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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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TheJournal: Prospects and Politicsby Nikos P e tropoulos

Fare we ll to the D iaspora R esistanceby Andreas P apa ndreou

nterview of Jam es P etras on the Rece nt Change s in Gree ceby Nikos P e tropoulos 16

P olitics Ve rsus Ideology: The G reek Ca seby G eorg e Ana staplo 28

Cyprus July 1974; or Ache son's Failure, K issinge r's Successby V an C oufoudakis 35

Th e Tra ge dy of Cyprus A Kissinge r Follyby Ge orge C. Vournas 43

The U. S. in C hile: the CIA Confe ssionsby V ictor W allis 51

Living the R evo lutionby He idi Stroh 56

Econom ic Problem s Cre ate d by the T urkish Invasion of Cyprusby Andrea s P olem itis 67

Re sponse to M ikis The odorakisby the Interior Com m unist P arty of Gre ece 71

A Re solution for Cyprusby the Gree k Ca nadians 75

Author Biograph ical Sketche s 78

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SOME BICENTENNIAL DEM ANDS

1. W E D E M A N D A N E N D TO T H E I N FL U E N CE O F M U LT IN AT IO N A L

C OR P OR AT IONS ON OUR F OR E I GN AND DOM E S T IC P OL I C Y; W EDEM AND REJECTION OF ROCKEFELLER FOR VICE-PRESIDENT.2. WE DEMAND AN END T 9 THE UNDUE INFLUENCE OF THE

P E NTAGON AND C I A ON OUR F OR E I GN P OL IC Y; W E D E M AND ANEND TO THE COUNTER REV OLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES OF THE CIA,U.S. CORPORATIONS, AND THE U. S . GOV ERNM ENT IN 3RD WOR LDCOUNTRIES.

3 . W E D E M A N D A N E N D T O E XE C U T IV E P R I V IL E G E S A N D L O O PH O L E S ; W E D E M A N D A N E N D T O T H E D O U B L E S TA N D A R D O FJ U S T IC E - L E N I E N C Y F O R T H E R I C H A N D S E V E R I T Y F O R T H EPOOR.

4. W E D E M A N D A R ES TO R ATIO N O F PO W E R TO T H E P EO P LE S'REPRESENTATIVES - THE CONGRESS.

5. W E D E M A N D T H E R E M O VA L O F A L L L E G A L R E ST R IC T IO N S -LOCAL, STATE AND FED ERAL - AGAINST SM ALL PARTIES WHICHREPRESENT THE DISPRIVILEGED.

6. W E D EM A N D SO C IA L A N D EC O N O M IC J U STICE FO R A M ER IC A NB L A C K S , I N D I A N S , C H I C A N O S , P U E RTO R I C A N S A N D O T H E RM I N O RITIES ; W E D EM A N D A N EN D TO K EN T S TATES, JA CK S O NSTATES AND ATTICAS.

7. W E D E M A N D R E V O L U T IO N A RY C H A N G E S T H AT W O U L D B ECONSISTENT WITH OUR REVOLUTIONARY BEGINNINGS; ABICENTENNIAL WITHOUT ANY SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES WO ULDCONSTITUTE O NLY A RITUALISTIC DIVERSION.

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THE JOURNAL OF THE HELLE NIC DIASPORA; CRITICAL THOUGHTON M ODERN GREECE: POLITICS AND PROSPECTS

Th e Journal 's prede cessor, theJournal of the Hellenic American Society, be-

ga n as a resistanc e Journal abroad. Som e m ight argue that the Journanow term inate itself since the Gre ek junta has fallen a nd dem ocracy has to Gree ce. We disag ree with this euphoric ana lysis for seve ral reasons anto continue the publication of the Journal.

1. The democratic processes have not yet been fully guaranteed in Greece.I t is t rue that there h as bee n a n ope ning forced upon the junta by thpeo ple's resistance ; howe ve r, the m an ner of succe ssion an d the coursnew go vernm ent m ake us some wh at skeptical. It is not unlikely tha t thein Gree ce w as orche strated by the P enta g on, including the C yprus crispedite the return of a m ore conservative g overnm ent to Greece . Comt ions em an ating f rom K issing er (and som e from Ece vit) to the effAndroutsopoulos should accept the solution of the Arm ed Forces, that ain gove rnme nt was im m inent, and that the new gove rnme nt are "old fours" detract from the spontane ous character of G erm an D avos" ini

Although no one can d eny that Ca ram anlis has som e po pular i ty inand tha t his declarations from se lf-exile contributed to the cha ng e in Grca nnot forge t tha t his initial acce ssion to pow er in 1955 wa s aidedAme rican S ervices in Gre ece , tha t during his first adm inistration the p(vigilante) groups (the T EA) terrorized the countryside, a nd tha t his decag ainst the ne o-colonial junta w ere accom panied by ge stures of non-reand re conciliation, should a chang e take place in Greece . The latter mimportant rea son why the junta reca lled Ca rama nlis the politician theto extricate them selves, rather tha n the country, from a crisis they b

upon themselves.That the appointments in the new Caramanlis government represent abroader po litical spectrum tha n he wo uld ha ve tolera ted in his first admt ion no one can do ubt . Th is ma y represe nt a ge nuine ch ang e on thCa rama nlis and the right-wing forces a cha nge that cam e a bout as athe junta's repression and the pe ople's resistance . On the other ha nd, it repre sen t toke nisin. After all, the ne w g ove rnm e nt of "na tiona l uncluded from its adm inistration the voca l radicals of the left who w oucha lleng ed the social, econom ic, and political structure o f the G ree k eme nt. As a consequence, the new gove rnment ha s been responsible for partialcleansing of the junta a ppa ratus and h as delaye d the prosecution of tprotag onists; it ha s initiated apartial (milita ry) and not a com plete (a lso politicwithdraw al from the NATO alliance that brought Gree ce to the prese nit has not yet se riously considered the term ination o f bilateral m ilitarym ents with the U . S. the principal powe r in the NATO affiance ; an

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sche duled e lections (for Novem ber 1974 ) before the junta 's police systhe traditional param ili tary g roups, w ho in the pa st terrorized the elhave been disma nt led a nd before the pa r ties of the lef t have had a orga nize them selves and present their program s.

The Gree k people ha ve g iven the Ca rama nlis governme nt a mora tofore put ting h is house in orde r because o f their desire to be r id of thsive junta, civi l w ar m em ories , an d the urgen cy of the current na t ionBut m oratoriums hav e de adlines, and the G reek people a re beginningtion Ca ram anlis ' half-me asures. The y are beginning to dem and com pdraw al from NATO , term ination of bilatera l ag ree m en ts with the U . S.,t ion of the junta principa ls, and true g uarantee s for the forthcom ing eThe predom inantly conservative g overnm ent ought to lea rn, as shoul

some segm ents of the lef t, that the G reek people cann ot p lace too mfidence in superpowe rs especial ly during the era of detente and pwa rd ge nuine independe nce, sovereignity, and social justice. We hopJournal can, som eh ow , contribute to the attainme nt of these go als.

2. The politics of Greece have long been dom inated by the conservativesegments of the A merican and Greek communities in the United States. Thedictatorship in Gree ce, w hich precipitated the C yprus disaster, was in mthe offspring of these conservative elem ents wishing to safegraud theirand strateg ic interests in the Ea stern M editerrane an. Am ong these w eAm erican industrialists, the established G ree k Church, fraterna l orga nand the conservative Gree k Ame rican press . They defende d their respterests by support ing the G ree k junta and U . S. pol icy towa rd the juntask wa s of ten faci lita ted by the ir se l f-ap pointm ent a s the spokesmGree k com m unity in the U . S. and the G reek people of Gree ce.

But there are many examples of political lags between the Greek people

and the G reek-Am erican in teres ts in the Un ited S ta tes . The m ajorGree k people in Gree ce a nd Cyprus had a djusted them selves to an indan d ne utral Cyprus and con de m ne d the junta 's adve ntures in Cyprus tthe ove r throw of a leg it im ate g overnm ent and provoked the T urkish t ion. O n the other ha nd, the G ree k Ame rican in teres ts a t tem pted tothe re ce nt m ass de m onstrat ions in the U . S. , ag ainst U. S. policy, inpa triotic , i rrend en tist ral lies ca l ling for union of C yprus w ith G ree cenosis)and projecting the dual ima ge of the T urk as a blood-thirsty dope -pushthe T urkish atrocities m ust be conde m ned , w e ca nnot escape our ow n bility in the C yprus crisis. U nde rnea th all the super-pa triotism there melem ent of co llective g uil t for com plicity with the junta and an attem ptthe m ovem ent f rom its t rue target Am erican fore ign pol icy in the ranean.

There are reports that groups from the left, who had been fighting thejunta for seve n years, a t tem pted to introduce some balance in the m as

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strat ions by point ing o ut theactive role of the Uni ted Sta tes and the G ree kjunta in the C yprus trag edy. The more conservative e leme nts, who had the mm edia a t thei r d isposal , f rus tra ted a nd isola ted the prog ress ives . The y eca l led the lat ter "unpatr iot ic" sa boteurs of na t iona l unity. The conse rvatGre ek-Am erican daily,The National Herald, in an editorial after the S eptem ber8 dem onstration in Wa shing ton, we nt as far as acc using sympathizers of the he llenic liberation M ovem ent (P AK) of being responsible for the D ictatorshippape r which sent special corresponde nts to interview the junta 's am bassato the U. S. (wh ose g overnm ent sold C yprus and oppressed the G reek pe oplseven years) and g ave them front-pag e coverag e, now accuses mem bers oresistance of complicity with the junta. This represents a kind of pseudo-

pa triotism that is correlate d with the a m ount of adve rtising incom e w hicturn is correlated w ith the number of tax loopholes a nd the level of depletal lowa nce s. I t is a kind of super-pa tr iot ism that G ree k people a nd hum anin ge nera l, can do w ithout.

The conserva t ive segm ents o f the Gree k Ame r ican com m unity have a l redispatched their conciliatory delegations to the Caramanlis government.Among these were Church, theNational Herald, officers of Ahepa , and the a u-thor of the junta 's 1968 constitut ion. The se interests, wh o ha d becom e acctome d to the e uphoric but depe ndent relationship which had de veloped betwthe U. S. and Gree ce a fter World War II, sensed the Gre ek peoples mood fordep ende nce f rom the U. S . and beca m e a ffected by sepa rat ion anx iety. TGree k people m ust rem em ber that these overtures are m ade in the contextnational trag edy not unlike the one w hich precede d the Truma n Do ctrineand to a P rem ier w ho is an "old fr iend" of the U nited S tates . Wh ateve r asance the G reek pe ople rece ive in order to al leviate the prese nt cris is , theyserve; i t represents the p ayme nt of Gree k Ame rican intere sts for the ir compli

with the junta. The Greek people need feel no obligation to become sub-servient to the U. S. for another g ene rat ion.

I t w ill be one of the purpose s of the Journal to provide a n al terna t ive foto the conservative forces in the U . S. who prete nd to repre sent our hom ela

3. Even if democracy were completely restored in Greece, there would stillbe battles to be fought elsewhere. The Hellenic American Society was orga n-ized not only for the purpose o f aiding the G ree k resistance but also for proving assis tance to Third W orld M ovem ents and m inority m ovem ents withinU. S. The opening in G reece wa s brought about both by Gree k and internatioresistan ce. Th ere is a ne ed for reciprocity. I felt proud to rea d about the G rstudent-worker dem onstration on the 11th of Se ptem ber com m em oratingdea th of Allende ag ainst intervention in Cyprus and C hile.

Cyprus was an "independent" neutral country. It is deplorable that theneo- colonialist junta e nginee red the coup w hich ga ve E cevit the pretext to in

C yprus. M oreo ver, it is de plorable that the Turkish P rem ier, know n for his p

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from the center to the lef t of the spectrum. Occa sional ly, we shal l conworks from conservatives whe n dea ling w ith fundam enta l issues wiproviso tha t the e ditors reserve the right to a rejoinde r. Th e Journal wtem pt to encourag e constructive dialog ue a nd criticism w ithin the left. case , the thoug hts ex presse d in the individual contributions shall not nece srepre sent those o f the Society nor any of its editors; the con ve rse sha ll atrue.

3. Modern Greece. The Journal w ill focus on m odern G reece . I t is impotant to countera ct "ance storit is" complexe s and ima ge s of Gre eks. The poration of the w ordmodern into the title w ill also dispel misconce ptions abouthe con tent of the Jo urnal; during conve ntion displays, it beca m e e vidensevera l people associatedHellenic with antiquity. This, howe ver, does no t me anthat we sha ll exclude from consideration historical studies wh ich have relefor mode rn Greece a nd the m odern world.

Th e na m e of the Journal could m islea d som e pe ople as to the n ationalthe pro spective contributors. It m ay convey the imp ression tha t only the wof G reeks w ho focus on m ode rn Gre ece w ill be con sidere d for publicatiothough this w ill be the g en era l rule, the Journa l will not be that e xcluExclusivene ss would violate our ideological goa ls and w ould de feat our comtive an d hum an istic aim s. Th ere fore, we sha ll en tertain critical w orks byGree ks on m odern G reece and on G reeks abroad. Finally, we shall conthe w orks of anyone, irrespe ctive of ethnic bac kground and the na ture subject, whe n the work is relevant to the social, econom ic, and political de vme nts of Gre eks.

I now w ould like to sugg est seve ral topics or questions for possible consideby plospe ctive contributors; the topics are implicit in the S ociety's g oa lsprospective con tributor, howe ve r, must kee p in m ind that the questionsreflect the editor's ow n e xperience s and m ay not tap a ll the ce ntral issudoe s not hav e to dw ell on any of the follow ing topics, either in part or inin order for his work to rece ive considera tion.

1 . The Gree k student move me nt under the junta2 . The workers movem ent under the junta3 . The Gree k press under the junta (the foreign press under the junta)

4 . Urbaniza tion and the G ree k junta5. P re- a nd post junta pre ss; continuities and discontinuities6. Th e im pac t of the junta's econom ic policies upon its fall7 . Clientel ism , nationa l chara cter, ge opolit ics, "da rk forces," and the

colonialist Gree k junta8 . The Orthodox Church and the G reek junta9. Gree k wome n in the re sistance move me nt aga inst the junta

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3 6. Gree k Americans and the wome n's rights m oveme nt in the U . S.3 7 .The political behavior of Greek American Cong ressmen during the junt3 8 . The involvem ent of Greek Americans in the Waterga te scandal3 9 .The anti-junta m ovem ent in the U. S., Cana da, Australia, Europe, the s

countries, etc.4 0. Th e outcom e of left-right coa litions in the U. S., Ca nad a, e tc., duri

Cyprus conflict4 1 . Profiles of Ame rican ambassadors to Greece

T he prospe ctive c ontributor to the Journal could focus on any of the questions and ha ndle them through a variety of m edia of e xpression: a

rese arch , na rrative, docume nts, interview s, poe try, book revie ws, editoriTh e Journal will give m ore w eigh t to original and a na lytical w orks bum ode s will not be exc luded. We started a s a resistance Journa l an d utilithe m edia of expre ssion; we w ould l ike to retain some of the wh olism cteristic of revolutionary pe riods. M oreo ve r, the re volution continues informs a nd p lace s. Lastly, w e w ould l ike to ove rcome the a liena tion dueove r-specialism a nd com partme ntalization in the m ajority of contemjourna ls by providing a g rea ter balance of the "scientific" an d "hum adisciplines.

A few w ords should also be sa id about the stylistic criteria o f the Jo urnw ould l ike to raise fundam ental quest ions and a t tem pt to answ er thewould like to look for a high leve l of scholarship in the wo rks; but we m uge t carried a wa y with ove r-scholasticism and our own specialty jarg onm odel of w rit ing should be that of the science -w riter wh o com m unicatthe g en era l public; we wa nt to com m unica te w ith the p ublic not with elite circles.

Th e Journal 's m e dium of com m unica t ion sha ll be Eng lish . W riterswrite in their own native lang uage m ust m ake provisions for translationsubm itting the ir w orks to the Journal. T ran slations should be submittethe origina ls to the C oordinating E ditor. In the future, the H ellenic AmSociety will attem pt to organize a translation pool and w ill survey the mship's capa bilitie s in this reg ard: voluntee rs in all lan guag es a re, of courscom e. Re ga rdless of who d oes the translation, the e ditor has a w ord ofor those w ho w rite in G reek a nd e xpec t the ir wo rks to be translated:av oid ove r-long se ntence s; this rea lly com plica tes translation and e ndmeaning.

Th e proce dure for judg ing submitted w orks will be as follows: The contor w ill submit his wo rk to the C oordinating Editor. Th e la tter, in tursend the article to two relevan t Consulting Editors; we will attem pt to g

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suiting Editors in all disciplines. The C onsulting E ditors will rev iew thand de cide on acceptan ce an d/or revisions. In case of ma jor disagree mtwe en the consulting Ed itors, the C oordinating E ditor w ill the n intercealso plan to ad d m ore C oordinating Editors in order to provide an a ppefor the contributor in case the decision of Consulting Editors and the Cooing Editor is neg ative. In an y case, both the Coo rdinating Editors and tsulting Editors are e xpected to be in g ene ral agree m ent w ith the g oaHellenic American Society.

TheJournal of the Hellenic Diaspora de rive s no financial support from fouda tions or corpo rations, as tha t would be ag ainst the g oa ls of the Sociesubsidized so lely by individual contributions, m em berships, and subscriUp to now, we have bee n m aking slow progress toward solvency. We ho

those w ho w ould like to promote the a ims of the S ociety and the Journatheir utmost to help in this reg ard. Naturally, w e exp ect the m em bersSoc iety to unde rtake g rea ter initiative in this are a. Finally, w e do n ot large individual contributors provided they do not restrict the nature a nof Journal content.

Nikos P etropoulosCoordinating Ed itor

Septem ber, 1974

SUB SC R IB E TO THE JOUR NAL

OF THE

HELLENIC DIASPORA

T O D AY

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ANDREAS PAPANDREOU'S SPEECH TO PAK M EM BERSAND FRIENDS*

(Toronto, Ca nada , August 11,1974)

G ree ks of Toronto, frien ds, and fe llow activists, it is na tural tha t I ,grea t ly move d because a t th is hour we separate to begin a ne w phadifficult and uphill strugg le that our peo ple started m any yea rs andag o I would say since 182 1 not to go too far back. I am m oved asam e time possessed by a lot of mixed a nd conflicting e motions.

First, I w ould like to thank all of those w ho ca m e tonigh t and w ith thence to dem onstrate their faith in the continuation of the struggle insidI especially enjoyed the fact that the ve teran a ctivist Philip Sa m as g rem y departure as he did upon m y arrival to Cana da se vera l years agw ould l ike to say som ething I told a local new spape r correspondenea rlier. He a sked m e howI felt about the Gree ks of Toronto. And I would to repe at to you wha t I told him. The y are one of the best seg m entlenism,they are de mo cratic, they are a ctive, and the y are supporters of gle; and that I am g lad that I spent m any of my yea rs in exile ne ar thare figh ters. I know we shall continue the strugg le, some of you insidand others he re in Toronto. We sha ll continue the strugg le until the ho

Gre ece will belong to us and to its people.Both S tam atis a nd P hilip said tha t ahe a d of us is a difficult roa d; anespe cial ly stressed tha t it should have been a m ore joyous occasiorig ht. We did not imag ine such an ope ning tha t would permit our struggGre ece . But tha t 's how it cam e; the m arch of history brought us hereha ve the duty, irrespe ctive of the uphill course wh ich aw aits us, to takeand the path w hich lead to freedo m . We are not the first, nor the last; tgle of the G reek people w ill continue, and the people sooner or later sooner will be sovereign (applause).

Th e strugg le, as P hilip said, is simultane ously dang erous, but whe n wasm any who g ave their presence d uring this decade , the on e before thaone before the las t one the Gree k fighters and the de m ocrats fort im e h ave painted our Gree ce w ith their blood. Tha t 's why there is ndang erous hour. The re is the hour of strugg le, and it calls all of us; we obligation to g ive our prese nce in order to justify our G ree kness (ap

*Dr. Papandreou's speech was translated from audiotape by the Coordinating Editor withthe assistance of friends. In four instances the phrase was inaudible, and the translator wasforced to supply a word or phrase depending upon the context. With the exception ofthese four cases, the m aterial in parentheses is provided by the Editor for the benefit ofthe reader with limited knowledge of Greek affairs.

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You will allow me some words to evaluate the conditions in Greece. Notm any, a few. O ur first declaration after the change in G reece created a relativefreeze, both within and perhaps outside Greece. We said two simple things,that the source of power w hich supports the current establishment in G reece

is the sam e as the one that supported for man y years the repression, the cruelrepression of our people: the Americans, NATO and their agents in Greece(audience shouts traitors to the Goudi a site for the execution of traitors).Is that true, Yes or N o? It is true (assent from the aud ience). W e said that thestruggle which w e started many years ago, to w hich all of you offered your timeand backing, w ill continue until the hou r of victory for our people. Is that trueor not? (applause).M any friends and fighters from G reece said to us: w ill you not let us sm ile justfor an instant? No O ur duty, if we are to remain the vanguard in the struggleis not to manufactu re sm iles; rather it is to analyze as carefully as w e can thestructure of power, to foresee the evolution of things, to take a stand, and togive our presence. And exactly because the people, irrespective of the struc-ture of government and power in today's G reece, believe that the battle m ustnow take place inside we are going inside to fight the battle with these samepowers (shouts and applause).

The change in Greece was entirely the programmed fabrication of the same

services wh o concocted the A pril 21 coup. T oday that m ight seem strange, butwith time the New Y ork Times w ill w rite, I imagine, abou t the details that Idon't even know myself. But they will write about it sometime. The sale andpartition of Cyprus which the Americans had planned since 1963 were con-nected with the political change in G reece.

W hich change? Y ou w ill permit m e to say a few w ords before I proceed to ourprogram and its implementation. The summer of 1973, not long ago, de-mocracy came to Greece, as I recall, with the constitution of 1973, the Presi-dent of the D emocracy (reference to Papadopoulos Ed Note) and M arkezinis(Papado upoulos' prem ier, audience laughter); how ever, curiously, no on e thensaid that the battle must now take place inside. Be careful, no one They re-leased all the prisoners; they even g ave a passport to Panag oulis (attempted anassassination of Papadopoulos in 1968) and the press had relative freedom.B ut, whoever tried to approach M arkezinis and Papadopoulos were character-ized by the people, and certainly by us, as accountable. Then as a result of thegreat popular revolt, with the youth of our country as the vanguard at the

Polytechnic on Novem ber 1973, the democracy of Papadopoulos and M arke-zinis collapsed (applause).

It is strange, and w e m ust note it, that the Caram anlis governmen t today hasgiven few er, not m ore, freedoms than w hat the M arkenzinis government hadgiven. T hat is true. M oreover, the establishm ent toward w hich C araman lis andhis governmen t are proceeding is more indefinite than that of M arkezinis who

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ha d ( told the pe ople) that they could vote but tha t the y could n ot cforeign policy, national defe nse, public orde r, and the central intelligencices. Tha t he ca n simply play the pa rliame ntary ga me but does not have and the potential to touch pow er. Even then , whe n the restriction of thewa s so clea rcut and g ene ral, M arkezinis had solutions which we re de spilaughed at whe n P apa dopoulos wa s still president of the De mocracyopportunity w as g iven us to speak ope nly, the youth the stude nts such a he roic battle that the first experime nt in de m ocracy collapse d asolved. And the second ca m e to contain m uch confusion an d w as acce pa large segm ent of the G reek polit ical world. And the second experimenat a tim e of na tiona l crisis and it wa s rega rded a s a first positive step democracy.

The (blueprint) had been pre pare d for ma ny yea rs now, since 19 67 andwa rd the m yth a nd the solution of Ca ram anlis. But I would like to ryou that the m yth, which w as repe atedly offered to us, is one thing areali ty is some thing else. Th e m yth w as that C ara m anlis with the supthe Am ericans and with forces of his own within the Arm y would ove rthe junta an d wo uld ope n the road for a de m ocracy of the 1 961 type m anlis wa s prem ier at that t im e a nd the Arme d Forces ha d a lo t of ove r the e lections). Th at w as the m yth; but the rea lity differs from theCa ram anlis w as invited to return to G ree ce by Gizikis and the junta. T

ha rsh and crude rea lity. Th is is not the judg m en t of Andrea s Pa pa ndrethe position of P AK ; it is a fa ct; that 's how it happe ned. Ca ram anlis reto form a gov ernm ent, that wo uld constitute the political ex pression of ethe same powe rs which had oppressed the land for more than seven yeprom ised d em ocracy upon the resolution of the n ational problem (refe rethe C yprus crisis) and the restoration of the 19 52 C onstitution w ith soms ions . How long the indefinite s ta tus w ill cont inue a nd w ha t gove rm echa nism s w ill be in operation, all these a nswe rs rema in unknown. Bha ps the m ost basic, the key to e verything, is that those people who tortufigh ters for dem ocracy, who repre ssed our people a ll those yea rs, still remtheir posts, untouched with the e xce ption only of the notorious loa nwh o ha s been place d in retireme nt for only six m onths.

Is there a Gree k today w ho doubts the character of pow er in the fatheNo on e. Th ey a ll know about it . D espite tha t, the peo ple w ith the ir curma ture criterion a nd intuition believe, a nd justly so because I re ally havconfidence in the com m on G reek of the villag e a nd the ci ties since th

plain he is the m ore correct he see s th ings that som ehow , som ethicha nge d w hich permits the continuation of the strugg le within Gree cethere fore, is tha t? It is interw ove n, doubtlessly, with the fa ct that the mdictatorship, the blatant m ilitary dictatorship, failed in Gre ece as a toolrepression and the dom ination of the Gre ek pe ople. It failed not only bthe Gre ek people, and this is an honor to them , stood at the ram parts ehis own individual mann er; not all we re a ctivists or participate d in the resan d liberation orga nizations. How ev er, the No. (0111) is alwa ys in their

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and each one expressed it in his own manner from his own vantage point.Th is OH I set the founda t ions in G reece for a decis ive a nd m ass ive m ove m ent w hich forced the op pressors of our country to take note o fforeign pow ers and the U nited S tates knew a bout it and they saw tha tattain ma ss proportions, being reinforced by the econ om ic disaster of t

a disaste r wh ich dep en ds, not coincidentally, on the c ourse that the jusued for se ve n ye ars. Its politics constituted a continuation of the poltroduced by ERE (the conse rvative National Radical Union pa rty of Ca rand the current prem ier of G ree ce in the de cade of the 50's , a p ol it icled to the colonization a nd the sale of our country to b ig foreign m ointerests both Ame rican a nd Europea n.

Whe n a Gree k worker m ust go to G erm any, Sw ede n, Belgium , Australiad a, and the U . S. in order to ea rn his brea d, whe n the bigg est portioGreek students and the labor force of Greece, that is to say, of the Greekwo rker by fate find them selves abroad today, wha t kind of econom ic andeve lopme nt can bloom in their fa the rland? W ith the dese rtion of thean d the shrinking of the co untryside , is it possible for G ree ce to surviecon om ic ent ity? The a nsw er is no And because on the top of the prepression w as a dded an econom ic disaster, the basic ruinat ion of theland 's econom y, it beca m e c lea r that the m ili tary pow ers could not econfrontation with the popular forces that we re a ssum ing g igan tic pro

in our fa ther land . A relaxat ion an d a cha ng e of som e form w ere, thenecessary.

The chang e w as connected w ith the C yprus affair. From 19 63, the Amha ve tried, by eve ry me ans, to br ing about part it ion a nd the placem enprus w ithin the NATO fram ew ork for the purpose of conve rting it intonava l and air base that w ould perm it them to prom ote their s tra teg ic nomic interests in the Ea stern M editerranean and the M iddle Ea st. Som eis no longe r with us, Ge orge P apa ndreou I wil l nam e him ga ve theto Johnson (applause). And I m igh t add som ething e lse : He ga ve the and, a t the sam e t im e, w as a ble to preve nt the Turkish intervention. Aduring our adm inistrat ion (1964 -19 65), de spite the at tem pt by the Upartit ion Cyprus and to com pel the G ree k gove rnme nt, as w ell as the Tto acce pt it , w e w ere able to sav e the big island a nd o ur terr i tor ial inAnd it becam e ne cessary to com e to a m ili tary gove rnm ent of pseudo-nists in orde r to surrend er C yprus to the T urks and NAT O an d to initiate solution of our fathe rland (shouts a nd a pplause ).

The y tel l us, and they are rig ht , that we should not m ake a frontal at tackthe Arm ed Force s of the country. Ye s, but we ha ve not only the r ight duty to denounce the, unti l today, grea test betrayal of the n ation, whistaffed by the military junta of Ioannides; and it is impossible for a free,healthy, and genuine political life to exist in Greece unless those who areg uil ty of the betrayal rece ive the h arshe st san ctions (applause a nd shtheGouda

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Th e Cyprus, coup led not only to the ove rthrow of M akarios but also pthe invasion by the Turkish force s. And, unfortunate ly, it is im possibllieve that it was e xecuted w ithout the (junta's) knowledge . What comm obelieve s tha t after a coup which m akes Sa m pson the P resident of the

D em ocracy i t is possible that the T urkish g ove rnme nt would not inteThe re is no Gree k who believe s that it was a ccidental and that i t wa sliberate. And if it wa s acc idental, the foolishne ss is such a s to be tantto a na t ional betrayal , beca use w hoe ver controls the fate of a nat ionright to be so foolish. All the m ilitary knew , as I know from m y limited as a m em ber of the go vernm ent, that the G reek m ilitary forces could hprus only for 72 h ours because w e a re not in a po sition from Gre ece toCyprus with a ir cover; the distance is such that airplane s originating incould provide cove r for a C ypriot wa r only for tw o m inutes. C onse qw ith w ha t right do you provoke a T urkish interven tion in Cyprus whimpossible after 72 hours to protect the C ypriot people? T ha t is the hsponsibility of the loan nides' junta and of the Arm ed F orce s lea de rshipis necessary, if the Arm ed Forces a re to stand by the pe ople, not only tthose wh o oppressed our people in the service of foreign interests for seone- half yea rs but also to m ete out more se vere sanctions ag ainst thoseus to the pre sent national trage dy to the de aths and the m assacre, onsay, of so ma ny Gree k Cypriots.

It wa s very sma rt for som ebody from Wa shington to coordinate the ntrage dy of Cyprus, lea ding loannides a nd his junta towa rd that na tional and conc urrently giving Gree ce a "dem ocratic" chang e. The opp ositoccur. A chan ge that would allow the m ilitary ma chinery tha t the fore iers and , especially the Ame ricans, hav e until now e xploited for the oppof the G ree k people to rem ain untouched , in order to conce al the betthe Arm y lea de rship in Cyprus. Ce rtainly, the g ove rnm ent of Ca ram ahe rited the C yprus ca tastrophe ; i t did not contrive i t . I t can dissociafrom the respon sibilitie s of the pa st only if i t lea ds the g uilty to the mcourts; only the n ca n it dissociate itself from those responsibilities. Th e hof the Cyprus issue in G ene va by the Ca ram anlis g overnm ent w ill be juthe people whe n the time com es and wh en the details become known.

But one thing is clea r. Not only did Am erica lead us to the slaug hter,so-called allies of NAT O also abandone d us. And finally, the tim e hasnot only for the Gre ek pe ople w ho know it but also for the Arme d Forealize the m ea ning of the al liance . For Gree ce, the al liance has not secured its territorial integ rity and the freedo m of its pe ople but, on ttrary, has led to a tram pling of human righ ts, the e radication of dem ocrato the underm ining of the territorial integ rity of our country (shouts aplause).

It is nece ssary that all those w ho, today, are neg otiating in Geneva from

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tion of wea kness must know tha t it is im possible to neg otiate unde r suchtions. O nly wh en NATO believe s tha t Greece is determined to m ake saonly the n will there be a solution of the C yprus crisis wh ich will not dishocountry and tra m ple a bsolutely on the rights of our people . But it is dfor the g overnm ents and the e stablishm ents which are under the totalof the K issing ers and the S tate De partme nts to stand up, take a step, ansom e c redibility in the negotiations. It is exa ctly for that rea son tha t Cypthe territorial integ rity of our fatherland a re e ndang ere d today at the netables.

But one m ight say that if conditions a re a s you describe, then wh y thto Gree ce? W hy take the strugg le inside G ree ce? But as I said ea rliert rue a s those thing s that I said are , i t is now the com m and of our pe

take the strugg le inside G reece . And if the active vang uard does not hai tself not only with the causes of the Gre ek pe ople but with their demthe strugg le now take place inside, then n ot only does it cease being a vbut it is also re sponsible for the we akening of the struggle. Th at's why ha s really come to carry on the strugg le inside G ree ce.

With the transfer of the strug gle inside Gre ece , we do not intend to retrethe principal positions which e xpress the wishes a nd the vision of ourTh e strugg le rem ains a strugg le, without conditions, for our nationa l inen ce; in order for G ree ce to be, in fact, absolutely free from e xterna lan d so that G ree ce w ill belong solely to the G ree ks. I t is a strug g leunrestricted sovere ignty of our people not for a pseudo-dem ocracy full dem ocracy. Not for the establishm ents and the backstag e g overnmAthens but for a dem ocracy wh ich expresse s wh olly the will of eve ry Geve ry household on G reek land. And for tha t , i t i s necessary that wconstruct inside G ree ce, the leg al an d political organization, m ust not press the intere sts of the people, as we interpret them , but it should a l

orga nization which sha ll be con trolled by the pe ople so that the pe oplece rta in it is their own o rga nization a nd w ill fight for the m irrespe ctivleade rship (applause).

We shall call upon a ll the forces w hich identify them selves w ith our oppe ople, the wo rker, the farm er, the a rtisan , the sm all busine ssma n, thm iddle classes, the salaried w orker, and the studen t all those w hoprivileg ed we shall call them all to enlist in such a m ovem ent. The and the bigg er the m ovem ent, the bigg er the coalit ion that can be a cdated by our platform and the m ore ce rtain w ill be the victory for our

We have no ' il lusions. The strugg le is not ea sy. The tanks exist; the Gex ist; and ES A (the G ree k Military Police) exists. But toda y the y promthe return to D em ocracy. We ll, then fine; w e ca n start, w ithout any misstandings, the o rga nization for the p olitical con frontation. And the rebility, if that confrontation surpasses the lim its and is transforme d into a

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confronta tion, will not fall upon our shoulders but upon the irs if pethey decide to subvert once a ga in the m arch of our peo ple toward the at ion of pow er (applause ):

Th ere e xists the feel ing m G reece , and I respect it , that we m ust not things. The feeling is general. A step was taken. Some change was made.Th ere ex ists, they say, an d they are basically right, a very frag ile situatfrom the first instant that w e m ove toward a confrontat ion we shall brinan ove r throw a nd the re turn of the tanks some thing that today thewould condem n as a provoca tion. We have no intention to provoke the of the tanks , but we a lso hav e n o in tent ion of abandon ing a ny of thcauses a nd de ma nds of our people for their unrestricted sovere ignty andt iona l inde pe nde nce (appla use). Th e respo nsibility will not fall on us

fa l l once ag ain on the g ene rals , the colonels , and the tanks . I hopeArme d Forces, after the ad ven ture on w hich the y led the country for seone-h alf years and the na t ional t rage dy of Cyprus, tha t the y will haveunderstood tha t the ir task is not the op pression of the G ree k peop le bstead, their protection ag ainst foreign a nd dom estic im positions (applshouts of The People are Sovereign). The People are Sovereign and the"Army by the Side of Th e P eop le" a re the s log ans w hich shal l persplause).

Final ly, I would like to m ake a n ap pea l to those of you w ho m ig ht abroad. You will not a lwa ys be a few. Som e of you will come to Greeothers w ill com e out of Gree ce. I t is impe rative that , not for an instanyou stop your wo rk abroad. A sizable portion of the G ree ks lives a broacourag eous; it has m et w ith diff icult ies , and i t ha s crossed oce ans to brea d . We m ust not for an ins tant a bandon th is m ajor force for our cand let i t be a prey for the propag anda of the junta or wh ateve r Gree k em e nt. We m ust w ork for its enlistme nt, its politicization and its assista

strugg le wh ich is Gre ek, whe reve r a Gre ek is found (applause). And thitoo, leave . I cal l upon al l of you wh o stay to rem ain a t the ram parts wassurance that your contribution eve ry day and eve ry nig ht is indispena strugg le that is comm on; so that som eda y, togethe r, we can say: The Ecom e; the Re surrection ha s com e; and w e a re building the foundationGre ece that belongs to the G reeks (shouts and standing o vation).

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position of the various left-w ing groups with regard to the C aramanlis gov-ernm ent of national unity?

A. think the po sition of the social dem ocra ts is to participate in the ca bThe y have ne ver been ve ry consequential as far as implem enting the san d econ om ic prog ram s tha t the y proclaim. Essential ly there is nom ass social dem ocratic party in G reece ; you have social dem ocratic pealit ies w ho have some influence am ong sm all groups in Gree ce. The political parties of the left, the com m unist pa rties, and the m ajor polpersonali ty of the left P apa ndreou have ,I think some wha t diverge ntposi tions . Th e tw o com m unis t pa r ties a re suppor ting the C ara m ag overnm ent on the basis that the imm ediate issue is the issue of natunity ag ainst external pressures an d a ga inst the T urkish ag gre ssion. also,I think, are favorably disposed because of the g overnm ent 's cri tposition to N ATO and the Am erican bases. Th e P apa ndreou position,see m s to m e, is an e volving position wh ich is ten tat ively in oppo sitem pere d by the tenuous situation of C ara m anlis vis-a- vis the m ilitarythe unpre dictable an d e xplosive situation in C yprus.I don't think you ca nsay that P apa ndreou is com pletely in opposi tion in the se nse of a n w arfare; on the othe r hand,I think, he is de finitely building a m ove m en tindepe ndent o f the gove rnme nt.I don' t ha ve a n exa ct term to describethis approa ch; i t 's not correc t to describe i t as a constructive op posbecauseI don' t see him re lat ing in an y way to the social and e conompolicies tha t will evolve out of the C ara m anlis g ove rnme nt which areconservative, pro-big business a nd larg ely reflect the intere sts of thecha nts, bankers, e tc ., in Gree ce. On the o ther ha nd he recog nizes tm ajor confrontation w ith the g ove rnm ent at this time wo uld play inthand s of the righ t-wing. The refore, the left today nee ds t im e a nd polspace to m obilize a nd reorg anize th is t rem end ous radical iza t ion oG ree k population. Th e G ree k working class, the low er m iddle classeve n sectors of small businessm en an d professiona ls ha ve m ove d agU. S. imperialism , and a ga inst the traditional cliente le relationship witWe st; and, in this situation, I think, time is obviously in favo r of the l

Q. You made a reference to the social democrats. Do you see them as sep-arate from A ndreas Papandreou and do you have an y concrete persons inmind?

A I m thinking of the Ce nter U nion party, esse ntially, wh ich itself is

f rag m ented. I t's very am orphous, andI

don't know if you can de scribe itas a pa rty. It ha s a substantial ele ctoral base but it is m ad e up of "inpend ent" pe rsonalit ies and dom inated by political factions.I ca ll it socialdem ocrat in a very gene ral sense that i t proposes some we lfare m eaand income redistribution; and i t does ha ve a very pow erful low er mclass social base a nd pe rhaps e ven som e w orking class support, a t historically. With the left depa rting w ith P apa ndreou, it can be de fessen tially today as a ce nter party. You ha ve, today, a ce nter-right go

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m ent w ith support from se ctions of the left outside the gov ern

Q . Caramanlis publicly said there were two conditions for his return to powerin Greece: one that the army withdraw to the barracks and he would have

total control over the military; and two, that the politicians would supporthim in his government of national unity. Up to now, have these two con-ditions been met? And do you think there are some covert conditions thatwere not stated by Caramanlis?

A. Well, I don't know if you wo uld ca ll them conditions;I think there is anunderstanding. The military understands that Ca ram anlis is a conse ron social and econom ic policies.I don't think they had to app ly any cov'erpressures. On the other ha nd,I think, it is clear tha t Ca ram anlis has g ottrid of those sectors of the m ilitary hierarchy who wo uld be an immand direct threat (coup-ma kers) and ha s replaced them with indivw ho are m ore loyal to him pe rsonally and wh o also share his socianom ic, and polit ical view s. So there h ave been som e cha nge s alHe 's sm art en ough of a politician no t to count on prom ises by indivw ho ha ve m ade a coup before. O n the other ha nd, he is not about m antle the m ilitary appa ratus. So wh at he 's done is ma nipulate thtary appa ratus in such a wa y as to crea te personal loyalt ies a m onnew g eneral staff.

Now am ong the polit icians,I think ag ain, the understandings are basealso on pra ctical facts. He ha s provided the m with office s, positiinfluence and prestige . He ha s provided opening s for a va riety of popa rties, etc. And unfortuna tely, as you know, a g ood d ea l of the option, and ac tivity of the politicians, wa s base d on the ir desire for and I think in pa rt , at lea st init ially, it ha s satisfied m ost of the mthe y are not l ikely to g o into op posit ion.I think if the T urkish ag gres-sion co ntinues, it is going to put enorm ous pressures for m ore deaction in which ca se divisions could appe ar tha t underm ine these lobased on the obtaining of political position.

Q . Some people say that this is the first time that a right-wing junta has re-linquished power on its "ow n accord." How does this compare with Por-tugal? Do you think the change would have occurred without the Cyprusdebacle?

A think we ha ve to m ake a distinction; there w as not a hom og ene oustary despite w hat outside observers said. The re w ere various factiwe now know in retrospect. And wha t you had w as a shift from one of the m ili tary to an other w hich app are nt ly wa s mo re responsnational pressures a nd w hich appa rently recognized the political w eof the g overnm ent a nd the threa t to nat ional securi ty. Now ag arigh t-wing in ge nera l vis-a-vis opposition to socialism, com munism,

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kind of sign ificant social leg islation, wa s in a gre em ent, but on othe r there w ere divisions on po litica l issues, on military issues; and, tfore , w he n w e look upon this cha nge i t's not exa ct ly a nove l eventha ve c ase s of intra-m ilitary strugg les, espe cially after a de fea t in a mencounter w here the g ene ral s taff and lea dership is de-prest igized

they lose pre stig e, they ha ve lost the ir rationa le or justifica tion for ras de fende rs of the na t ional pa trimony an d so on. They ha ve los tautho rity and , in this circum stanc e, it is not unusual for young er o for eve n som e se ctors of the officer corps to gain asce ndancy and tpose the ir w ill.

As far as the P ortuguese e vents, I think, there w e ha d a m uch clea revelopm ent of a political and social move m ent am ong the military ofthough the re w as som e disg runtlem ent w ithin the m il itary on purestitutional issues. I t's ve ry clea r that the Ca ptain 's M ove m ent in P oha d very c lose t ies w ith the lef t , and the m ove m ent wh ich ove r tCa etano w as a m ovem ent wh ich in effect w as interested in re-oriethe fore ign policy as w ell as the internal direction of the country in differen t fashion.

Now, how a nd w hat will happen in Gree ce de pends, I think, on a nuof factors. One, wh at happ ens in Cyprus;two, the deg ree of T urkish ag -

gre ssion. I think it's very clea r that som e observers in the U . S. areried that the more Turkey increa ses the pressure, the more the g overdepe nds on popular m obilization, the m ore ra dical the situation is to be. The m ore, in other w ords, the pe ople are being cal led upon fend the ir hom es, their country f rom Turkish a g gre ss ion a nd the you depe nd on the pe ople, the m ore influence the people w ill have osocial and e conom ic goals of the strugg le. I t see m s to m e, that is whhave seen thus far.

On the other hand, the unfor tunate e vents that have taken place ha vthe opposite effec t in Turkey a libera l populist president w ho bega social dem ocrat calling for a w elfare state e nds up in a m ilitary ature and becomes ca ptive now of the most extreme right-w ing expa nm ilitary force in T urkish society, w rapp ing him self up in the flag ang ett ing about the fact of interna l chang e. On the basis of f ig ures wha ve be en publishe d the w ar ha s already cost Turkey $400 m illion.this, of course, will m e an tha t virtually no ne w p rog ram s will be instfor the nex t yea r or tw o. In othe r wo rds , the e ven ts in C yprus haopposite im pa ct in ea ch country. In Gree ce, the y ha ve led to the ege nce of a progressive a nd radical izing populat ion m ore and m ore of the neg ative inf luences of their depe ndency on the U nited S tatethe m anipulation by the S tate D epa rtmen t and the C IA; and in Turkhas led to a grea ter subservience to the United States and a grea ter int ion into the North Atla ntic Tre aty Org an ization.

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l ike C ara m an lis, which is not go ing to restructure radically the mbut m anipulate it to de velop pe rsonal loyalties, to beg in trials ag aiofficers and no t ag ainst others. In othe r words, he n ee ds and wm ilitary a s a support aga inst the left. And his self-assume d positbe the m ediator of the balance , playing off the left ag ainst the m

And in no ca se w ill the re be a thoroug h purg e, although the p ossinot excluded if there deve lops a ma ss m ovem ent in Gree ce am ous political and social pressures that som e individuals will be to trial w ithin I suspe ct, the jurisdiction of the m ilita ry itself. Sono sense w ould it have larg er political and social re pe rcussions. Icould be brough t befo re a m ilitary tribuna l a nd trie d. Th a t 's somwe 'll have to w ai t and see .

Q . As soon as the C yprus issue subsides, the q uestion of a monarchy and aconstitution for Greece will arise. From your knowledge of current socialconditions in Greece, do you think the issue of the monarchy should bedecided by a referendum, by a constitutional assembly, or by some othermanner?

A. I think a refe rendum w ill lead to a clea r repudiation of the m onaIthink it would be a go od pre cede nt, espe cially a re ferend um in wleft is g iven a n opp ortunity to m obilize forces, not the kind of refethat the Brit ish org anized the frauds, the coe rcion, the repre

wh ich the m onarchy obviously had pea sants with bayonets to thego in to vote or where there is a hysteria against communism or anyprogress ive m ovem ent .I th ink in a f ree , c lean a nd ope n referenduw ill be a trem en dous basis for the left not only to raise the quethe re public but a w hole se ries of o ther issues related to p opularTheNew Y ork Timeshad a very succinct com m ent by a G ree k in Atwh om they in terv iew ed. When a sked w hat he thought of the m ohe a nswe red "who nee ds it ."

Q. Some have said that the popular referendum would be more vulnerable tothe paracratic and paramilitary influence than would be the constituentassembly. W hat do you have to say about that?

A. Obviously if the police apparatus that existed in Greece during the late40's, 50's, 60's, and 70's con tinue s, and th is police a ppa ratus conas a n effe ctive instrum en t of politica l control, you w on't ha ve a reend um; you w ill have the kind of election you have in South V iwhe re people a re m arched in and a re hande d a bal lot to throw inIn those circum stance s, the re fere ndum is not rea lly a refere ndukind of pledg ing a lleg iance to a particular reg ime . In those conte xously, one w ould look to an othe r pol it ica l are na to m ake the dand, in that sense, pe rhaps som e kind of constituent body would bsuitable; but ag a in, how w ould tha t const itue nt body be e lecte

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forces w hich forced C ara m anl is to w ithdraw from NATO exis t And the pressures ha ve built up trem end ously for the expulsion obases. Now , the U . S. base s in G ree ce , contrary to a lot of writ inot there to defend the W est ag ainst the Soviet Union; those basset up during a nd a fter the C ivil War to control the politica l and sovelopment of the left in G reece. The Ca rama nlis call for the disma nof the Am erica n base s will only occur if the left is strong e noug h tthe issue. In that case , I think it is ve ry clea r that he w ill be cre atinpropitious conditions for continuing cha ng e in Gre ec e. Tha t, in araises a fur the r quest ion. Doe s C aram anlis w ant m ore radical-s tcha ng es in Gre ece . M y sen se is tha t he doe sn 't . In tha t case, I this g oing to resist to the la st the ex pulsion of Am erican ba ses. I thha ve to kee p in m ind that the e xpuls ion of the U . S. does not d

fo llow from the w ithdraw al f rom NATO ; one does n ot d irec t ly from the othe r. We ha ve to kee p in mind that the f irst w as the repopular pre ssure a nd the second w ill only occur from that. The inwill not come from Ca ram anlis or from his advisers.

Q . You have already alluded to some of the consequences or repercussions ofthe Cyprus conflict upon the domestic Turkish and G reek re-alignmentswith respect to the alliance. Do you foresee other consequences with re-spect to the status of the NA TO alliance in Europe? And furthermore,do you think this will have an impact upon the Warsaw affiance?

A think theNATO alliance wa s put forth imm ediately after World War with the r ising social m ovem ents and the capa city of the United Sorga nize m ili tary a nd po lit ical forces in the se c ountries to followlea de rship. I think with the g row ing com pe tit ion to the U . S. in EItaly, Ge rma ny, France, I think you're se eing eco nom ic divisions foby military a nd politica l rivalries; and , I think, NATO a nd the o rga n

of unified m ilitary force s is toda y in ve ry serious trouble. The fuNATO does not depend on G reece . With detente , the European leve n the soc ia l dem ocra ts no longe r can see the reason or cannvince the ir follow ers to m aintain this m ilitary posture w he n in fais a rapproche m ent with the supposed ene m ies. For reasons of ct ion a nd for reasons of the d etente , NATO is confronting a n umser ious problem s inde pende nt ly of Gree ce . The e m erg ence of pand prog ressive m ovem ents such as in Portuga l , such as in Gre epossibly wh at ca n e m erg e in Fra nce or I ta ly could create m ore dt ies for NAT O .In that case NAT O w hich has been unde rstood historly as a n e ssentially Ame rican instrum ent h as, I think, bee n seriouslened. What I think m ight ha ppe n is the de velopm ent of sub-im perpoles a round the w orld: T urkey, Iran , Brazil, Indonesia, perha psAfrica , which w ill serve a s jum ping-off spots . And rathe r than reorga nizations you'l l ha ve the em erg enc e of these sub-im pe rial iswh ich l ike Bra zil in L atin Ame rica w il l be a l igne d w ith the U . S. aattem pt to act for it in this ne w configuration:

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Q What about the impact on the Warsaw Pact configuration?

A. Th ere a re di fferent problem s the re in som e w ays; in som e w ayssimilar. The detente, I think, has also loosened up some of the ties;though the Russians a re trying to cem ent them throug h their politictacts. Rom ania ha s acted fair ly inde pen dent, as has Yugo slavia foryea rs; i t see m s to m e tha t with the cha ng ing leve ls of consum ption creasing product iv i ty, there ha s been a lso a m ovem ent towa rd grdiversification o f trad e, t rade pa tterns, an d i t is l ikely tha t thesepatterns ma y in fact a l ter the de gre e of polit ical depe ndence . Thlarge secular trends; I don't think there is much e vidence to show ateg ration of the W arsaw P act in the short-run, but I think in the m

run, in the long run, we are going to see a gre ater diversification in Europe a lso.

Q . Som e people say that the Cyprus conflict was K issinger's first majorforeign policy fiasco. D o you agree w ith that? And if so, how do you ac-count for it?

A. No, I think K issing er ha s done a trem end ous job of self-prom otion. Ilook at ea ch of the a rea s in w hich he h as bee n involved , you will sthe success is m ore of a surface phe nom enon. In Vietnam , the w atinues; tens of thousand s of Vietna m ese are killed ; the U . S. continm ilitary and e conom ic support of the South Vietna m ese dictatorshthat, in fact, the w ar con tinues de spite the notion that circulates thsinge r achieved pe ace . Secondly, i f we look at the M iddle E ast , wha s in fact done is arra ng e a te m pora ry cessa tion of hostilities, butsocial, ec onom ic, an d polit ica l problem s that produced the conflilatent and could at any mom ent becom e ope rative. Thirdly, if w e

the cha ng e in Ch ina, you ha ve a gre at dea l of d ip loma t ic and prhe toric circulating about close re lations, but trad e w ith C hina h as crease d substantially and w hat trade ha s occurred ha s overwhe lmingone w ay Ch ina buying f rom the U nited S ta tes ; the U . S . has ciprocated. And this, of course, China will not tolerate. China is notgo ing to deve lop a ny huge t rade -de f ic it wi th the U ni ted S tates ;long-term trade de velopm ents with China are quest ionable . M y sthat wha tever success Kissinger ha s had ha s bee n m ore than offsefailures. And, I think, in the future w e a re g oing to se e m ore fa ilucause K issinge r is an a bsolute ig noram us, as G eorg e B all and othepointed out, whe n he dea ls with internationa l financial matters whrea lly the crunch of the m odern capitalist world.In this area , this persona l,lape lle pulling politics of K issing er is rea lly of no use. Th e internam onetary system is very shaky, econo m ic com pet i tion is grow inscarcity of resources is obvious and a ll of these problem s ca nnot beby a jet-sett ing diplom at. And i t see m s to m e, in this are a, the unanconsensus of the e xpe rts is tha t Kissing er ha sn't even beg un to ap

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the p roblem s let alone lay out any guidelines or solutions.

Q . One q uestion on which you have already touched upon has to do with theGreek-Americans' behavior with regard to the Cyprus conflict. W hat isyour assessment of the recent upsurge of Greek American demonstra-

tions in North America? W ere these demonstrators (and their leader-ship) in the anti-junta movement? Do you see any coalition between anti-junta forces and the recent demonstrators?

A I think those of us wh o g rew up in the 40 's , 50 's , an d 60 's and w athe wa y the Gre ek-Am erican comm unity w as dom inated by reacforces, the wa y Greek Ame ricans w ere recruited by the CIA to go toand do the dirty w ork for the U . S. , the de g ree to w hich the m edi

U. S. sprea d propag anda about the com m unist atrocit ies a nd braina whole ge neration of G reek Ame ricans a nd played up to the suppotues of Ame rican he ge mony in Gree ce a re de lighted by the turn ofTh ere a re a w hole ser ies of m yths tha t ha ve suddenly been shaWh en com m unists resist Turkish a gg ression, whe n the U . S. ope nports the T urkish m ilitary force s displac ing 2 00,000 G ree k Cyprioting 100's of Greek w ome n these practical experiences, much mothe lectures of intel le ctuals , ha d a m uch m ore signif ica nt im pa corient ing G reeks in the U. S. For the f irs t t im e, you ha ve G reek Acans recog niz ing tha t the re la t ionship betwee n Gree ce a nd the Sta tes wa s an unequal one w hich large ly bene f ited the U nited Sthe expe nse of the Gree k people .I lea ve a side the benef i ts to Tom P apas, Ona ssis, and those para sitic-G ree ks w hose on ly relationship tois an e xploita t ive one. Th is recog nition is not a c lear one in eve rthere is a g rea t dea l of chauvinism , of exag g erated na tionalism, a re ject ion of anything that is not Gree k, as i f the G reeks ha d a m oon virtue. We know that has a lwa ys been a n underlying them e, b

sense is tha t th is is not wh at is new and w ha t is promising. Wh atan d prom ising is this crit ica l posit ion, this de tachm en t from thethe rejection of ove rcom pen sation, overassim ilat ion and the a t teadapt by wrapping them selves up in the f lag whichI think tha t SpiroAg new personified but nev er theless ref lected a go od pa r t of wGre ek Am erican com m unity fel t. They thought if they atefeta cheese andsaluted the f lag , the y we re G reek Am ericans . It see m s to m e thsyndrom e is crumbling ; and that w ha t we c an se e possibly is a ctoge ther of left-wing G ree k intel lectuals wh o had bee n al iena ted fG ree k comm unity beca use it wa s so dom inated by rig ht-w ing soccultural orga nizations w ho d efined the polit ics for the G reek com man d pre ve nted the insertion o f crit ica l polit ics; so i t won 't be unusee wh at we saw in Boston: thousands of working class Gre eks mawith left-wing students from the m ajor universities on the ba sis of l ike "NAT O out of Gre ec e," "Cyprus for Cypriots" esse ntiallyg ressive de m ocra tic politics grow ing out of the G ree k comm unity.

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um gm l nri l111=11=1 m== 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 211111===1,111=11=nalk

MS=11111=11111 NM . 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 . 1 .

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 = 1 1 1 11==_. 4. 1=111===la MUN a====. 11 11==Mom=Nom =EwaMN= =Mb=MS =1111si OMNI=nom IIN=121 OM=1111=1111 11.111111 1111=11112=111 =1=11.11.11=1,MIB=111=11 11=11===lt==11 I l in== ==MN=

of=111..

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.=IIII=Sl.

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=11===1111, ..MINIMMI1= = L/1=1-1.5 1 .1 n/1=1111111= 10111111MIll===1 II I1111111=8. =111AIIMMIN/11121161; AIIMOIR =MUM

=1111=1 NWMU =.....11=1=111 M =WM

HM S= , T,- -4.- - 01111==SM=-- . . WES=

to continuation of the w ar by other m ea ns, not conventional w arfare. Msense is that these problem s are not a s ea sily resolved as they are crea tan d I think the position of som e intellec tuals to blam e both sides a nd look for som e utopian solutions, som e kind of m ythical unity of Turkisan d G ree k forces at this tim e, is not possible. I t's not that I am oppos

to it; I favo r unity of Turkish w orkers and G ree k workers in a de m ocra tsocialist republic o f C yprus; obviously, this is the g oa l. But a n im pe riarm y, a colonizing arm y that is succe ssful , bring s w ith i t the support the colonizing pe ople; a nd until the T urkish arm y suffers de fea ts, theis no re alistic possibility of g a ining supp ort from the T urkish po pulatiw ho se e s itself ga ining the fruits, the e cono m ic fruits, of the m ilitary vitory.

"Se lf-Explana tory" by Lurie (NEA, 8/17/74) .

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POLITICS VER SUS IDEOLO GY: THE GREEK CASE*

by George Anastaplo

(Editor's Note: Although Prof. Anastaplo's talk before a Marxist group was given in January,the issues he raises are of general relevance even today. In our subsequent issue, we plan topublish the Marxist group's response to Prof. Anastaplo.)

I.

I suspect there are critical differe nce s betwe en us about how to think of pora ry G ree k affairs. ButI also suspect there ca n be som e a gree me nt betwe eabout how the U nited S tates should respond to the g ove rnm ent in Athedays.

Le t me beg in this evening by ma king som e g ene ral rem arks about whatI think isa se rious difference betwee n us, a difference w hich goe s far beyond out ive opinions a bout G ree k affairs. M y ow n inclina tion is to try to thinthe issues of the day m ore polit ically tha n e conom ically or ideologicall iev e, for insta nce , that there is som ething seriously de ficient in the munderstanding w hich one finds in the typical radical ana lysis of these am ve ry dubious, in othe r wo rds, about the use fulne ss of ide ologica l or aire an alyses of such problem s. Th ey tend to give pe ople the im pressthey understand thing s whe n in fact they are m ere ly imposing upon themdetermined form.

Another problem is that the languag e th is sor t of supposed unders tanusually couche d in ten ds to be m ore v iolen t or comba tive than is consistmy taste. I put it as m ere ly "taste" for the m om ent butI believe it goe s muchdeeper than that. I m en tion this violen t lan g uag e (w hich is ev ident in the

ature your organization has bee n g ood e nough to supply m e) as a serioulem w ith the ideo logical approach to poli tica l m at ters . Am ong the leads to is the lack of ge nerosi ty tow ard one 's oppone nts. It does not seeappre ciated by dog m atists that hone st difference s of opinion must be ein politics, no ma tter w ha t one tries to do.

Your particular approach tends to see things in terms of "history" and of"forces," eco nom ically-ba sed force s prima rily. It is difficult for me to

this is rea l ly the w ay thing s w ork.I

believe the t ruth is m uch ha rder to comby tha n is sugg ested by reliance on "law s of history."

I t m akes a difference in conside ring the issues of the day w he ther onthat the reare law s of history. It make s a difference in the kind of re m edieadv oca tes, in the kind of a pproac h one takes to those issues in any pa

*T his article is an edited version of a talk the author gave in January 1974, in Chicago, Illinois,to a militant Marxist organization (as part of its program on "the Greek situation").

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situation. T o put it a different w ay, I believe that w ha t I ca ll a d octriideological approach d oes not pay due respect to the role of cha nce affa irs. I t can lea d, in de spera tion if for no other re aso n, to ruthlessnsee m s to m e a serious problem , to say nothing of wha t happen s to freehuma n dignity in the process.

P erm it m e to put wha t I have been sa ying in sti ll another w ay. I do noone can properly think about these m atters in term s of such conc eptm asses." "The m asses" is a quite m odern term wh ich ult im atelyseems to cometo us from physics. C onsider w ha t " the m asse s" im plies. It im plies awh ich no long er ha s a rational compon ent to be a ddressed. Such a pubsom ething to be rea soned w ith to som e e xtent but m ere ly som ethim oved by forces, by propag anda , by slog ans. Ideas, as Trotsky put wh ere , are the sm all cha ng e of objective interests. He evide ntly did nothem some thing to be thought a bout on their own term s.

All this points to the unde rlying problem w ith the ideological approa cbeen sketching and that is the problem of w hat the na ture of humanstanding is . To w ha t extent can one r ise a bove one 's c lass , to w ha t exone stand o utside one 's pa rt icular intere st? I suppose- the pe rennial problemone h as to dea l with is the problem ofnature wh at i t is, wha t huma n na tureis and w ha t the highe st activity which is called for by na ture.

I wo uld po int, as a contribution to the solution o f the p roblem of na tureancient opinion that the h ighest hum an a ctivity is som eho w involved instan ding, not in ac tion. But is not sound understanding ult im ate ly depupon the proposit ion tha tideas do m atter, that they are not me rely the em antions of "objective interests"?

II.

I hope I can now show that wha t I have said thus far ma y have somethinw ith h ow one looks at " the G ree k situation" toda y. For one thing , I bevery easy to underest ima te the role of chance in what has ha ppene d inthe p ast ten yea rs. I t is a lso ve ry ea sy to unde rest im ate the role of bam ent on the part of a l l the m en w ho w ere in responsible posit ions durperiod me n who w ere conservatives, men w ho we re liberals , me n whowh at is called the L eft and me n wh o we re of wha t is called the R ight.

Indee d, the colonels ' coup of April 1967 see m s to m e som ething w hiplace in large par t beca use of the fa i lure of v i rtual ly eve ry ma jor gG ree ce w hich ha d ha d a pa rt to play in the constitut iona l crisis leadinthat coup. C onditions ha d been a l low edto deteriorate in such a wa y as seriouly to disturb the sta bility of the co untry a nd to frig hte n pe ople , the rebm iffing se lf-see king a nd ruthless Arm y officers to ma ke the m ove w hi

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had long wa nted to ma ke and w ere a lwa ys looking for an opportunity tI believe that w he n one puts one's ana lysis this wa y, oneis talking about po liti-cal deve lopme nts: one is em pha sizing individuals who did this rathe r tone is talking about the role of m istakes a nd of m oral failings. One is no

about broad m ove m ents in history.Now, onecan th ink about Gree ce in term s of broad his tor ical m ovem eassure you that such mov em ents are far more p rofound than those w hta lks about w he n the s tock radical analyses a re re lied upon. Indeed , problem in Gree ce is to decide w he re to beg in in t rying to unde rs tacountry an d i ts pe ople. I t is plausible to sugg est that one should beg iFifteenth C entury, with the occupat ion of G ree k-speaking lands by thefor the ne xt four hundred yea rs . Th e results of tha t occupat ion re m aG ree ce to this day. This is not an irreleva nt considera t ion a nd ha s somto do wi th w ha t is know n as the G reek tem pera m ent . I t has som ethinas w ell with certain contem porary Gree k problem s.

Indee d, one ca n g o back much further to show you how unrea listic I about th is one can eve n say tha t " the Gree k prob lem " bega n in thC en tury B.C. wh en A lcibiad es fa iled to lea d Athe ns to the conque st of Sconquest w hich would have see n Gree ce a ssum ing the role R om e later

the M editerrane an. Have not Gree ks "always" suffered from ha ving bee nthe pree m inence to wh ich the y are "entit led"?

Th ese spe culations are , I m ust say, m ore intere sting in some wa ys than notions about " the m asses" and " laws of history" and they see m to mde epe r into wha t hum an e nde avo rs are al l about . Th ey bring in not onnom ic but also po litical and re ligious conside rations.

If one comes to modem times one has, of course, the Greek Revolution of182 1. Tha t revolut ion cont inued for a h undred yea rs , in the sense thaw ere , a ce ntury late r, lands stil l being a dde d to Gre ec e. In fac t, that revcan be thought of as continuing dow n to our time with certain Gree k-spland s yet to be ad ded, in the view of some G ree ks . Th at is , th ing s harea l ly been set t led yet and the problem is whe n ( if eve r) the y will be sWha t will cause the m to be se ttled?

Now if one looks at the situa tion toda y, one a lso ha s to say tha t it is hknow w he ther or how things ha ve bee n settled, eve n on a da y-to-day bavery hard to know w hat is going on at this very mom ent in Greece . Who in charg e? The re have been, I ga ther from w hat one ca n hea r outside tht ry, two p r incipal contend ers for control of Gree ce s ince the Nove mrevolution or coup d 'etat or w ha tever o ne calls that uprising of s ix we ekThe re is a g ene ral who is a m ore or less s traightforward Army ma n, mo

ve ntional, less flam boyant, less ideo logical (I take it) than the colonels. H

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P resident of the country, and he nce a t lea st the nom inal leade r of G re

Th en the re i s in the background a colonel in refer r ing to the se "colonels ," I refe r to the ra nk the y had a t the t im e the last leg itima tm ent in G ree ce g ave them a rank. Th is colonel is evident ly not a mtrifled w ith. He is from the reports I ha ve h ad, w hich I have rea son tan Arm y officer w ho ha s bee n very much involved in the torture w hicha ve be en subjecte d to since 1967. He is some thing of a tyrant.

Which of these two m en w ill control Gre ece in the imm ediate future rbe see n. O f course, if anyone h ere knows, he can d o us a service by t

IV.

M y own position as to how the U nited Sta tes should conduct itself towa rdm ay be found in a letter of mine w hich ha s been rece ntly published ine w spa pe rs in this country. (An ea rlier, shorter form of it w as publishNew Y ork Times of De cem ber 7 , 1973 .) I will now read the expa nded vof that le t ter (wh ich w as repr in ted in the D ece m ber 26 i ssue of theCongres-sional Record) as the be st statem ent of my current understanding w ith to imm ediate a ction:

The crisis which has toppled the bloody Papadopoulos dictatorship inAthens ca nnot be resolved, or eve n sm othered , by recourse to s t ilm ilitary s trongm an, e special ly one w ith so m uch rece nt expe rience iof his fellow citizens. This crisis is rooted in the incom pe tence an d aof colone ls w ho ca nnot be e xpec ted to handle intelligen tly the com pand e conom ic problem s of Gree ce. Such usurpers cannot enl ist the nservice s and g ood w ill of the better professiona ls, politician s and m ilice rs of that country for the g rea t work of reconc iliat ion a nd a usteri tGreece so desperately needs.

"The shor ts igh ted ro le p layed by our gove rnm ent s ince the colontook over in 1967 ha s a lrea dy (and pe rhaps eve n perm ane ntly) com pin the eyes o f the rese ntful Gree k people, our leg itima te interests in ttry and he nce in the M iddle E ast . Am ong our mistakes of the pa st six been tha t of publicly backing the w rong m en in G ree ce. I ha ve founvisi ts at the S tate D epa rtm ent a nd the P entag on during this period, thaicy-ma kers have been rem arkably unequipped to consider se r iously t

range consequence s of the policies they we re pursuing."We should, before st il l ano ther dictator beco m es co nsolidated in

try to rede em some wh at our good na m e by using our rem aining inf lGree ce a nd NATO to help the Gree k people recove r control of theirfairs . T his can best be done , i t see m s to m e, by vigoro usly enco uracolonels to step a side for Constantine K ara ma nlis, the m an w hose pre

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forme r conserva tive prime m inister still recom m ende d him to the G ree kas the best way to avoid the e ven bloodier crises w hich now threaten thetry.

"Gree ce m ay be the only country in the w orld today whe re the gpopular alterna tive to dom estic tyranny is so m ode rate a nd so expe ripolitician as M r. K ara m anlis. Wha t more ca n the G ree ks or the U nitehope for? D are w e or they risk furthe r deterioration in Gree ce a nd incan -G ree k relations? Everyone sh ould rea lize by now tha t phony consand fake e lections cannot w ork in G reece today."

V.

Le t me m ake two observations about w ha t I say in this let ter. O ne haw ith w ha t I hav e re ferred to as the "leg itimate interests" of the U nited G reece and in the M editerrane an. I take i t that you and I w ould probabsom e difference of opinion as to w ha t are in fact leg itimate Am erican iin various parts of the w orld. I can sugg est w ha t ma y be a t the rootdifferen ce betwe en us by m aking one simple com m ent, and that has to the prope r role of the U nited States w ith respe ct to such a country asT ha t is to say, the position m an y of your group take tow a rd Israe l is,menta lly, wh at I wo uld call "ung ene rous."

Th e other observation I have to m ake about wh at I say in m y Dece m beletter is that the ca uses of the Nove m ber troubles in Gre ece w ere q uitTh e colonelsare incom petent. Th ey had show n them selves incom petent to the troubles with the students in Novem ber. Students we re, for the m oex pressing resen tme nts which we re not lim ited to just the studen t poof the country. Indeed, one had begun to hea r eve n from returning Ame ricans, who ha d up to a yea r ag o been m ore or less favora bly incthe reg ime in Athens, complaints about the colonels' reg ime . O ne comwa s that "they ha ve stayed too long ." Wha tever plausibility there had the colone ls restoring a ce rtain kind of order ha d beg un to va nish. In aGre ek-Am ericans returning to this country com plained tha t inflation come very serious in Greece .

Both of the deve lopm ents com plained about were , I believe , intrinsiG ree k situa tion from the be ginning of m ilitary rule in Ap ril 1967. Anwh o saw the colone ls in 1967 should have rea lize d that they intende das long as the y could an d w ould stay there the rest of their lives if them ana ge that. Th e inflation of which eve ryone spe aks now is directly rethe dem ag og ic course the colonels have pursued all along. It wa s quitefrom various econom ists one talked with over the yea rs (conservative ecoliberal econom ists, it didn't m atte r), tha t the colone ls we re ca llously m orthe future in order to ha ve a n imm ediate popular e ffect and the fualready caught up with them .

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V I.

The nee d today, among f riends of the Gree k people , is fo r a com m obuilt around the a g reem ent thatthe crowd now in Athens should not be pe r-m itted to stay, tha t the support g iven tha t crow d by the U nited S tatetainly imp rope r, that that support is harm ful to both G ree ks an d Am eand that there should be se rious efforts to ma ke this clea r to those in Wton wh o m ay be in a position to do som ething a bout it .

But I w ant to em pha size that the principal consideration here is a pruone, the k ind of prudence w hich is invoked in the D eclara t ion of Indence , whe re prudence is he ld up a s a limiting considerat ion in decidirevolutions ag ainst i lleg itima te re gim es. I do not be lieve it prudent to

terms of revolutionary "ma ss move m ents" in G reece for such an aw ould, in e ffect , sac rif ice G ree k lives to our de lusions a nd o ur the atcl ina t ions. We m ust take ca re lest we s t ir up t rouble w hich the G reehave to live with for a ve ry long tim e.

O ne re ason the colonels hav e bee n able to s tay in powe r so long w ithsupport as they have ha d is that m ost Gree ks sim ply do not w an t civibrea k out ag ain. Th at is , they simply are not going to go back, if the y sibly help it , to wha t happe ned to the m betwee n 1945 an d 1949. We shca reful not to push the m in that direction. All this, I believe , one ha s in m ind in thinking about* wha t the G ree ks m ay do and w ha t we shouldthem to do.

One he ars argume ntspro andcon about Ame rica n interve ntion in the a ffairsother countr ies . I am w il ling to see Am erican in tervent ion in G ree"intervention" one m ea ns m aking ce rta in things "perfect ly c lea r." Wem ake i t clear that the U nited States w ill not continue to support the go v

in Athens; we should m ake it clea r wha t we co nsider our leg itima te inteduties in that part of the w orld to be; a nd w e should ma ke i t c lear thaintend that the G reek pe ople should resume control of the ir ow n a ffairs

VII.

But we sh ould ha ve no i llusion that once the G reek pe ople do resumeof their own a ffairs the y will do much better than they ha ve done beforthat m atter, eve n as w ell as we do in this troubled country. Th at is to should ha ve no illusion tha t thereis a final solution to the problem s of a ny peple.

Th is takes us back to m y opening rem arks of this eve ning. I believe theof politics to be such that it is dang ero us and re ckless a nd, in some w ayless to proce ed in the fai th tha t the re is inde ed a f inal solut ion, an d

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state of a ffairs, which a peo ple w ill surely rea ch by resolutely follow ing at icular prog ram . One t ries to m ake th ings bet ter. One real izes that w haone doe s w ill a lmo st certainly require furthe r im provem ent, that there wfalling back as w ell as mo ving forw ard. This is, I have observed, the na tuhuman affairs and no ideology can perma nent ly change that, however lma y conceal i t from view.

"1974 Iw o Jima in C yprus" by SkoulasA pogevmatini, 8/16/74).

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CYPRUS-JULY 1974; OR ACHE SON'S FAILURE, K ISSINGE R'S SUCCE SSV an Coufoudakis

Te n years after Ache son's abortive at tem pt to terminate C ypriot indepe

the basic objectives of his plan ha ve m et w ith success following the oveM akarios by the G ree k junta a nd the subsequen t inva sion a nd occupaNorthern Cyprus by the T urkish Arm y. D espite official de nials that the Uinvolved in th is las t sequen ce o f t rag ic e ven ts on Cyprus and the cim part ial ity towa rd G ree ce and Turkey during their confrontat ion ove ri t will be show n that the U.S. since 1963 ha s been actively involved inaffa ir s and tha t under Am er ican a usp ices w e a re now faced w ith a pa rtition o f C yprus.

W hy is the U .S. Interested in Cyprus

Since the collapse of the F irst Cypriot Re public, Ame rican policy ma kbeen interested in Cyprus for num erous rea sons forem ost am ong wh ichTh e fac t tha t Cyprus has contributed to the w ea kening of NATO 's S and h as brough t two m em bers of the a lliance to the ve rge o f wa r; (b) Thproblem has undermined Ame rican security policies in the M iddle Ea stBa lkan s and ha s upset the ca refully constructed po st-Civil Wa r Gre ek p

system ; (c) The abili ty of the US SR and AK EL (Cypriot Com m unist Pcapitalize on this inter-allied a nd intercom m unal dispute; (d) Th e neceUNFICY P o n Cyprus has created a financial burden on the UN and a proissue for the E astern bloc and the T hird World states; (e) Th e fa ct tha t Mdom e stic politica l base (w hich include d AK EL ) a nd his diplom atic suppFrance , the U SS R, Third World) offende d Wa shing ton; and ( f ) M aopposition to the pre sence of NATO bases a nd the use of C yprus by the its security policies in the M iddle E ast an d the Ea stern M editerrane an. TU.S. sought to neutralize Makarios' "political action capability," and thisbecam e a prima ry U.S. objective with the grow th of the US SR p resencare a; the loss of U.S. base r ights in the M editerrane an , the r ise of MM alta; the continuing Arab-Israeli crisis; the increa sed conce rn a bout pof oil supply routes a nd the p rospects of a reope ned S uez Ca nal.

Finally i t should be sa id tha t over the last de cad e Am erican n ational burea ucrats attem pted to pursue these intere sts w ithout any considerathe intere sts of the m ajority of the C ypriot population.

A n Ou tline of U.S. Policies Tow ard Cyprus

Ov er the past deca de U .S. policies towa rd Cyprus have m oved a t two levthe "p rac tica l," involved a tte m pts desig ne d to curb the p ossibility of betwee n Gree ce an d Turkey and lessen the leve l of violence on C ypruspolicies we re m otivated by concern for NATO 's cohesion and the fea r

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U SSR and AK EL could bene fit from the problem . In the sam e spiri t thesupported m ate rial ly the establishm en t of U NFICY P ; publicly supporteintercom m unal neg otiations in Cyprus and the efforts of UN m ediators oisla nd; and ple dg ed support to the islan d's indepe nde nce a nd territorial in

under the g overnm ent of Archbishop M aka rios.1

But it is the othe r lev el , the "ide al ," that ha s dom inated U .S. foreign ptowa rd Cyprus ove r the last deca de. The policies pursued in this categ ory to resolve the Cyprus dispute along the lines of the previously stated U.S.interests, and spe cifica lly to (a) curb C ypriot inde pe nde nce , an d term inapossible; (b) eliminate Makarios' "political action capability" whether byoverthrowing him, threatening him, supporting his rivals, or ultimatelyassa ssinating h im; an d (c) satisfy Turkish na tionalist objectives in Cyprus.

NA TO Peacekeeping and M ediation

The U.S. along the l ines of i ts Cold Wa r diploma cy at tem pted to preem ptUN role on the Cyprus problem by the introduction of NAT O in the disTh us, in the a fterm ath of the a bortive Lond on C onferen ce of Jan uary 15the U .S. along w ith Bri tain at tem pted to expa nd the Bri tish pea cekee pingthrough a NATO pea cekee ping force a nd a m ediator to seek a set tlem ent

the a lliance fram ew ork and objectives.D espite the he avy pressure exe rted on M akarios by G eorge Ball to acceplan and the threa ts of Ge nera l Le m ni tzer the p lan w as abor ted by Cydiplom atic m ane uver ing , Sovie t wa rning s to NATO ag ainst in terferenCyprus, and Franco-German unwillingness to get involved in thisAng lo-Ame rican e nterprise that would have to be im posed on the C ypriots

The A cheson Plan July-August 1964

The Cypriot ability to influence the policy of the Greek government andrejection of NATO 's peac em aking efforts increase d the fears of Americanmakers. By the spring of 1964 official Washington became increasinglyconvinced that M akarios wa s turning C yprus into a "Me diterran ea n Cuba.the task of perm ane ntly resolving the C ypriot problem now fell in the haGe orge W . Ball and D ea n Acheson. The latter me t with representatives of Gand T urkey in Ge nev a in the absence of the C ypriots.

The fundam enta l p rem ise of the Ache son p lan w as tha t continued C yindepe nde nce w as a threat to U.S. in teres ts . As a re sult Acheson a imterminate Cypriot sovereignty throug henosis of Cyprus to G ree ce ; territorialcom pen sation by Gre ece to Turkey; a Turkish m ilitary prese nce on the islabases to be leased to Turkey in pe rpetuity in NE Cyprus; and the e stablishof a utonom ous Turkish ca ntons on C yprus.

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Thus Acheson expected that the Greek dream of enosis would be fulfilled; thatTurkish security interests could be protected; that Makarios would be removed;and that AKEL influence would be curbed by Greece, in the same way thatpost-war Greek governments had curbed left-wing influence in Greece itself.Under this plan the sovereignty of Cyprus would be terminated by a unilateral

declaration of enosis by Greece, and through a secret NATO protocol, drawn upin advance, Greece would request the CIC of NATO to determine on the groundsof strategic necessity the extent of bases to b