 1997; Li and Lu, 2003).

Ball et al. (2003) argue that there are several reasons why conservatism is a good measure

of earnings quality. First, managers generally possess private information about the

economic gains and losses of companies that is unobservable to auditors. Their incentive

to disclose gain and loss information is not symmetric, and they tends to recognise gains

in a timely manner, so auditors generally give greater credence to information about

losses. Second, managers can book economic gains and losses by selling assets, without

accounting recognition of unrealised gains and losses, and they have an asymmetric

incentive to exercise the option to realise gains, not losses. Timely recognition of

unrealised losses reduces that asymmetry. Third, the level of conservatism in financial

reports decreases the likelihood of managers making ex ante negative net present value

(NPV) investment decisions and increases the efficiency of investments. Accounting

conservatism also protects the interests of outside investors through the timely disclosure

of earnings and investment information to them. Fourth, accounting conservatism

transfers decision rights from loss-making managers to lenders more quickly and

decreases the risk of debt default. Thus, accounting conservatism can effectively measure

firms’ earnings quality and help investors to understand the factual information on IPO

firms.

Follow the argument of Ball et al. (2003), this study uses the model of Ball and

Shivakumar (2005) to estimate accounting conservatism. As it does not depend on the

share price data, this model is good at testing pre-IPO earnings quality. The CFO-accrual

6 Because there are only 3 years of pre-IPO financial data and the research designs of Models (1) and (4) need the lead data, we finally select observations 2 years before IPO.


model is as follows:

titititi

titititi

titititititi

titititititi

titititi

titititi

tititititi

tititititi

BIG10CFODCFO

BIG10CFOBIG10DCFO

BIG10LEVCFODCFOLEVCFO

LEVDCFOLEVSIZECFODCFO

SIZECFOSIZEDCFO

SIZEPORCCFODCFO

PORCCFOPORCDCFOPORC

CFODCFOCFODCFOACCRUAL

,,,,19

,,18,,17

,16,,,15,,14

,,13,12,,,11

,,10,,9

,8,,,7

,,6,,5,4

,,3,2,10,

Effects FixedIndustry

, (1)

where ACCRUALi,t is accounting accruals, defined as net income minus cash flow from

operating activities (CFO) and then scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year;

DCFOi,t is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if CFO is negative and 0 otherwise; CFOi,t

is cash flow from operating activities scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year;

and PORCi,t is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the audit firm has the PORC status

and 0 otherwise. To test Hypothesis 1, we focus on β7, the coefficient of the interaction

term DCFOi,t*CFOi,t*PORCi,t. If β7 is positive, the result supports the reputation

hypothesis and means that the level of accounting conservatism among the IPO clients of

PORC audit firms is higher than that among the IPO clients of other audit firms. If β7 is

negative, the result supports the rent-seeking hypothesis and means that the level of

conservatism among the IPO clients of PORC audit firms is lower than that among the

IPO clients of other audit firms.

Following previous empirical studies (Goh and Li, 2011), we control for SIZEi,t and

LEVi,t to reduce the influence of company size and leverage on our results. Meanwhile,

considering that the quality of an audit firm is an important cause of a partner being

appointed as a PORC member, we control for the indicator BIG10i,t, which equals 1 if the

audit firm is among the top 10 in the Chinese market and 0 otherwise, to reduce the

influence of an audit firm’s quality on accounting conservatism. Table 2 presents the

definitions of the variables in this paper.

The second indicator representing earnings quality is discretionary accruals. The

Measures for IPO and Listing Management issued by the CSRC on 18 May 2006

stipulates that the net income of an IPO firm must be positive for the 3 consecutive years

immediately prior to IPO and accumulated profit must be more than 30 million renminbi.

Meanwhile, the Measures for IPO and Listing Management in the Growth Enterprise

Market issued by the CSRC on 11 March 2009 stipulates that the net income of IPO firms

must be positive and show continued growth for the 2 consecutive years immediately


Table 2 Variable Definitions

Variable Definition

1. Dependent Variables

ACCRUALi,t Accounting accruals = (net income – CFO)/ beginning total assets

ACC_DDi,t Discretionary accruals of the modified DD model

CARi,1 Market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns 1 year after IPO

2. Independent Variables PORCi,t

Indicator of the PORC audit firm which takes the value of 1 if a

partner of the audit firm is appointed as a PORC member in thecurrent year and 0 otherwise.

CFOi,t Operating cash flow = CFOt / beginning total assets

DCFOi,t Indicator of negative CFOi,t, which takes the value of 1 if CFOi,t < 0 and 0 otherwise.

SIZEi,t Company size = the natural logarithm of ending total assets

LEVi,t A company’s leverage = (current liabilities + long-term loan) / total assets

WCi,t

Working capital accruals = (operating profit + depreciation and

amortisation + financial expenses – CFO) / average of beginning and ending total assets

CFOAi,t CFO of the modified DD model = CFOt / average of beginning and ending total assets

ΔSALESi,t Sales growth = increase in operating income / average of beginning and ending total assets

PPEi,t Fixed assets = fixed assets / average of beginning and ending total assets

ROAi,t Return on total assets = net income / ending total assets

Ri,t Monthly stock return

Rm,t Equally-weighted average monthly composite market return withcash dividend reinvested

MBi,t Market-to-book ratio = market value/book value of equity

SOEi,t Indicator of state-owned enterprises which takes the value of 1 if theIPO firm is owned by the state and 0 otherwise.

BIG10i,t

Indicator of top 10 audit firms which takes the value of 1 if the IPO

firm chooses one of the top 10 audit firms (according to the rankings provided by the Chinese Institute of Certified PublicAccountants) and 0 otherwise.

REG_INDi,t

Indicator of regulated industry which takes the value of 1 if the IPO

firm is in the industry of mining, utilities, real estate, or servicesand 0 otherwise.

BIGBROKERi,t

Indicator of top 10 brokers which takes the value of 1 if the IPO

firm chooses one of the top 10 brokers (according to the rankings provided by the Securities Association of China) and 0 otherwise.

ACCRUAL_ADi,t Accounting accruals in the IPO year = (net income – CFO) / total assets

PAIRPORCi,t

Indicator of the audit firm having the PORC status which takes the

value of 1 if the audit firm has PORC status and 0 otherwise.


prior to IPO and the accumulated profit must be at least 10 million renminbi or the net

income must be positive and at least 5 million renminbi for the year immediately prior to

IPO; the total operating income must be at least 50 million renminbi for the year

immediately prior to IPO; and the percentage of sales growth must be at least 30 per cent

for the 2 years immediately prior to IPO. These stipulations actually require IPO firms to

have strong profitability, and so IPO firms always have strong incentives to manipulate

their earnings in order to meet these requirements (Lin and Wei, 2000; Aharony et al.,

2000). Wu et al. (2007) find that there is more earnings management in public firms than

in private firms because of the different regulations. So, this study uses the discretionary

accruals to represent earnings quality to test the level of earnings management in IPO

firms.

Following Gul et al. (2013), we use the model of Dechow and Dichev (2002) as

modified by McNichols (2002) (hereinafter the “modified DD model”) to estimate the

discretionary accruals of IPO firms. We chose this model because the models of Jones

(1991) and Kothari et al. (2005) have been criticised for their estimation noises; for

example, sometimes, the discretionary accruals of these models are actually working

capital increased by the firm’s investment. As suggested by McNichols (2002), it is useful

to link the approach of Jones (1991) to that taken by the DD model to reduce the extent of

the omitted-variable problem.

The model is as follows:

ti

tititititi

PPE

SALESCFOACFOACFOAWC

,4

,41,3,21,10,

, (2)

where WCi,t is working capital accruals; CFOAi,t-1, CFOAi,t, and CFOAi,t+1 are operating

cash flow in year t-1, t, and t+1 respectively; ΔSALESi,t is sales growth from t-1 to t; and

PPEi,t is the gross value of fixed assets. All of these variables are scaled by the average of

beginning and ending total assets in year t.

Following the CSRC industry classification scheme and requiring that there should

be at least 10 observations in each industry-year combination,7 this study estimates the

coefficients of Model (2) in each industry-year group and defines the discretionary

accruals as the regression residual.

To test Hypothesis 1, we test the discretionary accruals estimated in the above model

using the following model:

Effects FixedYear

_

,5

,4,3,2,10,

ti

tititititi

BIG10

ROALEVSIZEPORCDDACC

(3)

7 We relax the sample constraint of Model (2) to at least 20 observations in each industry-year combination, and our conclusions are unchanged. To save space, we do not report the results.


Since ACC_DDi,t is estimated by lagged data, the sample of Model (3) only contains

the 2-year pre-IPO data. To test Hypothesis 1, we focus on β1, the coefficient of PORCi,t.

In addition, following previous studies such as Gul et al. (2013), we control for SIZEi,t,

LEVi,t, ROAi,t, and BIG10i,t to reduce the influence of firm size, leverage, profitability, and

audit quality, respectively. However, we do not control for the indicator of loss because

IPO firms have to be profitable according to the stipulation of the CSRC.

3.2.2 Post-IPO economic performance

This study evaluates corporate economic performance 1 year after IPO to test

Hypothesis 1.8 Following Fan et al. (2007), economic performance is represented by the

cumulative abnormal market-adjusted stock return (CAR), calculated on the basis of

monthly stock returns using the following model as in Teoh and Wong (1993):

12

0,1, )1( log

ttm,tii RRCAR , (4)

where Ri,t is monthly stock return and Rm,t is equally-weighted average monthly

composite market return with cash dividend reinvested. We then test Hypothesis 1 in the

following model using the 12-month CAR immediately after IPO:

ti

tititi

tititititii

ADACCRUAL

BIGBROKERINDREGBIG10

SOEMBLEVSIZEPORCCAR

,9

,8,7,6

,5,4,3,2,101,

_

_

(5)

As previously mentioned, we focus on β1, the coefficient of PORCi,t. If β1 is

significantly positive, the result supports the reputation hypothesis and means that the

IPO clients of PORC audit firms are more profitable than those of other audit firms. If β1

is significantly negative, the result supports the rent-seeking hypothesis and means that

the IPO clients of PORC audit firms are less profitable than those of other audit firms.

Moreover, following Fan et al. (2007), we control for SIZEi,t, LEVi,t, MBi,t, and

BIG10i,t to reduce the influence of firm size, leverage, growth, and audit quality,

respectively. We also control for the indicator SOEi,t to reduce the influence of property

rights attributes, the indicator REG_INDi,t to reduce the difference from regulated

industries, the indicator BIGBROKERi,t to reduce the influence of brokers’ size, and

ACCRUAL_ADi,t to reduce accruals’ influence on future stock return.

3.2.3 Endogenous problem of PORC audit firms

8 The longer the time lag, the more noise the model has, so to avoid the influence of changing audit firm or other events on firms’ economic performance after IPO, we do not use a longer time range here. Following the previous literature, we test cumulative abnormal returns 1 year after IPO.


The list of PORC members in the appendix shows that nearly all PORC audit firms

are big audit firms. Therefore, the differences in IPO clients between PORC audit firms

and non-PORC audit firms (i.e. the results of above tests) may not be due to the influence

of PORC status but rather to the other characteristics of audit firms.

To confirm the influence of PORC status and to control for endogeneity problems

that might exist, we use the sample of all audit firms that have also been PORC members

(hereinafter the “involved audit firms”) to compare the quality of IPO clients before and

after the involved audit firms are appointed as PORC members. This design has at least

three advantages: (1) it remedies the subjective operational defect of matched samples; (2)

it avoids the arbitrary instrument selection problem of the Heckman test (Francis et al.,

2010; Larcker and Rusticus, 2010); (3) it controls for the influence of the other

characteristics of PORC audit firms, such as the ranking of an audit firm, the number of

certified accountants, and the quality of certified accountants, and focuses on the

relationship between PORC status and the quality of IPO clients. Specifically, we

construct the indicator PAIRPORCi,t, which equals 1 if a partner of the audit firm is

appointed as a PORC member and 0 otherwise, and use it as replacement for PORCi,t in

Models (1), (3), and (5) and run these regressions with the involved audit firm sample.

A potential problem is the level of representation of the involved audit firm sample.

The statistics indicate that the number of IPO cases dealt with by the involved audit firms

is 686, accounting for 80.0 per cent of the total of 857 IPO cases. The involved audit firm

sample is therefore representational.

Finally, we winsorise the top and bottom 1 per cent of each continuous variable to

exclude the effect of outliers.

IV. Empirical Results

4.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table 3 presents the summary statistics of the variables in this paper. In the

regression model of earnings quality, we find that, on average, 28 per cent of the IPO

firms choose the PORC audit firms, 36 per cent choose the big audit firms, and the

average ROA of these IPO firms is 10 per cent. In the regression model of CAR, we find

that, on average, 24 per cent of the IPO firms choose the PORC audit firms, 47 per cent

choose the big audit firms, 23 per cent are state-owned, and 8 per cent are in regulated

industries.


Table 3 Descriptive Statistics

Variable N Mean Std. Min. Q1 Media Q3 Max.

Panel A: Variables of Earnings Quality Regression Model

ACCRUALi,t 783 0.00 0.11 -0.27 -0.06 -0.01 0.04 0.37

ACC_DDi,t 660 0.00 0.05 -0.11 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.14

PORCi,t 783 0.28 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00

PAIRPORCi,t 603 0.36 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00

CFOi,t 783 0.14 0.12 -0.17 0.07 0.13 0.20 0.52

DCFOi,t 783 0.06 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00

SIZEi,t 783 20.58 1.36 18.57 19.71 20.24 21.10 25.37

LEVi,t 783 0.54 0.15 0.15 0.44 0.56 0.64 0.85

ROAi,t 783 0.10 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.09 0.13 0.31

BIG10i,t 783 0.36 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00

Panel B: Variables of CAR Regression Model

CARi,1 724 -0.24 0.39 -1.17 -0.45 -0.23 0.00 0.73

PORCi,t 724 0.24 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00

PAIRPORCi,t 564 0.31 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00

SIZEi,t 724 21.06 1.10 19.56 20.38 20.84 21.39 25.27

LEVi,t 724 0.26 0.17 0.02 0.12 0.24 0.38 0.75

MBi,t 724 4.54 2.09 1.38 3.12 4.12 5.52 12.76

SOEi,t 724 0.23 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00

BIG10i,t 724 0.47 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00

REG_INDi,t 724 0.08 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00

BIGBROKERi,t 724 0.36 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00

ACCRUAL_ADi,t 724 0.03 0.07 -0.11 -0.01 0.02 0.06 0.25

Note: To exclude the effect of outliers, all continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th

percentiles.

Table 4 reports the correlation coefficients of the variables of this study. Among the

variables of the earnings quality regression model, ACC_DDi,t is negatively related with

PORCi,t, but not significantly, which shows the lower level of earnings management

among the PORC audit firms’ clients. Among the variables of the CAR regression model,

CARi,1 is significantly and positively related with PORCi,t, which shows that the economic

performance of the PORC audit firms’ clients for the 12 months immediately after IPO is

higher than that of the other audit firms’ clients. The correlation coefficients of the other

variables are showed in Table 4.


Table 4 Correlations

Panel A: Correlations between PORC status and the variables of the earnings quality regression model

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1. ACCRUALi,t 1.000 2. ACC_DDi,t 0.412 1.000 *** 3. PORCi,t -0.031 -0.029 1.000 4. CFOi,t -0.647 0.062 0.017 1.000 *** 5. DCFOi,t 0.482 0.138 -0.041 -0.481 1.000 *** *** *** 6. SIZEi,t -0.056 -0.168 0.039 -0.146 0.117 1.000 *** *** *** 7. LEVi,t -0.052 -0.286 -0.068 -0.332 0.153 0.259 1.000 *** * *** *** *** 8. ROAi,t 0.202 0.537 0.026 0.539 -0.113 -0.315 -0.564 1.000 *** *** *** *** *** *** 9. BIG10i,t -0.077 -0.062 0.101 0.031 0.010 0.246 -0.060 -0.032 1.000 ** *** *** * Panel B: Correlations between PORC status and the variables of the CAR regression model

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1. CARi,1 1.000 2. PORCi,t 0.077 1.000 ** 3. SIZEi,t 0.049 0.008 1.000 4. LEVi,t -0.081 -0.094 0.379 1.000 ** ** *** 5. MBi,t 0.065 0.002 -0.131 -0.092 1.000 * *** ** 6. SOEi,t -0.050 0.045 0.416 0.302 -0.060 1.000 *** *** 7. REG_INDi,t 0.075 -0.007 0.291 0.159 0.078 0.279 1.000 ** *** *** ** *** 8. BIG10i,t 0.076 0.123 0.251 -0.073 -0.016 0.015 0.081 1.000 ** *** *** ** ** 9. BIGBROKERi,t 0.061 -0.045 0.286 0.026 0.001 0.118 0.066 0.116 1.000 *** *** * *** 10. ACCRUAL_ADi,t

-0.038 -0.040 -0.134 -0.031 0.094 -0.243 -0.102 -0.101 -0.045 1.000

*** ** *** *** ***

Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance of Pearson test at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.


Figure 1 is the tendency chart of cumulative market-adjusted compound stock return

from 1 to 36 months after IPO. The horizontal axis shows the number of months after IPO,

the solid line shows the CAR of the PORC audit firms’ clients 36 months after IPO, and

the dotted line shows the CAR of the non-PORC audit firms’ clients 36 months after IPO.

As shown by the trend in Figure 1, the average CAR of all IPO firms decreases by a large

degree, but the decline is smaller for the PORC audit firms’ clients than it is for the

non-PORC audit firms’ clients. Also, the difference is more obvious in the first year after

IPO. These findings support Hypothesis 1 and indicate that the post-IPO economic

performance of PORC audit firms’ clients is better than that of non-PORC audit firms’

clients. However, there is another possible explanation that cannot be ruled out – a PORC

audit firm is usually also a big audit firm. According to the study of Fan and Wong (2005),

the higher CAR of PORC audit firms’ clients might be a reputation discount from the

capital market. Thus, further research on the relation between PORC status and post-IPO

economic performance after controlling for the influence of audit firm’s reputation is

needed.

-.4

-.3

-.2

-.1

0C

AR

1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35Month

PORC audit firms' IPO clients Non-PORC audit firms' IPO clients

Note: The horizontal axis shows the number of months after IPO, the solid line shows the CAR of the

PORC audit firms’ clients 36 months after IPO, and the dotted line shows the CAR of the non-PORC audit firms’ clients 36 months after IPO.

Figure 1 Tendency Chart of Post-IPO CAR

Table 5 provides the descriptive statistics for the PORC audit firms’ clients and the

non-PORC audit firms’ clients. These statistics indicate that, on average, when compared


to the non-PORC audit firms’ clients, the PORC audit firms’ clients exhibit (1) lower

signed discretionary accruals and lower positive earnings management, but not

significantly; and (2) significantly higher post-IPO economic performance 1 year after

IPO and a more significant difference in negative CAR in the subsample. These results

support the reputation hypothesis.

Table 5 Comparative Statistics of Discretionary Accruals and CAR

Variables

PORC

clients

Non-PORC

clients

Diff.

T-value

PORC

clients

Non-PORC

clients

Diff.

Z-value

(1) Discretionary accruals

ACC_DDi,t

Full Sample

-0.004

(n = 485)

-0.007

(n = 175)

0.69

-0.006

(n = 485)

-0.009

(n = 175)

0.22

ACC_DDi,t if

ACC_DDi,t >= 0

0.041

(n = 193)

0.033

(n = 76)

1.56

0.030

(n = 193)

0.025

(n = 76)

1.22

ACC_DDi,t if

ACC_DDi,t < 0

-0.034

(n = 292)

-0.038

(n = 99)

1.16

-0.028

(n = 292)

-0.031

(n = 99)

1.35

(2) CAR

CARi,1

-0.252

(n = 548)

-0.183

(n = 176)

-2.08**

-0.242

(n = 548)

-0.206

(n = 176)

-1.81*

CARi,1 < 0

-0.413

(n = 416)

-0.338

(n = 128)

-2.61***

-0.361

(n = 416)

-0.297

(n = 128)

-2.03**

Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.

4.2 Empirical Analysis

On the basis of the above discussions and models, this study investigates the

relationship between the PORC status of audit firms and their IPO clients’ pre-IPO

earnings quality and post-IPO performance. We present the main results in the following

tables.9

4.2.1 PORC audit firms and the level of accounting conservatism of their clients

Table 6 reports the regression results on the relation between PORC audit firms and

their clients’ level of accounting conservatism. Specifically, the coefficient of PORCi,t ×

DCFOi,t × CFOi,t in Model (1) is significantly positive, which indicates that PORC audit

firms’ IPO clients generally recognise losses in a timely manner compared to profits

according to the design of Ball and Shivakumar’s (2005) model. Similarly, after

9 All of this study’s regressions test the VIF value, and we find that there is no problem of multicollinearity.


controlling for the endogenous problem of audit firm characteristics, the coefficient of

PAIRPORCi,t × DCFOi,t × CFOi,t in Model (2) is significantly positive using the involved

audit firm sample. These findings support the prediction of the reputation hypothesis that

the clients of PORC audit firms are more conservative and have higher accounting quality

than those of non-PORC audit firms. The results of the other control variables are

consistent with Goh and Li’s (2011) argument that IPO firms of smaller size and higher

leverage ratio are more conservative in their accounting practices, in which they

recognise losses in a timely manner compared to profits.

It should be noted that the coefficient of DCFOi,t × CFOi,t is not significantly

positive, as expected in the regression on 2 years before IPO. The main reason is that

firms’ operating cash flow before IPO is seldom negative; only 48 out of the 783 sample

firms (accounting for 6.1 per cent) posted a negative cash flow.

4.2.2 PORC audit firms and their clients’ discretionary accruals

The second variable for earnings quality is discretionary accruals. Following

previous studies (Jin, 2010; Lennox and Li, 2012), we examine the signed discretional

accruals and group the sample into two categories: the income-increasing group and the

income-decreasing group. Table 7 reports the regression results for signed discretional

accruals. We find that the coefficient of PORCi,t is negative but not significant, indicating

that PORC audit firms’ IPO clients have lower discretionary accruals and a lower level of

earnings management. The reason for an insignificant coefficient may be that IPO firms

can adjust earnings upwards or downwards. According to the backgrounds previously

introduced, firms must meet the earnings requirements of the CSRC to get the IPO

qualification, and so they have more incentive to engage in income-increasing earnings

management, but auditors generally require their clients to adjust earnings downwards

rather than upwards (Lennox and Li, 2012). Therefore, it is better to use

income-increasing earnings management to represent the earnings quality of IPO clients.

On the other hand, income-decreasing earnings management is inconsistent with the IPO

incentive, and thus it is difficult to distinguish between earnings management and

earnings quality. Therefore, we group the sample into two categories—the

income-increasing group and the income-decreasing group—and use the truncated

regression model to avoid the bias of the OLS model (Caramanis and Lennox, 2008). Not

surprisingly, the coefficient of PORCi,t is significantly negative in the income-increasing

group and negative but not significant in the income-decreasing group. Similarly, for the

regression on the involved audit firm sample, the coefficient of PAIRPORCi,t is

significantly negative in the income-increasing group. These findings support the

prediction of the reputation hypothesis that the clients of PORC audit firms are of a


Table 6 PORC Audit Firms and their Clients’ Level of Accounting Conservatism Variables ACCRUALi,t (1) (2) CFOi,t -1.429*** -1.527*** (-3.84) (-3.46) DCFOi,t 0.039 0.609 (0.17) (1.33) DCFOi,t × CFOi,t 0.390 4.624 (0.15) (0.92) PORCi,t 0.010 (1.02) PORCi,t × CFOi,t -0.103* (-1.95) PORCi,t × DCFOi,t 0.054 (1.41) PORCi,t × DCFOi,t × CFOi,t 0.957** (2.29) PAIRPORCi,t 0.012 (1.17) PAIRPORCi,t × CFOi,t -0.130** (-2.28) PAIRPORCi,t × DCFOi,t 0.064 (1.32) PAIRPORCi,t × DCFOi,t × CFOi,t 1.304* (1.66) SIZEi,t -0.017*** -0.020*** (-4.73) (-4.76) SIZEi,t × CFOi,t 0.079*** 0.094*** (4.23) (4.30) SIZEi,t × DCFOi,t 0.005 -0.023 (0.43) (-0.94) SIZEi,t × DCFOi,t × CFOi,t -0.043 -0.321 (-0.26) (-1.14) LEVi,t 0.016 0.065* (0.52) (1.83) LEVi,t × CFOi,t -1.412*** -1.764*** (-10.18) (-10.33) LEVi,t × DCFOi,t -0.244** -0.238 (-2.06) (-1.46) LEVi,t × DCFOi,t × CFOi,t -0.613 1.294 (-0.34) (0.51) BIG10i,t -0.000 0.001 (-0.02) (0.06) BIG10i,t × CFOi,t -0.063 -0.096* (-1.28) (-1.74) BIG10i,t × DCFOi,t 0.045 0.060 (1.45) (1.55) BIG10i,t × DCFOi,t × CFOi,t 0.591* 0.875* (1.69) (1.68) Constant 0.293*** 0.483*** (3.44) (5.36) Industry Yes Yes Obs 783 603 Adjusted-R2 0.643 0.616 F-value 47.964 34.358 p-value (0.000) (0.000)



higher quality, have lower income-increasing earnings management, and have better

earnings quality. The results of the other control variables are consistent with previous

studies.

Table 7 PORC Audit Firms and Their Clients’ Discretionary Accruals

Variable ACC_DDi,t

Full Sample

Income

Increasing

Income

Decreasing Full Sample

Income

Increasing

Income

Decreasing

PORCi,t -0.004 -0.009** -0.004

(-1.19) (-2.12) (-1.15)

PAIRPORCi,t -0.005 -0.012*** -0.004

(-1.18) (-2.60) (-1.01)

SIZEi,t -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001

(-0.20) (-0.23) (-0.20) (0.15) (0.25) (-0.35)

LEVi,t 0.012 0.053*** -0.017 0.019 0.047** -0.011

(0.88) (3.24) (-1.42) (1.12) (2.42) (-0.78)

ROAi,t 0.491*** 0.440*** 0.072* 0.518*** 0.451*** 0.088**

(14.24) (12.18) (1.86) (12.68) (10.29) (2.02)

BIG10i,t -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002

(-0.32) (-0.50) (-0.25) (-0.29) (-0.62) (-0.60)

Constant -0.076** -0.032 -0.031 -0.069* -0.045 -0.029

(-2.32) (-1.04) (-1.16) (-1.89) (-1.16) (-0.89)

Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Obs 660 269 391 515 206 309

Adjusted-R2 0.308 - - 0.294 - -

F-value 27.642 - - 20.489 - -

LR-2 - 154.00 21.91 - 114.05 20.57

p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.025) (0.000) (0.000) (0.038)


4.2.3. PORC audit firms and their clients’ CAR one year after IPO

Table 8 reports the regression results on the relation between PORC audit firms and

their clients’ economic performance after IPO in which we use CAR 1 year after IPO to

represent the company’s performance after IPO and find that the coefficient of PORCi,t is

significantly positive, supporting the prediction of the reputation hypothesis that PORC

audit firms’ IPO clients have higher economic performance 1 year after IPO. Meanwhile,


as shown by the trend in Figure 1, the average CAR of all IPO firms decreases by a large

degree after IPO, consistent with Fan et al. (2007). So we test the subsample of CARi,1 < 0

using the truncated regression model to avoid the bias of the OLS model (Caramanis and

Lennox, 2008).10 The result of the CARi,1 < 0 subsample is consistent with that of the full

sample in that the coefficient of PORCi,t is significantly positive and supports the

reputation hypothesis. Similarly, the coefficient of PAIRPORCi,t is significantly positive

in the involved audit firm sample regression.

Table 8 PORC Audit Firms and Their Clients’ CAR 1 Year after IPO

Variable CARi,1 Full Sample CAR < 0 Full Sample CAR < 0 PORCi,t 0.063* 0.069** (1.88) (2.40) PAIRPORCi,t 0.044 0.048* (1.30) (1.73) SIZEi,t 0.028* 0.030** 0.025 0.023 (1.68) (2.16) (1.31) (1.51) LEVi,t -0.184** -0.173** -0.162 -0.170** (-1.99) (-2.24) (-1.55) (-2.03) MBi,t 0.011 -0.002 0.013 -0.002 (1.60) (-0.34) (1.62) (-0.29) SOEi,t -0.088** -0.086*** -0.048 -0.055 (-2.22) (-2.60) (-1.06) (-1.50) REG_INDi,t 0.109** 0.055 0.053 0.012 (1.97) (1.12) (0.84) (0.23) BIG10i,t 0.022 0.053** 0.033 0.072*** (0.71) (2.10) (1.02) (2.74) BIGBROKERi,t 0.036 0.038 0.047 0.048* (1.15) (1.44) (1.42) (1.78) ACCRUAL_ADi,t -0.253 0.128 -0.497** -0.020 (-1.14) (0.68) (-2.06) (-0.10) Constant -0.839** -1.008*** -0.783** -0.870*** (-2.50) (-3.55) (-2.01) (-2.71) Obs 724 544 564 424 Adjusted-R2 0.024 - 0.015 - F-value 3.248 - 2.103 - LR-2 - 36.12 - 27.07 p-value (0.001) (0.000) (0.034) (0.001)


10 This study uses the truncated regression model to test the subsamples of income-increasing earnings management, income-decreasing earnings management, and CARi,1<0. The same applies hereinafter.


4.3 Robustness Test and Further Analysis

4.3.1 Influence of IPO cases rejected by the IPO screening process

As previously mentioned, this paper studies the difference in the earnings quality

and economic performance of successfully listed IPO clients between PORC audit firms

and other audit firms to eliminate the influence of IPO cases rejected by the IPO

regulatory process, but this approach may bring about the selection bias. We collect the

prospectuses of rejected IPO firms through databases and hand collection and add them

into the full sample to regress Models (1) and (3). The results of the new sample are

consistent with those of previous tests, indicating that whether rejected IPO cases are

included or not, our conclusion still holds. To save space, we do not report the specific

results of the new sample.11

4.3.2 Alternative solution to endogeneity problems

Apart from testing the new sample including rejected IPO cases, we compare the

quality of IPO clients between PORC audit firm A and non-PORC audit firm B 1 year

before A is appointed as a PORC member and 2 years after A is relieved of PORC status

to confirm that it is PORC status that increases client quality rather than the

characteristics of audit firm.12 The results show that there is no significant difference in

client quality between A and B and indicate that the difference in client quality between A

and B is due to PORC status rather than the characteristics of the audit firm. To save

space, we do not report the specific results.

To ensure reliability, this study employs other robustness tests: (1) We relax the

sample constraint of Model (2) that there should be at least 10 observations in each

industry-year combination, and our conclusions are unchanged; (2) Because the number

of members from audit firms increases to nine in the 9th PORC, we divide the sample

into the pre-2007 group and the post-2007 group and find that our conclusions remain

unchanged; (3) We extend the sample period to the end of 2001 and find that our

conclusions still hold; (4) We test our hypothesis with the GEM IPO sample and find that

our conclusions are consistent. To save space, we do not report the results of these

robustness tests.

4.3.3 Influence of audit firm size on the relationship between PORC status and

client quality13

11 All of the results not reported herein are available upon request. 12 We choose 2 years after the audit firm is relieved of its PORC status to eliminate the influence of PORC status. 13 The authors appreciate the constructive suggestions of the anonymous referees.


Yang (2012) finds that non-top audit firms significantly increase their IPO audit fee

and increase their clients’ pass rate in the IPO regulatory process after their partners are

appointed as PORC members. Similarly, this study also finds that the size of audit firms

impacts the relationship between PORC status and client quality.

From the rent-seeking perspective, big audit firms have a higher reputation and a

bigger market share, so the potential rent-seeking benefit of PORC status is limited for

big audit firms and they do not have to win IPO clients through their PORC status.

Meanwhile, PORC status attracts so much attention to the big audit firms that the cost of

rent-seeking activities increases and the potential loss from damaged reputation is raised.

Therefore, if the rent-seeking hypothesis dominates, big audit firms with PORC status

have less incentive to engage in rent-seeking activities and higher IPO client quality than

small audit firms with PORC status.

Table 9 Influence of Audit Firm Size on the Relationship between PORC Status

and Client Quality

Variable ACC_DDi,t

Full Sample Income Increasing Income Decreasing

Small Big Small Big Small Big

PORCi,t -0.004 -0.004 -0.010* -0.008 -0.002 -0.006

(-0.86) (-0.74) (-1.87) (-1.22) (-0.46) (-1.13)

SIZEi,t -0.003 0.002 0.000 -0.000 -0.002 0.001

(-1.27) (0.90) (0.09) (-0.09) (-1.17) (0.77)

LEVi,t 0.013 0.015 0.057*** 0.035 -0.025 -0.008

(0.72) (0.67) (2.71) (1.32) (-1.53) (-0.46)

ROAi,t 0.511*** 0.434*** 0.463*** 0.390*** 0.067 0.068

(12.10) (6.96) (11.04) (5.31) (1.20) (1.24)

Constant 0.003 -0.090** -0.047 -0.025 0.015 -0.066*

(0.07) (-2.05) (-0.84) (-0.55) (0.35) (-1.87)

Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Obs 414 246 170 99 244 147

Adjusted-R2 0.362 0.187 - - - -

F-value 24.482 7.280 - - - -

LR-2 - 115.00 41.09 17.52 8.58

p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.064) (0.477)



From the reputation concern perspective, PORC status increases market concern and

the potential loss from damaged reputation. Small audit firms usually have lower quality

clients because their market share and market concern are relatively smaller before they

are appointed as PORC members, but once they are appointed as PORC members, market

attention and the probability of audit failures being found increases significantly. On the

other hand, small PORC audit firms have more limited resources than big audit firms, and

the cost to them of initiating a lawsuit is lower than it is for big audit firms, and so the

probability of litigation will increase if small audit firms are involved in audit failures.

Therefore, if the reputation hypothesis dominates, the higher quality of PORC audit firms’

clients is mainly due to the influence of small PORC audit firms.

Table 10 Influence of Audit Firm Size on the Relationship between PORC Status

and Client Quality

Variable CARi,1 Full Sample CAR < 0 Small Big Small Big PORCi,t 0.112** 0.032 (2.55) (0.91) PAIRPORCi,t 0.114** -0.012 (2.52) (-0.39) SIZEi,t 0.054** 0.003 0.039 -0.005 (2.33) (0.16) (1.30) (-0.28) LEVi,t -0.356*** 0.066 -0.383*** 0.073 (-3.37) (0.60) (-3.09) (0.72) MBi,t 0.009 -0.019** 0.020* -0.029*** (1.04) (-2.06) (1.88) (-3.52) SOEi,t -0.124*** -0.022 -0.137** 0.042 (-2.74) (-0.47) (-2.38) (0.97) REG_INDi,t 0.163* 0.009 0.128 -0.017 (1.95) (0.16) (1.19) (-0.32) BIGBROKERi,t 0.039 0.023 0.071* 0.014 (1.04) (0.66) (1.65) (0.45) ACCRUAL_ADi,t 0.089 0.134 0.028 -0.058 (0.33) (0.51) (0.09) (-0.25) Constant -1.520*** -0.361 -1.253** -0.125 (-3.15) (-1.02) (-2.00) (-0.36) Obs 292 252 198 226 LR-2 33.72 6.64 31.79 15.67 p-value (0.000) (0.576) (0.000) (0.047)



Finally, we divide the sample by size of audit firm and test Models (1) and (3). As

shown in Tables 9 and 10, the client quality of PORC firms is higher than that of

non-PORC audit firms, but only significantly in the case of small PORC audit firms.

These findings support the above arguments and indicate that the higher pass rate of small

PORC audit firms’ IPO clients in Yang (2012) may be due to the significantly increased

client quality rather than the rent-seeking activities of small PORC audit firms.

V. Conclusions

Since the capital market was founded, the PORC of the CSRC has grasped the key

voting rights to decide whether IPO firms can be listed. With the reform and development

of this institution, more and more PORC members now come from self-regulatory

organisations outside the CSRC such as audit firms. This special PORC status facilitates

rent-seeking activities but also increases the potential reputation cost to audit firms.

To investigate how an audit firm’s PORC status influences the IPO resource

allocation efficiency of the capital market, we study the difference in IPO clients between

PORC audit firms and non-PORC audit firms. With a sample of all successfully listed

firms from 2004 to 30 April 2011, using conservatism and discretionary accruals to

represent earnings quality, and using market-adjusted cumulative abnormal return to

represent corporate economic performance, we find that (1) clients choosing PORC audit

firms have more conservative reported earnings and less income-increasing discretionary

accruals than firms choosing non-PORC audit firms during the IPO period and (2) clients

choosing PORC audit firms have a higher market-adjusted cumulative abnormal return

after IPO. These findings are consistent after controlling for cases rejected by the IPO

regulatory process and for potential endogeneity problems. Furthermore, the difference in

client quality between PORC audit firms and non-PORC audit firm is especially

significant in the small PORC audit firm group. These findings support the prediction of

the reputation hypothesis that PORC status encourages audit firms to distinguish between

good and bad companies and finally to choose higher quality IPO clients to maintain their

reputation.

We caution that our results do not deny the rent-seeking evidence of previous studies,

and we do not discuss the possibilities that the reputation concern of PORC audit firms

could totally eliminate possible rent-seeking activities. In other words, this study focuses

on whether the PORC, now a professional-dominated institution, can enhance the IPO

resource allocation efficiency of the capital market rather than on whether defects exist in

the PORC system. Besides, some of our regression results are not significant and some of

our variables may not be sufficiently representative; thus, further studies in this area are

needed.


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Appendix List and tenure of the involved PORC audit firms

(1) PORC members of Main Board Market (25)

Involved Audit Firms

Term

Tenure

beginning

Tenure

ending Quantity List

6th 24 Dec 2003 10 Dec 2004 5 Zhonghe Zhengxin; Xinyong Zhonghe;

Ernst & Young Huaming; Zhejiang

Tianjian; PWC Zhongtian

7th 10 Dec 2004 31 Dec 2005 5 Zhonghe Zhengxin; Tianjian Xinde;

PWC Zhongtian; Xinyong Zhonghe;

Ernst & Young Huaming

8th 31 Dec 2005 9 May 2007 5 Zhonghe Zhengxin; Tianjian Xinde;

PWC Zhongtian; Xinyong Zhonghe;

Ernst & Young Huaming

9th 9 May 2007 30 Apr 2008 9 Zhejiang Dongfang Zhonghui; Shenzhen

Pengcheng; Daxin ; Zhejiang Tianjian;

Shanghai Zhonghua Huyin; Yuehua;

Liandaxinlong; Tianjian Huazheng

zhongzhou (Beijing); Beijing Jingdu

10th 30 Apr 2008 11 Jul 2009 9 Jiangsu Gongzheng; Ernst & Young

Huaming; Zhongzhun; Yatai Zhonghui;

Lixin; Beijing Xinghua; Zhonglei;

Zhonghe Zhengxin; Xinyong Zhonghe

11th 11 Jul 2009 4 May 2010 9 Jiangsu Gongzheng; Ernst & Young

Huaming; Zhongzhun; Yatai Zhonghui;

Lixin; Beijing Xinghua; Zhonglei;

Zhonghe Zhengxin; Xinyong Zhonghe

12th 4 May 2010 26 May 2011 9 Sichuan Huaxin; Wuzhou Songde

Lianhe; Beijing JingduTianhua;

LixinYangcheng; Zhonghui; Zhongqin

Wanxin; Wuhan Zhonghuan; Guofu

Haohua; Zhongshen Guoji

13th 26 May 2011 --- 9 Beijing JingduTianhua; Lixin Dahua;

Zhongrui Yuehua; Zhonghui; PWC;

Zhongqin Wanxin; Guofu Haohua;

Xinyong Zhonghe; Zhongshen Guoji


(2) PORC members of Growth Enterprise Market (35)

Involved Audit Firms

Term

Tenure

beginning

Tenure

ending Quantity List

1st 14 Aug 2009 9 Aug 2010 14 Daxin; Jiangsu Tianheng; Tianjian

Guanghua (Beijing); Guangdong

Zhengzhong Zhujiang; Fujian Huaxing;

Shanghai Zhonghua Huyin; Guangdong

Dahua Delv; Huapu Tianjian Gaoshang;

Kaiyuan Xinde; Beijing Tianyuanquan;

Zhejiang Tianjian Dongfang; Yatai

(Group); Zhongxinghua; Zhongrui

Yuehua

2nd 9 Aug 2010 26 Aug 2011 14 Daxin; Jiangsu Tianheng; Tianjian

Guanghua (Beijing); Guangdong

Zhengzhong Zhujiang; Fujian Huaxing;

Shanghai Zhonghua Huyin; Guangdong

Dahua Delv; Huapu Tianjian Gaoshang;

Kaiyuan Xinde; Beijing Tianyuanquan;

Zhejiang Tianjian Dongfang; Yatai

(Group); Zhongxinghua;

ZhongruiYuehua

3rd 26 Aug 2011 --- 14 Daxin; Tianjian Guanghua (Beijing);

Tianzhi Guoji; ZhongruiYuehua; Lixin;

Shanghai Zhonghua Huyin; Beijing

Tianyuanquan; Beijing Xinghua;

Tianjian; Zhongtianyun; Yatai (Group);

Jingdu Tianhua; Zhonghui; Zhonglei

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School of Accounting and Finance | School of Accounting and ...州市海珠区新港西路135 号（510275）；Email：[email protected]。孔祥婷，博士生，中山大学管