Lugano- und Drittstaaten Die Herausforderungen des ... · 78 Die Herausforderungen des Europäischen Zivil verfahrensrechts für Lugano- und Drittstaaten Andreas Furrer / Alexander

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Andreas Furrer / Alexander R. Markus / Ilaria Pretelli (Hrsg.)

Die Herausforderungen des Europäischen Zivil-verfahrensrechts für Lugano- und Dritt staaten

The Challenges of European Civil Procedural Law for Lugano and Third States

Publications de l’Institut suisse de droit comparéVeröffentlichungen des Schweizerischen Instituts für RechtsvergleichungPubblicazioni dell’Istituto svizzero di diritto comparatoPublications of the Swiss Institute of Comparative Law78

Herausgegeben von Christina Schmid und Lukas Heckendorn Urscheler

www.schulthess.com

ISBN 978-3-7255-8593-9

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B402910-VSIR 78 Furrer Challenges EU Civil Proc Law_UG.indd Alle Seiten 13.05.16 15:40

Das Internationale Zivilprozessrecht der Schweiz sieht sich mit einer wesentlichen Veränderung konfrontiert. Ende 2012 ist die revidierte Europäische Gerichtsstands-verordnung („Verordnung Brüssel I bis“) verabschiedet worden und am 10. Januar 2015 in Kraft getreten. Neue Unterschiede vergrössern den Abstand zwischen zwei ursprünglich parallel konzipierten internationalen Instrumenten, dem Lugano-Übereinkommen und der auf das Brüsseler-Übereinkommen folgenden Verord-nung Brüssel Ibis. Es gibt Anlass zu einer Auslegeordnung unseres Internationalen Zivilprozessrechts, die auch die Instrumente der Haager Konferenz für Internatio-nales Privatrecht einzubeziehen hat. In dieser Gesamtsicht stellen wir uns insbeson-dere die Frage, wie das „Lugano-Modell“, welches die Schweiz mit dem Europäi-schen Zivilprozessrecht verbindet, nachgeführt überdacht oder aber erweitert wer-den könnte.

Im Juni 2014 haben das Institut für Internationales Privatrecht und Verfahrensrecht CIVPRO und das Zentrum für Konflikt und Verfahren CCR der Universitäten Bern und Luzern in Zusammenarbeit mit dem Schweizerischen Institut für Rechtsver-gleichung in Lausanne eine zweitägige Veranstaltung durchgeführt. Vortragende und Panelisten aus Schweiz und Ausland diskutierten miteinander verschiedene Aspekte der vorstehenden Ausgangslage. Diese Diskussion wurde jeweils durch ein Hauptreferat eingeleitet, die Anlass gaben für weitere Inputreferate und engagierte Voten. Der vorliegende Tagungsband enthält die vier in wissenschaftliche Beiträge umgearbeitete Hauptreferate, die verschiedenen Inputreferate der Panelisten so-wie die anregenden Voten den fachkundigen Teilnehmenden in teilweise überar-beiteter Form.

Die Herausgeber bedanken sich bei Prof. Dr. Christina Schmid für den herzlichen Empfang im Lausanner Institut, bei Dr. Lukas Heckendorn Urscheler für die viel-fältige Unterstützung und Beratung und bei Martine Do-Spitteler sowie den übrigen Mitarbeitern des Instituts für die zahlreichen organisatorischen Mühen. Bestens gedankt sei zudem den Damen Dipl. jur. Sosan Nawid und Dr. iur. Denise Schneider vom Institut CIVPRO, Carly Toepke von der Universität Luzern sowie John Curran und Anna Ruedi des Instituts für Rechtsvergleichung Lausanne für die Hilfe bei der Erstellung einer druckfertigen Vorlage. Unser Dank geht aber auch an Gabriela Zurkinden, die die Texte in die reprofertige Form gebracht hat. Zum Gelingen der Veranstaltung und des vorliegenden Tagungsbands haben v.a. die zahlreichen spannenden und innovativen Vorträge und Interventionen der Teilnehmer geführt. Ihnen allen sei herzlich gedankt.

Luzern, Bern, Lausanne im Mai 2015

Prof. Dr. Andreas Furrer Prof. Dr. Alexander R. Markus Dr. Ilaria Pretelli

B402910-VSIR 78 Furrer Challenges EU Civil Proc Law_IH.indd 8 13.05.16 15:47

78

Publications de l’Institut suisse de droit comparéVeröffentlichungen des Schweizerischen Instituts für RechtsvergleichungPubblicazioni dell’Istituto svizzero di diritto comparatoPublications of the Swiss Institute of Comparative Law

Andreas Furrer / Alexander R. Markus / Ilaria Pretelli (Hrsg.)

Die Herausforderungen des Europäischen Zivil-verfahrensrechts für Lugano- und Drittstaaten

The Challenges of European Civil Procedural Law for Lugano and Third States

Herausgegeben von Christina Schmid und Lukas Heckendorn Urscheler


Bibliografische Information der Deutschen NationalbibliothekDie Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen National bibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.d-nb.de abrufbar.

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© Schulthess Juristische Medien AG, Zürich · Basel · Genf 2016 ISBN 978-3-7255-8593-9

www.schulthess.com

Empfohlene Zitierweise: AndreAs Furrer / AlexAnder r. MArkus / IlArIA PretellI (Hrsg.), Die Herausforderungen des Europäischen Zivilverfahrensrechts für Lugano- und Drittstaaten. The Challenges of European Civil Procedural Law for Lugano and Third States, Veröffentlichungen des Schweizerischen Instituts für Rechts-vergleichung, Zürich 2016, Schulthess.

Vorwort ............................................................................................................... 9 Prof. Dr. Andreas Furrer / Prof. Dr. Alexander R. Markus / Dr. Ilaria Pretelli

Einführung von Prof. Dr. Christina Schmid......................................................... 13

Einführung von Prof. Dr. Andreas Furrer ............................................................ 14

Einführung von Prof. Dr. Alexander R. Markus ................................................... 17

Einführung von Prof. Dr. Monique Jametti ......................................................... 19

Introduction by Prof. Dr. Fausto Pocar ............................................................... 23

Introduction ....................................................................................................... 27 Prof. Dr. Jan von Hein

The Exequatur Procedure .................................................................................... 5l Dr. Dorothée Schramm

Gerichtsstandsvereinbarung .............................................................................. 57 Dr. Laurent Killias

Immaterialgüterrecht ......................................................................................... 61 Dr. Fritz Blumer

Arbitration ......................................................................................................... 67 Dr. Daniele Favalli

Exclusive and Discretionary Heads of Jurisdiction for Third States and Lugano States: the Way Forward ........................................................................ 71 Dr. Ilaria Pretelli

Diskussion / Discussion ...................................................................................... 79


Vorwort ............................................................................................................... 9 Prof. Dr. Andreas Furrer / Prof. Dr. Alexander R. Markus / Dr. Ilaria Pretelli

Einführung von Prof. Dr. Christina Schmid......................................................... 13

Einführung von Prof. Dr. Andreas Furrer ............................................................ 14

Einführung von Prof. Dr. Alexander R. Markus ................................................... 17

Einführung von Prof. Dr. Monique Jametti ......................................................... 19

Introduction by Prof. Dr. Fausto Pocar ............................................................... 23

Introduction ....................................................................................................... 27 Prof. Dr. Jan von Hein

The Exequatur Procedure .................................................................................... 5l Dr. Dorothée Schramm

Gerichtsstandsvereinbarung .............................................................................. 57 Dr. Laurent Killias

Immaterialgüterrecht ......................................................................................... 61 Dr. Fritz Blumer

Arbitration ......................................................................................................... 67 Dr. Daniele Favalli

Exclusive and Discretionary Heads of Jurisdiction for Third States and Lugano States: the Way Forward ........................................................................ 71 Dr. Ilaria Pretelli

Diskussion / Discussion ...................................................................................... 79


Possible Extension of the Lugano System in the Area of Family and Succession Law – Introductory Note ........................... 91 Prof. Dr. Andrea Bonomi

Einfluss/Sicherung des regulativen Rechts. Vorfrage/Erstfrage als Hebel zur Durchsetzung der EU-internationalverfahrensrechtlichen Standards ................. 99 Prof. Dr. Ulrich Magnus

Unterhalt ......................................................................................................... 107 Prof. Dr. Jolanta Kren Kostkiewicz

Zustellung und Beweis .................................................................................... 113 Dr. Danielle Gauthey

Insolvency and the Lugano System ................................................................... 119 Prof. Dr. Rodrigo Rodriguez

Diskussion / Discussion .................................................................................... 123

Introductory Presentation ................................................................................ 135 Dr. Michael Wilderspin

Auslegungsmechanismen ................................................................................ 147 Prof. Dr. Christian Kohler

Sicht der Lugano Staaten ................................................................................. 153 Prof. Dr. Felix Dasser

Point of view of Third States, International Organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations ................................................................................................... 157 Prof. Dr. Marta Pertegás

Point of view of the EU ..................................................................................... 159 Karen Vandekerckhove


Introductory Remarks ...................................................................................... 169 Prof. Dr. Felix Dasser

Lugano II beibehalten oder Alleingang: Sicht CH ............................................. 181 Prof. Dr. Pascal Grolimund

Lugano II beibehalten oder Alleingang: Sicht EU .............................................. 185 Hon. Prof. Dr. Dietmar Czernich

Neue Haager Konvention ................................................................................. 191 Dr. Niklaus Meier

Zukünftige Rolle des Lugano Übereinkommens ............................................... 195 Dr. Dirk Trüten


Literaturverzeichnis / Bibliography ................................................................... 209

Offizielle Dokumente und Gutachten / Official Documents and Reports by Experts ............................................................................................ 219

Auswahl zitierter Entscheidungen / Selected Cases ........................................... 221


Possible Extension of the Lugano System in the Area of Family and Succession Law – Introductory Note ........................... 91 Prof. Dr. Andrea Bonomi

Einfluss/Sicherung des regulativen Rechts. Vorfrage/Erstfrage als Hebel zur Durchsetzung der EU-internationalverfahrensrechtlichen Standards ................. 99 Prof. Dr. Ulrich Magnus

Unterhalt ......................................................................................................... 107 Prof. Dr. Jolanta Kren Kostkiewicz

Zustellung und Beweis .................................................................................... 113 Dr. Danielle Gauthey

Insolvency and the Lugano System ................................................................... 119 Prof. Dr. Rodrigo Rodriguez


Introductory Presentation ................................................................................ 135 Dr. Michael Wilderspin

Auslegungsmechanismen ................................................................................ 147 Prof. Dr. Christian Kohler

Sicht der Lugano Staaten ................................................................................. 153 Prof. Dr. Felix Dasser

Point of view of Third States, International Organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations ................................................................................................... 157 Prof. Dr. Marta Pertegás

Point of view of the EU ..................................................................................... 159 Karen Vandekerckhove


Introductory Remarks ...................................................................................... 169 Prof. Dr. Felix Dasser

Lugano II beibehalten oder Alleingang: Sicht CH ............................................. 181 Prof. Dr. Pascal Grolimund

Lugano II beibehalten oder Alleingang: Sicht EU .............................................. 185 Hon. Prof. Dr. Dietmar Czernich

Neue Haager Konvention ................................................................................. 191 Dr. Niklaus Meier

Zukünftige Rolle des Lugano Übereinkommens ............................................... 195 Dr. Dirk Trüten


Literaturverzeichnis / Bibliography ................................................................... 209

Offizielle Dokumente und Gutachten / Official Documents and Reports by Experts ............................................................................................ 219

Auswahl zitierter Entscheidungen / Selected Cases ........................................... 221


Das Internationale Zivilprozessrecht der Schweiz sieht sich mit einer wesentlichen Veränderung konfrontiert. Ende 2012 ist die revidierte Europäische Gerichtsstands-verordnung („Verordnung Brüssel I bis“) verabschiedet worden und am 10. Januar 2015 in Kraft getreten. Neue Unterschiede vergrössern den Abstand zwischen zwei ursprünglich parallel konzipierten internationalen Instrumenten, dem Lugano-Übereinkommen und der auf das Brüsseler-Übereinkommen folgenden Verord-nung Brüssel Ibis. Es gibt Anlass zu einer Auslegeordnung unseres Internationalen Zivilprozessrechts, die auch die Instrumente der Haager Konferenz für Internatio-nales Privatrecht einzubeziehen hat. In dieser Gesamtsicht stellen wir uns insbeson-dere die Frage, wie das „Lugano-Modell“, welches die Schweiz mit dem Europäi-schen Zivilprozessrecht verbindet, nachgeführt überdacht oder aber erweitert wer-den könnte.

Im Juni 2014 haben das Institut für Internationales Privatrecht und Verfahrensrecht CIVPRO und das Zentrum für Konflikt und Verfahren CCR der Universitäten Bern und Luzern in Zusammenarbeit mit dem Schweizerischen Institut für Rechtsver-gleichung in Lausanne eine zweitägige Veranstaltung durchgeführt. Vortragende und Panelisten aus Schweiz und Ausland diskutierten miteinander verschiedene Aspekte der vorstehenden Ausgangslage. Diese Diskussion wurde jeweils durch ein Hauptreferat eingeleitet, die Anlass gaben für weitere Inputreferate und engagierte Voten. Der vorliegende Tagungsband enthält die vier in wissenschaftliche Beiträge umgearbeitete Hauptreferate, die verschiedenen Inputreferate der Panelisten so-wie die anregenden Voten den fachkundigen Teilnehmenden in teilweise überar-beiteter Form.

Die Herausgeber bedanken sich bei Prof. Dr. Christina Schmid für den herzlichen Empfang im Lausanner Institut, bei Dr. Lukas Heckendorn Urscheler für die viel-fältige Unterstützung und Beratung und bei Martine Do-Spitteler sowie den übrigen Mitarbeitern des Instituts für die zahlreichen organisatorischen Mühen. Bestens gedankt sei zudem den Damen Dipl. jur. Sosan Nawid und Dr. iur. Denise Schneider vom Institut CIVPRO, Carly Toepke von der Universität Luzern sowie John Curran und Anna Ruedi des Instituts für Rechtsvergleichung Lausanne für die Hilfe bei der Erstellung einer druckfertigen Vorlage. Unser Dank geht aber auch an Gabriela Zurkinden, die die Texte in die reprofertige Form gebracht hat. Zum Gelingen der Veranstaltung und des vorliegenden Tagungsbands haben v.a. die zahlreichen spannenden und innovativen Vorträge und Interventionen der Teilnehmer geführt. Ihnen allen sei herzlich gedankt.

Luzern, Bern, Lausanne im Mai 2015

Prof. Dr. Andreas Furrer Prof. Dr. Alexander R. Markus Dr. Ilaria Pretelli


1. What options does Switzerland have? 169

2. Why bother anyway? 170

3. Going for a worldwide convention? 177

4. Questions to be asked 179

The title given to my intervention is “Introductory Remarks” and not “Introductory Presentation”. I will therefore limit my intervention to short remarks; the substan-tive topics will be addressed by the following speakers. I do not want to preempt them.

The underlying assumption for our panel is that Switzerland decides not to nego-tiate Lugano III. Under this premise, Switzerland has four main options: (i) the status quo, (ii) the “status quo plus”, (iii) the “national réduit”, and (iv) the “national réduit atténué”.

In the first scenario, “status quo”, our Private International Law Act (PILA) remains in basically the same shape and Lugano II is maintained. Switzerland does not accede to additional substantial international conventions. This is a system we are fairly familiar with. After having heard Monique Jametti earlier in this conference, I could imagine her to prefer this scenario, as it does not lead to even more legis-lative projects to be processed by the Federal Office of Justice.

In the second scenario, “status quo plus”, the PILA and Lugano II are also main-tained. In addition, however, Switzerland decides to accede to the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements and/or to other conventions.

In the third scenario, “national réduit”, Switzerland isolates itself: it will terminate Lugano II and stop participating in any further international efforts. The PILA is maintained, though. I label this scenario national “réduit” since this is the expres-sion used to describe the Swiss strategy in the Second World War: In case of an all-


out attack by the German army, the Swiss army would have retreated to the Alps, into fortifications and bunkers, and tried to defend the country from there. In this scenario, the PILA will remain the main applicable legal source for cross-border litigation. Of course, this is not necessarily a depressing prospect. The PILA, which entered into force in 1989, is still a modern codification and comparatively gene-rous when it comes to unilateral recognition and enforcement of foreign decisions. There will still be the current bilateral conventions, as long as they will not be terminated by one side or the other as well.

In the fourth scenario, “national réduit atténué”, Switzerland will terminate Lugano II. Of course, we will still have the PILA and the existing bilateral conventions, but, in addition, Switzerland will participate in international efforts by acceding to the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements and/or to other conventions. It will still feel like a retreat to the “réduit”, but mitigated, analogous to the public-policy exception being mitigated in enforcement proceedings as “ordre public

atténué”.

Most people in the audience will already have a preferred option. Before we enter into a discussion about the various scenarios by the panel members, let us take a step back and ask the basic question: Why bother? Or, to put it maybe a bit more elegantly, why should or should not States negotiate and accede to conventions on international litigation?

The sense and purpose of a convention on jurisdiction and/or recognition of decisions are quite obvious, at least in theory. Conventions facilitate international trade by promoting predictability and legal certainty and by furthering enforce-ment of judgments. Increased international trade in turn adds to the growth of GDP, which is a good thing, unless you are concerned with man's footprint on Planet Earth. A convention brings predictability in the long term: laws and regu-lations might be amended any day; conventions stay. If and when they are amen-ded everybody generally receives sufficient notice. A convention may further offer a minimum protection of the weak party and help spreading the minimum stan-dards of a fair hearing and due process.

Whether these advantages can play out in practice depends upon the effectiveness of a convention. There will always be a difference between the law in the books and the law in action, especially in cross-border situations. On the regional level, the Lugano Convention is by now a well-established instrument. It should be possible to measure its effectiveness. On the global level, we are nowhere near that.

On the other side, there are also disadvantages to conventions. First, conventions are basically “cut in stone”: Once a rule is negotiated, it is difficult to modify it. So it better be a good one!

Second, conventions – in particular the Lugano Convention – are based on the idea that the different judicial systems are equivalent. But blind trust in other legal systems is self-deception. The belief in “mutual trust in the administration of justice” as stated in the Preamble (Recital 16) of the Brussels I Regulation or in the decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union is based more on politically correct fiction than on facts. We should not be kidding ourselves. I have seen courts in action in many European countries. It is not always a pretty sight.

Finally, more conventions may lead to more foreign laws that need to be taken into account and foreign judges who directly or indirectly have a say. This implies political risks and may eventually foster a popular backlash. The growing unease about the expansive case law of the European Court of Human Rights might be a writing on the wall.

But let us take a further step back and look at the question about conventions from a purely pragmatic standpoint. What is actually at stake?

Until the end of 1991, before Lugano I, Switzerland had bilateral conventions with France (15.6.1869),1 Belgium (29.4.1959),2 Germany (2.11.1929),3 Italy (3.1.1933),4 Liechtenstein (25.4.1968),5 Austria (16.12.1960),6 Spain (19.11.1896),7 Sweden (15.1.1936),8 the Czech Republic and Slovakia (21.12.1926)9. All of these conventions dealt with recognition and enforcement only. There was no convention on jurisdiction. On the map, it looked like this:


out attack by the German army, the Swiss army would have retreated to the Alps, into fortifications and bunkers, and tried to defend the country from there. In this scenario, the PILA will remain the main applicable legal source for cross-border litigation. Of course, this is not necessarily a depressing prospect. The PILA, which entered into force in 1989, is still a modern codification and comparatively gene-rous when it comes to unilateral recognition and enforcement of foreign decisions. There will still be the current bilateral conventions, as long as they will not be terminated by one side or the other as well.

In the fourth scenario, “national réduit atténué”, Switzerland will terminate Lugano II. Of course, we will still have the PILA and the existing bilateral conventions, but, in addition, Switzerland will participate in international efforts by acceding to the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements and/or to other conventions. It will still feel like a retreat to the “réduit”, but mitigated, analogous to the public-policy exception being mitigated in enforcement proceedings as “ordre public

atténué”.

Most people in the audience will already have a preferred option. Before we enter into a discussion about the various scenarios by the panel members, let us take a step back and ask the basic question: Why bother? Or, to put it maybe a bit more elegantly, why should or should not States negotiate and accede to conventions on international litigation?

The sense and purpose of a convention on jurisdiction and/or recognition of decisions are quite obvious, at least in theory. Conventions facilitate international trade by promoting predictability and legal certainty and by furthering enforce-ment of judgments. Increased international trade in turn adds to the growth of GDP, which is a good thing, unless you are concerned with man's footprint on Planet Earth. A convention brings predictability in the long term: laws and regu-lations might be amended any day; conventions stay. If and when they are amen-ded everybody generally receives sufficient notice. A convention may further offer a minimum protection of the weak party and help spreading the minimum stan-dards of a fair hearing and due process.

Whether these advantages can play out in practice depends upon the effectiveness of a convention. There will always be a difference between the law in the books and the law in action, especially in cross-border situations. On the regional level, the Lugano Convention is by now a well-established instrument. It should be possible to measure its effectiveness. On the global level, we are nowhere near that.

On the other side, there are also disadvantages to conventions. First, conventions are basically “cut in stone”: Once a rule is negotiated, it is difficult to modify it. So it better be a good one!

Second, conventions – in particular the Lugano Convention – are based on the idea that the different judicial systems are equivalent. But blind trust in other legal systems is self-deception. The belief in “mutual trust in the administration of justice” as stated in the Preamble (Recital 16) of the Brussels I Regulation or in the decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union is based more on politically correct fiction than on facts. We should not be kidding ourselves. I have seen courts in action in many European countries. It is not always a pretty sight.

Finally, more conventions may lead to more foreign laws that need to be taken into account and foreign judges who directly or indirectly have a say. This implies political risks and may eventually foster a popular backlash. The growing unease about the expansive case law of the European Court of Human Rights might be a writing on the wall.

But let us take a further step back and look at the question about conventions from a purely pragmatic standpoint. What is actually at stake?

Until the end of 1991, before Lugano I, Switzerland had bilateral conventions with France (15.6.1869),1 Belgium (29.4.1959),2 Germany (2.11.1929),3 Italy (3.1.1933),4 Liechtenstein (25.4.1968),5 Austria (16.12.1960),6 Spain (19.11.1896),7 Sweden (15.1.1936),8 the Czech Republic and Slovakia (21.12.1926)9. All of these conventions dealt with recognition and enforcement only. There was no convention on jurisdiction. On the map, it looked like this:


Meanwhile, on the European Union level, the Brussels Convention was signed on September 27, 1968. On February 1, 1973 it entered into force between Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.10 Negotiations regarding the possible accession of Switzerland respectively the negotiations of a parallel convention started in the early 1980ies. An accession of EFTA-States to the Brussels Convention was soon considered not to be possible because of the tight relation between the Brussels Convention and the European Community. Thus, the idea of a parallel convention was pursued instead.11 It led to the Lugano

Convention of 1988.12 During the negotiations, the EFTA-States successfully proposed a few modifications compared to the Brussels Convention. Nevertheless, the parallelism between the two texts could still be maintained in the end, because the proposed modifications could be integrated in the Brussels Convention itself at the occasion of the accession of Spain and Portugal.13

The area covered by conventions grew under Lugano I. Almost all the countries with which Switzerland already had a bilateral convention acceded to the Lugano Convention. A few countries came on top, such as the United Kingdom. The pro-cess took several years (1992-1998).14 The old bilateral conventions were main-tained, with one notable exception: The bilateral treaty with France was termi-nated as of January 1, 1992, as it was considered not to be necessary any longer.

Under Lugano I, the map changed like this:15

SE

IS

DEBE

ES

IT

AT

CZSK

FLCHFR


Meanwhile, on the European Union level, the Brussels Convention was signed on September 27, 1968. On February 1, 1973 it entered into force between Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.10 Negotiations regarding the possible accession of Switzerland respectively the negotiations of a parallel convention started in the early 1980ies. An accession of EFTA-States to the Brussels Convention was soon considered not to be possible because of the tight relation between the Brussels Convention and the European Community. Thus, the idea of a parallel convention was pursued instead.11 It led to the Lugano

Convention of 1988.12 During the negotiations, the EFTA-States successfully proposed a few modifications compared to the Brussels Convention. Nevertheless, the parallelism between the two texts could still be maintained in the end, because the proposed modifications could be integrated in the Brussels Convention itself at the occasion of the accession of Spain and Portugal.13

The area covered by conventions grew under Lugano I. Almost all the countries with which Switzerland already had a bilateral convention acceded to the Lugano Convention. A few countries came on top, such as the United Kingdom. The pro-cess took several years (1992-1998).14 The old bilateral conventions were main-tained, with one notable exception: The bilateral treaty with France was termi-nated as of January 1, 1992, as it was considered not to be necessary any longer.

Under Lugano I, the map changed like this:15


Normally, the content of a convention is left alone once the states signed off on it. The dynamism of the European Union changed the course. Negotiations for a revision of Lugano I started in 1998 already, in parallel to negotiations within the European Union on the Brussels Convention. In 1999, a draft was presented. In 2000, the Council of the European Union adopted the Brussels I Regulation (replacing the previous convention as a consequence of the Amsterdam Treaty).16

As it turned out, the adaptation of Lugano I took longer. In 2002, the European Commission had to ask the European Court of Justice whether the Community had exclusive or shared power in respect of judicial cooperation in civil matters or not, in other words, whether the European Community or the Member States were

competent to negotiate the revision of the Lugano Convention. The Court rendered its opinion in favor of the European Community on February 7, 2006.17 Only after this date, by October 30, 2007, the negotiations could be brought to an end.

Under Lugano II, the map looks like this:18

As the contracting party on the European Union side was now the European Union itself, and not any longer the individual Member States, Lugano II introduced a

SE

IS

NO

FI

DK

Lugano I States:

DEBE

ES

IT

AT

CZSK

FLCHFR

NL

UKIE

PTEL


Normally, the content of a convention is left alone once the states signed off on it. The dynamism of the European Union changed the course. Negotiations for a revision of Lugano I started in 1998 already, in parallel to negotiations within the European Union on the Brussels Convention. In 1999, a draft was presented. In 2000, the Council of the European Union adopted the Brussels I Regulation (replacing the previous convention as a consequence of the Amsterdam Treaty).16

As it turned out, the adaptation of Lugano I took longer. In 2002, the European Commission had to ask the European Court of Justice whether the Community had exclusive or shared power in respect of judicial cooperation in civil matters or not, in other words, whether the European Community or the Member States were

competent to negotiate the revision of the Lugano Convention. The Court rendered its opinion in favor of the European Community on February 7, 2006.17 Only after this date, by October 30, 2007, the negotiations could be brought to an end.

Under Lugano II, the map looks like this:18

As the contracting party on the European Union side was now the European Union itself, and not any longer the individual Member States, Lugano II introduced a

SE

IS

NO

FI

DK

EE

LV

LT

Lugano II States:

DEBE

ES

IT

AT

CZSK

FLCHFR

NL

UKIE

PTEL

PL

RO

BG

HU

HRSI


new dynamism into the process. It automatically applies to any new EU-Member State. Thus, Croatia was added as of July 1, 2013.

What would it look like if Switzerland terminated Lugano II as contemplated under two of the four scenarios? The map would look like this:

The map now shows a few notable white spots: In particular France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Switzerland would still have some bilateral conventions left, but these conventions are old and not on the level of Lugano and they may be terminated (on a voluntary basis or under political pressure). Since the European Union has the exclusive power to negotiate in the field of juris-

diction and enforcement of judicial decisions in civil matters, the Member States may not negotiate new conventions with Switzerland.

Do we really want that? Can we afford not to have a treaty with France or the UK or to have just an outdated treaty with Germany? A look at the Swiss external trade by countries (as of 2012) might help in reaching an answer:19

If Switzerland left Lugano II, it would have a treaty with just four of the ten most important trading partners.

One could respond that the situation would not be much different from where we were before Lugano I or even before the PILA. However, in the meantime, Switzerland’s cross-border trade has more than doubled: from CHF 170 billion in 1989 to about CHF 400 billion in 2013.20

This chart also shows that three out of the ten are non-European countries (the USA, China, and Japan) and thus outside of the “Lugano” area. This raises the question whether a worldwide convention would benefit Switzerland. I will not

SE

DEBE

ES

IT

AT

CZSK

FLCH


new dynamism into the process. It automatically applies to any new EU-Member State. Thus, Croatia was added as of July 1, 2013.

What would it look like if Switzerland terminated Lugano II as contemplated under two of the four scenarios? The map would look like this:

The map now shows a few notable white spots: In particular France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Switzerland would still have some bilateral conventions left, but these conventions are old and not on the level of Lugano and they may be terminated (on a voluntary basis or under political pressure). Since the European Union has the exclusive power to negotiate in the field of juris-

diction and enforcement of judicial decisions in civil matters, the Member States may not negotiate new conventions with Switzerland.

Do we really want that? Can we afford not to have a treaty with France or the UK or to have just an outdated treaty with Germany? A look at the Swiss external trade by countries (as of 2012) might help in reaching an answer:19

If Switzerland left Lugano II, it would have a treaty with just four of the ten most important trading partners.

One could respond that the situation would not be much different from where we were before Lugano I or even before the PILA. However, in the meantime, Switzerland’s cross-border trade has more than doubled: from CHF 170 billion in 1989 to about CHF 400 billion in 2013.20

This chart also shows that three out of the ten are non-European countries (the USA, China, and Japan) and thus outside of the “Lugano” area. This raises the question whether a worldwide convention would benefit Switzerland. I will not

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

B CHF

No Convention

Lugano & Bilateral Convention

Only Lugano

0

10

20

30

40


attempt to give an answer here; this topic will be addressed shortly, I only provide here a short historical background of the work in The Hague.21

In 1992, the USA proposed to negotiate a convention on the recognition and en-forcement of judgments in civil matters (i.e., a “convention simple”) with the main aim of ensuring broad recognition of US judgments abroad. A working group in Hague came to the conclusion that a “convention double” would more likely be acceptable to other countries. The European countries were interested in exclu-ding certain grounds for jurisdiction under US law that they considered excessive, such as tag, transient, and doing-business jurisdiction.

The negotiators thus began to negotiate with the intention to draft a “convention

double”. In 1999, the working group presented a “Preliminary Draft Convention on jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters”.22 It was roughly modeled on the Brussels Convention. However, it became soon obvious that it was not getting enough support, neither by the US nor by other countries, and this for opposite reasons. A Diplomatic Conference in June 2001 in The Hague showed this clearly enough: The resulting draft contained brackets everywhere.23 There was really not much consensus to speak of. The gap between the (US) American and the European judicial systems is simply too wide to be bridged by a convention.

The result was a drastic reduction of the scope. In April 2002, negotiations started on a convention which was limited to choice of court agreements.24 This Choice of Court Convention was adopted in 2005 and has since been signed by the USA, the European Union and Mexico.25 It could enter into force in 2015 depending upon its approval by the European Union.

In 2011, discussions on a relaunch of the broad judgment project came up. Two expert groups are currently working on the two elements, (i) recognition and enforcement of judgments and (ii) matters of jurisdiction.26

In my view, the following questions have to be asked, before any decision is rendered on the scenarios:

1. How effective is the Lugano Convention?

2. What needs does the Lugano Convention fulfill?

3. Would our Private International Law Act be sufficient (from a Swiss, European, or global perspective)?

4. Is the negotiation of a worldwide convention on recognition of judgments realistic? Maybe limited to certain fields? What can be reached? What could be lost?

5. And, last but not least, is arbitration a valid alternative to all of the above?


attempt to give an answer here; this topic will be addressed shortly, I only provide here a short historical background of the work in The Hague.21

In 1992, the USA proposed to negotiate a convention on the recognition and en-forcement of judgments in civil matters (i.e., a “convention simple”) with the main aim of ensuring broad recognition of US judgments abroad. A working group in Hague came to the conclusion that a “convention double” would more likely be acceptable to other countries. The European countries were interested in exclu-ding certain grounds for jurisdiction under US law that they considered excessive, such as tag, transient, and doing-business jurisdiction.

The negotiators thus began to negotiate with the intention to draft a “convention

double”. In 1999, the working group presented a “Preliminary Draft Convention on jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters”.22 It was roughly modeled on the Brussels Convention. However, it became soon obvious that it was not getting enough support, neither by the US nor by other countries, and this for opposite reasons. A Diplomatic Conference in June 2001 in The Hague showed this clearly enough: The resulting draft contained brackets everywhere.23 There was really not much consensus to speak of. The gap between the (US) American and the European judicial systems is simply too wide to be bridged by a convention.

The result was a drastic reduction of the scope. In April 2002, negotiations started on a convention which was limited to choice of court agreements.24 This Choice of Court Convention was adopted in 2005 and has since been signed by the USA, the European Union and Mexico.25 It could enter into force in 2015 depending upon its approval by the European Union.

In 2011, discussions on a relaunch of the broad judgment project came up. Two expert groups are currently working on the two elements, (i) recognition and enforcement of judgments and (ii) matters of jurisdiction.26

In my view, the following questions have to be asked, before any decision is rendered on the scenarios:

1. How effective is the Lugano Convention?

2. What needs does the Lugano Convention fulfill?

3. Would our Private International Law Act be sufficient (from a Swiss, European, or global perspective)?

4. Is the negotiation of a worldwide convention on recognition of judgments realistic? Maybe limited to certain fields? What can be reached? What could be lost?

5. And, last but not least, is arbitration a valid alternative to all of the above?
