Spoilers or Governance Actors? Engaging Armed Non-State ... · GAM Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement, Indonesia) ICG International Crisis Group LRA Lord Resistance Army, Uganda

DFG Sonderforschungsbereich 700 Governance in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit - Neue Formen des Regierens?

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Engaging Armed Non-State Groups in Areas of Limited Statehood

Ulrich Schneckener

Spoilers or Governance Actors?

SFB-Governance Working Paper Series • No. 21 • October 2009

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Schneckener, Ulrich 2009: Spoilers or Governance Actors? Engaging Armed Non-State Groups in Areas of Limited Statehood,

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SFB-Governance Working Paper Series • No. 21 • October 2009 | 3

Spoilers or Governance Actors? Engaging Armed Non-State Groups in Areas of Limited StatehoodUlrich Schneckener

Abstract

Armed non-state groups pose a severe challenge for peace- and state-building processes. De-

pending on the situation, they may act as both spoilers and governance actors. This paper aims

at presenting a framework for analysing armed groups as well as forms of engagement for

international actors. It first describes various armed groups, which need to be distinguished

in order to highlight specific profiles, as ideal types. Secondly, a number of strategies for dea-

ling with these groups will be introduced and discussed by referring to realist, institutionalist

and constructivist approaches. Thirdly, the conclusion will point to key problems and limits of

these approaches when addressing the spectrum of armed groups. The argument here is that

these approaches - despite their differences - by and large are directed to similar profiles of

armed groups while other forms of non-state violence are systematically neglected.

Zusammenfassung

Nicht-staatliche Gewaltakteure sind eine besondere Herausforderung für Peace- und State-

building-Prozesse. Je nach Situation agieren bewaffnete Gruppen als „Störenfriede“ oder als

Governance-Akteure. Dieses Papier verfolgt die Absicht, einen konzeptionellen Rahmen für

die Analyse von nicht-staatlichen Gewaltakteuren sowie der Gegenstrategien durch interna-

tionale Akteure bereitzustellen. Zunächst werden verschiedene Profile von bewaffneten Grup-

pen in Form von Idealtypen unterschieden. Zweitens werden eine Reihe von Strategien im

Umgang mit solchen Akteuren eingeführt und diskutiert, wobei zwischen realistischen, in-

stitutionalistischen und konstruktivistischen Ansätzen unterschieden wird. Drittens verweist

das Papier auf zentrale Probleme und Grenzen dieser Ansätze. Insbesondere wird deutlich,

dass sich diese Strategien – ungeachtet ihrer inhaltlichen Differenzen – auf ähnliche Profile

bewaffneter Gruppen konzentrieren, während andere Formen von nichtstaatlicher Gewalt

systematisch vernachlässigt werden.

Spoilers or Governance Actors? | 4

Abbreviations

AAA AlianzaAnticomunistaArgentina(ArgentineAnticommunistAlliance)ALN AçãoLibertadoraNacional(NationalLiberationAction,Brazil)ANC AfricanNationalCongress,SouthAfricaAUC AutodefensasUnidasdeColombia(UnitedSelf-DefenseForcesofColombia)DIE DeutschesInstitutfürEntwicklungspolitik(GermanDevelopmentInstitute)ELN EjércitodeLiberaciónNacional(NationalLiberationArmy,Colombia)EZLN EjércitoZapatistadeLiberaciónNacional (ZapatistaArmyofNationalLiberation,Mexico)FARC FuerzasArmadasRevolucionariasdeColombia (RevolutionaryArmedForcesofColombia)FMLN FrenteFarabundoMartíparalaLiberaciónNacional (FarabundoMartíNationalLiberationFront,ElSavador)GAM GerakanAcehMerdeka(FreeAcehMovement,Indonesia)ICG InternationalCrisisGroupLRA LordResistanceArmy,UgandaLTTE LiberationTigersofTamilEelam,SriLankaPAGAD PeopleAgainstGangsterismandDrugs,SouthAfricaPOLISARIO FrentePopularparalaLiberacióndeSaguíaelHamrayRíodeOro(Popular FrontfortheLiberationofSaguiaelHamraandRíodeOro,WesternSahara)PSC PrivateSecurityCompanyPMC PrivateMilitaryCompanyRENAMO ResistênciaNacionalMoçambicana(MozambicanNationalResistance)SPLA SudanPeople’sLiberationArmyTIT TürkIntikamTugayi(TurkishRevengeBrigades)UCDP UppsalaConflictDataProgramUÇK UshtriaÇlirimtareeKosovës(KosovoLiberationArmy)UDA UlsterDefenseAssociationUNITA UniãoNacionalparaaIndependênciaTotaldeAngola (NationalUnionfortheTotalIndependenceofAngola)


Contents

1. Introduction:SpoilersorGovernanceActors? 6

2. The“Universe”ofArmedNon-StateGroups 82.1 SimilaritiesandDifferences 15

3. EngagingArmedNon-StateGroups 193.1 OptionsforDealingwithArmedNon-StateActors 203.2 Realistapproaches 213.2 Institutionalistapproaches 233.3 Constructivistapproaches 24

4. Conclusion:ProblemsandLimits 25

Bibliography 28


1. Introduction: Spoilers or Governance Actors?1

Beitpirates,mercenaries,warlords,bandits,partisansortribalchiefs:Armednon-stategroupshavebeenconstantcompanionsofwarsandviolentconflictsforcenturies.Fromahistoricalpointofview,thefigureofthenon-statearmedactorcanbeseenastheantagonisttothestate’smonopolyontheuseofforce,whichwassuccessivelyestablishedinEuropeandlaterelsewhereagainstthevariousformsofnon-stateviolence–eitherbyexertingpowerandcontainmentorthroughnegotiationswithandincorporationoftheseactorsintostatestructures.Armedgroupsarethereforeneitheranovelphenomenonnoranewchallengeforstateactors.Thecurrentinterestinthesegroups,however,isduetothefactthatforasuccessfulconflictresolutionaswellasforpost-conflictstate-buildingpromotedbyexternalactorstheengagementwitharmedgroupshasbecomeanissueofcrucialimportance.Therecanbenodoubtthatarmednon-stategroupsofdifferenttypedominatethesituationduringandafterarmedconflictinmanifoldways.Ontheonehand,theyareresponsibleforviolenceagainstunarmedciviliansasmuchasfortheestablishmentofcriminalandinformalshadoweconomies.Ontheotherhand,armedgroupsareoftentheresultofsocio-economicandpoliticalproblems,theymayseethemselvesasadvocatesforsuchgrievancesandmaybuildonbroadsupportwithinthepopulation.

Aglanceatthedatadelineatesthequantitativedimensionoftheproblem:TheUppsalaCon-flictDataProgram(UCDP)registeredatotalof124armedconflictsbetween1989and2007,ofwhich91wereintrastateand26internationalisedintrastateconflicts.2Intheseconflictsatleastonearmednon-stateactorisinvolvedbutnormallymultiplemilitantgroupswillbeimplica-ted.Lookingonlyatrebelsfightingagovernment,theresearchersconcludethat,forexample,in2002and2003morethan30%oftheactiveconflictsinvolvedmorethanonerebelgroup(Harbom/Melander/Wallensteen 2008: 697).Moreover, theUCDP has introduced“non-stateconflict”asanewcategory,whichreferstoviolentencountersbetweennon-stateactorsonly.In2002,36“non-stateconflicts”wereregistered(comparedto32conflictsinvolvingastateactor),in2006thefigurewas24(comparedto33withstateinvolvement)(seeHumanSecurityCentre2007).3Intheabsenceofareliabledatabasethatshedslightontheapproximatetotalofarmedgroups,theIISSMilitaryBalance2007mayserveasanillustration:Itlists345armednon-stateactorsworldwide,50ofwhomareactiveinIndiaalone,25inIraq,21inPakistanandhalfadozenineachBangladeshandNigeria(seeHackett2007:422-438).

1 Thepaperdidprofitfromaresearchproject(2008-2010)fundedbytheGermanFoundationforPeaceResearch on the role of NGOs in dealing with armed groups. I therefore would like to thank theFoundationforitssupportandinparticularmycolleagueClaudiaHofmannforhelpfulcommentsatvariousstagesofthedraftingprocessofthispaper.

2 http://www.pcr.uu.se/publications/UCDP_pub/UCDP_dyadic_dataset_1.0_Online_appendix.pdf;20.9.2009.

3 TheUCDPhaslisted27countrieswhichhavebeenaffectedby“non-stateconflicts”since2002:Mexi-co,Guatemala,Ecuador,Colombia,Brazil,Senegal,Coted’Ivoire,Ghana,Nigeria,DRCongo,Burundi,Uganda, Kenya, Sudan, Chad, Ethiopia, Somalia, Iraq, Palestine/Israel,Afghanistan, India, Pakistan,Nepal,SriLanka,Bangladesh,Myanmar,Philippines.Seehttp://www.pcr.uu.se/gpdatabase/search.php;9.5.2009.


Thedebateabouttheroleofnon-statearmedgroupsisbyandlargeshapedbytwoopposingangles:Thefirstperspectivewhichdominatesthepoliticaldiscourseandtheliteratureoncoun-ter-insurgencyperceivestheseactorsmainlyasa“problem”.Theyarenotonlyseenasactorswhomaycauseandtriggerviolentconflicts,butalsoasactorswhomakeitincreasinglydifficulttoendwarsandrestorepeaceandstability.Afterarmedconflicts,theystillactas“spoilers”whohavethepotentialtodisturb,undermine,orcompletelytruncateprocessesofpost-conflictstatebuilding,leadingtoviolenceflare-ups.4Thereby,theseactorsconstantlyquestiontheconceptofthestate’smonopolyoftheuseofforce.Moreover,inmanyinstances,suchasSomalia,DRCongo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Palestine, Iraq,Afghanistan or Pakistan armed groups are notonlya“local”affair,buttheyactacrossbordersandmaydestabiliseentireregions;some–suchastransnationalterroristnetworks–evenposethreatstointernationalsecurity.And,finally,externalactors,rangingfromUNpeaceoperationstodevelopmentNGOs,areinmanywaysdirectlyaffectedbythetheseactorswhomayattackorthreateninternationaltroops,policeoffi-cersoraidworkers:theymaytakeforeignersashostages,preventhumanitarianaidfrombeingdeliveredtothepopulation,orcausealackofinternationalinvestmentandofdevelopment.Theunderlyingassumptionofthe“spoiler”perspectiveisthattheseactorsshownointerestsinpeaceprocessesandstatestabilitybecauseofvariouspoliticalandsocio-economicreasons.However,intheliteraturereferenceismadetovarioustypesofspoilers(Stedman1997)aswellastovariousmethodsofspoiling(e.g.theselectiveortheindiscriminateuseofviolence,seeKalyvas2006:146-209).

Incontrast,thesecondperspectivedoesnotrefertotheseactorsas“problems”,butratheraskswhetherandunderwhichconditionsthesegroupsmayserveas“governanceactors”whoarewillingandabletoprovidebasicservicesbeyondtheirownmembershipforlargersegmentsofthecivilianpopulation–beitprotection,accesstoresourcesandjobs,taxation,supplyoffood,waterandmedicalcareorevenelementsofjurisdiction.Insomeinstances,theseservicesmayworkas“functionalequivalents”toregularstateactivitiesandassureacertaindegreeofstabilityinareasoflimitedstatehoodalthoughthedistributionofgoodsmayoftenbeselectiveandarbitraryaswellasbasedonapatron-client-relationship.Fromthispointofview,theque-stionariseswhetherornotarmedgroupsandtheirleadersalsohavethepotentialtoserveas“stabiliser”andtobecome“partofthesolution”instate-andpeacebuildingprocesses.5Intheliterature,thisapproachhasbeensubstantiatedbyempiricalresearchandbyconceptssuchas“legitimateoligopoliesofviolence”(Mehler2003,2006),whichareestablishedatlocallevelbyvariousarmedgroupsinordertosecureaminimumofstability,an“outsourcingofstatehood”(Zürcher2007)wherestateinstitutionsdefactohandovergovernancefunctionstonon-stateactors,“commercialisedsecurity”(Chojnacki/Branović2007)wherevariousarmedactorsoffertheirservicesona“securitymarket”,orformsof“transnationalsecuritygovernance”(Schne-ckener/Zürcher2007).Thelatterreferstosituationswhereinternationalandlocalactors,inclu-dingarmedgroupssuchasmilitia,clanchiefsor(former)warlords,cooperateinaninformal

4 Forthespoilerconceptsee:Stedman(1997);Schneckener(2003);Newman/Richmond(2006);Greenhill/Major(2006).

5 Forexample,inareporttheInternationalCrisisGroup(seeICG2006)askedthequestionwhetherIraq’smilitantShiiteleaderMuqtadaAl-Sadrisa“spoiler”or“stabilizer”.


orformalisedwaysoastoachieveasecureenvironmentandtodeliverservicestothelocalpo-pulation(seee.g.theinternationalinvolvementinKosovoorAfghanistan).Thesearrangementsusuallyemergeinanadhocfashion,forinstanceinthecontextofcoordinationorconsultationbodies(e.g.foraiddelivery),inwhichbothinternationalandlocalactorsarerepresented.Someoftheseformsofgovernancehaveprovedtobelong-standing,othersturnouttoberathertran-sientphenomenathatvanishassoonasthelocalsituationchanges.

Bothperspectivesleadtodifferentformsofengagementwitharmedgroups.Inthefirstcase,military,policeandlaw-enforcementmeasuresorcontainmentstrategiesseemtobeapprop-riate,whereasfromthesecondperspectiveattemptsforintegrationandsocialisationofthe-segroupsmaybeseenasmorepromising.However,armednon-stateactorsareusuallyboth–spoilersaswellasgovernance-actors–atonce.Withregardtosomeissuesorparticularactorstheymaybehaveasspoilers,whereasinotherareastheyhaveaninterestindeliveringtolocalconstituencies,cooperatingwithothersandshowingcompliancewithcertainagreements.Inotherwords,itremainsanempirical–andnotaconceptual–questionunderwhichcircum-stancesarmedgroupsbehaveinonewayoranother.Theaimofthispaperisnottoanswerthisquestionbuttopresentageneralframeworkforanalysingarmednon-stateactors,theirtypicalcharacteristicsandbehaviouraswellaspossibleformsofengagementforinternationalactors,beitagovernment,aninternationalorganisationoranNGO.Therefore, thepaperwillfirstdescribevariousarmedgroups,whichneedtobedistinguishedinordertohighlightspecificprofiles,asidealtypes.Secondly,anumberofstrategiesfordealingwiththesegroupswillbeintroducedanddiscussedbyreferringtorealist,institutionalistandconstructivistapproaches.Thirdly,theconclusionwillpointtokeyproblemsandlimitsoftheseapproacheswhenaddres-sing the spectrum of armed groups.The paper, however, does not link particular strategieswithparticulartypesofnon-statearmedgroups.Thiswouldnotseemtobeappropriate,sinceanumberoffactorswhichcannotbediscussedinthispaperindetailwoulddeterminethesuccessorfailureofthesestrategies,thetypeofarmedgroupbeingjustoneofthem.Theargu-menthereismuchmoremoderateinstatingthattheseapproaches–despitetheirdifferences–byandlargearedirectedtosimilarprofilesofarmedgroupswhileotherformsofnon-stateviolencearesystematicallyneglected.

2. The “Universe” of Armed Non-State Groups

Generallyspeaking,armed non-state groupsare(i)willingandcapabletouseviolenceforpursuingtheirobjectivesand(ii)notintegratedintoformalisedstateinstitutionssuchasregulararmies,presidentialguards,policeor special forces.They, therefore, (iii)possess a certaindegreeofautonomywithregardtopolitics,militaryoperations,resourcesandinfrastructure.Theymay,however,besupportedorusedbystateactorswhetherinanofficialorinformalmanner.Mo-reover,theremayalsobestateofficialswhoaredirectlyorindirectlyinvolvedintheactivitiesofarmednon-stateactors–sometimesbecauseofideologicalreasons,butnotseldomduetopersonalinterests(i.e.corruption,familyorclanties,clientelism,profit).Finally,they(iv)areshapedthroughanorganisationalrelationshiporstructurethatexistsoveraspecificperiodof


time(e.g.spontaneousriotswouldnotqualify).Againstthisbackground,thefollowingtypologyaimsatidentifyingthemostimportantandmostfrequentlyencounteredarmednon-stateac-torsaswellasathighlightingtheirspecificcharacteristics,basedondefinitionsandconceptsfoundintheliteratureaswellasillustratedbysomeexamples.6

Rebelsorguerrilla fighters,sometimesalsoreferredtoaspartisansorfranc tireurs,arethearche-typeofarmednon-stateactors.Theyseekthe“liberation”ofasocialclassorapoliticalcommu-nity(“nation”).Theyfightfortheoverthrowofagovernment,forthesecessionofaregionorfortheendofanoccupationalorcolonialregime.Inthatsense,theypursueapoliticalagenda,mostoftenbasedonasocial-revolutionary,ethno-nationalisticorreligiouslyinspiredideolo-gy.Theyseethemselvesas‘futurearmies’ofaliberatedpopulationorcommunity.Hencetheysometimeswearuniformsandemblems,theyhaveacommandandrankstructureaswellasinternalrulesoftheconductofviolentactions.Intheirmilitaryoperationstheyavoiddirectconfrontationwiththeiropponents;therefore,guerrillawarfaretypicallybeginsinruralareas,mountainous regions or in remote areas that are beyond the central government’s control.7Somewritershavepropagatedtheconceptofanurbanguerrillathatissupposedtofunctionasavanguardfortheruralguerrilla.8Accordingtothedoctrineofguerrillawarfareasdevelo-pedbyMao Tse Tung, Ernesto Che GuevaraorFrantz Fanon,guerrillafightersdependonthelocalpopulation for logistic andmoral support. In reality, however, themost significant supportcomesfromforeigngovernmentsorvariousnon-stateactorsthatprovidesafehavens,weapons,equipmentandknow-how.HistoricalexamplesareamongothersthepartisansduringWorldWarIIwhofoughtagainstGermanoccupation,theanti-colonialmovementsafter1945aswellastheVietCongandtheRedKhmerinthe1960sand1970s.MorerecentexamplesareRENA-MOinMozambique,theFMLNinElSalvador,UNITAinAngola,theZapatistaEZLNinMexico,theFARCandtheELNinColombia,theMaoistrebelsinIndiaandNepaloranumberofrebelmovementsinDRCongo,supportedbyRwandaandUganda.AlsoseparatistmovementssuchastheSPLAinSouthernSudan,POLISARIOinWest-Sahara,GAMinAceh/Indonesia,theLTTEinSriLankaortheUÇKinKosovodevelopedrebel-stylepolitics.

Militiasareirregular,paramilitarycombatunitsthataimatprotectinganddefendingthein-terestsofthegovernmentand/orcertainsegmentsofthesociety.Theyusuallyactonbehalfof,orareatleasttoleratedby,thepoliticalestablishment(seeEro2000;Francis2005).Militiasareoftencreated, funded, equippedand trained inanti-guerrilla tactics (counter-insurgency)bystateauthoritiesordirectlybyrulingelitesbuttheyaregenerallynotlegalised,i.e.theydonot

6 Forsimilarattempts,seeMair(2003);Wulf(2005:54-62);McCartney(2006:3-4).

7 Onthetacticsofguerrillawarfare,seeMünkler(1992:152-162);Daase(1999);O’Neill(2005:45-65).OnorganisationalandpoliticalaspectsofrebelmovementsseeinparticularWeinstein(2007).

8 OneofthemostprominentproponentsofurbanguerrillawastheBrazilianCarlos Marighela,whoseHandbook of Urban Guerrilla Warfare(1969)inspirednumerous(mostlyleftist)guerrillasandterroristgroups.MarighelahimselffoundedtheALN(Ação Libertadora Nacional)thatbecameknowntoalargerpublicthroughtheterroristattacksitlaunched.


actunderwrittenandtransparentprovisions.9Theirtaskisoftentofightrebelsorcriminals,tothreatenspecificgroups(i.e.minorities)ortointimidatemembersofoppositionparties.Onbehalfofthegovernmenttheymayhandlethedirtybusinessoftargetedkidnappingsandkil-lings,massacres,ethniccleansingorevengenocideasinthecaseoftheHutuextremistgroupInterahamwé in 1994, sponsored by the government of Rwanda. Nevertheless militias oftenevadegovernmentcontroland,inthecourseofaconflict,developtheirownagenda.Onepro-minentexamplewouldbethedevelopmentoftheanti-rebelmovementAutodefensas Unidas de Colombia(AUC)inColombia(seeRichani2007).Self-proclaimeddefendersofastatusquosuchas ‘protection forces’ (Schutzbünde or Heimwehren), political party militias or armed vigilantegroups(e.g.KuKluxKlanintheUS)alsofallintothiscategorywhentheyprotectthe(reported)interestsofsegmentsofthepopulationthatbenefitfromthecurrentpoliticalsituationanddonotwanttoloosetheirpoliticaloreconomicstatus(suchaslandowners,formercombatants,officers,dominantethno-nationalgroups).Someofthesegroupsmaythereforealsoattackthepoliticalestablishmentorstateinstitutionswhentheirprivilegesorsuperiorroleareputintoquestion.Anothersub-typeisself-helpdefenceforcesoranti-gangmilitiaswhoclaimtotrytoprotectacertaincommunityagainstcrimeandcorruptionbecausethestateisunableorun-willing.Often,however,thesegroupsthemselvesposeathreattotheirneighbourhoodbyigno-ringlawsandviolatinghumanrights–anexampleistheSouth-AfricangroupPeople Against Gangsterism and Drugs (Pagad),mainlybased inWesternCapeandKwaZulu-Natal,whowereresponsibleforanumberofattacksonlocalANCpoliticiansreportedlyinvolvedinorganisedcrimeorcorruption(Ero2000:26-27).Duetotheelusivenessofthemilitiaconcept,avarietyofgroupscanbesubsumedunderthisheadingsuchastheright-wingextremistWhiteHandinGuatemala,theArgentineTripleA(Alianza Anticommunista Argentina),theanti-KurdishTurkishRevengeBrigade(TIT),theprotestantUlsterDefenceAssociation(UDA)inNorthernIreland,thepro-SerbianArkanTigersinBosniaandKosovo,thepro-IndonesiangroupsAitarak(thorn)andBesi Merah Putih(red-and-whiteiron)inTimor-Lesteorthegovernment-backedJanjaweedmilitiainWesternSudan(Darfur).

Clan chiefs orBig Menaretraditional,localauthoritieswhoheadaparticulartribe,clan,ethnicorreligiouscommunity.10Inotherwords,theyaretheleadersofanidentity-basedgroup,deeplyrootedinhistoryandtraditions.Thus,theyhaveusuallyattainedtheirpositionsasleadersac-cordingtotraditionalrules,whetherbyvirtueoftheirageandexperience,ancestryorpersonalability(charisma).Inthisregard,theycanbeseenaslegitimaterepresentativesoftheirpeople.Mostoften,theycontrolacertainterritorywhichmayrangefromafewperipheralvillagesorsettlementstolargerregions.Whilethiscontrolcanbeformalisedinpara-statekingdomsorchiefdomswithacertaindegreeofautonomy,itmayalsobemoreinformalsinceinmanycasesiteitherexistsparalleltoorcutsacrossadministrativeunitsofthestate(vonTrotha2000).Mostchiefsorbigmenalsocommandanarmedforcerecruitedfrommalemembersoftheirtribe

9 However,insomecountriesprivatecitizensareallowedbyconstitutionorspeciallawstoacquireandtocarryfirearms(seee.g.the2ndamendmenttotheUSconstitutionortheColombianDecree3398of1965).Theseprovisionsareoftenregardedasthelegalbasisfortheestablishmentofmilitiagroups.

10ThisdefinitiondoesnotincludecorruptandautocraticAfricanpresidentsorpoliticians(e.g.thefor-merpresidentMobutuofZaire)whichintheliteraturearealsosometimescalled‘BigMen’.


orclan.Theseforcesaremainlysetupforthepurposeofprotectionandself-defenceaswellasforassuringthepoliticalorderandfordeterringandfightinginternalrivals.Examplesofthistypecanbefoundmainlyinclan-basedsocietiesinsub-SaharanAfrica(seethevariousclanfa-miliesinSomalia,theTuaregsinMali,theBagandainUgandaandtheZuluinSouthAfrica),inCentralAsiaorinthePacificregionaswellasincountrieslikeYemen,AfghanistanorPakistan(e.g.PashtuntribalareasalongtheAfghan-Pakistaniborder).11

Warlordsarelocalpotentateswhocontrolaparticularterritoryduringoraftertheendofavio-lentconflict.12Theysecuretheirpowerthroughprivatearmieswhicharerecruitedandpaidbythewarlordhimself.Therelationshipbetweenwarlordandfightersisthereforeprimarilybasedonpersonalloyaltyandtoamuchlesserdegreeonethnictiesorideology.AnearlydefinitionofthetermreferstothehistoriccaseoftheChinesewarlords(junfa)inthe1910sand1920s:Awarlordisamanwho“exercisedeffectivegovernmentalcontroloverafairlywell-definedregionbymeansofamilitaryorganisationthatobeyednohigherauthoritythanhimself ”(Sheridan1966:1,quotedinVinci2007:315).Moreover,warlordsthemselves–MaxWeberusedthetermKriegsfürst–areindependentfromanyhigherauthority(seeGiustozzi2003:2;Jackson2003:134).Modernwarlordsareatypicalby-productoflong-standingcivilwars.Someofthem,however,managetoperpetuatetheirpositionalsoaftertheendofcombatactivitiesandshapethepost-warorder.Quiteoftentheyattempt to legalise thebenefits theyacquiredduringthewarbyrunningforpublicoffice.Generally,warlordsbenefitinparticularfromthelackorthebreak-downofstatestructures.Theyusewarorpost-wareconomiesbyexploitingresources(suchaspreciousmetals,tropicaltimber,commoditiesordrugcultivation)and/orthelocalpopulation(forinstance,throughlootingorlevying‘taxes’).Indoingso,theyfrequentlycapitaliseoncross-bordertiesandlinkstoglobalnetworksandillicitmarkets.Inparticular,thiskindofpoliticaleconomyhighlightstheir“parasiticnature”whichseparatesawarlordorganisation“fromthestate,tribe,orotherformofpoliticalcommunity” (Vinci2007:327-328).Prominentexamplesofwarlords–someofthemlaterassumedhigh-rankingpoliticalpositionsinthegovernment–areMohammedFarahAidid(Somalia),CharlesTaylor(Liberia),Laurent-DésiréKabila(Zaire/DRCongo)andAbdulRashidDostum(Afghanistan).

Terroristsuseviolentmeans forspreadingpanicandfearamongthepopulation inorder toachievepoliticalgoals,betheybasedonleft-orright-wing,onsocial-revolutionary,ethno-na-tionalor religious ideologies (seeGuelke1995;Waldmann1998).Theyuseviolencenotonlytoshockandintimidatesocietybutalsotomobilisesympathisersandsupportersaswellastocontributetotheradicalisationofaconflict.Inthissense,terrorismisa“communicationstrategy” conveying political messages to friends and foes alike (Waldmann 1998: 13).Terro-ristgroupsaretypicallyorganisedinaclandestineway,mostofteninsmallgroupsandcells,sometimesalso in largercross-bordernetworks.Most long-standingterroristgroupshaveacertaindegreeofhierarchywithaleadershipandcommandlevelatthetop;however,thecell

11See the classic analysis by Sahlins (1963). For more recent examples of clan politics see Englebert(2002);Ssereo(2003);Collins(2004,2006);Schatz(2004).

12On warlordism see Reno (1998); Nissen/Radtke (2002); Jackson (2003); Giustozzi (2003, 2005);Vinci(2007).


structureisoftenorganisedinanetworkstylewithvariousnodeslinkingratherautonomouscellsorgroups.Onemaydistinguishbetweenlocalterroristswhoaimprimarilyatchanginganexistingpoliticalorderatthenationallevel(e.g.changeofpoliticalregime,separatism)andtransnationalterroristssuchasAlQaidaorJemaahIslamyyahwhoaddresstheinternationalorder or the state-system in a wider region and who are linked by a transnational ideologywhichbridgesnational,ethnic,geographicalorlinguisticdifferences(seeSchneckener2006).Militarilyspeaking,terroristsarerelativelyweakactorswhouseterroristattacksprimarilyasameansforgettingattentionfortheirideologyandgrievances.Typicaltacticalmeansincludekidnapping,hostage-taking,sabotage,murder,suicideattacks,vehiclebombsandimprovisedexplosivedevicesaswellaspotentiallytheuseofmaterialforweaponsofmassdestruction(e.g.“dirtybombs”).Potentialtargetsrangefrommilitarysites,policestationsandofficialgovern-mentbuildingstocompanies,airports,restaurants,shoppingmallsandmeansofpublictrans-port.HistoricandcurrentexamplesofgroupsandorganisationswhoprimarilyuseterroristmeansaretheRedArmyFactioninGermany,theActionDirecteinFrance,theBasqueETA,theNorthernIrishIRA,theKurdishPKK,theIslamicJihadinEgyptorthevariousIslamicgroupsinIndia,PakistanandIndonesia.

Criminals are systematically involved in illegal activities inorder to gainmaterial benefits.13TheyareoftenorganisedinMafia-typestructures,syndicates,gangsorlargernetworks.Thelistofpossiblecrimesandoffencesislongandincludessmuggling,robbery,fraud,blackmailing,piracy,contractkilling,moneylaundering,traffickingofhumanbeings,productpiracyand,inparticular,illegalcross-bordertradingofdrugs,weapons,nuclearmaterial,humanorgans,tim-berandcommodities.Mostgroupstodayarenotspecialisedinoneareabuttendtobeinvolvedinvariousfields,dependingontheopportunitystructureathand.Organisedcrimegroups,atleasttheirleaders,sometimesseekpoliticalinfluenceinordertosecuretheirprofitinterests.Forthatmatter,theyusemeanssuchasbribery,blackmailing,intimidationandmurderagainstpoliticians,policemenandjudges.14Therefore,criminalsdonotfightagainstthestateorapar-ticulargovernmentbutratheraimatinfiltratingandunderminingpublicauthorities.Usuallycriminalsuseviolentmeansselectivelysoasnottoreceivetoomuchattentionfromlawen-forcementbodies.However,insomeinstances,violencemayescalatetoawar-likelevel,inparti-cularwhencompetingcriminalgroupsfighteachotherandthestatereactsbyactivatingspecialforcesorthemilitary.Forexample,themostrecentdrug-relatedstruggleinMexico,involvingfourdrugcartels (Sinaloa, Tijuana, Juárez andGulf), causedmore than10.000deathsbetween2006and2008(seeHoffmann2009).Prominenthistoricandcurrentcasesofmanifestcriminalstructures,sometimesdevelopedoverdecadesandgenerations,aretheUS-AmericanLa Cosa Nostra, the Italianmafias (the SicilianCosa Nostra, the Calabrian Ndrangheta, the NeapolitanCamorraandtheApulianSacra Cordona Unita),variousJapaneseYakuzas,theChineseTriadsand

13TheUNConventionAgainstTransnationalOrganizedCrime(2000)definesinArt.2an“organizedcri-megroup”as“astructuredgroupofthreeormorepersons,existingforaperiodoftimeandactinginconcertwiththeaimofcommittingoneormoreseriouscrimesoroffencesestablishedinaccordancewiththisConvention,inordertoobtain,directlyorindirectly,afinancialorothermaterialbenefit.”

14ForanoverviewonorganisedcrimeseeKrasmann(1997);Williams(2001);Galeotti(2001);Naim(2005).SeealsoaspecialissueofGlobalCrime(2004)oncriminalnetworks.


theAsianBig Circle Boys,theRussianmafiyagroupings(e.g.Solntseva,Tambov),theTaiwaneseUnited Bamboo GangordrugcartelsinColombia/USA(e.g.Cali, Medellin, Norte del Valle).OtherexamplesaretheA.Q.KhannetworkinPakistan,whichdealtillegallywithmaterialandknow-howaboutweaponsofmassdestruction(seeHeupel2008)ortheactivitiesoftheRussianarmstraderVictorBoutwhohadbuiltupanetworkoffirmsinordertoprovidearmsinanumberofconflicts(e.g.Angola,WestAfrica,Afghanistan)despiteinternationalsanctions(seeFarah/Braun2007).Mostcriminalorganisationsoperateacrossborders,theyhavelinksandpresencesinanumberofcountries,frequentlybasedonfamilyties,ethnicnetworksormigrationpatterns.Theyareneverthelessoftenorganisedhierarchicallywithasinglepatronora“committee”ofgangleadersatthetoplevel.

Mercenaries and private security/military companies(PSCs/PMCs)arevolunteersusuallyrecruitedfromthirdstateswhoareremuneratedforfightingincombatunitsorforconductingspecialtasksontheirown.Theycanservedifferentmasters,rangingfromthearmyofastatetowarlordswhopromiserewards.Therefore,incivilwarsmercenariesarefrequentlyfoundfightingonallsides.Oftenthesemercenariesaredemobilisedsoldiersorformerrebelfighterswhonowoffertheirknow-howtootherwarringparties.Mercenarismhasalong-standingtradition:AmongitsfamousprecursorsaretheCondottieri–contractorswholedbandsofmercenarieshiredforprotectivepurposesbyItaliancity-statesorprincesfromthe15thcenturyonwards.Otherhisto-ricexamplesaremercenariesinthe30YearsWar(1618to1648)orduringthepost-WW2periodofdecolonisation,e.g.theactivitiesofformerGermanWehrmachtofficersinCongo(‘Kongo-Müller’).Thiscategoryalsoincludesprofessional‘bountyhunters’whohuntdownwanted(war)criminalsorterroristseitheronbehalfofagovernmentorontheirownaccountinreturnforfinancialrewards.Whiletraditionalmercenariesarebannedunderinternationallaw,modernprivatesecurityormilitarycompaniesusuallyactonalegalisedandlicensedbasis.Theyhaveprofessionalisedandcommercialisedthebusinessofprovidingcombatants,trainersoradvi-sers,orotherformsofoperationalorlogisticalsupport,andarecontractedbygovernments,companiesorothernon-stateactors.15Moreover,someareactivelyinvolvedincombatsitua-tions,oftenforcounter-insurgencypurposes.Becauseofthedifferentservices,Kümmel(2005:146-151)distinguishesbetween“militaryproviderfirms”,“securityproviderfirms”,“militaryandsecurityconsultantfirms”and“militaryandsecuritysupportfirms”.Alargenumberofthesecompanies,typicallysetupbyformerarmyorpoliceofficersaswellasintelligenceandsecurityexperts,arebasedintheUS,GreatBritain,SouthAfrica,France,CanadaorIsrael(seeKinsey2006:4-6).Prominentandwell-documentedexamplesaretheactivitiesof theSouthAfricancompanyExecutive OutcomesinAngolaandSierraLeone,theBritishDefence System Ltd.inCo-lombia,theUSfirmMilitary Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI)inCroatiaandBosniaorUScompaniessuchasDynCorporBlackwaterinIraqandAfghanistan.

15ForprivatemilitaryandsecuritycompaniesseeMandel(2002);Singer(2003);Krahmann(2005);Lean-der(2005).


Maraudersbycontrastaredemobilisedorscatteredformercombatantswhoengageinlooting,pillagingandterrorisingdefencelessciviliansduringoraftertheendofaviolentconflict.Theydisplayarelativelylowleveloforganisationalcohesionandmovefromoneplacetoanother.Aparticularversionistheso-calledsobel,aneologismcombiningthewordssoldierandrebel(soldiers by day, rebels by night).As described paradigmatically in the case of Sierra Leone,sobels aremembersof anunder-funded,disorganisedarmy; afterwork theyaimatmakingprivateprofitoutofcriminalandcommercialactivitiessuchaslooting,robbery,thecollectionofprotectionmoney,abductions,lynching(seeRichards1996).Maraudersarethereforebenefi-ciariesofachaoticsituationtriggeredbythecentralgovernment’slossofcontrolover(partsof )itsterritory.Insomecases,however,maraudersmaybedeployedstrategicallybyregulararmedforces,paramilitariesorpoliticalmovementsasauxiliariestohandlethe“dirtybusiness”ofeth-niccleansing,massacresofthecivilianpopulationorthepersecutionofpoliticalopponents.

2.1 Similarities and Differences

Despitetheirdifferentprofile,thereisanumberofcommonfeatureswhichmakesitincrea-singlydifficulttodistinguishanalyticallybetweenthesetypes.Inparticular,threetrendshavecontributed to this: First, most of these armed non-state actors frequently use– albeit to adifferentdegreeandbydifferentmeans–violenceagainstunarmedcivilians.Sometimesthishappensaccidentallybutinmostcasesthisispartofastrategyinordertoexploit,intimidateordeterpeople,toprovokereactionsfromthegovernmentandtounderminetheauthorityandlegitimacyofstateinstitutionswhoareapparentlynotabletoprotectthepopulation.Inotherwords,non-statearmedactorsgenerallydonotcareagreatdealforthedistinctionmadebyhumanitarianinternationallawbetweencombatantsandnon-combatants.Ifanything,suchadistinctionmayhaveplayedaroleforclassicalrebelorguerrillamovements,whoavoidedusingexcessiveviolenceagainstthecivilianpopulation,sincethelatterrepresentedasourceof–atleasttemporary–supportfortheinsurgents.Theyprimarilyattackedmembersoftheregulararmedandsecurityforces;however,theytendedtoviewas‚combatants‘allrepresentativesofthestateapparatus(e.g.politicians,policemen,judges)andtherebyextendedthenotionofcom-batantfarbeyondtheratherstrictdefinitionbyinternationallaw.Mostoften,thereferencetothisdistinctionispurelyrhetoricalandanactofpropaganda.Incontemporaryconflicts,espe-ciallyintra-stateones,mostpartiesdonotrespectthedifferencebetweencombatantsandnon-combatants.Onthecontrary,farfromreceivingspecialprotection,thecivilianpopulationhasforanumberofreasonsbecometheprimarytargetofvariousarmednon-stateactorspursuingpoliticalandeconomicgains.

Second,anothertrendemergingsincethe1990shasbeentheprocessoftransnationalisationwhichhasvariousdimensions:Somegroupssimplycooperateacrossborderswithotherorga-nisations.Inothercases,groupsbuilduptheirowntransnationaltiesandnetworks,mainlyforsupportandfinancialandlogisticalpurposes,byusingforexamplediasporas,NGOs,culturalorganisations,businessmen,ethnicandreligiousties.Agroupmayturnintoatransnationalactorwhichoperatessimultaneouslyinvariousstatesandregions.Inanycase,transnationali-


sationoffersnewopportunitiesandroomformanoeuvre.Transnationalisationnotonlyfacili-tatesthelinking-upofwarorpost-wareconomieswithcross-bordersmugglingroutesandglo-bal‘shadow’markets;itmoreoverfostersthetransmissionofpoliticalagendasandideologicalpropagandathataredisseminatedthroughsupportersandinternationalmedia.Thedegreeoftransnationalisationvariesfromonetypeofgrouptoanother:Inparticular,numerousterroristandcriminalorganisationsmakeuseoftransnationalrelations;thesameistrueformanyrebelgroupsandwarlordsaswellasformercenariesandprivatesecuritycompanieswhooperateindifferentstates.Ontheotherhand,processesoftransnationalisationarelessrelevantforclanchiefs,maraudersandmostmilitias.

Closelylinkedtothetransnationalisationissue,athirdtrendcanberecognised:Armednon-stateactorsmovemoreandmorefromahierarchicalorganisationintothedirectionofratherloosenetworkstructures.Onecanconclude:Thisseemstobemorelikely,themorethegroupsactacrossborders.Again,terroristandcriminalnetworksaretheprecursorsofthistrend,aswell as rebels, warlords, marauders and to a lesser degree other groups, which increasinglyshowelementsofnetworkstructuresthatincludeflathierarchies,ahighdegreeofflexibilityandratherautonomoussub-units linkedtoeachother.Inotherwords,actorsbecomemorefragmentedandtheleadershipandcommandlevelsbecomelessabletoachievecoherenceinstrategicandideologicalterms.

Yet,despitethesesimilarities,fromananalyticalpointofview,fourcriteriainparticularbringthedifferencesbetweenthesetypesintoperspective(seeTable1):

Change versus status quo orientation: Some armed non-state actors seek a (radical) changeof the status quo; they demand a different government, a different political system, thesecessionofaregion,anewworldorder,etc.Bycontrast,othergroups–whetherdrivenbyowninterestsorinstigatedbythoseinpowerwhomtheyserve–aimatsecuringandconsolidatingthestatusquo.Theformerpositionappliestoterroristsaswellasrebelsandguerrillafighters,whereasthelatterappliestowarlordsandcriminalswhogenerallyseektosecuretheirachievedpoliticalandeconomicprivileges.Thesameisoftentrueforclanchiefsandbig men,inparticularwhentheyareintegratedintothepoliticalsystembymeansofco-optiveruleorneo-patrimonialstructures.Theprototypesofastatusquomovement,however,aremilitiasorparamilitaryorganisations,whicharedeployedtoprotecttheruleofaregimeorthedominanceofparticulargroups.Mercenariesormarauders,bycontrast,behaveratheropportunistically;sometimestheymayservetheinterestofstatusquoforces,whileatothertimestheymaychallengethem.

Territorial control versus non-territorial tactics:Inhowfararearmednon-stategroupsabletocontrolalargerterritoryand,thereby,providesomekeygovernancefunctionsforthepopu-lationconcerned?Bothguerrillamovementsandwarlords,inprinciple,aimattheconquestofand–ifpossible–thepermanentcontroloverterritoryinordertoestablishstate-freeregions.Mercenariesandprivatemilitarycompaniesareusuallyemployedforsimilarpur-poses.Clanchiefsarealsooftenconnectedtoaparticular“homeland”orregion.Terrorists,

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ontheotherhand,mighthaveterritorialambitions (e.g.thecreationoftheirownstate);however, they lack thecapabilities toconquer territoryanddefend itbymilitarymeans.Thesameappliestomaraudersifoneneglectsthetemporarycontroloftowndistrictsorvillages.Criminalsaretypicallyinterestedinthecontrolofparticularfunctionsintownsandregions(suchastransactions,flowsofgoods,movementofpeople,protection)butnotinastate-likecontrolofterritories.Militiasmaybecharacterisedbybothvariants.Some(especially large)militiaorganisationsarecapableof securingorre-conquering territoryfromrebels,whereasotherunitsareassignedspecialtasksapartfromterritorialcontrol,suchasthepersecutionofdissidents.

Physical versus psychological use of violence:Eachactofviolenceentailsaphysicalandpsycho-logicalaspect;however,forsomegroupsoneaspectmaybemoreimportantthantheother.Rebels andguerrillamovementspursue theirgoalsprimarilyby relyingon thephysicaldimension.Theiraimistoweakentheiropponent’smilitarystrength,defeatitorforceittosurrender,andsubsequentlytakeitsplace.Terrorists,bycontrast,useviolencebecauseofitspsychologicaleffects.Betweenthesetwoextremesotherarmednon-stateactorsaretobefound:Clanchiefsormercenariesprimarilyusephysicalviolenceinordertodefeatrivalsoropponents,whileformaraudersandcriminalsthethreatanduseofviolenceisoftenmerelyameansofintimidation.Finally,militiasandwarlordsareratherambivalentwithregardtothetypeofviolencetheyuse;dependingonthegroupitselfandthegeneralcircumstancestheymakeuseofbothformsofviolence.

Political/ideological versus profit-driven motivation:Whereasguerrillamovements,militias,clanchiefs,bigmenandterroristgroupspursue–atleastrhetorically–asocio-politicalagen-da,oftenbasedonideologieswhichtheyneedeconomicresourcesfor,thereverseusuallyholdstrueforwarlordsandcriminals.Theyareprimarilyinterestedinsecuringeconomicandcommercialprivilegesandpersonalprofits.Politicalpowerandpublicofficesaswellastheuseofviolenceservetherealisationoftheirselfisheconomicinterests.Inthatsensewarlordsandcriminalsarenot“apolitical”actors;yet,theirmotivationforjoiningthepoli-ticalstruggleforpowerisdifferentfromthatofotherpoliticalactors.Similarly,mercenari-esandmaraudersprimarilypursuenarrowlydefinedprofitinterests.

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Table 1: Types of Armed Non-State ActorsChange vs. Status Quo

Territorial vs. Non-Territorial

Physical vs. Psychological Use

of Violence

Political/Ideological vs. Profit-Driven

Motivation

Rebels, Guerrillas

Change Territorial Physical Political

Militias Status quo Territorial Non-territorial

PhysicalPsychological

Political

Clan Chiefs, Big Men

Status quo Territorial Physical Political

Warlords Status quo Territorial Physical Psychological

Profit-driven

Terrorists Change Non-territorial Psychological Political

Criminals, Mafia, Gangs

Status quo Non-territorial Psychological Profit-driven

Mercenaries, PMCs/PSCs

Indifferent Territorial Physical Profit-driven

Marauders, ‘Sobels’

Indifferent Non-territorial Psychological Profit-driven

Tobesure,thischaracterisationconstructsideal-typesanddoesnotresultfromin-depthem-piricalstudies.Inreality,however,casesdonotalwaysfitinneatlywiththesecategoriessincegroupssometimesundergotransformationinthecourseofaconflict.Rebelleadersorbig men,forinstance,mayturnintowarlords;militiasorwarlordsmaydegenerateintoordinarycrimi-nals;criminalsbecomeinvolvedinterroristnetworksandviceversa;militias,rebelsorwarlordsincreasinglyemployterroristmethods,andsoon.Oftenwhathasstartedasaso-callednationalliberationmovementendsinterrorismagainstunarmedcivilians(seecasesinNorthernIre-landorPalestine).Andtheotherwayaround:Somegroupsstartwithterroristattacksinordertomobilisethepopulation,torecruitmoreandmorevolunteersandtobecomearebelorga-nisation(seee.g.developmentofUÇK1996-99).Moreover,inmanycaseswedealwithhybridformsthatarecharacterisedbyfeaturesofdifferentidealtypes.ExamplesincludetheTamilTigersinSriLanka,theFARCinColombia,theHizbullahinLebanonorMaoistrebelsinNe-pal.Theseorganisationscouldnotonlycontrolsignificantterritorybutalsolaunchedterroristattacksinotherpartsofthecountry.Theyemployedphysicalaswellaspsychologicalmeansofviolenceandpursuefar-reachingeconomicinterests,someofthem–likeFARC–areaddi-tionallyinvolvedinlarge-scalecriminalactivities(drugeconomyandkidnapping).Therefore,theseorganisationsaredifficulttocategorise.

Nonethelessitdoesmakesensetoholdontothesedistinctions,becausetheyallowformakingassessmentsregardingtheextenttowhichparticulargroupsorindividualscorrespondtotheseidealtypecategories.Moreimportantly,inordertoanalysethetransitionofaparticulargroup,criteriathatdistinguishonesituationfromanotherarenecessaryandcanbeprovidedbytheproposedtypology.Thismethodnotonlyhasinternationallegalandsociologicalimplicationsbutisalsorelevantforpracticalpolicypurposessinceitmaybehelpfulfordevelopingcoun-


ter-strategiesandcounter-measuresandtoassesswhichactorsaremoreorlesslikelytospoilinternationalstate-andpeace-buildingefforts.

3. Engaging Armed Non-State Groups

Generallyspeaking,internationaleffortsinpeace-andstate-building,implyingthestrengthe-ningorreconstructionofstatestructuresandinstitutions,dochallengethepositionofmostarmednon-stateactors–anotableexceptionarecommercialsecurityandmilitarycompanieswhichlargelydependongovernmentcontracts.Onthewhole,capablestatestructureswouldlimittheirroomformanoeuvreandopportunitiestopursuetheirpoliticaland/oreconomicagendas.Somegroupswouldfacedisarmamentand,eventually,dissolution.Otherswouldpro-bablybeforcedtotransformthemselves,i.e.tobecomepoliticalforcesortointegrateintoof-ficialstatestructures,whilecriminals,mercenariesormarauderswouldsimplyriskeconomicprofitsandfacelawenforcementmeasures.Therefore,thesegroupsaremorelikelytochallengethantosupportanystepsthatwouldstrengthenor(re-)establishthestate’smonopolyontheuseofforce.Thisbehaviourcanbeobservedinalmosteveryinternationalintervention,rangingfromBosniaandKosovotoSomalia,Haiti,Afghanistan,andDRCongo.Inthesecases,thein-ternationalcommunityisconfrontedwiththefollowingdilemma:Ontheonehand,peace-andstate-buildingactivitieshave tobe implementedagainst thevested interestsof thesearmedactorsinordertoachievepositiveresultsinthelong-run.Ontheotherhand,progressregar-dingasecureenvironmentisoftenonlypossibleifatleastthemostpowerfuloftheseactorscanbeinvolvedinapoliticalprocesswhichgrantsthemsomekindofpoliticalinfluence(e.g.postsinaninterimgovernment)and/oreconomicandfinancialprivilegeswhichmayinturnunderminethewholeprocessofstate-building.

Inotherwords,armednon-stateactorsarenotonlypartoftheproblembutmust,asstatedinthebeginning,sometimesalsobepartofthesolution(forcasestudies,seeRicigliano2005).Inparticularwithregardtoalreadyestablishedpara-statestructuresbywarlords,rebels, big menormilitias,thequestioniswhetheritispossibletousethesestructuresastemporarysolutionsandbuildingblocsforreconstructingstatehood,orwhetherthiswouldsimplyincreasetheriskofstrengtheningandlegitimisingthemsothattheestablishmentofthestate’smonopolyontheuseofforcebecomesevenlesslikely.Inotherwords,thoseactorswhointheoryhavethegreatestpotentialforstate-buildingandsecuritygovernancearealsotheoneswhocanmobilisethegreatestspoilingpower.Moreover,theinternationalcommunityrunstheriskofsendingthewrongmessage(“violencepays”)bydevotingtoomuchattentionorbygrantingprivilegestoarmednon-stateactorswhohavealreadybenefitedfromwarandshadoweconomies.Thismaynotonlytriggerincreasingdemandsbytheseactorsbutalsoseriouslyharmthecredibilityandlegitimacyofexternalactorsvis-à-visthegeneralpublic(“moralhazard”problem).Thetaskbecomesevenmoredifficultthemorethethreetrendsmentionedaboveprevail:Ifanactorhasbeenorisinvolvedingrosshumanrightsviolations,ifanactorbecomestransnationalisedandcanexploitopportunitiesacrossborders,andifanactor ischaracterisedbya loosenetwork


structurewherecentraldecision-makingcannolongerbeassured–allthesefactorsmaymakedealsbyinternationalmediatorsorfacilitatorswiththeseactorsmoreandmoredifficult.

3.1 Options for Dealing with Armed Non-State Actors

Clearly,therearenosatisfyinganswerstothesequestions.Consideringpastexperience,con-text-specific,flexiblearrangementsindealingwitharmednon-stateactorswillalwaysbeneces-sary.However,morebroadlyspeaking,inprincipletheinternationalcommunityhasanumberof options for“spoiler management” at its disposal. One prominent attempt to systematisestrategies fordealingwithnon-state armedgroups isStedman’s (1997),whichdistinguishedthreeso-calledspoilermanagementstrategies:positivepropositionsorinducementsinordertocounterdemandsmadebynon-statearmedgroups; socialisation inorder tobringaboutsituationalorevennormativechangesofbehaviour;andarbitrarymeasuresinordertoweakenarmedgroupsor force themtoacceptcertainterms.AstudyconductedbytheGermanDe-velopmentInstitute(DeutschesInstitutfürEntwicklungspolitik,DIE)identifiedavoidanceofengagement,disregard/observation/involuntaryengagement,apoliticalaction/equidistance,ex-clusion,andcooperationaspossiblecoursesofactionfordevelopmentagencieswhendealingwithnon-statearmedgroups(seeGrävingholt/Hofmann/Klingebiel2007).Undercloserscru-tinyhowever,theseapproacheslacktheoreticalsubstantiationanddonotcoverthecompleterangeofoptionsavailable.

ThebenefitofusingInternationalRelationstheoryinthisrespectisthatdifferentcampsandstrategicorientationsindealingwitharmedgroupscanbebetterstructuredandunderstood.Aseachoftheseapproachesislinkedtoparticularparadigmsandworldviews,whichexplicitlyorimplicitlycarrywiththemassumptionsaboutthecharacteroftheunderlyingconflictaswellasaboutthenatureandthetypicalbehaviourofarmedgroupswhentheyareconfrontedwithparticularsituations,meansandactions.Firstly,realist approaches,whichultimatelyfocusontheeliminationof,thesuppressionof,orthecontrolovernon-statearmedgroupsinordertoforcethemtoadapttoanewsituation;secondly,institutionalist approaches,whichaimatchangesofinterestsandpoliciesofthesegroups;andthirdly,constructivist approaches,whichconcentrateonachangeinnorms(suchasnon-violence)andinself-conception(identity)oftherespectiveactor.Thus, thedirectionsdonotonlydiffer regarding strategies and instruments,but alsoshowdifferentunderlyingassumptionswithrespect to learningprocessesofarmedgroups,rangingfrompureadaptationtochangesofpreferences tochangesof identity.Accordingly,the approachesbase themselvesondifferentmechanismsand result indifferentdegreesofbehaviouralchange:Therealistapproachmainlyrestsontheapplicationofforceandtheuseofleverage,whichmayprecipitateabehaviouralchangeonlyaslongasforceisapplied.Undersuchpressurefromtheoutside,non-statearmedgroupsmaychangetheirpoliciesbutusuallyinherentpreferenceswill remainunchanged–on thecontrary, theirpositionsmaybecomeevenmorehard-linethanbefore.Theinstitutionalapproachfocusesonbargainingasitskeymechanism,whichmayachieveasustainableresultbutreliesheavilyontherespectiveactorremainingapartofthebargainingsystem.Onlythecontinuousapplicationofaninstitutional


settingoffersenoughincentivesandguidanceinordertofirstchangepoliciesandlaterpos-siblypreferences.Constructivistsresttheireffortsonpersuasion:aresultmaybedifficulttoachievebutifabehaviouralchangeoccursitis–intheory–sustainableasthemotivationtobehaveconforminglyandmayovertimebeinternalisedbytheactor(seeTable2).Theliteratureaccountsforanarrayofapproacheswhichmayroughlybeassignedtothesedifferingtenden-cies(seeSchneckener2003,2006b;Newman/Richmond2006).

Table 2: Approaches for Dealing with Armed Non-State GroupsApproach Key Mechanism Behavioural Change

Based onResult

Realist Force/Leverage AdaptationNon-Sustainable

(based on the constant application of force)

Institutionalist BargainingAdaptation;

Policy/Preference Change

Sustainable(within institutional

framework)

Constructivist PersuasionAdaptation;

Policy/Preference Change;Identity Change

Sustainable

3.2 Realist approaches

Coercion:Internationalactorsmayusecoercivemeasures,includingtheuseofforceandco-ercivediplomacy(seeArt/Cronin2003;George1991,1996).Typicalinstrumentsaremilitaryorpoliceoperationsaimedatfightingorarrestingmembersofarmedgroups,thedeplo-ymentofinternationaltroopsinordertostabiliseapost-warsituationortheimplemen-tationof internationalsanctions (e.g.armsembargoes,no-flyzones,economicsanctions,freezingofforeignassets,travelsanctions,warcriminaltribunals),whichcouldharmtheinterestsofatleastsomenon-statearmedgroups,inparticularparamilitaries,rebelleaders,warlordsandclanchiefs.Thisapproachisoftenaccompaniedbylawenforcementmeasuresat national and/or international level.An example for the latter are the activities by theInternationalCriminalCourt(ICC)orotherinternationalcourtsagainstwarcriminalsorpersonscommittingseriouscrimes(e.g.useofchildsoldiers).16

Control and containment:Thisstrategyaimsatsystematicallycontrollingandcontainingtheactivitiesofarmednon-stategroupsand, thereby, reducing their freedomtomanoeuvreandcommunicate.Theaim is tomaintaina certain statusquoand toput thesegroupsunderstrictsurveillance(byusingpoliceandintelligencemeasures).Thiscanbedonein

16Forinstance,theICChasissuedwarrantsofarrestagainstfiveleadingmembersoftherebel-styleLord Resistance Army (LRA) inUganda, includingitscommander-in-chiefJosephKony,aswellasvariouswarrantsofarrestagainstleadersofarmedgroupsintheDRCongoin2005.

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particularwithgroupswhoareconcentratedinacertainterritorywhichcanbecutoff(e.g.bytheuseoffencesorcheckpoints)fromtherestofthecountry(seePalestine/Israel).

Marginalisation and isolation:This approach is concernedwith reducing thepolitical andideological influenceofarmedgroups.The idea is tomarginalise theirworldviewsanddemandsinpublicdiscourseandtoisolatethem–politicallyaswellasphysically–fromactualorpotentialfollowersandtheirconstituencies.Forthatscenario,abroadconsensusisneededamongpoliticalelitesandsocietalgroupsnottodealwiththeseactorsandnottoreacttotheirviolentprovocations,buttocontinueanagreedpoliticalprocess.Thisap-proachisanoptionparticularlyforratherweakoralreadyweakenedactorssuchassmallerrebelgroups,terroristsormarauders.

Enforcing splits and internal rivalry:Anotheroptionaimsatfragmentingandsplittingarmedgroupsbetweenmoremoderate forcesandhardliners.Thiscanbeachievedbydifferentmeans,beitthethreatofusingforceindiscriminately,byofferingsecretdealstosomekeyfiguresorbyinvolvingtheminapoliticalprocess,whichwouldencouragethemtoleavetheirgrouportotransformitintoapoliticalmovement.Thestrategy,however,canresultintheestablishmentofradicalfringeandsplintergroups,whichmaybeevenmoreextremethantheformerunifiedgroup.Suchfragmentationprocessescanoftenbeobservedwithrebelorterroristgroups.

Bribery and blackmail:Membersofarmedgroupsbeingcorruptedinacertainway–theymaybeforcedorinducedtocooperateorsilencedthroughtheofferingofmaterialincentives,i.e.economicresourcesorwell-paidposts.Insomecases,thismayalsoinvolveattemptstoblackmailortointimidateleaders(e.g.threateningfamilymembers)inordertomakethemmore likely to acceptmoneyorotheroffers.This strategy ispolitically andnormativelyquestionable;however,insomecasesitisindispensableforgettingapeaceprocessstartedinthefirstplace(seeAfghanistan).Inparticular,profit-drivenactors,suchaswarlordsorcriminalshaveoftenbeenreceptivetosuchastrategy.

Mostoftheseapproachesinvolveamixtureofsticksandcarrots,occasionallyincludingdealswiththegroup,withtheleadership,orwithsomekeymembersinordertoaltertheirbehavi-ourtoconformatleastintheshort-term.Therefore,inmostinstances,thesestrategiesarenotusedexclusivelybutincombination.Forexample,theconceptofcounterinsurgencycombinessomeoftheseapproachesinordernotonlytofightagainstrebelsorothergroupsbutalsotocutoffthelinksbetweenanarmedgroupandits(potential)constituencyorsupportersamongthepopulation(seeGalula2006;Hoffman2004;Jeapes2005;O’Neill2005;TheU.S.Army&Ma-rineCorps2007).Still,thefocusismainlyoncoercivemeasuresbackedby(material)incentiveswhichsomehowreflecttheunderlyingassumptionthatmostleadersofarmedgroupsattheendofthedayarenotdrivenbyidealsbutbyselfishinterests.Forrealists,thebottomlinereadsasfollows:Ifoneisabletoputenoughpressureonthemand/orofferthemsomeprofits,thesepeoplewillultimatelygoalong.

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5.


3.2 Institutionalist approaches

Mediation and negotiation:Usingthisapproach,externalactorsaimprimarilyatfosteringanegotiationprocessamongdifferentparties,includingarmednon-stateactors,inordertofindapoliticalsettlement(seeBercovitch2002;Touval/Zartman1985;Zartman/Rasmussen1997; Zegveld 2002).As facilitators ormediators theywould try to urge armed actors torefrainfromtheuseofforceandtoabandonmaximalistpoliticaldemands.Forthatpur-pose, informal contacts, multi-track diplomacy and extensive pre-negotiations are oftennecessary, inparticularwhendirect contactsbetween the conflictingparties (e.g. a localgovernmentandarebelgroup)areunlikely.Usually, insuchaprocessprosandconsofpossiblesolutionshavetobeweighed,incentivesanddisincentives(e.g.possiblesanctions)havetobetakenintoaccountandacompromiseacceptableforallsideshastobefound.Oftentimesarguingandbargainingmethods (includingcost-benefitanalysis)needtobecombinedinordertoachievesuchanoutcome.Theseapproachesobviouslyimplyalong-termengagement,sinceduringtheimplementationofagreementsmediationmaystillbenecessary.Thisscenarioappliesmainlytogroupswithapoliticalagendawhicharestron-glytiedtoadefinedconstituency(e.g.tribe,clan,ethnicgroup,politicalparty).Themostlikelycases,therefore,areclanchiefs,bigmenorrebelleaders;insomeinstancesterroristsorwarlordsmayalsobepartofsuchaprocess,inparticularwhentheyseektotransformthemselvesinto“politicians”.

Cooptation and integration:Herethebasicideaisthatnon-statearmedgroups,andinparticu-lartherespectiveleadership,canbeco-optedandslowlyintegratedintoapoliticalsetting,forexamplebydistributingresourcesandsharingpoliticalresponsibility.Therefore,thisapproachimpliesacertaindegreeofinformalorformalisedpower-sharing,beitatnatio-nalorlocallevel,whichwouldinvolveleadersofarmedgroupsinday-to-daypolitics(seeHartzell/Hoddie2007;ICRC2003;O’Flynn/Russel2005;Jarstad2008).Inotherwords,theattemptwouldbetogivethemaroletoplay,whichmaythenchangetheirattitudesandpreferences.Thisstrategyissometimesbasedonaformalagreement,brokeredbyoutsi-ders,butitisoftenpursuedbyeffortsofbuildingalliancesandcoalitionsamongdifferentlocalgroups.AgoodillustrationforthatapproachwastheattempttograduallyintegrateAfghanwarlordsintothenewlyestablishedpoliticalsystem,notleastbyofferingpostssuchasgovernorsorministersbutalsobygrantingthemacertainpoliticalstatusquo.SimilarprocessescanbeobservedinvariousAfricansocietieswithregardtoclanchiefs,bigmen,orcertainmilitiagroups.

Attheheartofinstitutionalistapproachesistheestablishmentofprocedures,rulesandinsti-tutionalsettingswhichallowforsomekindofpeacefulcoexistenceand,atthesametime,openaroomforbargaining,negotiationormediationprocessesinordertoreachapoliticalagree-ment.Here,incontrasttotherealistversion,thestartingpointisthatmanyarmednon-stateactorsareindeeddrivenbycertaingrievancesandpoliticaldemands,whichcanbeaddressedthroughnegotiationsand/orothermeans.Eveniftheleadershipiscorruptandgreedy,inmanyinstances,theymustshowsomekindofpoliticalprogrammeoragendainordertofindfollo-

1.

2.


wersandsupportersinlocalcommunities.Inotherwords,eventhemostselfishleadersareun-derpressuretodeliver–andthereforemaybereceptiveforincentivesandguarantees,assuredbyinstitutionalarrangements.

3.3 Constructivist approaches

Socialisation:Byinvolvingarmednon-stateactorsintoprocessesandinstitutions,thisap-proachclaimsthatovertimechanceswillincreasethatspoilerswouldbesuccessivelysoci-alisedintoacceptingcertainnormsandrulesofthegame(seeinparticularHofmann2006).Armedgroupswouldundergoprocessesofcollectivelearning,whichwouldalterstrategiesand,eventually,theirself-conceptionasanactor.Thismedium-tolong-termstrategymayagainworkbestforthosearmedactorswithclearpoliticalambitionswhohavetoaddresslong-termexpectationsoftheirconstituenciesanddevelopaninterestinimprovingtheirlocalaswellasinternationalimage.Suchareprimarilyrebelmovementsbutalsoclanchiefsandbigmen.

Naming and shaming: Theattempthereistoorganisesocialpressureandtocampaignpu-blicly,atnationaland/orinternationallevel,againstcertainpracticesofarmednon-stateac-torsinordertoharmtheirlegitimacywithinandoutsideoftheir(actualorpotential)cons-tituencies.Theaimisusuallytopersuadethemtoacceptandrespectcertainagreementsandnorms,inparticularnormsofhumanitarianinternationallawandtofosterthemtore-frainfromcertainviolentmethods(suchasterroristacts)andfromusingparticularmeans(e.g.landminesorchildsoldiers).OftenthesecampaignsareconductedbyinternationalNGOs.Again,thisapproachmaybeusefulincasesinvolvinggroupsthatneedmoralandmaterialsupportfromabroad.

Amnesty(i.e.exemptionfrompunishmentormitigationofpunishment):Grantingamnestyforcertaincrimesandactionscommittedbymembersofarmedgroupsmaybeanincentivetochangebehaviourandtorespectcertainnormsinthefuture.Thisapproachishighlyproblematicfromanormativepointofviewsinceitwillnotgivejusticetothevictimsofviolenceandserioushumanrightsviolations.However,itcouldworkundercertaincircum-stancesasafinalstimulustoendviolenceornottoreturntotheuseofviolence.Generally,amnestywouldbepartofagreaterpoliticalpackageandmaynotbeappliedtoeverycrimeoreverygroupmember.Inreality,thisoptionoftenrunstheproblemthatleadingfiguresofarmedgroupsreceiveamnesty,whereaslowerranksarepunished,whichcausesaso-calledimpunitygap.Nevertheless,amnestymightbeespeciallyattractiveforgroupswhosemem-bersarealreadywillingtooptforadifferentlifeandwhoseleadersarewillingtooptforadifferentpoliticalcareer,thusalreadydisplayingsignsofgenuinebehaviouralchange.

Ingeneral,constructivistapproachesputanemphasisontheroleofarguingandpersuadingaswellasonprocessesofnormtransfer.Allthreeapproacheshaveincommonthattheytrytopersuadearmedgroupstoaccept,respectand,eventually,internalisenorms.Theultimategoal

1.

2.

3.


istofosterlong-termtransformationprocessesthatnotonlyinvolvedifferentbehaviourforsometacticalreasonsbutalsoagenuineandsustainablechangeoftheactor’spoliciesandself-conception.Theassumptionhereisthatarmednon-stateactorscanbeaffectedbynormsandargumentssincemanyofthemareconcernedwiththeirpublicimage,theirmoralauthority(vis-à-vistheirenemies),andtheirsourcesoflegitimacy.Andindeed,anumberofleadersreferintheirpublicstatementstogeneralnormsand,thereby, trytoarguetheircasealsofromanormativeperspective.So,asconstructivistswouldask,whynottakethemseriouslyandengagethemindebatesaboutnormsandstandards?

4. Conclusion: Problems and Limits

The strategies and methods discussed above have their downsides and limitations. In mostinstances,acombinationofapproacheswillbenecessarysincetypicallybothincentivesanddisincentivesareneededtoachievebehaviouralchanges,whichwouldeventually leadtothereductionordenunciationofviolentmeans.Thisrendersalinkingofparticularstrategieswithparticularideal-typesofnon-statearmedgroupsimpossible.Moreover,thereisanumberofotherfactorswhichmaydeterminetheoutcomeofthestrategies.Atleastfourdifferentcate-goriesoffactorsneedtobeaddressedinmoredetail:(i)thegeneralenvironmentinwhichtheengagementwitharmedgroupsdoestakeplace(e.g.before,duringorafteraviolentconflict),(ii)thecharacteristicsoftheactorthatappliescertainstrategies(e.g.aninternationalorganisation,astateoraNGO?),(iii)kindandqualityofinteractionbetweenthethirdpartyandanarmedgroup(e.g.pre-existinglinks,long-termversusshort-termrelationship)and(iv)thecharacteris-ticsofthespecificarmedgroups,includingtheconditionswhichenablethegrouptoexistandtoperform(i.e.accesstoresources,recruitmentpatterns,outsidesupport,capableleadership,organisationalskills,transnationalties).

Acloseinvestigationofallthesefactorsisbeyondthescopeofthispaper.Whatitdoessuggestisthatscientificengagementwitharmednon-stateactorsfacesanumberofproblemswhichhavelargelybeenneglectedbythepredominantstrategies.Inwhatfollows,threeofthesewillbesketched:

Firstofall, themost importantaspectseemstobethatthevariousapproachesbyandlargeconcentrateonthesamepatternofaspectsofnon-stateviolence.Despitevariationinperpec-tiveandanalysisallapproacheshaveatendencytofocusmainlyonarmedgroupswhicharepoliticallyorideologicallymotivated,whohaveleaderswithpersonalpoliticalaspirations,showaninterestininternationalattentionandsupportandhavelinkswithaparticularconstituency,oftenincombinationwiththecontroloverterritory.Inotherwords,inparticularinstitutiona-listandconstructivistapproachestendtoconcentrateonarmedgroupswhoperform–inten-dedorunintended–governancefunctionsvis-à-viscertainsegmentsofthepopulationorwhohaveatleastgovernancepotential.Theassumptionisthatinsuchcasesinordertokeeportogainpopularsupportnon-stateactorsaremorelikelytorespondconstructivelytoincentivesbythirdparties.Thisprofilefitsbestwithclassicalrebelorganisations,clanchiefsandmilitias,


lesssowithterroristsorwarlords;itdoesnotfitatallwithcriminals,mercenariesormarau-ders.Onlywithintherealistparadigmalsopurelyprofit-drivenactors–theextremetypebeing„greedyspoilers“ (Stedman1997)–maybeaddressed, inparticularbybriberyandblackmailstrategies.Theapproachesarethusnotequippedtocoverthefullrangeofarmednon-stategroupsaspresentedinthispaper.Onecouldevenarguethatconceptuallyandempiricallytherangeoftypesaddresseddecreasesfromtherealisttotheinstitutionalisttotheconstructivistparadigm.Moreover,mostoftheseapproachesrestimplicitlyontheassumptionthatarmedgroupsare“coherentactors”withidentifiableleadersandspokespersonswhocanbeaffectedbyforce,incentivesorargumentsandwhowouldbeabletorespondina“coherent”manner(i.e.with“onevoice”).Theyarelargelybasedonatopdown-perspective,neglectingthefactthatleadership,individualfieldcommanders,footsoldiers,supportersandsympathisershavetobetreateddifferentlysincetheymaypursuedifferentinterestsandmotivations.Especiallymid-levelsandgrassroots-levelswithinarmedgroupsseemtohavebeensystematicallyneglectedsofar.Iftheseshortcomingsareobservedcorrectlyandiftheabove-mentionedtrendsabouttransnationalisationandnetworkstructuresareequallycorrect,thentheseapproachesrunintotheproblemthatmoreandmoregroupsormovementscanhardlybeengagedthroughthesemethods,betheybasedonmilitaryandlegalcounter-measures,onnegotiationtechniquesoronpersuasioncampaigns.Thisisalreadythecasewithregardtosomewarlordconfigurations,criminalorterroristnetworksorsmallergroupsofgunmenwhomaybehiredforallkindsofpurposes.

Secondly,thesituationinmostconflictorpost-conflictsettingsisrathercomplexsinceseveralarmedgroupswithdifferentcharacteristicsanddifferentagendasareinvolved.Usuallyavarietyofgroupsexists:Somecollaborate,othersfighteachother.Somearebeinginstrumentalised,someareopenlyorsecretlysupported.Some,likemilitias,aredeliberatelysetupbythenatio-nalgovernment,whileothers–inparticularrebelsorterrorists–arecombated.Andtomakethisevenmorecomplicated:Manygroupschangetheirstructureand,eventually,theirgoalsinthecourseofaconflict.Atthesametime,anumberofexternalactorssuchasstates,internatio-nalorganisationsorNGOsdisplaydifferentmeansandphilosophieswhendealingwitharmednon-stateactors.Thus,inmanycasesapluralityofexternal“interveners”isinvolved,beitin-tendedorunintended,applyingdivergingapproachesfordealingwitharmedgroups.Asstatedabove,intheory,theapproachesmaycomplementeachother.Inpractice,however,ontheope-rationalleveltheattemptsbyvarious“interveners”existinparallel:Theyfollowdifferentgoals,prioritisedifferentmeansandcompeteagainsteachother.Thisproblemisfurthercomplicatedbythefactthatexternalactorsdonotexchangeinformationabouttheirownstrategiesvis-à-visarmedgroups,whichmayleadtoanumberofunintendedeffectsinthefield.Forexample,armedgroupsareofteninapositiontoplayactorsoffagainsteachotherandusetheirdifferentstrategiesandlackofcommunicationtotheirownadvantage.Moreover,localactorsareawareofthefactthatusuallytimeisontheirsidesinceexternalactorswillnotstayforeverbutneedtoleavethecountrybecauseoflimitedresourcesandpublicpressureathome.

Thirdlyexternalactorsoftenlackknowledgeaboutthearmednon-stategroupstheyarede-alingwithandabouttherangeofoptionstheymayhaveat theirdisposal inaspecificcase.


Governmentsinparticularareoftenunwillingorunabletoreflectthefullspectrumofpossibleapproachesbuttendtodeliberatelyexcludesomeoptions(“wedonottalktoterrorists”).Theytendtochooseacertainapproachthattheyaremostfamiliarwithoraremostcapableofapply-ing,buttheyarenotflexibleenoughtoadapttheirpositionto,forexample,atransformationofanarmedgroupinthecourseoftheconflict.Thishasoftenresultedintheexpansionofcoun-ter-insurgencyorcounter-terrorismeffortsbeyondtheiroriginalgoalsduetoapreviousfailuretoreachthesetgoals(“missioncreep”problem,seeinparticularAfghanistanandIraq).Atthesametime,abandoningthemissioninfavourofpeacenegotiationsisoftentimesseenasgivinginandawardingtheuseofviolencebynon-stateactors.Instead,externalactorsdealingwitharmedgroupsneedtobeawareoftheexistingrangeofapproachesaswellasoftheirprosandcons.Thisimpliesthattheinternationalcommunityhastobepreparedtomakeambivalentdecisions,riskbacklashesandfailuresandputupwithnormativedilemmas(asforexampleinthecaseofamnesty).Butexternalactorsalsoneedtoreflectthechangingnatureofthesegroupsduringandintheaftermathofaconflictinordertoapplytheappropriatemixofapproaches.This,however,requiresamuchmorenuancedunderstandingofthecharacteristics,dynamicsandopportunitystructuresunderwhichthesedifferentarmedgroupsact.


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Sonderforschungsbereich 700, Berlin, Mai 2008.

Beisheim, Marianne/Dingwerth, Klaus 2008: Procedural Legitimacy and Private Transnational Governance. Are

the Good Ones Doing Better?, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, Nr. 14, DFG Sonderforschungs-

bereich 700, Berlin, June 2008.

Buckley-Zistel, Susanne 2008: Transitional Justice als Weg zu Frieden und Sicherheit. Möglichkeiten und Gren-

zen, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, Nr. 15, DFG Sonderforschungsbereich 700, Berlin, Juli

2008.

Beisheim, Marianne/Fuhr, Harald (Hrsg.) 2008: Governance durch Interaktion nicht-staatlicher und staatlicher

Akteure. Entstehungsbedingungen, Effektivität und Legitimität sowie Nachhaltigkeit, SFB-Gover-

nance Working Paper Series, Nr. 16, DFG Sonderforschungsbereich 700, Berlin, August 2008.

Koehler, Jan 2008: Auf der Suche nach Sicherheit. Die internationale Intervention in Nordost-Afghanistan,

SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, Nr. 17, DFG Sonderforschungsbereich 700, Berlin, November

2008.

Börzel, Tanja A./Pamuk, Yasemin/Stahn, Andreas 2008: The European Union and the Promotion of Good Gover-

nance in its Near Abroad. One Size Fits All?, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 18, Research

Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, December 2008.

Nagl, Dominik/Stange, Marion2009: Staatlichkeit und Governance im Zeitalter der europäischen Expansion.

Verwaltungsstrukturen und Herrschaftsinstitutionen in den britischen und französischen Kolonial-

imperien, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, Nr. 19, DFG Sonderforschungsbereich 700, Berlin,

Februar 2009.

Mueller Debus, Anna Kristin/ Thauer, Christina R./Börzel, Tanja A. 2009: Governing HIV/AIDS in South Africa. The

Role of Firms, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 20, Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, June

2009.

These publications can be downloaded from www.sfb-governance.de/publikationen or ordered in printed ver-

sions via e-mail to [email protected].



The Author

Professor Ulrich Schneckener is

one of the coordinators of the re-

search project C1 ‘Transnational

Cooperation and the Provision of

Security in the Context of Limited

Statehood‘ at SFB 700. Since Sep-

tember 2009 he holds the chair

for International Relations at the

University of Osnabrück. Before

he was head of the global issues division at ‘Stiftung Wis-

senschaft und Politik’ in Berlin. His research focuses on the-

ories of International Relations, global governance, peace

and conflict studies, particularly international conflict reso-

lution, state- and peace-building, the role of armed non-

state actors, terrorism and counter-terrorism.

Contact: [email protected]

Partner Organisations of the Research Center (SFB) 700

Governance has become a central theme in social science

research. The Research Center (SFB) 700 Governance in Areas

of Limited Statehood investigates governance in areas of li-

mited statehood, i.e. developing countries, failing and failed

states, as well as, in historical perspective, different types of

colonies. How and under what conditions can governance

deliver legitimate authority, security, and welfare, and what

problems are likely to emerge? Operating since 2006 and

financed by the German Research Foundation (DFG), the

Research Center involves the Freie Universität Berlin, the

University of Potsdam, the European University Institute,

the Hertie School of Governance, the German Institute for

International and Security Affairs (SWP), and the Social Sci-

ence Research Center Berlin (WZB).

Research Framework of the Research Center (SFB) 700

Host University

Freie Universität Berlin

University of Potsdam

Hertie School of Governance

German Institute for International and

Security Affairs (SWP)

Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB)

European University Institute

Florence (EUI)

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