Update Memo NIE-93-22

8/7/2019 Update Memo NIE-93-22

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Update Memorandum: NIE 93-22

From the Chairmon, National Intelligence Council

Prospects for Bosnia

Key Points

. A Bosnian confederation will not long survive any agreement reachedin Geneva. Serbia and Croatia will begin to absorb their clientministates, Ieaving a Muslim rump either dependent on Westernsupport or-in the unlikely event Bosnian-Croatian talks succeed-associated with Zagrebl

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. A three-way partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina-which largely reflects

Serb and Croat aims-will be easier to implement than cle4li4g a

multiethnic state as envisioned by the Vance-Owen Plan.li

. Even so,.international forces will have trouble separating and disarm-ing combatants and protecfinx civifian populations and will be

vulnerable to terrorist actsl___I

. Europeans will be unable to sustain a large:scale open-ended deploy-ment in Bosnia and will link additional troop contributions to a USground commitment; they would blame the United States for a

Eosnian failure if Washington does not commit t.oont.[__]

o New hostilitiessettlement and

in Croatia could derail implementatioq_Al a Bosnianput Western forces in greater danger.

U/M NIE 93.22October 1993

copy No. 4 40

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In NIE 93-22, Prospects for Bosnia, the

Intelligence Community concluded thatthere was little prospect of holding togeth er a

multiethnic Bosnia and that the country was

headed toward some form of partition. TheEstimate said that the warring parties doubt-

ed the international comrnunity's will to un-dertake major military operations and to

sustain a long-terp_Ug$qnce to maintain a

multiethnic statr.lI

These judgments remain valid. The agree-

ment negotiated in Geneva leaved unsettled

key territorial questions that would have tobe negotiated in bilateral working groups.

Within two years, Bosnian Serbs and

Bosnian Croats probably will secede fromthe Bosnian union.

It is unlikely that the latest round of secret

bilateral talks between Tudjman and lzetbe-govic will succeed in associating the Muslirn

part of BoSnia with Croatia. If those talksfail, only a Muslim rump state will remain

and will be heavily dependent for its survival

on the international community. Absent eco-

nomic and military support, this rumpBosnia will be absorbed or split by Croatia orSerbial I

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This Memorandum updates the findings of Nationallntef ligence Estimate 93-22, issued May 1993. It was

prepared under the auspices of the National IntelligenceOfficer for Europe and was coordinated with the DeputyDirector for Intelligence, Ccntral Intclligcncc Agcncy;

the Director, Defense lntelligence Agency; the Director,National Security Agcncy; and the Assistant Secretaryfor Inlelligence and Research, Department of State.

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We believe the three sides are likely tofinalize an agreernent that eventually willreduce the fighting. Although Serbia and

Croatia could reject the diplomatic process

and divide Bosnia by force, neither Zagrebnor Belgrade wants to risk Western militaryreactions or economic sanctions. TheBosnian Government will not be able to holdto its conditions once winter sets in, and it is

even clearer it has dwindling internationalsuppor,.[]

If there is no negotiated settlernent, localizedheavy fighting is likely to continue indefi-nitely, especially between Muslim and Croatforces in central and southern Bosnia. Thiswould rnagnify the war's human costs, pre-

vent implacement of an effective internation-al forc€, and would probably lead to thecornplete disappearance of a Bosnian state.

Prospects for Implementing an Agreement

Prospects for a lasting cease-fire and forenforcing a three-way territorial division are

higher than the earlier Vance-Owen Plan:

The agreement under discussion enables

the Serbs and, to a lesser extent, the Croatsto achieve their major territorial aims.

The Muslims are deeply dissatisfied withthe emerging postwar map but must have

international support for their survival.

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o Prospects of a harder winter than last year

and more severe fuel, food, and othershortages add incentives for all tfleqy,ar-weary comrnunities to cooperate.l

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Bosnia: Muslim Ministate for Muslims

With a multiethnic state including all ofBosnia no longer possible, President Izetbe:govic and his colleagu6s are intent on maxi-mizing the territorial boundarics of a Mus-lim entity to improve its dim chances ofsurvival. Izetbegovic is deeply disappointedin the international community's readiness toaccept a "Serb victor y," and will continue topress for more concessions. Nevertheless,

economic privations, the specter of still rnore

human suffering, and the likelihood that theBosnian military offensive will stall leave

him and his colleagues few options otherthan to sign before the onset of winter.[--l

Even if the Bosnian Government agrees to a

deal, Muslim hardliners are likely to contin-ue to fight. Periodic clashes are likely over

the dividing line between the Muslim and Limited information as to each side's motivds

Croatian ministates and around Brcko, suggests the Muslims have engaged in thesewhere Serb and Muslim claims overlap. In talks because Izetbegovic despairs of reach-addition, some Muslim radicals may stage ing a viable settlement with the Serbs. Forterrorist acts against Muslim moderates, his part, Tudjman is trying to expand hisSerbs, and Croats: influence to as much of Bosnia as possible

and may hope an agreement with the Mus-

Bosnia: Losing the War Against Winter

tf fishting continues, about' 2.8 millt:onpeople-about double that

of last, lear-will need asslsl ance. Tens ofthousands could perish from disease,

hunger, and hardship. Assuming contin-ued combat, total needs during the nextsix months could easily reach 3l 5,000metric tons of food and 75,000 metrictons of nonfood items at a cost ap-proaching $ 300-3 50 million. Even tf thefishting ends, hundreds of thousands ofrdugees and displaced persons will at-tempt to relocete, keepin7 humanitar-

ian needs hish through the winter. Inthat case, the United Nations Office ofthe High Commtssioner for Refugeesplanning figures suggest the six-monthcost of relief would still be at least $200million. In any case, relid will be diffi-cult to deliver because of damage toBosnia's main roads

' Muslim resistance may pose the greatest lims will bolstqr his sagging internationalrisk to Western forces implementing an tuppott.llagreement, although lopal Serbs and

Croats may also resist territorial adjust-men,r[_l Serbia and Croatia: Consolidating Control

Continued fighting between Muslims and Hardliners in Belgrade and Zagreb will wantCroats will be a major impediment to secret to dispense with the formality of BosnianMuslim-Croat negotiations to merge'their union and absorb into Serbia and Croatiaareas into a confederation with Croatia.

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Areas of Control and Proposed

Partitioning in Bosnia and llemegovina

Unclassified

proper the areas under the control of theirconationals. However, Presidents Tudjman

and Milosevic will try to bring their compa-

triots to heel and avoid flouting the fictionof a unified Bosnia that the international

community supports. Zagreb already exertsstrong control over the Bosnian Croat leader-

ship and need not be in a hurry to enforce

formal annexationi ----l



5.6 2r7 0 B

Milosevic hopes to stop the fighting, consoli-date Serb gains, and get an end to economicsanctions in order to shore up his own posi-

tion at home. Serbia is now suffering a

virtual economic collapse. Milosevic, how-ever, remains in firm control and has em-barked on a campaign to weaken Seselj andother ultranationalists who want to expandtheir power base in Bosnia. He is havingmore difficulty controlling Bosnian Serbleaders. Bosnian Serb rnilitary commanderMladic is a wild card; although generally a

Milosevi c ally, he will not readily followorders to give up territory for the sake of an

agreement. | |

Impact in Other Post-Yugoslav Hotspots

Although conclusion of a settlement inBosnia is likely to mitigate Serb-Croat ten-sions temporarily, neither Belgrade norZagreb is ready to make major concessions

with regard to their dispute over the Serb-held areas of Croatia. A settlement wouldenable Tudjman to concentrate on regainingSerb-held territory in Croatia, by negotiation

if possible but by force if necessary. Serbs inCroatia will stand their ground, anticipatingthat a settlernent will set a precedent forborder changes and will free up their breth-ren in Bosnia to come to their aid:

o A new war in Croatia would increase thedanger for Western forces in Bosnia andwould seriously complicate their logisticsupport.[----l

A Bosnian settlement would have little directimpact in Kosovo or Macedonia, where eco-

nornic, social, and interethnic problerns con-

-SEtrrt b

No Long-Term European Comrnitment

The Intelligence Community thinks thatWestern Europe alone is unlikely to cornmit

sizable additional forces to a long-term de-ployment in Bosnia. At best, most Allies willlink the size of any additional troop contribu-tions for Bosnia to the commitment of USground forces{---l

Europeans probably would interpret a rnajorUS deployment as Washington's acceptanceof long-term responsibitity for the region.The Allies will tie their time commitment toa US exit strategy and will not retain large

forces in Bosni a after US forces are with-drawn. With few exceptions, Allies would be

reluctant to go beyond traditional UN"peacekeeping" functions and engage inrnore aggressive "peace enforcement" mis-sions that mieht be envisioned under a

NATO command structure:

. Europeans would blarne the United Statesfor the failure of a peace agreement ifWashington does not commit groun_q__

troops to an implernentation force.t____l

The burden on military forces and finances

will lirnit Allied ability to sustain an in-creased presence if they are asked to send

more troops to Bosnia. NATO experts esti-

mate the first year's operating cost at $6

billion. Some contributors will not rnake newcommitments unless there is some guarantee

of reimbursement up front. Even France andBritain, the Allies most able to considerproviding troops to "peace enforcement"

missions, will have difficulty mounting along-term commitment.r

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UnW_tq deepen and could spin out of control.



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Europeans are concerned that a Muslimministate will be a bridgehead in Europe forradical Islarnic movements, but they prefer

this risk to a Serb-Croat partition that would

cause more Bosnian Muslims to migrate toWestern Europe. European foreign aid funds

are stretched thin by competing priorities,

but EC members will want to show a good-

faith effort toward the survival of the Mus-lirn ministate to counter radical Islamic in-fluence. Whatever they provide, however,

will fall short of the billions of dollars needed

for Bosnia's enormous reconstruction needs.

Documents

Update Memo NIE-93-22