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Recht und Ökonomie (Law and Economics)
LVA-Nr.: 239.203
WS 2011/12
Microeconomics (Repetition Part 2)
1 of 20
Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider
Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre
http://www.econ.jku.at/schneider
2 of 20
Recht und Ökonomie WS 2011/12 Microeconomics – Repetition Part 2 Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider
Outline of the Section on Microeconomics
1 Basic concepts and tools
2 Consumer theory
3 Theory of the firm
4 Interactions of households and firms
(Imperfect Competition, Consumer & Producer Surplus)
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Recht und Ökonomie WS 2011/12 Microeconomics – Repetition Part 2 Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider
4 Imperfect competition
Monopoly
— just one supplier (firm) in a market
Monopolistic competition
— many firms with differentiated products
Oligopoly
— only a few firms (2, 4, 7, …?) in a market
Other forms, e. g. price leadership, spatial competition,
…
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Recht und Ökonomie WS 2011/12 Microeconomics – Repetition Part 2 Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider
4.1 Monopoly
The monopolist faces the market demand curve.
A monopolist maximizes her profit by producing a quantity
where
MC = MR
The price will be higher than MC (and MR).
The price (quantity) will be higher (lower) than the price
(quantity) under perfect competition >> deadweight loss (=
lower welfare).
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Recht und Ökonomie WS 2011/12 Microeconomics – Repetition Part 2 Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider
Lost profit
P1
Q1
Lost profit
MC
AC
Quantity
€ perunit of output
D = AR
MR
P*
Q*
4.2 Profit maximizing monopolist
P2
Q2
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Recht und Ökonomie WS 2011/12 Microeconomics – Repetition Part 2 Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider
4.3 Measuring welfare
Consumer surplus
— equals total consumption benefit minus total cost of
purchases;
— equals the area below the demand curve and above the
market price.
Producer surplus
— equals the area below the market price and above the
supply curve;
— equals profits plus fixed cost.
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Recht und Ökonomie WS 2011/12 Microeconomics – Repetition Part 2 Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider
Demand Curve
Consumer surplus
Actual Expenditure
€19.50014)x6.5001/2x(20
4.4 Consumer surplus
Rock Concert Tickets
Price (€ perticket)
2 3 4 5 6
13
0 1
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
Market Price
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Recht und Ökonomie WS 2011/12 Microeconomics – Repetition Part 2 Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider
DD
PP**
QQ**
Producer Producer SurplusSurplus
4.5 Producer surplus for a market
Price(€ per
unit of output)
Output
SS
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Recht und Ökonomie WS 2011/12 Microeconomics – Repetition Part 2 Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider
ProducerSurplus
ConsumerSurplus
4.6 Consumer and producer surplus
Quantity0
Price
S
D
5
Q0
Consumer C
10
7
Consumer BConsumer A
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Recht und Ökonomie WS 2011/12 Microeconomics – Repetition Part 2 Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider
BA
Lost Consumer Surplus
Deadweight Loss
C
4.7 Deadweight loss from monopoly power
Quantity
AR
MR
MC
QC
PC
Pm
Qm
€/Q
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Recht und Ökonomie WS 2011/12 Microeconomics – Repetition Part 2 Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider
4.8 Monopolistic Competition
In a competition surrounding a large number of firms
sells differentiated products. Monopolistic competition
means:
Firms face a downward sloping demand curve.
Profit maximum at MR = MC, with P > MC.
Positive profits will attract additional firms.
In the long run profits will be zero with still P > MC.
thus: no Pareto-efficient allocation.
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Recht und Ökonomie WS 2011/12 Microeconomics – Repetition Part 2 Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider
4.9 A monopolistically competitive firm in the short and long run
Quantity
€/Q
Quantity
€/QMC
AC
MC
AC
DSR
MRSR
DLR
MRLR
QSR
PSR
QLR
PLR
Short run Long run
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Recht und Ökonomie WS 2011/12 Microeconomics – Repetition Part 2 Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider
Deadweight- lossMC AC
4.10 Comparison of monopolistically competitive equilibrium and perfectly competitive equilibrium
€/Q
Quantity
€/Q
D = MR
QC
PC
MC AC
DLR
MRLR
Qmc
Pmc
Perfect competition Monopolistic competition
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Recht und Ökonomie WS 2011/12 Microeconomics – Repetition Part 2 Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider
4.11 Oligopoly Characterized by a ‚small‘ number of firms.
Consequence: the action of one firm will be noticed by the
other firm(s).
The other firm(s) will react.
Essentially how to model this action and reaction of the small
number of competitors.
Example: Cournot model.
Two firms decide (simultaneously) how much to produce
treating the other firms output as given.
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Recht und Ökonomie WS 2011/12 Microeconomics – Repetition Part 2 Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider
MC1
50
4.12 Firm 1‘s output decision
Q1
P1
D1(0)
MR1(0)
If firm 1 thinks, firm 2 will produce nothing at all, its demand curve, D1(0), is the market demand curve.
D1(50)MR1(50)
25
If firm 1 thinks, firm 2 will produce 50 units its demand curve, D1(1), will beshifted to the left by this amount.
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Recht und Ökonomie WS 2011/12 Microeconomics – Repetition Part 2 Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider
Firm 2‘s reactioncurve Q2*(Q1)
4.13 Reaction curves and Cournot equilibrium
Q2
Q1
25 50 75 100
25
50
75
100
Firm 1‘s reactioncurve Q*1(Q2)
x
x
x
x
Firm 1‘s reaction curve shows how much it will produce as a function of how much
it thinks firm 2 will produce.
Cournot-equilibrium
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Recht und Ökonomie WS 2011/12 Microeconomics – Repetition Part 2 Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider
4.14 Cournot and Nash equilibrium
In Cournot equilibrium, each firm correctly assumes the
amount that its competitor will produce and thus
maximizes its own profit.
Cournot equilibrium is an example of a Nash equilibrium.
Nash equilibrium: Each firm is doing the best it can, given
what its competitors are doing.
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Recht und Ökonomie WS 2011/12 Microeconomics – Repetition Part 2 Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider
4.15 Duopoly example
Q1
Q2
Firm 2‘s reaction curve
30
15
Firm 1‘s reaction curve
15
30
10
10
Cournot equilibrium
Market demand is equal to P = 30 – Q, and both firms‘ marginal cost are equal to 0.
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Recht und Ökonomie WS 2011/12 Microeconomics – Repetition Part 2 Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider
Firm 1‘s reaction curve
Firm 2‘s reaction curve
4.16 Competition, oligopoly, and collusion
Q1
Q2
30
30
10
10
Cournot equilibrium15
15
Competitive equilibrium (P = MC, profit = 0)
Collusion curve
7.5
7.5
Collusive equilibrium
Collusion is best for the firms,followed by Cournot equilibrium.
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Recht und Ökonomie WS 2011/12 Microeconomics – Repetition Part 2 Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider
4.17 Other market forms
Cartels: see collusive equilibrium above
Price leadership: leader and follower(s)
Dominant firm(s): by size (market share)
Spatial competition: additional dimension, competition may not lead to efficiency
Monopsony (or oligopsony): one (or a small number of) buyer(s)
Bilateral monopoly: one seller and one buyer